THE ROLE OF THE RECOVERY
FUNDING GAP IN POST-CYCLONE
IDAI MALAWI.
AN EXPLORATIVE ANALYSIS.
Word count: 19,750Rani Marchal
Student number: 01708552Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Bruno De Cordier
A dissertation submitted to Ghent University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master-after-Master Conflict and Development Studies
Deze pagina is niet beschikbaar omdat ze persoonsgegevens bevat.
Universiteitsbibliotheek Gent, 2021.
This page is not available because it contains personal information.
Ghent University, Library, 2021.
2
Abstract
In early March 2019, Malawi was hit by Cyclone Idai, causing severe flooding across many districts in the southern part of the country. Overall, the emergency response was rather well funded, while
recovery activities seemingly got delayed due to a lack of funding. However, recovery might be equally, if not more, important than relief, as it is a chance for communities to renew and improve.
Poorly funded recovery might lead to increased vulnerability and chronic conditions of risk. Using semi-structured interviews with different actors involved in the recovery process in post-cyclone Idai
Malawi, this explorative case study examines whether there existed a recovery funding gap, which factors could have had an influence on this gap and what impact it had. This allows for the country to
eliminate these challenges in the future and to start a conversation between the different stakeholders. The paper also contributes to the international recovery literature and recovery funding gap evidence. The study finds that there does exist a recovery funding gap, but that the
official reported gap might not be accurate. Moreover factors such as lack of capacity, political instability, inflexible donor mechanisms, unfortunate timing might have had an influence on the amount of mobilized recovery funding. This recovery funding gap eventually led to the delay of the
implementation of recovery interventions, which is estimated to have had a direct and long-term impact on the affected communities, pushing them into a state of constant recovery and poverty. Researchers are in encouraged to use this explorative study to further examine correlations between
the presented factors and the availability of recovery funding and to research the actual impact of this recovery funding gap on the ground.
3
Content
1. Introduction ... 4
1.1. Context Malawi and Cyclone Idai ... 4
1.1.1. Socio-demographic characteristics and disaster profile Malawi ... 4
1.1.2. Cyclone Idai in Malawi ... 5
1.2. Literature study and theoretical framework ... 9
1.2.2. Types of disaster assistance ... 9
1.2.3. Recovery funding gap ... 12
1.2.4. Research questions ... 14
1.2.5. Implications ... 14
2. Methodology ... 15
3. Results ... 16
3.1. Was there a recovery funding gap? ... 16
3.1.1. Reluctance to channel funding through Government systems ... 17
3.1.2. Weak information management ... 20
3.1.3. Lack of data... 22
3.1.4. Exclusion of incremental recovery costs ... 23
3.2. Factors influencing the recovery funding gap ... 24
3.2.1. Lack of understanding recovery ... 24
3.2.2. High recovery cost compared to response ... 24
3.2.3. Non-prioritized country ... 25
3.2.4. Lack of media attention ... 26
3.2.5. Unfortunate timing ... 27
3.2.6. Political instability and interfering politics ... 28
3.2.7. Donor related constraints ... 31
3.2.8. Lack of capacity ... 34
3.2.9. Weak leading role government ... 37
3.3. What is the impact of the recovery funding gap? ... 39
4. Discussion and conclusion ... 41
4.1. Discussion ... 41
4.2. Conclusion ... 47
4
1. Introduction
In early March 2019, Malawi was hit by Cyclone Idai, causing severe flooding across many districts in the southern part of the country. The floods killed 60 people, injured 672 and affected more than 86,980 people in 15 districts and 2 cities (UN Malawi, 2019). Overall, the emergency response was rather well funded (89% of the appealed amount was raised), while recovery activities seemingly got delayed due to a lack of funding (only 40% of the appealed amount was pledged six months after the disaster). However, recovery might be equally, if not more, important than relief, as it is “a time for
renewal and improvement” (Joakim & Wismer, 2015, p. 402). Poorly funded recovery might lead to
increased vulnerability and chronic conditions of risk. Using semi-structured interviews with different actors involved in the recovery process of in post-cyclone Idai Malawi, this explorative study
examines whether there existed a recovery funding gap, which factors could have had an influence on this gap and what impact it had.
First of all, a context of Malawi and Cyclone Idai will be presented, after which relevant concepts alongside with an overview of important literature will be given. Based on this, research questions and the corresponding implications of this study will be presented. Section 2 consists of a description of the used methodology, followed by the results section. Eventually, in the discussion section, the results will be interpreted and compared to former researches. The section also includes recommendations for stakeholders involved in recovery in Malawi and for future research. After presenting the study’s limitations, the paper is concluded with a brief summary of the study. Lastly, in the appendix, a list of acronyms can be found.
1.1.
Context Malawi and Cyclone Idai
In this section, Malawi’s socio-demographic characteristics and disaster profile will be presented. Thereafter, a description of Cyclone Idai will be given, together with an overview of the country’s post-disaster response and recovery efforts.
1.1.1.
Socio-demographic characteristics and disaster profile Malawi
As Malawi’s economy is largely agrarian-based, the agriculture sector approximately contributes to 30 percent of the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Besides, the sector has a significant impact on other sectors as well, such as manufacturing activities. Around 85 percent of the Malawian
households are involved in subsistence, rain-fed agriculture, which makes Malawi’s economic growth heavily dependent on favourable weather patterns (Malawi Government, 2019b).
5 With a population of 17,6 million people, 84.5 percent of Malawi’s citizens reside in rural areas (National Statistical Office, 2018). About 36 percent of the rural population lives in semi-permanent houses and 20 percent lives in traditional houses. These structures are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters and are typically inhabited by the poorest and most vulnerable segments of the population, such as women, elderly, people with disabilities, orphans and widows (Malawi Government, 2019b).
Over the last years, educational infrastructure has expanded with an increase of enrolment. However, a significant proportion of school buildings has been built without taking into account established construction standards, which makes them particularly susceptible to disasters (Malawi Government, 2019b)
Malawi has a high rate of incidence of malnutrition. No less than 37 percent of the population is malnourished, with an under-weight rate of 11,7 percent. In case of a disaster, the situation of this large proportion of the population already in a precarious nutritional state, could rapidly deteriorate if immediate food and nutrition related needs are not addressed (Malawi Government, 2019b).
Malawi is a disaster prone country. As a result of “its location along the great African Rift Valley, rapid population growth, unsustainable urbanization, climate variability and change, and
environmental degradation” (Malawi Government, 2019b, p. xiii), Malawi is extremely vulnerable to the impacts of extreme weather events. Besides droughts, Malawi mostly gets affected by weather-related shocks such as floods, stormy rains and hailstorms. The country has dealt with more than seven droughts and nineteen major floods over the past 50 years. These shocks have been increasing in magnitude, frequency and scope over the years.
1.1.2. Cyclone Idai in Malawi
In early March 2019, Malawi was hit with heavy rains together with strong winds as a result of a severe weather system formation over the eastern coast of Mozambique (Malawi Government, 2019a). After moving back to the Mozambique Channel, where it intensified into Cyclone Idai, it hit Malawi a second time (Malawi Government, 2019a, 2019b; OCHA, 2019). The subsequent heavy and persistent rain caused severe flooding in the Southern and, to a lesser extent, the Central Region of the country. According to the Malawian Government (2019b), Cyclone Idai has affected more than 975,600 people, including over 86,980 displaced, with 60 deaths and 672 injured people. Two cities and 15 out of 28 districts have been impacted. Considering the major impact of Cyclone Idai, on 8th
6 The disaster has significantly impacted “people’s lives, livelihoods and socioeconomic
infrastructure in the affected areas, pushing a large number of people into poverty and food insecurity” (Malawi Government, 2019b, p. xiii). As the country was still recovering from the severe floods in 2015 and the drought in 2016, the population has been affected cumulatively. Moreover, with agriculture being the main source of livelihood for the population living in the rural areas, the heavy rains and floods have considerably impacted agricultural activities, as fields were inundated and crops were destroyed (Malawi Government, 2019a). As a consequence, around 3,3 million people in the flood affected areas were already categorized as food insecure before Cyclone Idai hit Malawi (Malawi Government, 2019b). Moreover, the floods have damaged infrastructure, such as houses, bridges, roads, and water well and irrigation systems. Most of the displaced people were accommodated in temporary shelters, including schools, churches and community buildings (Malawi Government, 2019a).
Emergency response
The Government of Malawi took charge of the emergency response through the Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA), supported by humanitarian partners, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the United Nations (UN) System and donors. The emergency response consisted of multiple coordination structures: the National Disaster Preparedness and Relief Committee (NDPRC), the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and the cluster system.
National Disaster Preparedness and Relief Committee (NDPRC). The NDPRC consists of Principal Secretaries of all line ministries and departments, the Malawi Red Cross Society (MRCS), and three NGOs. If necessary, UN agencies can be co-opted. The committee is chaired by the Chief Secretary to the Government. The NDPRC provides guidance to the Department of Disaster Management Affairs and supporting technical committees and sub-committees in order to
coordinate the implementation of disaster risk management at national level (Malawi Government, 2019a).
Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). The HCT comprises a multitude of actors, namely; “Heads of UN Agencies, international and local NGOs, Government, and the Malawi Red Cross Society. This team is co-chaired by the Principal Secretary of DoDMA and the United Nations
Resident Coordinator (UNRC).” (Malawi Government, 2019a, p. 10). Initially, the HCT meetings were organized on a weekly basis, ensuring a coordinated response operation.
Cluster Coordination. The Government of Malawi activated ten clusters, namely “Food Security, Agriculture, Health, Nutrition, Education, Protection, Water and Sanitation and Hygiene, Transport and Logistics, Shelter and Camp Management and Coordination and Early Recovery”
7 (Malawi Government, 2019a, p. 10) and were jointly led by the Malawian Government and the UN. These clusters were in charge of overseeing the implementation of the response, under guidance of the cluster leads and co-leads. Each cluster was led by a relevant government department and co-led by a relevant UN agency. In order to ensure proper operational cross-sector coordination, inter-cluster meetings were held on a weekly basis. With the intention of being able to better coordinate the response operations, the cluster system was replicated in the districts. At district level, the response activities were led by the District Commissioner / Chief Executive Officer, with support from the Director of Planning and Development and the District / City Civil Protection Committee.
DoDMA facilitated the development of a three month Flood Response Plan, which appealed for US$ 45,2 million to support response interventions of the active clusters. On 22 March 2019, the HCT met and reviewed the drafted response plan, after which the plan was officially launched on 28 March. This response plan officially ended on 30th June (Malawi Government, 2019a; UNCT, 2019).
Over US$ 40,5 million has been mobilized for the emergency response activities, leaving a gap of US$ 4,7 million, which is approximately 11% of the initial appealed amount (Department of Disaster Management Affairs of Malawi & United Nations Office of the Resident Coordinator, 2019).
Early recovery
For the first time in Malawi, an advisor hired by UNDP led the early recovery process. As one of the relief clusters was specifically dedicated to early recovery, UNDP tried to timely prepare for a smooth transition from emergency response to medium and long term recovery.
Recovery
When the recovery activities start, sectors take over the responsibilities from the emergency clusters. These sectors are entirely owned by Government owned institutions, in other words, ministries (Interview UNDP - early recovery advisor, 2019). Two significant documents provided guidance in the planning and implementation of recovery activities; the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) and the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF).
Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA). On the 3 July 2019, the Government of Malawi (2019b), with financial and technical support from the World Bank, the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Union (EU) and the African Development Bank (AfDB), launched the Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA). Throughout April 2019 the PDNA team assessed the needs and impact of Cyclone Idai in the affected districts and cities, quantifying the damage and loss and estimating the recovery and reconstruction needs. The effects of the floods were evaluated in terms of “the total or partial destruction of
8 infrastructure and physical assets and changes in economic flows arising from the disaster” (Malawi Government, 2019b, p. xiv). The PDNA made a division of the following relevant sectors and
subsectors:
(i) the social sector (housing, health and nutrition, education); (ii) the productive sector (agriculture: crops, livestock, irrigation and fisheries; and commerce and industry); (iii) the infrastructure sector (transport; energy; water supply and sanitation; and water resources); (iv) cross cutting issues (disaster risk reduction, DRR; environmental water systems; EWS, environment; social protection). (Malawi Government, 2019b, p. xiv)
Cyclone Idai left Malawi with significant damage to “infrastructure and physical assets and changes in economic production flows resulting in loss in both the public and private domains” (Malawi
Government, 2019b, p. xiv). It was estimated that the disaster effect was highest in the Social Sector, of which the Housing Sub-sector has suffered the most damage, followed by the Education and the Health Sub-sectors. Due to extensive damage to roads and drainage structures, in some areas, a large proportion of the population was not able to access social services (Malawi Government, 2019b). The second most affected sector was the Infrastructure Sector, as the floods washed away many roads, bridges, power supplies and so on. Thirdly, in the Productive Sector, Cyclone Idai primarily had an impact on incomes of farmers, fishermen and small traders. Moreover the damage in these sectors had spill-over effects in other sectors. For example, the shutdown of power plants for more than 48 hours caused disruptions in several commercial and economic activities (Malawi Government, 2019b). The PDNA estimates the overall damage and loss to amount to US$ 220,2 million, of which around 72 percent (US$ 157,7 million) is accounted for damage1. However, in order to reconstruct
and recover in a resilient way, following the “Build Back Better” (BBB) principle, the Malawian Government required US$ 370,5 million2. The World Bank (WB) pledged to give US$ 120 million
(Malawi Government, 2019b). Also the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) of Malawi and the African Development Programme (AfDP) committed US$ 6 million and US$ 20 million
1 the value of destroyed physical assets (Malawi Government, 2019b, p. xiv)
2 “The economic value of effects was calculated on the basis of the cost of replacing or repairing infrastructure
and physical assets; forgone income opportunities; higher operating costs; unexpected expenses; additional costs for coordination; provision of temporary facilities and staff; restoration of governance capacity; and expenditure related to the management of increased and/or new risks arising from the disaster” (Malawi Government, 2019b, p. xiv).
9 respectively. By October 2019 there still remained a funding gap of US$ 224,5 million, or roughly 60% of the initial appealed amount.
National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF). Based on the aforementioned PDNA, the National Disaster Recovery Framework was launched in September 2019. The Framework
operationalizes the recovery and reconstruction needs coming from the PDNA by prioritizing certain sectors and districts and by defining monitoring, management, financing and implementation mechanisms (Office of the Vice President (DoDMA), 2019).
1.2. Literature study and theoretical framework
In this section, different theoretical concepts will be described after which an overview of relevant literature and academic gaps will be presented. Based on this review, this section will conclude with the research questions which this paper will address, alongside with the implications of this study.
1.2.2. Types of disaster assistance
There is a large body of literature on the different types of disaster assistance and their relation to one another. For example, Lloyd-Jones (2006) states that in practice, disaster assistance is divided in the emergency humanitarian relief phase and the following non-emergency recovery. Amin and Goldstein (2008) identify a continuum of a relief, early recovery, and recovery and reconstruction phase. However, recently the academic world started to doubt this phased ‘continuum’ approach and replaced it by the so-called ‘contiguum’ model, as the former assumes that disaster assistance moves in a linear, artificial way from one phase to the other. As disasters are complex matters and conditions depend heavily on a country’s context, it is very important to note that these phases do not necessarily follow each other in a successive and linear way from relief through recovery towards a development phase (Lewis, 2001; Steets, Preysing, & Shapiro, 2011). Instruments used in these seemingly separate phases are often being used simultaneously, in order to respond effectively and comprehensively to a disaster. Therefore, different disaster assistance forms should not be
distinguished on the basis of the life-span of interventions. Steets et al. (2011) propose to
alternatively distinguish them by goal, target group, principles and cooperation partners, as shown in Table 1.
10
Table 1: Definitions of main forms of assistance (Retrieved from Steets et al., 2011, p. 11)
Moreover, since complex emergencies such as “natural disasters complicate pre-existing
humanitarian and development situations” (Steets et al., 2011, p. 9), especially in the case of Malawi, it is critical to emphasize this. As a country being incredibly vulnerable to natural disasters (Malawi Government, 2019b), Malawi may consequently move back and forth between emergency, recovery or development when another disaster hits the country soon after the previous one (Mosel & Levine, 2014).
As the United Nations were a key partner in all types of the disaster assistance in post-Cyclone Idai Malawi, in this paper the following terms established by UNDP (2008) were adopted: relief, early recovery, recovery, and development. Although the complex reality does not always fit the below written definitions, they remain useful.
Relief
Relief includes the immediate post-recovery. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines emergency relief as follows:
The immediate survival assistance to the victims of crisis and violent conflict. Most relief operations are initiated on short notice and have a short implementation period (project objectives are generally completed within a year). The main purpose of emergency relief is to save lives. (UNHCR, 2006, p. 155)
11
Early recovery
Early recovery has been introduced as part of the humanitarian reform process in 2005. UNDP defines this term as:
a multidimensional process of recovery that begins in a humanitarian setting. It is guided by development principles that seek to build on humanitarian programmes and to catalyse sustainable development opportunities. It aims to generate self-sustaining, nationally owned, resilient processes for post crisis recovery. It encompasses the restoration of basic services, livelihoods, shelter, governance, security and rule of law, environment and social dimensions, including the reintegration of displaced populations. (UNDP, 2008, p. 7)
Important to note is that early recovery cannot be identified as a separate stage in a consecutive ‘continuum’ between relief and recovery. As a consequence of affected areas recovering over different time scales, different combinations of relief and recovery might take place at the same time. Therefore, UNDP (2008, p. 7) states that early recovery “takes place in parallel to the
humanitarian relief programmes giving strength and purpose to the recovery”. It can bridge the gap between emergency response and longer-term recovery. In practice, in the UN system, UNDP is the designated cluster lead of the early recovery cluster.
Recovery
According to UNDP (2016, p. 19), recovery efforts “aim to restore peoples’ lives and livelihoods, re-establish institutions and social networks and foster sustainable development”. Steets et al. (2011, p. 3) add to this definition that recovery “constitutes the grey area that aims at recreating pre- or non-emergency situations, targets populations affected by emergencies, applies development principles as far as the humanitarian principles allow and has a preference for working through local
communities and local government”. In addition, recovery work is considered to be the perfect opportunity to “not only restore conditions to pre-disaster levels, but to improve them by addressing the underlying risks and vulnerabilities that caused the natural hazard to turn into a disaster in the first place” (UNDP, 2016, p. 19), in other words, to ‘build back better’, as emphasized in the United Nations Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR, 2015).
Development
Lastly, development is identified as another form of aid. It aims to improve “the social and economic situation, targets societies as a whole, follows the principles of ownership, alignment, results and
12 mutual accountability and preferably works through national and local governments” (Steets et al., 2011, p. 3).
1.2.3. Recovery funding gap
The international community increasingly perceives post-disaster recovery as “a time for renewal and improvement” (Joakim & Wismer, 2015, p. 402), rather than just bringing communities back to pre-disaster conditions (Khasalamwa, 2009). Both government and aid partners aim to apply the ‘building back better’ approach in their recovery activities, which is based on the belief that during the
recovery process, a ‘window of opportunity’’ is created for “vulnerability reduction, disaster risk reduction, and improved re-development” (Kennedy, Ashmore, Babister, & Kelman, 2008).
Moreover, contrary to immediate relief, which typically receives the lion share of aid, usually there are very few resources for longer-term recovery needs (Steets et al., 2011). Once the immediate response has been completed and media and public interest are gone, support slackens (Centre for Disaster Management, 2005), even though available funding is a critical element of any large construction project or programme (Macaskill & Guthrie, 2018). Consequently, UNDP (2016) identifies this lack of adequate financial resources as one of the causes for failed recovery. This may in turn result in “secondary disasters, with equally grave effects. A failed recovery can contribute to disasters becoming endemic, as it derails development gains and results in widespread losses” (p. 14). In combination with poorly carried out recovery processes, this could lead to increased
vulnerability and chronic conditions of risk. Steets et al. (2011) identify three different funding gaps. The first one is a temporal funding gap between the relief and development phases, which assumes that timing poses the main problem. This approach presumes that development funding slowly resumes once a crisis abates and relief funding phases out. This would cause a temporal funding gap during the “transition phase”. No consistent evidence has been found supporting this idea, as it assumes that crises develop in a linear phased way.
Secondly, strong evidence exists that supports a fragile state funding gap which assumes a lack of funding for “countries recovering from conflict or facing a situation of fragility or protracted crisis” (Steets et al., 2011, p. 25). Multiple studies (e.g. Boyce & Forman, 2010; FAO, 2010; OECD, 2010) have provided strong, evidence-based arguments that substantiate this gap, partly due to donor fatigue.
Moreover, some comprehensive evidence (e.g. Bailey, Pavanello, Elhawary, & O’Callaghan, 2009; Chandran, Jones, & Smith, 2008; CWGER, 2008; Hinds, 2015) has been found for a so-called recovery funding gap, which assumes a systematic funding gap for recovery activities. Limited funding for post-disaster recovery could impede the aspiration to “build back better” (Macaskill & Guthrie,
13 2018). This study will examine this type of gap. As humanitarian and development funding are mostly tracked and recorded separately and differently, it is hard to find conclusive evidence for a funding gap of recovery activities (Steets et al., 2011). Therefore this paper tries to contribute to this literature in order to help close this gap.
Causes and impact recovery funding gap
There are various factors causing this recovery funding gap, such as the following. First of all, overall, relief activities receive more funding than recovery. Studies (e.g. Koddenbrock & Büttner, 2009; Otto & Weingärtner, 2013) show that “the distribution of funds is strongly biased in favour of immediate (humanitarian) crisis responses” (Kocks, Wedel, Roggemann, & Roxin, 2018, p. 74). Also Telford (2012) states that appeals promoting acute emergency conditions are more likely to raise funds in comparison to those that are more mundane. As a result, raised relief funds are expected to be spent rapidly, which brings us to the next factor causing a recovery funding gap.
Also inflexible donor mechanisms play a big role in the lack of funding to finance recovery activities, preventing a smooth transition. A lot of donors split up their different types of assistance related to timing (Telford, 2012). Often donors fund the emergency response up to six months, recovery activities for six months to three years and finally finance development activities from three to ten years. This is a popular approach, as it provides a simple demarcation of different types of assistance and the corresponding institutional responsibilities. However, this administrative need to differentiate budgets in this manner is very problematic as it assumes a linear evolution and
contradicts the ‘contiguum’ model, which most donors officially accept (Steets et al., 2011). Most relief funds are not to be used for reconstruction and recovery (de Goyet, 2008) and most
development funding is not accessible to humanitarian institutions, making it hard to link short-term assistance to longer term development (Lawry-White & Schloffer, 2014). Especially in protracted crises, these inflexible funding modalities do not meet needs on the ground (Koddenbrock & Büttner, 2009). Also Lloyd-Jones (2006) states that ‘ring-fencing’3 and funding inflexibility hinders more appropriate and equitable allocation between the early and later recovery stages and the possibility of being transferred as need arises.
In the same sense, there is only a limited window of opportunity to raise funds in response to a crisis, as support drops off once the immediate relief phase has passed. Therefore, the Centre for Disaster Management (2005) advocates a sufficient flexibility/fungibility and suggests to include
3 ‘Ring-fencing’ is the “guarantee that (funds allocated for a particular purpose) will not be spent on anything
14 recovery efforts in disaster relief funding mechanisms. That way, national authorities and external actors are able to define best where to put in resources during the allocation decision process. Liu, Scheepbouwer, and Giovinazzi (2016) state that a flexible funding plan is one of the critical success factors to advance post-disaster infrastructure recovery. This plan would determine funding allocation prior to a disaster, but is flexible so it could be adapted to the actual post-disaster needs.
Another important factor in the lack of funding for recovery activities is donor fatigue. This is especially the case in countries recovering from conflict (Otto & Weingärtner, 2013; Steets et al., 2011). Otto and Weingärtner (2013) state that donor fatigue exists in cases of long-lasting crises and limited funding, because “no single actor can cover the whole range of sectors and all needs” (p. 34).
Moreover, according to Steets et al. (2011) there exists a reluctance of public institutions to fund this grey area of recovery. This reluctance would stem from two factors. First of all, recovery activities do neither meet humanitarian, nor development funding line criteria. The second factor is the fact that public funds are subject to control institutions, that try to avoid duplication and
overlapping mandates. In contexts where there is a lack of inter-department coordination and where recovery responsibilities are not clearly allocated, public institutions might be scared to be criticized when engaging in this area and are therefore cautious.
1.2.4. Research questions
Based on the abovementioned literature overview and the Malawian post-Cyclone Idai context, this paper will analyze the recovery funding gap in post-Cyclone Idai Malawi and therefore aim to answer the following research questions:
- Was there a recovery funding gap in post-Cyclone Idai Malawi?
- Which factors have influenced the recovery funding gap in post-Cyclone Idai Malawi? - What is the impact of the recovery funding gap in post-Cyclone Idai Malawi?
1.2.5. Implications
Although the international community increasingly acknowledges the importance of disaster recovery, few studies have been done on this subject (Smith & Wenger, 2007). Considering the importance of successful recovery, this paper seeks to contribute to the international literature on recovery assistance. In particular, the recovery funding gap (Steets et al., 2011) in post-Cyclone Idai Malawi will be analysed. As there have only been a few studies that provided comprehensive evidence that proves that a recovery funding gap exists, this paper tries to make a contribution to this hiatus. Furthermore, by identifying the causes of this recovery funding gap, failed recovery could be avoided in the future. Finally, with this study, the researcher hopes to provide guidance for the
15 different actors involved in disaster assistance in Malawi and aims to initiate a conversation between them.
2. Methodology
Considering the research questions and the specific focus on post-cyclone Idai Malawi, case study research appears to be a suitable methodology (Yin, 1994). This type of research is also useful as it is “ideally suited to the needs and resources of the small-scale researcher” (Blaxter, Hughes, & Tight, 2001). Case studies are nevertheless often criticized of offering little basis for generalisation
(Flyvbjerg, 2001) and therefore do not represent the world (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). However, case studies may be applicable to other situations “through conscious reflection on similarities and differences between contextual features and historical factors” (Greenwood & Levin, 2006, p. 70). In other words, the results of this case study on the recovery funding gap in post-cyclone Idai Malawi might be comparable to other disasters. Another criticism about case studies concerns the
subjectivity of the researcher (VanWynsberghe & Khan, 2007). However, as suggested by
Rueschemeyer (2003), case studies allow for a constant interplay between data and theory, which permits a better matching between the two. Moreover, when conducting case study research, it is necessary for the researcher to immerse himself “in the context to such a degree that they have opportunities to also recognize flaws in their preconceived notions” (VanWynsberghe & Khan, 2007, p. 86). This suggestion has been met, as the author of this paper was working as a Humanitarian Affairs Trainee with the United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office in Lilongwe while conducting this research. This direct involvement and relationship with actors such as the Malawian Government and UN actors could have potentially impeded the objectivity of this study. However, this
involvement established a prior understanding of the recovery processes and its funding challenges, which enabled the researcher to recognize flaws in preconceived notions, as suggested by
(VanWynsberghe & Khan, 2007). Moreover, thanks to this traineeship, the researcher could get access to key interviewees.
From June until October 2019, semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to answer the abovementioned research questions. That way, the researcher could rely on a small list of major interview questions that were written down in advance. On the other hand, there was enough space and flexibility to ask additional questions and to allow the interviewees to talk freely, which allowed to deepen the conversation and to retrieve rich information. In total 9 interviews have been
conducted with two Government officials, four UN officers, and three donor agencies (including two double-interviews). In addition, two international NGO (INGO) employees have been asked to
16 provide their insights via e-mail. The reason for this is that scheduled interviews had to be cancelled multiple times because of ongoing protests in Lilongwe following the 2019 general elections.
The interviewees were selected based on different factors, such as involvement in the early stage of recovery, in which the Department of Disaster Management Affairs in the Government of Malawi and UNDP played a big role. Furthermore, the researcher tried to interview various donors, including two agencies that seemingly did not officially fund the recovery, contrary to the emergency
response. Besides, an implementing UN agency and two INGOs were interviewed in order to have a voice of implementing organizations. The list of interviewees was not fixed. On the one hand, not all actors that the researcher intended to interview, were accessible. On the other hand, the list has been adapted based on interviewee’s recommendations and referrals, like ‘snow ball sampling’ (Goodman, 1961). Before starting each interview, respondents were informed about the goal of the research and about the fact that their data would not be shared outside this study. Furthermore, the interviewees were ensured that the interviews would be anonymous. Thereafter the respondents were invited to sign an informed consent document.
After transcribing the interviews, the data were analysed through the identification and
codification of statements that are relevant to the research questions. Afterwards, these codes were translated into themes, under which statements with common patterns were sorted. These themes can be found in the results section.
3. Results
This section presents the findings that will provide an answer to the abovementioned research questions. First of all, it will be discussed whether there existed a recovery funding gap in post-Cyclone Idai Malawi. Secondly, factors that influenced the recovery funding gap will be presented. Thereafter the impact of this gap will be discussed.
3.1. Was there a recovery funding gap?
In this section, the first research question will be addressed: Was there a recovery funding gap in post-Cyclone Idai Malawi? The official government numbers up until October 2019 appear to be clear: there is a recovery funding gap of US$ 224,5 million. However, the interviews show that this gap cannot be grasped that easily and that therefore this amount might have been inaccurate. While governments should always be responsible for where money is going to, as stated by a UNDP officer, multiple donors do not channel their recovery funding through the Malawian Government. It appears that donors rather give their money straight to UN agencies or implementing partners because of a
17 lack of trust in the government systems. As there does not exist a proper information management system within the Government that tracks these separate projects and programmes, several respondents state that the gap might be smaller than officially reported, as they too implement recovery projects. On the contrary, some of the interviewees state that this gap is probably much bigger, due to a lack of correct data of some sectors and the exclusion of incremental costs.
3.1.1. Reluctance to channel funding through Government systems
“The government should always be responsible for where money is going to. It’s their country. So they are the ones who have to shape where money is going, how priorities are being addressed”, as stated
by a UNDP officer. Moreover, it would make it easier for the Government to coordinate and track where there are any possible gaps. However, donor partners seem to be not in favour of channelling funding directly through government systems. The interviews show that a lack of trust in the
Malawian Government is a major reason for this reluctance, as it is one of the most recurring arguments for providing money straight to the UN or implementing partners.
First of all, the Cash Gate scandal plays a big role in why donors do not trust the Government of Malawi. One of the Government respondents explains that in 2013 Government officials broke into the management system and stole money from the Government accounts. The interviewee feels that donor partners are still holding grudges from this incident:
“So since that time up to today, most of our donors, they always refer to that incident. And
then we try to say: no, that was an incident that took place in that particular year. It’s not like it’s taking place every year. But they still say: no, we are really not sure.”
In the meantime, the Malawian Government has built in security systems in order to avoid such issues in the future.
Multiple donor interviewees confirm that there still exists a lot of distrust since then. Also a UNDP officer affirms this: “We still have to delink ourselves from the issue of the Cash Gate Scandal.
(…) Once we knew about the Cash Gate Scandal, most institutions don’t have trust in the Government system.” However, one donor respondent explains that this distrust goes beyond this one scandal:
“I don’t think it’s just Cash Gate. It’s the response to Cash Gate and all the systems that are in place. (…) It stems from Cash Gate, but it’s also the response and the improvement of the systems that we really need to see and change, so that risk is minimized. (…) I know their
18
budget is very tiny, but they also need to show some responsibility and accountability on that side.”
In the same spirit, a UNDP officer states the following:
“They want to see that the recipient is investing its own resources, that there is a track record of improving their own performances in terms of relief operations, recovery operations, resilience… They just want to see that the country is moving forward.”
Consequently, the interviewee believes that donors are hesitant to invest money in Malawi in general due to the uncertainty of whether their funds are spent well by the Government. This is confirmed by another UNDP employee:
“I can give you an example of Chikwawa and Nsanje. One frustration which we have, even me as a person, is the huge amount of money that’s going to that places for the past five years. When I go back to the same places to look at what impact that has had… (sighs). It’s very difficult to really tell if that money really did the right work in the best ways.”
One of the donor respondents does in fact put their funds directly through the Government systems. Nevertheless, it utilizes its own mechanisms to ensure that the resources are used in line with the project purposes. The agency acknowledges several challenges when working with the Government, such as slow action and low commitment. The interviewee estimates that those could also be reasons why donors would prefer to fund directly the UN agencies or NGOs, as delivery would take less time. However, the respondent reminds other donors to not forget their responsibility of building government capacity.
Another donor officer explains that it is difficult to invest money in the Malawian
Government due to a lack of transparency. The respondent gives an example of the limited existing budget reports. Each year, the agency conducts public management reviews in order to assess whether the Government has improved its management systems. The interviewee also tells that they build Government’s capacity by investing in public financial management and supporting the
anticorruption bureau. “You know, kind of looking at that long term, because that’s what needs to
improve in order for anything else to function (laughs)”, the donor officer adds.
Despite the abovementioned reasons of why donor agencies do not channel their money through the Malawian Government, often donors collaborate with, or at least inform the
19 Government on which programmes they are going to fund. One donor respondent explains that DoDMA subsequently talks to the corresponding district, in order to ensure that the programme fits in the existing plans and needs. Another donor interviewee also states that they always communicate which activities they are supporting. However, a Government respondent tells that they are not always informed about their partners’ activities and that “everyone is just doing what they think is
the right thing”. But even so, multiple interviewees state that the Government is not able to
coordinate all these different partner projects. This will be further explained below.
In addition, one of the NGO interviewees pleads for more funds to be channeled to NGOs, instead of investing the majority in the Government (through the World Bank) and the UN agencies, due to reasons of accountability:
“After the 2015 floods, there was little accountability on how the hundreds of millions of dollars that the World Bank gave to the Government was spent. And in fact, three years later, the funds were still not fully spent and many major projects were incomplete.”
However, the Government respondents are not in favour of this approach. The interviews show that there also exists a lot of distrust from the Government’s side towards NGOs in terms of
accountability. One of the respondents explains that NGOs do not report sufficiently on their activities. The interviewee’s colleague gives the following example of the then just ended flood response:
“We requested our partners, or the implementing partners who are implementing, saying: please, can you share with us just a summary report of the resources that you mobilized and then how you’ve utilized those resources. I’m telling you, to date, nobody, no NGO has given that report.”
He adds that when one would go check what has been implemented on the ground, it is not clear what has been actually done whit all those resources. Consequently, the respondent is surprised why donors still prefer to provide their money straight to NGOs, since a lack of transparency also exists in their systems.
Finally, a Government official remarkably suspects that donors might not want to channel their money through the Government, because of a hidden agenda to “decapacitate Government so
20
Consequences
Directly channelling funds through implementing partners brings along a couple of challenges. First of all, the Government is not able to monitor and coordinate what is being implemented, as stated by a Government official. Furthermore, another Government official fears that donors might invest in activities that are not prioritized in the recovery process and therefore do not respond to the actual needs. A UNDP officer adds that consequently, all activities and programmes become projectized:
“You have all these multiple development partners, which includes NGOs, running around with multiple projects, fragmenting the response and recovery operations. And because that’s compounded by the fact that they have low coordination capacity, so what tends to happen is that all money goes all over the place and we are not really having a strong sense of what impact we’re having on the actual recovery.”
Another UNDP interviewee states that in the long run, this could have an impact in terms of system ability, as the Government cannot improve its own systems when they are not involved in such activities.
3.1.2. Weak information management
When most funding is not going through the government systems, it is important to have a proper information management system, in order to track all of these resources and activities. However such a system is not in place in the Malawian Government. A UNDP officer makes this very clear by saying the following: “The information systems are not there. If you ask to give me a list of everyone
who’s given recovery support to DoDMA or anyone in the Government, no one will be able to provide that. No one.” Moreover, another UNDP respondent tells from his observations that every time a
disaster happens in Malawi, information flows dry up once the emergency response has finished:
“People should not just be very active in that very short period where people are dying, where we set up camps, where everyone is working hard. But once they go back to their homes, most agencies are just working on their own.” Consequently, projects funded outside the Government were not taken
into account in the officially reported numbers. Multiple interviewees therefore believe that the official recovery funding gap might not be accurate.
First of all, several donor respondents state that the PDNA exercise was not accurate and inclusive enough. The PDNA assessment was led by the Government, UNDP and the World Bank and also included relevant actors from sectors that were impacted the most. While it is a participatory process, two of the three interviewed donor partners declare that they were not consulted. One
21 donor interviewee tells that consultation only happened at high level, not connecting to programmes on the ground. As a result, the respondent did not feel completely integrated:
“I would say we are not part of it. But we do participate in the meetings, we do provide feedback if we are asked questions. But as far as the assessment is concerned, when they are going out, what they were doing and so forth, we have never been talked to. No one has ever talked to anyone as far as I’m concerned, about the PDNA. Like, we are doing an assessment, what are you doing? What is on the ground? What do you think about this? Never. It’s only in those big meetings, that is all.”
The donor officer adds that, in his opinion, the PDNA should bring together all partners in order to follow the same agenda and work as one. On the contrary, following a double-interview with a donor agency that did directly financially support the Malawian Government and co-owned the PDNA, the process was open to everyone and participatory. One of the agency’s respondents calls on the other partners to be more proactive if they want to be a part of the PDNA process. Moreover, the
respondent does not think that all donor partners were interested to be integrated in this process, as the recovery needs only focused on a couple of sectors, such as infrastructure. As this concerns the agency’s expertise, they sent a technical specialist to support the actual assessment. Also one of the Government interviewees ensured that the process was as consultative and participatory as possible.
Consequently, while a lot of existing programmes in part already addressed recovery needs, they were not taken into account when calculating the necessary costs to recover. One of the donor respondents explains in a double-interview that their existing resilience building programmes already feed into these recovery needs:
“If you think of, just generally agricultural programming that’s already existing and the different inputs that might go to farmers anyway, within existing resilience programs, are what is recovery. Maybe the timing of that and maybe it needs to be done in a little bit of a different way if there is one year a flood or if our focus needs to go into certain districts as you say, but generally it should already be there. (…) The PDNA shouldn’t just be on its own. It should be linked to what’s already happening.”
The respondent’s colleague adds: “So the money is there, the resources are there. It’s only that we
are failing to put the pieces of the funds together, I think.” Another donor partner agrees that the
22 funding gap. The respondent believes it is important to take these into account as well. One of the Government respondents acknowledges this as a key challenge and believes that there might indeed exist underreporting on ongoing programmes. His colleague notes that this is also due to the
reluctance of implementing partners to disclose information on projects that they are executing, which makes it difficult for them to coordinate. The first Government officer therefore proposes to find a way to make both donors and NGOs accountable to the Government, in order to track their activities. A UNDP officer agrees that accountability should be improved: “I think there is hope to
improve accountability on who is holding the funds and who is updating all the information and how are we using those funds by the end of the day.”
To avoid duplication, one donor partner suggests to discount existing programmes from the official recovery funding gap. One of the Government officials agrees that in the future, existing programmes need to be assessed and eventually be deducted from the demanded amount to cover the recovery requirements. However, the respondent does not think that there is duplication. Especially concerning physical projects, such as infrastructural interventions, duplications would not take place. On the contrary, the government respondent’s colleague does not agree on discounting existing resilience building programmes from the recovery funding gap, as he believes that there should be a demarcation between recovery and routine ongoing development activities.
Nevertheless, he does not give a clear reason for this argument.
Another way to avoid duplication is to develop a tool that captures all recovery activities, which would consequently allow the Government and its partners to plan and harmonize their projects. However, the Malawian Government only started to develop such information management tool in collaboration with UNDP and the UNRCO when the emergency response was wrapping up.
Once these information management issues are dealt with the Government of Malawi will be able to publish a more accurate cost estimation and consequently inform donors better.
3.1.3. Lack of data
The officially reported recovery funding gap also depends heavily on the availability of correct data. A respondent working for UNDP, co-leading the PDNA process, explains that specific sectors are
underrepresented in the PDNA due to a lack of data. The interviewee gives the following example:
“When calculating in the recovery all the damages and losses, you find that energy only had data on electricity and generation. But people who were affected, not most of them were using electricity for cooking, for lighting, under like. Recovery needs that are in the PDNA are
23
for electricity. Which means that sometimes if you don’t have adequate data, the recovery needs that go into the assessment are not appropriate for the population you’re addressing.”
While 84,5% of Malawi’s population lives in rural areas (National Statistical Office, 2018), it is especially hard to find data on which energy source households use in these areas. Besides energy, the PDNA team also struggled to find accurate data on the Environment sector. This lack of data does not only concern post-disaster, but also pre-disaster data, which hinders to properly measure the damages and costs compared to the situation before the disaster. The UNDP officer estimates that this has an impact on recovery funding, as costs are estimated too low and, according to the respondent, donors will rarely give money outside what was officially reported in the PDNA. “If you
say that your recovery needs is just 500 thousand dollars, but in reality it is 1 million dollars, it is really hard to donors to justify why should they give you more money”, the interviewee explains.
3.1.4. Exclusion of incremental recovery costs
Also incremental recovery costs were not taken into account in the official cost estimates. While the ‘building back better’ principle has been adopted in the PDNA report, a UNDP officer states that incremental costs go much further, as they also include costs to make infrastructure more climate resilient. Infrastructure has to be rebuilt using better standards than the ones used before. However, this would cost billions of dollars. The respondent explains:
“You can build back better, you can build a school better or you can rebuild this building, to make it more cut wind, resistant to our winds, rain, drainage, all that kind of stuff. But what does that cost? So the PDNA doesn’t explicitly kind of cost that out. So what tends to happen as well is in construction rehabilitation tends to focus on what the existent standards are in whatever country. And in Malawi while the standards on paper are, they’re pretty good, they don’t apply.”
The interviewee tells that these official standards are in practice often not applied, due to corruption, not using the right materials etc. Another UNDP officer agrees and adds that contractors build for profit and are consequently often building dangerous and vulnerable constructions. She fears therefore that the infrastructure that will be rebuilt after Cyclone Idai would be severely damaged again when another disaster hits the country.
24 Based on the abovementioned findings, it can be concluded that there are signs that a recovery funding gap did exist in the aftermath of Cyclone Idai in Malawi. However, the official numbers in the PDNA report were not completely accurate. Multiple donor interviewees estimate that the recovery funding gap might be lower, as most of their ongoing projects were not taken into account. On the other hand, the actual gap might be much bigger than officially reported, as there is a lack of correct data in some specific sectors and incremental recovery costs are not included in the cost figures.
3.2. Factors influencing the recovery funding gap
Knowing that there existed a recovery funding gap in post-Cyclone Idai, this section will aim to find out which factors might have had an impact on this lack of funding. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the following results are based on subjective opinions and observations of the interviewees and are therefore open to speculation.
3.2.1. Lack of understanding recovery
Following a scan within the cluster system, a UNDP officer stated that they discovered that there exists a big difference between, donor partners, NGOs and Government in the understanding of the concept of recovery. In his opinion, this might have an indirect impact on recovery funding: “My
sense is that still recovery is not well funded because it’s not well understood by bilateral donors.” The
respondent adds that it “gets lost in translation”, as recovery covers both the humanitarian and development field. This misunderstanding could be a consequence of the lack of experience in recovery, which will be further explained in section “3.2.8. Lack of capacity”.
3.2.2. High recovery cost compared to response
A NGO respondent highlights the challenge that the cost of recovery is much higher compared to the emergency response, particularly when it comes to sectors such as housing and infrastructure. A donor agency confirms this, as some of the recovery needs are to rebuild big roads, which require huge investments. However, the donor interviewee seems optimistic:
“The 200 million4 you are talking about is mostly coming from the roads. Well those are not small
investments. They’re big investments, which requires proper planning. To me it’s a gap but maybe
25
with time it will be filled because it’s a long term intervention. I’m sure that development partners are thinking about that.”
3.2.3. Non-prioritized country
The recovery funding gap might be related to Malawi’s overall standing as a non-priority country. Firstly, according to a UNDP officer, Malawi is not a prioritized Official Development Assistance (ODA)5 country. Therefore, there are very few donors in Malawi, including World Bank, USAID, Irish
Aid, DFID and EU.
“There is no way, even if you put all those together, they’re going to fill the funding gap if there’s a huge shock in Malawi, right. (…) That’s part of Malawi’s overall standing. Where’s Spain, where’s Canada, where are the other donors? They’re not here. So that itself conditions whether funding is available in Malawi.”
Also one donor agency acknowledges that Malawi receives few resources:
“But unfortunately, the resources, you know, that Malawi receives is not a huge amount. (…) The need for Malawi is huge. In a three-year cycle, it receives for the country allocation, it usually is about US$ 100 million. So that’s not much. And we’re bringing in a lot.”
Besides not being a priority country in general terms, Malawi was also not considered to be a priority after Cyclone Idai hit the country. As the disaster had a bigger impact in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the lion share of international funding went to those two countries. A UNDP officer explains:
“It depends on obviously the scale of the shock, right. The funding gap in Mozambique is in the billions, compared to here. So obviously, the funding gap, the scale in magnitude to the shock conditions what the funding gap is going to be.”
One of the NGO respondents shares this opinion. Furthermore, one of the interviewed donor agencies for instance approved US$ 100 million for Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique to finance
5 “Official development assistance (ODA) is defined by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as
government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries. The DAC adopted ODA as the “gold standard” of foreign aid in 1969 and it remains the main source of financing for development aid.” (OECD, 2020)
26 recovery activities, of which only US$ 22 million went to Malawi. Another donor agency also stated that these competing needs have an impact on the recovery funding gap in Malawi:
“And definitely, people focused more on where the needs are highest and more immediate.”
Interviewer: “Also *donor agency*?”
“Well, *donor agency* is everywhere, and you know, we are global, we did not just look at Cyclone Idai. We also looked at global, at the Middle East, this war there. We are everywhere, you know. So resources are never enough. So, it’s like they’re split everywhere. (…) Probably even in the eyes of the donors when you look at global situations they also look at where it is more severe compared to where it is less severe. And when you look at Cyclone Idai in the region, probably Mozambique was more severe and even on news they showed more Mozambique, so their case was more elevated to the higher level such that it drew more donor attention.”
3.2.4. Lack of media attention
Another factor that might have had an impact in raising funds for recovery activities is a lack of media attention. According to multiple interviewees, international media mostly covered the situation in Mozambique when reporting on the impact of Cyclone Idai, because it had to deal with the largest impact. An interviewed donor agencie estimates that this elevated media coverage drew more donor attention to that country. UNDP learned from colleagues in Mozambique and Zimbabwe that they received the major part of international funding. Also a government official believes that this has impacted recovery funding in Malawi. Interestingly, he nuanced the number of deaths in
Mozambique reported by the media:
“All those bodies that were discovered in Mozambique, they were not all Mozambiquans. Some of them were people that were washed away in Zimbabwe, some even in Malawi. So I think Mozambique, because of that level of impact, that’s what I think drew more attention in the media, unlike Malawi.”
Besides media attention drawn to neighbouring countries, media attention decreased after relief activities were wrapping up. The UNDP early recovery advisor explains:
“Normally the response comes with so much energy. (…) It is coupled with the fact that media attention that the response phase and emergency phase is made with. It is also an added
27
source of energy. Everyone knows that the spotlight is on you, international attention is on you. (…) But that is not so much the case, with the transition to recovery. Which is a bit more stable, steady and long term. (…) So that’s why it’s always important to capitalize on it, take advantage of that moment.
She further explains that media attention could raise donor awareness and consequently lead to donations. It is therefore critical to keep the media attention on recovery, and “keep the momentum
really high”, because “the bigger work just begins”. Due to this lack of media attention during the
emergency response, it is hard to retain the international attention in the transition to recovery:
“Even more in the case of Malawi that is trailing behind a bigger humanitarian emergency response right next door. The tendency is just to forget it and just leave it to oblivion”.
Furthermore, it was mentioned that the Malawian Government does not know how to engage international media. A UNDP official clarifies: “They get overrun, they’re led by the story rather than
leading the story on what we’re doing.” (…) They come with kind of a shopping list, and they’re not saying: okay, we’re doing this, we need more money for this activity.” The interviewed Government
officials agree that media engagement is important, but this requires resources, which they do not have.
3.2.5. Unfortunate timing
In this section, different factors concerning bad timing that could have possibly have an impact on the recovery funding gap will be discussed.
Holiday period
The recovery funding gap could have been impacted by the unfortunate timing that funds were supposed to flow in, namely starting from July 2019. The early recovery advisor explained how this timing have had an influence:
“Most people are on vacation. People are usually coming back in September. So July and August are usually quiet months. In the development and humanitarian world, usually quiet. (…) Maybe in September, the momentum for recovery will pick up. But for now, no, it’s affecting it. There’s no smooth transition.”
28 However, by September, even October 2019 the momentum has not yet picked up again.
Interruption by another disaster
Another example of unfortunate timing which could have impacted the recovery resource mobilization is the interruption by another disaster. As Malawi is very vulnerable to natural disasters and consequently faces one shock after the other, chances are high that recovery processes get interrupted by another disaster. As a consequence, recovery frameworks and plans get outdated very quickly and also the momentum to raise funding for recovery activities is lost, as stated by a UNDP respondent. That is what happened in post-Cyclone Idai Malawi. While the country was still transitioning to recovery, in September it started preparing and raising funds for a drought in the fall of 2019. According to the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC, 2019), the drought would push 1,1 million Malawians into food insecurity. As recovery plans keep getting underfunded and outdated, “households are in a constant state of recovery”, as told by a UNDP officer. A
Government official wishes that the recovery had started in June/July 2019, so that a couple of projects that were eventually included in the drought response plan, could have been dealt with already. Consequently, partners proposed to implement response and recovery projects
simultaneously, with the same funding, which is not ideal, according to the Government official, as the drought emergency response should mainly focus on lifesaving interventions.
Late finalization National Disaster Recovery Framework
Finally, another timing aspect that might have had an impact is the belated finalization of the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), which was launched not until 20th October 2019.
However, a Government official tells that the Framework was supposed to be ready by 30th June
2019 in order to start resource mobilization in July to kickstart most of the recovery interventions. The respondent estimates that because of the late finalization of the NDRF, partners did not know which interventions the Government wanted to implements. He thinks that that partners who did not have existing projects were waiting for the Framework to invest and implement. Another Government officer acknowledges this issue of conducting needs assessments in a timely manner.
3.2.6. Political instability and interfering politics
Political instability
On 21th May 2019, national elections were held in Malawi to elect the president (Andsen, 2018). The incumbent president Peter Mutharika of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won a second term. Both losing candidates alleged that the results were marred by fraud. As a consequence, the case
29 was brought to court. Moreover, as it was suspected that the election results were mismanaged, the Human Rights Defender Coalition (HRDC), an alliance of local human rights organizations, has called for the resignation of the Malawi Electoral Commission’s (MEC) chair, Jane Ansah. This resulted in a series of protests during the months following the elections. Demonstrations were organized in multiple cities, such as Blantyre and Mzuzu, but they have been particularly active in Lilongwe. Several interviewees state that these protests and the corresponding uncertain political climate have had an impact on the recovery funding gap in post-Cyclone Idai Malawi.
First of all, this political instability led to a lot of uncertainty within the Malawian
Government. For example, the UNDP early recovery advisor told she had to cancel a workshop with DoDMA on transitioning to recovery, because two officials were out of the country. However, she believed the workshop could continue anyway, but no government official wanted to take such decisions, they were being very careful to support the recovery process. The reason for this is that rumours existed that many civil servants might lose their job if the incumbent president would lose the court case: “So it has really affected this. And I fear that it would slow down the transition
definitely and even the recovery phase would not pick up as quickly as we would want until people feel more comfortable in their jobs.”
Furthermore, the demonstrations posed a challenge to the continuity of everyday work. Also the researcher of this paper observed multiple times UN staff being sent home and meetings being cancelled because of security reasons. This could have had an indirect impact on the management and raising of recovery funding.
A government official estimates that another impact of the political instability might be that donor partners could have been instructed to await how the Government will handle the situation. However, this is only speculation, as the interviewee could not give an example of such a partner:
“But I think silently, maybe they have just pulled a little bit back and then they’re just watching, seeing how we’re going to manage. But we don’t have a partner who actually said that. So we can just speculate.” Another government official also thinks that donors might wait to fund big recovery
projects because of the unstable environment.
Moreover, a government official stated in October 2019 that they still have not recovered from their expenditure on the national elections. As a consequence, Government was not able to commit to inject a lot of resources. However, another government respondent rejects the statement that there would be less funding for recovery activities due to the election expenditure. The reason for this is the fact that the Department of Disaster Management Affairs received in January 2019 100 percent of the requested funding of the national Government. Nevertheless, as a major disaster was not foreseen by that time, the amount eventually did not cover most of the recovery costs. In
