FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES
Department of Political Science
The contribution of terrorism to
the securitization of migration
A discourse analysis of the political debate on
migration in Belgium after the Brussels attacks
Janna Schellens
Name: Janna Schellens Student number: 11181478 Date: 27-01-2017 Research Project: Global Migration Assignment: Thesis Supervisor: Dr. J.M.J. (Jeroen) Doomernik Word count: approx. 14500
INTRODUCTION ... 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 6 SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION ... 6 Securitization theory ... 7 Securitization within the field of migration ... 8 Securitization in Europe after 9/11 ... 12
ANTI-IMMIGRATION PARTIES AND THE ‘CONTAGION EFFECT’ ... 14
FOUCAULDIAN DISCOURSE THEORY ... 16 CASE: BELGIUM ... 19 BELGIUM’S POLITICAL LANDSCAPE ... 19
MIGRATION POLICY THROUGHOUT BELGIUM’S HISTORY ... 20
BRUSSELS ATTACKS ... 23
METHOD ... 24
RESEARCH QUESTION & HYPOTHESES ... 24
RESEARCH MATERIAL ... 25 RESEARCH METHOD ... 26 CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON METHODS USED ... 27 RESULTS ... 28 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ... 28 First parliamentary debate ... 28 Parliamentary debates following 24th of March ... 30 WEBSITES POLITICAL PARTIES ... 34 Vlaams Belang ... 34 N-VA ... 36 PP ... 38 CONCLUSION ... 40 DISCUSSION ... 43
INTRODUCTION
“In Europe today it is forbidden to speak the truth…It is forbidden to say that today we are not witnessing the arrival of refugees, but a Europe being threatened by mass migration…It is forbidden to say that immigration brings crime and terrorism to our countries.”
- Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in a speech on 15 March 2016
This quote by Victor Orbán is very significant today as a sign of the securitization of migration, its connection to terrorism and the apparent lack of states to control this threat. The concepts of threat and security have broadened increasingly and migration has been more and more referred to as a risk to the Western, liberal world. Assertions such as these have been made not only by right wing, populist politicians, but also by international organisations, academics and journalists (Ibrahim, 2005). In its development report in 2002, the United Nations has even categorized migration as a threat, amongst issues such as narcotic production and trafficking, international terrorism and environmental degradation (UNDP, 2002). The legitimization of such a discourse by an organisation such as the UN, which is associated with liberality and humanitarianism, is very powerful and speaks to a wide audience. Whereas migration was seen before as imperative to capitalist expansion, it now is perceived as a threat that should be managed properly (Ibrahim, 2005).
Next to cultural and economical threats, more recently, the threat of terrorism has been related to migration. Especially in the United States after 9/11, the discussion of the issue of (counter-)terrorism has been related increasingly to immigration. In Europe, however, studies show that this effect has been much smaller (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008; Boswell, 2007). In this thesis, I aim to investigate in what way the terrorist attacks in Brussels, that took place on March 22th, have affected the political discourse on migration in Belgium. The focus is on how and in what instances politicians draw on references to terrorism or the threat thereof to promote certain migration policies.
This research will investigate how and in what instances Belgian politicians draw on references to terrorism in their strategies of defending and challenging certain
migration policies. It will be set in the background of two theories that can be categorised as social constructivist. First we discuss Securitization theory, based primarily on the writings of Waever and Buzan and the research on securitization of migration by Jef Huysmans. Securitization Theory, as developed by the Copenhagen School, has been one of the most frequently used theoretical lenses for analysing framing in security terms. The Copenhagen School, originally consisting of scholars like Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, introduced the concept of ‘speech acts’ to Political Science research. Speech acts are essential to the ‘linguistic approach’ of Securitization Theory. These acts do not necessarily require the use of the word ‘security’, as Buzan et al. argue, saying ‘defense’ also implicitly says security and priority (Pavel, 2016). This linguistic approach and its focus on speech acts is closely linked to the method used in this thesis. The research will consist of a discourse analysis based on Michel Foucault’s theory of
discourse and power (Ibrahim, 2005). Based on a framework of theory on the
securitization of migration, which can be examined as a discourse through which relations of power are exercised, Foucault also asserts that it is “truth that makes laws, that produce the true discourse which, at least partially, decides, transmits and itself extends upon the effects of power”. This means that government policies and laws are an outcome of discourse, and reaffirm discourse (Foucault, 1980). However, we keep in mind that there might be a distinction between discourse and policy on the matter. Since this thesis is written only half a year after the Brussels bombings, and it takes a while for policy to be implemented, the focus here will be on discourse and policy proposals, rather than on policy changes.
There has been compelling evidence suggesting that elite attitudes and public opinion toward immigration are largely influenced by perceptions of threat. Studies show that individuals are less likely to support liberal immigration policies when they perceive a threat to the physical or national security (Lahav & Courtemanche, 2011). This perception of threat might increase because of repeated messages thereof. Also Huysmans (2000) argues that directly or indirectly, supporting strategies of securitization makes the inclusion of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees in European societies more difficult (Huysmans, 2000). This thesis is thus also based on the premise that the dominant discourses shape people’s opinions.
First the theoretical framework, comprising of securitization theory and discourse theory, will be discussed. After this, there will be a discussion of anti-immigration, populist political parties and the effect they might have on the whole political spectrum. More specifically, the contagion effect will be described. After this, the Belgian political landscape and its migration policy throughout history will be set out. Here, the focus is on the recent refugee crisis and the main Flemish anti-immigration party. The context of the attacks in Brussels will be touched upon briefly as well. After this follows a discussion of the used methods and material for this research. The results of the discourse analysis will be elaborately discussed and compared to the literature presented above. At the end of this thesis there will be some concluding remarks and a discussion about the relevance and shortcomings of the research.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Securitization theory and discourse theory have been chosen to serve as the theoretical framework for this thesis. What these theories have in common is that they can all be classified in the category of social constructivism. Social constructivism is an umbrella theory that has several sub-theories, some of which will be used in this thesis and will be described below. Ontologically, it takes off from the assumption that reality is constituted in and through discourse (Hay, 2002: 199 in Lebedeva, 2014). This means that reality is a product from social construction and not a objective fact independent of our understanding (Hay, 2002: 24 in Lebedeva, 2014). Because of this, epistemologically, in order to analyse reality, we have to study these constructions, meanings, perceptions and understandings (Lebedeva, 2014).
The theory on anti-immigration parties and the contagion effect is also used as a framework to make certain predictions from the results of the analysis. This adds to the relevance of this research. Securitization of migration As pointed out earlier, securitization studies can be categorized as a sub-school of social constructivism. It is an approach to the study of security that is based on the assumption that the world is socially constructed, which consequently, also means that threats cannot be considered objectively ‘real’ or not (Lebedeva, 2014). The assumption is that threats or insecurities are politically and technologically constructed. This means the existence of these insecurities depend on the political, social and economic contexts in which they are contested. Consequently, the meaning of threat and insecurity is always a question, instead of a given (Huysmans & Tsoukala, 2008). What should be studied then, is the process through which certain issues become recognised as a security threat through social construction (Lebedeva, 2014).
Securitization theory
The theoretical framework for this research consists of the field of securitization studies, as developed by the Copenhagen School. It has been one of the most frequently used theoretical lenses for analysing framing in security terms. Its main scholars are Buzan, Waever and De Wilde. According to Waever, securitization occurs when the state declares measures meant to stop the advancement of threat (Waever, 1995). Securitization is thus the process where something is introduced as an existential threat. This causes the legitimization of any extraordinary measures to oppose this threat, even if these measures contradict the norms of the normal political sphere (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998). They introduced the concept of ‘speech acts’ to Political Science research. Speech acts are essential to the ‘linguistic approach’ of Securitization Theory. A speech act represents a performative statement that possesses the capability of changing the social reality it describes. However, a securitizing speech act does not necessarily lead to the securitization of an issue. Instead, and issue gets securitized when an audience responds to the securitizing act. This means that the audience perceives the issue as an existential threat and there is consensus on the acceptance of this threat. Once this happens, and the audience supports countermeasures to the threat, it will be justified to overstep the parameters of normal politics (Pavel, 2016). Waever argues that, in order to find out whether some issue is securitized or not, textual analysis is very useful. For this study it is important to achieve an understanding of the processes through which a shared understanding is created of what is to be considered a threat and how to respond to it (Lebedeva, 2014). When something is introduced as a threat it is placed above other issues and the gravity of the threat gets highlighted. Buzan agrees that analysis of political discourse is the best approach to study securitization. The emphasis in this research will thus be on the securitization of discourse on migration. This focus on discursive elements, which is the core of the Copenhagen School has been criticised by Bigo. Bigo states that, in the case of migration, it are the non-discursive practices that represent the core of the securitization process. Such non-discursive practices are security-oriented technologies, the presence of security professionals and surveillance systems (Bigo, 2002). In this particular research however, we limit ourselves to the discursive elements, as described in the Copenhagen
School. The reason for this is that the terrorist attack in Brussels is a relatively recent event. Not yet a year has passed since the event occurred. Keeping in mind that it takes a long time to implement policies, it might be more useful to analyse those non-discursive elements when more time has passed. However, we take context into consideration. Besides analysing what has been said, the speech acts will be placed in their context. This means that I will look at who performs the speech act, who it is they are representing and with which outcome. Securitization within the field of migration
In 1993, Myron Weiner published his work ‘International Migration and Security’, making him one of the first to stress the importance of the nexus between migration and security. At the end of the Cold War, Western Europe experienced the emergence of so-called new security studies, which considered migration to be a security issue. At the same time, many western states have started securitizing their migration policies (International Migration Review, 2002).
However, migration has not always been linked to threat. On the contrary, migration has been viewed in the past as the mediating factor for the development of capitalism. In the 1950’s and 1960’s, immigrants came to western European countries as a cheap and flexible workforce, fulfilling the need of the labour markets. During that period, the legal status of these immigrants was not yet politically sensitive or relevant to domestic needs. In the late 1960’s and 1970’s, immigration increasingly became a topic of public concern. Where immigration policy was quite permissive before, it became more control-oriented and restrictive. This did not radically change the understanding of immigrants itself, however, since this change was caused by changes in the labour market. The migrant was still considered as a guest worker. However, public awareness of the immigrant population increased and political rhetoric started connecting migration to the destabilization of public order. Migration was considered mainly in the context of social and economic rights, however, since the mid-1980’s it became increasingly politicized. This happened because of the confusion between immigration
in the EU (Ibrahim, 2005). Since the 1980’s, references to the destabilizing effects of migration within its political construction increased. The focus was on domestic integration and the dangers to the public order. Migration has since then been presented as a threat to the cultural identity, the labour market, etc. In other words, it has been constructed as a security question that endangers the “good life” in west European societies (Huysmans, 2000).
The transformation of the concept of security has taken place alongside the expansion of the capitalist market system into a global market system. During the Cold War, issues such as migration were approached in terms of realpolitik, meaning that concerns were contemplated in realist terms. This raised questions such as whether, for example, the reception of refugees could possibly be seen as a hostile act by other states. The United States, for instance, was very generous in its asylum admission toward refugees from communist states, in order to discredit and humiliate hostile regimes (Avdan, 2014). After the Cold War, however, the nature of the market became increasingly globalized. With that, a redefinition of the concept of security and consequently a broadening of security issues has taken place. The focus of the state shifted more to the individual. Instead of viewing security as concerned with “individuals qua citizens”, that is concerned with their states, security came to be viewed as concerned with “individuals qua persons”. In this redefined concept of security, the human subject takes centre stage and the focus is increasingly on human security instead of human rights. This human security approach is mainly concerned with potential vulnerabilities and threats to populations (Ibrahim, 2005). The main feature of this new security context is that threats can be carried on the backs of individuals. This means that threats can cross borders and cause devastation that was previously reserved for states’ armies (Avdan, 2014).
Huysmans concludes in his study that security discourses and technologies penetrated the European migration policy. The best example thereof is the 1990 Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, which connects immigration and asylum with terrorism, transnational crime and border control. This puts migration in the same institutional framework that deals with the protection of internal security. Even though this security discourse and policy is often presented as an inevitable
response the “problem” of migration, these security practices also affect social relations. They affect the way in which migration is rendered problematic and dangerous, as immigrants and refugees are framed as a security problem. It mediates the categorisation and differentiation between “them” and “us” by identifying “them” as the ones that are a threat to the survival of “us”. As migration is seen as one of the main factors weakening national tradition and societal homogeneity, it leads to the exclusion of migrants from the normal fabric of society. Migrants become not just aliens, but aliens who are a danger to the reproduction of the social fabric (Huysmans, 2000).
This securitization of migration is, according to Huysmans, based on three related themes: internal security, cultural security and the crisis of the welfare state (Huysmans, 2000). Research shows that citizens most commonly feel threatened by immigrants in two different ways: they may be perceived as a threat in terms of competition for scarce resources such as jobs. Secondly they may be perceived as a threat to the host country’s dominant culture (Schmuck & Matthes, 2005). When immigration is considered as a threat to society, it is most commonly in reference to how this immigration will transform the identity of the host country. Buzan states:
…the threat of migration is fundamentally a question of how relative numbers interact with the absorptive and adaptive capacities of society [.] This threat works on the societal level when the incoming population is of a different
cultural or ethnic stock from those already resident. It is amplified when migrants seek to maintain their identity rather than adapting to that prevailing in their adopted country (Buzan, 1993)
According to Huysmans (2000), this link between migration and insecurity “sustains a radical political strategy aimed at excluding particular categories of people by reifying them as danger”. This securitization of migration does not only take place in extreme right, populist parties. It includes multiple actors, such as national governments, grass roots organisations, European transnational police networks, the media, etc. (Huysmans, 2000). Central American child refugees in the United States, for example, were described in the media through metaphors using an influx of dangerous waters. Words such as ‘flood’, ‘surge’, ‘tidal wave’ or ‘deluge’ were commonly used. Also Donald Tusk, the president of the European Council, has described the refugees entering Europe as a
‘great tide’ that has ‘flooded into Europe’ that needs to be ‘stemmed and managed’ (Nail, 2016).
The migration-security connection was also shaped significantly by the enlargement of the European Union and its integration processes. In 1980, internal border controls within the EU were abolished. After that, harmonization effort took off with the Amsterdam treaty of 1997 that established the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice. This was a sign of a shift towards centralised decision making under the authority of the European Commission. This harmonization was desirable for governments, as they wanted to prevent ‘asylum shopping’. However, this process of convergence has been hindered by the unwillingness of less popular asylum countries to share the burden. Consequently, there has not been a development of a unified asylum regime in Europe. Rather, we can witness many country-specific legislative changes in admissions and integration procedures (Avdan, 2014). This securitization of migration has been cemented by fears that immigrants might be associated to terrorist activities or support them. With the link between migration and threat already in place, fears of terrorism, especially in the wake of September 11th, have strengthened this discourse (Huysmans, 2000). The central thesis is thus that immigration has increasingly been portrayed as a threat, and that it has become the ‘new focus for insecurity’ (Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup & Lemaitre, 1993). The discourse used is performative in nature, meaning that it contributes to the reconfiguration of social and political alignments. In practice that means that this discourse justifies a number of policies concerning migration control, that would otherwise not have been considered legitimate (Boswell, 2007). Research also shows that mass-mediated stereotypes may have damaging effects on democracy and integration (Schmuck & Matthes, 2005). Huysmans argues that directly or indirectly, supporting securitization strategies makes the inclusion of immigrants and refugees more difficult. It also affects the chances of promoting multicultural policies based on solidarity and human rights, separate from cultural identity (Huysmans 2000).
Securitization in Europe after 9/11
It has been argued that 9/11 opened up opportunities for the securitization of migration (Zucconi, 2004). It has portrayed an exceptional and global threat to Western states and consequently catapulted the terrorism-migration nexus into the global limelight (Avdan, 2014). In the language of critical security studies, it has provided discursive opportunities to correlate terrorism with migration. Through that, it has helped legitimize certain practices and technologies in migration control that were before used only in emergencies. So the common perception is that the threat of terrorism provided a pretext for a stricter form of migration control. Boswell argues that even though there have been instances where this is the case, such as more restrictive provisions on asylum-seekers in some European countries, in general there is little evidence of a securitization of migration in Europe through explicitly linking irregular migrants to terrorism. According to Boswell public debates on migration in Europe have remained relatively unaffected by the counter-terrorism agenda. He adds to this that, contrary to predictions of the critical security school, counter-terrorism practices have not been employed for migration control purposes. Rather, it is the other way around. Migration policy practices have been exploited for counter-terrorism purposes (Boswell, 2007).
Boswell argues that in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, there have been attempts to connect the threat of terrorism with migration control policies. However, this linkage became difficult to sustain and from late 2001 onwards there have barely been any references to terrorism in debates on migration in Europe. The fact that politicians and media did not exploit these security concerns about terrorism to achieve more support and a more restrictive migration policy seems contradictory to the securitization thesis. According to Boswell (2007), one possible explanation for this is the mismatch of the profile of international terrorists that emerged after 9/11 and that of the irregular migrant in Europe. Al-Qaeda terrorists were depicted as single-minded fanatics who didn’t care much about the welfare or employment benefits that some European states might have to offer. Also, any discursive opportunities to link migrants and terrorists were blocked by the growing body of information on the profile of the European Muslims involved in terrorist attacks (Boswell, 2007).
This view that the 9/11 attacks did not lead to more securitization in Europe is shared by Huysmans and Buonfino (2008), who have analysed parliamentary debates in the UK in which politicians related migration or asylum to (counter-)terrorism. They argue, much like Boswell (2007), that right after 9/11 (autumn 2001) migration was very visible in the justification and contestation of counter-terrorism. However, from 2002 onwards, the issue of migration has been less prominently raised in relation to counter-terrorism (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008). In relation to the other terrorist attacks such as those in London (July 2005) and in Madrid (March 2004), Huysmans, Buonfino and Boswell also conclude that the nexus between migration and terrorism is not as predominant as might be expected. It was also much less prominent than in the first weeks after 9/11 (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008; Boswell, 2007). However, the London bombings did trigger a revival of a focus on ‘foreigners’ in British politics, even though the attackers were British citizens. This has been an attempt partly to externalise the threat. This means presenting the threat as originating from abroad. There has clearly been made use of externalising rhetoric to stress the idea that the border remains an essential instrument, both in security and in migration policy (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008).
Huymans and Buonfino (2008) conclude that this does not mean that migration in Europe is not securitized, but that the way it is embedded within security framings is more complex and multifaceted that sometimes suggested. He concludes that asylum and immigration provide an autonomous policy debate that develops largely independent from counter-terrorism policies. This does not mean, however, that there is no security framing in debates on migration. They are permeated by references to the threat to the welfare state, to the labour market and employment, the cultural identity and social cohesion. Overall however, the political elite has been very reluctant to use the threat of terrorism in migration and asylum debates and in that way have not sustained a nexus between terrorism and migration. This does not contradict the finding that migration controls have intensified since 9/11, since parliamentary debates do not fully structure migration policy (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008). As also stated by Brouwer (2003), it did lead to a new emphasis on international security within European and national policy, which may have a far reaching impact on immigrants and refugees (Brouwer, Catz & Guild, 2003). So, even though these findings do not contradict
each other, it does question the idea that terrorism is central to the political justification of changes in migration policy (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008). Anti-immigration parties and the ‘contagion effect’ The securitization of migration seems to predominantly serve the interests of populist anti-immigration parties. These are also the parties that are expected to use references to counterterrorism the most. It is important, for that reason, to understand in what way those political parties can affect to whole political system of a country.
Populist, anti-immigration parties have emerged in most Western democracies. Examples are the Front National in France, the Austrian FPÖ, the True Finns in Finland, etc.. Anti-immigration parties’ main political concern in election campaigns is the immigration issue. These parties are not only strongly in favour of restrictive immigration policies, but also attach much importance to the issue (van Spanje, 2010). A number of scholars have pointed out the importance of these anti-immigration parties to the politicisation of migration issues by either putting them on the agenda or affecting the discourse and positions of mainstream parties (Van Spanje, 2010; Van Heerden, et al., 2014). A certain issue becomes political when political parties or movements disagree about the appropriate way to respond to it. Certain political parties may benefit prom politicising an issue such as immigration, as anti-immigration standpoints are a popular subject (Van Heerden et al., 2014). Survey results point out that in almost all West European states, the majority of voters is opposed to the idea of a multicultural society (Van der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). This means that when an anti-immigration party becomes successful, other parties also get the incentive to adopt a more restrictive position on the matter (Van Spanje, 2010). In theory, there are three possible ways in which a party may respond to electoral loss to anti-immigration parties. They might employ a strategy of accommodation, meaning that they will take over many of the policy positions of the anti-immigration party. They might also choose for a adversarial strategy, where they do address the issue but take a stand that is radically different from the anti-immigration parties. The last option is a dismissive strategy. Here a party will try to downplay and depoliticise issues concerning immigration. However, moving
closer to the position of the electorally successful competitor enhances the chances of wining back votes. For this reason, anti-immigration parties are assumed to have an influence on the position of mainstream parties by shifting the whole political spectrum to the right. This is called the ‘contagion effect’ (Van Heerden et al., 2014). Co-optation by established parties of anti-immigration policies and rhetoric dates back to the late 80’s. One example is France, where parties, both on the left and the right of the political spectrum, partly adopted anti-immigrant rhetoric from the Front National. Pettigrew (1998) argues that far-right effort may only have limited power directly, but they have caused a shift within the political spectrum to the right when it comes to immigration issues (Pettigrew, 1998). This is not only true for Europe, but also for Australia and the United States (Van Spanje, 2010).
It seems that since centre-right parties are usually closest to anti-immigration parties, they have the most incentive to co-opt their positions. However, it could prove to be a double-edged sword as on the one hand they could benefit from politicising the issue. On the other hand, however, very restrictive positions towards immigration and multiculturalism may contradict other ideas such as liberalism and human right. For left-wing parties this situation is different. They will naturally feel more supportive of lenient migration policies, but that may not sit well with the interests of blue-collar workers and the threat they perceive from immigrants. Van Heerden et al. (2014) conclude that, at the very least, anti-immigration parties have accelerated and promoted changes within the immigration and integration debate that were already taking place (Van Heerden et al., 2014). Van Spanje (2010) argues that the contagion effect does, in fact, take place, both in right-wing as in left-wing parties. However, this is more so for parties that are in opposition, compared to parties that are in government, which remain largely unaffected by it. Governing parties are less prone to reposition their viewpoints because it is more difficult for them to make any sudden changes to their policies. This is because they have their own track record on certain issues such as migration and because their policies are not independent of those of their predecessors. Also making bold statements on as issue such as migration would raise expectations from the public that the parties are unlikely to meet. An additional explanation why government parties are less prone to give in to electoral pressures than opposition parties is that that parties
are office-seeking. Parties in opposition are more willing to try diverse strategies in order to gain or regain access to power. Parties in government, by contrast, have little interest in changing viewpoints that have proven successful in the past (Van Spanje, 2010).
This fact is relevant as we assume that references to terrorism in order to legitimize more restrictive immigration policies will be made more often by the Flemish populist, anti-immigrant party (Vlaams Belang). Even though they might have limited direct power, it could have an influence on mainstream parties and their place on the political spectrum. Consequently it might cause more restrictive migration measures and policies, which may have a significant impact on migrants and refugees themselves. Foucauldian discourse theory Discourse theory also places itself within the framework of social constructivism. It is a theory that itself has a variety of schools and sub-theories. The starting point of these theories, however, is that reality should be studied through discourse, meaning language. Language contributes to the creation of reality and the social world around us. This means, consequently, that this social world is changed by changes in discourse (Lebedeva, 2014). The critical focus is on certain processes that shape the social world. Whereas other qualitative research methods try to analyse the social reality, discourse analysis tries to discover the way this social reality was created. It investigates how certain phenomena, such as threats, are constructed (Philips & Hardy, 2002). Ontologically, discourse theory should be understood through both agency and structure-based approaches. Agency and structure form a dialectical relationship where they are each other products and reproduce each other. This relationship also becomes clear in the case of language. On the one hand, language is a medium through which people express themselves and create reality. On the other hand, however, language itself is created through that reality and reproduced as a structure (Lebedeva, 2014).
Discourse theory is closely connected to the discursive production of ethnic groups through the creation of social boundaries. The theory explains how identities and ‘us’
versus ‘them’ categories are produced through discourse. This kind of discourse may also be found within the “war on terror” rhetoric after 9/11 (Lebedeva, 2014). These so-called “discursive strategies of othering” are also used, for instance, by populist right-wing politicians. This could lead to a very powerful discourse of exclusion, which is both socially significant and politically functional (Demmers, 2012).
Mass media serve as important socialising agents, providing ideas and contents, which are essential for the development of political values (Schmuck & Matthes, 2005). The words “migrant” and “refugee” have often been conflated in political and media discourse. However, we can see that the term “migrant crisis” delegitimizes calls for protection, in a way. “Refugee crisis”, on the other hand, reinforces those calls for protection. Discursive framings of the causes of migration, particularly dichotomies such as “voluntary”/”forced”, “immigrant”/”refugee” and “economic”/”political”, have shaped people’s and states’ responses to migration in a big way. Refugees are framed as deserving, since they are assumed to be involuntarily displaced by political circumstances such as war and violence. Immigrants, on the other hand, tend to be portrayed as voluntary leaving their home to find better lives for themselves. However, in reality, these categories are more difficult to sustain than is often presented in popular and political discourse (Holmes & Castaneda, 2016).
Discourse analysis is closely associated with Michel Foucault, who was a prominent philosopher in the twentieth century. Many discourse analyses today use the Foucauldian framework, namely genealogical analysis. According to Foucault, “in any
society there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize, and constitute the social body and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated, nor implemented without the production, accumulation and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth, which operates through and on the basis of this association. We are subject to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth” (Foucault, 1980).
Here, the focus is centred on the relationship between language and power. It goes beyond linguistics and focuses on how language, knowledge, truth and power relate to each other (Lebedeva, 2014). According to Foucault, knowledge and truth are not objective. They do not exist as part of the objective reality. Instead, they are constructed
by institutions, structures, agents and societies. This means that power is exercised, when knowledge and truth are defined by those who have the power to create discourses (Foucault, 1978). Analysing the parliamentary debates enables us to see what is presented as truth and knowledge within Belgian political rhetoric. More specifically, the following questions will be considered: • What is presented as a threat? • What issues are being presented as problematic? • Which interests underlie certain constructed discourses? By answering these questions in the analysis, it would be possible to identify the used discourse and how this discourse is being constructed through language (Lebedeva, 2014)
CASE: BELGIUM
Belgium’s political landscape At the time of Belgium’s independence, in 1830, the region in the north, Flanders, was more populous than the one in the south, Wallonia. However, economically, Wallonia was the first industrialized region in Europe, unlike Flanders, which was mostly rural and consisted of a peasant population. Most of the population in Flanders spoke Dutch, while French was the main language in Wallonia. However, political life in Belgium was dominated by a Francophone elite. Since 1919 and the introduction of universal male suffrage, it has been characterized by a phenomenon called verzuiling, meaning pillarization. Pillarization is a specific from of segmented pluralism. Each pillar consisted of a manifold of organisations that guided individuals from cradle to grave. Between those different pillars there existed wide cleavages that also divided the groups of people between the pillars. After 1919, governments switched between mainly Flemish Catholics and Walloon Socialists. Historically, these divisions were mostly geographically based, with the countryside being more catholic and the urban, industrialised regions more socialist. Within the same pillar, however, there could be much rivalry between different factions (Ceuppens, 2006). The Flemish movement emerged almost around the same time that the country gained its independence. It was started by a lower middle-class group of people who did not agree with the fact that French was a necessity for professional advancement. They strived for the recognition of Dutch as an official language. In 1963, four linguistic regions were established in the country: Dutch-speaking Flanders, Francophone Wallonia, a small German-speaking region in Wallonia and bilingual Brussels in Flanders. This meant that the linguistic barrier had been set. Between 1966 and 1968, a successful campaign in Leuven called “Walen buiten!” (Walloons out!), paved the way for the Dutchification of education throughout Flanders. This started the process of ontzuiling (depillarization), secularization and federalization. This also meant that political parties were split into Flemish and Francophone wings, which were no longer active all over the country. This regrouped voters around new social movements,instead of the old pillars. Both Flemings and Walloons started demanding more autonomy from the central state. This lead to the establishment of three linguistic communities for cultural matters (Dutch, French and German), and three regions for economic and regional matters (Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia). Each of these regions has their own legislative bodies and executives (Ceuppens, 2006). Immigration itself falls under the responsibility of the federal government. Integration, however, is the task of the regional governments (van Meeteren, et al., 2007; Gsir, et al., 2016). Belgium’s federal structure and its ethno-linguistic conflict, complicate the process of policy making. Within the Flemish and Walloon party systems, political parties compete for votes from individuals from that ethno-linguistic community. Historically, Flemish voters lean more to the centre-right, while Walloon voters prefer centre-left parties. It is also this political competition that has framed migration policy in Belgium. Political parties have used the topics of migration and integration to differentiate themselves and to win votes. On the federal level, Flemish and Walloon political systems compete and try to impose their views on national policies (Gsir et al., 2016). Migration policy throughout Belgium’s history
As mentioned earlier, the federal government has authority in matters of acceptance policy, residential status and the eviction of foreigners. The Flemish government is in charge of the reception of immigrants and their integration. The entry and residence of foreigners in Belgium is regulated by both national and international (EU) law. The fundamental rules for a short or long stay in the country are written down in the foreigner law of 15 December 1980 and the executive Royal Decree of 8 October 1981. However, ever since that moment, this legislation has undergone several changes. As many other European countries, Belgium has a quite restrictive immigration policy. This focuses on the repression of irregular migrants. After World War II, Belgium started an active immigration policy (Gsir et al., 2016). In the 1950’s and 1960’s, Belgium, like many other western European countries, brought foreign workers to the country to fill in the gaps in the labour market. Agreements were made with countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece. Later, agreements were also closed with countries outside of Europe,
received with hospitality. They were marked as ‘spontaneous guest workers’ (van Meeteren et al., 2007). In 1970 the oil crisis and the subsequent recession brought a change into this policy. From 1974 onward, to protect local employment, the government decided to put a stop to this flow of immigration. This didn’t signify an end to migration. It did change the type of migration and the countries of origin of the migrants. Family reunification became one of the most frequently used options to migrate to Belgium. The number of highly skilled workers and students decreased, together with the number of people applying for asylum (van Meeteren et al., 2007; Gsir et al., 2016). In 1993, the number of applications had its first peak at 26.408. In 2000 this number increased to 40.000. Every year, about five to ten per cent of these asylum applications were granted. Those to whom asylum is not granted, have to leave the territory. However, many people decide to stay in the country, despite their lack of papers. This, however, goes hand in hand with a policy of tolerance that has been characteristic in Belgium. This means that the presence of people who stay in the country without permission and are sometimes difficult to remove, is tolerated. Sometimes, this is the consequence of political decisions, other times from informal implementation practices (van Meeteren et al., 2007).
We can notice that throughout the years, rhetoric has changed on the matter as well. While in the 1960’s the locals welcomed migrant workers, immigration to Belgium nowadays has become increasingly difficult. Since the 1970’s, migration policy has been increasingly focused on countering irregular migration and support for migration declined significantly (van Meeteren, et al., 2007). The economic crisis of 2008 caused for the support for immigration to decline even more. Political parties started developing a discourse that focused on the ‘threatened European welfare state’. This rhetoric about the survival of the welfare state has served to reform social policies but also migration and integration policies. The economic crisis provided political parties with a powerful narrative to implement restrictions on immigrants’ access to welfare under the guise of protecting the welfare state (Gsir et al., 2016).
Scholar have argued that the presence of a strong right-wing, anti-immigrant party, such as Vlaams Belang, can explain a country’s restrictive migration policy (Koopmans, Michalowski & Waibel, 2012). In 2004, de political party ‘Vlaams Belang’ (Flemish
Interest) was created in Belgium as the successor of the in 1978 created ‘Vlaams Blok’. Vlaams belang calls itself the only right-wing Flemish nationalist party in Flanders. Right-wing, populist parties like these share a number of common features such as a strong opposition to established parties, the elite and Europe. However, their unique selling point is anti-immigration. They are in favour of restrictive immigration policies and tend to use xenophobic discrimination against immigrants. These political parties often take advantage of public fears from immigration and call for action against it. In that way, political advertising focuses mainly on a negative representation of immigrants. These unfavourable attitudes towards immigrants are the main explanation for their electoral success and support. Even without considering voting, it may have an effect on several aspects of daily life, such as integration of foreigners, social support or helping behaviour. Historically, the main strategies implemented by these right-wing populist parties are based on a representation of economic threats and that of symbolic threats posed by immigrants (Schmuck & Matthes, 2015). However, nowadays, threats to the physical safety and security of individuals has been added.
Because of the electoral success of this party, other political parties feel obliged to pick up the topics of migration and integration in order to gain electoral success. Especially in times of crises, a sense of emergency is created where electoral competition among political parties increases. This makes political parties act tougher in policy areas where they believe they can gain many votes. Migration is one of these policy areas where appearing firm and in control is very likely to give the government more authority in the eyes of the citizens. This was especially the case during the economic crisis, when, as mentioned before, support for immigration was very low (Gsir et al., 2016). One might conclude that the current refugee crisis the country has been dealing with could have the same effect as an economic crisis.
Since 2015, Europe has witnessed a huge influx of refugees at its borders. In the first nine months of 2015, around 487,000 people arrived on European territory. This number is twice as high as the total from 2014. A large part of this number of people is from Syria (Holmes & Castaneda, 2016). Since January 2016, Belgium has received around up to 15000 asylum requests (CGRS, 2016). This is commonly being referred to as a refugee crisis. When you add to that the current threat of terrorism, one might conclude that support for immigration might decline because of this sense of crisis. This
could also possibly lead to politicians taking a tougher stance on migration, in order to gain electoral success. Brussels attacks On Tuesday 22 March, 32 people were killed and many more injured in terrorist attacks in the Belgian capital, Brussels. In the main terminal of Zaventem International Airport, two bombs exploded. Another explosion hit the Maelbeek metro station in Brussels’ city centre. The terrorist group Islamic State (IS) has claimed responsibility for the bombings.
Three of the attackers, the two brothers Brahim and Khalid El Bakraoui and Najim Laachraoui, were Belgian nationals of Moroccan descent. The fourth attacker, Osama Krayem, is a Swedish national. It is clear that none of the attackers were refugees. Most of them grew up in Brussels and spent most of their lives there.
We can see a similarity here with the attackers of 9/11. The attackers were not refugees, nor migrants. However, the attacks lead to a stiffening of migration policy for all involved, such as Mexicans, Somalians, etc. I want to find out whether, within political discourse in Flanders, there has been the establishment of a link between terrorists and migrants or refugees. This is very relevant given the current refugee crisis that Europe is experiencing this present time. Using the fear of terrorist attacks to call for a stiffening of migration may lead to very real consequences for the asylum seekers that arrive in Belgium. Even if it doesn’t have an effect on the amount of asylum requests granted, it might influence the way refugees are treated.
METHOD
Research question & hypotheses
It has been assumed that migration and terrorism have become conflated in nationalist politics. Some even have gone as far as to say that hyper-religious-nationalism in the form of terrorism has pushed states beyond the limits of liberal democracy and closer to authoritarian states of martial law (Thomas, 2016). As I have written earlier, the 9/11 terrorist attacks that took place in the United States didn’t necessarily cause the establishment of the link between migration and terrorism in European states. In the first months after the attack there have been a few references to the threat of terrorist attacks within the migration debate. However, after a few months, those references were largely absent (Boswell, 2007; Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008). What I investigated is whether the attacks in Brussels did lead to a stronger connection between terrorism and migration. This leads us to the first hypothesis. H1: The Brussels bombings have caused a bigger increase in references to terrorism within the immigration debate in Belgium than 9/11 This hypothesis is based on the research of Avdan (2016). In his research, he concludes that asylum admission rates are lower in countries that have experienced a terrorist attack on their own soil. Incidents that cause devastation close to home provoke public fears more easily than incidents far away. Therefore the public might be more likely to mobilize domestic support for tighter asylum policies. However, taking into consideration the aftermath of other terrorist attacks such as those in London and Madrid, and the lack of a clear nexus between terrorism and migration, forces us to find an additional explanation. These stricter policies also serve to subdue public anxiety over terrorist threats. Matters such as the proliferation of border controls, the repression of immigrants, etc. are often a political attempt to reassure a certain segment
to ensure this safety. This is even more the case in times of crisis. We could say that Belgium is currently dealing with both a refugee crisis and a terrorism crisis. This causes politicians to want to appear even tougher and in control. Migration is a very popular topic to do so (Boswell, 2007). Consequently, the use of and change in a certain discourse justifies a range of new policies that were previously unacceptable (Avdan, 2016). It recruits and mobilizes certain groups within society in favour of new policies. Politicians may exploit incidents such as the Brussels bombings as a pretext to push through tougher policies. This brings us to the second hypotheses.
H2: References to terrorism in order to promote a more restrictive migration policy will be made more by right-wing populist politicians
Right-wing political parties historically have a more anti-immigration standpoint. However, as discussed above, we can see that these right-wing anti-immigration parties have an influence on mainstream politics (Van Spanje, 2010; Van Heerden, et al., 2014). I aimed to find out how and in what instances Belgian politicians draw on references to migration or asylum within (counter-)terrorism debates in their strategies of defending and challenging various policy measures. The focus is on finding out whether and how terrorism can be used as a tool for politicians of certain parties to help legitimize certain policy proposition. In order to do this I research in which amount and in what way politicians refer to migration and border policy in (counter-)terrorism debates. This gives us a view of whether and how terrorism can be used as a tool for politicians of certain parties to help legitimize certain policy proposition. This means analysing statements from politicians and government officials since the bombings on March 22. In that way I researched whether the attack in Brussels have lead to a bigger focus on the threat of terrorism in Belgium, and thus more securitization, than the 9/11 attacks. Research material
The way this research is conducted is inspired on the earlier discussed research by Huysmans and Buonfino (2008). In this research parliamentary debates were analysed to find out whether and how British politics has securitized migration since 9/11. To
provide me with the necessary information I have analysed the reports of all parliamentary debates since the Brussels bombings (36 debates in total). First, the debates were selected on the basis of their topic. All debates that concerned the topic terrorism were analysed. In the second stage, those debates were read with a specific focus on references to the terms (im)migration, (im)migrant, refugee, asylum, border, foreigner. The debates in which such links were present were then analysed for meaning, structure and connection with other themes. Aside from the parliamentary debates, I used the websites of those political parties that already established a link between migration and terrorism in the parliamentary debates. This serves as background information to investigate in further detail how this link is created. Each of those websites has a section, which contains news about statements made by its members. This is a very efficient way to collect information on the views of the party and the politicians. The purpose is to get a better understanding of whether and how the link between counterterrorism and immigration is constructed and what it says about the way the political elite frames insecurity in the societal area.
The analysis of these data were compared to the already existent literature on the subject of the securitization of migration and the terrorism-migration nexus in Europe after 9/11.
Research method
As mentioned above, this study happened through a discourse analysis of political statements on the matter of both migration and terrorism since the Brussels attacks. I used software Nvivo to facilitate the analysis. Discourse analysis is practiced within a strong social constructivist epistemology. Through systematic analysis, processes through which actors use language as a way to create meaning and convince people of a certain view, can be laid bare. These meanings are often communicated in a subtle way, which makes careful discourse analysis necessary to uncover its precise nature. Special attention must also be paid to how certain linguistic choices serve the interests of certain individuals or institutions (Machin & Mayr, 2012).
The analysis consists of three rounds. In the first round I count how many times terrorism and migration are discussed simultaneously compared to the total amount of statements about terrorism and migration. For the second round I employ codes such as border control, threat, danger, defence, security (to be specified further). Here I want to find out which codes are referred to most when discussing the issue of terrorism and migration. This will give a better understanding of the general undertone of such statements. In the third round, the focus is on the context in which statements are being uttered. This means more specifically that I focus on who makes the statement and his/her political position and possible interests. When are certain statements being used and to what purpose?
Critical reflections on methods used
Because of the inherent subjectivity and reflexivity that characterizes this kind of research, the reliability of this study might be questioned. The researcher is bound to have his/her own opinions on certain matters, which can be reflected within the work. This subjectivity may also be apparent in the choice of material. Being conscious about this possible bias and elaborately reporting the research process will contribute to a higher reliability. On the matter of the generalization of the study, we can say that this is quite limited. In this thesis, the Belgian case is studied. We cannot say with certainty that results from this study are valid within another context. However, through the use of the theories described above, we could make certain predictions.
RESULTS
Parliamentary debates
In 26 out of the 36 parliamentary debates that were taken up in this research, the topic of terrorism was discussed. In seven of those 26 debates, references were made to migration and border policy in relation to the threat of terrorism. The majority of those statements was uttered by politicians from Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest). As discussed above, this Flemish political party focuses strongly on immigration and holds very strong anti-immigration views. Two other political parties that made the connection between (counter-)terrorism and migration are N-VA and to a much lesser amount Parti Populaire (PP). N-VA is a Flemish right-wing party, known for their anti-Walloon standpoints. Parti Populaire is a amount Parti Populaire (PP). N-VA is a Flemish right-wing party, known for their anti-Walloon party that has fairly right-wing and anti-immigration points of view.
I will provide a separate section to discuss the first parliamentary debate after the bombings in Brussels, since it is completely dedicated to the events. After this section the rest of the parliamentary debates will be discussed jointly. All the quotes are translated from Dutch or French to English by the author of this work. First parliamentary debate The first debate that was taken up in this research took place on the 24th of March 2016. As this is only two days after the Brussels attacks, the whole debate concerns the subject of (counter-)terrorism. There are thirteen politicians, from various parties, that voice their condolences and opinions about the event. For that reason, this first parliamentary debate is very important to get a better first understanding of opinions of how to combat terrorism and see if there are already references made to migration. Three of the thirteen speakers mention the problem of open borders. The first reference is made by politician Peter De Roover from N-VA (New Flemish Alliance). He states that
“Jihadists have shattered…the dream that open borders lead to contacts and mutual understandings. The dream that certain values are universal and the dream that all citizens can agree with our cohabitation project”. (24 March 2016)
He states that these contacts could also be deadly, as proven by the Brussels attacks. N-VA came out as the wining party in the last federal elections in Belgium. It generates much support among the population. Their statements are therefor very important and carry much authority. The second reference to open borders is made by Barbara Pas from Vlaams Belang. She utters her anger towards the government for not being able to prevent events such as these terrorist attacks. She blames the open border policy, which caused terrorist, Najim Laachraoui, to be able to go to Syria to recruit. According to her, it also enabled him to return to Belgium as an asylum seeker unhindered, together with fellow terrorist Salah Abdeslam. Vlaams Belang is a party that traditionally has had a strong focus on anti-immigration and anti-establishment views. In this research we can see strong criticism on government policies from this party.
Lastly, Aldo Carcaci, from Parti Populaire (PP), a Walloon right-wing political party, states that there need to be stronger border controls and that the secretary of asylum and migration should be working every day in order to tighten the preconditions for entry into the country.
Parti Populaire is, as mentioned before, a Walloon party with moderately anti-immigration views.
As expected, it are the three most right-wing political parties that have referred to border policy as a cause of the attacks, and therefor propose a stiffening of border controls. The other speeches stress the importance of protecting our democratic values and working together to combat terrorism. None of the other parties made any references to migration. This is also the case in all the following debates on the matter.
Parliamentary debates following 24th of March
In the following parliamentary debates, we can see that shortly after the events in Brussels, references to migration are very present within certain parties. As more time passes, the link between terrorism and immigration fades a bit. Vlaams Belang is clearly the political party that refers to migration- and border policy the most. N-VA does this too, but in a more implicit manner. Parti populaire makes only one remark on the matter, which is not as blatant as the other two parties’ remarks.
Vlaams belang’s strategy is often to criticize the government for its weak policy that enabled tragedies like the Brussels bombings to happen. They blame the government for not hearing their warnings and being politically correct and therefor not seeing the truth. In the following quote Barbara Pas, the representative of Vlaams Belang in parliament, criticizes the nature of the investigation commission on the terrorist attacks.
Barbara Pas (VB): The political correctness, which has led to the many jihad
victims in Zaventem and Brussels, even appears in the task description of the investigation commission. The terms Islam, open borders and asylum policy are not even mentioned. What is present are all the ingredients for a politically correct get together of people who don’t face the facts. Everyone knows that this is just one big construction for one big political game under one big umbrella (12 april 2016). Following this, in the next parliamentary debate, the link between border policy and the terrorist attacks is made very clearly by her and by Filip De Winter, the previous president of the party.
Barbara Pas (VB): Vlaams Belang has been warning for the consequences of mass immigration and Islamification for decades.
Migration about their views on the unrestrained migration that allowed at least 500.000 moslims living on our territory, of which one out of three adhere to salafism, wahabism or jihadism. What have they done in the past to remedy more than 150 radicalised mosques? The enemy is between our walls and still the gates are wide open. The population already knows by now that terrorism is linked to the mass immigration. Without that mass immigration those hundred thousands Muslims wouldn’t have entered and there would not have been radicalisation and the terrorist organisations, which they have been involved in since day one of their migration. At least five out of thirteen terrorist that were involved in the attacks in Brussels and Paris went in and out of our country through the stream of asylum
seekers, in order to exchange information, to retrieve instructions or to recruit.
The traditional parties have covered all this up because they still believe in the multicultural project. The terrorist attacks provide the clearest evidence that
the multicultural project does not work and it has become a story of hard
confrontation between cultures and civilizations that are not and will never be compatible. (14 april 2016)
The “unrestrained migration” is put forward as the cause of the attacks. Furthermore, the government is blamed for covering it all up under the guise of the multicultural project. We can also read references to the stream of asylum seekers, which has entered Europe. Even when the government budget is discussed, references are made to open borders and Islam terrorism:
Barbara Pas (VB): the budgetary deficit has risen from 2,6% in 2015 tot 2,8%, just
below the limit of 3%. The structural balance is falling back. Income is lower than spending because of the costs for asylum, migration and security. These expenses go hand in hand with the open border policy en Islam terrorism. We could’ve all seen this coming. (29 juli 2016)
Open border policy and Islam terrorism are mentioned together as if one does not exist without the other. In this next section we can read a plea from Filip De Winter (VB) to close the borders for all refugees coming from “that region”. This specific region is not specified further than the place where IS fighters might be holding up. It could also apply to any Muslim country since he states that “violence is in the DNA of Islam”. This plea is responded to by minister Jan Jambon (N-VA) and Aldo Carcaci (PP). Filip Dewinter (VB): In Die Welt the Euro commissioner for Security stated that the
conquest of Mosul might lead to the return of many violent IS fighters. Minister Jambon said that there were no signs of an immediate threat. This, however, is naïve and dangerous. Violence is in the DNA of Islam. We know that in Mosul, Belgians are fighting on the side of IS. The minister wants to give the citizens a false feeling of safety, but we have to stay alert for new attacks. Which measures will the minister take? Will he close the borders for refugees coming from that region?
Minister Jan Jambon (N-VA): We are arming ourselves against a possible new refugee stream, which seems logical given the circumstances, … We will act humanely but tough when necessary. Through screenings we will identify people with terrorist intentions among the refugee stream…
Filip Dewinter (VB): The good intentions of the minister will not suffice. In both the
attacks in Paris as in Brussels, the terrorists have entered our country through
the stream of asylum seekers. We have to be conscious of the fact that because of
the decline of the caliphate in Syria and Irak, many IS fighters will leave their country to come here through the international migration stream. The most
efficient cure to this is to close the border to all those who come from the other side of the Mediterranean sea. Aldo Carcaci (PP): Ruling is foreseeing. You have to be ahead of the problems, not wait until they present themselves. (20 oktober) Jan Jambon, vice prime minister and minister of security and internal affairs, does not
respond directly to De Winter’s proposal. However, in his response he uses hard language such as “arming ourselves against the refugee stream” and acting “tough when necessary. We can see that Aldo Carcaci (PP) is being very indirect. Not making any direct references to the stream of asylum seekers. However, he is implying that foreseeing problems and acting before they present themselves requires action. Whether that action required is closing borders is not completely clear, however the reader might get the impression that he is agreeing with Filip De winter.
Finally we can find a statement by Sarah Smeyers (N-VA) where the matter of family reunion is discussed.
Sarah Smeyers (N-VA): There was also a discussion about the proportionality
between the right to family life and the right to security. Especially in times of threat of terror, it is our duty to investigate requests for family reunification thoroughly. This measure does not, in any case, cause disproportionality. (28 april)
We can read that the current circumstances, which is the threat of terrorism, causes her to state that family reunion requests need to be considered thoroughly.
During the time these parliamentary meetings took place, there have been more terrorist attacks, such as those in Nice, Istanbul and Orlando. We can see that the response to these events is mostly one of solidarity with the countries in which the attacks took place. We can see a strong focus on the importance of democratic and humane values and on cooperation to achieve more security. However, in none of those instances, references to open borders, immigration or asylum have been made. This could lead us to the conclusion that it is only attacks within the national borders that cause certain politicians to make this link.
