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Merdeka!

Indonesia’s Independence in Pictures

Name: Nina Svenson

Supervisor: Dr. Sophie Berrebi Second reader: Dr. Rachel Esner

Master thesis Erfgoedstudies: Museumconservator Graduate School of Humanities

University of Amsterdam 10 November 2017 22.422 words

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Contents

Introduction 3

Chapter 1: Context 6

Chapter 2: Military and Institutional Dutch photography 16

Photo reporting by the authorities: the DLC and MARVO 16

Propaganda Pictures versus Censored Pictures 20

Film 24

The Impact of Photographs 25

Chapter 3: The Independent Photo Reporter: Cas Oorthuys and Henri Cartier-Bresson 28

Cas Oorthuys: Een staat in wording (1947) 28

Henri Cartier-Bresson in Indonesia 32

Chapter 4: Indonesian Revolution Photography:

‘Kiblik’ (Republic) Agencies: Antara News Agency, BFI, and IPPHOS 38

Antara News Agency 41

Berita Film Indonesia (BFI) 42

Indonesia Press Photo Service (IPPHOS) 42

Galeri Foto Jurnalistik Antara and IPPHOS 46

Chapter 5: Collective Memory, History and Photographs 49

How history is written 51

Remembering and Forgetting 53

Conclusion 62

References 66

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Introduction

Both my mother’s parents grew up in Indonesia. My grandmother was born in Indonesia and left in 1938 at the age of 13, my grandfather moved there with his parents at the age of five in 1928 and returned to the Netherlands in 1946 after World War II, at the age of 22. His father was a protestant minister and the family was decidedly anti-militarist and anti-fascist,

religious but not conservative. My grandfather would often talk about his childhood in Indonesia. These stories were mostly happy and filled with a feeling of nostalgia. At times he talked about his time in the Japanese camps during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia. Having been imprisoned by the Dutch for refusing to join the army he was freed when the Japanese invaded Indonesia, only to be imprisoned again shortly after. For three years he was imprisoned in Japanese internment camps, together with his father.1

Even though he had been locked up in the camps and for a short time experienced the chaotic time after the Japanese capitulation (including the bersiap), he never talked about the Japanese or Indonesians with any hate, not in an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ way. Rather he tried to understand their motivations and read a lot about the subject. In February 1946 the family left Indonesia to go back to the Netherlands. Looking back at the period he said that he came to look at things differently. As a young boy for example he never really gave it a second thought that the Dutch and Indonesians never visited the pool at the same time. Later, he thought this was quite strange. Discussing his memories of the times he noted that his memory and the way he viewed this period had changed by the literature he read afterwards. For him as a child living in Indonesia as a European was completely normal. He compared the nature of his memories of the period to that of vague photographs. He compared them to flashes that you as a person then try to make sense of.2 He realised that the stories he remembered were to some extent constructed through a process of remembering and

1 The Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV). Oral History Archive

Indonesia (SMGI) Collection, interview with Paul Tichelaar. Code number 1071.1 (track 1), 22 July and 26 September 1997.

2 Original quote: ‘Ik ben bestormd geraakt door het feit dat je herinnering niet het karakter heeft van een film,

maar van foto’s, van vage foto’s. Eigenlijk herinner je je nauwelijks gebeurtenissen, zoals ze zich ontwikkelen, maar het is net of het tijdsopnamen zijn, flitsen, flarden en daar probeer je verbanden tussen te leggen. Maar in feite word je geconfronteerd met het feit dat het verleden eigenlijk ongrijpbaar is’.

Source: The Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV). Oral History Archive Indonesia (SMGI) Collection, interview with Paul Tichelaar. Code number 1071.3 (track 3), 26 August 1997.

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forgetting around pieces of memory. He viewed his history in Indonesia and his memories of this period in a very rationalised way.

***

When discussing the colonial period in Indonesia one encounters many different stories by different people; Dutch, Indonesians, Indo-Europeans, each have different memories. Some more nuanced than others, some more discussed than others. The Dutch often look back on the period of their colonial presence with feelings of nostalgia. Some look back with mixed, ‘bitter-sweet’ feelings.

An especially contested period regarding the Dutch presence in Indonesia is the colonial war, or war for independence, which marked the end of the Dutch colonial rule. Different numbers have arisen regarding deaths and murders. There are still different views as to when Indonesia became the Republic of Indonesia. In 1945, as the Indonesians see it, or 1949, as some Dutch still see it. Differences of opinion also persist when it comes to

terminology. The Indonesians refer to revolution, independence struggle or war, whereas the Dutch still tend to shy away from these terms.

There is a lot of ambiguity surrounding the photographs that have emerged from the colonial war in Indonesia. The ones most familiar to us are probably the ones that have been produced by war photographers and were widely circulated at the time. Photographs can tell us very different, even opposing stories depending on context and perspective.

This thesis looks at the different types of photographs that have been produced in Indonesia between 1945 and 1950 by Dutch, Western and Indonesian military authorities, artists and photojournalists, and at the asymetry in what we know about the Dutch and Indonesian photographers as well as the asymetry in knowledge derived from Dutch and Indonesian sources by Dutch scholars writing on the topic. Furthermore this thesis addresses the role photographs and museum collections and archives have in the forming of (national) collective memory. The question this thesis sets out to answer is how Indonesia’s

independence has been depicted in photography by Western and Indonesian photographers and why we know so little about Indonesian photography of this period?

Chapter one starts with a short introduction to the subject matter, the history leading up to Indonesia’s proclamation of independence, historical information regarding important events during the period between 1945 and 1950 and the relevance of the research as well as some contextual information regarding the status of the research today.

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Chapter two looks at the photographs taken on the Dutch side. The majority of these photographs derives from the Dutch military. Many of these photographs were disseminated in order to influence public opinion about the war. They were used as propaganda. This chapter looks at the types of photographs that were circulated in order to influence public opinion and how this was achieved. It also looks at the ways in which censorship was applied.

The third chapter looks at the position of two renowned international photographers, Cas Oorhuys and Henri Cartier-Bresson respectively, who travelled to Indonesia on

commission to photograph the period of decolonisation. They were working from a more independent, non-imbedded, perspective. This chapter poses the question whether this point of departure created a different manner of reporting on the decolonisation war than that of the photographers working within, for, or alongside the Dutch military apparatus.

The fourth chapter discusses Indonesian photographs that have been produced during the decolonisation war. It investigates in which way these photographs give a different image than those taken by the Dutch and by the independent photographers. It also looks at possible (formal) similarities and at similarities in the ways the photographs were spread and used as propaganda in the war and independence struggle.

Chapter five deals with the concept of collective memory and how this concept is useful when discussing photography of the colonial war. It analyses what role collective memory plays in the self-image the Dutch have regarding their colonial past. I take sociologist Maurice Halbwachs’s 1925 concept of collective memory as a starting point. Furthermore I discuss several authors that have been influential in their writing on collective memory and the philosophy of history. This chapter also looks at how the Indonesian war for independence has been, and to a some extent still is, remembered in collective Dutch

memory.

What happened in Indonesia during the war for independence will most likely remain a controversial topic of discussion for some time to come. There are still many ambiguities surrounding what happenend, how many people have been victim of Dutch violence, under what circumstances people, and at times whole populations of villages, were killed.

This thesis focuses on the photographs that have been taken and how they have affected the way we, in the Netherlands, perceive this history. The photographs that are discussed in this thesis are not discussed in chronological order of the events occurring. This thesis does not aim to give a detailed overview of historical events, rather it highlights certain historical events in order to analyse the ways in which these were photographed.

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Chapter 1. Context

August 17th 1945, two days after Japan’s capitulation, Achmed Sukarno (1901-1970) declared the independence of the Republic of Indonesia (see image 1, 2 and 3). It would take more than four years for the Dutch to formally recognise Indonesia’s independence, moreover the

Netherlands would still hold on to New Guinea until 1963. Between 1945 and 1950 a period of colonial warfare ensued. During two big Military Aggressions, euphemistically called ‘police actions’ (the Indonesians called them agressi militer Belanda)3, the Dutch tried to ‘restore’ the old colonial order. Apart from these two big Military Aggressions many smaller battles and a lot of violence took place.

The wish for independence did not arise suddenly. Already in 1927 Sukarno, together with members of a study association he was part of, had founded the Partai Nasional

Indonesia (PNI). The goal of the party was an independent Republic.4 Questions of ethics regarding Dutch colonialism, which started in the 1500s with the Dutch East Indies Company (de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie), have been noted at different points in history by different people. In 1860 already writer Multatuli (pseudonym of Eduard Douwes Dekker) published the famous and influential book Max Havelaar, in which he did not condemn colonialism but did criticise the way the colonial order in the Dutch East Indies was executed.5

As early as 1912 a first claim for independence was made by the Indonesians.

Javanese physicians Soewardi Soerjaningrat and Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo formed a political party together with Indo-European journalist, writer and political activist (and also brother of the writer of aforementioned book Max Havelaar) Ernest François Eugène Douwes Dekker, which aimed for complete independence for Indonesia. This party was called the Indies Party. It only lasted for one year.6

3 Kok, René, Erik Sommers, Louis Zweers. Koloniale Oorlog 1945-1949: Van Indië naar Indonesië.

Amsterdam: Carrera, 2009: 6.

4 Overmeer, Marjolein. ‘Geen plek voor Nederlanders: De Indonesische revolutie in beeld.’ Nemokennislink.nl.

Nemo Science Museum. Last accessed 25 August 2017. <https://www.nemokennislink.nl/publicaties/geen-plek-voor-nederlanders>.

5 Raben, Remco. ‘Hoe wordt men vrij? De lange dekolonisatie van Indonesië.’ In: Bogaerts, Els and Remco

Raben, eds. Van Indië tot Indonesië. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2007: 16.

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Also in 1912, Soewardi Soerjaningrat wrote an essay entitled If I were a Dutchman in which he pointed out the incongruity in the way the Dutch celebrated when being freed from Napoleonic rule yet continued to rule over Indonesia. Since circa 1850 different laws based on racial divides were enacted in Indonesia between Dutch, Indonesians, who were called ‘inlanders’, and Chinese and others from ‘the far East’, who were called ‘vreemde

oosterlingen’ (‘strange Orientals’)7. During the colonial rule in Indonesia different treatment existed for Dutch, Indonesians, Indo-Europeans and the ‘vreemde oosterlingen’. Within these groups of people there were further divides; within the group of Indo-Europeans these were based on matters such as skin colour and the degree of Western mannerisms and clothing style, amongst the Indonesian population these were based on issues such as the ownership of land.8 They were allocated different times for entering pools for example and different

entrances to the pasar malam (the market), with the Dutch ranking highest and the Indonesians lowest. Soerjaningrat in his essay argued for these laws to be ceased.9

During the period between 1945, after World War II had ended, and December 28th 1949, when the Dutch finally, under international pressure, officially handed souvereignty to Indonesia, a time of colonial warfare took place. Many small and big battles were fought during this period. Dutch war volunteers and later civil servants were sent over to support the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger), from hereon referred to as the KNIL. Dutch-Swiss historian Rémy Limpach writes in his 2016 book De

brandende kampongs van generaal Spoor (The burning kampongs (villages) of general

Spoor), that the war was an amalgamation of many different types of warfare and can be seen as a colonial war, a war for independence, a decolonisation war/struggle for freedom,

revolutionary war, armed revolt, guerrilla war, people’s war, conventional armed conflict, religious war, and a war of (failed) (re)conquest.10 These terms are used interchangeably in this thesis. It has been a complicated war and cannot easily be defined. This extended period of warfare has cost the lives of approximately 6.000 Dutch military, 100.000 Indonesian military and between 25.000 and 100.000 Indonesian civilians.11

The Dutch and the Republic did try to work together to come to a mutual decision about the future of Indonesia, but on both sides there were also radicals who did not want to

7 Delden, Mary C. van. Bersiap in Bandoeng: Een onderzoek naar geweld in de periode van 17 augustus 1945

tot maart 1946. Kockengen: Van Delden, 1989: 26-27.

8 Van Delden 1989: 27.

9 Cribb, Robert. ‘A system of exemptions: historicizing state illegality in Indonesia.’ In: Aspinall, Edward and

Gerry van Klinken, eds. The State and Illegality in Indonesia. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2011: 37.

10 Limpach, Rémy. De brandende kampongs van Generaal Spoor. Amsterdam: Boom Uitgeverij, 2016: 59. 11 Kok, Sommers, Zweers 2009: 6.

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cooperate.12 A period of aggressive counter-insurgency by the Dutch took place between 1945 and 1949.13 The First Military Aggression, referred to by the Dutch as the ‘First Police

Action’ or ‘Operation Product’ (referring to its economic gains), commenced July 21st 1947 with the occupation of East and West Java and parts of Sumatra, and lasted until August 5th of the same year. The Dutch authorities managed to gain trust among the populations of rural areas where people were generally less conscious of the latest political developments.14 The Second Military Aggression, referred to by the Dutch as the ‘Second police action’ or ‘Operation Kraai’, started out in the night of December 19th 1948, a year and a half after the First Military Aggression, and lasted until Janary 5th 1949. The idea was to regain control over the most important rice and oil fields, factories and plantations. Yogyakarta, the economic centre of the Indonesian Republic at the time, was the most important target. The leaders of the Republic, President Sukarno, Vice-president Mohammed Hatta, Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir, as well as other important political figures, were arrested and taken to Prapat on the Toba Lake on the island of Sumatra.15 The Republicans did not give up and another guerrilla warfare commenced.

During the Second Military Aggression the areas under Dutch control had become so large that the Dutch could no longer offer any ‘protection’ to the population of rural

Indonesia, which caused the Indonesian population to start distrusting the Dutch.16 In May 1949 the Van Roijen-Roem Agreement made sure a ceasefire was enacted. The Dutch military left Yogyakarta.17 Only under international pressure did the operation

come to an end. The United States of America (having their own geo-political agenda)

threatened to stop the Marshall plan on which the Netherlands were depending. On December 27th 1949 the Netherlands officially acknowledged Indonesia’s independence. December 31st 1949 the Dutch ceased their military operations in Indonesia. The warfare on, and occupation of, Sumatra however would still continue until January 5th the following month.18

12 Raben, Remco. ‘Vier jaar hoop, onzekerheid en geweld.’ In: Oorlog! Van Indië tot Indonesië 1945-1950.

Museum Bronbeek, 2015: 4.

13 Ibid: 243.

14 Scagliola, Stef. ‘Cleo’s ‘unfinished business’: coming to terms with Dutch war crimes in Indonesia’s war of

independence.’ In: Luttikhuis, Bart and A. Dirk Moses, eds. Colonial Counterinsurgency and mass violence: The Dutch Empire in Indonesia, Oxon: Routledge, 2014: 242.

15 Loderichs, Mark a.o. Verhalen in documenten. Over het afscheid van Indië. Amersfoort, Uitgeverij Moesson,

2008: 101.

16 Scagliola 2014: 243.

17 Zweers, Louis. Agressi II: Operatie Kraai: De vergeten beelden van de tweede politionele actie. Den Haag:

Sdu uitgevers, 1995: 40-41.

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The colonial war took place directly after the Dutch had suffered under German occupation. It seems peculiar that the Dutch did not realise what they were engaging in. The colonial history has been, and still is, influential in relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands today. One could argue that colonialism, albeit in a different form, is still being enforced today, for example through Dutch and Western companies present in Indonesia. Christian Democrat and at the time Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Jan Peter Balkenende, in 2006 repeatedly vocalised his enthusiasm for a return to the ‘Dutch VOC mentality’.19 One can see how much the colonial ‘view’ is still alive and engrained in the Dutch mind.20Of course the way in which people talkabout and deal with the colonial ‘past’, in all its different ways, is also important for the relationship between countries and people today.

The (post)colonial relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia is a topic that keeps arising in studies as well as in the media from time to time. Recently attention for this period was raised once again. In December 2016 the Dutch government announced it would be funding a four-year research project, starting in September 2017, entitled Decolonisation,

Violence and War in Indonesia, 1945-1950, involving three organisations (Royal Netherlands

Institute of Southeast Asian and Carribean Studies (Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, KITLV), The Netherlands Institute of Military History (NIMH) and the NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies), into the acts of violence committed during the colonial war in Indonesia.21 The plan is to establish a close collaboration with

Indonesian researchers for this project.22 A similar research plan was applied for five years

earlier but was at that time deemed ‘unnecessary’ by the Dutch government. The Indonesian government was not interested in the research at that time either.23

After the recent publication by aforementioned historian Rémy Limpach, De

brandende kampongs van generaal Spoor, in which he discusses structural war crimes

committed by the Dutch military in Indonesia against civilians during the colonial war, the

19 ‘Balkenende voc mentaliteit’ youtube.com. 3 June 2009. Last accessed 31 July 2017.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mBN8xJby2b8>

20 Of course this is not true for all Dutch people and all Dutch minds. The statement Jan Peter Balkenende made

does however point to a way of thinking that is still alive in the Netherlands today and the fact that he, at the time the Prime Minister of the country, would make a comment like this publically testifies to this.

21 ‘Decolonisation, violence and the war in Indonesia, 1945-1950’ ind45-50.org. Royal Netherlands Institute of

Southeast Asian and Carribean Studies (Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, KITLV), the Netherlands Institute of Military History (NIMH) and the NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies. Last accessed 31 August. <http://www.ind45-50.org/en/home?>.

22 ‘ ‘Indonesians want more focus on fine details in research on war of decolonisation’ ‘ Universiteit Leiden. 5

December 2016. Leiden University. Last accessed 28 July 2017.

<https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/news/2016/12/indonesians-want-more-subtlety-in-research-on-war-of-colonisation>.

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Dutch government has decided to fund this research project. In the course of the project research will be conducted on the bersiap period, the period during the last months of 1945 into 1946. During this period many Dutch, Indo-European, Ambonese, Chinese, British, Japanese civilians as well as Indonesian feudal leaders and Indonesian civilians that were in any way in contact with Europeans (for example through trade) were tortured, sexually mutilated and killed by Indonesian nationalists in horrible ways, mostly on the island of Java. How many people were killed exactly is unknown because the archival information is

missing; recent estimations vary between 25.000 and 30.000.24 The British sought to take a mediating function between the Netherlands and Indonesia between 1945 and 1946 before realising they had entered into a colonial war. They also suffered many casualties during this period.25

With respect to this current research project there are also critical voices.26 An

important part of the research will focus on the bersiap period.27 This was a stipulation set by

Prime Minister Mark Rutte in order for the neoliberal government to fund the project.28 One of the research questions of the project deals with the psychological effects of the bersiap on

24 Limpach 2016: 52. 25 Ibid: 53.

26 On October 19th 2017 a group of people from different backgrounds and institutions came together at Leiden

University to discuss their critiques on the research project Decolonisation, Violence and War in Indonesia, 1945-1950. For many of the Indonesians present in this meeting the first step of the Netherlands would have to be for them to start their research into violence with the Dutch East Indies Company and to apologise for colonising Indonesia and admit that this was wrong. An open concept letter has been written by representatives of the Indonesian community (amongst them Jeffrey Pondaag and former Tropenmuseum researcher Fransisca Pattipilohy) in which they ask for the project plan to be adjusted. Firstly, they ask for a contextualisation in which the colonial context features prominently and in which the influence of colonial thinking on today’s society is taken into account. Secondly, they ask for a more prominent role of the Indonesian researchers. Thirdly, the government should not be able to set prerequisites regarding the research, the NIMH should not partake in the research and neither military insitutions nor veterans should be involved in the research. Lastly, the final synthesis of the research, which is planned to be written by KITLV director and histoirian Gert Oostindie, should be written by multiple authors as opposed to one.

Source: Decolonizing Dutch Research: A Critical Consideration of the Indonesia 1945-1950 Project. Leiden University, Leiden. 19 October 2017. Lecture and Panel Discussion. Organised by Histori Bersama in collaboration with Leiden University.

The open letter can be found here: ‘Questions about the Dutch Research Project – Open Letter’

Historibersama.com. Last accessed 4 November 2017 <http://historibersama.com/translations/2017-2/questions-about-the-dutch-research-project/>.

27 ‘Dekolonisatie, geweld en oorlog in Indonesië 1945-1950: Werkprogramma’ pp. 4 and 7-13. PDF document

from webpage Ind45-50.org. August 2017. KITLV, NIMH, NIOD. Last accassed 24 October 2017.

<https://www.ind45-50.org/sites/default/files/2017-09/Werkprogramma-Dekolonisatie-geweld-en-oorlog-in-Indonesie-1945-1950_1.pdf>.

28 ‘Kabinet: we moeten in de spiegel van het Indië-verleden durven kijken’ nos.nl. 2 December 2016.

Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (NOS). Last accessed 7 November 2017. <https://nos.nl/artikel/2146126-kabinet-we-moeten-in-de-spiegel-van-het-indie-verleden-durven-kijken.html>.

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the behaviour of themilitary.29 This could be read as insinuating that the bersiap was what led the Dutch military to perform acts of violence.

Another critique is the fact that the colonial rule by the Dutch is not questioned at all and seems to be taken for granted.30Historian and journalist Marjolein van Pagee claims that the Indonesian researchers involved in the project, which are as few as two, have their doubts about the research. The research would, according to them, be focused on questions that only the Dutch are interested in. The starting point of the research into the violence that was committed and the scale of this violence, is not relevant to Indonesians. They argue that the fact that their country was colonised, testifies to violence. Historian Abdoel Wahid, one of the Indonesian researchers who was asked to join the research, states that despite the doubts he has, he has agreed on participating on the condition that the research team in Indonesia would be able to work independently.31

Another problem lies in the fact that the verification of facts produced by the Indonesian researchers will be performed by Rémy Limpach, who is a researcher for the NIMH.32 A question that can be raised about the research project is whether the NIMH, one of the main partners in the research project and part of the Ministry of Defense, can have a ‘neutral’ position and partake in an independent, as it claims to intend to be, research project. The Ministry of Defence has been active in opposing court cases of Indonesian widows about war crimes against the Dutch state.

Van Pagee has also expressed the concern that the research might be used by the Rutte III government as an excuse to not have to deal with any more damage claims from

Indonesian widows and families as well as official apologies in the future because the research would suffice.33 Surprisingly,The Foundation Committee Dutch Honour Debt (Komite Utang Kehormatan Beldanda (KUBK)), founded in 2005 by activist Jeffry Pondaag,

29 Kick-off onderzoek dekolonisatieoorlog: overbodig of hard nodig? Over het waarom van het

onderzoeksprogramma Dekolonisatie, geweld en oorlog in Indonsië 1945-1950. Pakhuis de Zwijger, Amsterdam. 14 September 2017. Kick-off meeting and panel discussion on the occasion of the start of the research project.

Accesible online through: <https://vimeo.com/233953454>.

30 Decolonizing Dutch Research: A Critical Consideration of the Indonesia 1945-1950 Project. Leiden

University, Leiden. 19 October 2017. Lecture and Panel Discussion. Organised by Histori Bersama in collaboration with Leiden University.

31 Heithuis, Niels. ‘Onderzoek oorlogsmisdaden Indonesië’ Reporter Radio. Radio 1. 11 October 2017. Last

accessed 24 October. <https://www.nporadio1.nl/reporter-radio/onderwerpen/427082-onderzoek-oorlogsmisdaden-indonesie>.

32 Decolonizing Dutch Research: A Critical Consideration of the Indonesia 1945-1950 Project. Leiden

University. 19 October 2017.

33 Kick-off onderzoek dekolonisatieoorlog: overbodig of hard nodig? Over het waarom van het

onderzoeksprogramma Dekolonisatie, geweld en oorlog in Indonsië 1945-1950. Pakhuis de Zwijger, Amsterdam. 14 September 2017.

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who in collaboration with lawyer Liesbeth Zegveld makes claims against the Dutch state for war crimes committed in Indonesia by the Dutch, has not been invited to collaborate in the research project, despite the fact that they have held many witness interviews which could prove useful for the research.34

The decision of the Dutch Government to fund the project now, after Limpach’s book has been published, is relevant though somewhat overdue. It has been known for years that the Dutch military used excessive violence in Indonesia. In 1969 psychologist Johan (Joop) Engelbert Hueting, former soldier and member of an intelligence team in Indonesia, declared on national television (on the VARA programme Achter het nieuws (Behind the news)) that he had witnessed, and been part of, war crimes committed by the Dutch during his period in Indonesia. He admitted that people were killed without reason and that this happened on a structural basis. He also stated that torture was an often used method by the authorities.35 Hueting described some of the events he had witnessed and been part of in detail, leading to shock and disbelief. Many veterans responded, some confirming Hueting’s statements, the majority firmly denying them calling Hueting a traitor and liar.36 Some of the veterans stated that their mission had been a peaceful, humanitarian mission they would never regret.

Veterans have also stated that those responsible for what happened were not the veterans but the politicians.37 Some veterans felt they were judged unfairly for ‘serving their country’ and ‘trying to restore peace in the colony’.38

Apart from veterans whodenied Hueting’s allegations there were also those who confirmed them. Numerous veterans have come forth stating to have witnessed and engaged in torture, setting fire to houses, and murder. They have said to have been given orders by their superiors to do this.39 Stories of veterans that have seen sixteen-year-old Indonesians without any weapons being killed by their sergeant have emerged. One veteran has relayed how Indonesians were imprisoned and used by the Dutch to rebuild a bridge only to be shot in the head one by one after the job was done and their presence was no longer necessary.40

34 Decolonizing Dutch Research: A Critical Consideration of the Indonesia 1945-1950 Project. Leiden

University. 19 October 2017.

35 ‘De excessennota’ Andere Tijden. NTR/VPRO. 9 April 2002. Last accessed 28 July 2017.

<https://anderetijden.nl/programma/1/Andere-Tijden/aflevering/551/De-excessennota>.

36 Limpach 2016: 22.

37 ‘De excessennota’ Andere Tijden. NTR/VPRO. 9 April 2002. 38 Limpach 2016: 29.

39 ‘De excessennota’ Andere Tijden. NTR/VPRO. 9 April 2002.

40 Limpach, Rémy. ‘Business as usual: Dutch mass violence in the Indonesian war of independence’ In:

Luttikhuis, Bart and A. Dirk Moses, eds. Colonial Counterinsurgency and mass violence: The Dutch Empire in Indonesia, Oxon: Routledge, 2014: 65.

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Numerous veterans have also admitted that the violence committed by the Dutch in these years was comparable to what the German SS had done in the Netherlands and elsewhere.41

Even though many veterans and other people distrusted or contested Hueting’s story, it did open up debate on what actually happened during the colonial war. According to

Professor Dutch East-Indies literature and culture Pamela Pattynama it can be seen as a turning point in the way that the Dutch deal with and think about this colonial ‘past’. A sense of ‘guilt’, ‘shame’, or ‘responsibility’ has since slowly entered the public debate.42

Despite the fact that it started a debate it, would still take a very long time for the Netherlands to start taking a different stance in the matter. This can be seen for example from the story of Dutch Poncke Princen. Poncke Princen was sent to fight against his will in Indonesia during the First Military Aggression. He was one of twenty-six Dutch soldiers who changed sides during the war in 1948 and joined the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), the Indonesian army, because he sympathised with their strive for independence. He was a so-called ‘East-Indies deserter’.43

For Princen, who is the most well-known person to have made this decision, it led to him being hated and seen as a traitor by many Dutch soldiers and civilians at the time and even today.44 Princen was threatened by veterans with murder if he would ever re-enter the Netherlands. He was not able to obtain a Dutch visa when trying to enter the country in 1994. When he tried again later that same year he was granted entry but only if he would not voice his opinion. The Dutch Government silenced him.45

After Hueting’s allegations in 1969 an investigation was initiated by the Dutch

government leading to the Nota of Excesses (published in June 1969) in which the crimes are noted. Due to political issues at the time on the Dutch Antilles (riots had broken out because of the social-economic crisis)46 the Dutch government had little time to spend on the Nota

41 Limpach 2016: 22-23.

42 Pattynama, Pamela. Bitterzoet Indië: herinneringen en nostalgie in literatuur, foto’s en films. Amsterdam:

Prometheus, 2014: 12.

43 Bank, Jan. ‘An Awkward Anniversary. ‘Indonesia and the Netherlands: Secolonisation Fifty Years On.’

Translated by John Rudge, The Low Countires, Vol. 4 (1996-1997): pp. 91-96. <http://www.dbnl.org/tekst/_low001199601_01/_low001199601_01_0011.php>.

44 Scagliola 2014: 251. 45 Ibid.

46 Between 1955 and 1969 the Dutch Antilles saw a period of increased automation and as a result of this an

increasing rate of unemployment. Economic deficiencies affected the standard of living and education in the Antilles and this led to major protests in May 1969.

Source: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, The Hague.

-Kamerstuk: Toekomstige samenwerking met de Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba [26 605]. 23 June 1999. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Last accessed 30 October 2017.

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which as a result was produced very quickly, in just three months.47 The Nota concludes that there has not been any violence on a structural basis and that the atrocities that did occur had been exceptions, few and far between, and only few of the military people were responsible for them. Crimes such as murder, rape, and torture are mentioned in the report.48 A lot of mass-scale murders that occurred are however not mentioned. Many historians, including Limpach and veteran and sociologist Jacques Van Doorn, point out that by describing the events as ‘excesses’ they are ascribed a much smaller role than they in reality played, and that the violence that took place was in fact of a structural nature.49Moreover, the Nota of

Excesses makes no mention of the highest military orders’ and authorities’ complicity in the violence.50 Its conclusion is that the violent acts that were committed were exceptions and that all in all the Dutch military has acted justly.51 Of course not all veterans have been exposed to, or involved in, the violence as many were stationed in quiet areas.52

Limpach states that the covering up of executions and torture committed by the Dutch wasn’t anything unusual but rather it was everyday business.53 Both the KNIL, and the Royal Netherlands Army (Koninklijk Leger, KL) have committed war crimes, murdered, tortured and raped.54 Pauljac Verhoeven and Hans van den Akker, respectively director and curator at Museum Bronbeek, state that violence was committed not just during combat but on a daily basis and during patrolling.55 The fight was furthermore unequal from the start since the Dutch were equipped with much more advanced weaponry than the Republicans.56

The idea amongst the Dutch and amongst veterans of having been ‘good colonisers’ is partly due to the photographic and film material that has been dispersed through media and news channels. Photographs, film fragments, articles and stories have played a role in the forming of a certain self-image and collective memory among the Dutch. On top of this much of the research conducted on the colonial period in Indonesia has been based on Dutch

archives and Dutch (oral) sources which has to some extent led to a one-sided story. Dutch archives contain mostly photographs, documents and oral history from a Dutch perspective. It 47 Limpach 2014: 65. 48 Ibid. 49 Limpach 2016: 29. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid: 30. 52 Limpach 2014: 66.

53 ‘Extreem geweld in Nederlands-Indië was structureel’ Nieuwsuur. NPO. 29 September 2016. Last accessed 28

July 2017. <http://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/video/2135113-extreem-geweld-in-nederlands-indie-was-structureel.html>.

54 Limpach 2016: 23.

55 Wils, Esther. ‘Oorlog! In Bronbeek: Een interview met Pauljac Verhoeven, directeur van Musuem Bronbeek,

en Hans van den Akker, conservator en projectleider van de tentoonstelling Oorlog van Indië tot Indonesië 1945-1945.’ In: Oorlog! Van Indië tot Indonesië 1945-1950. Museum Bronbeek, 2015: 3.

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is important that these documents keep being re-interpreted to be able to determine their meaning as it is not fixed.

A problem that has to be taken into consideration when studying these photographs lies in the function of, and ascribed meaning to, photographs. Photographs are still often regarded as depicting, at least to some extent, ‘the truth’ and having the capability to take us back in time to show how things really were at a certain moment. André Bazin, film theorist and critic, in his 1945 The Ontology of the Photographic Image argued that photography ‘embalms’ time.57 He believed that the photographic medium was able to ‘fix’ an event in time forever. Despite the fact that nowadays most of us are aware that we cannot discern ‘objective truth’ from a photograph, and that photography cannot really ‘capture’ a moment in time, and that photographs can be manipulated in many different ways, old photographs, especially black and white ones, are still often viewed in this way. The medium of

photography still holds a position of authority. This is true for instance in media reporting. People read newspapers to find out ‘news’ and ‘facts’, ‘truths’ about what happens in the world. Photographs in news reports are often seen as ‘proof’. When discussing the

photographic content of pictures taken during the independence struggle it is important to take these aspects into account. The power of the media in the construction of ideas and ‘truths’ is of great importance when discussing this subject matter.

Historian Susan Protschky in her book Camera Ethica analyses how literary theorist and philosopher Roland Barthes’ remarks on photography’s characteristics to contain traces of the past without the capability to present the viewer with an unmediated view of this past have been of influence on reinterpretations of photography, both in imperial and postcolonial contexts.58 It is important to consider who took which photograph and also who was

responsible for having which photograph published and to what end. Writer J.J. Clarke asks us to think about who has the authority to represent, which representations survive and why? He asks us to consider different histories and narratives and to always remain critical of who is speaking. He also states that we have to consider that our representations are of a

constructed nature and we should be aware of this.59 These are important points to take into consideration when looking at the photographs discussed in the following chapters.

57 Bazin, André. ‘The Ontology of the Photographic Image.’ [1945]. Transl. Hugh Gray. Film Quarterly, Vol.

13, No. 4 (Summer 1960): 8.

58 Protschky. Susie. ‘Camera Ethica: Photography, modernity and the governed in late-colonial Indonesia.’ In:

Protschky, Susie, ed. Photography, Modernity and the Governed in Late-colonial Indonesia. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015: 19.

59 Clarke, J.J. Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and Western Thought. London and New

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Chapter 2: Military and Institutional Dutch photography

This chapter discusses photographic material produced by the Dutch in Indonesia between 1945 and 1950. Most of the material discussed here is military photography. In order to study the material I have researched the museum collections and archives in the Netherlands that hold relevant photographic collections as well as studied literature related to the topic.60 The images we, in the Netherlands, are most familiar with of this period are, apart from the iconic photographs of historic events such as Sukarno reading out the proclamation of independence, military photographs of a propagandist nature or photographs that have been used in ways to serve a propagandist message. As Art Historian John Tagg in his The Burden of

Representation argues, the camera holds a type of ‘authority’ to produce ‘evidence’.61 Tagg asserts that we must always consider who is the authority speaking, who took the

photographs, for whom and for what purpose.62 What was the photographer’s, or in this case the Netherlands Government Information Service’s (Regeringsvoorlichtingsdienst, RVD) agenda? Taking these questions into consideration this chapter looks at several photographs that were used to convey propagandist ideas as well as some photographs that were censored.

Photo reporting by the authorities: the DLC and MARVO

The Netherlands Government Information Service (Regeringsvoorlichtingsdienst, RVD) had the responsibility to take care of the political news in the period after World War II. The Army Contacts Services (Dienst Legercontacten, DLC), founded by general Simon Hendrik Spoor (Chief of Staff of the KNIL and KL from 1946 to 1949) in 1947, and the Marine Information Service (Marinevoorlichtingsdiesnt, MARVO), founded in 1943, were

responsible for the military information dissemination both internally and externally. These three organisations were involved in deciding which film and photographic material was suitable for publication and which was not. All film rolls and developed film sheets, also

60 The museums and archives with photographs from Indonesia taken between 1945-1950 which I have included

in my research are: Museum Bronbeek (Arnhem), National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Netherlands Photo Museum (Rotterdam), NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies

(Amsterdam), Rijksmuseum (Amsterdam), Special Collections, University Leiden / Royal Netherlands Institute of Souteast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV), Stedelijk Museum (Amsterdam), The National Museum of World Cultures (Amsterdam, Leiden, Berg en Dal), The Netherlands Institute of Military History (NIMH).

61 Tagg, John. The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1993: 150.

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those for personal use, had to be sent to the DLC headquarters in Batavia (with lieutenant-colonel W.C. Koenders at its head) and were checked.63 A selection was made at the DLC headquarters where the photographs were usually printed.

The military photographers would generally send the photographs including a caption line stating the event photographed. The definitive captions were decided upon by the DLC and/or MARVO. Some photographs would receive a stamp indicating that they had been censored for publication or reproduction.64 Sometimes photographs or negatives were

scratched to indicate they were unsuitable for publication. Going through the archives of DLC photographs at the Dutch National Archives I came across photographs that had the text ‘do not publish’ written on the back in bright red pencil. Some photographs were carrying stamps that indicate publication was only permitted after the approval of the Army Information Services.

If photographs were deemed appropriate for publication they were sent to news agencies in the Netherlands.65 In the Netherlands the photographs were checked once again by military advisory organs in the city of The Hague and captions were adjusted if deemed necessary.66 Considering this excessive process of reviewing the produced material multiple times it is not hard to imagine that apart from this censorship self-censorship would have been common practice.

Not just the images that got selected, but also the captions that were added, were subjected to strict scrutiny. Through captions events could be framed in certain ways as to influence public opinion. They could also have a part in playing on the emotions of Dutch people. As Susan Sontag says in her Regarding the Pain of Others ‘All photographs wait to

be explained or falsified by their captions’.67 The captions that are used determine the

meaning of the photographs considerably; one photograph can be used to convey two opposing messages if the caption is changed.

For the photographers of the DLC a manual existed regarding their photographic practices. In this manual practicalities regarding the storage of the film material were discussed but mention was also made of how the photographers were meant to portray the military in Indonesia. In the manual the photographers were reminded of the fact that the image of the Dutch military in Indonesia, both nationally and internationally, was

63 Kok, Sommers, Zweers 2009: 50. 64 Ibid: 65.

65 Zweers, Louis. De gecensureerde oorlog: Militairen versus media in Nederlands-Indië 1945-1949. Zutphen:

Walburg Pers, 2013: 147.

66 Ibid: 47.

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codependent on their portrayal of it.68 It is unknown whether the MARVO had a specific manual with prescriptions on photo reporting but marine photographers and people working for the MARVO have stated that there were no written guidelines; they were expected to know instinctively what and what not to photograph.69

The news agencies in the Netherlands played an important role in the dissemination of information. Linguist Peter Scott reminds us that photographs are not of an ontological photojournalistic nature but are used and appropriated as such by the publisher. According to him by placing a photograph in a newspaper, the photograph takes on a different meaning to the public, it attains more of an authoritative voice.70A photo report in the Katholieke

Illustratie dated August 14th 1947 is titled: ‘De politionele acties. Nieuw bewijs van

Nederlands vredelievendheid’ (The police actions. New proof of Holland’s peacefulness).71

This is one example of a misleading headline out of many. Language and wording play an important role in these reports. The text accompanying the photo report in the Katholieke

Illustratie makes the statement that there will never be an independent Republic and that

everything that is happening in Indonesia is an internal affair that is no one’s business but that of the Dutch. The photo report shows photographs with headlines pointing toward the many ways the Dutch are ‘fixing’ and ‘helping’ the country.72 Elsevier published a photograph of a wounded Indonesian being treated by doctors and nurses with the caption stating ‘The Indies

have been freed’.73 Through captions like these an inaccurate message of a peaceful

Netherlands (military) was presented. The aforementioned newspapers can be seen as pro-colonial rule and pro-pro-colonial war. The photographs they published were framed in a way as to spread a message that was pro-Dutch presence in Indonesia. De Groene Amsterdammer,

Het Parool, the communist newspaper De Waarheid, De Vlam, and Vrij Nederland were the

only media outlets in the Netherlands that wrote critical entries regarding the colonial war. These magazines and newspapers had a small budget so it was hard for them to send reporters over to Indonesia. They were largely dependent on the photographic material produced by the embedded photographers.74

68 Zweers 1995: 11. 69 Zweers 1994: 13.

70 Scott, Clive. ‘The Behaviour of Caption in the Press.’ In: The Spoken Image: Photography & Language.’ In:

Reaktion Books, 1999: 99.

71 Zweers, Louis. Front Indië: Hugo Wilmar, ooggetuige van een koloniale oorlog. Zutphen: Walburg Pers,

1994: 46-47.

72 Ibid.

73 Zweers, Louis. Agressi II: Operatie Kraai: De vergeten beelden van de tweede politionele actie. Den Haag:

Sdu uitgevers, 1995: 27.

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Lieutenant W. Heldoorn, who was head of the photo selection at DLC at the time, mentioned in an interview with the Dutch newspaper Parool that he had been given the task to, and did, destroy all photographic material, in 1949 just before the signing of the

souvereignty agreement took place.Heldoorn had been trained as a photographer by the Legerfilmdienst in The Hague.75 He said that the largest part of the material the DLC photographers shot never ended up in the newspapers leading him to believe that taking the pictures was rather pointless. Even though Heldoorn has stated to have burnt the photographs as he was asked, negatives have survived. In 1950 the DLC ceased to exist, in that same year a large number of negatives was shipped to the Netherlands.76 These negatives were later discovered by historian Louis Zweers at the Dutch National Archives (at that time still called

Het Algemeen Rijksarchief), in the city of The Hague, where they had been stored in boxes.

Zweers has conducted extensive research on the DLC photographic archives.77 The biggest part of the DLC Archives is now housed by the Dutch National Archives and consists of a series of approximately 10.000 prints, most of these mounted on cards with captions and negative numbers (a section of these photographs are the photographs taken in 1946 by the Army Information Services (de Leger Voorlichtingsdienst), the predecessor of the DLC), a series of approximately 6.000 nitrate negatives, and a series of negatives that were found in the depository in 2002.78 Apparently Heldoorn had wanted to conduct research on, and make an inventory of, the collection of photographs in 1991 but was not granted permission by the Ministry of Defence.79

As I looked through some of the yet to be digitised photographs taken by the DLC photographs at the Dutch National Archives, the captions in typewriting on the back of the photos stood out to me. They are revealing as to how much there was a sentiment of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ amongst the Dutch military, a feeling of the herioc Dutch and the ‘enemy’. Some of the captions hold a passive aggressive sentiment such as the following caption on the back of a photograph (see Images 4 and 5), the photographer unknown, of an old lady: ‘FA

150 PADANG: Amidst the ruins of Loobook Aloen our troops found this old woman, ill and starving. Often unfortunately, the soldiers of “imperialistic” Holland arrived to [sic] late to help the victims of republican rule.’ There is no nuance in this caption and there seems to be

75 Zweers 1995: 11. 76 Ibid: 7.

77 Ibid.

78 Nationaal Archief, ’s Gravenhage, Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap.

-Kortlang, D.J. (2012) ‘Inventaris van de fotocollectie Dienst Legercontacten Indonesië (DLC), – positieven 1946-1950’ [2.24.02.01].

<http://www.gahetna.nl/collectie/archief/pdf/NL-HaNA_2.24.04.01.ead.pdf>.

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no understanding of, or reflection on, the role of the Netherlands’ imperialist rule in the war having broken out in the first place. The photograph could be explained with a very different caption from the Indonesian perspective, perhaps stating the woman was dying because of the way the Dutch had treated the people in the village.

Propaganda Pictures versus Censored Pictures

Images of violence committed by the Dutch military or of them in the position of victims did not get published. The Dutch military was presented as heroic and as performing

humanitarian deeds. Discussing the following photographs I show different ways in which propaganda was applied and censorship was enacted by the Dutch. I also touch upon how this affected the practice of photographers at the time.

Examples of the type of propagandist photographs published during the colonial war are photographs in which the military were seen in friendly contact with the locals.

Photographs of military men handing out cigarettes to Indonesian kampong residents (image 6) and candy to children (image 7) are examples. These images give the impression that the residents were happy with the arrival of the Dutch. In image 6 we see a man smiling while being handed a cigarette by a Dutch soldier sitting in his military vehicle. Other residents stand around the car looking with expressions of hopefullness on their faces towards the military men in expectation of them baring more ‘gifts’. In image 7 we see children happily receiving candy. The children hold up their hands looking expectantly at a young Dutch soldier with what looks like a roll of candy in his hands, a cigarette hanging out if his mouth. Another Dutch soldier looks at the camera smiling. It is easy to imagine how these

photographs would have been used to give a pleasant portrayal of the presence of the Dutch in Indonesia and of their amiable relations with the locals. One could however also read the images as the Dutch coloniser entering the small Indonesian village that has entered a state of poverty precisely as a result of this colonialist rule and war that oppresses them and has made the residents dependent on the coloniser. The military men seem to be greeted with

enthusiasm despite them being in a war vehicle. Other examples of preferred images are those of military men shaking hands and talking to the locals and those of the military involved in activities such as clearing roads. The picture these photographs paint is very one-sided, not showing the full story. Anything that could harm the portrayal of the Dutch as bringing peace to Indonesia was censored. Neither the Dutch government nor the military apparatus wanted

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to show realistic images of the war that was going on. Neither Indonesian nor Dutch victims of the war were reported on.80

Alfred van Sprang was an embedded war photographer who worked for the American United Press International (UPI) and reported on the two big Military Aggressions. Although Dutch, Van Sprang was seen as an American photo reporter because he had an American press card which gave him easy access to areas that were under the Republic rule since America took an anti-Dutch-colonial stance. Van Sprang regarded the Independent Republic of Indonesia as a ‘fairytale’ and was pro-Dutch rule and intervention.81 He apparently did report on some horrible scenes of the war but most of his photographic material was destroyed by relatives after his death and nothing remains today.82

Dutch photographer and film maker Charles Breijer, who worked for Multifilm

Batavia (discussed further on) from 1947 until 1949 as an imbedded photographer, mentioned in an interview, that he had to edit the footage he shot during the Military Aggressions in such a way that what was to be seen seemed like ‘pacifying’ acts.83 Breijer reported for Wordende

Wereld, a cinema journal that was used to justify the presence of the Dutch in Indonesia.84

Image 8 shows the general atmosphere in Indonesia at the time. This photograph by Breijer presents us with a scene of two men walking past a big poster of a strong fist with text proclaiming Merdeka (Independence). Posters like this filled the streets; trams and public buildings were clad with phrases that pointed to the stride for independence and freedom from the Dutch. This photograph and many others that contain imagery of a similar nature did not, as one may expect, make it to the general public in the Netherlands.

Dutch Hugo Wilmar was trained in 1944 as a war photographer on Long Island, New York after having been rejected from serving in the military. In 1945 he worked for the Dutch Marine Brigade as a photographer. After this he worked for three years as a photographer in Indonesia. During these years he worked for Spaarnestad that published both the Katholieke

Illustratie and Panorama. He took photographs during the First Military Aggression for

Spaarnestad. Wilmar has mentioned his resentment for the fact that a lot of the photographs he took did not pass the strict censorship, despite the fact that he had permission to choose his own subject matter. He was granted permission to send his negatives straight to Photo

80 Kok, Sommers, Zweers 2009: 64.

81 Zweers, Louis. De gecensureerde oorlog: Militairen versus media in Nederlands-Indië 1945-1949. Zutphen:

Walburg Pers, 2013: 240.

82 Kok, Sommers, Zweers 2009: 164.

83 Jansen Hendriks, Gerda. ‘ ‘Not a colonial war’: Dutch film propaganda in the fight against Indonesia, 1945–

49’ Journal of Genocide Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3-4 (2012): 408.

84 ‘Charles Breijer’ Beeld en Geluid wiki. Last accessed 29 July 2017.

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Spaarnestad in Haarlem, the Netherlands, without any intervention by the DLC. The selection for publication was made by the office director of the Katholieke Illustratie and the editor in chief of Panorama. They were also the ones deciding on the captions that would be used.85 Wilmar was, like Van Sprang, in the possession of an American press card, which gave him access to areas, events and people (such as Sukarno) that were inaccessible to the Dutch.This way he could travel through Java, Sumatra, Celebes, Borneo, the Moluccas, Bali, New Guinea and Flores.86

Of the five thousand pictures Wilmar took several hundred are now in the Spaarnestad Photo Archive. Wilmar was bothered by the fact that the photographs he took of battle did not get published. He was of the opinion that too much of a sweet picture was being painted of the situation in Indonesia. However, during his time in Indonesia he also practiced self-censorship.87Wilmar did take close-up pictures of the battlefield, of wounded persons and of soldiers stepping over dead bodies, but these pictures were never published.88 Zweers

describes his photographs as giving quite a ‘distant’ view of things.89

The photographs Wilmar took for Spaarnestad were confirming the image of bad policy of the Republicans and the good humanitarian work of the Dutch military.90 They were pictures of mooi Indië (the beautiful Indies), where no war, but just scenery, is to be seen. The idyllic sawas (rice fields) are an example of an often photographed theme. These pictures were very popular at the time and don’t look very different from holiday pictures, and have a timeless feeling to them.

In the period between the two Military Aggressions Yogyakarta, the political centre of the Republic at that time, was very inaccessible. The only Dutch war photographers that managed to take pictures in Yogyakarta during this time were Hugo Wilmar and Charles Breijer.91 Apart from photographs taken by these (and other) photographers whom we know by name, there is a lot of ‘anonymous’ photography from this period as well.

Image 9 showsa negative of a censored photograph taken by DLC photographer Vaandrig van Krieken. The picture was taken during a visit of General Simons, head of the medical department, to a hospital in Yogyakarta. After the Second Military Aggression

85 Zweers 1994: 24.

86 Verdonck, Ruud. ‘Ongewenste beelden van een koloniale oorlog / Cultuur’ Trouw, 21 January 1995. Trouw.

Last accessed 29 July 2017. <https://www.trouw.nl/cultuur/ongewenste-beelden-van-een-koloniale-oorlog~ad2b7acb/>.

87 Zweers 1994: 13.

88 Kok, Sommers, Zweers 2009: 50. 89 Zweers 1994: 14.

90 Ibid: 32. 91 Ibid: 91.

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Simons visited soldiers who had been shot, in the hospital. In the imagewe see a doctor standing next to the bed of a wounded soldier after having been shot in the leg. The image was deemed inappropriate for showing a Dutch military person wounded in a hospital. The knowledge amongst the people at home that there was an actual war going on, and people on both sides were getting hurt, had to remain undisclosed.92 The whole series of negatives of this visit has been scratched to prevent it from being published.

Image 10, a censored photograph that was taken by DLC photographer Ben Huisman, shows an Indonesian man, who had been imprisoned by the Dutch, sitting on the ground with Dutch military around him. The photograph was taken at the start of a military action on Sumatra by the KNIL in 1947. The man is being questioned by the Dutch army.93 Multiple soldiers are standing around the young man with guns while he sits defenseless on the ground, his hands tied to his back and a distressed expression on his face. The identities of the men pointing guns at him do not get revealed in the photograph, their faces fall outside of the image frame. Next to the young man we see a Dutch military vehicle with a Dutch military man sitting on the bonnet in a relaxed fashion, looking at the young man that has been taken prisoner. The military costumes of the Dutch men stand in stark contrast to the ragged clothes the Indonesian man is wearing. The same is true for their military equipment. Photographs such as this one, with Indonesians surrendering to the violent forces of the Dutch military, are no rarity. The DLC archives are filled with them. These images did of course not get

published at the time.

Image 11shows a picture taken by DLC photographer Ton Schilling of five young men siting on the ground, their hands on their heads; they have surrendered. They are skinny, look like they haven’t been eating properly for a while, their ribs are sticking out, and some of them look very young. Around them stand ten large, well-fed, young Dutch military men. They all have guns and look at the camera smiling. They look happy, without any worries. Their postures, smiles and facial expressions give the impression that they are posing ‘proudly’ with their imprisoned ‘enemies’. The scene is reminiscent of hunters posing with their captured ‘prey’. From the image it looks like it is a game to them. The image gives a painful look into the unequal position the Indonesians had against the Dutch.

Image 12shows another violent scene, this time concerning seven young Indonesians and one Dutch soldier. On the back of this photograph that was taken by Hugo Wilmar we

92 ‘Ongewenst beeld’ Verzetsmusuem Amsterdam. Verzetsmuseum Amsterdam. Last accessed 28 July 2017.

<https://www.verzetsmuseum.org/museum/nl/de-koloniale-oorlog/1947-1948-in-actie/ongewenst-beeld>.

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can read ‘Met deze dreigende beweging krijgt men vlugger iets los van de extremisten’ (With this threatening gesture it is easier to get information out of the extremists).94 The photograph shows the military man threatening to hit the Indonesian men with a large gun. Evidently the gesture was not the part that was most threatening but the fact that the man had a gun and could possibly kill them with it. Killing in these situations did often happen.

Almost all of the several thousand photographs that were taken during the Second Military Aggression were censored.95 Only Dutch military correspondents and photographers from the DLC, MARVO and RVD were allowed to report on events. No photographers or journalists from the outside were allowed to enter.96 Only photographs portraying peace and prosperity were published. Until February 1949 no recent photographs of the Second Military Aggression were published. Old archival photographic material was used in this period for publications. A lot of the archival material that was used had been shot by Hugo Wilmar.97 Only twenty photographs got through the censorship and were distributed to Dutch and American press agencies.98

Film

A parallel can be drawn between photographic material and film that was produced and dispersed by the authorities during this period. Historian Gerda Jansen Hendriks in her Not a colonial war’ Dutch film propaganda in the fight against Indonesia, 1945–49 discusses the

ways the Gouvernements Filmbedrijf Multifim Batavia (Government Filmcompany Multifilm

Batavia, founded in 1941 by Dutch Jan Mol)99under the East Indies authorities, disseminated propagandist views through their films and how these films became part of a national

collective memory in the Netherlands. She discusses how in these films the focus was, like was the case in the photographs, on humanitarian aid from the Dutch military as opposed to violence. Jansen Hendriks describes how the films have been included in Dutch archives and have been used and re-used from the 1970s onwards for documentary purposes; thus

reinstating the idea of a humanitarian peaceful affair.100

94 Zweers 1994: 15.

95 Kok, Sommers, Zweers 2009: 188.

96 ‘1946-1947: In actie’ Verzetsmusuem Amsterdam. Verzetsmuseum Amsterdam. Last accessed 29 July 2017.

<https://www.verzetsmuseum.org/museum/nl/de-koloniale-oorlog/1946-1947-in-actie>.

97 Kok, Sommers, Zweers 2009: 188. 98 Zweers 1995: 15.

99 Jansen Hendriks, Gerda. Een voorbeeldige kolonie: Nederlands-Indië in 50 jaar overheidsfilms, 1912-1962.

Diss. University of Amsterdam, 2014. Zutphen: Koninklijke Wöhrmann, 2014: 230.

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There was no instructive manual with specific guinedelines on what could and could not be filmed for the Gouvernements Filmbedrijf but everyone seemed to agree on painting a positive picture of what the Dutch were up to in the archipelago. The government in the end decided what was and what was not to be shown as Multifilm Batavia was part of the RVD. There weren’t any independent news reporting journalists who were active at the time in Indonesia.101

The MARVO, commissioned by the Dutch government, produced propagandist films during this period. One of these films dealt with the First Military Aggression. It shows the Dutch military driving their tanks through the streets. Military marching music is played along the footage and a male voice over states ‘..op dezelfde dag trokken de troepen van de

landmacht door de straten van Bandoeng. Ook hier kon door snel optreden veel vernieling worden voorkomen.’ (..on the same day the troops marched the streets of Bandung. Here as

well, by acting promptly, a lot of damage was prevented). The video fragment shows the soldiers waving at the local population while the voice over speaks: ‘de verhouding met de

bevolking was gunstig..’ (the relationship with the locals was favourable..). Moreover, the

fragment shows the military handing out candy and lighting cigarettes for locals.102 The title of the fragment ‘Pacificatiestrijd op Java’ (Stride for Pacification on Java)103 made on commission for the Netherlands Government Information Servicesspeaks for itself. Many Dutch were under the impression that Indonesia and the ‘terrorists’ this country harbored had to be ‘pacified’.

The Impact of Photographs

The fact that the photographs (and films) that were published at the time were put out by an ‘authority’ figure, namely by the RVD, is problematic. Many people tended to take the information they were fed by this authority at face value. Together with the supposed truth value of the photographic medium this is even more problematic. Apart from the film and photographic material that was undoubtedly meant to underwrite the actions of the Dutch, photographs and film material of the actual atrocities that were committed on both sides was also produced. There have been (military) photographers who did capture the fighting and the

101 Ibid: 410.

102 ‘Gewenst beeld’ Verzetsmuseum Amsterdam. Verzetsmuseum Amsterdam. Last accessed 29 July 2017.

<https://www.verzetsmuseum.org/museum/nl/de-koloniale-oorlog/1946-1947-in-actie/gewenst-beeld>.

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effects of the war. These photographs were however not published, but censored, and came to the attention of researchers and the public in later years.

John Berger in his 1972 essay Photographs of Agony poses the question of the effect photographs of violence have. He comes up with this question after noting how the Vietnam War was being reported on. As opposed to the Indonesian colonial war the Vietnam War was photographed in all its atrocity and reported on in newspapers whilst at the same time being supported by these very same newspapers.104By the time the Vietnam War was happening (between 1955 and 1975) it had become fairly normal (though still shocking) to have images of the horrific realities of war appearing in the papers. This type of uncensored immediate publishing of photographs taken during wartime started after the World War II, with the Korean War (1950-1953) and intensified with the Vietnam War.105 Everyone has a mental image of the famous photograph of the young girl running away after a napalm bomb blast; it belongs to our collective memory. One can say that the censorship in Indonesia thus also had to do with the time in which the photographic material was produced.

According to Berger we are taken aback by the photographs depicting violence and war, they have an imposing, or arresting, effect on us.106 He is of the opninion that this effect results in the viewer feeling some kind of guilt which he or she deals with either through brushing the issue aside, becoming desensitised, or by performing an act of charity, in this way soothing his or her conscience. Berger argues that both these ways of dealing with the issue make that the image becomes depoliticised. They place the events at a distance from our lives and make them into something that is unsolvable and has to be accapted as it is. He asserts that many of the horrible images we are confronted with are a direct result of wars that are being fought in our name and for which we are indirectly all responsible. We as citizens, he states, have not got the political power to influence the political and military apparatus in a way as to change these acts. Our response is to regard the photographs as part of life.107 Berger’s argument might to some extent explain why these images of horrors do not enter our collective memory, an issue which I eleborate on in chapter five. Since we feel that we cannot deal with these images adequately we discard them and ‘forget’ about them, because we consider them as presenting something far away, something that is not particularly our business, and something that we cannot resolve.

104 Berger, John. ‘Photographs of Agony.’ In: In: Wells, Liz, ed. The Photography reader. London and New

York: Routledge, 2003: 289.

105Lewinski, Jorge. The Camera at War: a history of war photography from 1848 to the present day. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978: 12.

106 Berger 2003: 289. 107 Ibid: 290.

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