Explaining Russia’s Foreign Policy after
Ukraine and Syria: Liberalism, Constructivism,
Realism and the Security Dilemma.
MA Thesis in European Studies
Graduate School for Humanities
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Name Hasar Demnati Student number 6206565
Main supervisor A.M. Kalinovsky Second supervisor M.M. Lok Date July 2016
Content
Preface ... 3
List of abbreviations ... 4
Introduction ... 5
Chapter 1: Theoretical Approach ... 9
Liberalism ... 11
Social Constructivism ... 13
Realism ... 15
Chapter 2: Theories as guides for policymakers ... 17
Realpolitik ... 17
Liberal internationalism ... 20
Chapter 3: Russia’s shift from a liberal worldview to realism and the pursuit of security ... 23
The Security Dilemma ... 24
Chapter 4: The road to the Ukrainian conflict ... 27
The source of Russia’s aggression: Fighting for security ... 27
Ukraine, Russia’s last frontier ... 32
Crimea... 37
Chapter 5: Russia-Syria allies or illusions? ... 42
The cradle of Russian-Syrian cooperation ... 42
Nostalgia and Minimal Interests? ... 45
Russia’s biggest Security threat ... 51
Conclusion ... 57
Preface
Even before I began my Master European Studies I was intrigued by the Russian President Vladimir Putin and his course of actions regarding the past five years. However, from a layman’s perspective it was hard to understand what the basis was for the contemporary upheavals in Ukraine and Syria. During the last year of my Bachelor European Studies I followed the course Putin’s Russia, but I still seemed to be missing the point and my curiosity remained unsatisfied. Nevertheless, as I started my Master degree I followed an eye-opening course, Geopolitics by dr. Luiza A. Bialasiewicz in which I got to learn more about inspiring and influencing geopolitical figures, such as Sir Mackinder and Alexander Dugin. At this point a new world had opened for me and I was dedicated to find out what drove world leaders into pursuing certain approaches.
This thesis, is the product of my curiosity and the beginning of a new adventure in my life. Nevertheless, this amazing journey contained both ups and downs, but still I have never stopped from attempts to confront any occurred challenges and accomplish the objectives I have set. Luckily, I have had a great supervisor who really believed in me and the analysis I was dedicated to produce. Therefore, I would like to express many thanks to Professor dr. Artemy M. Kalinovsky who seemed to be able to encourage me every time I felt lost, and I can promise you that this occurred a few times. Besides, he managed to get me on the right track every time I struggled to comprehend delicate issues and provide me with the right advice.
Other people who also greatly influenced my performance during my research is my brainstorm buddy Tijana Vojnovic, my inspiring and patient husband Rachid el Hassani and my beautiful little girl, Amber who gave me the strength to pursuing my dreams even when I thought I could not. And last but not least I would also like to express my appreciation to the rest of my family, my friends, including Fadoua Rahhou and Karima Bouchatoui for their contribution and moral support that helped me in writing this thesis. I am extremely honored to have had such a proficient supervisor, loving and supporting family and friends. And if I forgot to mention anyone that should be mentioned I hereby apology as I undoubtedly appreciate any contribution from anyone.
List of abbreviations
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EU European Union
IMF International Monetary Fund
IR International Relations
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nation
UNSC United Nation Security Council
US United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Introduction
ussian foreign Policy, particularly in Ukraine and Syria is vexing scholars, pundits and politicians in the West. Many of whom are relying, overtly or not, on one of several dominant International Relations (hereinafter: IR) paradigms to try to understand Russia’s behavior. These dominant paradigms are among others realism, liberalism, constructivism, and functionalism. While all have their explanatory value, this thesis will argue that the explanatory value of liberalism is limited by the fact that the way leaders believe the world works, has changed over time. Leaders themselves turn to different paradigms to guide their approaches. In the case of Russia and the West, a liberal approach after 1991 was gradualy replaced by a realists perspective, which sees the acumulation of power and the preservation of its national security as its most significant interests. However, Russia’s behavior has also put it into the position of a security dilemma, which is a situation in which the actions taken by states to guarantee their own security are considered to be a threat to the security of other states. Therefore, I will be applying the notion of the security dilemma to the present situation concerning Russia’s behavior in Ukraine and Syria. With this I will try to demonstrate the relative explanatory value of three specific theoretical frameworks: liberalism, constructivism, and realism.
Liberalism, begins with the premise that humans are naturally good and the individual is self-sufficient. Liberalism in IR advocates public and political autonomies, supervision by law in harmony with the ruled, and security from autocratic power (Beavis, 2015). In economics, as well as in politics liberalism’s emphasis on the collective results of individual actions leads to the analysis of markets and policies, market and policy failure, and institutions to correct such failure. In traditional IR theory it implies attempts to reconcile state sovereignty with the reality of strategic interdependence.
Constructivism approaches IR as rooted in creations of history and society. Constructivist theory condemns the basic hypothesis of realism that the state of anarchy is a structural situation characteristic to the structure of states. Rather, they argue that the world is made up of social constructions (i.e. ideas, or meanings people attach to objects) – that is, that material forces do not have any fundamental significance only that what actors define as their meaning (Webber, 2013, 43-4). Thus, anarchy is a situation of the system of countries, since (heads of) states choose to create it a certain way. Anarchy is therefore, the outcome of a process that builds the norms that administer the collaboration of countries rather than an
intrinsic element of state-to-state affairs. Thus, in constructivism one would argue that it is possible to alter the anarchic essence of states’ structure (Jørgensen, 2010, 160-3).
Nevertheless, in the case of liberalism the conventional liberal assumptions stating that economic interdependence between states reduces conflict, seem to be contested ever since the conflicts arose in Ukraine and Syria. Constructivism, while offering an alternative to explaining Russia’s behavior in the past five year; that is, that Russian leaders have been developing a certain kind of domestic consensus around ideas of stability, tradition, and their approach to foreign policy emerges from that and while putting great emphasis on historical process, constructivism still fails to analyzing how realistic and cautious leaders handle possible future issues of uncertainty, as leaders do not have the capacity to read the minds of other leaders. Besides, the fact that social constructs and human beings are alterable and if these alteration were to happen independent of diplomatic collaboration this could create uncertainties and generate a security dilemma (Copeland, 2000, 210).
In realism, states are the main actors and characteristically hold some sort of power, which could cause them to be a possible threat to each other. States fear that a lack of security makes them vulnerable to domination, exploitation, and subjugation (Herz, 1950, 157). This fear exists due to the fact that leaders will never be able to foresee what goes on in the heads of other state-leaders, and as their goal is to preserve their sovereignty and survive in security, they are required to think strategically. As a result, states seek power to overcome this fear and uncertainty, which in turn sets the ball rolling towards “the vicious circle of security and power accumulation” (Ibidem.). This process in which states seek more power to overcome the security dilemma is referred to as the ‘security dilemma’.
The security dilemma is the final effect of uncertainties and fear between opposing sides. While each side sees its efforts to reinforce national interests – diplomatically, or militarily - as protective precautions, the other side interprets these attempts as a subjective threat which needs an instant reaction. Their response to the threats from those other states, such as setting up more of their own military services, as a counteract can than again be considered to be a threat to the prior state (Mearsheimer J. J., 2006, 75). The dilemma is a key source of arms races in which states spend large amounts of money on equally threatening weapons that in the end does not even offer the security that is needed. The contemporary situation concerning the West – the United States (hereinafter: US), European Union (hereinafter: EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter: NATO) - and Russia, which led to the Ukrainian and Syrian crisis, is fed and maintained by a past of endemic and shared distrust, which seems to be an exemplary case of the security dilemma.
In addition, the security dilemma, also offers valuable insight into the ongoing conflicts in Syria. While, Putin was concerned about US, EU and the NATO’s increasing involvement in former Soviet-controlled Europe and the possible NATO and EU expansion into Ukraine, in the case of Syria, the Russian president seems to be more concerned about the growing influence of Islamist extremists in the Arab Middle East. The fear and uncertainty of these extremists taking over Syria and expanding eastward and southward into Muslim regions in Russia, causes more than just external security concerns for Putin. Russian elites believe that these Islamists expansions could lead to turmoil, security threats and possible separatism within Russia itself and thus, these concerns need to be eliminated directly by the Russian government. For that reason, Putin’s concerns in the case of Syria could not only be explained by the security dilemma, as it also involves another dilemma referred to, by Brian L. Job1
as the ‘insecurity dilemma’.
Knowing that Russian leaders are concerned about the increasing involvement of Islamist extremists, such as ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Quada, and Ahrar al-Sham, they are likewise concerned about Russian fighters for these organizations returning home and causing turmoil and a rise of extremist movements on Russian soil, such as in Chechnya, and the Volga and Urals region, where the biggest Muslim populations live. For that reason the ‘insecurity dilemma’, which unlike the security dilemma - where states are exposed to the threat of the international anarchic order and thus have to protect themselves from what might occur outside their borders – perceives the surrounding areas as the basis of security instead of threats, seems appropriate as well. Job argues that the concept of the “insecurity dilemma” is capable of capturing Russia’s current problems, since its state weakness and insecurity have led the Russian leaders to try to find external support to improve their own security position. The increased Russian involvement in the Arab Middle East, in particular Putin’s support for the Syrian Al-Assad regime, and the increased security threat from Islamist extremists appears, thus, to be a good example of Job’s insecurity dilemma.
However, Russia has not always pursued a realist posture and principle. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the former Russian President Boris Yeltsin turned to the West for post-war aid. Nevertheless, as a precondition of support the West demanded Russia to abandon the communistic principles and adopt the liberal world order. For a while this worked, until Yeltsin felt deceived and felt that he was relying too much on “fictitious Western assistance”. He changed his course and pursued a more self-centered and assertive approach. After
1
Brian L. Job (PhD, Indiana University) is a specialist in Political Science and a resident Faculty Associate of the Liu Institute.
five years it appears as if the liberal democratic policies has failed for Russia. The conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, that both seem to contests the conventional perceptions of liberal theories about the relationship between economic interdependence and conflict, further deepened this perception among Russian leaders.
While liberal democratic policies seem, thus to be failing in the case of Russia, the security dilemma is, in fact able to demonstrate the value of an explanatory theoretical framework: realism. I will argue that the main reason for Putin’s course of actions with regard to both of my case studies, Ukraine and Syria, is the security threat Russia is experiencing. The results advocate that security concerns about the conservation of the sphere of influence over Ukraine and the protection of Russia from Islamist extremists from the Arab Middle East, influenced to a great extent Russia's course of actions in the past five years. Besides, as will be evident later on this thesis, the EU and NATO expansion process towards former Soviet-controlled Europe, caused the Russian-Western (i.e. US and its European allies) relationship to deteriorate over the past several years.
This thesis will analyzing Russia’s course of actions with respect to Ukraine and Syria. The emphasis will particularly be on the issues that generated the security dilemma for Russia, causing President Putin to pursue his national interests and safeguard Russia’s own security. This thesis will thus start with a more detailed discussion of Liberalism, Constructivism, and Realism. This will be followed by an analysis of two theories, realism (or realpolitik) and liberal internationalism, as political approaches to foreign policy rather than as IR theories. Furthermore, I will continue by exploring what led to Russia’s course of actions with regard to the two case studies, Ukraine and Syria, and show how the concept of the security dilemma best explains Russia’s current behavior and predicament. Finally, I will close with a brief analysis of the “insecurity dilemma” that also seemed to be generated among Russian elites as a consequence of the growing Islamist extremists in Syria.
Chapter 1: Theoretical Approach
n this chapter I will start demonstrating why I believe that the main reason behind Putin’s course of actions with regard to both of my case studies, Ukraine and Syria, is the security threat Russia is experiencing. Therefore, the emphasis will be put on the security dilemma within realism. Two alternative theories that might help us understand Russia’s behavior are liberalism - though not in the case of Ukraine - where the emphasis will be put on cooperation and peacekeeping due to the close interdependence of states, and social constructivism. In addition to providing liberalism, constructivism, and realism as explanatory theories, two of these theories (realism and liberalism) will be analyzed as guiding ideas for policymakers, as they are often used by politicians, including Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Rather than looking at Putin’s course of actions with regard to the Ukrainian and Syrian crisis from an empirical perspective, this chapter will provide a theoretical analysis. It will analyze to what extent theories in the discipline of IR can explain Russia’s course of actions in the past five years with respect to Ukraine and Syria. This discussion will help substantiate the primary argument of this thesis, that the contemporary situation concerning the West – the US, EU, and NATO - and Russia, which led to the Ukrainian and Syrian crisis, is fed and maintained by a past of ubiquitous and shared distrust, and is an exemplary case of the security dilemma within theoretical frameworks: realism. However, as mentioned before another possible alternative theory (constructivism) for Russia’s behavior will also be briefly discussed.
Realism (also known as political realism) is a school of thought that explains IR in terms of power (J.S. Goldstein, 2014, 43). Realism is marked by actors acting out of self-interest and the accumulation of power and security is the main driving force behind the rhetoric of realism. Like many other scholars, including Andrej Kreutz2
, I argue that ever since Putin’s alliance with Syria, the rest of the Arab World have been characterized by self-interested rationality and therefore, it is only logical to use the realist framework in understanding Russia’s course of actions with regard to Syria. The following chapters will expand on the arguments provided by scholars and politicians on both Ukraine and Syria, to see whether these fit within the assumptions of a realist framework and thus whether realism would be able to explain Russia’s course of actions in these two countries.
Academics seem to consider theories in IR to be the key tool for guiding a research. It is true that these theories are outstanding tools to compete with prejudices, conventional world
2
Kreutz, a specialist on Russia’s policy in the Middle East and the author of the book Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?
perspectives and/ or wisdom. Moreover, theories harvest interesting issues to examine and they allow the analysis of inherent conventions and outlooks. This is equally true in the case of both Ukraine and Syria, where many observers consider marginal and pragmatic issues to be at the heart of Russia’s behavior. However, the intervention and increasing Russian involvement in both cases revealed profounder Russian concerns. In addition, theories make the comprehension of complex political issues easier, as they lay out possible ways of analysis, clarify compound issues, and conceptualize the world (Jørgensen, 2010, 6). And last but not least theories can contribute to the evaluation of political performance. However, the goal of this is not to evaluate every possible explanation or theory, but rather those that are used most frequently in debates about Russia’s behavior.
Liberalism
Liberalism is a prominent political discipline in IR that dates back to the 17th
and 18th
century and can be branded by the fact that liberalist have strong trust in human reason. In the course of the 20th
century liberalist theorists managed to establish the theory in the discipline of IR and position the worldview as one of the most significant theories in IR. It is therefore often associated with Western civilization with determined obligations to individual liberties. The political liberal worldview strongly values free markets and marginal state interference with regard to economics. Moreover, it advocates public and political autonomies, supervision by law in harmony with the ruled, and security from autocratic power (Beavis, 2015). However, liberalism in the study of IR comprises a large range of outlooks varying from the democratic peace thesis to the Wilsonian Idealism.
Unlike in realism, liberal theories argue that states are merely one of the actors in world politics, and that states might collaborate via institutional mechanisms (Beavis, 2015). Besides interdependent states, other actors like multinational corporations, NATO, International Monetary Fund (hereinafter: IMF) and United Nations (hereinafter: UN) play a vital role as well. That is why after WWII, when the US and its European allies adopted liberalism as their world order, such organizations were established. The functions of such organizations was to act as overarching organizations to preserve a liberal world order in an otherwise anarchic system.
According Adrew Moravcsik3
, liberalism as a social science theory strives to clarify what states should do rather than what states do and is therefore often perceived as a normative approach rather than an explanatory one. Nevertheless, as argued previously liberalism beholds a large variety of outlooks, but even within liberalism as a social theory Moravcsik distinguishes liberalism in four categories, 1) republican liberalism, 2) pluralist liberalism, 3) commercial liberalism and 4) regulatory liberalism. He states that the first category is when liberal democracy tends to be more soothing in contrast to other forms of administration. The second category argues that incentives for international conflict are produced by maldistribution of social power, or the presence of endemic social segmentation. The third category argues that economic interdependence clears the way for peace and collaboration. Whereas the forth category opposes that international institutions and law stimulate international accommodation (Moravcsik, 1992, 2).
3
He is a politician and the author of many articles concerning liberalism, including Liberalism and International Relations Theory.
For the sake of my argument, it might be convenient to consider liberalism as a theory (a study of social reality) that begins with individuals as its significant actor, but also a theory that tries to understand how groups of individuals make shared decisions and how organizations made up of individuals cooperate. Furthermore, it is a theory that encloses this study in a perspective that stresses individual rights and that implements a beneficial view of evolution in human affairs. As argued by Robert Keohane,
“In economics, liberalism’s emphasis on the collective results of individual actions leads to the analysis of markets, market failure, and institutions to correct such failure; in traditional IR theory it implies attempts to reconcile state sovereignty with the reality of strategic interdependence” (Keohane, 2002, 45). In addition, much of the literature on interdependence argues that increased economic interdependence reduces the possibility of conflict between states4
.
As opposed to realism, liberalism is not devoted to any striving and parsimonious fundamental theory, which is often perceived as vaguely identified and incompatible to produce determinate outcomes. However, constructivism might in fact have the capacity to explain Russia’s course of action in Ukraine and Syria.
4
Solomon W. Polachek, ‘Conflict and Trade’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1980), pp. 55 – 78; William Domke, War and the Changing Global System (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988);
Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997);
Michael W. Doyle, ‘Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 3 (August, 2005), pp. 463 – 6;
John R. O’Neal and Bruce Russett, ‘Clear and Clean: The Fixed Effects of the Liberal Peace’, International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 2 (2001), pp. 469 – 85; Zeev Maoz, ‘The Effects of Strategic and Economic Interdependence on International Conflict across Levels of Analysis’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 53, No. 1 (2009), pp. 223 – 40.
“IN ECONOMICS, LIBERALISM’S EMPHASIS ON THE COLLECTIVE RESULTS OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS LEADS TO THE ANALYSIS OF MARKETS, MARKET FAILURE, AND INSTITUTIONS TO CORRECT SUCH FAILURE; IN TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY IT IMPLIES ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE STATE SOVEREIGNTY WITH THE REALITY OF STRATEGIC INTERDEPENDENCE”
Social Constructivism
Compared to all the theories that will be discussed in this section, constructivism is the latest participant in the discipline of IR. Constructivism is an approach that believes that vital aspects of IR, are a construct of history and society (Jørgensen, 2010, 160). Social constructivists consider the behavior of states to be formed by power, emotions and subjective beliefs. Besides, they agreed on the fact that the anarchical character and power of IR exclusively, failed to outline the national interests and policies of states, declaring that power is a tool rather than an ambition of social acts (Tsygankov, 2012, 19). Despite the fact that constructivists recognize the importance of state power, security, and status, in realism, they argue that in understanding Russia’s foreign policy it is key to acknowledge that a policy cannot emerge without due concern for the prevailing framework of the international structure. Moreover, realism tends to underrate the contribution of ideas and culture of a country’s assertive international behavior (Tsygankov, 2012, 7). Constructivist theorists argue that without discovering the values and emotions behind IR, one is not likely to effectively explain and forecast state’s course of actions. What is more notable is that constructivism focusses on how external issues influence the behavior of a state, but also how internal issues contribute to a state’s behavior. For example, Andrei Pavlovich Tsygankov5
in his book Russia and the West From Alexander to Putin, argues that the ‘sense of honor’ of states is essential for their behavior (Ibidem). Russia’s sence of honor is that it wishes to be a significant player on the world stage, and also Russia wants the West to consider the state to be a vital player of the Western world. Yet, internally it wishes to be observed as a great power, and a strong and stable state. In other words, the logic of honor is a social construction of Russia’s past experiences and its relations with other states (Ibidem, 19).
Therefore, constructivists claim that when a state is (internaly) weak and does not form a strong unity, state leaders will seeks to bind the state together by allying themselves with surrounding states that might be capable of supporting the weaker state in its internal battle. Looking to Russia’s history, having had several conflicts in the last 25 years in the Southern regions within its own periphery6
, it might not be far fetched to claim that, from a constructivist perspective, Russia is seeking for alliances that could offer support if internal conflicts occur in the future. Russia’s alliances with Arab Middle Eastern states and support for the al-Assad regime in Syria, who are already fighting the enemy, namely Sunni Islamist extremists, could
5
He is a Russian Political Scientist and specialist of IR
6
A few of the examples are the Chechen War in 1994 and 1999, the War of Dagestan in 1999, the North Caucasus insurgency in 2009 and more.
thus be preparatory work for the unlikely upcoming conflict with Islamist extremists in Russia. Therefore, Russia’s behavior towards Syria is not quite surprising, as Russian analysts are noticing an increase in Islamist extremists movements and study groups in Russia, with in particular in the North Caucasus regions, such as the Volga and Urals regions.
Although these observations make the internal instability and growing division within Russia undeniable, and make it seem as if constructivism might be able to help analyse Russia’s support for Syria in their battle against Islamist extremists, it is does not have the capacity to offer as much in terms of explanation as realism and the security dilemma. This does not mean that constructivism is useless, on the contrary, as constructivism is argued not to be an absolute theory it is an approach that goes hand in hand with dominant traditional theories. In other words, it is not a theory that is similar to conventional theoretical traditions like liberalism and realism, rather it can be amalgamated with all theoretical conventions to provide a more complete and broader understanding of complex issues (Jørgensen, 2010, 21).
Nevertheless, while some scholars, such as Robert Jervis an International Affairs scholar at Colombia University7
consider constructivism to be opposed to realism, others such as Henry Nau a Political Science and International Affairs scholar, argue that realist and constructivist approaches concerning power and identity can be perceived as harmonizing approaches. Moreover, they have the capacity to be combined effectively within one and the same analytical framework (Jørgensen, 2010, 161). Thus, even though constructivist and realist approaches might be based on contrasting conventions and might deliver contrasting visions, their relation is not by definition opposing, or incompatible. However, I consider realism and the security dilemma to be more capable of providing a comprehensible and complete explanation of Russia’s course of actions in the past five years with regard to Ukraine and Syria. Stated differntly, the fact that the Russian government fears NATO and EU expansion into more regions of former Soviet-controlled Europe, including Ukraine that trigged Russia’s behavior, and also Russia’s fear of the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (hereinafter: ISIS) and its affiliates spreading from Syria into the North Caucasus and other surrounding regions on Russian soil, cause Russia’s behavior to be a textbook case of the security dilemma.
7
He holds the Adlai E. Stevenson Chair, and one of the main representatives of (neo)realism within the discipline of IR
Realism
This IR theory as we know it now emerged in the1930s and was developed by the realists John H. Herz, E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr, who are thus regarded as the school’s founding fathers. Since Second World War (hereinafter WWII), realists have blamed idealists for looking too much at how the world should be instead of how it really is. The notion was therefore established as a challenge to the idealistic international politic of the 1920s and was derived from the German word ‘Realpolitik’8
. Realists are disposed to see political power detached from, and predominant over, ideals such as morality, ideology, and other social and economic features of life. For them, ideologies are factors that should not be considered in IR, nor should religions, or other cultural features with which states may legitimize their actions. Realists regard states with dissimilar religions, philosophies, or economic structures as relatively akin in their actions with regard to national power (Jørgensen, 2010, 78).
Realism is thus a theory used to clarify social phenomena’s in societies described as a specific theoretical approach (a.k.a a paradigm) defined by revolutionary international territories, which are made up of independent political components, i.e. states. These states are the main actors and characteristically hold some sort of power (offensive military capability) which could cause them to be a possible threat to each other. In addition, states fear that a lack of security makes them vulnerable to domination, exploitation, and subjugation (Herz, 1950, 157). This fear exists due to the fact that leaders will never be able to foresee what goes on in the head of other state-leaders, and as their goal is to preserve their sovereignty and survive in security, they are required to think strategically. As a result, to overcome this fear states begin to seek power, which in turn sets the ball rolling towards "the vicious circle of security and power accumulation" (Ibidem.).
Professor Mearsheimer stated in his chapter of the book International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, realists believe that power is the currency of international politics. According to realists, the structure of the international world order, forces states to care sincerely about the balance of power and forces them to either gain power at the expense of others, or at least to make sure they do not lose power and all this just in order to survive (Mearsheimer, 2006: 77-8). Consequently, realists argue that IR is (partly) best elucidated by the actions of rational actors aimed at maximizing their self-interests in an international system of sovereign states without a central authority. This sounds quite similar to what Kreutz argues to be the fact in the case of the Russia-Syria relation. He argued that “during the past five years, Putin’s relations with Syria and the rest of the Arab World have been cautious and marked by
8
self-interested pragmatism.” (Kreutz, 2007, 25). Remarkable is that this logic can also be observed in the case of Ukraine. Mikhail Suslov, a researcher at Uppsala University wrote an article “Crimea Is Ours!” Russian popular geopolitics in the new media age, where he examines how the annexation of Crimea has been embodied and discussed on Russian social media. Many Russian observers, i.e. participants of Russian social media forums, consider the annexation of Crimea to be plain geopolitics. One Russian participant even said that Ukraine should not be offended, since it was nothing personal. He claimed that Russia was required to annex Crimea, as it is a great power, and great powers have to pursue their great national interests (Suslov, 2014, 598).
It is evident that many regard Russia’s course of action, especially with respect to Ukraine – but also Syria – as a textbook case of the security dilemma. Moreover, such expressions indicate that the influence of these scholarly theories extends beyond tenure organizations and universities. Policymakers invoke features of realism and liberalism as well, when laying down solutions to global security dilemmas and therefore, these theoretical approaches are often reflected in international politics. However, it is important to make a clear distinction between scholarly theories, realism and liberalism, and theories as guidance for policymakers, realpolitik and liberal internationalism (a.k.a. liberal world order). So in order not to be confused, a short reiteration: the philosophy of political realism and liberalism is aimed on the explanations, descriptions and predictions of events in IR, and is thus a descriptive paradigm, whereas realpolitik and the liberal internationalism are designed to guide politicians in the making of their foreign policy. We will explore the latter two concepts in more detail in the following section.
Chapter 2: Theories as guides for policymakers
he end of the Cold War had profoundly changed international politics and a new, postnational order, liberal internationalism, had substituted the realist rationality that used to administer Europe. The US was not only the “indispensable nation,” as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put it; it also took on the role of a benign leader and thus, the US was unlikely to be regarded as a threat in Russia (Mearsheimer, 2014, 7). Since, the fall of the Soviet Union the new Russian Federation, led by former President Boris Yeltsin has been operating within the liberal world order and trying to integrate into the West, but as soon as he felt cheated by the actors of this liberal order, he pursued a more self-centered direction for Russia. Having observed former President Yeltsin, and served as an advisor his successor Vladimir Putin, followed his lead, and is therefore often referred to as a realpolitiker. As will be evident, Russia changed its direction over the years from liberal world order to realpolitik, for that reason it is useful to see where this deflection of direction was based on, and whether it will help us understand Russia’s contemporary course of actions with respect to Ukraine and Syria. What follows in the next section is, thus an introduction of the two worldviews in question, realpolitik and liberal internationalism.
Realpolitik
Realist politics (i.e. Realpolitik) are based on real and physical factors rather than theoretical, or moral objectives. It is a notion first introduced in 1853, by the German publicist Ludwig von Rochau, in his Grundsätze der Realpolitik. In this publication he explained the notion as followed:
T
“The study of the forces that shape, maintain and alter the state is the basis of all political insight and leads to the understanding that the law of power governs the world of states just as the law of gravity governs the physical world. The older political science was fully aware of this truth but draw a wrong and detrimental conclusion - the right of the more powerful. The modern era has corrected this unethical fallacy, but while breaking with the alleged right of the more powerful one, the modern era was too much inclined to overlook the real might of the more powerful and the inevitability of its political influence.” (von Rochau, 1853, p)
However, it only became popular in the time Otto von Bismarck was Minister President of Prussia, as his policy towards the unification of Germany seemed to be comparable with the principle of Realpolitik. His foreign policy was aimed on re-uniting Germany and growing economically and therefore his actions were described as, “a scrupulous attention to what is possible, a shrewd estimation of what one’s opponent really wants, rather than what he says he wants, and a preparedness to assert force when necessary” (Scruton, 2007). The notion of Realpolitik is also known as Machiavellianism, which refers to the Italian political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli, who argued that the main goal of a prince is to seek power, irrespective of ethical and/or religious concerns. The policies, or politics that Realpolitik conceives are considered to be amoral, coercive and pragmatic (in the context of politics). As von Bismarck said: “Not by speeches and majority votes are the great questions of the day decided... but by blood and iron.”
Although it had existed for almost a century it was formally introduced in the US by the political scientist Henry Kissinger during the presidency of Richard Nixon and had been deployed ever since. However, after WWII the US, United Kingdom (hereinafter: UK), and their alliances were searching for a new order that would help them keep peace and security. Leaders and scholars were convinced that the interdependence of states, with shared norms and values, such as democracy would eliminate conflicts and war they shifted to the liberal world order with all the commitment they could muster. This flawed view of international politics has been the reason why they were frequently bushwhacked by events. He states that foreign politicians, mistakenly, tended to underplay the importance of realpolitik (Mearsheimer, 2014, 2).
On the other hand, Keohane argues that, a lot of what liberals seek to explain about world politics firstly, is able to indicate the nature and actions of world capitalism and, secondly, the character of political-military rivalry (Keohane, 2002, 46). Senator John Kerry during the 2004 presidential campaign, for instance, said that US’s foreign policy has achieved greatness only when it has combined realism and liberalism (Snyder, 2004, 54). There are many other advocates for an amalgam of the theories, such as the pundit Charles Krauthammer who backed the Middle East policy imposed by Bush’s administration by arguing for an assertive combination of liberalism and realism, which he called: democratic realism (Ibidem).
Nonetheless, the American political scientist and political economist Francis Fukuyama9 replied on Krauthammer’s argument by saying that the use of force and the feasibility of
9
Francis Fukuyama is the author of The End of History and the Last Man, which is one of the key works in the liberal tradition.
democratic change in Iraq blinds him to the war's lack of legitimacy, a failing that "hurts both the realist part of our agenda, by diminishing our actual power, and the idealist portion of it, by undercutting our appeal as the embodiment of certain ideas and values"(Ibidem). While Robert Keohane condemns that liberal theories are not able to meet social scientific standards of parsimony10
set, if not always attained, by realism, he did claim that an amalgam would in fact be benificial (Moravcsik, 1992, 3). Many current great world leaders pursue a liberal world order in theory, but in practice they seem to be pursuing the state’s national and private interests. This state of affairs arguable describes the relationship between Russia and the US.
10
Parsimony refers to the law of parsimony (i.e. Ockham's razor) which prescribes that a theory should deliver the simplest imaginable (feasible) explanation for a phenomenon.
Liberal internationalism
As was mentioned earlier, after WWII the US and UK had introduced a new world order, liberal internationalism, also known as the liberal world order. The WWII had severe impact on Western European states, leaving one state more devastated than the other. The aftermath of the war caused fear and consternation to be the dominating feelings among the Western population and their leaders. In addition to these bitter emotions, was the terrible economic situation of these states, which did not only need a onetime financial boost, but a solid approach on which state heads could rely. This postwar situation was an excellent opportunity for the new liberal world order, championed by the US, to play its part. The trademarks of liberal internationalism, which were openness and rule-based relations, human rights, and democratic solidarity protected by big institutions, such as the UN, and IMF and standards, such as multilateralism, were going to bring prosperity and security and were to become the new guide for foreign policymakers. And alongside these institutions, common security alliances and regional institutions were founded (Ikenberry, 2011, 450).
As a consequence of war and settlement, the great powers learned the right way to function within a multipolar balance-of-power system (Ibidem). The US had advocated its ideas, such as liberal democracy, free markets, alliances, and the tolerability of US military power, ever since 1940s, resulting to many leaders of western and non-western countries wanting to be part of this new world order, as they firmly believed that it would likewise provide their states the benefits of prosperity and security.
US President Franklin Roosevelt’s government devoted their time and effort to building a liberal world order, which incorporated the idea of an open trading system and a collective security alliance in which the great powers would collaborate in order to be able to overcome the ‘security dilemma’ in IR, that was perceived to be the reason behind many great wars in history (Russett, 2013, 95). Due to the severe economic and social impact the war had on global level, international diplomacy was needed. Leaders of the affected countries established cooperation organizations in order to overcome the security threat that could produce warfare, as they believed that, from a liberalist perspective, high level of interdependence between states decreases the possibility of political conflict (Doyle, 2005, 465). The US took the initiative to become the hegemonic leader, by taking on the rights and responsibilities to organize and run the liberal world order, in the years that followed WWII. The US led and controlled a wide-ranging hierarchical liberal order, which was arranged around alliances, multilateral organizations and special partnerships (Ikenberry, 2011, 450).
In line with the post-Cold war, the idea that a liberal world order would provide prosperity and security, leaders were convinced that the new liberal world order was the Holy Grail, which would consequently lead to the expansion of liberalism into the rest of the world. Western leaders firmly thought that staying behind, or failing to adopt the liberal world order would cause exclusion, which would be unbearable for any country. In order for a non-liberal state to compete with the US and its European allies, a state would need to become like them. However, to become like them, a state would need to turn into “the kind of wishy-washy, pacifistic milquetoast society” (Mead, 2014, 71-2). The only possible threats could be from states, such as North Korea which might be willing to challenge actors within the liberal world order, but this was a minimal threat since they were too weak to do anything, as a result of their non-liberal system. Thus, choices needed to be made: you [non-liberal states] either join and turn into an open and pacifistic liberal system, or you could stick to your guns and your culture as the world passed you by. Initially, it all seemed to be working properly (Ibidem, Mead, 2014, 72).
As the US, along with the other four victors11
of WWII, created the UN, including its Security Council (hereinafter: UNSC), which was aimed at taking away all possible concerns about security matters and providing peace and security; Europe founded the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), from 1992 on known as the European Union, to avoid further war between Germany and France. As Robert Schuman, one of its founding fathers, stated my aim is to “make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible” (Europa, sd). The liberal world order has been dominating over the years, as a result of its diverse rules and organizations that not only preserved open markets and trade, but provided tools for its governments to achieve security and economic interdependence as well (Ikenberry, 2011, 453).
And yet, the liberal world order had minor flaws as it was a creation of the Western world and did not esteem upcoming non-Western states, such as China, India and Brazil. Due to the fact that these states had different sets of cultural, political, and economic knowledge, and they perceived the world through their own pasts – be it communism, anti-imperial, or anything in that order – the trademarks of this order have been pushed to the limits. Many scholars argue that its western design is one of the reasons why the ‘old’ liberal order is not suitable for the globalizing world. Nevertheless, the liberal world order rests on open rule-based relations, which are kind of the basic principles for liberal internationalism. Whereas openness involves the capacity of states to participate in exchange and trade – of thoughts, capital, merchandises, etc. – rule-based relations involve the relations between states that are arranged confirming to
11
general values and arrangements. These general values and arrangements together with institutions turn into a multilateral structure (Ikenberry, 2011, 451). Thus, even though liberal internationalism may have failed in accounting non-western states and in explaining the behavior of states, it has been a guide to how both Russian and western leaders tried to structure their relations after 1991, and up until now the basic principles of liberal order, openness and ruled-based relations, are not being contested.
On the other hand however, it needs to be visibly spelled out that, while the liberal institutions, UN and EU, were established to overcome the security dilemma in IR, other organizations simultaneously established for the same reason seemed to generate the security dilemma. For instance, NATO that was established to “safeguard the freedom and security of its (Western) members through political and military means” (NATO, sd) caused the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter: USSR) to estalish the Warsaw Pact in reaction to NATO. This vicious circle created by fear and uncertainty is called the ‘security dilemma’. Despite the fact that Russia is often accused for pursuing policies of assertiveness towards the West, it is incontestable that fear and uncertainty are often the driving force behind these policies and actions. Therefore the security dilemma allows us to understand concequences of Russia’s actions over the past five years with respect to Ukraine and Syria.
Chapter 3: Russia’s shift from a liberal worldview to realism and
the pursuit of security
ussia’s opposing and hostile attitude towards NATO in the past 25 years proves that the military alliance organization poses a serious threat to the security and sphere of influence of Russia. This conflicting perspective towards NATO, as well as towards the EU deteriorated even further in the course of events, causing these organizations to form a serious threat to Russia and even led to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Nevertheless, over the years many other arguments have been mentioned for the Ukrainian upheavals in 2014, ranging from a holy war to Putin’s secrete-service background and personality being the driving force behind the conflict. And whereas the West blames Russia, Russia blames the West for the turmoil caused by its military intervention, pointing them on Russia’s actions being a counteract against their violation of international law.
However, I will argue in this chapter that Russia’s course of actions regarding Ukraine could be explained through the lens of a realist theory, with in particular the security dilemma. With this lens the focus will be put on three important factors, namely the increasing EU involvement in the East of Europe (i.e. former Soviet-controlled Europe); Ukraine’s geographical position; and the pro-western angle of Ukraine’s new regime. These three factors combined give Russia a good motive to pursue a self-assured policy towards Ukraine (Götz, 2015, 3). Given Ukraine’s strategical situation, it is of utmost importance to Russia, thus not only Putin, but any other Russian leader will try to avoid Ukraine joining a ‘collective security alliance (i.e. NATO), or geopolitical blocs. If they do not succeed in pursuing this goal, Russia will continue to try to create a forward security zone along its western border (Ibidem, 4). As Putin once argued, “Russia should protect its own interests and act flexible in the pursuit of its goal.”
I will justify my argument, which is, that the generated security dilemma will be best capable of providing us a clear and comprehensible explanation of Russia’s course of action regarding the conflict in Ukraine (and Syrian), by using the ongoing eastward NATO expansion process, which went almost simultaneously with the eastward EU expansion, into former communist states as the most significant reason for the current upheaval with respect of Ukraine. Another thing this chapter will show, is that Putin has been highly capable of playing the games needed to regain his power position on the world stage and secure Russia from external threats. Both scholars and politicians argue that his strategies in pursuing Russia’s national interests correspond with a traditional realpolitik approach. However, first the ‘security
dilemma’ will be elucidated, before we continue to display that the course of history has resulted in Russia pursuing this realist’s strategy.
The Security Dilemma
Realists argue that the actors in IR frequently generate a security dilemma —a situation in which the actions taken by states to guarantee their own security (such as setting up more military services) are considered to be a threat to the security of other states (Mearsheimer J. J., 2006, 75). Their responses to the threats
from those other states, such as setting up more of their own military services, as a counteract can than again be considered to be a threat to the prior state (Ibidem). The dilemma is a key source of arms races in which states spend large amounts of money on equally threatening weapons that in the end does not even offer the security that is needed.
The ‘security dilemma’ was
articulated by one of the founding fathers of realism, John H. Herz and was perceived as an undesirable result of anarchy in the international system. This model is now probably the furthermost used and cited model in textbooks of IR. The notion of 'security dilemma' is not a new one in IR, as it was first introduced in 1951 in Herz’s book Political Realism and Political Idealism (Herz, 1951). In that very same year the British historian, Herbert Butterfield also described a situation in his book History and Human relations, which was similar to ‘the security dilemma’ nonetheless, he used other words to describe it12
. Ever since, the model has become one of the most significant theoretical ideas in IR.
Herz and Butterfield shared the same main argument, namely that a ‘security dilemma’ arises when two actors, none of them actually attempting to harm the other, wind up going to war, their understandings of the notion differed from each other. Butterfield argued that, “The greatest war in history could be produced without the intervention of any great criminals who might be out to do deliberate harm in the world. It could be produced between two powers
12
Unlike Herz, Butterfield referred to ‘the security dilemma’ as the 'absolute predicament and the irreducible dilemma' (Butterfield, 1951: 19)
THE GREATEST WAR IN HISTORY COULD BE PRODUCED WITHOUT THE INTERVENTION OF ANY GREAT CRIMINALS WHO MIGHT BE OUT TO DO DELIBERATE HARM IN THE WORLD. IT COULD BE PRODUCED BETWEEN TWO POWERS BOTH OF WHICH WERE DESPERATELY ANXIOUS TO AVOID CONFLICT OF ANY SORT.”
both of which were desperately anxious to avoid conflict of any sort” (Butterfield, 1951, 19-20). Thus even if men were up to no harm the fear and uncertainty that is genarted by precautionary measures functions as a vicious circle. Butterfield listed six indication, which according to him define the ‘security dilemma’ in the best way, with on number one fear, derived from the “universal sin of humanity”13
; number two is the uncertainty over others’ intentions; number three is the unintended nature; number four is the tragic results the security dilemma produces; number five is the possible intensification by psychological aspects; and last but not least is the essential source of all human conflicts (Butterfield, 1951, 19-22).
Herz did in fact agree with Butterfield when stated that the key to understanding how the security dilemma can occur is ‘fear’ and ‘uncertainty’. In 1966 in his book International politics in the Atomic Age, Herz notes that: 'it is one of the tragic implications of the security dilemma that mutual fear of what initially may never have existed may subsequently bring about what is feared the most' (Herz, 1966, 241). In other words, it is a tragedy when state leaders never having any intentions to causing a conflict with another nations, are taken over by concerns and uncertainty about the intentions of the other nations, which eventually leads to the production of men’s greatest fear, namely a conflict. This fear created by uncertainty with regard to the future of Syria and Ukraine is expressed very often by the Russian President Vladimir Putin in his speeches and interviews, however this will be further addressed in the following chapters.
To continue with the analysis of Butterfield’s indications of the security dilemma, Professor Shiping Tang of the school of IR in Shanghai, rightly criticized, in his article The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis, that Butterfield’s first indication of the ultimate source of security dilemma, the “universal sin of humanity” is logically incompatible with his other theses, which argue that the security dilemma is unintentional in origin and that conflicts driven by the security dilemma are tragic (Tang, 2009: 590). This would mean that if the “universal sin of humanity,” causes us to be preset to harm each other there should be no
13 With “universal sin of humanity” Butterfield refers to the ‘will to power’ or Machiavelli’s ambizione, and Hans
Morgenthau’s “lust for power.”
“BECAUSE NO STATE CAN EVER FEEL ENTIRELY SECURE IN SUCH A WORLD OF COMPETING UNITS, POWER COMPETITION ENSUES, AND THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF SECURITY AND POWER ACCUMULATION IS ON.”
exception to this rule; thus, making this attribution incompatible with Butterfields’ second indication of ‘uncertainty’ as well.
This flaw within Butterfield’s definition was addressed by Herz and Robert Jervis when they attributed the final source of the security dilemma to the anarchical structure of international politics. Herz, described it as follows: “Groups and individuals who live alongside each other without being organized into a higher unity . . . must be . . . concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attacks, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the effects of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Because no state can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.” (Herz, 1951, 157). The way the security dilemma is generated among Russia’s government by uncertainty and fear, and the desire of states to preserve their power in order to be able to protect one’s state is an important issue. Russia’s biggest fear is losing its great power position and consequently be subject to a security threat. Besides it seems as if NATO is doing its best to exclude Russia from all the important security issues, and with this Russia is being removed out of the great power sphere of influence by NATO. Moreover, although Russia possesses a significant regional power position in the Middle East, Europe and Europe, these regions are in their own turn extreme strategically important regions, this again leads to severe security concerns and substantial temptations for Russia to accumulate more power (Braun, 2008, 56).
We might be able to conclude that Russia’s course of action with regard to both Syria and Ukraine can thus be explained under the banner of ‘fear’ and ‘uncertainty’, compatible with the security dilemma of realism, since Russia’s in the case of Ukraine fears NATO and EU expansion into more former communist regions and in the case of Syria fears the expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (hereinafter: ISIS) and its affiliates into the North Caucasus and other surrounding regions on Russian soil. But how is it that an institutions like NATO, established to overcome the security dilemma, which existence is also acknowledged within liberalism and constructivism, seems to generate rather than overcome a security dilemma among Russian leaders. The answer to this question will be addressed in the following chapter, in which I analyze my first case study, Ukraine.
Chapter 4: The road to the Ukrainian conflict
The source of Russia’s aggression: Fighting for security
hroughout the Cold War the West maintained strong diplomatic relations with Russia. Russia has been and still is an important country for the West, since the role of Russia was read as a threat to security in Europe’s neighborhood and it was thus considered to be, to a certain extent, partly responsible for global stability and security (Galantino & Freire, 2015, 283). Although Russia was never considered to be complying with the Washington approved model of liberal democracy, it generally had similar interest as the West. Nevertheless, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, it seemed as if former President Yeltsin mistakenly depended too much on the “fictitious Western assistance”, where the West promised Russia all kinds of aid that was never received, if they would abolish communism and adopt a liberal world order. Therefore, Russia was committed to change its foreign policy by publishing a document called ‘The Fundamental Principles of Russia’s Foreign Policy Conception’ in April 1993, which stimulated three main goals for Russian Foreign Policy. The document stated a realist approach for Russia, its main goals was to revive, uphold its private interests and regain it great power status (Xia Yishan, 1997, 22).
The striving towards these goals have recently been very visible, as the national interests of Russian leaders have changed, as well as the Western “collective security alliances as means to overcome the security dilemma of the international system” (Russett, 2013, 95). The NATO– Ukraine relation, more than any other, confirmed that NATO did not view the former Soviet periphery as a separation line. Every step that Ukraine took towards NATO was affectionately recompensed. When the current Russian President Vladimir Putin, came to power in 1999 – first as prime minister and then as president - a more realistic perspective on international order was created. Rather than distancing Russia from a multipolar world order, it was reconsidered into a more practical alternative which was beneficent for Russia (MacFarlane, 2008, 42). Instead of focusing on the West, Putin pursued allies all over the world who shared common interests on ‘matters of significance’, which however did not always meant that these allies corresponded with the liberal framework of the West , like its alliance with Iran (Ibidem). Moreover, it was exactly this collective security alliance, i.e. NATO’s process of expansion that created the security dilemma for Russia in the first place.
Even though Russia frequently tried to cast vetoes with respect to the UNSC draft Resolutions and was not amused by NATO expansion into former communist states (such as
the first NATO expansion into the three former Soviet regions, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic), for quite a long time it was not strong enough to raise objections to vital interests of the West, or protect its own interests (Mearsheimer, 2014, 2). However, as the country started to stabilize economically, cooperate with another great power, China, it regained its great power status and Russia was dedicated to letting the West know that is was no longer weak and that it was going to pursue its realists approach that it had created shortly after the fall of the USSR. Russia has, from the start, truly appreciated its permanent membership of the UNSC14
with its power to veto and it seemed that it was finally coming to great use.
Given Russia’s enduring opposition to external (military) intervention on the basis of humanitarian support – as it claims that these interventions are just an elaborate smokescreen to topple any regime not complying with the Washington approved model of liberal democracy – combined with its support to countries viewed as important potential international partners for Russia, its power to veto has frequently been circumvented. Such as the constraint of NATO military intervention in 1999 in Yugoslavia by Russia with the support of China. Followed by Russia preventing the UN from issuing a mandate for the incursion of Iraq by the US. Furthermore it prevented severe sanctions to be taken against the nuclear explosions of North Korea, President Mugabe’s dictatorship in Zimbabwe15
, and Iran’s nuclear program (Oldberg, 2010, 32)
Although it had achieved these successes, Russia had a lot to endure subsequent to the fall of the USSR, according to many scholars amongst whom are Roger Kanet and Joseph Black NATO’s first eastward expansion into former USSR states in 1999 was a matter that elevated the most serious Russian concerns at this time, and remained a significant matter till this day (Kanet, 2010, 208). In January 1999, former member of the Duma Defense Committee Vladimir Volkov said during a press conference that Russia preceived the NATO’s new strategic concept to be a “geostrategic threat to peace” which would result into “adequate measures”. Besides that Putin, later repeatedly claimed that NATO’s expansion is a severe provocation that needs to be taken seriously by Russia as diminishing common trust would be perceived as a serious threat to the security of Russia.
Despite Russia’s attempt to oppose this eastward expansion by offering three conditions for the membership of the three former Soviet states to overcome the security dilemma. First of all membership of these countries had to be according to the ‘French model’, meaning that they were allowed to join the political organization without being involved in the military cooperation
14
With the power to cast vetoes
15
of NATO. The second conditions was that NATO was not allowed to position its forces in regions close to the Russian borders, neither was NATO allowed to place military, or nuclear bases in Central Eastern Europe. Thirdly and last, NATO was to be limited in its further enlargements signifying that no expansion into Baltic states were tolerated, since this would be interpreted as a direct challenge to Russia’s national security interests (Xia Yishan, 1997, 24) Nevertheless these conditions were never taken into consideration and Russia failed to prevent NATO expansion by Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.
During its 50th
anniversary in Washington in the same year NATO announced a new strategic doctrine, which stated that in case of a regional crisis, for instance, at the border of the Alliance, NATO would response with force without permission from the UNSC. And since the borders of some of its Alliances were, due to its enlargement, likewise borders of Russia this strategy meant a direct threat to a region which Russia believed to be inside its rightful sphere of influence (Light & Allison, 2006, 5). From Russia’s point of view this implied that NATO provided itself with a carte blanche to act with military force wherever it considered to be needed and that it wanted Russia to be excluded from decision taking on security matters in Europe. This was confirmed when, in accordance to its new strategy doctrine, NATO launched its first airstrike against Serbia in response to the Kosovo crisis (Ibidem). Following these developments, the eastward expansion of NATO, weakening of international security mechanisms (such as UN and the OSCE), Russia seemed to be facing several external threats. In the end, with the threat of global terrorism lurking after 9/11 and the creation of a security dilemma, President Putin decided to change its security perception in that terrorism, separatism, border security and military conflict were now regarded as the primary threats and resume its cooperation with NATO (Li, 2008, 151-2).
Nevertheless, Russia was not alone in changing its strategy after 9/11, apparently so did NATO. Subsequently to 9/11, NATO dedicated itself to further enlargement in both geographical as well as functional matters. Although it appeared as if NATO expansion was put on hold and for a little while relations between Russia and the West looked to be moderately improving, it did not however, result into compromises on strategic matters that involved Russia (Light & Allison, 2006, 11). As NATO started to engage in US-led missions in regions that were subject to the Russian sphere of influence, such as the Caucasus, and Central Asia the earlier concerns voiced by Russia turned out to be completely justified (Simon, 2008, 98). Consequent to the broadened NATO commitments and the supposed ‘global terrorism threat’ a US-led
