MIGRANTS: GUESTS THAT NEED TO BE
TAUGHT HOW TO BEHAVE
PVV SUPPORTERS’S VIEW OF THE CIVIC INTEGRATION POLICY
Author: Zoë Cremers Student Number: 11256419
Supervisor: dhr. prof. Dr. W.G.J. Duyvendak Second Supervisor: mw. Dr. S.A. Bonjour University of Amsterdam
CONTENT
Content 2
Summary 3
Introduction 4
Theory 7
The political debate on integration 13
History of integration policy 13
Current civic integration test 14
PVV’s point of view on integration policy 15
Methodology 17
Results 21
Migrants are not a problem but… 21
Norms and values, but which ones? 24
Guidance and control 27
Conclusion 30
References 33
Appendix 36
Interviewguide 36
Overview of respondents 41
SUMMARY
The party for freedom, the Dutch radical right wing party of leader Geert wilders, became the second biggest party in this year’s national elections. In the light of the popularity of radical right wing parties across the European continent many scholars have researched what motivates the electorate of those parties. Although political discontent and progressive values influence a radical right vote, anti-immigrant attitudes are the major driver of radical right wing support. Most research stops at this point, however this does not tell us exactly what radical right wing voters think about migrants. With the polarization of the migration debate I believe it is important to have a nuanced picture of PVV supporters opinion about migrants. Based on interviews and pairwise ranking with PVV voters about the Dutch integration policy this thesis aims to shed light on the opinions of PVV supporters in a constructive way. It concludes that PVV voters generally see migrants as guests rather than inhabitants of the Netherlands. Since guests are in daily life the ones who adapt they also expect this from migrants. They emphasize the importance for migrants to accept Dutch norms, values and traditions such as gender equality. For migrants to be able to learn this they feel that the government should play a major role in facilitating integration. In this way the government can control migrants as well as ensure the effectiveness of the integration process.
INTRODUCTION
In the last elections in the Netherlands the polls predicted high results for the PVV, the Dutch radical right party for freedom. In the light of Trump’s election in the United States and the high expectations for radical right parties in other European elections, national and international media paid a lot of attention to the PVV and its leader Geert Wilders. Journalists for national and international papers wondered if he could win and what the consequences would be in that case, but more than that, journalists tried to figure out why people vote PVV. The ‘angry white men’ argument, used to explain support for trump also popped up here. The argument assumes PVV voters would be angry with the status quo, did not feel heard and felt insecure. Although there has been a lot of fuss about the PVV and its voters remarkably little scientific research has been done on this topic.
During last elections the PVV received 13 percent of the votes, securing 20 seats in parliament which made them the second biggest political party of the Netherlands (NOS 2017). It is not alone in its popularity, all over Europe radical rightist parties are rising. Only a few of them have actually claimed power but they nevertheless have great influence on national politics as well as European politics. Many have written about the rise of these parties and the reasons for their popularity. In order to explain this popularity some researchers have looked into the electorate of said parties. Demographically speaking most voters turn out to be lowly educated, quite old and male. They are generally either blue collar workers or small business owners (Goodwin 2011).This resonates with the numbers for PVV voters last elections; 67 percent of PVV voters was older than 35, only four percent was highly educated and 55 percent was male (Ipsos 2017). Others have gone further and looked at the individual’s motivation to support radical right-wing parties. There are three major explanations in the literature when it comes to explaining radical right-wing support: the first is termed political discontent. Radical right voters feel they are not supported by their government or have a general distrust in the political establishment. The second explanation is that radical right voters are drawn to the progressive values that these parties promote. They see these parties as the true advocates of progressive values such as equal rights for women and homosexuals. The third explanation is that radical right voters share the anti-immigration attitudes of radical right parties. They fear that the influx of migrants will change their society for the worst. All three of these explanations can motivate people to vote for radical right wing parties and can sometimes overlap, for example voters who think that the current government inadequately handles the refugee crises. Nevertheless it is the anti-immigration argument which is the biggest driver behind a radical right vote
While this gives us some information about the motivations of voting radical right there is still some knowledge missing. First these conclusions are based on research of many different parties in different countries. The problem is that researchers have not been very consequent with using terms for the radical right. Some speak of right-wing parties in general, others talk about extreme right, some about radical right and last there are parties labelled as new right. The big differences between parties may ask for such a broad spectrum of names. The variety of right-wing parties and
the inconsistent use of the different terms make it difficult to transfer the results of these researches to the Dutch context of the PVV. Therefore I believe it is useful to specifically look at PVV voters. Second most of this research uses quantitative methods. While this is perfect for analyzing a big group of people it also has its disadvantages. When it comes to this specific topic we see that previous research can mainly give us broad answers about the reasons people vote PVV. We know that anti-immigration sentiments are the biggest driver of PVV support. However this does not give us further insight into why these people share anti-immigration sentiments and what parts of migration are most problematic to them. Rydgren (2008) does categorize different kinds of anti-immigration attitudes, thereby showing that we should not see all radical right voters as the same. This however still does not provide us with insight regarding individual voter’s opinions.
Chris Aalberts (2009) and Koen Damhuis (2017) both have provided research based on in-depth interviews with PVV-voters. Aalberts showed that the biggest problem for PVV voters is migrant’s unemployment. They feel that migrant’s do not contribute to Dutch society but only profit from it. When it comes to the Islam, he states that most PVV voters’ views are a lot less extreme than Wilders’ views. Many of Aalberts’ respondents see Wilders as the one to steer other politicians in the right direction (2009). It is then up to the other politicians to create a decent policy (Aalberts 2009). Damhuis (2017) mainly focused on why people vote for the PVV. He differentiates three groups that capture most PVV-voters. The biggest groups consist of people who feel like they are becoming secondary citizens in their own country. According to them they have to pay everything while migrants get everything for free. While both of these pieces of research are valuable contributions to the knowledge of PVV voters they concentrate on voters’ feelings about the party. In this thesis I aim to present more knowledge about their opinion on one of PVV’s most important topics: immigration. I believe this is useful because now the perception of PVV voters is mainly based upon the perception of Wilders. However as aalberts (2009) notes, voters do not always agree with Wilders. With the current polarization of the migration debate I think it is necessary to understand one another in order to be able to have a constructive debate. In order to understand PVV-voters we will have to talk with them instead of about them.
PVV-voters are mostly portrayed as a homogenous group of people who hate foreigners. As Marja, one of my respondents said:
‘’I think it is really disturbing as well as aggravating that, as a PVV voter or supporter, you are immediately labeled as racist or as someone who discriminates, or as a dumb or lowly educated person, while that does not have to be the case’’
In this thesis I want to move beyond this stigma and give a nuanced picture of PVV voters’ attitudes regarding migrants by investigating their opinion of the Dutch integration policy. The current Dutch integration policy sets the requirements, obligations and rights for foreigners who wish to obtain a permanent residence permit. The main requirement for most migrants from non-European Union member states is to pass the civic integration test which consists of different subtests about Dutch language, Dutch society and the labor market. This integration policy touches upon a lot of aspects of migration and is therefore a useful instrument to gain deeper insight into PVV voters’ opinion on
migrants. Regulations regarding who has to pass the test and who doesn’t can tell us about the distinction voters make between different migrants. The topics and content of the test are a starting point to discuss the problems they experience with migrants and the thing they deem most important for fruitful integration. Thus focusing on integration policy enables me to move beyond vague statements of opinion. Furthermore the integration policy can be seen as a kind of solution to the migration problem. By asking respondents about the solution it will also become clearer exactly what their problems are. I also believe that talking about solutions is more constructive than talking about problems and can open the dialogue regarding this emotional topic.
This thesis is based on eleven semi-structured interviews with people who voted for the PVV at least once. During the interviews pairwise ranking was used to gain insight in respondents’ opinion on the civic integration test. The thesis shows that most of the interviewed PVV voters share the conception of immigrants as guest who have to adapt to the host family, in this case the Dutch people. Assumptions regarding the high criminality among migrants and the incompatibility of their culture on the one hand and Dutch culture on the other hand, ensures that some PVV voters see migrants as unwanted guests. Nevertheless when migrants are here, most the PVV voters believe that the government should support migrants in learning the Dutch language, norms and values, which is contradictory to the PVV’s position on this matter. The PVV supporters in this research do agree with the PVV on the most important issues for integration, namely language and equality of men and women. Before further analyzing the opinion of PVV voters about integration policy I will first give a brief overview of existing literature the motivation of radical right supporters in general and PVV supporters specifically. Then I will highlight the most important historical developments of Dutch integration policy, followed by a detailed description of the current integration policy. I will proceed by outlining the position of the PVV when it comes to migration and integration. After explaining the used research methods I will present the results of this research which will then be discussed in light of the previously mentioned literature.
THEORY
In the early 2000’s when extreme right-wing political parties suddenly got a lot of attention and rose in popularity all over Europe, scholars wondered if this was just a temporary peak that would disappear soon, due to the focus on one issue that characterized most of these parties. Now we know differently. Radical right wing parties have consistently won votes in many European countries like France, Austria and the Netherlands. Although recent elections in these countries saw the extreme right parties’ failure to take power, they still received a lot of support in their respective countries. The questions scholars have been asking regarding these parties have thus shifted from questions about the endurance of their popularity to questions about the reasons why they remain popular and what motivates their voters.
There has been a fairly large amount of research on the socio-demographic composition of the right wing electorate. As Goodwin (2011: 5) summarizes, radical right supporters are mainly semi- or unskilled workers and small business owners whose economic situation is insecure. They tend to be either young or old and poorly educated. When trying to explain right wing support it is easy to point to these demographic factors, however, Ignazi (2003: 247) warns that a link between socio-demographic factors and voting for a certain party says nothing about the individual voters’ motivation to vote for that specific party. Van der Brug et al. (2013) tested this by taking into account demographic factors when investigating the importance of several factors for voting radical right. They showed that demographic factors only explain 13 percent of the probability to vote for the radical right. Furthermore they tested whether political discontent played a role in voting for the far right. They found that aversion to the political status quo only accounted for 13 percent of the probability to support a right wing party (van der Brug et al. 2013: 70-71). They thus concluded that most far right voters vote based on their ideas about policy and the ideology of a party, just like most voters (van der Brug et al. 2013: 71).
What then is the ideology of most radical right wing parties? Zhirkov (2014) notes that research on the radical right party family has been troubled by the lack of a universally accepted definition of the radical right. As Rydgren (2012) writes in the introduction of his book ‘’class politics and the radical right’’, there is some discussion over what exactly defines a radical right wing party. However he argues that there are two characteristics that are central to most far right parties. First they rely upon an ethno nationalist form of xenophobia and second they cast themselves in opposition to the political establishment. Be this as it may, party characteristics do not translate one on one to voter characteristics. For the purpose of this thesis it is particularly relevant to identify what motivates people to vote for radical right wing parties. Zhirkov’s (2014) findings disagree with the idea that radical right voters are motivated by distrust in political institutions. He states that these voters are not less satisfied with politics than other voters (2014: 291). He confirms the importance of anti-immigration rhetoric. This is, according to him, by far the most important factor in voting radical right (ibid.). Nonetheless the right-wing position regarding economics that most radical right parties hold also seems to be quite influential in motivating radical right supporters. In the case of Wilder’s freedom party however, this is disputable (ibid.). The PVV has gradually shifted from a right-wing
economic position to a center-left-wing position. Harteveld (2016) discusses this in the light of the so-called new winning formula for radical right parties. This winning formula consists of combining a cultural right-wing position with an economic left-wing position since it is assumed that people who oppose immigration are mostly found among the lower class and are thus in favor of left-wing economic policies (Harteveld 2016: 227). Although this is the opposite of Zhirkov’s argument, the idea that the economic position of radical right-parties contributes to voting for these specific parties prevails. Arzheimer (2008) states that right-wing support has been framed in terms of fear specifically fear of migrants taking away jobs and abusing the welfare system. His research found that this is a fair representation. According to him radical right support is mainly motivated by anti-immigrant sentiment and policy identification. Kehrberg (2014) also emphasizes the importance of fear. He distinguishes three different levels of fear (Kehrberg 2014: 4). The economical level: Migrants take away our jobs. The cultural level: we are losing our culture, and the encompassing establishment level: the political elites are letting migrants ruin our country (Kehrberg 2014: 4-6). He finds that radical right support is not driven by a single attitude but by a combination of attitudes. Even a negative attitude towards migration alone does not contribute greatly to voting radical right. However radical right voters do differ significantly from other voters in that they are more afraid for the cultural and economic impact of migrants. Furthermore Kehrberg found that for western European radical right voters the populist appeal is of significant importance while for Eastern Europeans voting for social conservatism is more important. In their article about the English extreme right British National Party Cutts et al. (2011) state that racist, xenophobic and populist motives were all present in the party's’ electorate. They argue that although BNP support was previously defined as an anti-establishment vote, negative attitudes towards out-groups and immigrants in particular turns out to be the main driver for BNP voters. They found that BNP voters specifically differ from other voters in that almost twice as many BNP voters desire a full halt of all migration into the UK, furthermore around 80 percent of BNP voters believe Islam is a threat to Western-Europe compared to 40 percent of the rest of the electorate. Rosenthal (2011) also emphasizes the fear of Islam as one of the only characteristics shared by all far right political parties. He further states that PVV party leader Geert Wilders shares this opinion since the freedom party leader argues that Islamic ideology is fundamentally incompatible with Dutch norms and values (Rosenthal 2012: 60). Wilders supports this argument by emphasizing progressive Dutch values such as the equality of women, the legality of gay marriage and freedom of speech. According to him, Islam opposes all these values and Muslims are therefore a threat to Dutch culture. Mepschen (2016) signals the emphasizing of progressive values as typical Dutch as a more general trend in Dutch society. He states that there is an increased sexualisation of nationalism. Meaning that a liberal view of sexuality, including the tolerance of homosexuals and equality of men and women, is seen as a typical Dutch trait while homo negativity is ascribed to cultural others, specifically Muslims (Ibid. 2016: 156).
The progressive values promoted by Wilders led de Koster et al. (2014) to investigate the role of progressive values in motivating people to vote for Wilders’ freedom party (PVV). They researched whether progressive values as a sole factor are a driver for PPV support and if progressive values are a driver when combined with ethnocentric values (Ibid. 590). They distinguished between three kinds of progressive values. 1) Moral values, which entail equality of men and women and tolerance
for homosexuality 2) Aversion to public interference of religious orthodoxy 3) support of freedom of speech (Ibid. 590). They found previous claims that ethnocentrism was the main driver for right wing support to be true. Progressive values in isolation do not direct someone to new right support. On the contrary, people with more progressive values tend to vote less instead of more for the new right (Ibid. 593-596). However, for ethno centrist people this was a bit different. For both the first and the second kind of progressive values they did not find any positive effect on voting for radical right (Ibid. 596-597). This might be because these progressive values are widely shared among the Dutch population (Duyvendak 2004) and the political spectrum accordingly (Koster 2014). For support of freedom of speech this was different. They found that ethno centrist people who are strongly in favor of freedom of speech are more likely to vote for radical right parties than their counterparts who did not embrace these specific kinds of progressive values (Ibid. 596-597). From this we can conclude that although embracing progressive values can strengthen and legitimize support for radical right wing parties in a few cases, it is ethnocentrism which remains the main motive for voting radical right.
Many scholars draw the same conclusion but it is interesting that all of them use slightly different terms. Van der Brug et al (2013: 71) argue that it is the opposition to migration that draws people to the far right. Berning and Schlueter (2015: 91) state that it is the perceived threat of migration and integration that motivates people to support right-wing parties. Kessel (2011) agrees with them but makes the important note that this still entails a form of political discontent since most radical right supporters feel that the established parties fail to address the burning issue of migration and do not take their worries into account.
While Rydgren (2008: 739) acknowledges the importance of skepticism towards migration for voting radical right he argues that we should not equate these with racist or xenophobic perspectives. After all when someone is against immigration because of his fear of declining social welfare this does not have to have anything to do with xenophobia or racism (Rydgren 2008: 739). He argues that only a small part of the radical right’s support can be categorized as xenophobic or racist and that most support for far right political parties is motivated by the belief that the migration stream should be significantly reduced if not blocked entirely (Rydgren 2008: 744-745). Furthermore he shows that anti-immigration consists of various different narratives which are not equally important (Rydgren 2008: 760-761). In his research he distinguishes four anti-immigration frames: immigrants are a threat to national identity, immigrants are a cause of criminality, immigrants are a cause of unemployment and immigrants are abusers of our welfare system (Rydgren 2008: 739). His results show that only the statements about national identity and criminality significantly contribute to people voting in favor of far right political parties (2008: 744).
Although political discontent, economical attitudes and progressive values can all play a role in motivating someone to vote radical right, we can conclude that anti-immigrant sentiments are the main driver for radical right wing support. As Rydgren notes, there is a large variety of anti-immigrant sentiments. They can hold xenophobic or racist notions, but can also be focused on the economic consequences of migration. Due to the quantitative nature of the above articles they do not give us detailed insights into radical right voters’ opinion about migrants. Furthermore we have
seen that not all radical right parties are the same. Therefore we will now discuss two pieces of qualitative research on the PVV specifically.
Chris Aalberts (2012) has interviewed 87 PVV voters for his book ‘achter de PVV’. The aim of his book is to give a better insight into the motives of individual PVV voters. He shows that PVV supporters are a rather diverse group of people, who all express different reasons to support and vote for Wilders and the PVV. He presents some interesting findings regarding PVV voters’ views on migration and integration in the Netherlands. He states that their views on migration are actually quite nuanced and can be summarized in two main points; they do not want to join anti-islam and racist sentiments but at the same time demand migrants adapt to the Dutch lifestyle (Aalberts 2012: 150). To support this they often emphasize that it is not the migrants themselves that are problematic but rather their behavior. According to them the most crucial thing is that migrants work or are beneficial to society and follow Dutch law. Furthermore many PVV supporters claim migrants shouldn’t be allowed to profit from the Dutch welfare system (Aalberts 2012: 151). In their opinion the current situation is the opposite which also fuels their resentment of the political establishment (Aalberts 2012: 153). In the light of these findings he also described some interesting remarks concerning views on migration policy and integration specifically. Several respondents mention the importance of speaking the Dutch language and they expect migrants to adapt to life in the Netherlands (Aalberts 2012: 131-132). Furthermore there are several respondents that praise the strict migration policies in other countries such as the United States and Australia. According to them these policies entail a job requirement, which they believe prevents a lot of trouble (Aalberts 2012: 134). In general the two most important things are that migrants should adjust themselves to the Dutch lifestyle (Aalberts 2012: 135) and that they should have a job (Aalberts 2012: 152). Furthermore Aalberts (2012: 203) concludes that most of the PVV-voters he interviewed did not share Wilders’ extreme point of view regarding Islam and migration in general. They often felt that all the other political parties did not take their worries seriously and saw Wilders as the only politician who voiced their concerns. These voters see Wilders as a way of placing the issue on the political agenda in the hopes that he can influence other parties to address the issue with less extreme measures (Aalberts, 2012: 203).
Koen Damhuis recently published a new book: Wegen naar Wilders (2017). In this book he presents 8 monographs of different PVV-voters to show the diversity amongst PVV-supporters. He differentiates between three different types of voters: 1) voters who experienced the feeling of resentment, 2) voters who felt migrants are benefiting from their contribution to society and 3) radical conservative voters. He recognizes that these three subtypes are ideal types; some people will fit perfectly in one category while others will combine motives from the various categories. However this typology gives us insight into the variety of reasons that draw people to vote PVV. Although the focus of this thesis is not the civic integration exam in itself it is still relevant to give a brief overview of how these civic integration exams are theorized in the literature. This gives us an idea of where to place the Dutch civic integration exam compared to other countries. I will specifically focus on the Dutch civic integration exam, its content and the way this policy came to be.
Many scholars have analyzed the emergence of these civic integration exams in multiple European countries, including the Netherlands (see van Oers 2009, Goodman 2010, Joppke 2007). Goodman (2010: 664) argues that citizenship tests have only emerged quite recently (the first dates from 1998) due to the fact that European states did not see themselves as immigration countries until then. According to van Oers (2009) we can now distinguish three different models and perceptions of citizenship. She distinguishes a liberal model which states that everyone has the right to citizenship, the republican model which states that political participation is the most important feature of citizenship, thus only people who can participate in the political process are eligible for citizenship, and a final model, the communitarian model, which states that a citizen becomes part of a community and has to adhere to the community’s identity (van Oers 2009: 114-115). Van Oers (2009: 123-124) argues that the first reason the Dutch government implemented language requirements was to increase the migrant’s ability to participate in society, which thus falls under the republican model. However, during the years the focus shifted towards a more emotional argument; migrants should be proud to feel Dutch, which leans towards the communitarian model. This shift towards a communitarian model has continued till now. The first Dutch civic integration test in 1998 consisted of an obligatory language course for (new) immigrants as well as programs for societal and professional orientation, offered for free by the municipality. Although these courses were concluded with a test, the outcome of the test did not impact a migrant’s chance to obtain residency (Bonjour 2013: 840-841). In 2006 this was replaced with the law on civic integration (wet inburgering). This law stated that the obligation of participating in a civic integration course was replaced by the need to pass a civic integration exam. Thus it was not important to put any effort into integrating anymore, apart from the effort needed to pass the test (Bonjour 2013: 841). Furthermore this new act shifted the responsibility for preparing for the test from municipalities to the individual migrants (Bonjour 2013: 814). Civic integration courses were now provided by private companies instead of municipalities and migrants had to pay for these themselves. They could get a loan that would give them a reimbursement of seventy percent of the cost if they passed the test within three years (Bonjour 2013: 841). In the years after, the focus on passing the test and the mandatory character stayed the same. The responsibility for integration has shifted back and forth between municipality and individual migrant but has been placed on the individual migrant since 2013 (Bonjour 2013: 849). Bonjour argues that, regarding socio-cultural integration, most of the political parties agree that there should be a shared Dutch identity which should be protected by the state, however the PVV is clearly the most extreme (Bonjour 2013: 842).
This resonates with Michalowski’s findings researching the content of citizenship tests in five different countries (2011). She states that although the Netherlands can be categorized as having a relatively open citizenship regime, they focus more on so called illiberal knowledge than the other examined countries (Michalowski 2011: 752-758). By illiberal knowledge Michalowski means questions about what is considered good in a society, thus questions about public moral (2011: 753). Furthermore she notes that the Dutch test is the only test that contains what she calls a: how-to-guide-on-etiquette questions. This equates to topics like making appointments for meetings and informing neighbors when having a party (Michalowski 2011: 760). She concludes that the Dutch
state takes a big role in governing the religious and cultural differences of its citizens while using a thick concept of Dutch culture (Michalowski 2011: 763-764).
THE POLITICAL DEBATE ON INTEGRATION HISTORY OF INTEGRATION POLICY
The Dutch integration policy is often cited as an example of a shift from a rather tolerant stance on integration towards a very restrictive stance on integration (Besselink 2009, Joppke 2007, van Oers 2009, Goodman 2010). When the first migrants after the second world war came to the Netherlands, mainly former inhabitants of the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) and later guest workers from Southern Europe, Morocco and Turkey, the Dutch government saw them as temporary residents (Prins 2002: 3). Because these immigrants were expected to go back to their home countries there was no integration policy (Scholten 2011: 70). Policies concerning the different migrant groups fell under existing policy departments like the department of social affair and the department of foreign affairs (Scholten 2011: 70). Those policies were guided by the principle of ‘integration with retention of identity’, integration meaning the social and economic integration of migrants during their (temporary) stay in the Netherlands (Scholten 2011: 70). When in the early 1970’s the government realized the presence of migrants in the Netherlands they emphasized the changing composition of this group of migrants. To make it easier for migrants to return home, policies were aimed at retaining one’s socio-cultural identity (Scholten 2011: 71). In the early 1980’s the first official integration policy was implemented, the so-called ethnic minorities policy. By then minorities were recognized as a permanent part of the Dutch population. The focus of this policy was on the socio-cultural emancipation of minorities which was also believed to favor socio-economic integration. Therefore specific group-facilities for minorities were maintained while at the same time emphasizing the need for mutual adaptation (Scholten 2011: 71-73). By the end of the 1980’s the effectiveness of the minority policy regarding education and labor was highly criticized by the Dutch government. This, together with the realization that migration would be a permanent phenomenon for the Netherlands, led to the prioritization of socio-economic integration over socio-cultural emancipation (Scholten 2011: 74). New migrants had to learn the Dutch language and basic knowledge of Dutch society in the light of mutual adaptation. However after the turn of the century this mutual adaptation moved quickly towards an assimilationist perspective. The social and cultural differences between migrants and the native Dutch population were seen as an obstacle for the socio-economic integration of migrants. Furthermore the big differences between migrants and the rest of the population were seen as harmful for Dutch society in general (Scholten 2011: 77-78). Meanwhile Dutch political parties had also shifted from a multicultural view of Dutch society towards a mono-cultural view (van Heerden et al. 2014: 128). While Duyvendak and Scholten (2010: 339) argue that Dutch migration policy was never really multiculturalist, they too note that after the turn of the millennium Dutch integration policy started to emphasize the common ground that formed the basis of Dutch society. Instead of focusing on one’s individual rights and duties as a citizen, integration policy more and more focused on Dutch national identity (Duyvendak and Scholten 2010: 340). This resulted in a strong emphasis on knowledge of Dutch society in the civic integration exam.
CURRENT CIVIC INTEGRATION TEST
Since its implementation in 2006 the Dutch law on integration (wet inburgering) has changed a couple of times. For the purpose of this thesis I will explain the law as it is stated at the moment, this version of the law on integration was implemented in March 2014. The regulations brought forward in this law are the ones I explained to my respondents when asking their opinion on this respective law.
Everyone who wants to live in the Netherlands for a longer period of time and wants to obtain a permanent residency permit has to officially ‘integrate’ (inburgeren) into the Netherlands. This effectively means they need to pass the civic integration test.
This test consists of six elements. The testing migrant’s knowledge of the Dutch language is assessed by a test which is composed of four sections, reading, listening, writing and speaking. The format of the Dutch language test is comparable to the ones Dutch students have to pass in high school. The fifth part is concerned with job market orientation. This part does not consist of a test but requires the migrant to create a portfolio that shows his ability to navigate the job market. Finally there is a part that’s called: knowledge of Dutch society. For this part migrants have to pass a test consisting of around forty multiple choice questions. These questions tackle subjects that range from Dutch history and Dutch traditions to testing their real life knowledge in various scenarios such as health and education. To receive permanent resident permit migrants need to pass all the different subtests.
Migrants with an obligation to integrate will receive a letter from DUO, a Dutch governmental organization responsible for education. This letter notifies migrants about their obligation to integrate as well as announcing the starting date of their integration period. The integration exams need to be passed within three years of this start date. If the migrant does not meet this requirement he or she will have to pay a fine of up to 1250 euros. Furthermore the migrant will be granted two extra years to complete the exam. If these two extra years are still not enough the migrant will have to pay a fine every two years until he or she passes the exam and can eventually lose his temporary residence permit.
The exam itself costs €350,00 and has to be paid for by migrants themselves. Since 2013 the integration courses, where migrants can learn everything necessary to pass the exam, have been privatized. This means migrants are responsible for choosing and attending an integration course, as well as paying for the course. If migrants are unable to pay for the course they can take a loan with DUO. This loan consists of a maximum of €10.000,00, which can only be used for integration courses and the integration exams. Asylum seekers can always borrow the full amount, however for regular migrants this is income dependent. Another difference between these two groups is that asylum seekers do not have an obligation to pay the loan back when they finish their integration exams in time. On the other hand regular migrants always have to pay back their loans.
The civic integration exam is obligated for all migrants who are not from the European Union, except for citizens of Switzerland and Turkey. However there are some more exceptions. Children under the age of 16 and elderly who have reached the retirement age do not have to take the integration
exam, as well as people who have lived in the Netherlands for 8 years or longer during the age they were obligated to attend school according to public education law. Lastly people who cannot be expected to pass the exam due to a mental or physical handicap are exempted.
PVV’S POINT OF VIEW ON INTEGRATION POLICY
Migration and Islam are woven into every aspect of the PPV's electoral programs. It is not a coincidence that Wilders stated that the PVV is unjustly seen as a one issue party due to their focus on migration. According to him, migration influences all aspects of society. When reading through their manifestoes of 2010, 2012 and 2017 one thing becomes clear, the PVV wants to close all the borders of the Netherlands and, at the very least, totally halt migration for migrants who follow Islam. When it comes to integration policy however, they are less vocal. In the 2010 electoral program there are 4 points that talk specifically about integration. First migrants should be obliged to take an integration course before they come to the Netherlands, second as long as the above is not yet realized everyone who fails to pass the integration course should be deported, third migrants have to pay for their own integration and language courses and fourth they want to implement assimilation contracts that have to be signed by migrants, when breaching these contracts migrants will be deported.
The 2012 electoral program was less specific about integration. Since point three was already passed by government Rutte 1, a government consisting of the Liberals and the Christian Democrats supported by the PVV, this was no longer in their electoral program for the 2012 election. All the other points remained. Furthermore they stated that migrants should only be able to receive social benefits once they have worked in the Netherlands for 10 years and have no criminal records. In addition to this the PVV suggested speaking Dutch and not wearing a full burqa as proposed requirements for receiving social benefits.
In the 2017 electoral program, which only consisted of one page, the only focus regarding migration is the de-Islamization of the Netherlands. This topic was already brought forward in the previous electoral programs but this time it is stated as their main goal.
Where this overview has only discussed the electoral programs, Bonjour (2013) has researched the positions taken by Dutch political parties in debates on civic integration policies. She did this by analyzing more than 350 parliamentary records of the debates on the law on civic integration, which took place between 2002 and 2011 (Bonjour 2013: 838). To analyze the positions of the different political parties on this issue she uses Kitchelt’s model that divides state intervention into economic intervention and socio-cultural intervention (Bonjour 2013: 842). In the case of the PVV this translates into a preference for a big state when it comes to the socio-cultural dimension of the civic integration test combined with a preference for a small state when it comes to the economic dimension of the test. To briefly clarify this means they are in favor of a strong shared identity and the state’s protection of this identity as well as a free market mechanism, minimal involvement of municipalities and the migrant’s own responsibility to pay the civic integration trajectory (Bonjour 2013: 843). According to the PVV, migrants need to take responsibility for their own assimilation into Dutch society. Furthermore they argue that there is only one dominant culture
in the Netherlands and that migrants are required to adapt to that alleged dominant Dutch culture (Bonjour 2013: 845-846). It is important to note that although the PVV takes the most extreme position when it comes to both the socio-cultural and the economic dimension compared with the other political parties the conservative liberal party (VVD) has comparable views on civic integration. Whereas this article gives us a more complete insight of the PVV's view on integration till 2011, it still does not say anything about the most recent years. It is not within the scope of this thesis to fully research the PVV’s current position regarding integration. However a brief analysis of recent government documents provided some evidence to assume their position on integration has not changed much. I have analyzed a total of 10 documents of Dutch parliamentary discussions regarding changes in the law on integration between 2011 and 2017. In one of the discussions Sir de Graaf, a member of the PVV, stated that the ideal situation for the PVV would be that migrants first migrate, then integrate (inburgeren) and finally assimilate (Kamerstuk 32824: nr. 190). As expected the PVV requires the full assimilation of migrants into Dutch society, thus inhabiting Dutch norms and values. The documents do not give us in depth insight into which norms and values are seen as most important by the PVV because this is not the main topic of most discussions. Nevertheless the repeated emphasis on the equality of men and women indicates that this is regarded as a crucial Dutch norm(Kamerstuk 33086: nr 38 ;Kamerstuk 32824: nr. 31). Furthermore the PVV mention the Jewish Christian tradition, reciprocity, equal rights for homosexuals, the freedom of speech and the separation of church and state (Kamerstuk 33086: nr 38). As Rosenthal (2014) also argues in his research this is often contrasted with Islamic norms and values, which they believe to be the opposite.
Since the parliamentary discussions were focused on the facilitation of integration we have a clearer picture of the PVV’s stance regarding this subject. In a recent debate on the implementation of the participation declaration and social support, the newest development in the debate on civic integration, sir de Graaf, a member of the PVV stated (Kamerstuk34584: nr. 54) :
‘’Sir Meenen (a central democrat party member) says that all these people coming here, have to find this (regulations regarding integration) out themselves, on websites etcetera, that there is no support, that there is too little money to help these people, and you name it. My question thus is: who chose to come to the Netherlands, often via safe countries?’’ He counters the argument of a fellow member of parliament that migrants should receive more support by stating that it was their own choice to come to the Netherlands. Next to the argument that migrants made their own choice in moving to the Netherlands they often point out that Dutch society should not have to pay for migrant’s integration. This indicates that the PVV still believes migrants need to show responsibility for their own choices and integration. What adds to this argument is that in one of the debates sir de Graaf states that his party will support the participation declaration but is not yet sure if they want to support the social support that is part of this same law. Apart from the idea that migrants should pay for their own integration the PVV also emphasizes the need for higher consequences in case someone does not pass the test. According to them the integration test should be mandatory in the strictest sense of the word (kamerstuk 33086: nr. 75). If you do not pass the test, your residence permit should be withdrawn.
METHODOLOGY
My research question consists of two parts; I want to know how the anti-immigration attitudes mentioned in the literature manifest themselves in PVV voters and I want to know how this influences their opinion on integration. The additional question about their view on integration can also give us new insights on their opinion about migrants in general.
Because I focus in this research on what’s on individual voters’ minds, qualitative research methods were the best choice for me. I used in-depth interviews to grasp the essence of my respondent’s view on the integration of migrants. Originally I aimed to interview around fifteen PVV voters born before 1980. I decided on the age limit because the immigration and integration landscape of the Netherlands has changed quite a lot over the years, in matters of policy, migration streams and public attitudes. Therefore I wondered if this had influenced my respondent’s view of migrants and their integration. Since the most drastic changes happened around the change of the millennium I wanted my respondents to have been able to consciously experience this change, which I thought would be the case when they were at least 18 years at that point. However soon I discovered that finding respondents would not be easy. Since the first interviews proved that the change in the migration landscape did not really influence my respondents I decided to abandon the age criteria for my respondents. The fact that it was really difficult to find respondents resulted in a total of eleven interviews instead of fifteen. I assume that the difficulty of finding respondents is due to the sensitivity of the topic as well as the tight schedules of people nowadays. There is still a stigma on voting PVV in the Netherlands. Although the PVV received 15 percent of the votes in the last national election and was the biggest party in a number of municipalities, people still fear the reaction of the people around them when they would admit they vote PVV. As Marja, a high school teacher thinking about working for the PVV, told me: ‘’I’m afraid I will lose my job when I get involved with the PVV, while this would not be the case if I would join the Christian-democrats’’. Apart from the stigma on PVV voters, people in general do not discuss politics that much which means that a lot of people are not aware of the PVV voters that they know, even if these people would be willing to talk about it. The last issue was that some people were willing to participate but simply could not find the time to do a one-hour interview.
Despite these issues I believe I have been able to gather enough interesting and meaningful data through the total of eleven interviews that I did. My interviewees ranged in age from 23 years old to 59 years old. In the appendix you can find an overview of all respondents with details regarding their age, gender and education. My group of respondents was fairly representative for the group of all PVV voters in terms of characteristics, I will come back to the representability of my results later in this chapter. The interviews took from 45 minutes to 2 hours and most of them were conducted at the respondent’s home except for one that was conducted in a café. Since people tend to feel more comfortable at home, especially with sensitive topics like this I proposed to do the interview at home, however I always gave the option of conducting the interview in a café if the respondent would prefer that. I found all of my respondents through my direct network which resulted in ten of the eleven respondents coming from the south of Limburg, where I am originally
from. I had the advantage of speaking the local dialect. Although everyone in Limburg speaks perfect Dutch, for some the dialect is their mother tongue and it is thus easiest for them to express themselves in their dialect especially when discussing such a sensitive topic where they want to be as clear as possible. I believe my ability to speak in their mother tongue helped to build trust. I transcribed the interviews in the original language for reasons of authenticity and practicality. When translating the quotes used in this thesis I tried to translate them as accurate as possible. However, when I had to choose between accuracy of the translation, or capturing the essence of the quote I always chose to capture the essence, even if that meant changing the words.
I used an interview guide during the interviews in order to keep the interview structured. The emotions at stake in debates around migration combined with the idea of quite some PVV voters that they are not taken serious by the current government, gave me reason to believe that the interviews could easily derail into for this thesis irrelevant matters. By following this interview guide I made sure the interview focused on the topics that really mattered. Many of my respondents seemed to feel insecure about their knowledge of politics. To take away these insecurities I assured them that this interview was solely about their feelings and opinions and that I would give them all the information necessary to answer the questions. I always started the interview with the question: what comes to your mind when I say migration? I then asked the same for integration. I used their answers as a step to discovering their basic assumptions and feelings about the topic. When I felt the basics were covered I continued with the rest of my interview guide.
Although many of the respondents have an outspoken opinion about migrants, most of them know very little about the policies concerning migration and integration. Therefore providing information on Dutch integration policy and the civic integration test specifically was an important part of my interview. I did this in two ways. I gave all my respondents some general information about the current civic integration exam in terms of who has to participate, the different parts of the test, and regulations such as who has to pay. This was the same information as is displayed in the previous chapter, under the heading ‘current civic integration test’. I gave my respondents this information relatively early in the interview, in spoken form. During the interviews I noted that all this information was sometimes too much to process all at once. Therefore in my last few interviews I gave the information in small bits and asked my respondents to react after every part of information I gave. In hindsight it might have been better to provide the information in written form, because this is often easier to process. I made sure to ask their opinion before and after I gave them information and asked them to explain the change in their opinion if there was one.
Although this was very useful for gaining information regarding their opinion on the citizenship test in general I had to find another way to question them about the content of the integration test. I could just ask my respondents which topics they deemed important for integration. However, with a subject this broad, it can be difficult for respondents to give concrete answers. Furthermore I wanted to know their opinion about the current civic integration test. In order to achieve this I wanted to show them questions from the integration test itself. Because it was not feasible to show the respondents all the questions, I chose to use pairwise ranking. Pairwise ranking is a method that was developed within rural development research and belongs to a bigger group of rural appraisal techniques. It allows me to determine the most important questions for the respondent as well as
the reason why they think these are important (Theis and Grady 1991: 65-68). Furthermore it makes it easy to compare the different respondents. For pairwise ranking you choose a set of problems, around 6 to 10. In this case I used questions from the civic integration test. You show your respondent two questions at a time and ask them to choose which one they feel is most important, which you can then write down in the matrix. You continue this until all questions have been compared to one another (Theis and Grady 1991: 65-68). It is important to ask your respondents to elaborate on their motivations for each choice since the goal is to understand the underlying motivations.
As mentioned above the civic integration test consists of six parts, four of them on Dutch language, one on job market orientation and one on knowledge of Dutch society. I will discuss all six of these parts in the interview. For the pairwise ranking I focused on the part about knowledge of Dutch society because this addresses the question of what migrants are integrating into. The questions of the civic integration test are not available to the public. However DUO, the government organization responsible for the integration test, has practice tests available at their website. There are three practice tests available online, each consisting of 39 multiple choice questions, which brings the total amount of questions to 117. In order to present a representative picture of the exam, I first inductively grouped all the questions into five different categories: Values of decency, history, practical matters, politics and geography and equality of men and women. I then randomly chose one question from all categories. From the categories values of decency, practical matters and politics I chose two because these categories were significantly bigger than the other categories. When picking this second question I actively looked for one that was quite different from the other. This evidently influenced my research. Although I created the categories with the idea that my chosen question would represent all the others, during the interviews I realized that the specific question was nevertheless very influential for my respondent’s opinion. This however, is not any different for the randomly chosen questions. Therefore I think choosing the second question myself was a good thing to do since I could now observe two different sides of one category.
The pair-wise ranking turned out to be very useful. My respondents all very much liked to see the actual questions from the test and were eager to give their opinions. However the pair-wise ranking also created some difficulties. It turned out that for some people the objective of the ranking was not very clear in the beginning. I underestimated the difficulty of the matter at hand. I should have realized that most of my respondents do not know anything about policies in general and even less about this specific integration policy. They thus had no clear vision in which context to see these questions, which made it very difficult for them to determine their importance. I tried to overcome this by phrasing my questions very explicitly, I would say: do you think this is important for migrants to know when they come to live in the Netherlands? In most cases this solved the problem. Another issue was the way in which the questions of the civic integration test are formulated and the nature of the questions. The formulation of the question about gender equality for example, made that some respondents did not deem this as very important. When asking to explain their reasoning I noted that it had to do with the context of the specific question. This could cause problems with validity. To prevent this as much as possible I asked extra questions about the topics that proved to be problematic. Here I really needed to balance the desire for accurate, meaningful answers with the
aim of being objective and neutral. To prevent this in further research it might be better to create my own categories to use for pair-wise ranking.
The aim of being objective and neutral is always a difficult one when it comes to qualitative research, it is therefore important to reflect upon one's role and one's position as the researcher. Having an anthropological background, I believe that to be able to truly understand someone else (as far as that is possible) one has to be aware of one’s own beliefs. When talking about migration I personally believe that everyone should be free to live where he or she wants to live, and should thus be free to migrate. I do not believe I am more entitled to live in the Netherlands and to participate in Dutch society just because I was born here. When it comes to integration I believe it is almost impossible to define Dutch culture and thus to ask people to integrate into this. Before starting this research I expected my point of view to be very different from that of my respondents, which proved to be true. By actively thinking about my own prejudices regarding my respondents and their point of view I minimized the effect this had during the interviews. However there were still instances where I was genuinely shocked by what my respondents said. for example when Gerda, a self-proclaimed racist told me that ‘’all migrant should be sent back, regardless of what will happen with them over there, even if they get stoned at the border’’. In my daily life I would probably confront a person saying these things, and possibly get quite mad about this. However, this was not my role at this moment. I wanted to know how Gerda felt and thus set my own feelings aside. I think this worked quite well for me, most of my respondents did not ask about my own stance on the subject and I did not feel like they were giving socially accepted answers. I think this is because in some way these interviews were also a way for them to explain myself. As said before there is still a stigma on PVV voters. Suzanne said for example: ‘’you don’t think I am racist now right? No you don’t, because I explained why I feel this way’’. My aim to show a nuanced picture of PVV voters thus contributed to the willingness of my respondents to open up to me.
All the collected data was eventually transcribed verbatim to analyze them using atlas ti. I coded the interviews inductively in order not to miss relevant data. This proved useful since some of the most interesting insights did not fit into the original sub questions I had in mind. To see which topics my respondents found most important for integration, I added the scores for each question, given my all my respondents. I then ranked the questions from highest to lowest score. For the parts of the transcript regarding the ranking question I used a specific coding system. I started each code with a name for the specific question, this way I knew the context of the quote. This is important because of the difference between saying something about a topic because you are specifically asked to do so and saying something about a topic because you want to. The codes were then divided into three different categories that are now also the chapters of the result section.
RESULTS
MIGRANTS ARE NOT A PROBLEM BUT…
With the exception of Gerda, a lady who categorized herself as racist, all the other respondents remarked that migration is not a problem in itself. Some made sure to make this clear at the beginning of the interview while others mentioned it later on. What is interesting is that this statement was almost always followed by a ‘but....’ As Harry told me when I asked him what he thought about migrants:
‘’Yes, what do I think about that? What do I think? We don’t have any [migrants] in this neighborhood. So I should actually, yes I didn’t experience it but I do not think I would have a problem with that. If of course, provided that they behave properly and properly want to integrate. And not be like, we are this, we are that, we are this, and we do whatever we want. Look at what happened in Cologne (explain), what they did over there with the women. And I think, yes, when something like that happens, well then according to me that [migrants should immediately be sent back to eh, returned to sender.’’
This ‘but’ is often more telling than the statement it followed. In this case Harry talks about behaving properly and not assaulting women. These are things we don’t want anyone to do but they are especially mentioned here when talking about migrants. There is thus a certain image that migrants are more likely not to follow these societal norms. However this does not only concern societal norms but law as well. Many respondents believed that criminality was common among migrants. Although they nuanced this by mentioning that there are exceptions and that Dutch people can be criminal as well, the general belief was that migrants are more criminal than ‘native’ Dutch people. This also appears from the next quote where I asked a question about the test in general.
‘’P: well, that is what she already said actually, why three years? Because they [migrants] are sitting there all day, they have all the time the whole day, and instead of doing criminal stuff, first do that course, before you can stay. I would say 12 months max.’’
While my question had nothing to do with the criminality of migrants Ben mentioned this in his answer. Therefore it is clear that Ben has the assumption that migrants are participating in criminal activity instead of using their time to study for the Dutch integration test. Furthermore 6 out of 11 respondents mentioned the Dutch television program ‘opsporing verzocht’. In this television program the police and the department of justice seek help from the public in solving criminal cases. As my respondents noted, the people they are looking for are almost always colored, which is another indication to them that most criminals are migrants. Most respondents furthermore differentiate between Muslim migrants and other migrants. They believe Muslim migrants are more criminal than their counterparts who do not follow Islam. Except for Hen, who specifically distances himself from this rhetoric. He states:
‘’If there are 100 Muslims and 100 Christians, are all the Muslims bad and all the Christians good? No of course not, there are always a few bad guys, but does that mean we should treat all Muslims as outcasts? I don’t think so!’’
This nuance in itself is not that rare among my respondents. Most respondents nuance their statements by adding that there are also a few good ones [migrants/Muslims]. These statements are often accompanied by an example of someone they know, for example a Muslim colleague or a migrant neighbor, which they get along with very well. However, contrary to Harry’s point of view, most see these examples as the exception, instead of the rule.
Furthermore my respondents differentiate between migrants and ‘native' Dutch people when it comes to correcting this bad behavior. Where the government should not tell its ‘own people’ what to do or what not do, migrants should be ‘’sent back to their own countries’’ as soon as they do not behave properly. This can be related to the fact that most of my respondents do not see migrants as permanent inhabitants but as guests. On the family level, guests have different entitlements than inhabitants and my respondents tend to see this the same way on a national level. Since they see migrants as guests they feel that migrants should behave properly, adapt or otherwise should just leave.
Another thing that came up in the interviews were migrants that pretended to be refugees but were actually just economic migrants. Except from Gerda all of them stated that the Netherlands should help refugees since these people have a reason to flee their country. Some thought refugees should be admitted and helped in neighboring countries since that makes it easier for them to return ones their country is rebuild and safe again. However they understand that this is not always an option and that fleeing can be inevitable. In that case we should provide shelter. Nevertheless according to the PVV voters in this sample this is accompanied by the requirement that they return to their country of origin once it is safe. Thus a temporary ‘asylum’ permit should never result in a permanent residence permit.
However this is according to them not the biggest problem of the so-called refugee crisis. The problem is that according to them, the refugee crisis is an excuse for a lot of foreigners to come to Europe, and the Netherlands specifically. This is linked to a specific image of what a refugee ought to be.
‘’S: well uhm, if you really are a refugee, a poor refugee, then uhm, then the appearance tells you all you need to know. Then you won’t walk around in new clothes, new bags and gel in your hair. You don’t even have the money for that, you have saved all your money to make that trip.’’
In this case a refugee is always poor, others talked about how it surprised them that all refugees owned smartphones and tablets. Furthermore the overrepresentation of men among refugees struck them as odd. They could not imagine leaving your wife and children behind while fleeing a war. All these signals made them conclude that the majority of those refugees are actually coming from safe countries. These statements about refugees are often followed by complaints about the current border policy of the Netherlands. Although some of them note that it is wrong of migrants to
pretend to be refugees, most of them focus their frustration towards politics and sometimes specifically members of the current government.
Most of the respondents are very clear on their opinion about current Dutch border policy. According to them it is way too easy to access the Netherlands. Although they understand that due to European border policy it is not feasible to close the borders, all of them argue that we should. They believe that by closing the borders and increasing and improving border control it is possible to better filter migrants. Which in this case means not allowing anyone with a criminal background to come in, rigorously investigate migrant’s background to make sure they are actual refugees and an even more thorough check for Muslim migrants since they are believed to be an extra risk. According to my respondents this change would already improve the situation since it would hamper the influx of criminals and fake refugees. If it was totally up to the respondents however, there would be a complete end of migration or at least a ceasing of the granting of residency to Muslim migrants. Because of their perceived criminality, migrants are seen as a greater risk than other migrants. Although some of the above arguments against migrants would fit into the xenophobic or maybe even racist discourse as Rydgren (2008) distinguishes them, they are mostly combined with an anti-immigrant discourse that focuses on the financial situation of the Netherlands.
M:Look, I just feel, Honestly I just feel as a teacher, as person, uhm as contributor in this society that there, well not that you keep a country satisfied, you can never satisfy everyone, But that you have to take good care of your own citizen. By which I mean, enough nurses for the sick, investing in healthcare, investing in education, in tomorrow’s future, investing in employment opportunities and the job market. And if after that, you have money left, and most people can indeed say like, I have a job, people in healthcare are, everything is taken care of properly, we are really, for example, look at Sweden, Denmark, Scandinavia, you name it. They admit refugees there. Sure they will have some trouble sometimes, but in general people there are a lot less dissatisfied. Because I think, and I specifically say I think that these sorts of things are taken care of there. Everything there is at an amazingly high level. And I think that in the Netherlands, that there, I won’t say that they [government] take money away from us and direct it that way, [towards migrants] I don’t say that, I do not have the knowledge to claim that. But I do think that there is just a lot of dissatisfaction because uhm, because the idea prevails that migrants, refugees and you name it are prioritized over the Dutch population itself.
As the above quote from Marja illustrates, these PVV voters feel like there is still enough to improve in the Netherlands before we should worry about others. This clearly relies on the understanding that Dutch natives should be prioritized over migrants. This is non discussable and even perceived as self-evident. Because of this my respondents all report experiencing a major feeling of resentment when it comes to the treatment of migrants compared to the treatment of native Dutch people. Whether they themselves have experienced difficulties renting a house, worry about their children’s students’ loans or worry about less for fortunate fellow Dutch. They all feel like migrants receive special treatment and that they themselves or Dutch people in general are thus disadvantaged.
NORMS AND VALUES, BUT WHICH ONES?
The idea that migrants are guest in the Netherland is also visible in another very strong sentiment among my respondents; the idea that migrants have to adapt to Dutch lifestyle. According to them, it is the other way around nowadays. They feel like the Netherlands is changing in order to satisfy migrants. This is another case in which they feel subordinated in relation to migrants. Important to note is that this is linked to a fear of the future. As Abygail said: ‘’I think it is important to teach migrants about our norms and values and that they should respect our culture, before we will lose our own culture entirely, which is the direction we are heading towards right now’’. It is thus not only the situation now that worries my respondents but more specifically the possible future. Also in this area some migrants specifically mention Muslim migrants because Islam is according to them non-compatible or at least less compatible with Dutch culture compared to other cultures. However there are also respondents who emphasized that all migrants should learn about Dutch norms and values, and inherit them, including European migrants. My respondents thus focus on different groups but they do all agree that migrants should adapt. The question then is what exactly Dutch lifestyle is. For the purpose of this thesis we do not need to know everything that entails Dutch lifestyle, more specifically we want to know the most important parts of Dutch lifestyle for migrants to inhabit, according to my respondents.
There are two subjects that immediately come forward in almost all interviews when talking about the adaptation of migrants: language and norms and values.
The subject of language is quite clear. Apart from Paul all of my respondents saw speaking the Dutch language as the number one priority. It should be mandatory to understand and speak Dutch, although they did note that migrants do not have to be fluent in Dutch. Because most people in the Netherlands have some understanding of English, my respondents were okay with migrants speaking English instead of Dutch. However, they still felt that Dutch language should be taught and tested in the integration course so that every migrant would at least have basic knowledge of Dutch. The importance of speaking Dutch has to do with three things. First this follows the line of the central argument of most respondents; they should adapt, not we. Thus also when it comes to communication, migrants should be the ones to adapt and speak Dutch. Second speaking Dutch is seen as a requisite to full participation in Dutch society. My respondents believe that it would be very hard to get a job without speaking the language. Furthermore some note that parents should also speak Dutch to set an example for their kids so that they will have fewer problems when participating in society. The third argument was only mentioned by Marc but is nonetheless interesting because it focusses solely on the migrant. He states when talking about speaking the language: ‘’Because otherwise you get fooled, if you do not understand the language''. He does not express any concerns regarding his own life but specifically points towards the risks for migrants when not speaking Dutch.
The results of the ranking showed that question relating to norms and values were deemed most important by my respondents. However not all respondents categorized the same questions as ‘norms and values-questions’. Furthermore during the rest of the interviews a lot of different norms
