UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM
MASTER THESIS POLITICAL SCIENCE - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
M O V I N G O N S A N D
RETHINKING THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT-MIGRATION NEXUS IN REGARD TO THE EUCAP SAHEL NIGER MISSION
SOPHIA THERESE WOLPERS 11110759
JUNE 2016
SUPERVISOR: DHR. DR. JEROEN DOOMERNIK SECOND READER: DHR. PROF. DR. HEIN DE HAAS
D I S C L A I M E R
The views in this thesis reflect the opinions of the author and, although the European External Action Service and EUCAP Sahel Niger have been consulted, neither the EEAS nor the Mission endorse the content of this thesis.
A B S T R A C T
This paper explores and analyses the effects of securitisation employed by the EUCAP Sahel Niger Mission on migrants, local communities and the overall stability of the country. The EU has severely endangered the human security, but also the overall stability of the Agadez region through its progressing measures of securitisation, conflating smuggling with terrorism and trafficking networks. It is more than apparent that a neglect of the linkages of the security-development-migration nexus in a specific country setting, like Niger, lead to undesired outcomes and possibly even to a destabilisation of the region. Going forward the EU will need to gain a better understanding of this nexus and its underpinning assumptions to successfully implement its policies in Niger, but also other countries targeted by the EU Neighbourhood Policies.
K E Y W O R D S
Migration-development-security nexus, securitisation, human security, Niger, Sahara, European Neighbourhood Policy, Tuareg, EUCAP Sahel Niger, Copenhagen School of Security Studies
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
My heartfelt thanks go to my supervisor Jeroen Doomernik for his essential guidance and encouragement. The thesis would not have been possible without the constructive discussions and patient support of Thanh-Dam Truong as well as the shared research, contacts and insights from Julien Brachet, Ines Kohl, and Eric Hahonou. A big thank you goes to Jack Kennedy and Louise Sarant for proofreading and proper questioning of my argumentation. And lastly, I am grateful to Steve Thorpe for passing on his passion for migration studies.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ... 3
II. Literature Review: Migration and Security ... 6
2.1 Migration - Development ... 7
2.2 Security - Development ... 10
2.3 Migration - Security ... 11
III. Theoretical Framework - Copenhagen School of Security Studies ... 13
3.1 Security Sectors ... 13 3.2 Regional Security ... 14 3.3 Securitisation ... 14 3.4 Extended Definitions and Concepts of the Nexus Factors ... 16 3.4.1 ‘Security’ ... 16 3.4.2 ‘Development’ ... 18 3.4.3 ‘Migration’ ... 19
IV. Data and Methods ... 21
4.1 Case Selection ... 21
4.2 Interviews ... 22
4.3 IOM Flow Monitoring Data ... 23
V. The EUCAP Sahel Niger Mission ... 23
VI. EUCAP Sahel Niger - A Tool for Securitisation of Migration ... 26
6.1 Valetta Summit – the Bigger Picture ... 26 6.2 Securitisation and EUCAP Sahel Niger ... 28 6.3 Results ... 29 6.4 Interests of the Different Stakeholders ... 29 6.4.1 EU ... 29 6.4.2 State of Niger ... 31 6.4.3 Tuareg ... 33 6.4.4 Migrants ... 34
VII. EUCAP Sahel Niger Moving on Sand ... 35
7.1 Securitisation of Migration ... 35
7.2 The Contextual Situation in Niger ... 38
7.2.1 Transit migration ... 38
7.2.2 Dependency of Local Economies on Migration ... 39
7.2.3 Decrease of Human Security due to Criminalisation of Migration ... 43
VIII. Nexus or Impossible Triangle ... 44
8.1 Policy proposals ... 48
IX. Conclusion ... 49
X. References ... 52
XI. Appendix ... 55
I. INTRODUCTION
The visit of the French and German Foreign Ministers, Jean-Marc Ayrault and
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, on May 4th 2016 to Niger highlights anew the European Union’s
(EU) interest in the stability and border management capabilities of the country. The special attention given to Niger had already started back in 2014, with the implementation of the European Union Capacity Building (EUCAP) Sahel Niger Mission, which focuses on supporting the security forces in Niger through training and equipment. But since the start of the ‘migration crisis’ in 2015, the importance of Niger to the EU has increased. During the Foreign Ministers’ press conference, the main emphasis of the visit was placed on the EU’s support to ‘combat human smuggling’1, while other concrete support in development aid was not specifically discussed.2
This renewed interest by the EU in Niger is not surprising; Libya has been an unstable partner in the European Neighbourhood Instrument’s regional programs, especially as the security situation worsened further in mid-20143. Libya’s inability to protect its borders and honour its agreements with the EU, as well as the EU’s inability to properly deploy people to support Libya on the ground with security and state-building missions, have increased the focus of the EU on countries along the migration trail. There is a particular focus on targeting migrants from West African countries that belong to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
While there have not been any agreements similar to the EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) agreements with Niger, this visit fits in with the on-going deepening of bilateral agreements on law enforcement and infrastructure with North African countries to create a buffer zone to protect the EU from ‘unwanted’ migration. In turn, these countries within the buffer zone receive financial support for security forces, development and will be able to strike special trade deals with EU member states (Truong, 2008: 89).
Irregular migration from the ECOWAS region towards the EU is mostly categorised as ‘unwanted’, and does not qualify as skilled, attractive labour, and it is unlikely that
1http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-sahel-niger/mission-description/index_en.htm 2 http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/niger-steinmeier-migranten-101.html
the EU will admit to its unskilled labour demands in the near future (De Haas 2008). Somewhat unrecognised by the EU is the continued attraction of Libya as a destination country, despite its unstable situation. Routes through Niger (and partly Mali) have been used by ECOWAS migrants for decades to find employment in the oil, farming or construction sector in Libya. With the involvement of the EU through tighter border restrictions and deportation demands towards Libya, the EU indirectly increasingly compromised the regular circular migration routes, which forced much of the transportation business underground. The securitisation and criminalisation of migration have a lasting influence on the human security of the migrants and the flows. Due to the stricter border controls and the increased costs of reaching Libya, many ECOWAS nationals now have two options: they either stay longer in an unstable Libya to earn back the money or they will try to go to Europe directly as they assume higher earning potential there. Furthermore, regular or irregular return migration has been made progressively difficult, increasing the attractiveness of migrants to board a boat towards Europe to escape the escalating dangers of irregular employment in Libya4.
It would be inattentive for the EU to regard Niger as yet another case of its efforts in expanding its ‘concentric circles of security’ politics (Rogers 2004; Truong, 2008: 89), disregarding that Niger has a vastly different relationship with migration than the countries on the North African coast. Nigerien people have always secured their livelihood through mobility, either as nomads following pastoral demands or specialising in different trades through the desert for the last centuries. Since the 1980s, a quickly adapting economy has grown around the business of transit migration to North Africa.
This paper places the EU extraterritorial migration control measures in Niger in the vision of the EU “Common Foreign and Security Policy” which provides the guidelines for the EU Neighbourhood Policy framework in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
The EU policy towards Niger can be depicted on two levels:
1) The concept of security defined by the EU as a series of concentric circles in the management of its enlargement and neighbourhood policy based on EU norms;
2) The tendency to reproduce a self-defined concept of ‘security’ (and ‘development’) rather than understanding its local meanings in trans-Saharan migration.
Niger emerged as the EU’s newfound focus, given the shortcomings of its neighbourhood policy in Libya: being both a traditional seasonal migration area as well as a ‘new’ transit area for trans-Saharan migrants seeking to reach Europe. While extraterritorial measures of managing migration flows in Libya since 2004 were now rendered ineffective due to its current state, the EU continues to expand its security measures in a similar way to Niger now. Without proper recognition of the distinct historical and socio-economic features of trans-Saharan migration in Niger, a traditional transit rather than destination country, the EU’s extraterritorial measures to pre-empt migratory flows out of Niger are bound to fail.
This paper uses a two-tier approach to demonstrate these shortcomings. The first tier identifies how the possible signs of a (cognitive) disconnect in the extraterritorial EU migration management approach, embodied by the support function of the EUCAP Sahel Niger Mission to the Nigerien Security Forces, can lead to practices of securitisation of migration. Such practices can generate outcomes that in turn produce unwanted responses. The second tier highlights the key weaknesses in the EU policy experience in Niger, where the reality of trans-Saharan migration differs significantly from the known patterns of migration in North African countries into Europe. This finally leads to the questioning of a possible gap between the mission’s set objectives from Brussels and its actual application in Niger. Since the main objective of the EUCAP Mission is to support the Nigerien government in its efforts to increase security and stability, the objectives concerning migration control need to be revisited. Preventing any worsening of the stability in Niger might become a priority in addressing the migration and security nexus.
The research questions for this thesis are thus:
1) How is the EU fostering the further securitization of migration in Niger through its EUCAP Sahel Niger mission?
2) What role do the linkages between security, development and migration play?
3) What is the specific context of these factors in Niger (Agadez region) and how are they influenced by the securitization?
I will examine these questions in the framework of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies while taking a closer look at the overlaps of security, development and migration and their effects on each other. Following, I will shed some light on the premises the EU stakes its objectives on and highlight the different interests at play by the involved stakeholders. Subsequently, I explore the special context situation in Niger and point out the effects of securitisation.
Lastly, I take a critical look at the problem at hand and will give possible policy proposals.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW: MIGRATION AND SECURITY
At the heart of the argumentation lie the linkages between the fields of security, development and migration, with their peculiar pairings and varying interpretative scopes. An integral problem is that “[m]igration, development and security are integrally linked but habitually studied in ‘pairs’” (Sørensen 2012: 62) depending on the viewpoint of the analyst and which argument is supposed to be advanced.
However, there is a second dichotomy at play, as the pairs are generally either analysed from a Global North or Global South position. What holds true for one perspective is often not transferable to the other, or at least not perceived as transferable arguments. The main aspects of their bilateral relationships will be highlighted for a better fundamental understanding of the issues at hand.
Overarching, it will be a juxtaposition of a state-centred and normative approach to an interactive approach or securitisation approach of the nexus factors. It is of utter importance to understand the relevance of the latter along the shaping of the contextual meanings of security by state action and local responses.
2.1 MIGRATION - DEVELOPMENT
Migration has always been a closely linked factor to either economic or social development (Sørensen, Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002; De Haas 2008). Unfortunately, research on the correlation between migration and development has shifted to simply investigating the influence international migration has on development in the Global South and only in rare cases the causality link is turned around5. There has been a disconnect in this correlation, where emigration is nowadays positively linked with development, while immigration is still seen as a negative occurrence. This stark contrast between argumentations for the Global North and South leads to many blind spots in the study of linkages between migration and development.
Classical migration studies see migration as singularly economically motivated. The individual leaves his/her country of origin to seek out better economic opportunities in another country, if possible to support his/her family back home. Migration from this perspective is seen as a balancing movement between two unequal pools: the greater the migration movement, the greater the inequality between countries. This economic view constitutes that the biggest migratory movements should originate from the poorest countries to the richest until a equilibrium is achieved.6 A equilibrium is achieved through the flow of remittances, goods, finance and ultimately human capital (‘brain gain’) back to the country of origin when the migrant returns after a temporary stay in the Global North (Bakewell 2008; Castles, De Haas & Miller 2014). This argument assumes that migration can only be positive for development if it manifests itself in actual, physical circular migration, otherwise, the real, long-term and sustainable development effect might be marginal if the circle is not fulfilled. The contrary debate runs along the argumentation lines of ‘brain drain’, where it is claimed that migration affects less developed countries even more negatively. It is assumed that only the well educated and rich are able to move and thus starve the country of valuable human capital, as they move to more developed countries or
5 The influence of migration on development in the Global North is studied, but it rather focuses on the
migration of highly skilled migrants, leaving out low skilled labour and thus denying its importance for the smooth workings of an advanced economy.
6 Reasons for the imbalance between countries are argumented differently depending on Structuralist,
Marxist and Liberal theories, but they all take the economic viewpoint of balancing movements. (Frank, 1969; Wallerstein, 1974)
countries that offer more opportunities for their particular skills. This negative view on migration-development linkages in the Global South also often assumes that remittances transform producers in rural communities rather into consumers than into productive investors (Castles et al. 2014; Sørensen et al. 2002).
Development studies, on the other hand, have seen migration as an assessment of their own work. If emigration takes place, it is interpreted as a sign of failure of the development measures in a particular community or as sign of conflict resulting in insecurity and state fragility (Bakewell 2008). In many countries migration to the urban centres is often misinterpreted as failed development policies in the rural areas of the country, since rural-urban migration is often associated with urban poverty (Bakewell 2008; Castles et al. 2014). In this vein, migration is seen as a negative influence on rural production, increasing inequality, improper use of remittances for consumption rather than productive investments and the stress, migration inflows have, on quickly expanding megacities of the developing world that fail to keep up on an infrastructure level with its human inflows (Bakewell 2008). “In general, within the [Western] development literature migration has been framed as a problem: a response to crisis rather [than] a ‘normal’ part of people’s lives” (Bakewell 2008: 1345; De Haan 1999).
Bakewell (2008) also emphasises how the compartmentalisation of development and migration, which is mainly analysed on the unit of states, hinges behind the true effects migration has on individual and communal development. The consequences of this approach are well captured by Rimmer (2003: 488):
“No matter how remunerative migration might be, it is likely to be thought an unsatisfactory answer to the question of how Africa is to be developed. Individuals and their kin become better-off, but their places of origin remain backward or under-developed. But this perception signifies only in the context of a world we divide as nations or states. In this context, Sudan counts for more than the Sudanese, Nigeria for more than the Nigerians, Ethiopia for more than the Ethiopians.”
In many ways, the acknowledgement of movement being an integral part for development and thus adjusting Western development aid to these circumstances is a test for the true interests and beliefs the Global North pursues in the states it intervenes.
While it is important to acknowledge in which ways migration and development might be linked it is equally crucial to understand which casual relationships are not existent or not proven (De Haas 2008).
Sørensen et al. (2002) point out the three most important myths of development-migration linkages. Firstly, that there is “no direct link between poverty, economic development, population growth, and social and political change on the one hand, and international migration on the other. Poverty reduction is not in itself a migration reducing strategy” (Sørensen et al. 2002: 3). A precondition for international migration that is often neglected is the availability of substantial financial means, which are normally not accessible for the poorest members of society (De Haas 2008). This argument also holds true for refugees, who often only have the means to flee to a different region in their home country or a neighbouring country to leave the biggest trouble spots of conflict behind. Only a small percentage of refugees will become part of intercontinental migration.
Secondly, migrants from the Global South need to be reconsidered as agents for development. Curbing the movement of human capital and labour is hurting global economic growth in a globalised world where there are seemingly no barriers for capital, goods, or services. Governments have been ignoring the power of remittances, thus, many remittance flows are severely diminished through the inefficiency of the networks they pass through. There is demand and moreover strong incentives for governments in the Global North and South to better cooperate on issues of labour mobility and remittance flows.
And lastly, the way the Global North distributes development aid is skewed, as it often favours well-performing countries over least developed ones, which are often rather the recipients of humanitarian aid. Unfortunately humanitarian aid - while effective in the direct aftermath of a crisis - is not a successful tool for poverty reduction. “Development aid is more effective than humanitarian assistance in preventing violent conflicts, promoting reconciliation and democratisation, and encouraging poverty-reducing development investments by migrant diasporas” (Sørensen et al. 2002: 4) and should thus be distributed on revised conditions.
2.2 SECURITY - DEVELOPMENT
Similar to the interrelationship of migration and development, development and security are endogenously linked, but here to a lesser degree cause and effect can be separated, meaning that it is less straightforward to argue that one is (solely) the precondition for the other one. Nevertheless, the significance of this nexus is increasing due to the globalisation of political and economic interests.
Depending on the epistemological, ontological and philosophical approach the nexus can be interpreted on multiple levels. In order to keep some coherence in the presentation of this nexus, this thesis only focuses on determining issues of security and development and assesses them through the same theoretical lens.
The modern, teleological narrative paints “security and development [as] spatially located in a particular bounded geographical space - usually the state, but also increasingly the region - and temporally located through a particular historical trajectory in relation to other geographical spaces” (Stern and Öjendal 2010:17; Bhabha 2004; Hutchings 2008; Jabri 2007; Walker 2006). This view favours the state as the actor and the main subject of the two concepts, which leads to the conclusion that both factors must be “internal[ly] confluence[d]” (Stern and Öjendal 2010: 17), meaning that they each need each other as a precondition for success. In this view development manifests itself through “economic growth, democratisation and social welfare” (Stern and Öjendal 2010:18), while security is associated with the domestic control and legitimacy of the state. If this concept is applied to states where neither is present, the theory quickly fails to show significant progress. Nevertheless, this interpretation of the nexus as a mutually reinforcing bridge between security and development is often taken to a global level where in order for one region to be secure another has to develop. This logic is easily illustrated with the rhetoric around the ‘War on Terror’. The Global North increases development aid to developing countries under the fear that its security could be threatened by the poverty and thus the (alleged) induced tendencies of dispossessed people to radicalise and participate in global terror.
The contrary, often extremely negative approach, is the interpretation that if neither of the nexus factors are already present through reasons of history, neither will be ever be accomplished. “Efforts at achieving development breed underdevelopment, more poverty, [and] disenfranchisement” (Stern and Öjendal 2010: 19) as the former
colonial powers act in a paternalistic way and deny the Global South heterogeneity, sovereignty, autonomy and self-determination. Security always carries with it the possibility of insecurity, violence and being seen as a threat itself.
An alternative school of reasoning focuses on a broadened and humanised interpretation of this nexus, denoting security primarily as human security, and development in terms of human development. Despite the humanistic view of this school, spatial and temporal aspects dictate the value and hierarchy of these aspects for the different societies in question.
2.3 MIGRATION - SECURITY
Similar to the migration-development nexus, this link follows widely different assumptions on the topic when viewed from the Global North and the Global South. The divide can also be characterised as having a focus on either state security or human security.
Migration as a factor, or rather as a threat to state security is predominately discussed in the Global North. In doing so it confronts a notion of the liberal paradox, the assumption that greater security is reached through greater globalisation, cross-border exchanges of information, cooperation between countries and national agencies internationally, the only factor excluded from moving freely across borders is the human being. The extent of the freedom of movement for humans is closely linked to his/her origin and then to his/her economic status or exhibited skill level (not potential). While certain migration from high-skilled individuals is wanted, low-skilled labour migration is often characterised as a threat to the social welfare systems of the Global North. Often overlooked is the fact that the economies of the Global North also have a high demand for the low-skilled labour migrants (e.g. service sector) in order to have well-functioning economies (De Haas 2008).
This perception of migrants as a threat has lead to increased levels of structural violence (Galtung 1969) decreasing the human security of individuals in countries categorized as safe by forcing them into precarious employment and housing situations. Increasing xenophobia and related violence have further added to factors of insecurity in the Global North (Castles et al. 2014: 198ff).
This layer of human insecurity is just the last stage migrants will usually encounter. Human insecurity, manifested through socio-economic, political or environmental contexts are often the reason migration happens in the first place. En route the insecurity is only heightened through added vulnerabilities imposed through raised state security measures. The increase in state security when it comes to migration, especially the militarisation of borders foster smuggling networks and makes migrants more vulnerable to trafficking networks.
United Nations organizations like UNHCR and UNDP7 have often played a two-sided
game on issues of migration and security, while stressing the vulnerability of human security of refugees and migrants, they have also promoted policies ‘preventing’, ‘containing’ and ‘reversing’ the flows of people as they create new security threats, namely socio-economic instability in the new host-regions (Adamson 2006; Isolato 2009).
Furthermore, governments of the Global North have also focused on linking migration flows with channels for international terrorism since the early 1990s and have only become fiercer in their advocacy after 9/11 and the attacks in European capitals in the early 2000s (Adamson 2006: 165).
The potential of emigration to increase state security is often underestimated. International migration relieves economic pressures in countries with high youth unemployment and the presence of Diasporas can be used to tighten diplomatic and economic relationships (Adamson 2006).
The perception of mobility, especially in the Global South, as a threat is deeply rooted in colonial practices of control. Stricter security measurers in the border areas have not significantly led to the desired curbing of migration; only a symbolic act of control has been achieved (De Haas 2008; Flahaux & De Haas 2016; Hagan 2008; Rudolph, 2003; Sørensen 2012).
Security arguments make mobility highly selective and thus create a new class of subaltern with no access to the globalised world (Truong 2011).
7
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK - COPENHAGEN
SCHOOL OF SECURITY STUDIES
3.1 SECURITY SECTORS
The Copenhagen School of Security Studies (CS), spearheaded by the work of Buzan, Wæver and Wilde (1998), brought three big advances to the study of security in International Relations. Firstly, it broadened the definition from a materialistic term of power that was concerned with targeting military threats through military intervention and only focused on state actors, to a more holistic approach that could be differently interpreted in the various areas of military/state, politics, society, economy and environment (Buzan et al. 1998).
With the breach into other areas than the military, security is able to capture the different dynamics that security encapsulates in these areas. It also gives way of constructing a combined threat of many different areas and analysing the varying relations, manifesting in positive and negative spill overs, between them. While thinking in sectors sounds plausible and accessible, in terms of real analysis the distinction between the different entities is not always that accessible. Buzan (1998) suggests defining the sectors by their “specific types of interaction.” This means, “the military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition; the economic sector is about relationships of trade, production and finance; the societal sector is about relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere.” (Buzan et al. 1998: 7; Buzan 1991; Wæver et al. 1993)
It has to be noted that these descriptions of the sectors by relationships alone, mainly apply if viewed through the lens of security and cannot unilaterally be transferred to other studies.
Another progressive step of the CS is broadening the level of analysis. To mirror the multifaceted approach, they move away from the state as central unit of analysis and allow different players as viable actors influencing more than just their level.
3.2 REGIONAL SECURITY
The CS focuses on the regionality of security; it assumes that security threats do not travel well over a certain distance (e.g. USA does not feel threatened by conflicts in Central Africa, thus no involvement). Security in a certain region is marked by the interdependence of all actors on each other, this definition does not limit security threats to a certain radius but considers the underlying ties between actors/states and can thus take varying sizes. Globalization, not just in the economic sense, but also in the social and cultural sense, is a catalyst for expanding these regional security complexes as it decreases distance in relative terms. The more nations, societies and economies are connected, the more they also share each other’s burdens, which can be widened to the concept of security threats.
The increased migration movements of North and sub-Saharan Africans towards Europe in the last two decades have shown that neither the Mediterranean nor the Sahara can be considered natural borders and that modern communication technology and transport methods enable a larger variety of connections and pathways (Collyer, Düvell & De Haas 2012). After economic globalization, human globalization is following in its steps and thus expanding what can be perceived as a regional complex. The horizon for African migrants has changed, but so has the European view on what can qualifies as a threat.
“A security complex is defined as a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved from one another.” (Buzan et al. 1998: 12). While this does not hold true to all sectors of security defined earlier, as some sectors have their own unique dynamics and causal dependencies prevail, Europe and North Africa and now the Sahel can be defined as a regional security complex according to the CS. The actors involved in this security complex need not see themselves as being part of a security complex (Buzan et al 1998).
3.3 SECURITISATION
The CS coined and defined the term securitisation as a (speech) act of a dominant actor trying to move a certain topic away from the political debate, or onto the stage at all, into the area of security concerns, marketing the threat as existential to a certain audience. Only if the audience agrees with the threat, the dominant actor is able to use
the established securitisation frame to justify extraordinary measures to fight the threat. “It is important to note that the security speech act is not defined by uttering the word ‘security’” (Buzan et al. 1998:27) conversely it is often not mentioned at all or tied to something unrelated.
A threat is inter-subjective, meaning that it is neither objective, nor subjective to a certain group of people but depends on the acceptance of the audience to the securitisation speech act. Through this perspective almost any international relations topic can be analysed under the measures of securitisation/desecuritisation.
“A successful securitisation […] has three components (or steps): [exclamation of an] existential threat [followed by] emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules” (Buzan et al. 1998:26). Prioritisation of an issue and the ‘feasible’ neglect of established rules or laws characterise the process of securitisation. The extraordinary measurers employed are justified by the urgency, the necessity to act before properly assessing the situation, as otherwise the constructed threat could already have devastating consequences. Buzan et al. (1998:29) go so far as to label security as a negative, “as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics”. They strongly warn that the idolisation of national security is increasingly used to silence opposition and to employ measures less constrained and controlled by democracy (Buzan et al. 1998). Securitisation is not an objective security assessment; rationale is purposefully excluded for the line of reasoning behind the existential threat (Buzan et al. 1998).
The main units involved in securitisation and its analysis are (Buzan et al. 1998: 36): 1) Referent object: the thing or person that will mainly suffer from the existential
threat
2) Securitising actor: actor that moves the issue into the security sphere, declares the referent object and stands to gain politically from this action
3) Functional actors: actors possessing the power to significantly influence the dynamics of the sector, often negatively affected by the securitisation move Securitisation also occurs when the securitising actor drives the criminalisation of a certain topic, elevating minor crimes to more serious ones by associating them with national security threats (Grewcock 2003; Parkin 2013: 5). This practise helps to
conflate realities and legitimacy of threats and makes it possible to even criminalise victims through association. Criminalisation is an effective tool in the process of establishing credibility of an ‘existential threat’, and thus needs to be carefully monitored.
Securitisation in politics is used to asset control and to shift action and policy out of the political sphere, where debate is sanctioned to something more unilateral.
3.4 EXTENDED DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS OF THE NEXUS FACTORS
The Copenhagen School of Security Studies has shown that definitions and approaches have to be widened, levels of analysis combined, non-state actors need to be considered, and that interests behind all actors have to be better analysed and understood. The stress set by the Copenhagen School on relationships or linkages between sectors validates the focus on interactions of the nexus factors to gain a better understanding of their real life consequences.
In order to grasp the true dilemma of the debate around the security-development-migration nexus it is important to be aware of the different definitions and scope/ understanding of the specific usage of the terms; meaning can shift quickly in seemingly similar discourses. “The power of definition over ‘development’ [,‘migration’] and ‘security’ also implies power to define not only the relevant field of interest, but also the material content of practices, the distribution of resources, and subsequent policy responses” (Stern and Öjendal, 2010: 7; Chandler 2007). Each field is dominated by divergent ontologies, which translate into varying empirical approaches and methods and thus arrive at different causal relationships.
This should be perceived as an attempt to holistically define each field with all its aspects, to possess all necessary understanding for a contextualised and valid analysis.
3.4.1 ‘SECURITY’
In keeping with the Copenhagen School’s tradition, this thesis widens the concept of security even further by adding the individual human being as an additional unit of analysis. This wider scope also encompasses the actors and enforcers of security on all levels of analysis. In a globalised world, states do not hold the monopoly of security powers but increasingly choose to cede and externalise this monopoly to
private security providers or internationalise it through close cooperation with foreign governments. The increased number of players in the security field often obscures or negates the underlying interests of the actors at play. At best, they compliment each other, improving security strategies: in the worst-case scenario, they contradict each other. This contradiction creates possible sources for violence – a deterioration in the status quo leads to increased insecurity (Stern and Öjendal 2010). Nevertheless, this model often leads to the conflation of “‘nation’ with ‘sovereignty’ and ‘territoriality’ and thereby the interests of the state with those [of the] people living under its jurisdiction” (Truong 2011: 25). The Eurocentric model of equating these terms denies the chasms between them, if one considers the migration flows across borders in post-colonial countries, where borders were demarcated by colonial rulers that often separated local communities sharing common ethnic and cultural origin.
There is also the danger that security is abused as a technique of governmentality (Foucault 1991), where the state, by itself or through coercion by external factors, misuses it sovereign power through oppression, regulation, violent control, policing and surveillance of its society to create certain subjects, which then can be framed as criminal, harmful or disruptive to society and the state.
As these subjects are often human beings, it is only appropriate to properly extend the concept of security to human security. Human security can be described in similar categories as Buzan et al (1998) have categorised state security; there is human economic security, human political security and so forth. Or as defined by Jolly and Ray (2006:5) that “the causes of insecurity [… to human] include threats to socio-economic and political conditions, food, health, and environmental, community and personal safety”
If all facets of security are actually taken into account, constructing security objectives becomes quite complicated, as it seems that due to competing interests one is only able to prioritise one, either the state or the human. The best way to define security holistically can be summarised as: “being the aspiration for order and well-being through justice, in a double sense: a contextual phenomenon and a process of transformation.” (Truong 2011: 37)
3.4.2 ‘DEVELOPMENT’
Development is a topic of constant debate as its definition and practice are not clear-cut (De Haas 2008). Most definitions of development centre on the development of countries measurable in GDP growth, growth in income per capita or the rate of industrialisation, but they rarely expand to the development of the human. True development cannot be measured on the analysis level of states, as all these economic measures incorporate the ability to hide the existence and possible expansion of inequalities in a society, progress for some region or part of society normally goes hand in hand with the deprivation of others (Castles et al. 2014).
The broadest definition of development is given by Sen (1999): “a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy”. Growth in income per capita can be used as a measure for this but it cannot give a full picture of the quality of life. This requires an expansion of freedoms that could also be established by other means, like the wide presence and accessibility of facilities for health and education or the expansion of civil and political rights (World Bank 2004). The true heart of development lies in the objective of freedom; only freedom, the right of people to control their own lives, is able to expand development (Sen 1999).
Development studies have tried to capture this principle by setting the ‘good life’ as a development goal. Unfortunately the concept of defining the ‘good life’ is inherently paternalistic and recalls colonialist practices (Bakewell 2008). Furthermore, the focus of development aid is often on the “fight against the abuse of rights and exploitation, but they struggle to understand and respect people’s decision to take such risks” (Bakewell 2008: 1354). This denial of people’s agency also becomes problematic when trying to properly integrate migration into the agenda of development. The focus is often on the exploitation and general human insecurity that occurs through irregular migration channels, which are actually a symptom of the abusive international framework and its arbitrary limitations on movement, rather than a root cause in itself (Anderson 2007; De Haas 2008).
Development policies thus need to focus on the actual extension of freedoms of people, rather than pursuing an out-dated paternalistic definition of development. Instead of taking away agency, by forcing them to ‘develop’ in on certain space one needs to make the space more attractive through allocation of resources for health,
education and production. Access to resources is the basic right that should not be deflected.
3.4.3 ‘MIGRATION’
Individual agency is as important for development as it is crucial in understanding migration. Migration should be rephrased as human mobility to reflect this emphasis and needs to be further widened to include all kinds of short-term, long-term or circular movements, to include the whole array of reasons for movement, from forced, be it by war or poverty, to voluntary for individual or economic aspirations (Vigneswaran & Quirk 2015). As international migration is singled out as a problem, one also needs to reconsider the formulation of fixed borders and their influence on the perception of sovereignty. “A country’s right to determine who enters its borders, and under what conditions, is regarded as the essence of state sovereignty” (Sørensen et al. 2002: 16; Haus 2001). From a Western perspective, negligence to actively control the borders and thus the in- and outflows, is generally seen as a weakness of the state that needs to be remedied.
This leads to the exploration of the widely different understanding of control over movement mostly exhibited by African countries or societies with nomadic roots, which Rossi (2015: 149) termed “kinetocracy”8.
“[T]he desert-like environments, characterised by low population densities and the necessity to be mobile, support the development of particular governmental rationales that should be conceptualised in their own terms. […] [P]ower comes to be expressed primarily as control over one’s own and other people’s movements, because it is through such control that access to water, food, and other assets is secured. In these contexts, political authority is based on three main conditions: ability to access resources and make them available to allies and dependents; ability to make others move in support of one’s economic and military purposes; and ability to hinder the mobility of one’s enemies.” (Rossi 2015: 149)
8 (Rossi 2015: 265): „The term combines elements from the ancient Greek words kinesis (=motion,
movement) and krátos (=force, power). [It is used to indicate particular form] of government, in which power corresponds to the capacity to move freely and control other people’s movement.“
The real power of mobility, especially in the harsh climate of the Sahara, lies in the freedom to seize economic opportunities where they arise and access resources where they are present (Rossi 2015).
This leads to rather diverse logics of governmentality, rather than attesting just to a clash between different interests of political elites (Rossi 2015). Logics of governmentality are also formed by the interaction between state agents and citizens on a day to day basis, that have clearly defined which movements are deemed acceptable, often influenced by persistent culture and history, and which are not. It is in this context where “mobile populations interacting with officials in contexts where laws and procedures are either meditated or marginalized by informal interventions, unequal negotiations, and sometimes highly exploitative and coercive exchanges” (Vigneswaran & Quirk 2015: 7) result in systems of ‘irregular taxations’ that are widely accepted and anticipated by people. Furthering this line of thinking, migration - in a less traditional line - can be seen as increasing economic well being of the communities involved. It becomes an indispensible financial injection into the economy.
Since these practices are motivated by financial gains, pragmatism overrides the differentiation between legal and illegal migration. This equalizer of conditions while moving has given birth to the term ‘mixed migration’, defined by the absence of clear legal categorization of the moving people into refugees, victims of trafficking, economic migrants and so on, but rather focusing on the shared vulnerabilities endured by all people in ‘transit’ (Collyer et al. 2012). This reality, unable to be properly grasped in the binary perception of the Global North, abolishes the “divide into morally acceptable victims, [generally categorized as refugees] […] and the morally irresponsible, who choose to take the risks, or worse make money from organizing people’s journeys, and can therefor be criminalised” (Bakewell 2008:1354). They merge to a quasi homogenous group while in transit.
The effects of migration need to be analysed in their direct context and are often not transcended of regions, states or continents. Only if seen in context one is able to determine the positive and the negative effects of migration.
IV. DATA AND METHODS
This exploratory as well as explanatory thesis consists of a case study of the European Union Capacity Building (EUCAP) Sahel Niger mission, which is part of the
cross-border, regional approach of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 9
for the Sahel zone. The qualitative data selection followed a typical social science triangulation approach, which resulted in a mixed methods approach including expert interviews, policy and media analysis as well as data samples provided by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). This approach is needed in order to construct a comprehensive picture of the situation in Niger as well as pay respect to the use of a longitudinal time horizon.
The policy and media analysis were mainly used to establish and prove the occurrence of securitisation. Since official EU documents and the media do not always reveal the underlying reasoning for certain activities, expert interviews with officials related to the EUCAP mission as well as senior researchers on the Nigerien context were included to complete the picture and diminish the risk of a bias.
To corroborate and quantify the claims made in this thesis, data from the newly established IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix Project was used, which started counting and interviewing migrants passing through two separate Flow Monitoring Points (FMP) along the two most used treks in and out of Niger, one towards Algeria and the other towards the Libyan border.
4.1 CASE SELECTION
This thesis chooses to only investigate the case of EUCAP Sahel Niger as it represents a typical, but new and understudied case in the implicit expansion of the EU Neighbourhood Policy and thus in the securitisation of migration. EUCAP Sahel Niger, as a security mission would not have been sufficient as a sole case study until last year, nevertheless, with the recent update of their objectives to include ‘combatting of irregular migration’ last year, the mission becomes a prime example of the on-going securitisation of migration by the EU. EU involvements in Niger, just
9 CSDP, formerly the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is the European Council organ
dealing with defence and military operations of the EU, as well as civilian crisis management. Main parts of the European Security Strategy (2003) are listed as: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, failed states, and organized crime
like the mission itself, have gained in importance in recent year as evidenced by the steadily increasing political, financial and media attention.
EUCAP Sahel Niger reveals the increasing intervention of the EU in African states’ sovereignty, particularly in domestic affairs such as security, borders and migration. Hence, the EU is assuming and exerting greater controls over the movements of migrants, even when mostly referring to their mission as being in a supportive role to the Nigerien security forces. It nevertheless, is a clear example of externalization of the EU migration agenda.
4.2 INTERVIEWS
The EU officials interviewed were chosen by relationship to the mission, availability and willingness to be involved. All interviewed EU officials stated that they would like to stay anonymous and that their personal insights should not be quoted but could be referenced.
In addition, to the interviews with three EU officials, I also conducted another set of interviews and written exchanges with relevant academic researchers in the field of anthropology, social sciences, security and political studies. The choice of researchers was guided by the significance of their research and through their personal referrals, using a snowballing sample method. The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way to leave room to appropriately react to new insights and reduce the risk of a bias constructed through the questions or through the answers of the respondents.
The qualitative data collected through the expert interviews has a lower degree of external validity due to the statements of personal opinions and the small sampling size, resulting in a higher possibility of bias. I counteracted this bias by using a triangulation and case-specific approach, which embeds the answers of the respondents in the context of their research, work or think tank affiliation.
The insights presented in this thesis also stem from second-hand ethnographic studies, as some of the researchers granted me access to their personal research notes and data. The limitations of the second-hand ethnographic studies, in terms of validity and reliability, due to their inherent bias, as they were collected with altogether different research agendas in mind, were considered.
4.3 IOM FLOW MONITORING DATA
Most data that pertains to the quantification of the flows and to the estimation of the migration business’ size in the region of Agadez has been provided by the IOM Flow Monitoring Points. Despite the fact that the data was only collected at two outposts, trying to cover the main migration paths, it can still be validated to reflect the bigger picture, as it held up in comparisons with previous estimates by independent academic and private researchers. The Flow Monitoring Stations are located far enough from the international borders, on purpose, to facilitate the approach of migrants by IOM officials.
As the IOM does not disclose all information about the selection process of the chosen interviewees, I was not able to fully determine the possible bias or limitation of the results of their interviews. Here as well, comparisons with data collected by independent researchers and journalists helped to estimate its accuracy.
V. THE EUCAP SAHEL NIGER MISSION
The EUCAP Sahel Niger Mission is part of the cross-border, regional approach of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the Sahel zone strategy. It was adopted in March 2011 and launched at the request of the Nigerien government in the summer of 2012. The main interests of the EU in the region are stated as fighting security threats, terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration and ensuring energy security10. The Mission is branded as a civilian project, under the command of Filip De Ceuninck, a Belgian police professional, who has been with the mission since its start in 2012.
The mission has been renewed three times since its instatement, each time with incremental yearly budgets11. The mission’s extension until July 201612 came with an
10
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-sahel-niger/mission-description/index_en.htm
11 Latest public budgets granted for the period of 16 July 2014 to 15 July 2015 in the amount of EUR
9,15 million and EUR 18,4 million for the period 16 July 2015 to 15 July 2016
increased budget of EUR 18.4 Mio13. This budget is now on par with the monthly funds of the EU development initiatives in the country14.
The mission objectives are listed as following15:
1) Help Niger's security forces achieve interoperability and develop their operating strategies.
2) Strengthen the Nigerien security sector's expertise in combating terrorism and organized crime.
3) Improve the human resources, training and logistics management policies to ensure that the achievements made under objectives 1 and 2 can be sustained. 4) Support the development of regional and international coordination in the
fight against terrorism and organized crime.
With the addition of a new point in the 2016 Factsheet:
5) Support the security forces’ capability to better control migration flows and to combat irregular migration and associated criminal activity more effectively. Combating illegal migration seems to be a more recent addition to the objectives of the EUCAP Mission, as it does not appear as an objective in the previous statements and factsheets of the mission dating back to 2014. It appears to have only become part of the mandate in May 2015 during discussions on the extension of the mission. This extension also established a permanent outpost in Agadez, referred to as “a major trafficking hub on the road to Libya” by the European External Action Service16 The activities now also include the support through advice and training of Nigerien authorities in “preventing irregular immigration [sic!] and combatting associated crimes”17
The EUCAP Mission is primarily concerned with the spillage of security threats of neighbouring countries, such as the terroristic activities of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast, and with the territorial expansion of the so called Islamic State fighters to
13
https://www.modernghana.com/news/647100/eucap-sahel-niger-council-nearly-doubles-missions-annual-b.html
14 National Indicative Plan 2014-2020 with a budget of EUR 596 million
http://eeas.europa.eu/niger/index_en.htm
15
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-sahel-niger/pdf/factsheet_eucap_sahel_niger_en.pdf
16 see (15)
southern Libya, to the fragile state of Niger. EUCAP Sahel Niger also supports the fight against criminal organisations specialised in illicit trafficking of drugs, arms and human beings. To assist Niger in the fight against these threats the Mission has trained more than 7.000 members of the Nigerien security and defence forces, as well as magistrates.18 The mission’s new long-term approach has shifted its focus to
mentoring, monitoring and advising trainers. Other measures to support the Nigerien security and defence forces have included the upgrading and extension of training centres and vehicle workshops.
Due to the extension of its interests to specifically combat irregular migration, the Mission has expanded its trainings on “various aspects linked to crime associated to irregular migration, such as border management and detection of document forgery.”19
Furthermore, on the wish of the Nigerien government, the Mission is shifting its actions towards more strategic approaches, mainly through supporting the government with the formulation of a national security strategy. The mission has also voiced, that “local political buy-in is crucial” and acknowledged that “the existing security and development problems in Niger are linked and should be addressed in the context of a global approach.”20 What exactly is meant by local political buy-in or in which way security and development problems are linked is unfortunately not further specified. When questioned about the possible prospect of cooperation with security providers in rural areas, often non-state security providers like reformist non-violent movements and ethnic militias, the Mission relegated to its support of national authorities and security forces and its obligation to neutrality and its non-engagement in politics.
18 Written statement by EUCAP Sahel Niger, with additions of the CPCC in Brussels, 19.05.2016 19 see above footnote (18)
VI. EUCAP SAHEL NIGER - A TOOL FOR
SECURITISATION OF MIGRATION
6.1 VALETTA SUMMIT – THE BIGGER PICTURE
EUCAP Sahel Niger was initially instated as a security and stability mission tasked with supporting the Nigerien government in its formulation of a proper security strategy. It is also concerned with the critical situation in the Diffa region, located in the south east of the country, where a military intervention is taking place and has thus provided trainings to security forces from Diffa in Zinder. The mission has received exponentially increasing budgets and has been named as a key actor in Niger
during the Valetta Summit21, where EU and African heads of state came together to
“strengthen cooperation and to address the current challenges but also opportunities of migration”22 and has become yet another tool of the perpetual extension of the EU Neighbourhood Policy.
The Valetta Summit was called for in the aftermath of the tragedy of April 19, 2015, when a migrant boat, believed to have carried up to 700 migrants capsized and thus revealed the core intentions of the EU in their compiled policy proposals as well as the establishment of the Emergency Fund for Africa.
Although the Action Plan of the summit seems to touch on all the relevant fields, discussing various forms of development and security, all proposals are too narrowly focused on preventing or reversing migration. The proposals show a neglect for proper effects of these proposals. Development is here primarily seen as a means to reduce migration movements, which are justified by the security concerns of the EU. The Emergency Trust for Africa was launched with the sole purpose of “addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa”23. The connotation of ‘emergency’ urges the reader to think about ‘crisis’ and ‘security’ first and foremost and does not indicate long-term development goals. The budget of the trust fund stems largely from the European Development Fund and EU budget, which means that funds earmarked for wholesome development are now redirected to
21 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/ 22 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/ 23 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/
development projects that only follow the goal of preventing migration and thus diminish the security concerns of the EU.
The conditionality of development aid related to migration policies favoured by the EU is nothing new, as repeatedly demonstrated in research conducted by Brachet. He suggests that development aid is often found tied to the readmission of nationals or that individual distributed grants of development aid are given for the ‘voluntary’ return of migrants (Brachet 2016).
The Valetta Action Plan could have been a good initiative on EU-African cooperation, as it cuts across main issues of development, security and migration, unfortunately the proposed policy disenthralls quickly, as nothing about it is truly comprehensive. Proposals on the topic of combating irregular and illegal migration are the only ones put forth with concrete measures, while the other areas, like the ones concerned with increasing the efficiency of remittances, remain quite vague. While trafficking and smuggling are stated as separate actions that need to be fought, no differentiation is made in the measures to address them. This denies the vastly different operation of these businesses and demonstrates the ignorance of the EU in understanding these networks. The conflation of smuggling with trafficking also highlights the disregard of the EU for actual human security, as it unnecessarily criminalizes and victimizes a market indirectly created by the strict EU immigration laws and the missing alternative channels of legal labour migration.
Furthermore frequent lip service is paid to pursuing the protection of human rights and implementing its principles in all policies proposed. This might check all the boxes of a human rights based approach for policy makers, but violates actual human
rights as stated in the UN Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR 1948)24. Article 13
outlines the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State, but also states the right to leave one’s country. Article 14 further attests to the right to seek and enjoy asylum in any other country (UDHR 1948).
6.2 SECURITISATION AND EUCAP SAHEL NIGER
Comparing an earlier draft of the Valetta Summit Action Plan from October 7, 201525, clearer links between the utilisation of the EUCAP Sahel Niger Mission appear along with new wording that strongly indicate the growing securitisation of migration. In the first category of policy proposals, ironically titled “Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes” under “1.3 Addressing instability and crises”, the EU aims to “develop activities of EUCAP Sahel Niger along the migratory route, from the Agadez region”26 in order to reinforce state capacities ensuring security and fighting terrorist threats, to the benefit of the local population. This exemplifies the new role the EUCAP Sahel Niger Mission is given by the EU.
Furthermore it showcases the deliberate conflation of migrants with terrorist or at least their direct connection, as according to the EU they use the same migratory paths. This does not only put migrants under the general accusation of being potential terrorists but also indirectly equates cross-border smuggling networks with terrorist networks.
However, the EUCAP Sahel Niger Mission had already taken steps to securitize the issue of migration movements by phrasing its objectives to ‘combat irregular migration’. Firstly, the term ‘combat’ assumes military measures to be employed to control migration. Secondly, it is not clear who concretely will be fought, the irregular migrant or the enabler of irregular migration. This infers that human security is actually not on the agenda of the mission, despite their statement of following a human rights based approach. Thirdly, the mission’s statement of interests also refers to combat terrorism and organized crime in the same listing, which leads to the conclusion that these threats are connected and on the same level of importance to the EU. It also subtly concludes that there is a relationship between these ‘threats’ and that they have to be ‘combated’ together.
Another indication for the strong focus on migration is the establishment of an outpost in Agadez, where the mission focus on “supporting the Nigerien authorities in border and migration management, and in their fight against terrorism and organized
25 Valetta Action Plan Draft Oct 7, 2015:
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/oct/eu-council-valletta-WD2-12560-rev-1-15.pdf
crime”27 will play a major role, as Agadez is the main migration hub in the country. Here again, migration control and the fight against terrorism are mentioned together, implying, if not directly a connection, though at least a similar level of importance. Talking to officials of the EU External Action Service who work in the field, it was quite obvious to them that both aspects should not be directly connected. They believe that racketing up migration prevention measures would, on the contrary, lead to far greater instability.
6.3 RESULTS
It seems the only real opportunity granted by the Valetta Action Plan to the involved African heads of states, is the potential to monetise their role as detention and prison guards for the EU. The promised development aid is patchy at best, while most is earmarked for projects that aim at curbing migration flows. Security measures give priority to the EU security concerns over the physical integrity of citizens and migrants, while subordinating the Nigerien state and the migrants it ought to protect. The understanding of the security-development-migration nexus and its linkages, exhibited by the EU, follow only certain perceptions and purposefully ignore possible side effects. It amounts to a cherry picking of interpretations of the nexus factors, unambiguously stated in the policy proposals that follow neither a coherent ontological nor epistemological approach.
“[A]t worst they create the security-development problem they are expected to solve” (Stern and Öjendal 2010: 19).
6.4 INTERESTS OF THE DIFFERENT STAKEHOLDERS 6.4.1 EU
Following the framework of the CS, EU policy makers represent the ‘securitizing actors’ and the security and wellbeing of the citizens of the EU are the ‘referent objects’ of the securitisation. So what are the real interests behind this securitisation of migration in Niger?
27
The interests of the EU in Niger can be divided into the mainly French interests before the complete loss of cooperation of the EU in Libya and after, starting approximately in the beginning of 2015, when the EU acknowledged Niger’s role as a transit country for migrants departing the shores of Libya. Before Libya had descended into chaos, at a time when it was still perceived as a possible partner for cooperation on migration issues, the sole interest of the EU in Niger was of economic nature. Niger has the fourth biggest uranium mine in the world, owned and operated
by the French company AREVA together with a second smaller one28. Their
combined production account for more than 7% of the world market of uranium and they provide the largest share of uranium for French nuclear plants, which account for 75% of France’s electricity. It needs to be noted that the French company only pays around 5,5% of the market value in royalties for the exported uranium; neither export duties on the valuable resource, nor taxes on operational machinery are paid.
This underscores the extreme economic interest in the stability of the Agadez region and especially the city of Arlit, where the mines are located29. The Tuareg tribe who inhabit this region and claim their rights to the resources have not only been marginalised and discriminated against by their own government but also by the French company AREVA. This has led to many violent confrontations between the Tuareg, Nigerien security forces and security personnel of the French company. The close relationship of the Nigerien government with its formal coloniser France is also validated by the many diplomatic visits between officials of each country (Hahonou et al. 2016).
The special interest of the French in the stability of the country has even led to labelling EUCAP Sahel Niger as “a French mission under European flag” by a EUCAP Sahel expert (Hahonou et al. 2016). One can assume that due to the nature of the economic interests, the focus was only on stability and the protection of the status quo as opposed to actual development of the country, which would have increased the price of uranium extraction. Proper democratic representation of Tuareg in the national government would have almost certainly led to less favourable terms of exploitation for the natural resources in their region.
28
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/uranium-mining-overview.aspx
