An analysis of the United Nations Security Council and the 2011 uprisings in Libya and Syria

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An analysis of the United Nations Security Council

and the 2011 uprisings in Libya and Syria

Justifying and understanding the Russian position upon the

two Arab uprisings

Neil Mortimer

Student Number - 11106417 Supervisor: Prof. Michael Kemper Second Marker: Sudha Rajagopalan

Master East European Studies 2016

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In 2011/12 Russia vetoed three western backed resolutions in the Security Council against a UN, NATO-led intervention in Syria to prevent government forces suppressing less well-armed oppositionists. Interestingly, this contrasted with the abstention cast by Russia in accordance to UN intervention in Libya at the beginning of 2011. Hereby, in this paper I will attempt to explain why this was the case, whilst offering an analytical overview of both uprisings and

conflicts. In determining why Russia acted the way it did, this paper will establish how Security Council decision-making compared on the uprising in Libya on one hand, and the uprising in Syria on the other hand. Finally, this paper will hope to understand and justify Russia’s motives behind Libya and Syria, proposing how such decisions were made, what principles were deemed essential, whilst aiming to situate Russia’s place in the Security Council and what decisions made

regarding the two crises mean in the wider context.

1.1 Methodology

This paper will draw from Maarten Hajer’s argumentative discourse analysis, which provides my paper with a framework, which will analyse both conflicts in terms of the ideas, concepts, norms expressed, and the development of decision-making within the UNSC1_{. In doing so, this paper will break down the complex}

chain of events that were associated in both cases, to offer a clear analysis that provides the reader with a comprehensive, yet broad understanding of both cases before determining links or commonalities shared.

Moreover, through offering an individual, yet comparative case study, this paper will aim to examine similarities and differences in how the Russian authorities justified their stance. Whilst offering a comparison between both cases, this paper will also determine to what extent Libya affected Russian decision-making in the following Syrian crisis.

Subsequently, when justifying the Russian position and determining why certain actions were decided upon, this paper will draw upon neorealism. Through 1 Hajer, Maarten et al. The argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning. Eds. Frank Fischer, and John Forester. Duke University Press, 1993

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applying neorealism, this paper will draw from themes of humanitarian intervention, territorial integrity and sovereignty, all which will be applied towards Russia’s actions.

Furthermore, when determining the decisions made by Russia in light of the UNSC, an insight into the two cases will reveal the principles and norms Russia defends and promotes within international society. In doing so, each area of justification will determine what type of foreign policy Russia enacted in each separate case.

Chapter 2. Libya as a Prelude

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Before 1951, Libya experienced a turbulent history, which was characterised through belonging to various ruling empires, including those of Roman, Spanish, Ottoman and Italian influence. In 1951, Libya became an independent kingdom from Italy and was declared as a constitutional monarchy. In 1959, after Libya attained freedom and independence, oil was discovered in the region that allowed the nation to increase its previously poor capital. Yet, in 1969, following unfair distribution of wealth by King Idris al-Senusi, a military coup was devised that targeted removing the pro-western king and Colonel Muammar Gadhafi successfully led the ‘al-Fateh revolution’.

Following the coup, Colonel Gadhafi was established as the de facto leader of the Libyan state and following the movement of the times, Gadhafi, like Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, supported pan-Arabism. Interestingly, Gadhafi outlined his own political theory, which he coined as “The Third Universal Way”, in his ‘Green Book’2_{. Here, Gadhafi rejected worldwide ideas of Communism and}

Capitalism and instead based his ideas on a democratic system that combined both Socialism and Islam. Additionally, Gadhafi rejected representation based systems that featured in liberal democracies and was determined that his system would feature direct democracy, enforced through appointing peoples

committees. This formation appeared across Libyan governance, known as “Jamahiriya”, which translates as the “State of the Masses”3_{. Upon further}

examination, Gadhafi’s unique “Jamahiriya” allowed him to exercise a dominative grasp over the state, leading to absolute power over political and economical life. Not only did Gadhafi exert control over economic and political life, yet as newly established head of state, he also assumed position of commander in chief of the Libyan Armed Forces. This position allowed him to exert influence over the “mukhabarat”, which was Libya’s national intelligence service. Through acquiring positions such as these, regime loyalists within revolutionary committees

supported Gadhafi’s ideology, aiding him to uphold his rule. 2 Gadhafi, Muamar "The Green Book." (2009)

3 Pargeter, Alison "Libya: Reforming the impossible?" Review of African Political Economy 33.108 (2006): 219-235.

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The Jamahiriya establishment combined with Gadhafi support from his kin and allowed him to endorse fear, intimidation and loyalty in establishing a four decade long rule. Within his rule, Gadhafi violated Rule of Law, through using socialist claims to mask human rights violations, such as televised hangings and the rape of hundreds of women4_{. Moreover, Gadhafi was even subject to}

international human rights abuses following an attack on a Berlin discotheèque on April 5 1986, where three people were killed and 230 injured when a bomb was planted at La Belle discotheèque, West Berlin. Following the incident, Libya was accused by the US government of sponsoring the bombing and US President Ronald Reagan ordered revengeful strikes on Tripoli and Benghazi in Libya on April 15. These strikes purportedly killed 15–30 people, including Gadhafi's adopted daughter. The strikes were swiftly condemned by the United Nations General Assembly5_{. A 2001 trial in the US found that the Libyan secret service}

and the Libyan Embassy had planned the bombing.

Just two years on from the discotheèque bombing, on 21 December 1988, a terrorist bomb destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, travelling from Heathrow to New York. Following the incident, which killed 243, the Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary conducted a three-year joint investigation alongside the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which ultimately issued arrest warrants for two Libyan nationals in November 1991. In 1999, following pressure applied through sanctions, Gadhafi handed over two men for trial at Camp Zeist, Netherlands. Yet, in 2003, Gadhafi accepted responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and paid compensation to the victims’ families, although he repeatedly stated that he had never given any direct order. _Accepting

responsibility still scarred the country due to subsequent sanctions, yet Libya renewed co-operation with EU states, including Italy following a lifting of sanctions and 2008 ‘friendship and cooperation agreement’.

4 Fuelle, Michelle. "Hundreds of Women Raped by Gaddafi Militia." The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, 29 May 2011. Web. 5 May 2016.

5 Erlanger, Steven (November 14, 2001). "4 Guilty in Fatal 1986 Berlin Disco Bombing Linked to Libya". New York Times, [Accessed 8 May 2016]

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Incidents such as these demonstrated cruel lessons for the Gadhafi

administration and plagued Libya’s reputation. Sanctions placed upon Libya crippled the oil industry and ‘rendered Libya all but inaccessible to the outside world and ratcheted up the international media’s portrayal of Gadhafi as demon dictator’6_{. Additionally, plagued by the separate incidents, Gadhafi continued to}

stay in power offering ‘proof of his unshakable power’7_.

In Gadhafi’s Libya, freedom of expression was subject to criminalization, where if one was to speak out against the establishment, it was not uncommon for the individual(s) to be tortured, face life imprisonment or be killed. Furthermore, the political landscape diminished under Gadhafi’s rule, as numerous opposition groups were suppressed. If any group were to investigate into human rights and/or political matters they would be banned, in accordance to ‘Libyan law 71’, which meant that any opposed to the principles of the al-Fateh Revolution can be punished by death8_{. Responding to criticism, the Libyan government argued that}

freedom of association and assembly are not required in a political system based on “popular power”. A Libyan official declared to Human Rights Watch: “the right to demonstrate is a right in the traditional sense. But that implies there are two sides, the rulers and the ruled. But when we talk about one group, there is no need”9_.

2.2 Events leading to the Libyan crisis

Colonel Gadhafi’s 40-year rule began to disintegrate in December 2010, following 6 Kawczynski, Daniel. Seeking Gaddafi: Libya, the West and the Arab Spring. Biteback Publishing, (2011) P. 173

7 Ibid. P. 173

8 Zamani, Amir, and Casey Jordan, "Law Enforcement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and The Socialist Peoples' Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: A Comparative Study." Int'l Rev. Police Dev. 12 (1989): P. 39

9 HRW "I. Summary." Libya: Words to Deeds: The Urgent Need for Human Rights Reform: Human Rights Watch, 1 Jan. 2006. Web. 5 May 2016.

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a string of uprisings, known as the ‘Arab Spring’. Before moving on to an event-based discussion, it is worth noting that before civil war, Gadhafi’s Libya looked set to becoming one of the richest states across Africa10_{. Moreover, Libya boasted}

the highest GDP per capita and life expectancy on the continent, where

somewhat surprisingly Harvard researcher Garikai Chengu advocated that there were less Libyan’s living below the poverty line than in the Netherlands11_{, a}

position hard to grasp as Libya trumps the 17th_{largest economy in the world.}

However, upon closer inspection, this claim would only hold true through a comparison that includes stark differences in population, with Libya at 6 million compared to seventeen million in the Netherlands. Moreover, discrepancies between the definitions of ‘poverty’, explain the findings, as the official or common understanding of the poverty line is significantly higher in developed countries than in developing countries. According to the CIA’s world fact book, Libyan’s living under the poverty line is represented as one-third (≈33%),

compared to 9.1% in the Netherlands12_{. In terms of GDP, figure one below reveals}

how pre war Libya consistently boasted well balanced figures, where in 2010, these statistics peaked at $9494.27 per capita. Following this, it appears that these figures began to change in late 2010/11, where the Arab spring led to political turmoil that damaged the economy.

Figure 1: Libya GDP per Capita 2006-2014

10 Oliveri, Enrica, "Libya Before and After Gaddafi: An International Law Analysis." Universitaè Ca' Foscari Venezia, International Law Journal (2013) P. 22

11Chengu, Garikai, ‘Libya: From Africa’s Richest State Under Gaddafi, to Failed State After NATO Intervention’ Global Research, 22nd_{October 2015 Edition} http://www.globalresearch.ca/libya-from-africas-richest-state-under-gaddafi-to-failed-state-after-nato-intervention/5408740

[Accessed 15th February 2016]

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("Data From Central Bank Of Libya")

Upon closer examination, many official statistics were falsified, yet the above appears to resonate with figures provided by the IMF, which can be seen below. Upon inspection, it appears that the Central Bank of Libya reflects many

similarities shown by the World Bank, yet the World Bank figures peak at 12,378 and as a low as 5,859 per capita. Here differences represented by the Central Bank of Libya between 2010-11 are -62.47, compared to -52.67 by the IMF. Suggestively, the differences here could be explained as the Libyan model has taken in consideration more coarse data, so volatility is not as evident.

Statistically, the Libyan government may have covered the actual cost of war, as they did in other outlets outlined below, again producing unclear figures.

Figure 2: World Bank data for Libyan GDP per Capita

13 Figure 1: "Data From Central Bank Of Libya". Tradingeconomics.com. N.p., 2014. Web. 17 Apr. 2016.

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14_{IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), April 2016}

Nonetheless, unclear documentation and figures prove unsurprising, as Libya exerted considerably higher levels of corruption over other key Arab Spring actors including Egypt and Tunisia15_{. Moreover, Gadhafi’s claims that Libyan’s}

received stable incomes appeared exaggerated, where evidentially 20% of Libyan’s were absent of any form of employment and over 40% of families could only claim that one family member attained a stable income16_{. Once a beacon of}

hope following the ousting of King Idris al-Senusi, Libya and Gadhafi now replicated the very regime it replaced and could not quell major societal outcry as Benghazians eventually and inevitably questioned Gadhafi’s rule. At this moment, a US State Department Cable described Libya as “a kleptocracy in which the regime — either the al-Qadhafi family itself or its close political allies — has a direct stake in anything worth buying, selling or owning” adding that this was sustained through “the wealth that Colonel Qaddafi’s family and his government

14 Figure 2: IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), April 2016

15 Kamba, Ibrahim Noureddin, and Mohd Fu’ad Sakdan. "Reality Assessment of the Corruption in Libya and Search for Causes and Cures." Journal of Business and Economics (2012): 357.

16 Vandewalle, Dirk. "Qadhafi's" Perestroika": Economic and Political Liberalization in Libya." Middle East Journal 45.2 (1991): 216-231.

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accumulated with the help of international corporations in the years since the lifting of economic sanctions by the West ”1718_.

However, remained to praise Gadhafi, including South African President Jacob Zuma, who commended Gadhafi’s stories of a positive welfare policy. Here, Zuma unknowingly or knowingly placed Gadhafi on a pedestal for the fabricated claims Gadhafi made, that aided the Libyan population through state subsidies funded with oil export sales: boasting the highest standard of living in Africa with free health and education, and the possibility of studying abroad at state expense and providing $50,000 for each new married couple19_{. Alongside these incentives and}

policies, Gadhafi pioneered non-interest state loans, subsidizing prices of cars much lower than in Europe coupled with the cheapest gas and bread prices in the world20_{. However, through critical examination it appears that these incentives}

have been falsified or exaggerated. Firstly, upon free universal health care, it appears that ‘free’ certainly does not translate as adequate. The government embarked on a variety of institutional reforms, but the healthcare system

suffered from many deficiencies due to poor capacity, low financial remuneration of healthcare employees and badly equipped facilities. Due to this, many suffered, whilst wealthy Libyan nationals sought healthcare abroad, in Tunisia, Egypt, United Kingdom and Switzerland21_.

Secondly, in terms of education, it may be free, yet the system remains outdated, coupled with neglected teachers, who are underpaid and under-trained. Moreover, upon claims stated around non-interest loans, this is emphatically untrue. Libyan banks would include a percentage rate charge on all loans, which is comparable to an interest rate, but via the spirit of ‘Islamic ethics’ it is not 17 Litchblau, Eric et al. Published 24-03-11, ‘Shady Dealings Helped Qaddafi Build Fortune and Regime’http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/world/africa/24qaddafi.html?

pagewanted=all&_r=0 [Accessed 3rd_{March 2016]}

18 "CNN.Com - Bush Signs Order Lifting Sanctions On Libya - Sep 20, 2004" Edition.cnn.com N.p., 2004. Web. 24 June 2016.

19 "Facts About Libya Under Gaddafi That You Probably Did Not Know About" CNN iReport. N.p., 2012. Web. 25 Apr. 2016.

20 Brown, Ellen. "Libya: All About Oil, or All About Banking." Reader Supported News 15 (2011). 21 Salem, Salem F. "The Health Care Delivery System in Libya with Special Emphasis on Public Health Care Services in Benghazi." Libyan Studies 27 (1996): 99-123.

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called interest, yet called ‘Administrative Expense’22_.

Gadhafi loyalists claim that those who disprove such policies do so as they see large parts of the population excluded from accessing such incentives. Here, loyalists blame the sanctions placed upon Libya in the early 1980’s until 2003 by the US and UN. These sanctions constrained Libya’s economy, leading to an inevitable smothering of development projects and social welfare schemes. However, even if large parts of the population were to benefit from such incentives, they were not as good as they were claimed to have been and they could not disguise serious troubles both in society and elsewhere. Hereby, attention will now turn to explaining how the Arab Spring led to Gadhafi’s demise, which gave way for turmoil, civil war, and the slow-motion implosion of the Libyan state.

Additionally, it is worth briefly outlining bilateral relations between Libya and Russia. Here, Russia has an embassy in Tripoli, and Libya has an embassy in Moscow. In doing so, both have forged diplomatic contact, which has always been close and productivedue to the factboth countries have had and continue to see volatile relations with the US. Additionally, Gaddafi himself was a close ally of the Soviet Union, despite his country's membership in the Non-Aligned Movement, in which Russia regards Libya as its strongest ally in the Arab world.

2.3 The Arab Spring

The Arab Spring is widely believed to have begun through dissatisfaction with municipalities, emerging from the youth23_{. Besides, mass concentration of wealth}

in the hands of autocrats in power for decades, corruption, and a refusal by the youth to accept the status quo fuelled discontent.

22Abida, Saleh R., and Gianluigi Giorgioni. "The Efficiency of Libyan Commercial Banks in the Context of Libyan WTO Accession." Salford Postgraduate Annual Research Conference. (2011) 23 Hoffman, Michael, and Amaney Jamal. "The youth and the Arab spring: cohort differences and similarities." Middle East Law and Governance 4.1 (2012): 168-188.

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The initial catalyst that placed voices of discontent into the public eye emerged on 17 December 2010. On this day, 26-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi was planning to sell fruits and vegetables in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. Bouazizi was working on behalf of his widowed mother and six siblings, although he did not have a permit to sell his goods. Hereby, when approached by police to hand over his goods, Bouazizi refused and a policewoman allegedly slapped him. Angered and disillusioned after being publicly humiliated, Bouazizi marched in front of a government building, soaked himself with gasoline and set himself alight24_.

Bouazizi’s act of despair resonated instantaneously with others in the town and protests began that day in Sidi Bouzid, seen via images and videos shared on the Internet25_{. Within days, more protests started popping up across the country,}

calling upon President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and his regime to step down and a month later, he fled. The momentum in Tunisia set off uprisings across the Middle East that became known as the Arab Spring and Bouazizi became a martyr.

‘The Arab Spring’ essentially aimed to transition away from tyrannical,

oppressive governance systems, where in place of overbearing leaders, activists afforded the opportunity to achieve political change. It is necessary to

understand that the developments in Libya were part of a broader movement, where waves of protests across Northern African were driven by similar demographic realities, failures of state policies and demands for greater representation.

Change was quickly brought about in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, yet when protests also broke in the Libyan city of Benghazi, such changes were not as smooth, coupled with the beginning of civil war. Protests in Libya began on 15 February 2011 in front of Benghazi's police headquarters following the arrest of a human rights attorney who represented the “relatives of more than 1,000 prisoners allegedly massacred by security forces in Tripoli’s Abu Salim jail in 24 "CNN.Com - Bush Signs Order Lifting Sanctions On Libya - Sep 20, 2004". Edition.cnn.com. N.p., 2004. Web. 24 June 2016.

25 Howard, Philip N., and Muzammil M. Hussain. "The role of digital media." Journal of democracy 22.3 (2011): 35-48.

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1996”26_{. What had began peacefully, turned into confrontations, which were met}

with military force. Gadhafi ordered a military crackdown, which triggered further demonstrations in Misrata, Darnah, Tobruk, Zintan and Tripoli. In comparison with the Tunisia and Egypt uprisings, these targeted the removal of presidents; yet distinctively Libya had a dictator and had no system of political alliances, network of economic associations, or national organizations. What this meant is that even though nonviolent protests emerged similar to those in

Tunisia and Egypt, in Libya such actions led to violence involving diverse militias and state security forces. Such formations included guerrillas, Islamists, and militias who fought against Gaddafi. The militias soon shifted from merely delaying the surrender of their weapons to actively asserting a continuing political role as “guardians of the revolution”27_.

The legislative body of the National Conference declared a “Day of Rage” for 17 February for the Libyan Opposition. The “Day of Rage” was a term coined by protesters who were seeking to oust Gadhafi through defying his brutal crackdown and occupying the streets. In response, the Libyan military and security forces fired on the protesters, and on the following day, security forces withdrew from Benghazi after being overwhelmed by protesters, with some security personnel also joining the protesters movement. The protests spread across the country and anti-Gadhafi forces established a provisional government in Benghazi, called the National Transitional Council with the goal to overthrow the Gadhafi government in Tripoli. These militias stemmed from individuals who refused to join the Libyan military, to police and intelligence forces that were paradoxically financed by the Libyan government. Additionally, militias were able to able to stockpile weapons that were used in the Cold War, from the former Soviet bloc looted from Gadhafi stockpiles28_.

Upon firing at protestors, ‘Gadhafi's cruelty against his own people disgusted even longtime cronies and set off a wave of defections that, within a week of the 26 Allansson, Marie, et al. "The first year of the Arab Spring." SIPRI Yearbook (2012): 45-56. 27 Bruno, Greg. "Iran's Revolutionary Guards". Council on Foreign Relations. N.p., 2013 Web. 24 June 2016.

28 Petkova, Mariya. "Libyan Militias Trading High-Powered Weapons Through Online Websites" Middle East Eye. N.p., 2016. Web. 24 June 2016.

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first demonstrations on Feb. 15, left the regime deeply — perhaps fatally — wounded’29_{. The violence descended from anti-government protestors into a}

fully-fledged civil war between rebel and pro-governmental militias. Due to this escalation, on 26 February 2011, an initial United Nations mediation was triggered to protect civilians. The UN was acting in accordance to their

responsibility to protect due to recognising a potential threat of mass atrocities. Also, in response to Gadhafi’s reaction and his attacks on civilians, the UN

Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution referring his human rights abuses to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for prosecution.

Amidst the chaos, defected soldiers from Gadhafi’s army and civilians came together from different cities, took up arms, and formed the “Free Libyan Army”, also known as the “National Libyan Army”. Additionally, opposition forces

established the National Transitional Council (NTC), originally known as the Libyan Interim National Council with the aim to provide political and military leadership. The NTC was formed in Benghazi on 27 February 2011 and pledged to lead the uprising and oversee the transition period to an elected government after liberation.

2.4 Initial responses to the Libyan Crisis from the International community Gadhafi’s violent approach towards the rebels sparked international outrage and climaxed in March 2011, where the UNSC authorized a no-fly zone over Libya, over which NATO commanded. This was known as resolution 1970. Within the UNSC, Britain and France considered intervening because they felt that the emergent norm of ‘responsibility to protect’ applied to the Libyan case and they believed the massive flows of refugees fleeing the violence threatened their border security. The UNSC pursued military intervention, seeing it as succeeding at low cost and that if they don’t intervene the problem would not be solved. Upon such developments, Nicolas Sarkozy put France at the front of the effort suggesting ‘What is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly

29 Ghosh, Bobby, 07-03-11, ‘Gaddafi’s Last Stand’

http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2055193,00.html [Accessed 5th_March

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zone, and what we want is the protection of civilians and not the bombardment of more civilians’30_.

Meanwhile, British Prime Minister David Cameron told the House of Commons: “A successful outcome is the enforcement of the will of the UN, which is the ceasing of attacks on civilians. That is what we are aiming at. But let me be absolutely frank about this: it is a more difficult question, in many ways, than the question over Iraq, because in Iraq we had been prepared to go into a country, knock over its Government and put something else in place. That is not the approach we are taking here”31_.

From this statement, Cameron remained rather vague on whether Gadhafi himself is a target, and beyond the immediate aim of protecting civilians, some commentators have said that the coalition is not clear of the preferred outcome. However, it would be assumed that coalition leaders would be happy if there were a “palace coup” and Gadhafi was removed. A spokesman for the US State Department said on 21 March: “What we are trying to do is convince Gaddafi and his regime to step down from power . . . that remains our ultimate goal”32_.

However, this did not happen as planned under resolution 1970. Gadhafi’s ground forces were much better trained and equipped than the rebels and there was a strong chance that he will hold on to power. The applied resolution did not call for regime change and the coalition feared facing an extremely hostile

Gadhafi regime, supported by sales from the country’s western oil fields. Even if the rebels were to topple the Gadhafi regime, it is not clear the coalition would be capable to aid administering the country or that the resulting regime would be better for the Libyan population, more in line with western ideals such as human rights, or more supportive of western interests. Furthermore, Italy 30 Sarkozy, Nicolas in Smith, Ben, and Arabella Thorp, "Interpretation of Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya." UK House of Commons Library (2011)

31 Ibid sec.8

32 Tisdall, Simon “Is Gaddafi a target? Cameron and military split over war aims”, Guardian, 22 March 2011 [Accessed 19th_{April 2016]}

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notably along with The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Spain sided with the alternative US ‘Operation Odyssey Dawn’33_{. Operation Odyssey dawn}

concentrated on preventing further attacks by regime forces on Libyan citizens and opposition groups. In doing so, the operation also sought to limit the Gadhafi regimes potential attempts to resist the no-fly zone.

Following implementation, groups of Libyan rebels were able to make territorial progress, however, these gains were soon forced back by well-equipped pro-Gadhafi forces. Markedly, the French air strike campaign revealed the first apparent features of Russian geopolitical discourse in response to the Libyan crisis. Here, through “formal geopolitics” Russia used UNSC following resolution 1973 as a means for undermining the role of NATO, coupled with a condemnation of NATO’s actions to launch air strikes. NATO’s involvement soon escalated and was coined as ‘Operation Unified Protector’, which the Russian federation

responded by stating that Russia “strongly believes that it is unacceptable to use the mandate derived from UNSC resolution 1973, the adoption of which was quite an ambiguous step, in order to achieve goals that go far beyond its

provisions, which only provide for actions for the protection of civilians”34_{. Here,}

the provisions of the UNSC resolution will discussed latterly in this thesis, where decisions made by the UNSC will be looked at, in accordance to forming a

geopolitically charged discussion of how Libya shaped Russian foreign policy and how events were viewed by other major states.

By July of 2011, the rebels continued to target Gadhafi and his dismantling grip upon the state and they forced Gadhafi into hiding, as rebels took control in Tripoli. Eventually, on 20 October, Gadhafi was captured and killed as rebel fighters take his hometown Sirte. Three days later, the NTC declared Libya to be officially "liberated" and announced plans to hold elections within eight months. 33 U.S. Department of State (27 March 2011) "TRANSCRIPT: NATO Enforcing All Aspects of UNSCR 1973 in Libya". US AFRICOM.

34 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, № 378-20-03-2011, 'Statement by Russian MFA Spokesman Alexander Lukashevich on the Situation around Libya'

http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/21462 2/pop_up?

_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_viewMode=print&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId =en_GB&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_qrIndex=0 [Accessed 10th March 2016]

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One month later, Saif al-Islam, the fugitive son of Gadhafi, was captured, becoming the last key Gaddafi family member to be seized or killed.

The death of Gadhafi however, did not solve Libya’s immediate issues, and widespread violence and major clashes between the former rebel forces broke out in the beleaguered city of Benghazi. In the wake of the New Year (2012), rebel forces began to grow in dissatisfaction that the killing of Gadhafi had not stabilized the status of Governance in Libya. Hereby, the new NTC government was criticized for being slow to bring about any formal change and still remained corrupt in form and nature, leading to the spokesman for the NTC, Abdel Hafiz Ghoga, to swiftly resign. Additionally, by March, Benghazi once again became the battleground of the rebel forces, where contestations over oil further increased tension and pressure on the NTC in Tripoli.

A further three months passed, where little progress appeared to be made, and the interim NTC Government struggled to control local militias, especially in Zintan in the West. Here, the notable Al-Awfea Brigade briefly exerted control over Tripoli International Airport and raided the election commission building in Benghazi. By August, the NTC government’s failings to promote stability meant that they dissolved, formally transferring power to the General National Congress (GNC), which was elected in July.

Now that events that followed the outbreak of violence in the nations capital have been explored, it proves necessary to discuss the various groups/rebels and militias who were involved and their importance in the developing crisis. To improve understanding, this thesis will consider both those involved inside and outside of the state.

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Figure 3: Political Map of Libya

35_{United Nations Cartographic Section Web Site (2013)}

35 Figure 3: United Nations Cartographic Section Web Site (2013): Libya.

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2.5 Inside Libya

Instead of simply discussing the role of differing groups through a competitive lens, it is worth making the distinction that even though it is suggested ‘the important story about the 2011 Arab revolts…is not how the globalization of the norms of civic engagement shaped the protesters’ aspirations. Nor is it about how activists used technology to share ideas and tactics. Instead, the critical issue is how and why these ambitions and techniques resonated in their various local contexts’36_{. Yet, this statement remains unclear upon these “Local Contexts”,}

as it is not explained if this reflects contestations between states such as Tunisia v Libya, or contestations within cities such as Tripoli v Benghazi. Upon such assertions, this paper will instead evaluate how each group established their own footing regarding the crisis, targeting specific forms of support, from militant violent aggressors, to groups who received funding to initiate regime change. Following Gadhafi’s ousting, Libya was depicted by various skirmishes, which led to more fighting. When discussing the militias and governments within Libya, one must begin in 2011, where a confusing network of factions and regimes are revealed, in which the nationalists of the National Transitional Council (NTC) assumed power. The NTC only remained in power for a year, until The General National Congress (GNC) became the legislative authority of Libya for two years following the end of the Civil War. The GNC was elected by popular vote on 7 July 2012, and took power from NTC on 8 August.

In 2014, after a 2-year absence from power, the nationalists defeated the Islamist dominated GNC in parliamentary elections. Yet, the nationalists won the vote that featured a small turnout of 18%, down from 60% in the previous Gadhafi

election of 201237_{. By}_{November 2014, the Supreme Court ‘invalidates’ the} election results, after a legal challenge by a group of politicians. This in turn delighted militias located in Tripoli and politicians involved with voiding the elections suggested they were unconstitutional, as the parliament does not sit in

36 Anderson, Lisa. "Demystifying the Arab spring." Foreign Affairs 90.3 (2011): Pg. 2

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Tripoli or Benghazi38_.

Firstly, the role of Islamist formations will be deciphered, before discussing the Nationalists opposed.

Old parliament (GNC)

Islamist groups are largely affiliated in upholding the old GNC government, where they base their government in Tripoli. During Gadhafi’s rule, Libya’s Islamists were imprisoned, forced underground or fled into exile, however, they rose in numbers again after his capture in October 2011. The Islamist groups span the ideological spectrum, from moderates who embrace democracy to militants with a global vision linked to al Qaeda. In the GNC, Omar Al-Hassi was appointed the head of their government. Militias, included here are 17th_February

Brigade, Dawn of Libya and Misratan Brigades.

17

th_{February Martyrs Brigade}

On the Eastern coast of Libya, is where one of the “biggest and best armed militias” is located39_{. The name of this brigade marked the “day of rage”. Here,}

protests were communicated via social media networks, urged people to protest on 17th_{February 2011, hoping to emulate popular uprisings that unseated rulers}

in Tunisia and Egypt.

This brigade received funding from Libya's Defense Minister Mohammed al- Barghathi, which has allowed the group to gain some form of authority, whilst conducting enforcement functions in southern and eastern Libya. The brigade is also located in Benghazi and has waged war against anti-GNC General Haftar. Misratan militias

38 "Libya Supreme Court 'Invalidates' Elected Parliament - BBC News". BBC News. N.p., 2014. Web. 9 July 2016.

39 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 11-01-16, ‘Guide to key Libyan militias’

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Misratan militias supported the GNC and were aided by monetary injections by private businessmen, coupled with ideological links to Muslim Brotherhood politicians. The militia has received funding from one of Libya’s most successful businessmen Mohammed Raed40_{. Misratan militias made a coalition with Libya}

Dawn, which allowed for the Misratan militias to support the Tripoli based parliament under Omar al-Hassi.

Dawn of Libya

Dawn of Libya encompasses an alliance between a coalition of Islamist forces and militia groups from Misrata. As General Haftar’s campaign posed an existential threat to Islamic formations, operation Fajr Libya (Libyan Dawn) was launched on July 13, 2014. Within this formation, included are Islamist militias from the aforementioned February 17th_{Martyrs. Dawn of Libya also deny any relationship}

with the notorious Ansar al-Sharia41_{, who have held responsibility for various}

terrorist actions, including the 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy in Benghazi. In distancing themselves from Ansar al-Sharia, Dawn of Libya claim they do not affiliate with terrorist groups and are apparently focused upon charitable works in Libyan communities42_{. In terms of military feats, they managed to capture and}

seize the international airport in Tripoli, which is controlled by the Qaaqaa and Sawaq brigades, which were linked to Al-Zintan tribe and allied with Haftar. Seen with the seizure of Tripoli airport, Libya dawn was successful in exerting their operational goal in seizing Tripoli from Pro Government and Gadhafi forces.

New parliament of the National Transitional Council (NTC)

The formation of the NTC parliament was announced in the city of Benghazi on 40 Gatehouse, Gabriel "Libya: Funding The Fight From Besieged Misrata - BBC News". BBC News. N.p., 2011. Web. 29 Apr. 2016.

41 "Libya Dawn Islamists 'Reject Ansar Al-Sharia Terror'". Yahoo.com. N.p., 2014. Web. 24 Apr. 2016.

42 Irshaid, Faisal. "Profile: Libya's Ansar Al-Sharia - BBC News". BBC News. N.p., 2014. Web. 24 Apr. 2016.

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27 February 2011 with the purpose to act as the “political face of the revolution”. Additionally, the council declared itself to be the “only legitimate body

representing the people of Libya and the Libyan state”43_.

Some groups were angered by the Islamist dominated GNC, where in doing so, defected soldiers from Gaddafi’s army and civilians came together from different cities, took up arms, and formed the “Free Libyan Army”, also known as the “National Libyan Army”. Here, they were led by Khalifa Haftar and hoped to defeat and impose authority over the opposition forces that stood by the GNC.

Officials from the NTC parliament labeled the GNC secessionist government as ‘terrorists’44_{and they were not afraid to voice their negative opinion towards the}

Islamists.

Gen. Khalifa Haftar and the "Libyan National Army"

Within the factions that emerged with the disintegration of the establishment, General Khalifa Haftar and the “Libyan National Army” can be seen as pivotal in upholding the battle against the GNC. Haftar graduated from the Benghazi Military Academy45_{and went on to receive military training in both the Soviet}

Union and Egypt. Haftar served in the Libyan army under Gadhafi, and took part in the coup that brought Gaddafi to power in 1969. However, the former general fell out with the dictator and he adopted a senior position in the forces, which overthrew Gaddafi in the 2011 Libyan Civil War. Interestingly, Haftar also is a US citizen, after he spent two decades of exile in Virginia, where his significance wavered as the CIA in Langley trained him46_{. According to a}_{New York Times}

report from 1991, American intelligence services funded and assisted the

training of Haftar and his 350-strong contingent of troops in “sabotage and other

43 "Founding Statement of the Interim Transitional National Council" National Transitional Council 5 March 2011. Archived from the original on 7 March 2011. Retrieved 7 July 2016 44 "BBC News - Libya crisis: Tensions rise as Tripoli airport seized". BBC News. 24 August 2014. Retrieved 14 June 2016

45 Borzou Daragahi 23-05-14 "Khalifa Haftar, a hard-headed Libyan warrior" Financial Times.

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0b4a3e30-e0f8-11e3-875f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz45Wdw93ND [Accessed March 10th_{, 2016]}

46 Russ Baker (April 22, 2014). "Is General Khalifa Hifter The CIA's Man In Libya?” Business Insider. Archived from the original on August 27, 2014. [Retrieved March 26, 2016]

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guerrilla skills” in Chad as part of efforts to bring about the overthrow of Gaddafi47_.

Haftar’s life in the US would remain vague, as he spent the next 20 years living a seemingly quiet life with his family in suburban Virginia. This prompted

speculation of his involvement with the CIA. Haftar resided only a few miles away from the CIA’s headquarters in Langley. According to the New York Times, Haftar himself has said he often spoke to the CIA during his time in Virginia48_.

Haftar announced his return in 2011 and decided to appear in a televised announcement to outline his plans to thwart the controversial

Islamist-dominated GNC. However, such proclamations did not go ahead unquestioned, as critics quickly dismissed his ideals with great skepticism, including

condemnation by then acting Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, who personally targeted Haftar's actions, labeling them as a pathetic “coup attempt” and “ridiculous” in magnitude49_.

Haftar’s GNC offensive ultimately stalled, allegedly emerging from suspicions about his political affiliations and his links to the CIA. Haftar was seen as ‘anti-Islamic’ in nature, which stemmed from his overly aggressive stance against Islamist groups. Furthermore, Haftar’s return remains stained by the essence of regime change, coupled with his unclear ambitions in the NTC Tobruk

Government. Suggestively, the fact that Haftar returned from the US to topple Gadhafi evokes suspicion of Western backed regime change and when the NTC was recognized as the legitimate government in Libya, not only was Haftar seen with close links to the US, as many of the NTC leaders were reported to have close connections with the United States including Mahmoud Jibril, who acted as

47 Neil A. Lewis "350 Libyans Trained To Oust Qaddafi Are To Come To U.S.". Nytimes.com. N.p., 1991. Web. 9 July 2016.

48 Abigail Hauslohner and Sharif Abdel Kouddous (May 20, 2014). "Khalifa Hifter, the ex-general leading a revolt in Libya, spent years in exile in Northern Virginia". Washington Post. Retrieved June 26, 2016.

49 Zeiden, Ali in Lefeèvre, Raphaeël. "An Egyptian Scenario for Libya?" The Journal of North African Studies 19.4 (2014): 602-607.

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the interim prime minister50_.

Jihadist Militias

Aside from the two battling forces of the Islamists and the Nationalists, Jihadist groups also feature, yet their support calls upon the formation of a Islamic caliphate, which neither supports the GNC or the NTC.

Islamic State (IS)

IS began their Libyan mission in Derna, where in this traditionally Jihadist environment, the group has attained gradual support, leading to occupying local administrative buildings with local support. IS were able to make significant gains in Libya as hundreds of its members withdrew from previous strongholds in Syria and Iraq, due to increased bombing and tighter border controls. IS emerged in Libya in 2015, first in the eastern city of Derna where the

Mujahedeen ousted it in July51_{. Currently, its main stronghold is the costal city of}

Sirte, where its official radio, Al Bayan, began broadcasting in June. Following this, IS were able to exert considerable control over town Bin Jawad, located east of Sirte and the group additionally exerts a strong presence in Al Nawfaliyah, Al Sidra, and Ras Lanuf, which are seen as key oil producing areas52_.

Importantly, IS also has hands in Benghazi and has set up cells in Tripoli. Regarding their presence in Libya, IS have divided Libya into three sub regions. Here, IS views the east as Cyrenaica, the northwest as Tripoli and Fezzan as the southwestern region of Libya. Their objectives in Libya revolve around occupying key strategic locations overlooking the Mediterranean coast, as costal towns such as Sirte act as the main gateway for the organisation towards Europe and the 50 Baker, Russ. "Is General Khalifa Haftar The CIA’S Man In Libya?". Business Insider. N.p., 2011. Web. 9 July 2016.

51 "Libyan Islamists Claim To Drive Islamic State From Port Stronghold". Reuters. N.p., 2015. Web. 24 Mar. 2016.

52 Vandewalle, Dirk J., and Dirk Vandewalle. Libya since independence: oil and state building. IB Tauris, 1998.

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world, in turn threatening international peace and security towards major European countries. IS envisions positions in Libya as significant to gain

resources, including precious metals and large oil reserves. Acquisition of these resources allows IS to develop a good economic outlet to sustain thorough organisation of the fight and to provide their fighters with support and

assistance. IS view Sirte as of upmost importance, due to the fact it contains 80% of total oil reserves in Libya, representing 90% of total oil production in Libya. In doing so, IS are targeting an oil and gas company in Libya operating under the state-owned National Oil Corporation (NOC)53_.

In Libya, IS has managed to strike in Tripoli and Benghazi by launching high-profile one-off attacks, including targeting embassies and hotels in Tripoli in January and February 2015, and most recently on a police training base in Zliten, near the capital.

Ansar al Sharia

Ansar al Sharia aim to impose strict Sharia law across Libya and the group stemmed out of militants who fought in the 2011 uprising. As of 2012, the group began to be questioned surrounding their potential links to terrorist group Al Qaeda; these claims however, have been denied by prominent figures within the group54_{. Yet, when investigating these links, Ansar al-Sharia can be attributed to}

making up the majority of al-Qaeda’s network in Libya. This can be confirmed through Sharia supporting groups who attended a demonstration in Liberation Square, Benghazi on June 7/8th_{2012. Here, according to Libya al-Youm, a Tripoli}

newspaper, at least 15 militias attended the event, telling us that many militias affiliate with al-Qaida55_{. Furthermore, al-Qaeda has adopted the name Ansar al-}

in the Lands of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), located in Yemen and Tunisia.

53 Libya Reserves, Geology, NOC, Companies, EIA 2005

54 Zamorano, Abraham. "Profile: Libya's Ansar Al-Sharia." BBC News. BBC, 13 June 2014. Web. 23 May 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27732589>.

55 “Multaqha Ansar A-Shari’a Al-Awal Fi Benghazi” [First Gathering of Supporters of Sharia in Benghazi], Libya al- Yom [Tripoli], June 9, 2012, http://www.libya-alyoum.com/news/index.php? id=21&textid=10124 (accessed August 17, 2012)

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Mohammad al Zahawi, who heads the group, denotes that they exert reasonable levels of power in Benghazi, Derna, and Sirte, leading to an increase in size and weaponry. This can be seen their first major public appearance on 7 June 2012, where they revealed their strength in numbers, leading a rally including 200 pickup trucks mounted with artillery along Benghazi’s Tahrir Square, demanding Sharia Law. According to the New York Times, “western diplomats who watched said they were stunned by the scale and weaponry of the display”56_{. Shortly}

afterwards, Ansar al Sharia was linked to the attack on the US mission in

Benghazi and the death of US Ambassador Christopher Stevens on September 11, 2012. Due to their Islamist nature, the group has been battling Gen. Haftar’s forces since May 2014.

2.6 Initial response to the crisis in Libya

Now that the Gadhafi regime and the Libyan crisis has been explored in relation to the Arab Spring and the groups/events that followed, discussion is now able interpret the Security Council 1973 documentation in detail, that Russia refused to veto, yet abstained from.

When Gadhafi’s forces conducted a brutal military campaign in order to regain control of lost territory and neutralize the opposition, scholars drew

comparisons to acts of genocide. Gadhafi declared that he intended to “clear the streets of vermin” and Bellamy and Williams describe the developments as direct echoes of the Rwandan genocide57_{. Agreeing with this perspective, Ibrahim}

Dabbashi, Libya's deputy UN representative denounced the Gadhafi regime as committing “a real genocide against the Libyan people. Colonel Gadhafi is shooting his own people,” in an interview on the al Jazeera network58_{. Such}

statements are drawn from Gadhafi’s quotes as “soldiers have been deployed to 56 Kirkpatrick, David D. "A Deadly Mix in Benghazi." The New York Times 28 Dec. 2013. Web. 26 Apr. 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/#/?chapt=0>.

57 Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul D. Williams. "The new politics of protection? Coôte d'Ivoire, Libya and the responsibility to protect." International Affairs 87.4 (2011): 825-850.

58Al Jazeera and Agencies, "Libyan Pilots and Diplomats Defect." - Al Jazeera English, 22 Feb. 2011. Web. 23 Apr. 2016.

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all regions so that they can purify these cockroaches and any Libyan who takes arms against Libya will be executed”59_.

On 22 February 2011, The League of Arab States and the Organisation of the Islamic conference (OIC) disparately called for action from the international community in response to developments in Libya. Much of these calls stemmed from the Gadhafi’s regimes excessive use of force through shelling peaceful protestors and threatening the lives of many civilians. On 23 February, the African Union joined in with these calls, asking for the international community to enact strong measures that would cease the humanitarian situation.

Seemingly, the Gadhafi regime was condemned through the accumulation of these three regional organisations, yet each organisation called for differing responses to the Gadhafi threat.

The African Union (AU) strove towards enacting a peaceful solution to the violence and openly rejected “any foreign military intervention” in Libya,

“whatever its form”60_{. Instead, the organisation presented a ‘Roadmap for peace’}

on 25 March 2011. Within this document, the African Union called for a ceasefire and swift implementation of political reforms. However, the ‘Roadmap’ was rejected by the NTC and was seen as a ‘de facto death sentence by the opposition leadership’61_{, markedly because the document did not call for the direct removal}

of Gadhafi from power. NTC spokesman Mustafa Jabril cemented this position, stating “any initiative which does not include this key popular demand will not be regarded. Muammar Gaddafi and his sons should depart immediately”62_.

Even though this initial dismissal seemed to quell any further efforts from the AU, the organisation soon put together a political proposal for the conflict, which 59 Gadhafi, Muammar inBellamy, Alex J. "Libya and the responsibility to protect: the exception and the norm." Ethics & International Affairs 25.03 (2011): 263-269.

60 Kuwali, Dan, and Frans Viljoen. Africa and the Responsibility to Protect: Article 4 (h) of the African Union Constitutive Act. Routledge (2013)

61 Maru, Mehari Taddele. "On unconstitutional changes of government: The case of the National Transitional Council of Libya." African Security Review 21.1 (2012): 67-73.

62 De Waal, Alex. "‘My Fears, Alas, Were Not Unfounded’: Africa’s Responses to the Libya Conflict." Libya, the Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013. 58-82.

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immediately gained steadfast support from the NTC. When discussing the political effort, the AU “is convinced that only a political solution will make it possible to promote peace in a lasting manner that will also fulfill the aspirations of the Libyan people to democracy…and good governance”63_{. Following the swift}

support the AU received, they decided not to support the Security

Council-sanctioned NATO air strikes and rejected arrest warrants for the Gadhafi regime, which were put forward by the International Criminal Court (ICC), due to the fact such processes would ‘seriously complicate’ any further political solutions. In the following month, on 31 March 2011, the African Court of Human and People’s Rights increased their involvement, declaring the existence of “a

situation of extreme gravity and urgency as well as a risk of irreparable harm to persons”64_{. The Court}_{then enacted}_{“provisional measures” against Libya,}

supported by Human Rights Watch with the intention to prevent further loss of civilian life, additionally calling for the government to appear before Court65_{. On 8}

June 2011, a member of the government did stand up in court, yet

controversially, the Court struck down the case because the Applicant (the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights) failed to file a reply to the Libyan government’s request to have the case dropped, which led the Court to believe that the Applicant is not going to pursue the case any further66_.

In contrast to the opinions of the aforementioned organisations, both the Gulf Cooperation Council and the League of Arab States called on the Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya on 7 March and 12 March 2011 respectively. Both organisations were also present during an emergency meeting held on Libya by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on 19 March. Here, OIC Secretary-General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu welcomed the no fly-zone that was 63 Clottey, Peter. "African Union Official Urges Political Solution to Libyan Crisis." VOA, 7 May 2011. Web. 23 May 2016. <http://www.voanews.com/content/african-union-official-urges-political-solution-to-libyan-crisis--121468349/158058.html>.

64 Oder, Judy. "The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ order in respect of the situation in Libya: A watershed in the regional protection of human rights?" African Human Rights Law Journal 11.2 (2011): 495-510.

65 Hansen, Thomas Obel. "Africa and the International Criminal Court." AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A HANDBOOK, Tim Murithi, ed., Routledge (2013).

66 "Libya: African Rights Court Issues First Ruling Against A State". Human Rights Watch. N.p., 2011. Web. 24 June 2016.

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mandated by the Security Council in Resolution 197367_.

2.7 Responsibility to Protect

During initial discussions, the emerging norm of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), was considered, where Libya represented the first case in which the UNSC has authorized intervention-citing R2P. The concept consists of three “pillars,” articulated by the Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, in which Libya “recalled the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its

population”68_.

1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement

2. The International community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility

3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations69_.

2.8 UNSCR 1970 & 1973

Following the application of R2P, on 26 February 2011, members of the Security Council adopted Resolution 1970. The resolution was proposed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41 the resolution,

67 Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu cited in Laura Roberts, Tom Chivers and Barney Henderson. "Libya Protests: As It Happened March 8". Telegraph.co.uk. N.p., 2011. Web. 24 June 2016.

68 Libya (S /RES/1973 (2011)

69 Bellamy, Alex J. "The Responsibility to Protect and the problem of military intervention." International Affairs 84.4 (2008): 615-639

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1. Demands an immediate end to the violence and calls for steps to fulfil the legitimate demands of the population;

2. Urges the Libyan authorities to:

(a) Act with the utmost restraint, respect human rights and international humanitarian law, and allow immediate access for international human rights monitors

(b) Ensure the safety of all foreign nationals and their assets and facilitate the departure of those wishing to leave the country;

(c) Ensure the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and humanitarian agencies and workers, into the country; and

(d) Immediately lift restrictions on all forms of media

3. Requests all Member States, to the extent possible, to cooperate in the evacuation of those foreign nationals wishing to leave the country70

On 10 March 2011, working alongside the EU, the AU and OIC Union imposed sanctions, including an arms embargo and a travel ban on Gaddafi and members of his family, freezing assets held by Libya’s sovereign wealth fund and central bank. This intended to “keep the actions of the Libyan authorities under

continuous review and would be prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the prescribed measures in light of compliance or no-compliance with the resolution”71_.

Moreover, as Resolution 1970 was passed and implemented by the UNSC, irrelevant of abstentions cast by Russia and China. Yet, as the international community did so, the non-military sanctions certainly did not quell the on-going violence nor protect Libyan civilians. Here, the Security Councils’ Secretary 70 UNSC S/RES/1970 (2011)

71 UN Meeting Coverage and Press Releases, 26-02-11, ‘In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters’ http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10187.doc.htm [Accessed 16th

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General Ban Ki-Moon foresaw such failures, when he previously suggested that ‘even bolder action may become necessary’ adding that the positions of relevant states on potential ‘bolder action’ have become clear72_.

Russia openly disagreed with Ki-Moon’s progressive position, as they regarded that the limits of forceful intervention had already been reached with Resolution 1970. In doing so, Russia abstained, which initially revealed it to be against further action and/or military action stating that, “a settlement of the situation in Libya is possible only through political means. In fact, that is the purpose of the resolution (...) it does not enjoin sanctions, even indirect, for forceful interference in Libya’s affairs, which could make the situation worse”73_{. Aligning with Russia,}

the Chinese permanent representation to the UN was also quick to make clear that the only way forward in the Libyan peace progress was ‘through peaceful means, such as dialogue’74_.

Russia and China’s common position showcases a continuing Sino-Russian relationship that has featured in UNSC voting. Russia and China have jointly cast abstentions regarding Libya and the Sudan, and both have cast vetoes regarding Syria, Myanmar and Zimbabwe.

Ban Ki-Moon’s initial concerns held true as a further ‘Resolution 1973’ was drawn up by the UNSC, which authorized the use of all necessary measures, including the imposition of a no-fly zone to prevent further attacks on civilians in Libya. A no-fly zone (NFZ) simply can be described as a territory or an area over which aircraft are not permitted to fly. Usually, the imposition of a NFZ will be under a military context, reflecting a demilitarized zone in the sky. In Libya, any military aircraft from the Gadhafi regime would be prevented from operating in 72 Ban Ki Moon, Security General, UN Meeting Coverage and Press Releases, 26-02-11,

Statement, ‘Secretary-General's remarks to the Security Council on Libya’

http://www.un.org/sg/STATEMENTS/index.asp?nid=5111 [Accessed 16th_{March 2016]}

73 Williams, Paul D., and Alex J. Bellamy. "Principles, politics, and prudence: Libya, the responsibility to protect, and the use of military force." Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 18.3 (2012): Pg. 295

74 Baodong, LiUN Meeting Coverage and Press Releases, 26-02-11, ‘In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters’ http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10187.doc.htm [Accessed 16th_{March 2016]}

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the region, and if a Gadhafi affiliated aircraft were to break the no-fly zone, it would be shot down. Resolution 1973 went further as not only did it establish a NFZ, but it also formed the legal basis for military intervention in the Libyan Civil War, because of its demands that included "an immediate ceasefire" and

authorizing the international community to use all means necessary short of foreign occupation to protect civilians75_.

Aside from the demands mentioned above, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations resolution 1973,

1. Demands the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians

2. Stresses the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people and notes the decisions of the Secretary-General to send his Special Envoy to Libya and of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to send its ad hoc High Level Committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms

necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution;

3. Demands that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law and take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance; Additionally, the resolution aimed to wholly protect civilians, enforce an arms embargo, ban any flights and freeze government assets76_.

The introduction of Resolution 1973 was by no means greeted universally and caused splits within the UNSC, including Russia and China. Nevertheless, ‘Resolution 1973’ was adopted with ten votes and five abstentions (including Russia, China, India, Brazil and Germany), on 17 March 2011.

75 Roth, Richard (18 March 2011). "U.N. Security Council approve no-fly zone in Libya". CNN. 76 UNSC S/RES/1973 (2011)

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Two days following the imposition of Resolution 1973, NATO stepped in to initiate the intervention, through officially establishing a NFZ and launching aerial attacks upon government forces. Joined by a trade and arms embargo, NATO charted their involvement under the name ‘Operation Unified Protector’ (OUP). NATO heightened its surveillance operations in the Mediterranean on 8 March 2011. The Alliance deployed Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft to the area to provide day-by-day observation. This technique of monitoring the Libyan developments provided NATO with sufficient information about movements in and out of Libyan airspace. Additionally NATO ships were deployed to the Mediterranean Sea to boost the monitoring effort.

On 31March 2011, NATO took control of the military campaign. Within the timeframe of the conflict, NATO launched 25.944 air maneuvers in Libya, of which 17.939 were armed, until the operation officially ended on 31 October 201177_{. When discussing NATO’s ambition to lower the numbers of civilian}

casualties, according to both IICILibya and HRW, NATO were able to do so

through employing the exclusive use of precision-guided munitions coupled with a cautious approach to targeting. NATO told the IICILibya that it had “zero

expectation” of death or injury to civilians, and that they would not target specific locations if there were any reason to believe civilians would be present.

Furthermore, NATO declared to have followed intricate procedures to reduce destruction and human losses, including delayed fusing of ammunitions to minimize collateral effects, minimum-sized munitions and warnings to the population in the form of leaflets and radio broadcasts before airstrikes were carried out78_.

However, when investigating whether such claims held true, HRW and IICILibya expressed that NATO overstepped their mandate and failed to prevent

unnecessary civilian deaths. Civilian deaths were reported and substantial

damage was inflicted upon civilian infrastructure. Fred Abrahams, special adviser at HRW points out that: “NATO took important steps to minimize civilians

77 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, ‘Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Final Mission Stats’ Fact Sheet, 02 November 2011 [Accessed 8th_{May 2016]}

78 United Nations, ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya’, Advance Unedited Version, 2nd_{March 2012, Chapter H, 2.84, Pg. 17 [Accessed 8}th_{May 2016]}

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casualties during the Libya campaign, but information and investigations are needed to explain why 72 civilians died”79_{. HRW led an investigation in target}

sites where civilian deaths occurred, recording 72 victims, including 20 women and 24 children. This study also showcases that in seven out of eight bombing sites; no military target was present when the NATO strikes occurred80_{. In}

comparison, IICLibya’s investigation looked at 20 NATO airstrikes. Here, they revealed that 60 civilians were killed and 55 injured as the consequence of 5 strikes81_.

In concluding their report, IICILibya suggested that NATO had not committed such killings on purpose and they extensively prepared to avoid doing so. Here, skeptically HRW went further than the IICILibya, asking what exactly NATO forces were striking in the target sites devoid of military objectives. Moreover, the IICILibya found that information lacked to determine whether these strikes were based on incorrect or outdated intelligence and whether “they were consistent with NATO’s objective to take all necessary precautions to avoid civilian

casualties entirely”82_{. In summary the ICIIL responded by advocating further}

investigations in order to provide accountability and compensation.

After Resolution 1973, even though the crisis worsened, Professor in Law and International Relations, Paul Williams suggested that the “coalition led by the British and French demonstrated the legal skill and moral commitment to prevent an impending massacre”83_{. Furthermore, nations who voted in favour of}

resolution 1973 have been commended as providing “swift action… when diplomacy appeared fruitless” and suggesting that a “well-drafted resolution provided the mandate necessary for a successful intervention”8485_{. Yet opinions as}

79 Human Rights Watch, ‘NATO: Investigate Civilian Deaths in Libya’, 14th_{May 2012,}

https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/14/nato-investigate-civilian-deaths-libya [Accessed 8th May 2016]

80 Human Rights Watch, (14 May 2012)

81 Human Rights Watch, ‘Libya and the International Criminal Court’, Questions & Answers, (May 2013), [Accessed 9th_{May 2016]}

82 Human Rights Watch, (May 2013)

83 Williams, Paul R., and Colleen Popken. "Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya: a moment of legal & moral clarity." Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 44 (2011): Pg. 225

84 Williams, Paul R., and Colleen Popken. (2011): Pg. 225

85 The international coalition was not misled by calls for a ceasefire from the Gadhafi regime, where in previous cases the international community have been misled in other instances where

An analysis of the United Nations Security Council and the 2011 uprisings in Libya and Syria