Israel and Palestine : the construction of a conflict : a rhetoric analysis of the Israeli construction of a zero-sum game attitude in the conflict with Palestine in Israel's UN speeches

Israel and Palestine: the

construction of a conflict

______________________________________________________________________

A rhetoric analysis of the Israeli construction of a zero-sum game

attitude in the conflict with Palestine in Israel’s UN speeches.

By: Dennis van Velzen

Student no.: 10246894

Thesis Supervisor: V. Matthies-Boon

Second reader: D. Bouris

Master: Political Science: International Relations track

Course: Researching the Middle East: Power, Politics and Change

Table of contents

1. Introduction

Conflict has been at the center of the study of International Relations since it has developed as an object of scientific interest, and in particular, though not exclusively, for realist scholars (Walt, 1998: 30). And still, even though the field has widened, the study of conflict takes a prominent place in this field. One of these conflicts is that between Israel and Palestine. Realist scholars assume that conflict between actors is zero-sum, in other words, their gain is another actor’s loss, and vice versa. The conflict between Israel and Palestine can shed light on this assumption. This dissertation argues that Israel constructs a zero-sum game attitude with regard to the conflict with Palestine. Furthermore, it argues that realist scholars have to pay more attention to the concept of identity when studying conflict.

The aim of this research then, is twofold. First, it aims to show that realist scholars, when studying conflict, need to look more closely to the concept of identity, and hence, constructivist concepts. Bridging the gap between realism and constructivism is now a new exercise. Adler (1997) tries to bridge the gap between realism and constructivism by arguing that what we interpret to be social facts are social facts that exists in the world, thereby bringing constructivism closer to realism (Adler, 1997: 327). Jackson et al (2004) claim that there can be a ‘constructivist realism’, a realist approach that takes the role of norms and ideas seriously as objects of analysis (Jackson et

al, 2004: 338). Sørensen (2008) tries to bridge this divide because, in his eyes, both realism and

constructivism in themselves are not able to examine both the material and ideational forces that shape the world. Therefore, ‘analytical eclecticism’ is necessary (Sørensen, 2008: 6). This thesis adds to that literature using a specific conflict that shows that realist scholars ought to incorporate identity as a distinct object of analysis.

Second, this thesis aims to give us a deeper understanding of the political reality driving Israel in its UN speeches, and the way Israel presents her version of this conflict to the world.

The UN speeches will be analyzed by doing a rhetoric analysis, which allows me to critically interpret the words of the Israeli representative. This will lead to the uncovering of the rhetoric being used, and showing that Israel is in fact constructing a realist version of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, while at the same time showing that realist scholars ought to pay a closer look to the constructivist related concept of identity when aiming to gain a better understanding of conflict, in this case, the conflict between Israel and Palestine.

These two aims lead to the following main question: To what extent does the Israeli

government frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a zero-sum game in its UN speeches?

This research thesis has a scientific relevance. First, even though there has been a lot of academic attention for this conflict over the last 60 years, Israel’s position at the UN deserves a closer look. The fact that Israel uses the UN to bring across a message in which there is ‘constructed realism’, already shows that realist scholars underestimate the role of international organizations, and should pay more attention to this.

Second, realist scholars ought to pay more attention to the constructivist conception of identity when studying conflict. Although there have been examples of scholars trying to find middle ground between realism, liberalism and constructivism, (Adler, 1997; Mercer, 1995; Ruggie: 1993; Sørensen, 2008; Jackson et al, 2004), this has been a theoretical exercise. This thesis adds an empirical study on constructivist grounds to argue that realism is in need of the incorporation of identity as an object of causality. It does so by choosing a conflict that has been described as intractable, and therefore, fits very well within the realist framework. Therefore, this thesis is not only applying realism, but also critiques it with the goal of developing the realist school of thought.

The societal relevance draws from other sources, and is compliant with the second aim of this thesis. A better understanding of the political realities guiding the primary actors in the conflict, Israel and Palestine, is necessary to develop feasible policy options to bring peace closer. This thesis does not aim to develop this strategy, but does give insight in the political realities guiding one of the primary actors, Israel. It is highly relevant to have a sufficient understanding of Israel's version of the conflict, as it guides Israel’s leaders in her role as party to the conflict. Knowing to what extent Israel, in het UN speeches, constructs this conflict as a zero-sum game is relevant, since it effects the strategies that can be undertaken to achieve a feasible solution to the conflict.

The object of study, the ten most recent Israeli UN speeches, will be subjected to a rhetoric analysis. This constructivist approach aims to uncover the meaning behind the rhetoric in the UN speeches. In short, rhetoric analysis is the study of language, and how that language is used for persuasion (Selzer, 2004: 280). This methodology enables this thesis to engage in a critical examination of Israel’s rhetoric, and examining to what extent Israel creates a zero-sum game.

The UN speeches have been chosen as the subject of analysis because the United Nations are the institution that seeks to ensure human security (Hultman et al, 2013: 875). Therefore, it is involved in conflict resolution and peace keeping missions. The UN was and is an active actor in the region, and also within Israeli conflicts. For example, the United Nations have negotiated a peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors in 1948, just short after Israel was formally established. The United Nations also sent peace-keeping missions in the conflict between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights, doing a relatively successful job (Goulding, 1993: 452-453). So, the United Nations play a role in the conflict, or at least, have the ability to play a role in the conflict, and also have done so in the specific context of the conflict between Israel and Palestine.

Furthermore, the speeches at the United Nations are relevant because it is a place, or the place, where international affairs are spoken about, and therefore also the place where actors can influence how the world sees certain international affairs, and in this case, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. This is the place where international norms can be discussed, and are also created and altered, and where frames can alter the opinion of states (Morgan, 2004: 487). Furthermore, Morgan argues, that especially affairs which are at the normative core of the United Nations, such

as self-determination for peoples in the world, there is opportunity to alter the opinions of other states and actors (Morgan, 2004: 497).

Before moving on to the order of this thesis, a short overview of the (for this thesis relevant parts of the) conflict between Israel and Palestine will be given. This to ensure that the analysis can be placed in a context, since this thesis does not study the empirical reality of the conflict, but only the Israeli UN speeches. Of course, there will be shortcomings to this description, since the conflict is highly contested, and are dissertations in it selves. Although most of the world, represented at the United Nations, believes in a two-state solution (Falah, 2005: 1342), whereby a sovereign Palestinian state co-exists next to Israel, the conflict has not yet been resolved. The influx of Jewish immigrants during the 20th century, and the building of settlements, social institutions and in the end, a state, combined with Palestinian attempts to create a state, have led to conflict (Kelman, 1999: 584). Zionism, the Jewish story of the foundational myth, also plays a role in this conflict. In short, Zionist thought relies on the idea that the Palestinian lands are historical lands of the Jewish people, where they will have to return to one day. In the theoretical framework the role of Zionism and its relation to realism will me more closely examined. After the formal creation of the State of Israel in 1948, large parts of the Palestinian population became Israeli citizens, while others were not and continue to live in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and a third part, the diaspora, lives in various parts of the world, but mainly in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (Kelman, 1999: 585). This also shaped the role of Zionism, since part of their goals, the creation of a nation-state, had been accomplished.

Soon after the creation of that state, the Arab-Israeli war started. From an Israeli point of view, this was caused by the creation of a Jewish state. However, according to Slater, it has more to do with inter-Arab rivalries, the expulsion of Palestinians and control over borders, especially between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights (Slater, 2002: 82-83).

For Israel, the conflict with the Palestinians is not the only threat they face. Iran is by far the most vocal, hostile actor towards Israel (Menashri, 2006: 110). Iran has never recognized the territory of Israel to be theirs, and claims it belongs to the Palestinians (Menashri, 2006: 110). Furthermore, Iran has supported Palestinians Islamist movements against Israel (Menashri, 2006: 112). Furthermore, there are conflicts with other powers in the region as well. This leads to a situation where Israel has a need for a strong defense policy. As noted above, also the conflict with Syria has been ongoing for decades, and is still ongoing, especially concerning the Golan Height. A third threat that Israel faces is Saudi Arabia. The country has no trade or communication ties with Israel, and has threatened the country with war several times (Prados and Blanchard, 2007: 15-16). These ongoing regional conflicts are important because they also shape the Israeli view on the world. Both sides influence each other, and the way Israel constructs the conflict with Palestine is influence by, and influences, other regional conflict. However, this thesis will concentrate on the

conflict between Israel and Palestine, since these other topics are dissertations in themselves. Having given an overview of the conflict, this thesis will proceed with the structure of this thesis.

The structure of the thesis is as follows. The main question, to what extent Israel frames the conflict with Palestine as a zero-sum game in its UN speeches, In the theoretical framework, a note is given on the audience of the speeches, and their implications for the content of the speeches. Afterwards, both the content and epistemology of realism and constructivism will be explained. Subsequently, a short overview of the critiques on realism, and their consequences for policy making will be given. Third, the concepts that are related to the specific case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be conceptualized, hence providing the researcher with the theoretical knowledge necessary to conduct the rhetoric analysis. Taken together, these paragraphs will show the debate in which this thesis is placed, and the relation between this constructivist work and the realist school of thought, and the concepts necessary to analyze the UN speeches.

This analysis will be explained in the chapter on methodology. First, this will go into the nature of the data, followed by the introduction of discourse, frame and rhetoric analysis, and a motivation of the choice to use rhetoric analysis as the research methodology. Afterwards, a detailed description of how the analysis has been conducted will be given, and finishing with the limitations that this type of research brings with it. This chapter provides the reader with the knowledge of the methodology, and ensures that this thesis can argue that Israel creates a zero-sum game, and that realist scholars ought yo pay more attention to identity.

The third chapter will provide the reader with the analysis of the speeches. This starts with the theme on the role of identity in Israel’s UN speeches, and its connection to territory, followed by the theme on victimhood. The third theme will go into the role of international organizations, in relation to realism. The fourth theme is about the role of the West, and the fifth is about the blaming

of other countries for their role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All five of the analyses will be

closed off giving a sub conclusion. These will answer parts of the main question, and provide the empirical evidence needed to argue to what extent Israel creates a zero-sum game in the conflict with Palestine.

The chapter on the conclusion will bring these sub conclusions together, arguing that Israel, in its UN speeches creates a zero-sum game attitude, which influences the policy options that can be undertaken to work towards a feasible solution for both parties. Second, it will argue that realist scholars studying conflict need to pay more attention to the concept of identity, in order to increase the relevance of their work. Finally, the thesis will close off by giving some points of discussion and for future research on this topic.

2. Theoretical framework

In order to examine to what extent the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is constructed as a zero-sum game, it is first necessary to understand what the possible audiences of the speeches are. Secondly, this thesis will clarify the school of realism, on both its position in the study of international relations, as on its epistemological position, as well as on the epistemology of constructivism. After that, this thesis will go into the critiques on the realist school of thought, and deal with the consequences that a realist vision has for policymaking. The last part of this chapter will then cover identity construction within the realist/constructivist debate and identity construction within the Israeli context.

Audience


First, it is important to identify who the audience of the speeches is, to be able to have a better understanding of why certain rhetoric is being used. For politicians, it is likely that the speaking actor is addressing multiple audiences at the same time, within the same speech (Meyers, 1999: 55). When it comes to audiences, we can define two types; domestic and international. When addressing the UN, which is a public speech, the Israeli representative makes itself accountable to at least a part of the Israeli public, since the statement that Israel is a democracy has been a contested one, among others since the democratic rights that citizens enjoy are to a large extent based on being Jewish (Kimmerling, 1999: 349). However, there is a public that can hold its politicians accountable for what they say, even though this might not be the entire population of Israel. When publicly issuing statements on international politics, a democratic state representative ties its hands to this outcome, thereby strengthening its position on the international level (Baum, 2004: 604). On the other hand, when state leaders talk ‘cheap talk’, making public foreign policy statements while not actually pursuing them, leaders lose credibility, and therefore they might suffer electoral harm come the next election (Smith, 1998: 623). This mechanism leads to more credibility for state leaders, since their international colleagues know that they will not easily make public foreign policy statements on which they will not act.

So, the addressing of two different audiences serves two different goals. On the one hand, the domestic audience is addressed to serve domestic interests, i.e., re-election, and is furthermore being used to show that one’s promises, threats and policy positions are more credible, by making them in public instead of using more confidential, diplomatic channels. Second, it serves an international goal, namely to persuade other countries to adopt their version of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and their stance on how to end this conflict. So, we can assume, based on the theory on this subject, that the rhetoric being used in these speeches serves a strategic goal, and is not just randomly selected, even though it is still not possible to know what the actor’s intentions are.

Realism

Realism as a paradigm in International Relations dates back to the 15th century Italian scholar Niccolò Machiavelli. However, realism as an intellectual approach started to grow after the First World War (Donnelly, 2000: 1). It grew as a reaction to both the destruction of two World Wars, and the idealism behind the liberalist school of thought that, according to its realist critics, mainly looked at how they wanted the world to be, instead of studying the world as it actually was (Moravscik, 1997: 514). Realism has, especially in the United States, been the leading school of thought within International Relations studies, but endured criticism after the end of the Cold War, when the bipolar system broke down and was replaced by a more multipolar system (Waltz, 2000: 7; Pashakhanlou, 2014: 295). Leading realists such as Waltz and Mearsheimer have been criticized, amongst other elements, for not being able to predict international outcomes in a changing political environment (Pashakhanlou, 2014: 305).

Legro and Moravscik start their inquiry into realism by stating that realism is not just one theory, but a family of theories (Legro and Moravscik, 1999: 9). They try to give the most basic set of core assumptions, that distinct the paradigm of realism from the paradigms of liberalism and institutionalism (Legro and Moravscik, 1999: 10). While there are many different forms of realism, such as offensive realism, defensive realism and neorealism, this thesis will not explain all these different strands of realism, since they fall outside the scope of this thesis, but stick to the ‘basic’ elements of realism.

Paradoxically, as we will see in the following paragraphs, several elements that constitute the idea of a zero-sum game from the Israeli perspective, such as Zionism and Israeli identity, have a constructivist foundation, since constructivism is concerned with the influence of ideas, norms and identity on interest formation (Adler, 1997: 329). Therefore this thesis has incorporated the constructivist critique on realism, and in the rhetoric analysis this thesis looks at the concept of identity, since this is a constituting factor of the Israeli perception of the conflict as a zero-sum game.

Three core assumptions follow from the analysis of Legro and Moravscik. First, the authors see the state as acting unitarily and rationally (Legro and Moravscik, 1999: 12). This means that each sovereign entity is capable of undertaking unitary action. It logically follows that the interaction between these states is the main focus of research (Jackson and Sørensen, 2010: 93). There are various reasons why scholars of IR use this simplification. First, some argue that in the end, it is the head of state (or the prime minister) that decides on foreign policy objectives, and therefore what he or she does can be seen as what the state does. Second, some argue that even though it is a group of actors that decides foreign policy, their interests are so close to each other, that they might as well act as one (Hug, 1999: 479). Therefore, the assumption is that the state is a unitary actor. What happens at the domestic level is less relevant to realist scholars.

When saying that actors are rational, it means that the actors involved identify a certain set of potential actions to be undertaken, the causal structure of the situation that determines the outcomes of the actions, and a ranking of these outcomes according to which one leads to the best possible outcomes (Kahler, 1998: 923). Also Kenneth Waltz, a leading neorealist, assumes that states act rational. He argues that states calculate their behavior based on the information of the capabilities of other states in the international system, and that this changes the outcomes (Waltz, 1990: 30). Furthermore, actors are assumed to act out of self-interest, and, at a minimum seek for self-preservation, and at a maximum seeking for universal domination (Mearsheimer, 1994: 9-10). States act in their self-interest and can make mistakes, but do not act randomly (Fortna, 2003: 340).

Second, the paradigm of realism assumes that the interests of the actors involved are conflictual (Legro and Moravscik, 1999: 14). Conflict is inevitable, since all men strive for power and their own self-interest (Donnelly, 2000: 10). Following from this pessimistic view on the human nature, states, will also be conflictual, since they are made up of people that all strive for self-interests. States have different interests, that cannot all be met at the same time Therefore, there will always be conflict between states. Since living in a positive-sum world would not differentiate realism from liberalism or institutionalism, assuming that the world is a zero-sum game, motivating states to search for power at the cost of others, becomes viable (Legro and Moravscik, 1999: 15). States will always compete for scarce goods, such as land, oil or control over trade routes. This is where the concept of the zero-sum game comes in. Actors in the international system believe that one actor’s gain is the other actor’s loss.

The third core assumption is about the international structure in which states function. Realists believe that the international system is characterized by anarchy (Donnelly, 2000: 11). There are no higher authorities than the state, which means that states themselves have to create order, by making agreements and treaties, but mainly based on coercive power relations (Donnelly, 2000: 82).

The capabilities of states are determined by material conditions. This means that bargaining outcomes are a reflection of a state’s material power (Legro and Moravscik, 1999: 17). It is not institutions or ideology that determine power relations, but material conditions. Mearsheimer (1994) argues that international institutions are not able to reduce the number and intensity of violent conflict in the world, and therefore do not make a difference (Mearsheimer, 1994: 6). Since one state’s material gain inevitably has to be another state’s material loss, because relations between actors are seen as a zero-sum game (since there are no third parties to be exploited), the international system will always see fights over material resources.

Jackson and Sørensen identify similar core assumptions in realism (Jackson and Sørensen, 2010: 58), but they also add to that the most important objectives of realism. This can also be deducted from the three core assumptions that have been described above. Realists are

mostly concerned about national security and state survival (Jackson and Sørensen, 2010: 58). The idea of a zero-sum game and an anarchic world system with little to no role for international institutions leads to a world where states always remain in insecurity, since gains for other states pose a direct threat to one’s own security.

In conclusion, realist scholars, on the level of international relations, focus on states that are distrustful towards other states, that seek to maximize their own profits (including their own security), and generally believe that gains for other actors constitute their own position in the international arena to be affected by that, which is conceptualized as a zero-sum game. The next paragraph will go into the epistemological side of realism, and place the epistemological approach of constructivism opposite.

The epistemology of realism and constructivism

Where realism has its roots in the positivist, natural sciences, believing that there is a world that exists objectively outside of our own interpretation, constructivists believe that, as the name already states, the world as we see it is constructed (Oulasvirta et al, 2005: 196). Constructivism on a meta level is comparable to rationalism (Adler, 2013: 113), which views the world in the way of the natural sciences. Realism and constructivism have distinct epistemological roots (Checkel, 1998: 325-326). What separates these two approaches is the view that biological or natural structures are given meaning by the social context in which they exist. Carr, one of the founding fathers of realism, already stated that in the social sciences, the role of the observer cannot be separated from the object of observation (Carr, 1946: 4). Second, identity or interest formation is a reciprocal process between structure and agency, allowing social scientists to open up the ‘black box’ that realists assume to contain the unchanging identities and preferences of actors (Checkel, 1998: 326).

In addition, Wendt argues that the ignorance of realist scholars to identity and interest formation has negative consequences (Wendt, 1992: 392). This is caused by the assumption of self-interest, which is the basic driver of action for states, and all actors in general. States that do not act this way will be overruled by others; there is no need to look at anything else. Self-interest has become a self-explanatory factor that drives behavior, other behavioral concepts are of little importance (Wendt, 1992: 392). Furthermore, realism takes the nature of the state, and of individuals as being self-evident, needing no explanation, but assuming these to be true (Wendt, 1987: 340). According to Wendt, the identity, or nature of the state is created through interaction with other actors, and cannot be fixed beforehand. This leads to his understanding that anarchy in the international system does not necessarily lead to conflict (Wendt, 1992: 400). Also, not only profit-maximizing assumptions are made, what profit is, is usually filled in as well, being power, wealth or survival (Checkel, 1998: 327). This causes realist scholars not to examine how concepts such as identity and interests are formed, and therefore to overlook the influence that these

concepts have on the behavior of actors, and in particular state behavior in the international system.

For the research that constructivist scholars conduct in international relations, they focus more on the role of the observer, as observers can have different interpretations of the same research object. Where this would be a problem for realists, since they, in general, do not believe in different interpretations, for constructivists it is not. Because of this, constructivist scholars tend to look for other elements when conducting their research. As a theoretical and empirical perspective, constructivism has a focus on the role of identity, norms and beliefs as shapers of human behavior, and the influence these concepts have on interest formation and modes of governing (Adler, 2013: 114). For this research, a constructivist approach allows us to go into rhetoric, looking for the construction of realism, and more specifically, the construction of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a zero-sum game.

However, before doing so, the next paragraph identifies the critiques on realism, followed by the concepts that are relevant for the analysis of Israel’s UN speeches.

Critiques and policy-making consequences

Two liberalist critics of realism are Keohane and Krasner. They argue that realists wrongfully ignore the role of international regimes, and the international institutions that help shape these. This is important because Israel does participate in the UN, which is the topic of this thesis, and, as shown in the introduction, is already one of the critiques on realist scholars.

According to Keohane, the number of international organizations grew exponentially after the Second World War (Keohane, 1998: 84). He gives the example of growing economic interdependence, and the need to manage that led to the growth of international regimes, with their own sets of rules and practices, and their own body of law (Keohane, 1998: 85). Krasner defines international regimes as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making

procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner, 1982: 186). These international regimes are capable of promoting trust as a

norm; and as a consequence changing states’ aim to maximize their interest in the short-term, to more beneficial goals in the long term (Krasner, 1982: 187). International regimes, therefore, are capable of changing the attitudes of the actors in the system. This is one of their main critiques on realism, the fact that realists assume that states have fixed preferences, which, according to both Keohane and Krasner, can be altered by norms and rules through international institutions, but also on the fact that realists assume that everything that happens outside of the state is irrelevant.

Not taking international institutions and the role they play in shaping norms and fostering compliance seriously has its policy implications. Since international relations are always seen as a zero-sum fight between unitary actors over material resources, international institutions do not play a major role. States are always aiming at securing more resources at the expense of others, in

order to secure the survival of the state (Jackson and Sørensen, 2010: 59). Therefore, the international system is anarchic, and the role that international institutions can play in conflict resolution will not be valued as much as it might be. Hansen and Nemeth, for example, identified some key success factors for international organizations when it comes to the meditation of interstate conflicts. They argue that more institutionalized organizations with more democratic members tend to be more effective in mediating conflicts between states (Hansen and Nemeth, 2008: 314). Although the authors do not find a direct link between every international organization and the power to successfully mediate between states in conflict, and do not reach as far-fetching as liberal peace theory authors do, they do stress that international organization are able to make a difference when it comes to mediating interstate conflict.

Fortna (2003), follows a similar logic to Hansen and Nemeth, but takes a different starting point. She argues that, in order to achieve a durable peace, cease-fire agreements need to function the way they are supposed to do: by raising the costs of non-compliance, to reassure both actors that the other actor will not strike first (Fortna, 2003: 342). However, to ensure that this actually happens, Fortna argues that the involvement of international organizations increases the audience costs that actors ‘pay’ when they break the ceasefire agreement. These are the costs that come into play because of losing international support. Furthermore, the involvement of a third party leads to another actor being committed to the ceasefire agreement, and taking up some of the costs of a possible defection by one of the actors involved (Fortna, 2003: 343). In short, the lack of focus on international organizations as relevant actors, able to contribute in a positive way to conflict resolution, narrows down the policy options that can be undertaken. However, conflicting parties, in this case Israel and the Palestinians, are still able to make use of a third state party, serving as mediator. This option is still on the table if we assume that Israel holds a realist view of the world.

Maoz (1999) shows that third party communications can have a positive effect on policy preferences from parties in conflict. He researches American public appeals made to the Israeli public, and the effect they have on making the Israeli public more open to making concessions to the Palestinians (Maoz, 1999: 12). He shows that the same concessions made by the side of the US and by the side of the Palestinians were more favorably received by the Israelis when they came from the Americans than when they came from the Palestinians (Maoz, 1999: 20). By that, he shows that third parties can change policy preferences, and that can have a positive effect on making concessions towards, in this case, the Palestinians. This shows that third-party involvement can have a positive effect on conflict resolution.

However, even this option of having a third state party act as mediator, might not succeed if the actors involved have a realist view of the world. When seeing the world as a zero-sum game, both the actors involved in the conflict might be reluctant to have a third party enter, since there will be little reason to trust that actor. Having a realist view of the world, as we have seen before,

causes states to mistrust each other, since they are first and foremost in it for their own gains, and therefore cannot act as a neutral mediator between two conflicting parties. So even the possibility of a third state party might not be feasible when it comes to mediating in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Even when a third state party has not interest in how peace is achieved, but just the fact that peace is achieved will still not be trusted to the fullest extent, since in the realist view, states have little trust in other actors. However, as Maoz argued, third party influence might have a positive effect on the ability to make concessions. Nevertheless, a realist outlook from the Israeli government might make them reluctant to incorporate them in a peace process as a mediator, leaving third parties only the option to influence Israeli society, instead of working with the Israeli government.

This is related to the work of Ross and Ward (1995) who show that concessions made from the opposing actor in a conflict are in general being devaluated when compared to the same concession made by a third, neutral party (Ross, 1995: 28). This phenomenon is called reactive devaluation. Actors will interpret these concessions from their opponent with mistrust, and thereby making it seem less advantageous to themselves, making them less willing to appreciate the concession on its own value, and to make concessions themselves (Ross, 1995: 39). Ross, in his conclusion, states that ‘third parties can play a useful role in neutralizing the mechanisms that

underlie reaction devaluation and its potentially negative consequences’ (Ross, 1995: 41). Since

this is a psychological, and not a strategic act, third parties can point out this mechanism, making parties aware of it, and also help guide the concession making process.

So, a realist outlook, and thus not taking the role that third parties can play in conflict resolution seriously, has influences on the amount of trust and cooperation that can be fostered between adversaries. Furthermore, it has a negative influence on the reception of concessions, even when they are genuine, they might still not be perceived that way, and therefore will not contribute to the resolution of the conflict.

As the analysis will show, Israel, in its UN speeches, is in fact not ignoring what happens at the level of international institutions. The fact that Israel is a member-state of the UN, and participates in the annual General Assembly, shows that according to Israel, the UN is not an irrelevant actor. The analysis will show that Israel does think that international institutions, in this case, the UN, can influence international outcomes, but that this influence might be negative. Participating, in this case, implies that Israel intends to counter this negative influence that they perceive the UN to have.

Another strand of criticism of the realist school of thought is the idea of international relations as a zero-sum game. Haas (1980) argues that due to more and more complex (economic) interdependence between states, fighting has almost become obsolete (Haas, 1980: 358). He builds upon international regime theory to argue for his position. Haas argues that due to developments that have little relation to state power, the goals of states might change, and with

that the opportunity costs, which are the costs (material or immaterial) that come with change (Fearon, 1998: 286), of achieving those goals. Power, then, is not such a big explanatory factor anymore when it comes to setting and achieving certain goals (Haas, 1980: 359). Goals change all the time, and countries are more and more dependent on each other, and will therefore fight less, since they are in need of each other. Conflict can arise, then, when the benefits of the interdependence are being felt as unequal, or when one of the actors has less to lose from a break of alliance than the other actor (Haas, 1980: 361). Furthermore, the concept of issue-linkage makes states more willing to negotiate, even though the more powerful actors in the negotiating game might not be so inclined to negotiate on a certain topic, but by linking it to other issues, might now be more willing to negotiate on this issue (Haas, 1980: 372). Therefore, enforcing the idea of political life as a zero-sum game creates a situation in which cooperation is not seen as useful or even possible, which has certain implications for policy making.

Another strand of criticism is directed at the assumption of the state as a unitary actor. Moravscik (1997), for example, does not even see the state as an actor, and emphasizes the role of societal interests and roles as the shaping factors of state preferences (Moravscik, 1997: 516-517). The state, in contradiction with realism, is not an actor, but an institution that represents a part of the interests of domestic society. Therefore, the preferences of the state may change, following changes in domestic preferences, or different winners in the domestic struggle over influence on state policies (Moravscik, 1997: 517).

Also, Zakaria criticizes the assumption that the state is a unitary actor. The focus on the state as a unitary actor ignores everything that happens at the domestic level (Zakaria, 1992: 178). This emphasis on what happens at the domestic level comes from the idea that groups within societies are in general more inclined to cooperate peacefully with other groups that do not function at the state level. Liberalists in general have a more positive view on human nature, especially on the question whether cooperation is possible, while realists tend to have a more pessimistic view on human nature (Jackson and Sørensen, 2010: 99). Zakaria takes on a different approach then Moravscik, but both end up arguing that the focus on the state as a unitary actor leaves out important processes that influence state behavior.

The focus on the state as unitary and sovereign has consequences for policy-making. When realists focus solely on what happens at the state level, a realist perspective on a conflict will lead to actors not focusing on what happens within a state, where divisions might not be as big as they are on the level of states as a whole. As argued before, threats can be used strategically to achieve other goals, so these threats may be constructed or used at the state level, but might not be, a priori, experienced that way at the domestic level. In other words, divisions between states might be larger than divisions between groups of people at the domestic level, or in the case of the Israeli/Palestine conflict, between groups of Israeli and Palestinian civilians.

Related to the focus on the state as the primary unit of analysis, Donnelly argues that anarchy is not a dichotomous variable, but a continuous variable (Donnelly, 2000: 92). Saying that the international system is anarchic and that states are organized hierarchically does not do justice to the empirical world. Also at the domestic level, one can find conflict and power politics, not just law and authority (Donnelly, 2000: 92). Also, states can function as less sovereign bodies under other states. Therefore, stating that there is absolute sovereignty from the states is also too dichotomous. Anarchy and hierarchy are being presented too dichotomously, while they are variables that are to be empirically studied as being continuous, instead of presenting them as theoretically dichotomous (Donnelly, 2000: 92). For Donnelly, anarchy on the international level does not imply something that is necessarily different from anarchy on the domestic level. Therefore, the concept is a murky one, and not very useful for analysis.

All of this combined means that a realist perspective leaves out the possibility to ask the question ‘how can hostile relations be transformed into peaceful ones?’ (Kaplowitz, 1990: 40). Since the international system consists of sovereign states that play a zero-sum game with each other, there will be very little focus on how hostile relations can be transformed into peaceful ones, because the idea of appeasing other states will lead to losses for one’s own state. Realism, therefore, is more occupied with the balance of power than a viable peace between states. Mostly, this is because of the assumption of fixed preferences and the state of the international system.

The policy options that can be undertaken by the Israeli government, or can be proposed to the Israeli government then, are limited. The involvement of third parties will not be valued at its true merits, there will be little sympathy for the opposing side in the conflict, making it even more difficult to make concessions, and the focus on the state as a unitary actor will lead to seeing the opposing side as one unitary state, overlooking the willingness within both societies to resolve a conflict. The next paragraph will explore the role that identity plays in the debate between realism and constructivism.

Identity construction in the realist/constructivist debate

Identity, as the UN speeches will show, plays a key role in the conflict between Israel and Palestine. In order to be able to connect the conception of identity in the Israeli context to the concept of identity in the realist/constructivist debate, it is important to explore both these concepts of identity, in order to conduct the analysis. This paragraph will explore identity in the realist/ constructivist debate, while the next paragraph will explore the role of identity in the Israeli context. First, identity in the realist/constructivist debate. In realist thought, the concept of identity is mainly overlooked or deemed irrelevant to their work (Adler, 2013: 114). Does this mean that identity is completely absent in realist work? Mitzen (2006) argues states are striving for more than just physical security, but also, as she calls it, ontological security (Mitzen, 2006: 342). This concept implies, on the individual level, that individuals do not only seek physical security, but also

some kind of security of who one is. Individuals need this sense of security of the self because it underwrites their capacity for agency (Mitzen, 2006: 344). Since being insecure about one’s identity leads to not being able to act as an agent, and being consumed with a search for one’s identity, this security is vital for the individual.

The analogy with the state’s need for ontological security relates to the question ‘what is the state’? Whereas physical state security implies that the state territory must be secure in order to say that the state is secure, Mitzen argues that the identity of the state is as much a vital part of the state as its territory. Next to that, she claims that these identities help distinct groups from other groups (and thereby other states), which helps individuals to relate to their own group (Mitzen, 2006: 251-352). Therefore, states need as much ontological security as they need physical security. Also, Mercer (1995) argues that realists do assume that states have a particular kind of identity. According to Mercer, the identity of states lies in their ambition for relative gains and survival (Mercer, 1995: 233). However, he claims that since this is a fixed, self-evident identity, and with no regard for identity formation, there is little interest for realist scholars to examine (Mercer, 1995: 233). However, Mercer argues that identity is in fact relevant for realist scholars. Since individuals want to identify in a positive way with a group, they compare themselves favorably to other groups (Mercer, 1995: 241). This leads to a willingness for relative gains, a concept that is particularly important for realists. This could be a more constructivist basis for the explanation of conflict between groups.

However, as Sterling-Folker (2002) argues when she tries to find a common ground between realism and constructivism, the fact that groups have differences, and even reify these differences, does not necessarily lead to violent conflict (Sterling-Folker, 2002: 85). She argues that realism might assume that identity formation plays a role in realism, as coming forth out of in- and out-group formation. These groups will reify their differences (because of the fact that identity needs to be constructed in a group), which leads to competition between these groups. However, she does not argue that identity in itself is enough to explain conflict, since access to natural resources and intergroup exposure, among others, influence the probability of conflict. The pint Sterling-Folker makes it that group identity formation should serve a purpose for realists when analyzing group conflict (Sterling-Folker, 2002: 86), and therefore, this constructivist concept should be analyzed as well when explaining conflict.

One of the most important realist scholars is Samuel Huntington. He argues that the fundamental source of conflict should not be found in economic or geographical differences between countries and groups of countries, but in their different civilizations (Huntington, 1993: 24). The civilization is, according to Huntington, the highest level of identity for an individual to identify with. Because civilization covers all parts of the human identity, as history, language, culture and religion, differences in civilization will not be overcome easily. When one adds to this the concept of globalization, conflict, or clashes, between civilizations will become more likely then they have

been in the past (Huntington, 1993: 25). For Huntington, this means that clashes will happen, and that these identities are unchanging.

However, threats, such as identity may pose, are not just a given, but can also be constructed, or, at the very least, be used in order to achieve other goals. Buzan (1991), one of the founders of the Copenhagen School, argues that national policy makers benefit from security threats, because they have a symbolic leverage over alternative policy domains, therefore, invoking security threats can be used to the advantage of policy makers (Buzan, 1991: 11). Cultural identity, according to Buzan, will be one of these threats (Buzan, 1991a: 447). Clashes between different cultures are likely to happen because of the great differences in culture and wealth between the West and other parts of the world. Policy makers might exaggerate these differences, in order to take policy measures with the goal of preventing these threats. Migration is one of the examples that Buzan gives (Buzan, 1991a: 448). The threat of migration could be exaggerated by combining it with terrorism, as right wing political parties all over Europe currently do, to have a political argument for a stricter migration policy, even thought the actual threats immigrants pose are very limited. In that case, threats are being used strategically by policy makers to further their own agenda. This might also be the case with the Israeli UN speeches. Politicians do not say words just because they like saying them, there is a strategic logic behind the use of certain words. Therefore, threats being spoken of serve a strategic goal of furthering these politicians own policy agenda.

So, identity is not completely absent from realist thought. This opens the way to look at a specific form of identity relevant to the Israeli subject of this thesis. Specifically connected to the construction of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a zero-sum game is Zionism, the Jewish form of nationalism. Zionism will be explained first, and then connected with realism and nationalism using the concepts of collective and competitive victimhood.

Identity in the Israeli context

Klar, Schori-Eyal and Klar (2013) describe how the Holocaust served as a means to build the Israeli state (2013: 130), and how the Holocaust became central to the Israeli identity. Since the second and third generation of Holocaust survivors in Israel were born and raised in Israel, this part of their identity merged with the Holocaust memory of their parents and grandparents. It became a part of cultural life in Israel. This explains why the Holocaust became more important for the Israeli identity some generations after the end of the Holocaust than directly after, then for Israelis that had not lived through the Holocaust (Klar, Schori-Eyal and Klar, 2013: 132). Therefore, the Holocaust became a central part of the Israeli identity.

Ochs (2006) describes how present-day Israeli suffering from Palestinian bombings is related to the Holocaust memory of the Jewish people. She argues that this is not only a way to give meaning to the current experiences, but it is also a means to give the victims, or survivors, of

Palestinian attacks a heroic-like status (Ochs, 2006: 357). This has several effects. First, it downplays both Israeli agency and Palestinian suffering, since Palestinians are portrayed as terrorists, while Israeli civilians are portrayed as victims, or survivors. Second, political commitment and empathy to the Israeli state is generated. Third, this discourse can be used for security practices (Ochs, 2006: 358). It enables the Israeli government apparatus to use more strict security measures on Palestinians, thereby creating a larger division between Israeli and Palestinian civilians. All of this creates a certain Israeli Jewish identity, which is distinct from the identity of Arab peoples.

Also Podeh’s research (2000) shows an element of this identity construction. Her research on educational textbooks in Israel shows that these textbooks had, among others, the goal to spread Zionist values, and contained prejudices against the Palestinian people in particular and Arabs in general (Podeh, 2000: 80-81). In that sense, Israel has a history of portraying itself and Palestinians and other Arab peoples as different from Israeli’s, creating a dichotomy between the two groups via the educational system. This division, which is also found in the Israeli UN speeches, is therefore relevant, since it places this division in a broader context of identity construction that is partly based on the distinction between Israeli Jews on the one hand and Arab people on the other hand.

Another element that has a constituting effect on the Israeli identity is Zionism. Zionism emerged in the late 19th century, as a reaction to growing anti-Semitism in both Eastern and Western Europe (Ram, 1999: 328), and the long history of Jews being persecuted around the world (Jaspal and Yampolsky, 2011: 202). After 1948, when the state of Israel was formally established, and the goal of Jewish nationalists had been partially achieved, it has become the flag under which groups and organizations worldwide support Israel (Feldman, 2015: 1070). Furthermore, the Holocaust became the ultimate testimony that Jews should not live in the diaspora, but have their own state, Israel (Klar, Schori-Eyal and Klar, 2013: 130).

As with realism, there are different brands of Zionism. I will shortly at two Zionist narratives, one that puts the foundational myth as central in justifying the rights of the Jewish people on Palestinian ground, and Hannah Arendt’s view, which is based on labor.

Feldman (2015) describes Zionism as ‘the ideologies and practices that emerge from a

foundational myth that seeks the negation of Jewish diaspora through the purported “return” of Jews to the land of Israel, and in the process the purported “return” of Jews to history’ (Feldman,

2015: 1069). In order to do so, the then Palestinian lands had to be settled by Jewish people. In that way, the diaspora would be home again and could take up her place in history.

In the first years after the Second World War, the Zionist cause was seen as a liberation movement of the Jewish people. Followers of Zionism related its cause to other anti-colonial movements as a way of gaining legitimacy by claiming that the Jews were reconquering the former British colony of Palestine, even though it were not the Brits that had driven the Jews away from

the Israeli lands. Zionism was the liberation movement of the Jews (Moore-Gilbert, 2016: 2). However, since Israel is now closely aligned with the Western world, it is no longer seen as an anti-colonial movement (Moore-Gilbert, 2016: 4). Hannah Arendt, in her posthumous work The Crisis of

Zionism, takes another approach for justifying Zionism. She argues that the settling of Jewish

people is justified ex ante, as the settlers have been able to cultivate the land on which they have settled much more effective than the peoples that have lived there in earlier days have done (Kohn and Feldman, 2007: 184). She does not argue for the historical rights of the Jewish people, or the narrative of the Jewish homeland, but takes an approach that is built on labor. In order to have a state of their own, the Jewish people should be able to work the land, and by that earn the right to live on the land (Lederman, 2016: 395).

Furthermore, Feldman argues that this relation between the leader of the Western World, the United States, and Israel, derives from the fact that both states are settler states. Both the Israeli and American claims on land were on lands that were already inhibited when these groups arrives. The shared narratives that exclude the indigenous people of both these lands include ‘modernization’, ‘development’ and ‘civilization’ (Feldman, 2015: 1070).

Thus, identity plays a role in the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Kelman (1999) also argues that identity plays a defining role in the conflict between Israel and Palestine. According to Kelman, the advance of political Zionism has created the roots for the conflict, since this induced the wave of Jewish settlers moving to Israel and forcing the Palestinians living there at the moment to move elsewhere (Kelman, 1999: 583). Since identity is the cause of the conflict, creating an overarching identity between Israeli’s and Palestinians is the solution to the conflict (Kelman, 1999: 586).

The Zionist narrative plays a large role in this, since the Zionist narrative does not leave any room for other people on the ‘Jewish’ lands, and adds to the feeling of collective victimhood, whereby the Jewish people are the victims of injustice, while others, under which Palestinians, are the perpetrators of these injustices. Therefore, the conflict that seems to be about a division of territory is in fact a conflict of identity. This implies that, as the zero-sum game assumption states, that concessions to the opponent have implications for oneself, since recognition of the other implies a modification of one’s own identity (Jamal, 2000: 38), an attitude that is also found in Zionist thought. This implies that conflicts about territory and identity are linked.

Does this imply that nationalism, whether or not religiously inspired, is always exclusive, creating a zero-sum game? Nationalism, then is defined, very broad, as ‘the convergence of

territorial and political loyalty’ (Haas, 1986: 709). Zionism, in that sense, is a form of nationalism,

since it stresses the importance of Israeli territory to the core of the Jewish identity.

According to Brewer (2007), in-group loyalty does not have a causal relation with out-group discrimination. She argues, citing a case study among 30 ethnic groups is Eastern Africa, that they favored their own group, while not having any negative biases towards members of the other

groups (Brewer, 2007: 432). Also Sterling-Folker (2002) argued that identity is not the sole variable that decides whether conflict between groups occurs (Sterling-Folker, 2002: 86).

Thus, conflict needs more than in- and out-group differences, but also a form of competition between these groups. Research related to the concept of collective victimhood does imply that Zionism, when promoting the idea of collective victimhood, contributes to the construction of a zero-sum game. According to Schori-Eyal, Halperin and Bar-Tal, collective victimhood contains ‘a

mindset shared by group members that results from a perceived intentional harm with severe and lasting consequences inflicted on a collective by another group or groups, a harm that is viewed as undeserved, unjust, and immoral and one that the group was not able to prevent’ (Schori-Eyal,

Halperin and Bar-Tal, 2014: 778). This collective state of mind creates an ‘in-group’ and an ‘out-group’. This concept is associated with several effects: it reduces empathy for the out-group, therefore increasing support for ‘extreme’ policy preferences, and the delegitimization of the other group (Schori-Eyal, Halperin and Bar-Tal, 2014: 782). Furthermore, they argue, specifically in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the bigger the historical feeling of collective victimhood has been, the smaller the motivation for the group was to work towards a solution of present conflicts (Schori-Eyal, Halperin and Bar-Tal, 2014: 785).

According to De Guissme and Licata (2017), competitive victimhood does foster negative attitudes towards the other group. They build upon the concept of collective victimhood. In this case, one cannot speak of one group that has experienced being victimized, but of two or more groups that have competing claims about which of the groups has the most rights to feel victimized (De Guissme and Licata, 2017: 148). Noor et al, define competitive victimhood as ‘a group’s

motivation and consequent efforts to establish that it has suffered more than its adversaries’ (Noor et al, 2012: 351). According to Noor et al, this leads to these groups to try and create a historical

narrative, that underscores their suffering, via media, or via speeches from the group leaders (Noor

et al, 2012: 353). Thus, competitive victimhood fosters negative feelings towards the other group,

which makes it very difficult to not interpret making concessions to that group as a loss for one’s own group, since there is a competition between these groups.

When this is the case, it is reasonable to speak of a zero-sum game attitude. Zionism, as a form of nationalism, connects identity and territory, which already makes negotiations about territory highly difficult, since identity is something that cannot be easily divided. Next to that, competitive victimhood adds an element of competition to this, whereby one group can lose out while the other group wins the competition between the groups. In that way, a connection can be laid out between realist thought and Zionism. Where realism assumes that interaction between the primary actors is a zero-sum game, Zionism in Israel, in combination with the element of competitive victimhood that is part of the Israeli identity, results in the same zero-sum game attitude. Therefore, Zionism in itself is not enough to relate it to realism, but the combination of

Zionism and competitive victimhood creates a zero-sum game attitude, in which giving in to the Palestinians affects the identity of Israel, and is therefore not possible.

The creation of a zero-sum game attitude has consequences. Other psychological research has shown that the idea of a zero-sum game decreases sympathy for the ‘out-group’, and makes it therefore harder to take steps towards peace (Maoz and McCauley, 2005: 804). Mackie and Smith (2015) argue that groups, in order to create a group identity for their own group are in need of other groups (Mackie and Smith, 2015: 265). Being part of a group enforces certain emotions already being felt as an individual, and diminishes others, depending on the characteristics of the group (Mackie and Smith 2015: 265). In other words, the identity of the group shapes, in part, the identity of the individual. In the case of Israel, where support for making concessions to the Palestinians is low (Maoz and McCauley, 2005: 804), this causes individuals to be less willing to accept concessions to the Israeli side, because the group as a whole influences the individual, and the group itself is only to a low extent accepting of concessions from the Israeli side to the Palestinian side. It should be noted however that the status of the Palestinian territories, and the solution of the conflict is a matter of lively debate within Israeli society, which have led to deep domestic divisions (Alimi, 2007: 439). This is based on the concept of collective victimhood, as explained earlier. Collective victimhood creates this ‘in-‘ and ‘out-group’, decreasing empathy for the other group, and making it harder to make concessions towards the other group, or to foster cooperation and trust between the two groups.

This has consequences. Earlier discourse analysis on Israeli attitudes towards Palestine has shown that although Palestine does exist in the Israeli discourse since the Oslo peace-process, no strong commitment from the Israelis towards a Palestinian state exists (Jamal, 2000: 40). Also Michels (1994) argues that the Oslo Agreements reaffirmed the Zionist narrative that the Israeli land belongs to the Jewish people (Michels, 1994: 28-29). Even though the right of Palestinians to a state is recognized, the Zionist narrative still excludes any other people then Jews from the land of Israel (Michels, 1994: 31). Peled (1992) shows that Israel is an ethnic democracy, in which minorities do enjoy some civil liberties, but not at the same level as the Jewish population of Israel. This shows that the commitment to the rights of non-Jewish people is low, both within as outside of Israel (Peled, 1992: 432).

Therefore, the more the conflict with Palestine is framed in zero-sum game terms, the smaller chances for a viable solution will be. Since this idea will lead to people believing that gains for the other actor, in this case, Palestine, will lead to losses for one’s own side, willingness to strive for a solution will decrease, as the concept of competitive victimhood supports.

In conclusion, Zionism, as a form of nationalism, does not in itself create the idea of a zero-sum game, and is in itself not something ‘realist’. As Brewer and Sterling-Folker have shown, sympathy for the in-group does not necessarily cause a negative bias towards the out-group. However, what Zionism adds to this particular form of nationalism is the concept of collective

victimhood. Since the concept of collective victimhood and the connection between identity and territory are both emphasized by Zionism, it is distinct from nationalism, thereby creating a situation in which positive in-group attitudes go hand in hand with negative out-group attitudes, which are vital to the identity of the in-group. Combined with the competition over injustices (competitive victimhood), this leads to an attitude that experiences gains for the other group as an expense for one’s own group. In other words, the combination of Zionism and competitive victimhood creates a zero-sum game attitude.

Taking a constructivist approach to the UN speeches enables us to look for and analyze the concepts explained above. Furthermore, it enables us to explore what is being said critically, and to uncover the meaning behind what is being said, as opposed to just reproducing what is said in the speeches. The exact methodology of this approach, and its limits, will be covered in the next chapter. By doing so, I will be able to argue that Israel, in her UN speeches, creates a zero-sum game attitude, and that realist scholars ought to pay more attention to identity, since in the case of Israel, identity stands at the basis of this zero-sum game attitude.

3. Methodology

As shown in the last chapter, the realist assumptions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a zero-sum game are not a given, but are constructed. Therefore, a constructivist research design is necessary in order to examine this claim. So, paradoxically, this thesis will gain a deeper understanding of the realist rhetoric in Israel’s UN speeches using rhetoric analysis, a constructivist research design.

This chapter will explain the methodology that forms the base of this thesis. First, this thesis will go into the (nature of) data, then into the umbrella of discourse analysis, the differences between rhetoric, frame and framing analysis and into why rhetoric analysis is best suited to conduct this research, while the third paragraph will go into the limitations of this research design. Finally, the last paragraph will describe how the analysis has been conducted.

Data

For this research, the ten most recent Israeli UN speeches have been analyzed. Important to note is that the speech in 2007 was given by former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, the 2008 speech was given by former President Shimon Peres and the 2010 speech was given by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman. The 2009 speech, as the speeches from 2011 until 2016 were all given by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The shortest speech was given in 2010, and had a length of 1441 words. The longest speech was given in 2016 and was almost three times as long, with a word count of 4023. There is no hard order in which countries give their annual UN speech; only that Brazil and the United States are always the first and second country to give their speech. All the other countries are ordered according to level of representation, geographical balance and preference (UN, 2017). This means that heads of state come before prime ministers, who come before foreign ministers or ambassadors.

Discourse, frame and rhetoric analysis...

Rhetoric analysis falls under the broader umbrella of discourse analysis, a group a research approaches that share the idea that language does not neutrally describe reality, but has a constituting effect on it (Sims-Schouten and Riley, 2014: 46). Words, or text are in themselves meaningless, it is through the shared, mutually agreed upon use of language that meaning is created. The analysis of discourse can be used to examine the way in which language shapes the world around us (Starks and Brown Trinidad, 2007: 1374). In other words, text is both given meaning by reality, and also shapes the way we perceive reality, thereby also influencing reality itself.

A part of discourse analysis is frame analysis, and related to that (but distinct from it), framing analysis. Frame analysis, as the name suggests, analyzes frames, defined by Gitlin (1980)