Metaphorical Argumentation in Popular Science

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Metaphorical Argumentation in Popular Science

Towards argumentative analysis of metaphors about the nature of the brain

Katja van Nimwegen

University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Humanities

Katja.vannimwegen@student.uva.nl

Student number: 10268618

Master's Thesis

19 June 2015

rMA Rhetoric, Argumentation Theory and Philosophy

Supervisor: dr. J.H.M. Wagemans

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1 Introduction

The shift between the academic world of laboratories, theories and conferences on the one hand and journalism, mass media and internet platforms on the other is crucial to the construction of scientific facts. In popular media, scientific insights are explained, debated, and translated into new forms of knowledge. This is necessary because, as Latour and Woolgar noted, “only by virtue of a crucial shift between one network and another could a particular statement begin circulation as a fact.” (1979, p. 151). The intersection between these two 'networks' can be called popular science. In order to increase our understanding of the transformation of scientific findings to public facts, this thesis will investigate one particular tool that scientists have at hand in the popular-scientific context: metaphor. In the Dutch television show 'Gesprek op 24', the British philosopher Peter Hacker was interviewed about his view on neuroscience and free will. In the end of this interview, he summarizes his critique as follows:

If we start thinking about ourselves in a way in which some neuroscientists recommend we do, namely as machines, it will provide us with a range of excuses which are not really legitimate excuses, it will diminish our sense of responsibility, and answer-ability for ideas, and those are very deleterious social consequences and moral consequences. It will alleviate our own sense of responsibility, which should be strengthened and not alleviated. And for no good reason at all. [...] The idea that all of us lack responsibility, and are not answerable for what we do, is absurd, and very damaging to the social fabric of society. [...] If we think of us as machines, we don't deserve any respect at all. (June, 2013)

The statement by Peter Hacker points to the fact that metaphors influence one's thinking and behaviour and that, should we believe Hacker, it could even affect society as a whole. Brain scientists regularly refer to mechanical devices such as computers when they explain how the human brain works, and also when they discuss implications of their insights for society. Sometimes this happens in the form of an explicit comparison such as 'brains are like computers', and in other cases the analogies are more indirect. Hacker argues against the mechanical metaphor for the brain, both because he thinks it has detrimental effects on people and because there are no good reasons for looking at the brain that way.

Research on popular science is needed to understand how scientific findings are implemented in society. Relatively little has been written about what happens with the language of scientists when they step out of their own community and reach for a popular audience. Yet in the Dutch

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government's policy plan on science for the coming years, the 'Wetenschapsvisie 2025', the necessity of interaction between the academia and society receives a lot of emphasis. According to this report, a large part of society has interest in scientific developments and, the other way around, research should benefit from interaction with civilians and stakeholders. The formulation of this policy plan is symptomatic of a movement in which openness and communication of scientific development towards a broad public are highly valued. This has resulted in much activity on both old and new media platforms on which scientific insights are shared with whoever is interested.

Various recent publications on popular science have pointed out the role of metaphors in translating scientific facts to a general audience (Knudsen, 2005; Wyatt, 2004; Smith, 2013) and explaining complex information (Kendall-Taylor and Haydon, 2014). As becomes clear from the critique of Hacker, metaphors can be very problematic. Several accounts in the literature argue that metaphorical language can be an argumentative device. For example, Luokkanen et al. explain how metaphors frame new technologies and their effect on climate change. They note that metaphors are used “not just neutrally to illustrate the arguments and make the story more readable” (2013, p. 978). Woods et al. even argue that religious metaphors are used as support for arguments about climate change (2012). But how does such a support work? In argumentation theory analysts are starting to be interested in metaphors as “a serious type of argumentation”, sometimes called 'figurative analogy' (Garssen and Kienpointner, 2011, p. 43).

Garssen suggests that we need to find out “when and in what contexts is it advantageous to use this presentational device and what exactly makes the figurative analogy more effective than a direct presentation of the argumentation” (2009, p. 139). These questions are empirical claims that can only be answered if there is a clear view of the argumentative function of such a device: if we have the analytical tools to reconstruct the argumentation in metaphors within certain contexts, it becomes possible to compare metaphors in different situations on, for example, the degree of effectiveness. This thesis therefore aims at providing such preconditions by answering the question: how can a metaphor be analysed as support for a scientific claim in popular brain science?

I have chosen to focus on brain science because it concerns complex information and is of interest to a broad public. Also, brain science has become very alive in recent decades and is omnipresent in popular media. Material for this study was therefore easily found. The popularity of neuroscience is demonstrated by Weisberg et al., who conducted an experiment to show that psychological explanations become more convincing if they contain neuro-scientific information, even when that is not relevant (2008). The examples I chose from this scientific discourse are merely illustrative and do

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not provide any statistic evidence. They will be used to demonstrate how to treat such metaphors as an analyst and elucidate the steps of my investigation.

The thesis has been divided into three parts. First (chapter 2) I will characterise popular science as a genre of communication. I will answer the questions which role popular science plays within the construction of scientific facts in society, and which communicative devices are suited to increasing the 'facticity' of scientific claims in this context. Subsequently (chapter 3), I will look more closely at the metaphors that are used in popular-scientific discourse about the brain. I will investigate which general functions these metaphors can have within the language of scientists, and also which argumentative functions: what differences of opinion are present in popular-scientific brain discourse? Starting from the argumentative role of metaphors in brain discourse I will then (chapter 4) search for a way to reconstruct them. The goal in this chapter is to identify argumentative structures behind the metaphors that I have introduced in chapter 3. From these structures I will infer in the conclusion (chapter 5) an argumentative model that can be used in future research for the reconstruction of similar arguments. Ultimately I will clarify how these elements are all instrumental in the analysis of metaphorical arguments in popular science.

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2 Communicating science

Popular science manifests itself in the form of, among others, newspaper articles, talk show conversations and online presentations. One example is the online platform 'TED', an organisation that describes itself as follows:

TED is a nonprofit devoted to spreading ideas, usually in the form of short, powerful talks (18 minutes or less). TED began in 1984 as a conference where Technology, Entertainment and Design converged, and today covers almost all topics — from science to business to global issues — in more than 100 languages. Meanwhile, independently run TEDx events help share ideas in communities around the world (http://www.ted.com/about/our-organization). To be able to analyse brain metaphors in a certain setting, it is necessary to take into account some aspects of that setting that play a role. Scientists in popular media behave differently from scientists inside the academia, among peers or students, even though they talk about the same topics. The main difference is the audience: instead of scientist-to-scientist communication, popular science concerns communication between scientists and a broad, undefined audience. We can only start analysing such communication when we have a clear view of what popular science is and what it is that scientists are trying to do while addressing a popular audience. What kind of behaviour can we expect of scientists in this context? To answer this question, I will discuss briefly some insights from the extensive body of literature of sociology of science and journalism. The reason for this is that popular science can be seen as the intersection between the academia and public media. To effectively characterise popular science as a communicative context, I will first discuss the position it has in the production process of scientific facts and second some communicative devices that can be expected to occur in view of the contextual features.

2.1 Popular science and the production of facts

Journalists, as well as scientists, have the aim of presenting claims about reality as 'the truth' (Broersma, 2010). Both scientific articles and journalistic texts are worthless if they don't have any persuasive force, that is, if the reader is not in any way being convinced that the observations are accurate. After a research has been conducted, its findings are not automatically incorporated into 'common knowledge'. Researchers have to make a selection of what they think is relevant and important to a particular scientific discipline. The communication of these outcomes first and foremost takes place within the academia. Research papers are the main medium for communication,

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and by writing them, authors try to achieve that “claims are accepted and ratified as new knowledge in the disciplinary community” (Livnat, 2012, p. 22). Published papers are thus argumentative and aim at a specific audience. Its convincingness depends on several factors, such as credibility of the author (Latour and Woolgar, 1979), the values that are seen as important in the scientific discipline (Kitcher, 2011) and general scientific values such as objectivity (Kuhn, 1973). The acceptance of findings as new scientific truths is often described as a social process instead of a rigid decision between yes or no. Latour and Woolgar investigated the academic practice with an ethnographic method, and uncovered the complex network of myriad actors that influenced the production of meaning. The ethnography makes clear that the production of facts involves a lot of effort, people and time.

Research papers are central to this process, and are highly conventional. Livnat effectively points out that there is a gap between the actual research and the paper in which this research is reported. The paper tells a different 'story'; many methodological details are left out and the chronology in which the research is conducted is often very different from the order in which it is presented (2012, p. 25). Also, scientific papers are inherently dialogic: they are part of an ongoing conversation about reality. Livnat describes four linguistic structures from which this “dialogic dimension” becomes observable: “citations, concession, we forms and questions” (Idem, p. 45). Conventions such as these are useful in increasing the 'facticity' of statements. This means that language use can determine the extent to which claims will be regarded as facts. Another way to encourage the level of facticity is by positioning the proposition as a starting point for argumentation instead of a conclusion that is supported with arguments (Idem, p. 35).

Popular science differs from 'ordinary' science in the audience that is being addressed. That is, research papers are pointed towards a relatively small group of people with common aims and interests, described by anthropologists as a 'tribe' or 'community' (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). The 'dialogue' that takes place between the members of these communities is thus inherently different from discourse of scientists aimed at a general audience. The latter exists of anyone who is interested, such as television viewers, visitors of internet platforms such as TED.org and, in the Netherlands, 'De Universiteit van Nederland'.

Kitcher calls popular science the 'second' social process scientists have to engage in before their findings are accepted as public facts. He notes that the meaning of scientific authority has eroded caused by certain social processes, and investigated the role of public values in the agenda setting and convincingness of scientific research. He raises the problem that society, from which funds are derived that make possible research, is inherently not value-free and based on fears and beliefs, while science has the intrinsic value of truth finding via objectivity and dry evidence. To achieve a role in

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democracy, he argues, science needs to change into a 'well-ordered' division of labour (2011). Communication to society plays a pivotal role in this.

Science is not the only branch that is concerned with the production of 'facts'. In journalism, other processes are at work that are aimed also at a presentation of reality that is received as the truth. Broersma argues that journalistic text are inherently aimed at presenting itself as truthful, because their credibility is their 'raison d'être'. He says that journalistic texts “rely on a set of professional practices, routines and textual conventions that were developed during the 20th century to guarantee that this process of construction or representation is as accurate—or mimetic— as possible” (Broersma, 2010, p. 27). While journalists' values in their search for facts are very different than the values of scientists, the importance of personal credibility is equally important. Broersma argues, “journalism does not derive its performative power from its contents (the facts), but merely from its forms and style” (Idem, p. 27). Schudson similarly claims that the relation between the media text and reality lies in the form of the text. He stresses the role of narrativity in journalism, as claims about reality are always incorporated in some kind of story. The form of what is presented is conventional, it makes messages readable and makes them “fit the social world of readers and writers”. He claims “The world is incorporated into unquestioned and unnoticed conventions of narration” (1995, p. 54).

In conclusion, stylistic characteristics such as narrativity thus reframe facts into a new reality, a story that depends on a complex social process. This is, as Broersma states “performative discourse with the power to persuade people that its interpretation of the social world is legitimate” (2010, p. 24). Notions such as narrativity, performativity, dialogicity, credibility and stylistic mimesis thus are all ways in which speakers try to achieve facticity.

2.2 Communicative devices in popular science

Scientists, like journalists, engage in a social process in which the acceptance of their claims as truthful is an aim that is inherent in the genre. I will now discuss some communicative devices that can be expected in the communication of scientists to the public, given their desire that their claims be accepted as facts in society. A well-researched presentational form in scientific discourse that concerns the indefinite nature of scientific findings. For example hedging (Zuczkowski, 2013) and epistemic modal markers (Kranich, 2011) are ways in which scientists sometimes mitigate their claims. However, scientists addressing a general audience are expected to aim for their claims to be accepted as facts, and presenting them as uncertain, tentative ideas would hinder the achievement of this aim.

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Another communicative device that is prevalent in the literature on popular science is the argument from authority. The relation between the scientist and the audience of non-specific listeners is an asymmetrical relation, that is, there is a substantial difference between the knowledge of the audience and the speaker regarding a particular subject. This makes the situation suitable for scientist to appeal in their arguments to the fact that they have expertise regarding the subject: they can be seen as an authority. Wagemans labelled these arguments 'arguments from expert opinion', in which the expert is defined as ‘‘someone of whom the arguer believes the addressee to put a certain intellectual trust in’’ (2011, p. 331). The proposition that says that the speaker is an expert does not provide evidence for the truth of his claims but it can make the claims more acceptable.

Argumentation from expertise is often described as characteristic to contexts such as medical doctor-patient consultations because here the arguer is by definition an expert on the relevant topic. This concerns the same asymmetry as observed in popular science. This should also be the case in popular science, since the scientist's raison d'être is his expertise: scientists, like doctors, characteristically provide arguments from professional expert opinion (Wagemans, 2011). Scientists are invited to share knowledge that the audience expects to have a certain scientific value.

Argumentation from expertise thus necessarily derives its effectiveness from a successful establishment of 'ethos', a trust from the public in the scientist's status as an authority on the subject. However, Kitcher describes an eroding belief in authority in society and in particular in the authority of scientists (2011, p. ). This appears to be causing an authority crisis because being asserted by the scientist is not sufficient any more for the claims to be accepted as true. Walton also mentions this “postmodern decline in respect for scientific objectivity” and explains this as a result of advocacy groups supporting their opinion with scientific findings (1997, p. 9).

Walton formulates some basic critical questions for the argumentation from expert opinion. One of these is “Is A consistent with what other experts assert?” (Idem, p. 223), where A refers to the claim of the expert. According to this condition the strength of argumentation from expert opinion decreases when there is disagreement between experts about a subject. This is often the case in popular science, as many scientific topics are disputed strongly by either other scientists or non- or pseudo-scientific experts. Scientists then not only will have to argue that they are telling the truth, but also that the other experts, who disagree, are not.

In order to deal with these issues, scientists may be inclined to give more argumentation, preferably other than arguments from expert opinion. However, at the same time the presence of argumentation can also prevent the audience of regarding the claims as facts. As mentioned in

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section 2.1, Livnat argued that a piece of information becomes more acceptable as fact when it is used as a starting point for argumentation instead of when it has the role of a conclusion, supported by argumentation (2012, p. 35). This notion provides us with reason to assume that the absence of argumentation – or otherwise a form of presentation that seems non-argumentative at first sight – is beneficial to the 'facticity' of the information, thus characteristic of a communicative context in which acceptance of information as facts is a central aim. In other words, in popular science we may reasonably expect scientists to avoid their claims to be explicitly supported with argumentation. Since the authority crisis lead us to expect more instead of less argumentation for the claims, it is understandable that scientists choose presentational devices that give their claims the appearance of facts in need of explanation instead of a claim in need of argumentation. This can be done with help of some presentational forms that I will briefly discuss here. One type of argumentation that has been studied as a useful way to illuminate, arouse attention, personalize and demonstrate validity is the argument from example. This type is characteristic of plenary legislative debates in the European Parliament (Plug, 2010). However, because of its potential to both increase acceptability of the claim and illuminate this claim at the same time, it can be expected to be typical to popular scientific discourse as well.

A second presentational form that can help scientists translate their findings to popular language, again both presenting them as true and adapting to the social world of listeners, is using visuals. From an English writing perspective, Miller compared visuals in popular and academic articles, and concluded that in academic articles visuals are used that are designed to prove, such as graphics, while visuals used in popularisations are designed to explain and attract. This is being done by designing the visuals according to certain conventions that are dominant in the particular genre, such as “size, place, order and organisation” of the visual (1998, p. 43).

It is thus clear that there are multiple ways of scientists to present their claims both as true and as fitting to the social world of the audience, which can be seen as the two main aims in the production process of facts. However, there is yet another device that has been mentioned several times by authors to occur in popular-scientific discourse: metaphorical language. Kendall Taylor and Haydon analysed the use of metaphor to translate the science of resilience and developmental outcomes to a general public (2014), and Smith analysed the debate on determinism in popular accounts of Quantum Mechanics by looking at the metaphors that were used (2013). In the following chapter, I will look in more detail at the use of metaphors as a way to argue, explain and adapt to the audience.

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3 Functions of metaphors in brain discourse

This chapter will introduce some examples of metaphors in the popular-scientific language of scientists. I will demonstrate with help of the literature that there are several functions these metaphors can fulfil within popular-scientific discourse. These functions will provide some ways in which to look at the examples of metaphors for the brain, taking into account the context of popular science that has been outlined in the second chapter. The reason I speak of 'functions' instead of 'categories' is that single examples of metaphors often don't fall within one category: they can have two, or even three functions for the language of the scientist at the same time.

In order to prevent misunderstandings due to the large amount of terms that are being used for similar phenomena, I have chosen to follow Maasen et al. in their choice for the term 'metaphor', meaning “the transfer of ideas and concepts, thus 'pieces of meaning' from one delineable discourse to another” (1995, p. 1). This general definition is suitable because it focuses on two separate discourses, also called areas of human thought, between which information is being transferred. This chapter will first explore some general purposes that the transfer from brain-discourse to mechanics-discourse can serve in popular science. Second, I will discuss differences of opinion that are present in popular brain science, which give the metaphors an additional argumentative aspect.

3.1 General functions of brain metaphors

The first function that brain metaphors appear to have in popular science is that they give scientists the opportunity to position themselves within a scientific paradigm. As Sismondo notes, “almost every scientific framework depends upon one or a few key metaphors” (2011, p. 154). In a similar fashion, Weingart (1995) wrote about the metaphor of the word 'struggle' in the discourse of social Darwinism that, according to him, shaped people's world-view. The notion of paradigms was described by Kuhn as central ways of thinking at certain periods of time within specific scientific disciplines, which affect every aspect of research. According to Haraway, these paradigms are directly related to metaphors. She effectively demonstrated the value of metaphorical analysis in her investigation of paradigms in the field of biology, in which the work of Kuhn plays a pivotal role (Haraway, 1976).

In a similar way, the contemporary state of affairs in neuro-scientific research can be said to fall under the heading of 'mechanical brain' discourse. That is, brain scientists in popular media often refer to the brain as a mechanical device such as a computer, a machine or an instrument. This is a rather bold simplification of a complex discipline that includes myriad different methods and starting

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points, but it serves well as a perspective to look at metaphors such as the following, discussed by Swaab in his Dutch popular-scientific book Wij zijn ons brein:

Example 1

If you regard the brain as a rational, information-processing, organic machine, then the computer metaphor of our time isn't such a bad one. It's a comparison that's hard to avoid, especially if you consider the impressive figures about our brains' building blocks and their connections. There are 1,000 times 1,000 billion points at which neurons connect with one another … And your skull comes fitted with a fantastically efficient machine with parallel circuits that can process images and associations better than any computer yet built. (Swaab, 2010, p. 27-28, translated by Jane Hedley-Prôle)

In this quotation, Swaab considers the appropriateness of the metaphor of the computer, and uses it to illustrate the excellence of the brain. The example makes clear how the metaphor can help to make abstract information more accessible and 'fit the social world of the listeners' as described in the second chapter. A computer is used daily in Holland by 84% of the population in 2013 (CBS Statline, 2014), so the concept of a computer is indeed suitable in order to adapt to the audience's everyday world.

Swaab is not the only scientist who speaks of the brain in these terms. Many other speakers (such as Miesenboeck, Markram, Merzenich and Wolpert) make the comparison with a machine explicitly in their TED-talk. For Kuhn, the communal aspect of scientific paradigms is important to understand how scientific progress takes place. The metaphor that a scientist gives to an object such as the brain determines with who he communicates, shares insights and which values he adopts (Haraway, 1976). The perspective of Kuhnian paradigms to metaphor thus enables the analyst to draw a general overview of the scientific field.

The second function that mechanical brain metaphors can have is related to the notion of performativity described in the previous chapter. Some authors have recognized that metaphors not only describe or refer to the world, but also change it: they can be an actor in the course of events themselves. Metaphors can in some cases play a political role, that is, instead of only referring to reality they have the ability to also shape reality. This was effectively described by Wyatt, who investigated metaphors for the internet in the magazine Wired, and found that these metaphors influenced the public debate, policy and theory about the internet (2004).

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In a similar way, the use of a mechanical concept when referring to the brain can be related to scientist's wishes for future research. A discipline that is growing very fast recently is computational neuroscience, in which insights from neuroscience, psychology, cognitive science, computer science and mathematics are being synthesized. In the following example, neuroscientist Daniel Wolpert concludes his speech at TED and subtly hints at how he thinks scientific research should proceed:

Example 2

So I hope I've convinced you the brain is there and evolved to control movement. And it's an intellectual challenge to understand how we do that. But it's also relevant for disease and rehabilitation. There are many diseases which effect movement. And hopefully if we understand how we control movement, we can apply that to robotic technology. And finally, I want to remind you, when you see animals do what look like very simple tasks, the actual complexity of what is going on inside their brain is really quite dramatic. (July, 2011)

In this fragment, Wolpert supports research in which the brain is treated as an actor that 'controls movement', as a robot does. The association of movement control with a robot is made explicit as a side issue (apply that to robotic technology), but regarding the fact that Wolpert is both engineer and neuroscientist, it may be of greater importance than it seems.

Sismondo notes that metaphors play an important role on both the direction of inquiry and how people generally think about a topic, because they function as frameworks with which structures of material things can be elucidated (2011, p. 156). Metaphors are also often recognised as a heuristic tool (Maasen, 1995, p. 251), resulting in new questions, concepts and research agendas.

A third general function of metaphors in popular science is to clarify complex scientific insights. Kendall-Taylor and Haydon analysed metaphors that are used by scientists of resilience and effectively described the force of such a linguistic tool to explain complex findings about the resilience of people and societies and pave the way for “engaging non-experts in its programmatic and policy implications” (2014, p. 10).

In metaphors, an abstract structure is generally being compared to another abstract structure that is easier to understand. This becomes clear in the following example, in which Swaab is debating with a Rabbi about religion, and he claims that human behaviour is nothing more than a result of chemical processes in the brain. The interviewer asks him while understanding the brain in such a way, he still falls in love. Later she asks him whether he is a romantic husband. Swaab responds:

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Example 3

The fact that you understand a mechanism doesn't mean that you treat this machine differently. If you know how a vacuum cleaner works, you don’t use it in a different way. (January, 2007)

In this statement, the relation between understanding a brain and behaviour that results from processes in that brain is being compared to the relation between understanding a vacuum cleaner and using one. This is a clear example of a structure as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971) formulated, which has the form of (for example): A:B = C:D.

This analogy is metaphorical according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca because of the difference in nature of a brain and a vacuum cleaner. That is, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca characterise metaphor as an analogy in which “fusion of spheres and transcendence of traditional classifications” make it very much suited for poetry, philosophy and comedy (1971, p. 40).

This overview still does not account for all functions the mechanical metaphor can have in brain discourse. Brains are also often seemingly mindless called 'a machine' or 'a computer' in a very indirect way. Erik Scherder, a neuroscientist who is very eager to visit popular Dutch media, seems to distance himself from comparisons with machines whatsoever. In none of his books (Laat je hersenen niet zitten, 2014; Veroudering en de ziekte van Alzheimer, 2001) words like 'machine' or 'computer' are used, and also other comparisons are not easy to be found. However, one of his recent 'lectures' at DWDD University, a prime-time 45 minute talk about the workings of the brain, was called 'The Power Switch' (De Aanknop). Also in this talk no comparison was explicitly made between the brain and any mechanical device but, though chaotically formulated, indirectly:

Example 4

And exactly of coma you can say, if you are talking about the power switch, from the brainstem, thalamus, to the cortex, that with a coma this power switch is temporarily, hopefully, off. (April, 2015)

This is a mechanical metaphor because power switches are generally known to occur with machines, thus the state of coma is being compared to the state of a machine being off.

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3.2 The argumentative function of brain metaphors

Apart from general functions such as those described above, metaphors have argumentative aspects as well. Van Eemeren et al. treat argumentation “as a means of resolving a difference of opinion” (2002, p. xi). It is therefore necessary, when searching for argumentative aspects, to look at differences of opinion that may play a role. From the following example, also mentioned in the first chapter, it becomes clear that the mechanical brain metaphor itself is the subject of a difference of opinion:

Example 5

If we start thinking about ourselves in a way in which some neuroscientists recommend we do, namely as machines, it will provide us with a range of excuses which are not really legitimate excuses, it will diminish our sense of responsibility, and answer-ability for ideas, and those are very deleterious social consequences and moral consequences. (June, 2013) Hacker, in example 2, verbalizes a strong critique against the metaphorical language of many neuroscientists. Apparently there is a debate between proponents and opponents of the mechanical brain metaphor. In this sense, opponents in this debate, when using such a metaphor, join a community of other supporters of the same metaphor. In this way they position themselves in the paradigm of specific theorists. For example Swaab, as became clear in example 1, is a proponent of the metaphor. He said 'the computer metaphor of our time isn't such a bad one', and it is 'hard to avoid'. Hacker rejects this by claiming that this metaphor has very bad consequences, and calls the idea absurd. He therefore can be seen as an opponent in this difference of opinion.

Metaphors can also be argumentative on a very different level, such as in the example of a newspaper column of Rosanne Hertzberger:

Example 6

It is ridiculous that the human being with that enormous computer in his head in 2015 is still loading wash machines [...] and has to pay attention to other stupid businesses. (May, 2015) Hertzberger is a microbiologist who has her own column in the well-read newspaper NRC Next, in which she in this case argues for robots to do domestic chores. The computer metaphor for the brain plays a minor, unobtrusive role in this fragment. The difference of opinion obviously concerns the chores and 'other stupid businesses', and not the metaphor itself. The metaphor, the 'enormous computer in our head' here seems to be functioning as a short way to say how intelligent humans are

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in contrast with the stupid tasks we need to do in the household. The metaphor, in other words, functions as support for a standpoint that is in itself not metaphorical at all.

In a similar way, the metaphor in example 3 functions, apart from the function of clarification, as support for a standpoint that has nothing to do with vacuum cleaners. Swaab was here arguing that he could still have feelings like love, and the metaphor somehow functions as support for this standpoint. In chapter 4 I will investigate how exactly such a support works.

To sum up, metaphors can have various functions. They can be used to describe information in a paradigmatic way, thereby positioning within the scientific field and setting up a framework that can be shared with others in the same paradigm. Metaphors can also be performative in the sense that they themselves are actors in a network, for example resulting in new questions for research or even giving direction to society. And third, metaphors can be used to make specific points clear, comparing two abstract structures of which one is easy to understand. In addition, it has become clear that there are two levels in the discourse in which differences of opinion occur. First, there is a difference of opinion between opponents and proponents of the mechanical brain metaphor. This difference of opinion generally takes place between scientists, who argue about the consequences of scientific language use. Second, innumerable differences of opinion can exist between scientists and the audience in popular science. These typically originate in anticipated doubt from the audience and manifest themselves in argumentation for scientific claims. Metaphors in these differences of opinion function as support for those claims.

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4 Argumentative analysis of brain metaphors in popular science

In chapter 2 I have discussed popular science as a context in which scientist´s findings are communicated to a non-specific audience in attempt to let them be accepted as facts. I found that in popular science certain presentational forms occur that can be instrumental in both increasing the acceptability of those claims and adaptation to the social world of the audience. In chapter 3 we found that one of these forms, the metaphor, can also be instrumental for the speaker to position himself in a scientific paradigm, influence future research and clarify complex information. In addition, metaphors appeared to be argumentative on two different levels.

This chapter will investigate how examples, such as those mentioned in chapter 3, can be analysed as argumentative acts. In the first section I will give a basic introduction of three analytical accounts of analogous argumentation, brought forward by respectively Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Garssen and Kienpointner. In section 3.2 I showed that there are two differences of opinion at work at the same time, which will treated apart from each other in this chapter. The second section will therefore be focussed on arguments of scientists that anticipate doubt of the direct audience and explores how these scientists use metaphors to make their claims more acceptable. The third section will be concerned with a second difference of opinion that is present between experts and concerns the metaphor of the brain itself.

4.1 Metaphor as analogical argumentation

As explained in section 3.1 follow Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca Aristotle in the basic metaphorical structure: 'A:B=C:D'. Metaphors, they say, produce a fusion between a theme (A:B), what the speaker is talking about, and a phoros (C:D), a concept or structure that the listener is familiar with. Because the listener knows or understands the abstract structure of the phoros, he will in principle accept and understand the abstract structure of the theme more easily. The phoros and the theme can be related in more complex ways, but the metaphorical fusion between domains is always central (1971, pp. 399-403). The structure of a metaphor thus has been dealt with sufficiently. But how can such general mappings between two distinct conceptual domains, as Lakoff described metaphors, be argumentative (1993, p. 203)?

Garssen adopted the term figurative analogy and argued that this is not a type of argumentation but a presentational device, able to “put forward other types of argumentation” (2009, p. 134). Garssen also stresses the fact that the figurative analogy brings together two elements that are

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situated on very different domains: they are not directly comparable at first sight. The similarity between elements is often an abstract structure within both elements, such as the relation between A and B which is being compared to the relation between C and D. Garssen notes: “it does not make much sense to look for more similarities” (2009, p. 138).

Kienpointner has formulated a model for a descriptive variant of the figurative analogy:

Major Premise : Generally, case C1 is similar to C2 and C1 and C2 belong to (totally) different domains of reality.

Relevant Similarity Premise : The similarity between C1 and C2 observed so far is relevant. Minor Premise : Proposition A is true (false) in case C1.

Conclusion : Proposition A’ is true (false) in case C2. (2012, p. 114. Italics in original)

This model is problematic for several reasons. As Garssen noted, case 1 and 2 are not similar, because they belong to different domains of reality. The major premise is therefore nonsensical. The only similarity between the cases is proposition A, the central message of the argument. This makes the argument circular, because the major premise and the relevant similarity premise can only be supported with this similarity: proposition A, which also constitutes the standpoint. This model can be translated into pragma-dialectical terms (van Eemeren, et al., 2002, p. 68-72) and would look something like this:

1 A is true of C2 1.1 A is true of C1

1.1' C1 and C2 are comparable (similar in a relevant respect) 1.1'.1 A is true in both C1 and C2

Kienpointner also distinguishes a normative variant, which concerns the rightness of an action A instead of the truth of proposition A. On the issue of comparability Kienpointner seems to disagree with Garssen, which also becomes clear from one of the critical questions formulated by Kienpointner:

CQ3: Are the important (that is, the most relevant) differences (dissimilarities) between C1 and C2 too overwhelming to allow a conclusion which crosses the different domains of reality to which C1 and C2 belong? (2012, p. 114).

In short, authors who looked at figurative analogies were, among other things, concerned with the comparability of the phoros and the theme and the argumentative aspect that lies in the (only) similarity between the elements. The argumentative model that results from these contributions is

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inherently circular, because the comparability always has to be supported by the same thing that constitutes the standpoint. I will now, with help of the examples from chapter 3, explore an alternative to this model in order to find out how the metaphor can be argumentative.

4.2 Metaphor as support for a claim

The simplest example of a metaphor that is used to support a non-metaphorical claim is example 3. Here, Swaab referred to a vacuum cleaner without mentioning any similarities between a vacuum cleaner and a human brain at all. He did explicitly mention the rule 'the fact that you understand a mechanism doesn't mean that you treat this machine differently'. Taking into consideration the context and the fact that Swaab had repeatedly called the human brain a machine, we may interpret 'this machine' as referring to his brain, in relation to behaviour such as 'being a romantic husband'. Let us summarize all the ways in which Swaab claims he has not changed, such as falling in love and being a romantic husband, by calling it 'normal behaviour'. The standpoint than would be: 'my behaviour is normal despite my understanding of the brain'. The metaphor “if you know how a vacuum cleaner works, you don’t use it in a different way” follows immediately, which suggests it functions as support for the standpoint.

Now how exactly does the argument work, that is, how is the metaphor used to support the standpoint? The metaphor brings up a case that is very different from the initial case about the human brain, except for one similarity: they are both based on the same abstract structure. That is, allegedly understanding the brain relates to behaviour in a similar way as understanding a vacuum cleaner relates to using a vacuum cleaner. This abstract structure I will from now on call 'structure A', and can be seen as a negative causal relation: the former does not cause a change in the latter. Structure A amounts to the only similarity between the two cases of the metaphor and, following Kienpointner, could be reconstructed as support for the comparability of the two cases (premise 1.1'), which would make the argument circular thus fallacious. However, it seems strange to analyse metaphors with a model that is fallacious beforehand.

A slight change of the standpoint would resolve this problem. In the original fragment, Swaab responded to the question of the interviewer whether he is romantic as a husband, assuming that the understanding of chemical processes in the brain would lead him to abolish romance and falling in love. Swaab thus needed to convince the interviewee that it is possible to still have this normal behaviour despite a deep understanding of the brain, because there is no causal relation between those things. The standpoint should therefore not be 'my behaviour is normal despite my

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understanding of the brain' but 'it is possible to have normal behaviour despite understanding of the brain'! The metaphor thus functions as support for the possibility of structure A, and not as support for the truth of structure A in the case of the brain. The possibility of a structure can indeed be proved by adducing a totally different case, as long as the structure is applicable to this case. The argumentative model would then be as follows:

1 It is possible to have normal behaviour despite understanding of the brain 1.1 Behaviour is related to understanding of the brain via structure A 1.1' Structure A is possible

1.1'.1 Vacuum cleaning is related to my understanding of a vacuum cleaner via structure A The metaphor is thus located as a support for the implicit premise 1.1', which is not a statement about comparability but a statement about the possibility of an abstract structure.

A more complex version of this argumentative model can be found in the following example of Henry Markram who held a TED-talk that was called 'A Brain in a Supercomputer'. Halfway his presentation he started talking about a piano:

Example 7

So you can think of the neocortex actually as a massive grand piano, a million-key grand piano. Each of these cortical columns would produce a note. You stimulate it; it produces a symphony. But it's not just a symphony of perception. It's a symphony of your universe, your reality. Now, of course it takes years to learn how to master a grand piano with a million keys. That's why you have to send your kids to good schools, hopefully eventually to Oxford. But it's not only education. It's also genetics. You may be born lucky, where you know how to master your neocortical column, and you can play a fantastic symphony. (July, 2009)

In Aristotelian terms, this metaphor can be summarized as follows: • Neocortex : Cortical column = Piano : Key. (A:B=C:D)

• Stimulation of Cortical column : Universe, Reality = Stimulation of Key : Symphony. (SB:E=SD:F)

• Learning Cortical column : Education and genetics = Learning to play piano : Education and genetics. (LC:G=LB:G)

The theme, using the capitals between the brackets, consists of A,B,E,G; and the phoros consists of C,D,F,G. In order to find the argumentative aspect of a fragment such as this, it is necessary to first find the standpoints that are being defended. For this it is helpful to look again at the aims the

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speaker might have. Markram is a scientist, who, as discussed in the second chapter, characteristically engages in popular science in order to allow his scientific claims to be accepted by the audience, and ultimately society, as facts. The neuroscientific claims that can be found in this fragment are:

1. Your universe or reality is the result of the stimulation of all cortical columns. 2. It takes years to learn to optimally develop your brain.

3. The extent in which you succeed to develop your brain is a result of both education and genetics.

These three scientific facts can be taken as the standpoints, and all are supported by the different aspects of the analogy between the neocortex and a grand piano. A metaphor, I explained in 4.1, can increase the understandability of the theme by comparing it to the already familiar abstract structure of the phoros. This applies to more of the examples: both a vacuum cleaner and playing a piano are much more familiar and understandable to the general audience than the brain.

But how does that increase the acceptability of these standpoints? As Garssen suggested, we need to look at the similarity between the elements of the metaphor in order to grasp the argumentative aspect (2009, p.138). In the case of the first standpoint, this similarity amounts to the abstract structure behind A:B and the structure between C:D. Keys are technical, non-magical, small components, in contrast to the fantastic, emotional, beyond explanation, all-encompassing nature of a symphony. The same contrast between a small, simple component and the magical and complex product applies to a cortical column and our reality. This contrast is thus the similarity: structure A. Despite the fact that neither keys and cortical columns nor symphonies and universes are comparable to each other, that is, are from the same class or domain of thought, the relation between the elements of the phoros is similar to the relation between the elements in the theme.

Just as in example 3, the similarity is the abstract structure (A) and the metaphor establishes support for the possibility of this abstract structure. This increases the acceptability of the first standpoint according to the following model:

1 It is possible that your reality is the indirect result of innumerable cortical columns in the neocortex

1.1 Your reality is related to cortical columns via structure A 1.1' Structure A is capable of occurring

1.1'.1 A symphony is related to keys of a grand piano via structure A

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However, in this case the argument is more complex. The value of learning and the role of genetics constitute yet two new similarities between the brain and a piano. It is thus not true in this case that, as Garssen claimed, metaphors can only have one similarity. However, in this case we see that those similarities all concern a different standpoint. Standpoint 2, the claim about the value and duration of learning 'to master your brain', is supported with the fact that you need years to learn to play a symphony, which again proves the possibility of such a fact. And standpoint 3, the fact that genetics play a role, is supported with the fact that some are born lucky and learn to play a fantastic symphony. Markram thus succeeds in establishing the acceptability of three abstract structures by using one metaphor.

In addition, the 'extra' similarities between the brain and a grand piano also support the metaphor itself. In the second section I will explore more ways in which the analogy of a mechanical object with the brain can be supported with argumentation.

4.3 Metaphor as a standpoint in need of argumentation

In chapter 3 I concluded that there are two differences of opinion on different levels present in popular-scientific discourse. Apart from supporting all kinds of claims regarding the brain, metaphors can also be the subject of discussion. The example of the piano-metaphor, discussed in the previous section, contains an additional layer of argumentation that relates to this second difference of opinion. This can be reconstructed as follows:

1 A massive grand piano (GP) is a good metaphor for a neocortex (NC) 1.1 NC and GP are similar.

1.1.1 NC and GP both indirectly produce a 'symphony'.

1.1.2 It takes years to learn how to master both a NC and a GP.

1.1.3 Genetics decide partly the extent you can learn to master a NC and a GP.

In the first example, in which Swaab introduces the mechanical metaphor, he explicitly positions himself as a protagonist of the standpoint that this metaphor is a good or suitable way to talk about the brain. The statement 'the computer metaphor of our time isn't such a bad one' is supported with resemblances between the brain and a computer. This, Swaab claims, makes the comparison 'hard to avoid'. The resemblances thus explicitly serve to support the appropriateness of the metaphor. A reconstruction would look like this:

1 The computer metaphor for the brain is a good metaphor 22

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1.1 A comparison between a computer and a brain is appropriate 1.1.1 A brain and a computer are both highly interconnected

1.1.2 A brain and a computer can both process images and associations very efficiently 1.1.3 Etc.

The qualification 'hard to avoid' is substituted with the more straightforward word 'appropriate'. The resemblances between the two domains serve as a support for the standpoint because of a justificatory force such as 'if there are resemblances between two domains, a comparison is appropriate' and 'if a comparison is appropriate, the metaphor linking those domains is a good metaphor'. In this way, more similarities can thus be brought forward in order to strengthen metaphorical arguments as the ones discussed in 4.2.

The appropriateness of the metaphor is also being disputed, as appears from the contribution of Peter Hacker. In his statement (example 5), he argues against scientists such as Swaab, who favours the mechanical metaphor. His standpoint is as follows:

1 We should not think about ourselves [our brains] as machines.

The fact that Hacker mentions ´consequences´ which are ´deleterious´ is an indication for a pragmatic argument (Van Eemeren, et al., 2002, p. 101-2) that typically recommends a certain course of action on the basis of its (un)desirable consequences. The argumentation therefore has the following structure:

1.1 Thinking about ourselves as machines has undesirable consequences.

1.1' If a course of action leads to consequences that are undesirable, we should not adopt that course of action.

1.1.1 The machine-metaphor provides people with illegitimate excuses for things and a diminished sense of responsibility and answerability.

In conclusion, the reconstruction of metaphorical argumentation in popular science should begin with the question if the metaphor functions as the standpoint or as support. Arguments can be given for the metaphor itself, in the form of resemblances or as pragmatic argument. Arguments can also have the form of a metaphor, in which resemblances form a further support for the argument. Taking apart those two categories is important, because they both should be reconstructed in a very different way.

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5 Conclusion

In this thesis I set out to improve our analytical approach to metaphorical argumentation by looking at a specific context. I asked the question: how can a metaphor be analysed as support for a scientific claim in popular brain science? I have started with a characterisation of this context, in which scientists present their knowledge to a general audience, and identified some communicative devices that could be seen as characteristic to popular science. I have argued that popular science revolves around the social process of establishing facts, which entails tools and conventions that increase the facticity of scientific claims. The metaphor, proved to be especially apposite in popular-scientific discourse because it does not have the appearance of argumentation for a claim, though it does increase its acceptability. Metaphorical language is instrumental in popular science for several reasons. First, it gives scientists the opportunity to position themselves in a scientific debate. The debate about whether the brain is 'like' a machine is a good example of a paradigmatic division within contemporary brain science. Second, metaphors are instrumental to influence the course of events within scientific research and destigmatise society. In this way metaphors can themselves be an actor in the network around science (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). Third, metaphors are subservient to the social process of fact-making because they elucidate complex information by introducing a concept or situation that is familiar to a broad audience.

From section 3.2 onwards I have concerned myself with the question how metaphors, apart from the general purposes, serve to increase the acceptability of scientific claims. That is, how can metaphors be argumentative? From my characterisation of the context I concluded that in popular science the analyst should distinguish two differences of opinion relating to metaphors. In each difference of opinion the metaphorical argument has a different nature. The analysis of a metaphor should therefore always be preceded by answering the question whether (A) the metaphor itself is a standpoint for which argumentation is given, or (B) the metaphor is advanced to support a different, non-metaphorical standpoint.

In case A the argumentation is fairly simple. The standpoint is about the suitability or usefulness of the metaphor, and this is supported with independent arguments that amount to resemblances between the cases that are being compared. The argument can of course contain more subordinate premises of another nature, but they do in principle not consist of metaphors themselves. The following model of subordinate argumentation applies, in which F and G are the two elements of the metaphor:

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1 You can think of F as a G 1.1 F and G have resemblances. 1.1.1 Resemblance 1

1.1.2 Resemblance 2

But the question of case B remained: how can general mappings between two distinct conceptual domains (Lakoff, 1993, p. 203) can be analysed as argumentation for a standpoint. Several accounts in the literature on argumentation theory already addressed metaphors, of which the most relevant were focussed on what they call 'figurative analogy'. Kienpointner developed a model for the figurative analogy in which there was room to account for the relevance of the similarity between the two cases. Unfortunately when there is only one similarity, this model appeared to be inherently circular. Through the analysis of some examples, I found that a metaphor, when adduced to support a scientific claim, can function as support for the plausibility of a particular abstract structure. In this case the metaphor, by introducing a conceptual domain in which this abstract structure is obvious (a domain in which P is true of Q), supports the fact that the structure really can occur. This resulted in a model that is not inherently fallacious, as the model formulated by Kienpointner was. The model looks like this:

1 X is true of Y

1.1a X and Y are related via abstract structure A 1.1b Abstract structure A is capable of occurring 1.1a-b.1 P and Q are obviously related via structure A

These results are not in any way exhaustive, neither as a list of patterns nor as a rule that accounts for all metaphors in this context. The examples adduced in this thesis are merely illustrative for the points I have made, and do not provide any statistic evidence. However, these points are important for argumentation analysts. Metaphors are similar to, for example, visual images and narratives in the sense that they are common communicative phenomena which argumentation theorists are only recently starting to see as potential argumentative devices. Analytical inquiries to the argumentative aspect of these forms of language have proved to be a challenge for existing theories on argumentation, but certainly have the potential of reinforcing them. The suggestion for analysis that I have done in chapter 4 is one example of a way in which argumentation theory can be extended in order to account for a wider variety of communicative phenomena. In this way this thesis fits within the contemporary efforts of theorists trying to integrate insights from argumentation theoretical frameworks and contextual information in the analysis, which makes it possible to “draw conclusions that otherwise could not have been reached” (van Eemeren, et al., 2014, p. 736).

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As I have shown, it is important to start from a characterisation of a context when identifying standpoints and arguments. My review of literature from disciplines as sociology of science and journalism resulted in the identification of communicative devices that can be expected in popular science. This made it possible to describe metaphorical language as an instrument that scientists can, among other things, use to increase the acceptability of their claims. From these findings I concluded that metaphors in popular science, in addition to being useful for scientists in various ways, have the potential of being argumentative. I have given a recommendation on how to approach these metaphors in future research. That is, some metaphors should be analysed as a standpoint and others as argumentation. For both cases, I have formulated an argumentative model which can be used to reconstruct these metaphors as standpoints or as support for scientific claims.

I have provided the preconditions for empirical research that could aim at answering the question of Garssen: “when and in what contexts is it advantageous to use this presentational device and what exactly makes the figurative analogy more effective than a direct presentation of the argumentation” (2009, p. 139). This thesis thus opens up many possibilities for future study both on an empirical and on a normative level. The empirical level amounts to either research to the strategic maneuvering of scientists in the context of popular science, or to quantitative research of effectiveness or argumentative indicators of metaphorical arguments. The normative level amounts to the issue of evaluation. I have now provided one model for metaphorical argumentation that is not fallacious beforehand, but this does not prohibit scientists to provide metaphors that do mislead the listener. Normative criteria therefore have to be developed in order to assess the reasonableness of arguments about – or with – a metaphor.

This thesis is also relevant to those concerned with the role of science in society. I have provided a discussion of popular science as a communicative context in which scientists not only strive for more enthusiasm and appreciation of their discipline, but also argue more or less directly about scientific issues that are of interest for the entire society. Together with the growing body of information on the internet, platforms have evolved on which scientific insights are shared and debated. But also in more traditional media such as television and newspapers science is more present than ever. As I have shown, it is necessary to acknowledge this discourse as at least partly argumentative and investigate which rhetorical devices are employed in order to affect the reception of scientific findings. Processes like the ones described in this thesis determine common knowledge: the things that are considered facts in society.

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Metaphorical Argumentation in Popular Science