Dorien van Duivenboden
MASTER THESIS, LEIDEN UNIVERSITY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE
STUDENT NUMBER: S2089882 SUPERVISOR: DR. C.H.J.M. (CAELESTA) BRAUN DATE: 18 JUNE 2020 WORD COUNT: 18008
Preventive Radicalization Policies
AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTS OF RADICALIZATION AND THE
TYPES OF POLICY TOOLS IN THE G4 MUNICIPALITIES IN THE
INTRODUCTION 3
1.1SCIENTIFIC DEBATE 4
1.2ACADEMIC AND SOCIETAL RELEVANCE 4
1.3SCOPE OF THE THESIS 5
1.4RESEARCH QUESTION 6
1.5RESEARCH DESIGN 6
1.6THESIS OUTLINE 6
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 7
2.1RADICALIZATION, TERRORISMAND EXTREMISM 7
2.2FRAMING OF RADICALIZATION 8
2.3RADICALIZATION POLICIES 10
CHAPTER 3 THEORY 12
3.1THEORY ON POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 12
3.1.1FIRST AND SECOND GENERATION: TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES 12 3.1.2THIRD GENERATION: HYBRID THEORIES AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTS 13
3.2POLICY TOOLS AND IMPLEMENTATION 15
3.2.1CHOOSING POLICY TOOLS 15
3.2.2.NATO MODEL OF POLICY TOOLS 16
3.3THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 17
CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN 19
4.1RESEARCH QUESTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 19
4.2CASE SELECTION 19
4.3DATA GATHERING 20
4.4METHOD 21
4.5CONCEPTUALIZATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION 23
CHAPTER 5 ANALYSIS 25
5.1POLICY CONTEXT 25
5.1.1 EU PREVENTIVE RADICALIZATION POLICY 25
5.1.2NATIONAL DUTCH PREVENTIVE RADICALIZATION POLICIES 26 5.1.3 G4 MUNICIPALITIES PREVENTIVE RADICALIZATION POLICIES 28
5.2SOCIAL CONSTRUCTS 30
5.2.1EUPOLICY PREVENTIVE RADICALIZATION 31
5.2.2NATIONAL DUTCH PREVENTIVE RADICALIZATION POLICIES 33
5.2.3G4 MUNICIPAL PREVENTIVE RADICALIZATION POLICIES 36
5.3NATO MODEL -POLICY TOOLS 43
5.3.1G4POLICY TOOLS RADICALIZATION POLICIES 43
5.3.2PERSON-ORIENTED APPROACH 44
5.3.3COOPERATION WITH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES 45
5.3.5TRAINING FOR FRONTLINE PROFESSIONALS 48 5.3.6INFORMATION POINTS 48 5.3.7OTHER FACTORS 49 5.4CONCLUSION 50 5.4.1MULTILEVEL PERSPECTIVE 50 5.4.2LOCAL PERSPECTIVE 52 5.4.3EXPLANATIONS 53
6. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 54
BIBLIOGRAPHY 57 SOURCES 62 EU 62 NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 63 AMSTERDAM 65 THE HAGUE 65 ROTTERDAM 66 UTRECHT 66 APPENDICES 67 APPENDIX 1 67 APPENDIX 2 67 APPENDIX 3 68 APPENDIX 4 69 APPENDIX 5 71 APPENDIX 6 72
Introduction
In 2014 President of the European Commission, Jean Claude Juncker stated in his political guidelines for the next European Commission that “combating cross-border crime and terrorism is a common European responsibility” (Juncker, 2014 p.9). It makes sense that Juncker emphasized the need for EU cooperation to counter-terrorism and radicalization because these are cross border societal challenges. Therefore, since 2005, after the bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), the EU follows an ambitious counter-radicalization policy agenda (De Goede and Simon, 2012 p.315). However, the EU emphasized that the responsibility of combating radicalization and terrorist's recruitment lies primarily with the Member States, at a national, regional and local level (Council of the European Union, 2005 p.8). This raises the question; how do local municipalities implement these ambitious counter-radicalization policies?
The EU's “Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism” presents a strategic commitment divided over four pillars: prevent, protect, pursue and
respond (Council of the European Union, 2005). Especially the prevention pillar
requires intensified coordination on a local level. The prevention strategy aims to “prevent people from turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalization and recruitment, in Europe and internationally” (Council of the European Union, 2005 p.3). The EU stressed that this strategy requires the full engagement of all populations in Europe and beyond (Council of the European Union, 2005 p.8). Consequently, counter-terrorism has now been reframed as a broader issue that needs to be tackled by society as a whole (Ragazzi, 2018 p.9). Therefore, “families, teachers, doctors, nurses, social workers, and community and religious leaders have all been asked to participate” (Ragazzi, 2018 p.9).
Radicalization policies require cooperation on all levels of society, but emphasize the role actors on a local and municipal level. Therefore, this thesis aims to clarify how local municipalities implement radicalization policies. The following paragraphs elaborate on relevant concepts and theories of radicalization. It emphasizes the scientific and societal relevance of this thesis. Thereafter this introduction explains the scope of this thesis subject, from which the research question and research design follows. Lastly, this introduction explains the thesis outline.
1.1 Scientific debate
Scholars identified that the concept of radicalization is difficult to define (Sedgwick, 2010; Neuman 2008). Radicalization has different meanings on the agendas of security, integration/society, Islam and foreign affairs (Sedgwick, 2010). Therefore, it has been argued that the concept radicalization is a social construct, that is defined by the context in which it is applied (Figoureux and Van Gorp, 2020). Previous studies on radicalization focused on the influence of social constructs of radicalization on the agenda-setting phase. However, not many scholars paid attention to the implementation of radicalization policies on a local level. In this implementation phase conflict and negotiation among policymakers, continues and reflects in the policy means that are assigned (Howlett, 2009 p.27). Therefore, this thesis examined the role of social constructs in the implementation phase of radicalization policies. Relevant theories that were taken into account include the theory of social constructs of Schneider and Ingram (1993), the theory of an implementation deficit by Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) and the NATO categorization of policy tools by Hood (1986).
1.2 Academic and societal relevance
This research has academic relevance because the effect of social constructs of radicalization and the effect on policy instruments has not yet been thoroughly researched. Previously, other academics researched how radicalization has been framed by politics and by the media. It has not yet been analyzed how radicalization as a social construct, influenced the policy tools that are implemented. This thesis aims to contribute to the gap in the literature by identifying mechanisms of how social constructs of radicalization affect the policy tools that are implemented. The multilevel nature of radicalization policies is taken into account because it is likely that the contexts of administrative layers resulted in different dominant social constructs of radicalization.
A local implementation study of radicalization policies also has societal relevance because it outlines how influential EU local policy recommendations are. The EU develops local policies for cross border societal issues. However local administrations are responsible for the implementation of these recommendations. It is thus interesting to what extent local municipalities take the advice of EU policies into
account. Moreover, this research has societal relevance because radicalization is a cross border societal issue that threatens to destabilize western societies. Furthermore, combating radicalization touches upon broader societal issues such as security and safety, integration, inclusion and diversity.
1.3 Scope of the thesis
The Netherlands has been selected as the case study for this thesis because the Netherlands implemented policies for the prevention of radicalization. In 2005, the Dutch Minister of Security and Justice explained that the prevention of radicalization is both the responsibility of national and local governments. However, municipalities should take the initiative for counter-radicalization policies, because they interfere with local communities, they possess local police information, and they are involved in social affairs, community houses and educational institutes (Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, 2005). Furthermore, in the national Dutch counter-radicalization strategy of 2007, it was argued that societal actors and educational professionals are the eyes and ears of society that can detect radicalization (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2007 p.24). Thus, for radicalization policies the subsidiarity principle applies, meaning that “a higher organ of society may not do what a lower organ of the individual can do, but it is the higher level that should decide to decentralize or to leave responsibilities to the lower level; this is less the natural right of the lower level” (Dekker, 2015 p. 3).
The cases that have been selected are the radicalization policies of the four largest Dutch municipalities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht.
These Dutch municipalities together are called the G4 municipalities (Grote 4, big four). These four municipalities are particularly relevant case studies because, even though radicalization can occur in every municipality, the issue is perceived more intensely in big cities. Since 2005 the G4 municipalities developed more comprehensive policies for radicalization, which increases the likelihood that a relation between social constructs of radicalization and policy instruments can be observed.
1.4 Research question
This thesis, therefore, aims to answer the question:
What is the effect of social constructs of radicalization, on the type of policy instruments that are implemented in counter-radicalization policies the G4 municipalities?
1.5 Research design
The goal of this research is twofold. First, this thesis aims to identify how preventive radicalization policies designed on an EU level are implemented on the local level. Second, this thesis aims to identify if on the level of the G4 municipalities a relation between the social constructs and the policy tools could be identified. To study the mechanism of how social constructs of radicalization affect the policy instruments that are implemented. This thesis applied a comparative case study on the implementation of radicalization policies of the G4 municipalities. Therefore, this thesis applied qualitative methods to answer the main question. Explorative semi-structured interviews with local policymakers of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht were combined with document analysis. EU, national and municipal policy documents for radicalization policies were thoroughly analyzed.
1.6 Thesis outline
Chapter 2 identifies the main literature related to the concept of radicalization, framing of radicalization and local radicalization policies. Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical framework of implementation theories. Thereafter the theoretical implications for this study are identified. Chapter 4 presents the research design of this thesis, including the conceptualization, operationalization and the data gathering. Chapter 5 outlines the analysis of the social constructs in documents of the EU, the national government and the G4 municipalities. Thereafter Chapter 5 outlines policy tools per G4 municipality. Chapter 6 summarizes the research findings, answers the research question, discusses the limitations of this study and makes recommendations for further research and policies.
Chapter 2 Literature Review
This section aims to clarify the independent variable of social constructs of radicalization. Recent academic literature has therefore been identified that discusses some of the definitions of radicalization, outlines relevant frames, and explains why there is a gap in the literature.
2.1 Radicalization, terrorism and extremism
Sedgwick (2010) stated that radicalization, at first sight, is used to describe “what goes on before the bomb goes off” (Sedgwick, 2010 p.479). However, there is no simple answer to the question of what radicalization is. The concepts radicalization, terrorism and (violent) extremism are often confused. Some argue that radicalization is a cognitive process that culminates in “radically” different ideas about society and governance, and terrorism and violent extremism consists of the violent or coercive outcomes of those ideas (Neumann, 2003 p.874). Neumann asserted that the link between radicalization and terrorism is of political origin, its aim being to allow the discussion on the causes of terrorism (Neumann, 2008 p.4). Like the definition of radicalization, there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism. Some argue that terrorism is both a doctrine and a practice (Schmid, 2009), while others state that terrorism is also a tactic and a strategy (Hoffman, 1998).
Neuman (2008) and Sedgwick (2010) argue for more research to better understand the concept (Neuman 2008; Neuman 2003; Sedgwick 2010). These academics identified two classifications: end-point definitions, which conceptualize radicalization as a progression over time; and relative/contextual definitions, which explain how radicalization is shaped by its context (Neumann, 2003 p.874). As a result of the discussion on the definition of radicalization, the concept has also been criticized (Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin, 2009; Furedi, 2009; Herbert, 2008). Some critics argue that radicalization is a discourse of political convenience (Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin, 2009 p.107). Others argue that the concept of radicalization is invented to blame young Muslims in order to distract attention away from cultural differences in society (Furedi, 2009). Radicalization is often linked to Muslim youth in Europe, as demonstrated by the rise of the Islamic State (Lynch 2013). After the 2015 terrorist
attacks in Paris, the refugee crisis in Europe and the terrorism crisis became inseparable (Nail, 2016 p.158). Consequently, the concept of radicalization is intertwined with ideas of multiculturalism, identity, integration, and segregation. By preventing radicalization, the consequences of violent terrorism can be avoided. (Lynch 2013; Figoureux and Van Gorp, 2020). In policymaking, the line between radicalization, terrorism, and immigration is therefore diffuse and open to interpretation.
Experts have identified trends of radicalization. Martins and Ziegler (2017) explained that even though “Islamist-inspired terrorism is obviously a present reality in contemporary western Europe policymakers and bureaucrats should not neglect the other terrorist threats. These include para-military groups on the far-right, radical nationalists, environmental extremists, and lone wolves” (Martins and Ziegler, 2017 p.27). Although there is discussion on the exact categorization of types of radicalization, Doosje et al. (2016) presented a clear overview of five different types of radical groups and their main concern (see Appendix 1). Doosje et al. (2016) mentioned the Nationalistic or Separatist Groups (IRA in Ireland), Extreme Rightwing Groups (Klu Klux Klan, U.S.), Extreme Leftwing Groups (FARC, Colombia), Single Issue Groups (Earth Liberation Front, U.K.), Religiously motivated Groups (ISIS, Syria/& Iraq). These groups show the diversity of radicalization types and the geographical spread of the phenomenon.
2.2 Framing of radicalization
Due to the lack of a concrete definition of radicalization, it has been framed as a “wicked problem”. The characteristics of a wicked problem are that it keeps recurring in the agenda and triggers debate on the nature of the problem and how to determine which policy measures are successful in tackling it (Poppelaars and Scholten, 2008 p.338). As a result, every commentator can frame a wicked problem according to their interpretation, preference, or advantage. It is, therefore, possible to frame the issue of radicalization in multiple ways. Figoureux and Van Gorp (2020) outlined that “it is difficult to point out an empirical reality that corresponds to the notion of ‘radicalization’. Different stakeholders, such as academics, police or youth workers seem to define ‘radicalization’ differently” (Figoureux and Van Gorp, 2020 p.240). Thus, the interpretation of radicalization is relative and depends on the point of view. De Graaff
(2009) explained that radicalization and terrorism can be politically framed because these issues are political matters and are thus “essentially contested concepts” (De Graaff, 2009 p.16). De Graaff (2009) explained that radicalization policies are the outcome of a policy process in which political choices affect the development of policies (De Graaff, 2009 p.15-18). Due to this political interference, different government departments strive for different goals, because these have different agendas (De Graaff, 2009 p.17). As a result, the political fame of radicalization can result in differences in policies of radicalization.
Sedgwick (2010) explained how, after private discussions with several European government officials, he identified radicalization as featuring in security, integration, foreign policy, and Islamic agendas. These four agendas are outlined in detail, as they have a central position in this thesis. In the security agenda, radicalization appears as a “direct or indirect threat to the security of the state and the citizens” (Sedgwick, 2010 p.485). Direct threats, Sedgwick explained, include spreading online jihadist propaganda. Indirect threats are more complex, but they include an enabling environment. Consequently, political opinions on what constitutes an enabling environment—Muslim communities in the context of Islamic terrorism, for example—are part of the security agenda (Sedgwick, 2010 p.485). In the integration agenda, the danger of radicalization is used to stress the need to combat segregation and focus on tolerance (Sedgwick, 2010 p.486). Policies, therefore, result in suitable public housing and language skills training for recent immigrants (Sedgwick, 2010 p.486). However, Sedgwick (2010) also stressed that due to the rise of nationalistic political parties, immigration becomes a politically contested subject that reflects objectives for national agendas that go beyond combating segregation by promoting democracy and citizenship. It can thus be argued that this is a more of a societal and integration agenda.
In foreign policy agendas, radicalization is explained as relating to foreign affairs. The concept of radicalization is thus directly used as framed by the security agenda. Indirectly, radicalization is used to support friendly and allied regimes and to label regimes or their opponents as radical (Sedgwick, 2010 p.487). Radicalization is also applied to private Islamic agendas, to distinguish moderate Islamic groups from radicalized ones (Sedgwick, 2010 p.488). Sedgwick thus argues that policymakers should be aware of their conflicting agendas on radicalization policies. These differences in the agendas of policies reflect differences in the outcomes of
radicalization policies. Political parties might favor a certain type of policy agenda of radicalization because this suits their political opinions. For example, anti-immigration political parties might stress how radicalization is related to the Islam. It is likely that these parties emphasize how radicalization is related to the Islam. It can therefore be argued that these politicians establish social constructs of radicalization based on their political agendas. Therefore, political opinions might influence the outcomes of radicalization policies.
2.3 Radicalization policies
Policymakers see radicalization policies as “the holy grail of counterterrorism (CT)” (Coolseat 2016 p. 4; Figoureux and Van Gorp, 2020 p. 239), and research therefore focuses on the effectiveness of preventive EU radicalization policies (Aiello et al., 2018; De Goede and Simon, 2013; Lindekilde, 2012). However, less publications focused on the practical implementation of these policies. As outlined in the introduction of this thesis, recommends the EU ‘'Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism” (2005) to involve multiple actors to especially prevent youth from radicalization. As a result, social workers, teachers, doctors and religious leaders are suddenly asked to participate to prevent radicalization. For example, Ragazzi outlined that the Dutch schools have various channels for reporting cases of students who might be considered to be in the process of radicalization (Ragazzi, 2018 p.24).
For the involvement of the civilian population in preventive radicalization policies, Ragazzi (2018) explains that governments must “win the hearts and minds” of the population (Ragazzi, 2018 p.22). To get all these actors on board it is likely that radicalization is framed differently on a local level, compared to the national and international level. In the policy field of immigrant integration policies, Poppelaars and Scholten (2008) argued that “the Dutch national government applied a “citizenship approach”, whereas local governments chose a more accommodative approach to migrant groups” (Poppelaars and Scholten, 2008 p.355). In the article it is outlined that “national integration policies were the result of central policy coordination, a sharp turn from depoliticization to politicization, responsiveness to a series of focus events, and mood swings during the past decades. Local integration policies, in contrast, were characterized by a considerable degree of pragmatic problem coping “(Poppelaars
and Scholten, 2008 p.355). It is likely that a similar distinction in frames can be indicated in preventive radicalization policies.
Chapter 3 Theory
By discussing the work of three generations of academics who focused on policy implementation, this chapter explains how incongruity between the intended goals and outcomes of implemented policies can occur. In particular, this chapter focuses on the third generation of academics and the role of social constructs in the implementation phase. It outlines how social constructs influence the chosen policy tools and the type of stakeholders consulted. Thereafter, this chapter describes the policy tools that have been implemented, discussing the NATO model of Hood (1986) in particular. The chapter concludes by presenting the causal scheme that outlines the variables and hypotheses of this study.
3.1 Theory on policy implementation
3.1.1 First and second generation: top-down and bottom-up approaches
In the 1970s, the first generation of scholars of public administration on implementation started to question why policy goals and policy outcomes often fail to match (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979), and argued that implementation is a top-down process. Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) noticed that a so-called implementation deficit/gap occurred, because “over time circumstances change, goals alter and initial conditions are subject to slipperage” (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984 p.xxiii). Their main argument was that “the longer the chain of causality, the more numerous the reciprocal relationships among the links and the more complex implementation becomes” (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984 p.xxiv). In contrast, the second generation of scholars focused on the bottom-up approach. At the lowest level, street-level bureaucrats—such as police officers, teachers, and social workers—create conditions for public policies to be implemented. Lipsky (1980) argued that these street-level bureaucrats have a significant influence on citizens’ lives, because they are responsible for implementing governments’ decisions on benefits and sanctions. (Lipsky, 1980 p.4). The second generation of academics argued that by examining the difficulties that street-level bureaucrats encounter, the roots of the incongruence between policy outcomes and policy intentions can be outlined.
3.1.2 Third generation: hybrid theories and social constructs
The third generation of scholars acknowledged the influence of other internal and external parties in the implementation process. Moreover, the new generation of academics was interested in the influence of ideas, discourses, and social constructs on implementation. These third-generation studies suited a broader development in which scholars of public administration acknowledged the impact of ideas on policymaking. Together, these publications can be categorized in the theories of social constructivism and discursive institutionalism.
Social constructivism recognizes context and environment as influential factors that shape ideas and perceptions. In other words, “the social environment in which we find ourselves, defines (constitutes) who we are, our identities as social beings. ‘We' are social beings, embedded in various relevant social communities” (Risse, 2004 p.145). As a result, socially constructed contexts define ideas on issues, policies, and solutions. Hall (1993) is one of many scholars in public administration who examined how social learning, the process of political interaction, and ideas influence policymaking. He explained that policy change is a constrained process, because, in a set of ideas, some social interests are recognized as more legitimate than others (Hall, 1933 p. 292).
After the publication of Hall’s study, other authors began researching the role of ideas in politics and policymaking. Baumgartner (2013) noticed similarities between Hall’s theory of ideas and policy paradigms and other theories, including his own theory of policy changes (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991). Campbell (2002) researched how ideas and interest are intertwined and concluded that the ideas that players hold affect how they define their interest in the first place (Campbell, 2002 p.22). The presentation of ideas and interest was researched by Baumgartner and Mahoney (2008), who explained that “lobbyists, political leaders and civil servants within governing institutions, try to spin or frame issues to their preference” (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2008 p. 435). They explained that this process of framing takes place at multiple levels: at individual level framing and as collective issue definition by the EU (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2008).
Thus, while academics influenced by social constructivism researched the influence of multiple actors, ideas, and discourses on the many stages of the policy cycle, most publications focused on the agenda-setting stage (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2008; Wolfe et al., 2013; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). Only a handful of social constructivist publications focused on the implementation phase.
These publications from the third generation of scholars in implementation literature. Lester et al. (1987) commented that the third generation of authors in implementation literature synthesized top-down and bottom-up approaches. In these publications, “state implementation [was] a function of inducements and constraints provided to (or imposed on) the states from elsewhere—above or below” (Lester et al., 1987 p.206). The third generation thus created hybrid theories that acknowledged the influence of ideas and multiple actors on implementation.
The study by Schneider and Ingram (1993) is a key example of a social constructivist publication that focused on the implementation phase. Schneider and Ingram (1993) argued that “social constructions of target populations refer to the cultural characterization of popular images of the person or groups whose behavior and well-being are affected by public policy” (Schneider and Ingram, 1993 p.334). Schneider and Ingram (1993) thus argued that there is a relationship between socially constructed policy formulations that categorize citizens and the policy tools that are assigned to this group. As a result of the formulations, some groups receive support and others do not. This theory is especially relevant in the implementation phase, because this is where the support to certain target groups is allocated.
This theory proposed by Schneider and Ingram (1993) clearly outlined that there is a relationship between social constructs in policy designs and the policy tools that are assigned. This theory, and other publications of the third generation, is relevant for this thesis, which focuses on the relationship between the social constructs and the policy tools that are implemented. The theory has been substantiated by many other publications that researched the link between social constructs and policy tools. Schneider and Ingram (2006) listed the publications that were influenced by their 1993 theory. As a result of Schneider and Ingrams’ work more authors acknowledged the relationship between social constructs and the policy tools that are assigned (Schneider and Ingram, 2006 p.115). For example, the works of Soss (1999; 2000; 2005) outlined how orientation, identity, and participation affected policy design and implementation. Howlett et al. (2017) is a more recent example of a publication that,
influenced by the work of Schneider and Ingram, explains how policy mixes that include policy tools are influenced by the type of policy design.
Based on these studies, it can be deduced that a certain frame, idea, or construct affects the type of policy tools that are applied. Furthermore, as Howlett (2009) explained, “the policy goals and means are the products of constant conflict and negotiation among policymakers, guided by their values and interests and shaped by a variety of contingent circumstances” (Howlett, 2009 p.27). This process continues in the implementation phase, where the policy tools are assigned. The next section elaborates further on the causality between constructs and policy tools. It looks at what factors affect the choice of policy tools, how policy tools can be categorized, and how collaborative governance can be applied as a specific type of policy tool.
3.2 Policy tools and implementation
3.2.1 Choosing policy tools
Schneider and Ingram (2006) referred to policy tools as “the aspects of a policy intended to motivate the target populations to comply with policy or to utilize policy opportunities” (Schneider and Ingram, 1993 p.338). Howlett (2009) explained that “policy instruments” and “governing instruments” are alternative words for “policy tools” (Howlett, 2009 p.168). He asserted that by making this basic distinction in the type of instruments that are applied, it can be argued that governments possess the power to manipulate the policy actors (Howlett, 2009 p.115)—for example, by providing information to actors or withholding it from them, or by maintaining or cutting financial means, governments can influence the actors involved in their policies.
Instrument selection is a complex process influenced by many different factors. Economist theories explain that policy instruments need to be the best match for the job at hand. Political scientists, however, argue that political forces influence the outcome of choice of policy instruments (Howlett, 2009 p.169). Howlett (2009) explained that “the process of giving substance to a government decision always involved choosing among several tools available, that could contribute to advancing policy” (Howlett, 2009 p.168). Another theory was proposed by Doern (1981), who argued that eventually all instruments are technically suitable and can be shaped for
the desired purpose. However, according to Doern (1981), liberal democracies prefer the least coercive instruments available, and only in order to overcome societal resistance will they consider moving toward more interventionist action (Doern, 1981; Howlett, 2009 p. 172).
3.2.2. NATO model of policy tools
Hood and Margetts (2016) explained the NATO model of Hood (1986) by stating that “this approach argues that for any policy problem government has four basic tools at its disposal” (Hood and Margetts, 2016 p.138). “Nodality (N) is the property of being at the centre of social and information networks, authority (A) is the legitimate legal or official power to command or prohibit, treasure (T) the possession of money or fungible chattels which may be exchanged, organizational capacity (O) is the possession of a stock of people, skills, land, buildings, and technology” (Hood and Margetts, 2016 p.138). These instruments can be further categorized by substantive and procedural policy tools. “Substantive policy tools affect the substance of policy outputs, procedural policy tools are directed toward the manipulation of the policy processes” (Howlett, 2009 p.169). In Appendix 2, Howlett outlines how the substantive and procedural governing principles relate to the NATO model of Hood.
Howlett (2000) explained that by applying a set of policy instruments, contemporary governments indirectly steer social actors toward their preferred policy options. He explained that “unlike traditional ‘substantive’ instruments, which directly affect the delivery of goods and services in society, these ‘procedural’ policy instruments are intended to manage state-societal interactions to assure general support for government aims and initiatives” (Howlett, 2000 p.412). Public-private partnerships and collaborative government are examples of these forms of procedural policy instruments (Howlett, 2000 p. 413). Collaborative governance is therefore of particular interest for this thesis, because actors collectively accomplish social action for policy problems. Waardenburg (2020) explained that collaborative governance gained the interests of governments because no individual agency holds the key to resolving complex societal problems (Waardenburg, 2020 p.386). In other words, by involving many actors in this process, a collaborative advantage may occur.
3.3 Theoretical implications
Chapter 2 indicates that there is no generally accepted definition of radicalization. It has different meanings in different contexts, frames and agendas. Figoureux and Van Gorp (2020) outlined that “if the empirical reality is largely missing, then a concept such as radicalization can be seen as a social construct” (Figoureux and Van Gorp, 2020 p.240). Radicalization can thus be perceived as a social construct that is affected by its context. Third generation scholars on implementation have argued that there is a relationship between policy ideas and policy design. It can therefore be deduced that there is a relationship between the social construct of radicalization and the type of policy tools that are implemented. This thesis examines whether such relationship can be identified.
As was explained in section 2.2, the concept of radicalization is applied to different agendas: the security agenda, the integration agenda, the foreign policy agenda, and the Islam agenda (Sedgwick, 2010). These different agendas create different social constructs of the idea of radicalization. The third generation of academics in this field have described how social constructs affect the choice of policy tools. This thesis, therefore, aims to uncover how the social construct of radicalization affects the policy tools that are implemented. These policy tools are categorized using the NATO model of Hood (1986). Specifically, the stakeholders engaged in the implementation of these policies are analyzed. It can, for example, be expected that the social construct of radicalization as an issue of security might lead to more authoritative policy instruments. The security social construct views radicalization as a threat to society. To prevent these threats, social policies might be focused on authoritative interventions such as more police deployment. Radicalization as a societal/integration social construct will likely have the effect of more nodality and organizational policy tools.
Furthermore, as the theory of Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) explained, policy outcomes often fail to match policy intentions. Thus, an examination of different governing administrative layers might reveal that social constructs for radicalization policies differ. This incongruence might have consequences for the outcomes of the policy tools and the engagement of actors, compared to the policy intentions. For example, if the radicalization strategy of the EU is focused on the social construct of radicalization as an issue of foreign policy, it can be expected that the strategy
recommends international cooperation. The policy tool applied can then, for example, be the exchange of information (nodality). However, if municipalities pragmatically need to tackle the issue of radicalization that is perceived as a social construct of integration, these municipalities might choose more local collaborative governance to establish networks involving vulnerable youth (organization).
Chapter 4 Research Design
4.1 Research question and research design
This study asks an explorative research question: What is the effect of social
constructs of radicalization on the type of policy instruments that are implemented in counter-radicalization policies of the G4 municipalities?
This research applies a small-N comparative case study to the G4 municipalities, to identify whether a relationship exists between the social construct of radicalization (X) and the policy instruments that are implemented in the G4 municipalities (Y). The unit of analysis for this thesis is the citizens of the G4 municipalities that are possibly radicalizing. The population for this thesis consists of the citizens of the G4 municipalities
4.2 Case selection
This study examines whether social constructs affect the type of policy tools used in the implementation phase of the policy cycle. Chapter 3 explained that most publications have focused on how ideas influence policies in the agenda-setting stage. This thesis aims to contribute to the literature by focusing on how ideas influence the implementation stage. In this phase of the policy cycle negotiations, circumstances and interests continue to shape ideas that influence the outcome of policies. In the implementation phase, the policy tools are assigned, which makes it a relevant indicator. Radicalization is a relevant policy field to identify if social constructs affect the type of policy tools, because, as revealed in the literature review, it has been argued that in the absence of a generally accepted definition, radicalization is a social construct that is shaped by its context (Figoureux and Van Gorp, 2020).
The cases that have been selected are the radicalization policies of the four largest Dutch municipalities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht. These Dutch municipalities provide insightful case studies because, in line with the 2005 guidelines of the EU on radicalization policies and the subsidiarity principle, preventive radicalization policies in the Netherlands were implemented on a local level. These
four municipalities are particularly relevant case studies because, even though radicalization can occur in every municipality, the issue is perceived more intensely in big cities. One way to measure the intensity of the issue of radicalization in municipalities is through the yearly distribution of National Coordinator of Terrorism and Security (NCTV) funds. Municipalities with a high level of threat and insufficient resilience policies receive the most funds. The G4 municipalities are high on this list of funds almost every year. Furthermore, a 2017 report from the Inspection for Security and Justice explained that only large municipalities—those with more than 100,000 citizens—developed radicalization policies (Inspectie Veiligheid en Jusitie, 2017 p. 23). Since 2005 the G4 municipalities developed more comprehensive policies for radicalization, which increases the likelihood that a relation between social constructs of radicalization and policy instruments can be observed.
Three important characteristics make the G4 municipalities comparable cases. First, they all developed counter-radicalization policies over the past ten years. Second, they are the four biggest municipalities in the Netherlands, each with with more than 250,000 citizens. Third, as Bruinsma (2007) explained, larger cities face relatively similar security policy issues compared to other municipalities (Bruinsma, 2007). However, there are also significant differences between the G4 municipalities, resulting in variables that need to be controlled for. In line with partisan theories, political party coalitions influence the outcomes of policies. It can be expected that rightwing political party coalitions, which view safety and security of societies as one of the key tasks of the government, will prefer more authoritative policy instruments. Furthermore, it can be expected that recent radicalization incidents in municipalities might also provoke a stronger authoritative response, resulting in more authoritative policy instruments. Moreover, the following variables represent common threats to the conclusions of this study: the exact number of citizens; the political coalition of the municipality; yearly distribution of NCTV funds. These differences are outlined in Appendix 3.
4.3 Data gathering
For this thesis, similar data on all the municipalities were gathered through a systemic policy document analysis and one explorative semi-structured interview per
municipality. The interviews were not applied as a form of triangulation, but as expert counseling that provided insight into the organization structure, relevant policy documents, and agenda points. The interviewees of the four municipalities were all well-informed policy advisors of the region, two in a senior position, two in a junior position. These interviewees participated anonymously and voluntarily. To guarantee their anonymity, the transcripts of the interviews are not published in this thesis. (For further inquiries on the content of the interviews, please contact Dorien van Duivenboden.)
The documents for this thesis were selected after consultation with the policy advisors, based on the importance and relevance of the information regarding radicalization policies. To measure the importance and relevance of the documents, it was checked to see whether the documents corresponded with public information on websites and whether the policies had been discussed in the media or political arena. All documents were published between 2005 and 2020. This scope of fifteen years was chosen because the since 2005 the Netherlands implemented radicalization policies. In total, 56 documents were analyzed for this thesis. These included policy documents, expert reports, letters from ministers to the Second Chamber, letters from the majors to the municipal councils, and policy evaluation or progress reports.
4.4 Method
This thesis applies a simple word frequency qualitative content analysis that is “used to compress many words of text into fewer content categories” (Stemler, 2001 p.1). This type of analysis was chosen because it “allows us to discover and describe the focus of individual, group, institutional, or social attention” (Weber, 1990; Stemler, 2001 p. 1). It thus outlines the focus of any given document, because “the words that are mentioned most often are the words that reflect the greatest concern” (Stemler, 2001 p.2). This is a relevant technique for identifying social constructs—by applying certain words, it emphasizes different aspects of an issue. It thus explains how an issue is constructed. Researchers have indicated that this word frequency technique is often applied, but that it has several disadvantages. Stemler (2001) explained “that the word counts do not include synonyms; each word may not represent a category equally well; not all issues are equally difficult to raise; and some words have multiple
meanings” (Stemler, 2001 p.2). These difficulties can be taken into account by checking the context of sentences in which the words are found and by systematically applying synonyms.
This thesis applied both a priori and emergent coding to establish the categories of the analysis. The four agenda that Sedgwick (2010) outlined are a priori applied as categories: security (as a threat to society); societal and integration (to combat segregation); foreign policy (foreign agenda); and Islam (related to Islamic issues). The content of these categories is explained in section 2.2. For each of these four categories, ten relevant keywords were selected (see Section 4.5). This selection of words was based on synonyms and the categories created by Sedgwick. Furthermore, emergent coding was applied after the policy documents were briefly scanned to identify frequently applied words to select for the codification. These words included “violence” and “polarization”. This is a very subjective interpretation of the codification of the categories, which will be taken into account in the analysis and discussion section of this thesis.
The frequency of the keywords in the documents was then analyzed. The total number of keywords found in all the documents per administrative layer was taken as 100%. The categories with word frequencies were taken from this total number of keywords per administrative layer. For the exact number of words per category and percentages and administrative layer, see Appendix 6. Because the numerical word frequency analysis is time-consuming, only a limited number of 27 documents were selected for this analysis. However, as this thesis is a qualitative study, the findings of this numerical analysis were further substantiated with a qualitative analysis of more policy documents. The inclusion of more policy documents makes this research more reliable and creates a more holistic picture of approaches to radicalization policies.
For the word frequency analysis, relevant policy documents were selected based on similar dates of publication and references in the interviews. More documents were selected for the EU and national level, than for the municipalities. As such most EU and national Dutch government agencies that are involved in the development of radicalization policies were included. For an exact overview of the documents used in the word frequency analysis see Appendix 4 In Chapter 5, the percentages of the word frequencies are visualized in tables and further illustrated with quotes. Thereafter, based on the NATO theory of Hood (see section 4.5) the policy
documents used for the word frequency analysis, along with the interviews, were used to indicate the policy tools that were implemented in the municipalities.
4.5 Conceptualization and operationalization
Concept: Policy tools for radicalization (Y)
Policy tools are “the aspects of a policy intended to motivate the target populations to comply with policy or to utilize policy opportunities” (Schneider and Ingram, 1993 p.338). Other terms that are used as synonyms for policy tools are “policy instruments” and “governing instruments” (Howlett, 2009 p.168). The documents of the municipalities were analyzed in terms of the type of policy tools used in radicalization policies.
Policy tools can be divided into procedural and substantive policy tools. Substantive policy tools affect the substance of policy outputs (Howlet, 2009), while procedural policy tools are directed towards the manipulation of policy processes (Howlet, 2009). This thesis looks at both types of tool. The policy tools that are expected to be applied in radicalization policies are categorized according to over the so-called NATO indicators, following the theory of Hood (1986) (see section 3.2.2 and Appendix 2). Hood and Margetts (2016) explained that “this approach argues that for any policy problem government has four basic tools at its disposal”. First is the “nodality” category, which contains informative policy tools such as the provision of advice or training to create awareness for radicalization. Second is the “authority” category, which includes legal powers such as more law enforcement and police deployment. Third is the “treasure” category, which includes financial policy tools such as the funding of think tanks to substantiate policies or subsidies for preventive radicalization projects. Fourth is the “organization” category, which includes the organizational capacity to create collaborative governance cooperation with educators or religious leaders.
Concept: Social constructs of radicalization (X)
Following the papers of Figoureux and Van Gorp (2020) and Risse (2004), “social construct” is defined as “a concept of which the empirical reality is largely missing, and is therefore defined by the social environment in which we find our identities as social beings”.
As indicated in the literature review, radicalization is difficult to define. Academics distinguish between contextual definitions and end-point definitions (Neuman, 2003). Contextual definitions of radicalization are defined based on the context in which the term is applied. Some academics argue that due to the variety of contexts, researchers should abandon the idea that radicalization can be defined as an absolute concept (Sedgwick, 2010 p.491). The relative nature of the concept of radicalization is taken into account in this thesis. However, due to the central position of the concept in this thesis, it is necessary to choose one working end-point definition. This thesis therefore broadly defines radicalization as “the process whereby people become extremists” (Neuman, 2003 p. 874). It subscribes to the idea that “becoming extremist” is a process, and that studying radicalization is about discovering the nature of that process (Neuman, 2003 p. 874).
The social constructs of radicalization were operationalized for the qualitative content analysis. Appendix 5 outlines this operationalization and lists keywords and Dutch translations. For the security agenda, category words were selected that portray radicalization as a threat to society. For integration, category words were chosen that are associated with integration and social aspects of radicalization. Following the work of Sedgwick (2010) the indirect foreign policy agenda regimes are labelled as radical. In this sense, radicalization can be framed as a matter of foreign policy. The Islamic agenda was applied by Sedgwick (2010) to the moderate or radical Islamic groups. This agenda can also be applied as a category in which the government makes a distinction between moderate and radicalized Islam.
Chapter 5 Analysis
This chapter aims to identify whether a relationship exists between a social construct of radicalization and the type of radicalization-related policy tools employed. First, the chapter presents the policy context of the EU, the national Dutch government, and the G4 municipalities. Second, the social constructs of radicalization per administrative layer of the EU, national Dutch government, and the G4 municipalities are identified based on a word frequency analysis of policy documents. Third, the radicalization-related policy tools of the G4 cities are analyzed based on the NATO classification. In the concluding part of the chapter, the literature and theory are connected to the results of the social constructs and policy tools. This conclusion compares the social constructs of radicalization of multiple administrative layers, along with the implementation of policy tools at a local level.
5.1 Policy context
Since the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks of 2001, terrorism and radicalization have become a worldwide concern. In the aftermath, policymakers have implemented security policies for a largely invisible phenomenon. In the EU, counterterrorism policies were developed after terrorist strikes in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). Soon after these general EU policies were employed, national and local governments of individual EU countries began to develop counterterrorism policies. Since 2005, this multi-level nature of counterterrorism policies has created a complex policy field. At all levels of policymaking, the prevention of radicalization is often intertwined with repressive strategies of counterterrorism (CT). This analysis focuses on the prevention policies, but it also takes into account the repressive policies.
5.1.1 EU preventive radicalization policy
The Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism was adopted by the European Council in 2005 and “commits the Union to combat terrorism globally, while respecting human rights and allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice” (Council of the European Union, 2005). Even though this comprehensive strategy was fifteen years old in 2020, it still forms the basis of the
EU’s counterterrorism agenda. The strategy is built on four pillars: “(1) to prevent people from turning to terrorism and stop future generations of terrorists from emerging, (2) to protect citizens and critical infrastructure by reducing vulnerabilities against attacks., (3) to pursue and investigate terrorists, impede planning, travel and communications, cut off access to funding and materials and bring terrorists to justice, (4) to respond in a coordinated way by preparing for the management and minimization of the consequences of a terrorist attack, improving capacities to deal with the aftermath and taking into account the needs of victims” (Council of the European Union, 2005 p.4).
Following the terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo in 2015, the EU took several steps toward more concrete policies aimed at combating radicalization. For example, the EU security agenda—which was developed to counter terrorism, organized crime, and cybercrime—highlighted the need for further synergies and closer cooperation at all levels (European Commission, 2015 p.2). Furthermore, on the EU level, countering radicalization underlies the agenda to support member states, create networks, and fund research to combat radicalization. The EU supports member states with developing national radicalization prevention, training practitioners to help prevent radicalization, and cooperating with civil society and private actors (European Commission, 2014). In 2016, the EU is funding member states to prevent radicalization by, for example, supporting research and countering terrorist propaganda and online hate speech (European Commission, 2016a p.3). Furthermore, the EU special high-level expert group on radicalization (HLCEG-R) supports the EU in creating more impactful responses to radicalization (European Commission, 2019).
5.1.2 National Dutch preventive radicalization policies
EU policies have created guidelines to help member states establish policies for the prevention of radicalization. In the Netherlands, the assassination of Theo van Gogh in 2004 led to Dutch politicians placing the issue of radicalization on the agenda. Since 2005, several Dutch ministries and government agencies have cooperated to combat terrorism and radicalization. The Ministry of Justice and Security, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance are responsible for the development and implementation of (international) repressive counterterrorism policies. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, and the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science aim to improve resilience. The Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations is tasked with keeping in close contact with the municipalities. The National Coordination Terrorism and Security (NCTV) is involved in all policy fields regarding counterterrorism, but is specifically focused on the prevention of radicalization.
Since 2005, the NCTV has monitored the level of threat from terrorism (DTN) on a scale from one (minimal threat level) to five (critical threat level). Over the period 2005 to 2015, the level of threat from terrorism and radicalization fluctuated between level two and level four. The threat increased in 2013 when terrorist attacks took place in Europe, the threat of jihadism expanded, and the Dutch government feared that Dutch citizens who had traveled to Syria and Iraq might return as foreign terrorist fighters (Witte, Jacobs & Muis, 2015 p.3). In 2020, the Dutch Intelligence and Security Service estimated that in total 300 Dutch citizens travelled to Syria and Iraq (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2020). This demonstrates that several policies have been introduced in the Netherlands over the past 15 years. In 2005, the Minister of Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Justice and Security presented policies to combat radicalism and to prevent radicalization (Radicalisme & Radicalisering, 2005; Weerbaarheid & Integratiebeleid, 2005). These policies created the framework for Dutch anti-radicalization policies that sought to focus on radicalized people and their environment, hinder the spread of radicalized speech, and create more resilience to radicalization among vulnerable people (Ministerie voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie, 2005 p.25).
These two policies were further synthesized in the 2007–2011 policy strategy for the prevention, action, and repression of radicalization (Actieplan Polarisatie en Radicalisering 2007-2011). This strategy put particular emphasis on international, national, and local cooperation. In 2014, the NCTV presented both a national and local plan of action to combat jihadism. These policies have further evolved since 2015, and were presented as part of the counterterrorism strategy of the NCTV for 2016–2020. The Minister of Social Affairs emphasized that the repressive and preventive aspects of policies should be supplementary to the main approach of anti-radicalization policies (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2018a p.1). The repressive and preventive aspects are thus separate policies, but strongly intertwined with each other. The Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport developed more practical tools for municipalities. In close cooperation, the ministries established a youth
prevention platform for extremism and polarization (JEP) and an expertise unit for social stability (ESS) that gives practical advice to municipalities regarding tensions in societies and radicalization. In 2017, a report by the Inspection of Security and Justice triggered revisions in policymaking when it concluded that only half of the Dutch municipalities had established policies for the prevention of radicalization (Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, 2017). More recently, the national Dutch government has helped municipalities to create more evidence-based policies—the recent evidenced-based toolkit, for example, an online schematic evaluation toolkit that supports municipalities in the evaluation of their policies (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2019b).
5.1.3 G4 municipalities preventive radicalization policies
Soon after the national Dutch government implemented counterterrorism policies in 2005, municipalities set up strategies in local contexts. Over the past 15 years, all G4 municipalities have had to deal with various concerns over radicalization and terrorism—for example, concerns over anti-democratic and anti-integrative behavior at the Cornelius Haga Lyceum in Amsterdam in 2019, and the tram shooting in Utrecht in 2019. These incidents strengthened the necessity for municipal anti-radicalization policies. Following the EU advice, to tackle radicalization at its root causes, the G4 municipalities implemented and evaluated several policies.
Based on an expert report of 2015, the radicalization policies of the G4 municipalities of the period 2005–2015 can be divided into three phases (Witte, Jacobs, Muis, 2015 p.4). In the first phase, 2005–2011, the municipalities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague implemented new comprehensive policies to counter radicalization. The report explains that following the death of Theo van Gogh in 2004, the municipalities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam formulated radicalization policies in an independent policy field (Witte, Jacobs, Muis, 2015 p.4). These policies included action plans to counter radicalization, including Wij Amsterdammers in Amsterdam and Meedoen of achterblijven in Rotterdam. The report explains that the municipality of The Hague first implemented anti-radicalization policies combined with integration policies. Since 2007, The Hague has implemented separate anti-radicalization policies (Witte, Jacobs, Muis, 2015 p.4). For the municipality of The Hague, the 360
soft policy tools that have a combination of focused intervention and general prevention (Gemeente Den Haag, 2019). In 2005, the municipality of Utrecht formulated some more ad hoc policies in cooperation with the local police (Gemeente Utrecht, 2005). This led to the Minister of Interior and Kingdom Relations arguing that the anti-radicalization policies of Utrecht lagged behind the policies of Rotterdam and Amsterdam (Gemeente Utrecht, 2005). The 2015 report explained that in the second phase, after 2011, radicalization policies were focused on specific problems and persons, as a result of financial cutbacks. In the third phase, after 2014–2015, all four municipalities implemented anti-radicalization policies following the EU and national guidelines. These policies formed the basis of the 2015–2020 policies (Witte, Jacobs, Muis, 2015 p.4).
In following EU and national guidelines, the policies of the G4 municipalities showed similarities such as cooperation with the local actors and person-targeted policies. However, the local contexts of the municipalities also influenced the development of local anti-radicalization policies, which resulted in policy differences between municipalities. In 2017, the municipality of Amsterdam had to deal with severe criticism of its radicalization policies as a result of an integrity incident and critique expressed in the media (Obbink, 2017; Soetenhorst, 2019). Senior policy advisor on radicalization Saadia A.T had been reported to the bureau of integrity because she was involved with someone to whom she offered several assignments and funds of the municipality (Obbink, December 2017).
This resulted in, for example, a new approach to the key person network. In the municipality of Utrecht, radicalization policies were evaluated after the tram shooting in 2019. Local politics in the municipalities also influenced the development of radicalization policies to some extent. One important development for the anti-radicalization policies in Rotterdam occurred when Mayor Ahmed Aboutaleb took office, a figure who appealed to both Muslim and non-Muslim residents (Witte, Jacobs, & Muis, 2015 p.59). The leadership of Aboutaleb, therefore, strengthened policies for the inclusiveness of Rotterdam. Furthermore, the municipality of Rotterdam formed a new coalition in 2018 without the local populist, anti-immigrant party Leefbaar Rotterdam. In the municipality of The Hague, a new coalition was formed without the local populist political party Groep de Mos. These local incidents and political coalitions inevitably resulted in differences in anti-radicalization policies.
5.2 Social constructs
Security Integration/Societal Foreign Islam
EU 26% 3% 69% 2% National Dutch Government 50% 10% 19% 21% Amsterdam 37% 32% 7% 24% Rotterdam 30% 40% 8% 22% The Hague 32% 25% 8% 35% Utrecht 35% 51% 2% 13%
Table 1. Overview of percentage of dominant social construct categories based on the word frequencies found in the policy documents.
For the word frequency analysis, keywords that codify for the categories of social constructs were counted in the policy documents. For each administrative layer, the percentages outline the percentage of keywords that codify for a social construct. Per each administrative layer, the social constructs are discussed and explained with policy documents and quotes from the interviews. Table 1. presents an overview of the four administrative layers and the four social constructs. The percentages of the social constructs are taken from the total number of keywords that were found in the documents per administrative layer. Table 1 shows that in all three layers of government, the outcomes indicate that the security social construct is present, but that this is most present in the national government. Second, the results indicate that on the municipal level, the integration/societal construct is of more significance than on the national and international levels. Third, outcomes indicate that on the national and international levels, the foreign social construct is of significant importance. Fourth, the results indicate that the social construct of Islam is of insignificant importance on an international level. The outcomes will be further analyzed per administrative layer.
5.2.1 EU Policy Preventive radicalization
Figure 1. Percentage of keywords per social construct in EU policy documents.
The most prominent social construct identified in the word frequency social construct analysis is the foreign category. The second most prominent social construct is
security, while neither integration/societal nor Islam are well represented. Words that
were mentioned most often were “EU, European, Europe,” “states,” and “countries.” Because these words are included in the codification for the social construct foreign it was to be expected that this was the dominant social structure. However, when taking a closer look at the policy documents, the foreign and security social construct are indicated in EU policies.
In EU documents, radicalization is often linked to an international threat of terrorism. In the first sentence of the introduction of policy document the strategy to combat radicalization (Council of the European Union, 2005), it is emphasized “that terrorism is a threat to all states and to all peoples. It poses a serious threat to our security, to the values of our democratic societies and to the rights and freedoms of our citizens, especially through the indiscriminate targeting of innocent people. Terrorism is criminal and unjustifiable under any circumstances” (Council of the European Union, 2005 p.6). Thereafter, it is explained that the strategy was created as a “proportionate response to the international terrorist threat” (Council of the European Union, 2005 p.6). Academics still debate whether radicalization and
26% 3% 69% 2%
EU
Secutity Integration/Societal Foreign Islamterrorism are directly connected. It is, therefore, striking that in this definition radicalization and terrorism are directly connected, which further stresses the foreign and security social construct of radicalization.
In the strategy for Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism, it is stated that “Europe is also directly affected by terrorist activity around the world. Europeans can be victims of attacks, as the recent atrocities in Nairobi made clear. But they can also be the perpetrators of these attacks. Often set on the path to radicalization in Europe by extremist propaganda or by recruiters, Europeans travel abroad to train and to fight in combat zones, becoming yet more radicalized in the process” (European Commission, 2014 p.2). This statement, and the policy document, indicate that ten years after the first publication in 2005 the EU still linked radicalization to terrorism and violent extremism. Furthermore, ten years after the publication of the 2005 document, the security social construct was further strengthened by the fact that the EU placed radicalization on the EU security agenda of 2015.
The EU strategy for the policies of the prevention of radicalization is focused on “tackling the root causes” at a local level (European Commission, 2005 p.7). At first sight, this is a remarkable EU policy, because the EU perceives radicalization as an international phenomenon, and yet the local level is the responsibility of local government, not the EU. What is actually meant by this policy is a recommendation of close international cooperation on multiple levels between the EU, national governments, and local governments to combat radicalization. One of the important EU policies that aims to facilitate this international cooperation on a local level is the establishment of international networks. The Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) is an important EU anti-radicalization network that brings together frontline practitioners who work daily with people who are vulnerable to radicalization. This network includes police and prison authorities, but also teachers and local authorities’ representatives (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2020). The EU Internet Forum is another EU network, this one tackling online terrorist content (European Commission, 2020a). In the European Strategic Communications Network, member states share analyses and good practices. It can thus be argued that the EU’s perception of radicalization as a security social construct and a foreign social construct is in line with the policies it developed.
