Considering rational resolutions for a deep disagreement

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A pragma-dialectical study on the discussion about the role of Judaism in Israel

Author:

Laura Vrijsen

Student number:

10252703

Study Programme:

MA Communication and Information Studies: Discourse and

Argumentation Studies

Supervisor:

dr. A.F. Snoeck Henkemans

Second Reader:

dr. B.J. Garssen

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Acknowledgements

This thesis is the end product that I made as part of the master programme Discourse and

Argumentation Studies. In a period of less than a year I got acquainted with many different theories in the field, more than I could ever expect to learn in such a short time.

I want to thank all the professors in the department that helped me on the way. I would like to express my gratitude in particular to my supervisor Francisca Snoeck Henkemans for guiding me through the intensive process of writing this master thesis.

Last but not least, I want to thank my parents for their unconditional support, and for never doubting my capability of doing a master.

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Summary

This study focuses on deep disagreements, a term that was first introduced in 1985 by Robert Fogelin. He argued that some disagreements cannot be resolved by means of rational argumentation, because the different parties in the dispute do not share enough common ground for normal argumentative exchange to be possible. In this study I will look at the argumentative exchange that takes place in the discussion about the role of Judaism in the state of Israel. In that discussion there is a party that argues from a religious perspective, and a party that argues from a non-religious perspective. Their different starting points in the discussion cause them to talk at cross-purposes. Moreover, the religious party’s starting point that God is the ultimate and unquestionable authority, is not up for debate in the discussion. The discussion fulfils Fogelin’s criteria for a deep disagreement. Although Fogelin believes that a deep disagreement cannot be resolved by means of argumentation, this study proposes audience adaptation as a possible solution. Audience adaptation can be a rational way to overcome the problem of not agreed upon starting points, by arguing as if one accepts the other’s starting point, or by pointing at undesirable consequences for the other party.

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4.3.2 Argument schemes 34 Chapter 5: Rationally resolving deep disagreements by means of argumentation 44 5.1 The discussion about the role of Judaism in Israel as a deep disagreement 44 5.1.1 A context of broadly shared beliefs and preferences 44 5.1.2 The existence of shared procedures for resolving disagreements 45

5.1.3 A clash in underlying principles 47

5.2 Rational resolutions for deep disagreements 47

5.2.1 Considering proposed solutions 48

5.2.2 Religious rhetoric: audience adaptation 49

5.2.3 Audience adaptation as a potential rational solution for deep

disagreements 53

Chapter 6: Conclusion 54

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Chapter 1: Introduction

“There are disagreements, sometimes on important issues, which by their nature,

are not subjected to rational resolution” (Fogelin, 1985, p. 7)

This controversial statement was made by Robert Fogelin. In 1985, he published a study called “The Logic of Deep Disagreements”, in which he describes a type of disagreement that cannot be resolved by means of rational procedures, because within the argumentative exchange, a context of broadly shared beliefs and preferences is missing. In this type of disagreement, which he calls ‘deep disagreement’, people can only fall back on non-rational tools of persuasion to resolve the conflict. Fogelin’s work received many reactions and criticisms. Not everyone was as pessimistic as Fogelin in believing that no rational resolution is possible for a deep disagreement. Others even doubted the existence of deep disagreements.

In this study I will evaluate the concept of deep disagreement when it is applied to a discussion between religious and non-religious groups. I will use the debate about the role of religion in Israel as a case study. This debate is not only very actual, it is also a very clear example of how religious and non-religious people argue with one another. Moreover, it is a discussion that has been going on for a very long time.

The discussion about the role of religion in Israel is older than the state itself. Although Israel was founded in 1948 as a “Jewish state”, it was never agreed upon what this Jewish character should exactly be in a state that at the same time emphasises its character as a democratic state. For many, Israel meant a safe homeland for Jews all over the world, a place where they could be Jewish without being persecuted. At the same time, different religious Jewish groups had their opinions about the role Jewish religion should play in official state matters.

The discussion about the Jewish state is still going on. Some religious groups would like to see Israel as a theocracy: they believe that Israel should entirely be governed by Jewish law. The number of religious citizens is increasing, and religious parties have representation in Israeli politics. Most Israeli Jews are secular, however, and they do not support the idea that Israel should be governed by Halacha (i.e. Jewish law). They emphasize that Israel should be a secular state, as it was founded as such.

Although there have been discussions about this issue for more than hundred years now, it is still one of the most heated debates in Israel. One might wonder if the different parties will ever agree on

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this matter. Is it actually useful to continue to argue about this matter, or is this disagreement so deep that rational argumentation is not even a possible option for resolving this conflict?

The arguments that have been put forward in the debate over the role of religion in Israel, are often grounded in either a secular or a religious point of view. In other words, they seem to be based on very different ‘shared beliefs and preferences’ that are held by the different parties. Can this be

considered what Fogelin calls a deep disagreement?

In this study I will investigate to which degree the discussion about the role of Judaism in Israel can be seen as a deep disagreement and I will consider the solutions for such a type of disagreement that are offered in argumentation theory.

The following research questions will be central in this study:

1. To what degree can the discussion about the role of Judaism in the state of Israel be seen as a deep disagreement?

2. To what degree are the solutions offered in argumentation theory applicable to the discussion about the role of Judaism in the state of Israel?

In the second chapter, I will discuss the different scholarly contributions to the concept of deep disagreements. I will also consider the concept from a pragma-dialectical perspective. The aim of this chapter is to provide a clear image of the different theoretical views about deep disagreements. I will be especially focused on determining how we can decide whether a disagreement is deep, and which –if any- theoretical resolutions can be offered for this type of disagreements.

In the third chapter, I will go deeper into the discussion about the role of Judaism in the state of Israel. I will provide some historical background that is needed in order to understand the subject of the discussion and the different positions.

In the fourth chapter I will present a characterization of the discussion about the role of Judaism in Israel. I will make use of the tools offered by pragma-dialectics to reconstruct discussions by

identifying the types of disputes, the argument schemes, and the argument structures.

The characterization given in chapter 4 will be the starting point for my attempt to establish whether the discussion can be seen as a deep disagreement in chapter 5. I am especially interested in investigating whether there are theoretical solutions offered in the literature for resolving such deep disagreements by means of rational argumentation.

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Chapter 2: Deep Disagreements

The term deep disagreement can be used in multiple ways. Sometimes it appears in a news item as a reference to a disagreement that seems hard to resolve, because it has been going on for a long time, or because the different parties have strongly opposed opinions on a certain matter. However, usually it is not really made explicit what exactly is meant by the term, nor what the consequences are of this specific type of disagreement.

This chapter consists of two parts. In the first part I will present different scholarly views on deep disagreements. In the second part I will discuss the phenomenon from a pragma-dialectical perspective.

2.1 Theoretical accounts of deep disagreements

2.1.1 Fogelin’s concept of deep disagreement

In his work Logic of Deep Disagreements (1985), Fogelin presents a theoretical account of deep disagreements. He describes a deep disagreement as “a disagreement in which arguers miss a shared background of beliefs and preferences” (Fogelin, 1985). Characteristic of deep disagreements is that they persist even when normal criticisms have been answered; and they are immune to appeals to facts. Within a deep disagreement, parties might agree on all historical and statistical facts, yet they still disagree on the matter at hand. Although Fogelin does not provide a clear list of criteria to distinguish deep disagreements from other disagreements, he does give us some guidelines that I will discuss in this paragraph.

Fogelin’s concept is for a great part based on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (1969), in which Wittgenstein discusses the question of how we can be certain about anything. It is worth quoting Wittgenstein’s ideas about certainty that Fogelin uses to explain his concept, in order to get a deeper understanding of why Fogelin believes deep disagreements do exist:

“341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

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343 But isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

344. My life consists in my being content to accept many things” (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 44e)

In other words, all interaction between people is based on some common assumptions about what they think to know about the world. Those could be really simple things that most people agree on, but also more complicated matters. Wittgenstein gives a few examples to illustrate this:

“345. If I ask someone “what colour do you see at the moment?”, in order, that is, to learn what colour is there at the moment, I cannot at the same time question whether the person I ask understands English, whether he wants to take me in, whether my own memory is not leaving me in the lurch as to the names of colours, and so on.

346. When I am trying to mate someone in chess, I cannot have doubts about the pieces perhaps changing places of themselves and my memory simultaneously playing tricks on me so that I don’t notice”

(Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 44e).

According to Wittgenstein, we all have some simple, basic assumptions about the world that we don’t question because they are so natural to us. Usually an argument takes place against a background of shared basic assumptions. Fogelin considers this shared background a prerequisite for argumentative exchange. This brings us to our first guideline to decide whether a disagreement is deep:

In a deep disagreement, the context within which the arguments occur is neither normal nor nearly normal. This means that the argumentative exchange does not take place within a context of broadly shared beliefs and preferences, and that there are no shared procedures for resolving disagreements.

Fogelin first explains what he means by the term normal: “an argumentative exchange is normal when it takes place within a context of broadly shared beliefs and preferences”, and “for an argumentative exchange to be normal, there must exist shared procedures for resolving disagreements” (p. 3).

Wittgenstein’s On Certainty could be of help to clarify what Fogelin means with ‘broadly shared beliefs’. As I showed already in the introduction of this chapter, Wittgenstein argues that everything we say only makes sense in the context of a broad shared belief system that is expressed in our language. Wittgenstein formulates this system as follows:

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“105. All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our

arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life” (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 16e).

Although people tend to make a distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘beliefs’, Wittgenstein doubts if there can be such a distinction, for every ‘fact’ is based on what we believe about the world, often because we have been taught this from childhood, or because we had certain experiences. He gives some examples, and I will quote one of them in which religion is involved, as it is related to the discussion that I will be concerned with in this study:

“239. I believe that every human being has two human parents; but Catholics believe that Jesus only had a human mother. And other people might believe that there are human beings with no parents, and give no credence to all the contrary evidence. Catholics believe as well that in certain circumstances a wafer completely changes its nature, and at the same time that all evidence proves the contrary. And so if Moore said “I know that this is wine and not blood”, Catholics would contradict him.

240. What is the belief that all human beings have parents based on? On experience. And how can I base this sure belief on my experience? Well, I base it not only on the fact that I have known the parents of certain people but on everything that I have learnt about the sexual life of human beings and their anatomy and physiology: also on what I have heard and seen of animals. But then is that really a proof?” (Witttgenstein, 1969, p. 32e).

In other words, when people argue with each other, they don’t argue from an entirely unprejudiced basis, but from a context of already existing beliefs and preferences. In the process of argumentation, an appeal is constantly made to some commonly assumed ground. If the different parties do not share this common ground, the arguments don’t make sense because the parties argue at cross-purposes.

The second criterion that Fogelin gives for argumentative exchange to be normal is the existence of shared procedures for resolving disagreements. Different parties have to agree on how a certain fact can be proven, otherwise the arguments of the one party do not make sense to the other party. He gives the example of a disagreement in which two people argue about who won a baseball match. Their shared procedure of resolving this disagreement is by looking it up in a record book.

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A deep disagreement is not caused by one of the parties being dense or pig-headed, but by a clash in underlying principles.

In a deep disagreement, the parties could be unbiased, free of prejudice, consistent, coherent, precise and rigorous, but still disagree. That is because the agreement is generated by something different, namely underlying principles. Those are the sources of the disagreement that lie in the background and they make normal argumentative exchange in the disagreement impossible. Underlying principles are not just some isolated propositions, but they consist of a complete system of interrelated propositions that support one another and form an entire belief system about the world. A deep disagreement is therefore always profound, and not marginal.

Fogelin gives two examples to illustrate what he means with deep disagreements. The first is the abortion debate, in which supporters and opponents of abortion could agree on all kind of biological facts and even about the moral issue of the sanctity of human life, but still disagree. They disagree because their disagreement is generated by a conflict in underlying principles. These underlying principles form a ground upon which people argue about the question of when human life starts. The argument against abortion is based on a tradition that is grounded in religious revelation, a belief structure that is not shared by supporters of abortion. Fogelin says that it is not so easy to resolve the conflict by making these different underlying principles as the subject of debate, because they are entire belief systems, and not just some isolated propositions.

The second example Fogelin uses is the dispute over affirmative action quotas, which he sees as a dispute concerning moral standing. He states that two opposing parties in the dispute have different basic assumptions. In the anti-quota argument one starts from the assumption that only individuals have moral claims, while in the pro-quota argument one departs from the assumption that social groups can have moral claims against other social groups. These basic assumptions, says Fogelin, form the

framework on which the arguments on both sides are carried.

What Fogelin tries to show in his study is that there are sometimes argumentative exchanges that differ from what he calls ‘normal argumentation’. They are different because a common background of beliefs and preferences is missing between the different sides in the dispute. Fogelin sees this common

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with a deep disagreement, for which there is no rational resolution. If the essential condition for argumentation is absent, arguing becomes a futile effort. Fogelin does not say that a conflict on which people have a deep disagreement cannot be resolved, he only says that the argument cannot be resolved by means of rational procedures. Instead, all that can be done is to fall back on (non-rational) tools of persuasion. He uses Wittgenstein’s quotes again to explain why:

“608. Is it wrong for me to be guided in my actions by the propositions of physics? Am I to say I have no good ground for doing so? Isn’t this precisely this what we call a ‘good ground’?

609. Suppose we met people who did not regard that as a telling reason. Now, how do we imagine this? Instead of the physicist, they consult an oracle. (And for that we consider them primitive.) Is it wrong to consult an oracle and be guided by it? –If we call this “wrong” aren’t we using our language game as a base from which to combat theirs?

610. And are we right or wrong to combat it? Of course there are all sorts of slogans which will be used to support our proceedings.

611. Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each men declares the other a fool and heretic.

612. I said I would ‘combat’ the other man – but wouldn’t I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.)” (Wittenstein, 1969, p. 80e-81e).

The relevance of his study is that, according to Fogelin, there are sometimes deep disagreements on important matters. People usually tend to resolve these matters by means of argumentation. If Fogelin is right, these efforts can only prove to be fruitless.

Many scholars have criticized Fogelin’s study. Not everyone agreed with his pessimistic

conclusion about the impossibility of resolving a deep disagreement by means of argumentation. Some scholars highly disagreed with his thesis, while others praised his work (at least partly), and adjusted or omitted parts; or added certain features to it. In the following section I will present an overview of different scholarly reactions to Fogelin’s work about deep disagreements.

2.1.2 Lugg´s reply: starting points are debatable

A year later, Lugg (1986) published a reaction to Fogelin’s work, called “Deep Disagreement and Informal Logic: No Cause for Alarm”. As the title already implies, he has a less pessimistic view about deep

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disagreements. Lugg does not agree with Fogelin that there can be no rational resolution to deep disagreements. As I mentioned in the previous paragraph, Fogelin considers a context of broadly shared beliefs and preferences a necessary condition for “normal argumentation”. When this context is missing, there is no normal argumentation possible. For Lugg this is a bit too simplistic. Instead of accepting a context of broadly shared beliefs and preferences as an unchangeable fact, he thinks that this context is dynamic and subject to change, exactly by means of argumentation. As he puts it:

“What I am suggesting is that we take common viewpoints to be what individuals move towards rather than what they fall back to. Instead of thinking of shared belief as a "common court of appeal", we should think of it as a product of discussion, argument and debate.” (Lugg, 1986, p. 3)

When people have clashing beliefs and preferences relating to a certain issue, these beliefs and preferences could be defended by means of argumentation. Argument could be a way for people to narrow down the different views they have. In case there are no rational reasons available that can prove why a certain ‘common ground’ is better than another, people could always suspend judgement about the issue, according to Lugg.

Moreover, Lugg accuses Fogelin of a logician’s view on argumentation. Although Fogelin criticizes the formal way of looking at argumentation as merely a set of propositions, the conclusion that no rational resolution for deep disagreements is possible, implies a view in which debates are governed by logical principles. For Lugg, the rationality of a debate should not be measured merely by general logical principles, because reasoning is also a human practice. Therefore, Fogelin’s criteria for ‘normal

argumentative exchange’ should not be seen as a prerequisite for rational argumentation.

Lugg’s reaction is mainly a critique of Fogelin’s way of looking at deep disagreement. For my purpose, the way Lugg sees deep disagreements is especially interesting. His focus is not so much on when a disagreement is to be considered deep, but on whether a disagreement could be rationally irresolvable. He is very sceptical about the impossibility of rationally resolving a deep disagreement by means of argumentation and in fact believes that argumentation is a very good way to resolve

disagreements that are caused by different beliefs and preferences.

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In 1992, Peter Davson-Galle published an article in which he replied to both Fogelin and Lugg. He particularly criticizes Lugg’s view and he partly agrees with Fogelin, although he sees the concept of deep disagreement somewhat differently.

Davson-Galle agrees with Fogelin that there should be some common ground between two parties in order to rationally resolve a conflict by means of argumentation. Like Fogelin, Davson-Galle is convinced of the existence of deep, unresolvable conflicts, and argues that they can be caused by different systems of belief, but also by a single proposition.

However, in the end of his work, Davson-Galle comes back to this, and he describes a way in which rational persuasion could be possible without the common ground that is needed for it according to Fogelin:

“One might rationally persuade someone of the error of his/her ways by tracing distasteful consequences (to him/her but not to you). One is, so to speak, pointing out an inconsistency in the set of propositions s/he subscribes to” (Davson-Galle, 1992, p. 154).

He criticizes Lugg’s vision in which arguing is emphasised as a practice of human beings rather than just a structure of propositions, because according to Davson-Galle this tells us nothing about the way a discussion can turn into a deep disagreement.

2.1.4 Levi: no proof for the existence of deep disagreements

In the same year, another critique on Fogelin’s study was published by Don Levi (1992).

As an informal logician, Levi sympathizes with Fogelin’s rejection of the logician’s conception of argument as merely a sequence of propositions. However, Levi questions the existence of deep disagreements. He thinks that Fogelin has insufficient basis to claim that deep disagreements are possible.

According to Levi, Fogelin’s findings are relevant because they assume that in certain cases, disagreements can come to a point in which our critical thinking is incapable of resolving them. Fogelin is not concerned with how difficult conflicts could be resolved, his aim is not to say something about conflict-resolution, rather his findings relate to what he calls the limits of our critical thinking and that is what makes his study controversial. What is at issue according to Levi, is whether one’s critical thinking is

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limited by one’s already existing viewpoint in a discussion. Levi is not convinced by Fogelin’s conclusion that there is such a limitation to critical thinking. In other words, he is not convinced that what Fogelin calls a deep disagreement does actually exist.

Firstly, Levi criticizes Fogelin’s claim that a shared background of beliefs and preferences is a condition for normal argumentative exchange. In many disagreements on social and political questions, he argues, differences in beliefs are involved. However, in some of these beliefs, for example the inherent inferiority of a certain race, expressions of bias are involved. As deep disagreements according to Fogelin are not caused by one of the participants being biased, these types of disagreements do not fall under the category of deep disagreements. Levi doubts if there are differences in beliefs and preferences that are not based on bias or mistakes; in other words, he doubts whether deep disagreements exist.

Secondly, Levi criticizes Fogelin’s idea that shared framework propositions –if they exist at all- can be a condition for argument. Wittgenstein´s examples in On Certainty are used to question metaphysical beliefs about the existence of material objects, and therefore Levi considers them unsuitable to prove the existence of deep disagreements. Referring to one of Fogelin’s examples of a deep disagreement, Levi sees the disagreement over the morality of abortion as a disagreement in which parties accept conflicting framework propositions as a starting point for their discussion. Thus, Levi is not convinced of the existence of shared basic assumptions as a condition for normal argumentative

exchange.

Levi has problems with the idea that a deep disagreement is not resolvable, even when someone can see things from a different point of view. He explains the disagreement about abortion as a failure to see the viewpoint from the other side. He says that Fogelin fails to understand the arguments of the pro-life side. He only says that this view is based on Revelation, but this is not part of the argument for that side. He says that Fogelin does not have sufficient reason to believe that in cases like the abortion debate, all arguments will be question-begging.

For Levi, our already existing viewpoints and basic assumptions do not necessarily have to limit our critical thinking. Our critical thinking can be of help in getting an understanding of why it matters how an argument is resolved. It enables us to seek a better understanding of what is at stake in the issue that is under discussion. That is what should be achieved with critical thinking, not a final verdict on the argument. Levi shifts the focus from the argument itself to the issues that arise in the course of the dialectic. By focussing on the second, our critical thinking enables us to understand which underlying

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problems are at stake in the disagreement, even if we are non-participants, looking at the argument from an outsiders perspective.

2.1.5 Adams: when is a deep disagreement deep?

Another criticism of Fogelin was presented by David Adams (2005). He poses the question of how we are to decide when exactly a disagreement is deep. Where is the boundary between disagreements in which some common ground between two parties is differing, and disagreements in which the parties have insufficient common ground for argumentation to be a possible way of resolving it? Adam´s main point is that Fogelin does not come up with very clear criteria.

As a clinical bioethicist, Adam wants to know whether some disagreements in the field of bioethics qualify as deep disagreements. He not only considers Fogelin´s criteria for deciding whether a disagreement is deep insufficient, he also sees non-rational persuasion as a means of resolving

disagreements in the field of bioethics as a very unsatisfying and unpractical solution. In the clinical field, the well-being of a patient is often at stake, and this well-being is considered more relevant than

reaching a compromise between two opponents.

For Adams, Fogelin’s conclusion that for some disagreements there is no rational solution possible, does not have practical value because if the participants in a discussion do not have clear criteria on how to decide whether their disagreement is too deep to be resolved by means of rational argumentation, they will continue to discuss the disagreement by means of rational argumentation in the hope they will find a solution.

2.1.6 Turner and Wright: revisiting Deep Disagreement

Turner and Wright (2005) are more enthusiastic about Fogelin’s view about deep disagreements. They make a distinction between what they call Fogelin’s modest claim on the one hand, and his radical claim on the other hand. His modest claim (which they do not really consider to be modest) is that some disputes cannot be resolved through argument, and his radical claim is that such disputes are beyond rational resolution.

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Regarding the ‘modest’ claim, Turner and Wright dig deeper into the question of what “normal exchange” consists in. They cast the argumentation of a normal exchange in the classic, schematic form of an argument that supports a conclusion. In the case of a normal argumentative exchange, the participants of the discussion share enough basic assumptions to agree on what is needed in order to economically find the best solution.

However, in some cases, we share less, and it will become harder to continue the argument. Turner and Wright do not agree with Fogelin that in a deep disagreement there is no point in arguing. Although the point of arguing might be restricted in the context of a deep disagreement, the resolution of conflict is only one function of argument. Other functions are for example articulating one’s position and showing that this position is reasonable, or investigating where different areas of disagreement lie. Turner and Wright think Lugg too easily concludes that common viewpoints are to be seen as a result, and not as something to begin rational argument with. Fogelin does not say that viewpoints cannot be changed as a result of argument, but his point is that sometimes not enough background is shared to resolve the conflict by means of arguments. In deep disagreements, a shared fundament upon which the arguments build is missing. Instead of changing one’s view on a certain matter, an alteration of the party’s entire background is required.

They refer to discussions about the compatibility of free will with determinism; or about the existence of an external world outside the mind as examples which usually do not end in an agreement, even though reasonable arguments have been put forward. These are subjects that lie beyond our understanding and competence. Some subjects are so complex that it takes years to understand them in order to have a good rational discussion about them.

2.1.7 Feldman’s solution: suspending judgement

Another scholar who advanced a more optimistic view on deep disagreements than Fogelin, is Richard Feldman (2005), who argues against Fogelin’s thesis that there can be no rational resolution to deep disagreements. Referring to Lugg, he argues that a disagreement can be resolved in three different ways: if there is a disagreement about proposition P, and one party believes P to be true, while the other party believes P to be untrue, the disagreement could end in three ways: (1) both parties believe P to be true; (2) both parties believe P to be untrue; (3) both parties suspend judgement for the time being, until they have found convincing evidence. Feldman proposes this third option as a possible solution for the type

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of disagreement that Fogelin calls deep disagreement. He argues as follows: if two parties disagree about a certain point, and there is no evidence available that proves one of the two is right, both parties should suspend judgement about the matter. Feldman admits that this does not solve the issue itself, it only resolves the disagreement. For Feldman, this is evidence that there is always a rational resolution available, suspending judgement being the worst case scenario.

Like Levi, Feldman criticizes Fogelin for his lack of proof for his thesis that there is no rational resolution available for deep disagreements. The examples used by Fogelin only show that people do not reach agreement, but this does by no means prove that there is no rational resolution possible.

Even if the disagreement is caused by a difference in framework propositions, those framework propositions can be discussed and debated. Depending on the evidence that is uncovered by them, these propositions should be judged positively, negatively, or neutrally, and when they are judged neutrally, judgement should be suspended. Feldman sees suspending of judgement as the rational proper response to cases in which it is not clear (yet) which party’s evidence proves right.

Feldman concludes by saying that the suspension of judgement might not be a very welcomed outcome, because it would make the whole effort of thinking about the arguments look like an effortless activity. However, he believes that in many controversial cases, there is no rational resolution of the issue available, and therefore we would be better off suspending judgement. Although it does not solve the issue, it is a way to rationally resolve the disagreement.

2.1.8 Philips: common beliefs

Dana Philips (2008) investigates the shared background that is required for what Fogelin calls ‘normal argumentative exchange’. Like Adam, she criticizes Fogelin for not being clear about what this shared background exactly consists in. Philips says that argumentation can affect people’s common beliefs and values, although it might not happen right after the argument is being posed. Instead of directly resolving the disagreement, argument can cause the beginning of a process of reflection that could eventually contribute to resolution of the disagreement.

For Philips, there is no reason to accept that framework propositions are fixed and unchangeable starting points. Instead, they are perfectly suitable for rational discussion. She admits that a difference in framework propositions can make the process of rational argumentation more complicated, but this

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problem concerns us only practically. Fogelin goes too far by saying that it makes rational resolution theoretically impossible.

Philips says that common beliefs about the topic at hand are not a prerequisite for the rational resolution of disagreements. Instead, she gives different criteria for disagreement to be rationally resolvable. For Philips, it is not the common beliefs about the topic under discussion that are decisive for making productive argument possible, but certain shared procedural commitments and competencies:

1) The willingness of arguers to subject challenged beliefs to rational appraisal; 2) The commitment to respond rationally to evidence;

3) A basic freedom of expression;

4) A joint commitment to communicate sincerely and transparently; 5) Arguers must be able to pinpoint the basis of their disagreement.

These are the criteria under which productive argument is possible, and when these criteria are not met, argumentation becomes useless and futile.

Philips’ list of criteria is based on van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s list of first and higher order conditions, on which I will elaborate in the following section.

Philips´ main point is that the absence of a shared background of beliefs is not a theoretical problem, but a practical, procedural problem. It is often hard to articulate what the framework

propositions of the different parties are. Because this is so hard, the discussants are not always willing or able to determine the differences between them.

2.2 A pragma-dialectical account of deep disagreements

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004; 2010) have developed a pragma-dialectical model for argumentation and fallacies. In this model, a discussion can be evaluated and analyzed as a critical discussion, which is a theoretical model for a reasonable discussion that is aimed at the resolution of a conflict.

Like Fogelin and his commentators, van Eemeren and Grootendorst are concerned with the question of how a disagreement can be rationally resolved. A list of ten discussion rules contains the conditions necessary for conducting a critical discussion. These ten rules form what they call the first

order conditions. The first order conditions should be seen as the plain rules of the game. Next to these

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and relate to the state of mind of the participants, and the third order conditions are external conditions that relate to the social circumstances in which the discussion takes place. Van Eemeren et al. (1193, 2004) describe these higher order conditions as prerequisites for critical reasonableness. As the ten discussion rules are purely theoretical rules, they provided a list of ten requirements (“Ten

Commandments”) for reasonable behavior, to which they refer to as ´the code of conduct´. Those ten requirements correspond to the ten discussion rules. It is not in my concern here to sum up all Ten Commandments for reasonable behavior. Instead, I will only present the requirements that are related to deep disagreements:

The freedom rule: discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from calling

standpoints into question.

If we follow Fogelin’s account of deep disagreements, then participants cannot resolve their conflict by arguing rationally, since their beliefs and values differ too much. This implies that those beliefs and values, that could be put forward as standpoints, are not to be called into question. This could occur for example in cases where something is declared taboo or sacrosanct by one of the parties, and is therefore not open for discussion. In pragma-dialectical terms, this would be seen as a violation of the freedom rule.

The starting-point rule: discussants may not falsely present something as an accepted starting point or

falsely deny that something is an accepted starting point.

A deep disagreement is the result of a difference in framework propositions, or common beliefs. In pragma-dialectical terms, this means a difference in starting points. In the beginning of a discussion, discussants should agree on certain common starting points, from which the discussion can evolve. In a deep disagreement, the different parties do not agree on these starting points, instead, their starting points are founded in some deeper set of beliefs of how they perceive the world. A deep disagreement, in other words, is a lack of agreed upon starting points.

Thus, comparing the concept of deep disagreements with the pragma-dialectical code of conduct, I showed that from a pragma-dialectical perspective, a deep disagreement is located in the violation of the freedom rule and the starting point rule, rules that should be obeyed if the discussion is to lead to a resolution of the conflict. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst consider these rules as conditions that could be fulfilled provided the discussants have the right attitude (and the external conditions for reasonable discussion obtain). This means that for them the solution lies in the willingness of the

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discussants to obey the rules that are needed to resolve the conflict. Fogelin on the other hand, thinks that some beliefs and values are so essential for the way people perceive the world, that they are not subject to rational discussion.

In the next chapter I will give an account of the discussion about the role of Judaism in Israel. Then I will investigate that discussion using the theoretical framework presented in this chapter.

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Chapter 3: The debate over the role of Judaism in the state of Israel: different

perspectives

In the previous chapter I discussed Fogelin´s concept of deep disagreements and several academic replies to it. In a deep disagreement, two or more parties argue from different assumptions, or starting points. According to some scholars, these starting points block normal argumentative exchange, which would make it impossible to solve the disagreement by means of rational argumentation.

In this study I am interested in the argumentation that takes place between on the one hand people who argue from a religious viewpoint, and on the other hand people who argue from a non-religious viewpoint. I will use the religion-state debate in Israel as a case study to get deeper into this type of discussion. In this chapter I will provide some background information on the discussion that is needed in order to understand the different viewpoints and the arguments that are put forward.1

3.1 The founding of Israel as a secular Jewish state

A detailed description of the history and founding of the Jewish state of Israel could (and indeed does) fill entire libraries. The historical accounts usually trace back to the beginning of Zionism at the end of the 19th_{century. By that time, a group of European Jews began to consider the possibility of a national}

homeland for the Jews, who had been scattered throughout the world since the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE. Two developments in Europe played an important part in the creation of Zionism: increasing anti-Semitism and the rise of nationalism.

A range of Zionist Congresses were held by the early Zionists, in which many issues were subject of heated debate: where should the homeland be located, and what type of state should it be? Which language should be the national language of the new state, and how could people from so many different countries form one people again with one culture? It is not hard to imagine that there were all kinds of different opinions and ideas about it, and sometimes they were highly contrasting. The Zionists agreed on the need for a Jewish homeland, a state in which Jews could live safely as one people, and without being persecuted. However, they did not agree on more specific things, for example on what

1_{My account is based on several publications about Israeli society and Judaism, namely Ottolenghi (2005) about}

the rise of Zionism; Mahler (2011) about Zionism and religious groups in Israel; Garfinkle (2000) about the role of religion in Israel; and Dieckhoff (2013) about Zionism, the Status Quo Agreement and the role of religion in Israel;

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would be the best location for this homeland, and what the role of religion in the state should be. This last issue will be the subject that I am concerned with in this study.

Although Theodor Herzl, the founder of Zionism, aspired a secular state, there were leading Jewish figures that emphasized the importance of religion for the Jewish people. Their wishes could not be ignored. After all, the common history of the Jewish people is inextricably connected to religion. The first compromises were made in June 1947, one year before the founding of the state.

David Ben Gurion –who would later become the first Prime Minister of Israel- received a letter from

Agudat Israel, a political party representing Jewish Orthodoxy. The party requested religious authority

over certain state matters. Ben Gurion´s reply to this letter became the official foundation of what is nowadays referred to as the Status Quo Agreement, in which the relationship between state and religion was laid down.2_{Marital affairs, kashrut (religious dietary laws), education, and Shabbat were to become}

the four issues on which religious laws should be fully protected by the state. Despite these concessions, the agreement at the same time explicitly emphasized that the Jewish state was not to become a theocracy.

The Status Quo Agreement offered a temporary solution for the issue, but the discussion about the role of religion in the Jewish State continues up to today. Marital affairs are nowadays still governed by religion, despite a growing resistance of a large part of the population. Shabbat is the official day of rest, and in cities with a large percentage of religious inhabitants like Jerusalem, there is no public transport available on Shabbat.3_{Many secular Israelis oppose this restriction, and wish the public}

transport to be accessible also on Shabbat. Moreover, the Israeli Chief Rabbinate has full authority over

kashrut certification, and all imported meat has to be kosher. Furthermore, the rabbis authorize the

religious schools, and also in the textbooks of non-religious schools they have curriculum input.

The tension between religious and non-religious groups in Israel revolves for a great deal around the four issues that are mentioned in the Status Quo Agreement. Although the majority of the Jewish population of Israel is secular, the religious (ultra-Orthodox) population is growing very fast due to high birth rates. When Ben Gurion made these concessions to the Orthodox world, he surely had not anticipated this.

2_{The letter is published in Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign}

Relations, Pre-1948 to the Present by Rabinovich and Reinharz, 2007: pp. 58-59.

3_{Arab buses are available on Shabbat. However, as a result of the tensions between Jews and Palestinians, those}

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3.2 Defining Jewishness

In the previous paragraph I discussed how the Jewish state was founded by secular Zionists, and that religious parties had been given authority over certain state matters in the Status Quo Agreement. The religious authority is carried out by the Chief Rabbinate. In an Israeli news item in Ynet, an Israeli news website, this rabbinate is described as ‘the most hated institution in Israel’ (Shohat, 2015). The issue that seems to concern the non-Orthodox Jewish population most is that the Chief Rabbinate has the

authority to decide over who is Jewish. From a purely Halachic perspective, you are considered Jewish only when your mother is Jewish, or when you passed an Orthodox conversion. This means that Jews who passed a non-Orthodox conversion, are not considered Jewish by them. As a consequence, they are not allowed to marry in Israel, as marital matters are under control of the Chief Rabbinate.

However, the state is responsible for who can get Israeli citizenship. The Law of Return4_that exists from 1970, allows every Jew to emigrate to Israel. In this law, a Jew is someone with a Jewish mother, or someone who converted to Judaism. It does not matter whether they converted as an Orthodox, a Conservative or a Reform Jew. Non-Orthodox converts can get Israeli citizenships, but they are not accepted as Jewish by the Chief Rabbinate. Although they consider themselves religious, they are excluded from several aspects of religious life. The Law of Return also allows the children and

grandchildren of a Jew and their spouses to emigrate to Israel. If those children, grandchildren and spouses are not Jewish as defined by the Chief Rabbinate, they too have no possibility of marrying in Israel.5_{Many Israelis oppose the full authority of the Chief Rabbinate over defining Judaism and deciding}

who is a Jew. They do not support the idea that Orthodox Judaism is the only true form of Judaism. Due to this unbalanced relation between religion and state, it happens to be that many persons are considered Jewish in some situations, while in other situations their Jewish identity is rejected. This is the case for non-Orthodox converts and for many immigrants that came to Israel under the Law of Return.

4_{The Law of Return can be found on the website of the Israeli Parliament:}

https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/return.htm

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I will now continue with an account of different Jewish groups and their position to the state of Israel. My aim is not to present a complete overview. Rather, I wish to emphasize that there is a great variety of different Jewish groups, and I want to show how their varying ideas about the Jewish state developed over the years.

3.3 “Secular” perspectives on the Jewish state

The maintenance of Judaism seems to be important for most Jewish Israelis, but as I showed in the previous section, there are different opinions about the definition of Jewishness. The situation gets even more complicated when we take into account that Jewishness can also be nationally defined. Unlike Christianity and Islam, Judaism can refer not only to a religion but also to a people. Even when a Jew is entirely secular and does not consider himself religious in any way, he is still part of the Jewish people. It may sound contradictory, but it is perfectly possible for a Jew to be an atheist.

Notwithstanding the different definitions that are given to Jewishness, there is a broad

agreement under Jewish Israelis (both secular and religious) that Israel should be a Jewish state; that is a state in which Jewish values are (at least) a central feature. The ambiguity of the term and the general explanations of it are not very much of help, but they do show a general importance of Judaism in the state for the Israeli population. Being a secular Jew does not necessarily mean for a person that religious values do not play a role at all. Although there are secular Jews who do not give importance to religion at all, there are also secular Jews who, for example, obey the Jewish dietary laws of kashrut to a lesser or a higher degree. Many secular Jews in Israel have a mezuzah6_{on their doorpost, and have their son} circumcised eight days after his birth. Although these customs are often considered more as a

‘traditional value’ than a religious one, it shows a way in which Jewish laws continue to play a role in the life not only of Jews that call themselves religious, but also of secular Jews. The problem that the secular Jews have with the Orthodox authority does not so much concern the religious traditions, but their rigidity and intolerant attitude towards non-Orthodox forms of Judaism.

For secular Jews, a Halachic state carried out by the Orthodox rabbis would only worsen the situation. Non-Orthodox Jews do not want to live in a country in which Halacha is forced upon them. Israel was founded by secular Zionists, and it has never been a religious state. For many secular Israelis, a

6_{A mezuzah is a small box that contains a Scripture with a Jewish prayer. It is traditionally attached to the doorpost}

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Jewish state means a homeland for Jews, in which Jewish values are respected, but not forced upon them by an ultra-Orthodox minority. In other words, they do not only support freedom of religion, but also freedom from religion (Arian, 2005, p. 351).

Now that I have discussed the issue from the perspective of the secular parties that oppose a state that is fully governed by Halacha, I will continue by discussing the main religious groups in Israel and their ideas about the role of Judaism in the Jewish state.

3.4 Religious perspectives on the Jewish state

The Biblical Land of Israel has always played a significant role in Jewish tradition. From a traditional religious point of view, Jewish exile is a temporary situation that will be ended with the coming of the Messiah, who is believed to lead the Jewish people from exile back to the Biblical Israel. The process of waiting for the coming of the Messiah, who shall bring Redemption to the world, is essential for Jewish tradition. Exile is seen as a punishment for Jewish misdeeds, and accepted as such. From this point of view, it is only God who can bring about Redemption, and when the time is there, the Messiah will come and lead the Jews from the diaspora to Israel. Consequently, (Orthodox) religious Jews initially did not support Zionist views in which a Jewish state was to be founded by secular Jews, instead of the Messiah. They considered it an intervention in God’s holy plan, that would only cause more misery and suffering to the Jews.

There are some minor religious groups in Israel today that continue to resist the modern state of Israel. These groups, for example Satmar or Neturei Karta, believe that the Jews have to wait for the coming of the Messiah who will lead them to Israel. They despise the Zionist movement and the secular state of Israel. Many of their members come from families that were part of the Old Yishuv, the Jewish community that lived in Palestine before Israel was founded.

The interpretation of the traditional perspective was challenged by several Jewish leaders. They offered new interpretations in which the Jewish narrative was combined with nationalist ideas. Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935) was one of the most influential thinkers of what became Religious Zionism. In his view, exile should not be seen as a punishment from God. Instead, it functioned as a way to keep Jews away from power, so that they would be saved from the evils that power brings about. In Messianic times, the Jewish state would be governed without ruthlessness and barbarism. Kook believed

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that his generation would encounter the coming of the Messiah, and he had no problems working together with secular Zionists to prepare a Jewish state already. For him, Zionism was part of the process of Redemption.

National aspirations were thus incorporated into existing religious views, and new religious interpretations developed. Although they were offered as a solution to a theological problem regarding messianism, they in fact created a new division between religious groups. While the Orthodox are generally negative about Zionist aspirations of creating a Jewish state before the arrival of the Messiah, for the religious Zionists it has religious significance.

After anti-Semitism reached its low in the Holocaust, even most Orthodox communities did not deny any longer the need for a Jewish homeland, even if it was to be established in Israel before the coming of the Messiah. As we saw in the first section of this chapter, instead of resisting the state, they now shifted their focus to the implementation of Halacha in Israel.

The (ultra-)Orthodox and the religious Zionists are the two main religious Jewish groups in Israel that base their worldview on religious beliefs, but they are not the only religious groups in Israel. There are Conservative Jews, who consider Halacha important but not binding, and there are Reform Jews, who accept a more flexible and liberal view on Judaism. These groups generally value the freedom of religion, and their main issue at the moment is to gain full acceptance as real Jewish communities in Israel. As I discussed in paragraph 3.2, the ultra-Orthodox Jews do not accept these denominations as Jewish. For them, the only true form of Judaism is Orthodox Judaism in which Halacha is the highest law.

In short, there is disagreement on the issue not only between religious and non-religious groups, but also between the different religious groups there are different visions on how Israel should look like, and which role religion should play in it. What these different religious groups have in common however, is that their beliefs and convictions are based on a religious worldview. In other words, they have a shared common ground from which they can argue with each other. This common ground is not shared with the secular part of Israel.

In this chapter I discussed the background of the discussion about the role of Judaism in Israel. I showed the difficulties that arise because of the many ways in which Jewishness is defined, and I discussed the main religious views on Zionism and Israel as a Jewish state.

In light of my research about the theoretical concept of deep disagreement, I am especially concerned with those parts of the discussion in which arguments resting on a religious worldview are being put forward against arguments that are based on a non-religious worldview. According to Fogelin,

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some disagreements make normal argumentative exchange impossible, because the parties involved argue from different belief systems. In a religious view, the world is perceived from an entirely different perspective than in a worldview that is not guided by religious beliefs.

In the next chapter I will have a closer look at the argumentation in the discussion about the role of Judaism in Israel. Using insights from the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, I will determine the type of discussion, the different parties that are involved, their standpoints, and the arguments that are central in this discussion.

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Chapter 4: A pragma-dialectical typology of the discussion of the role of Judaism

in Israel

In the previous chapter I discussed the background of the discussion about the role of Judaism in Israel. In this chapter I will provide a reconstruction of the discussion based on insights from the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation.

As I am interested in the way Fogelin’s concept of deep disagreements can be applied to this debate, my focus in this chapter will be on the underlying assumptions that can be found in the arguments of the discussants.

The function of this chapter is to theoretically explain what is happening in the discussion. This will allow for providing a clearer account of the disagreement, that I will use as a starting point in the next chapter, where I will discuss the consequences for the discussion if it is to be considered as a deep disagreement.

4.1 Three standpoints

The discussion about the role of Judaism in Israel can be reconstructed as a dispute in which three different positions can be distinguished: 1) Israel should be governed by civil law; 2) Israel should be governed by Halacha; 3) Israel should be governed partly by civil law, and partly by Halacha.

The first view is held by those who propose an entirely secular government in which religion has no special authority. This does not necessarily mean that they do not follow Jewish law at all, they just believe that the state should not be governed by it. They might still obey Jewish laws in their private lives.

The second view is held by those who value Halacha as the highest and most important law. In Israel they are generally represented by the ultra-Orthodox and Religious Zionist communities. Their standpoint is often defended by arguments that are embedded in religious discourse.

Whereas the first view is held by secular as well as religious people, this second view is limited to people with a very strong religious affiliation.

The third view is a middle course between the first two views, and is held by those who see Judaism as an important feature in Israeli state matters, although they don’t want Halacha to be the guiding factor in all aspects of society. I already mentioned that this is the view that corresponds to the

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current situation in Israel. Although Israel is a civil state governed by secular political institutions, certain aspects of life -most importantly marriage, divorce, and conversion- are under the authority of the Halachic rulings carried out by the ultra-Orthodox. The current situation receives much criticism in Israeli society, also from people who support this third viewpoint. Although they support the idea that some aspects of civil life should be governed by Halacha, they are not satisfied with the way it now functions in Israel. As mentioned in the previous chapter, many people criticize the monopoly position of the ultra-Orthodox on Jewish religion.

When people consider themselves religious, it does not necessarily mean that they want the Israeli state to be governed by religious laws. Religious arguments could support all three views. In contrast, I could not find examples in which a Halachic state was defended based on a non-religious view. Figure 1 shows the three standpoints, and whether they are supported by religious or non-religious arguments:

Standpoint Arguments

1. Israel should be governed by civil law Non-religious and religious

2. Israel should be governed by Halacha Religious

3. Israel should be governed partly by civil law, and partly by Halacha Non-religious and religious

As the discussion is not limited to official parties debating the topic, it is hard to say who the parties are. The discussion is held everywhere, by anyone who wishes to join in. In my analysis, I collected arguments from the internet, most of them reactions to news items in Israeli newspapers. As those comments are usually anonymous, it is quite impossible to trace back their authors. Moreover, the discussion is held by individuals, often not belonging to a specific group or party. Therefore I chose to differentiate between the different parties based on their position. In other words, the different parties are defined by the viewpoints they defend, and not by the group they belong to.

Before taking a closer look at the types of argument that are put forward to support the different viewpoints, I will determine the type of dispute that is at stake.

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4.2 Type of dispute

In the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, a difference is made between mixed and non-mixed differences of opinion. A disagreement is non-mixed when one party presents a standpoint that is met with doubt by another party. A disagreement is mixed when one party presents a standpoint that is met with opposition by another party. The discussion about the role of Judaism in Israel can be reconstructed as a mixed difference of opinion. It is mixed, because the different parties do no only cast doubt on each other’s standpoint, but their standpoints oppose each other.

Furthermore, a difference of opinion can be either single or multiple. In a single difference of opinion, a standpoint concerns only one proposition, while in a multiple difference of opinion, a standpoint relates to multiple propositions (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2010; Van Eemeren, Houtlosser, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2007). Sometimes it gets more complicated, when one party puts forward a standpoint, and a second party puts forward another standpoint that does not only refute the standpoint of the first, but at the same time offers an alternative. Then we still talk about a multiple difference opinion, although the difference of opinion is not (only) multiple in a quantitative sense, but (also) in a qualitative sense (Van Eemeren et al., 2007).

This is the type of complexity that occurs in the discussion about the role of Judaism in Israel. The first party has as its main standpoint that Israel should be governed by civil law. The second party then, does not agree with this standpoint, and instead of just refuting the standpoint, it defends an alternative standpoint: Israel should be governed by Halacha. The third party then, comes up with yet a third alternative: Israel should be partly governed by civil law, and partly by Halacha.

This can be schematized as follows:

1 Israel should be governed by civil law

(1’) (Israel should not be governed by Halacha) (implicit standpoint)

(1”) (Israel should not be governed partly by civil law and partly by Halacha) (implicit standpoint)

2 Israel should be governed by Halacha

(2’) Israel should not be governed by civil law) (implicit standpoint)

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3 Israel should be governed partly by civil law and partly by Halacha (3’) (Israel should not be governed by civil law only) (implicit standpoint) (3”) (Israel should not be governed by Halacha only) (implicit standpoint)

We see that each of the three standpoints implicitly refutes the standpoints of the other parties, because although the standpoints could all three be false, they cannot simultaneously be true.

Therefore, their relation is contrary. If one of the parties succeeds in a defence of their standpoint, the standpoints of the other parties will at the same time be refuted. In other words, their positive

standpoints imply the negative standpoints of the other parties.

Sometimes an argument is explicitly directed at opposing the opponent’s standpoint. Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans (2010) describe argumentation as ‘an attempt to either justify or refute something’ (p. 38). Arguments either justify a positive proposition, or refute a negative proposition. Sometimes a speaker puts forward an argument in order to justify his own standpoint, but at other times an argument is used in order to refute the opposing standpoint of another party.

By adding the implicit standpoints to the original standpoint, I showed how this dispute is multiple mixed in a quantitative sense as well as in a qualitative sense. Quantitative because the standpoint relates to more than one proposition. Qualitative because the standpoints do not only oppose each other, but they all offer different alternatives to how Israel should be governed.

4.3 Types of arguments

4.3.1 Selected examples

This section includes a selection of examples of arguments that have been put forward in the discussion about the role of Judaism in Israel. I collected examples from the internet, most of them anonymous reactions on news or opinion items, or arguments that were put forward in those opinion items. The selection also includes arguments that I found on websites of religious organizations, and in literature about the subject. The examples function to show the argumentative exchange between parties

depending on a religious worldview in their arguments, and parties depending on a worldview that is not religious in their argumentation, at least in which religion is not considered to be the decisive factor in deciding about state matters.

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In section 4.1, I distinguished three different standpoints: 1) Israel should be governed by civil law; 2) Israel should be governed by Halacha; 3) Israel should be governed partly by civil law and partly by Halacha. The third standpoint is a combination of the first two, since it takes something from both parties. In that respect, this perspective differs from the first two standpoints. In the selection of the examples that I am to discuss in this paragraph, I limited myself to the arguments that are put forward to support the first two standpoints, as those arguments most clearly represent what happens in a

discussion in which two parties base their arguments on different belief systems. The third standpoint is in fact already an attempt to solve the conflict by means of a compromise.

4.3.2 Argument schemes

Now that I determined in the previous paragraphs the parties that are involved, their different

standpoints, and the type of the dispute, I will continue with a characterization of the main arguments that are put forward to support the standpoints. This means that I will look at the different argument schemes that are used. In pragma-dialectics, argument schemes determine the relation between an argument and a standpoint. This relation can either be causal, symptomatic or analogical (VanEemeren et al., 2010). The division is helpful in the evaluation and analysis of argumentative discourse.

Another typology of arguments is provided by Schellens (as explained in Garssen, 1997). Instead of looking at the relation between the argument and the standpoint, he uses the conclusion as his point of departure. He distinguishes different types of conclusions, and his argument schemes are based on this typology. Thus, where in the pragma-dialectical typology of argument schemes the argument is central, in Schellens’ typology it is the conclusion that is central. With Schellens’ approach the analyst can already anticipate what type of arguments are to be expected in support of a certain standpoint, by looking at the type of standpoint that is defended.

The standpoints in the discussion about the role of religion in Israel are prescriptive standpoints, as they relate to how the situation should be. More specifically, they relate to the (un)desirability of a policy on how the state should be governed, either by civil law, or by religious law. These standpoints are often supported by means of pragmatic argumentation, in which a certain situation is positively or negatively valued. Schellens schematized this as follows:



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“Action A leads to B B is (un)desirable

Therefore: Action A is (un)desirable” (Schellens, as cited in Garssen, 1997, p. 86).

In pragma-dialectics, pragmatic argumentation is a subtype of causal argumentation, because there is a causal relationship between the argument and the standpoint.

To illustrate the different types of arguments and the way they relate to the standpoint they support, I will present and typify some main arguments that are put forward in the discussion about the role of religion in Israel. I will not only look at the argument schemes that are used, but also at the implicit premises that can be found in the arguments. These implicit premises show us some underlying principles from which people argue. For Fogelin, these underlying principles are of great importance to determine whether a discussion is a deep disagreement.

The following argument was put forward to refute the standpoint that Israel should become entirely secular:

[Example 1]

“No. That would be a mistake

God will definitely kick you out if you go secular.” ("Comment #111 on a blog in newspaper Haaretz",

2010).

This speaker points out a consequence of Israel being a secular state: if you become secular, he argues, then ´God will kick you out´. Although he does not explicitly state that this is an undesirable situation, neither does he make clear what exactly he means with it, being kicked out by God is obviously an undesirable situation. To prevent this undesirable situation from happening, Israel should not become entirely secular. More implicit assumptions can be found in this argument, namely ´God will kick you out´ implies that God exists, and moreover, he has the power to ´kick out´ anyone who ´goes secular´. These implicit assumptions are starting points that are not shared with the non-religious participants in the discussion.

Considering rational resolutions for a deep disagreement - A pragma-dialectical study on the discussion about the role of Judaism in Israel