Ceuta and Melilla as a Gateways to Fortress Europe:
The consequences for human rights when border security is humanitarianised.
Golfers in Melilla and African Migrants Clinging to Border Fence. Source: International Bu-siness Time UK edition.
Master Programme: Political Science International Relations Research Project: Geopolitics, Borders and Conflict
Author: Lisa de Meijer
Student number: 10008187
Date: 26/06/2015
Supervisor: dr. Polly Pallister-Wilkins
Abstract
This thesis aims to analyse the consequences for human rights in a humanitarianised bor-der enforcement. In the first part of this thesis the theories to unbor-derstand my research question are highlighted. First I introduce the term humanitarianism based on the work of
scholars like Fassin and Barnett and Weiss. I also introduce the term ‘humanitarian government’ by Fassin. Furthermore the security theory by Huysmans and the paradox of
protection by Bigo are conceptualized. Finally, I touch upon the relation between the hu-manitarianisation of border enforcement and teichopolitics. A discussion about how bar-riers relate to this humanitarian border security/policing through teichopolitics is included.
In the second part of this thesis I use these theories to analyse three major events at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla to see what happens to Human Rights. Ceuta and Melilla are
two Spanish Enclaves located in northern Morocco, on the African continent. The events that are analysed are the use of fences at Ceuta and Melilla, the events at February 6
2014 in Ceuta, and the push-backs executed in the name of the Spanish-Moroccan agreement. I have used an interpretive approach to analyse written documents like news
articles, rapports from human rights organizations and official documents from the Euro-pean Union and the Spanish government.
Keywords
European Union; Spain; Borders; Ceuta; Melilla; Geopolitics; Human Rights; Securitizati-on; Humanitarianism; Teichopolitics
Table of Contents
Abstract p. 3
Introduction p. 5
Theoretical Framework p. 8
Humanitarianism p. 8
Human Rights and Humanitarianism p. 11
Security Theory p. 12
Teichopolitics p. 14
Methodology p. 17
Analysis p. 19
Tragedy at Tarajal, Ceuta on February 6 2014 p. 19
The return of the barbed wires at the borders of Melilla in 2013 p. 23
Push-backs p. 27
Conclusion p. 33
Introduction
According to the European Commission 276.113 migrants entered the EU irregularly in 2014, an increase of 138% compared to 2013. Migration flows to the European Union are still a hot topic. Irregular migrants enter the EU mostly by land or sea routes. Two land borders of the EU that are attractive to irregular migrants are the Spanish enclaves of Ceu-ta and Melilla. In 2013 2.508 immigrants entered Melilla compared to 4.952 in 2014. (AP-DHA, 2015) Both enclaves are located on the continent of Africa but are part of Spain. Since the accession of Spain to the EU in 1986 they are also part of the European Union. This means that since 1986 the border has had a double geopolitical significance, as a na-tional border (between Spain and Morocco) and as an external border of the European Union. In 1991 Spain became part of the Schengen Agreement, but a special provision was made which allowed for continuation of the existing bilateral local border traffic agreements between Spain and Morocco concerning Ceuta and Melilla. However, at the same time Spain continued to carry out controls on persons traveling from these two towns to the mainland to ensure that they satisfied the conditions laid down in Article 5 of the 1990 convention. This means that Ceuta and Melilla are not part of the Schengen Area. With the increase of illegal immigration the fences of the enclaves were reinforced in 1995, with the purpose to stop illegal immigration.
The increase of illegal migration brought security risks with it. It can be argued that migra-tion is a ‘game of risk’. For example, there is the security risk for example for the European Union but there is also a risk for the migrant who is literally risking his/her life. In the case of the EU and the state it is about securing the border to protect its own inhabitants. At the borders of Ceuta and Melilla the Spanish Guardia Civil does everything it can to keep the migrants out and has used violence to do this. Spain is often criticized for these practices by human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch and The Asociación Pro De-rechos Humanos de Andalucía. However, Spain keeps defending the violent practices by saying that they are carried out in the name of Europe’s border security. The humanitarian argument is that the greater border security is carried out to increase the safety of the mi-grants. There has been a humanitarisation of border enforcement. Within this discourse the safety of the migrant and border security are framed as a mutually obtainable goal. (Williams, 2014:1) In order to protect borders, ‘humanitarian’ fences are built. These fen-ces are humanitarian in a way that they respect the right to life are build, but at the same time these fences protect territory. However, is this even possible? The dilemma between
respecting life and maintaining the territory of the European Union emerges. Has the secu-ritization of borders really reduced migrants mortality rates and has it not made the mi-grants life more insecure? It seems that humanitarianism today has come to displace hu-man rights.
The research question for this thesis is: ‘What happens to human rights when border
secu-rity is humanitarianised?’ My main argument is that human rights are lost in a policy where
only the right to life is respected and where the security of territory plays an important role. This thesis is set up in two parts. The first part is the theoretical framework where I will lay out the theories and concepts used in this thesis such as security theory, humanitarianism and human rights. Furthermore I will connect these theories and explain the similarities between humanitarianism, human rights and security. Finally, in the theoretical framework, I will include a discussion about how barriers relate to this humanitarian border security/ policing through teichopolitics.
The second part of this thesis is the analysis. I will connect my theories to the case of the border enforcement of the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla (See Image 1). As stated above the enclaves are famous for the fences that have been reinforced in 1995. Illegal migrants not only try to jump over the fences in order to get into the the enclaves, another way of entering illegally is by sea. This can be by boat or by swimming around the fences where these reach into the sea. This is considered extremely dangerous due to the strong currents in the waters. The main focus of this thesis will be on what happens to human rights when border security is humanitarianised. I will use an interpretative approach to analyse practices by comparing political documents and reports from NGOs, human rights organizations and news articles. The data used for my interpretations will illustrate my ar-gument that human rights are lost in a policy where only the right to life is respected and where the security of territory plays an important role.
Relevance
This thesis aims to draw attention to the consequences for human rights as the result of the European border regime, focusing on the borders of Ceuta and Melilla. With an increa-sing stream of migration due to tragedies in Syria and Eritrea amongst others, it is impor-tant to analyse what happens to human rights in a humanitarianised border security sys-tem. In May 2015 the European Commission presented a European Agenda on Migration which drew the outline for the immediate measures to be taken in order to respond to the
humanitarian crisis situation in the Mediterranean. First Vice-President Frans Timmermans of the European Commission said (2015): ‘The tragic loss of life in the Mediterranean has
shocked all Europeans. Our citizens expect Member States and European institutions to act to prevent this tragedy from continuing unabated.’ So while there seems to be lots of
attention to the the humanitarian ‘right’ to bare life it is unclear what happens to the human rights of migrants in the humanitarianisation of border enforcement. By arguing that human rights are lost in a policy where only the right to life is respected and where the security of territory plays an important role I want to draw attention to the fact that human rights are being violated in the current migration policy of both Spain and the European Union.
Image 1: ‘Overview of Ceuta and Melilla.’ Source: https://therightsangle.wordpress.com/ 2013/12/19/the-1992-spanish-morocco-readmission-agreement-in-english/
Theoretical Framework
Introduction
In this chapter I will provide an overview of the key theories and concepts that articulate the research and lay down the overarching theoretical foundation of this thesis. In this the-oretical framework I will conceptualize the theories of humanitarianism, human rights and security because these are the key concepts in the argument of this thesis. My main ar-gument is that human rights are lost in the humanitarian discourse of border enforcement. Firstly, I will lay out how I conceptualize humanitarianism based on the work of other scho-lars like Fassin, Barnett and Weiss. The term humanitarianism is of importance in under-standing the humanitarian discourse of border enforcement. Secondly I will include a dis-cussion on human rights and its relationship to humanitarianism and how this relates to migration. Thirdly I will take a deeper look into the theory of security by Huysmans’ (2006) and the paradox of protection as conceptualized by Bigo (2006). Over the last few deca-des the idea that the securitization and militarization of borders through humanitarianisati-on of border enforcement could save lives has emerged. (Williams, 2014:1) Finally I will introduce the concept of teichopolitics as it is defined by Ballif and Rosière and Jones. I will touch upon the relation between the humanitarianisation of border enforcement and teichopolitics. A discussion about how barriers relate to this humanitarian border security/ policing through teichopolitics will also be included.
Humanitarianism
To understand my argument, namely that human rights are lost in the humanitarian dis-course of border enforcement, it is important to define the concept and ideas of humanita-rianism. Humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and uni-versality are the seven core principles of humanitarianism as defined by Jean Pictet of the International Committee of the Red Cross. (Barnett and Weiss, 2008:3) Didier Fassin (2012) defines humanitarianism as a ‘rationalizing’ logic of contemporary politic where the
preservation of human life and alleviation of human suffering is privileged.’ (Williams,
2014:3) According to Fassin this has ironic and paradoxical results. Barnett and Weiss (2008:11) define humanitarianism as an ‘act motivated by an altruistic desire to provide
life-saving relief; to honor the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and indepen-dence; and to do more good than harm’. So it can be argued that humanitarianism is about
the provision of relief to victims of human-made and natural disasters. Historically humani-tarianism has been concerned with the saving or relief of the human or humanity and
no-thing more. The discourse of humanitarianism has been framed in very strong language of moral duties and responsibilities. Humanitarian agencies base these moral duties and res-ponsibilities on their common humanity. (Barnett and Snyder, 2008:168) Barnett and Weiss argue that there are three periods within humanitarianism: the first one from the early 19th century through to World War II, the second from 1945 until the end of the Cold War and the third from 1990 until today. (Ibid, p.21) Humanitarianism is treated as a symbol of what is good about the world. (Rieff 2002:333)
Fassin introduces the concept of ‘humanitarian government’. By this he means the de-ployment of moral sentiments in contemporary politics. These ‘moral sentiments’ are the emotions that we have when others are suffering that make us want to help them or the sympathy we feel for the misfortune of others. (Fassin, 2012:1) We should understand ‘government’ in a broader sense here as ‘the set of procedures established and actions
conducted in order to manage, regulate, and support the existence of human beings: government includes but exceeds the intervention of the state, local administrations, inter-national bodies and political institutions more generally.’ (Ibid, p.2) With the concept of
‘humanitarian government’ Fassin means to address a certain language and practices that are used to both define and to justify the discourses and practice of governments. This language includes terms such as: suffering, assistance, responsibility to protect on both the national and international level. (Ibid) Fassin’s examples of this languages included the case of French authorities’ grant of residence to immigrants on the condition that they were suffering from a serious illness and could not be treated at their home country, on the grounds of ‘humanitarian reasons’. This is where the humanitarian language becomes an action, so humanitarianism is more than just language.
Through humanitarian reason and action insecure lives, like the lives of asylum seekers and sick immigrants, are being governed. The humanitarian government protects these lives, they are the subjects of humanitarianism. Humanitarian government is thus about the politics of insecure lives. (Ibid, p.4) Another example of humanitarian reason is the bombing of Kosovo by NATO in 1999, which certain Western heads of state called for on ‘purely humanitarian grounds’. So the concept of humanitarian government is used to rea-son about choices that are made. However, it can be argued that it is no more than a smo-ke screen playing on sentiment for the sasmo-ke of imposing the law of the marsmo-ket and the in-humanity of realpolitik. (Ibid, p.2) All humanitarian governments consist of a relation of a domination and a relation of assistance, there is a tension between equality and solidarity.
The social relations between the two parties are not equal since one of them makes a ge-sture out of ‘moral sentiment’ with possibly nothing in return. The receiving party realizes very well that they are expected to show gratitude and humility rather than expressing de-mands for rights. (Ibid, p.4)
As stated above there is a tension between two parties that are not equal. So there is the dominant self and the other that needs to be helped. Humanitarian action is focused on the others or strangers. (Barnett and Weiss, 2008:7) The saving of these ‘strangers’ has implicitly been linked to emergencies. Calhoun (2008) defines an emergency as ‘a sudden
unpredictable event emerging against a background of ostensible normalcy, causing suffe-ring or danger and demanding an urgent response.’ It seems that ‘emergency’ has become
the primary term when referring to conflicts, catastrophes or human suffering. Since the Cold War states have become more central players in humanitarian action. They have be-come the agents of humanitarianism. Calhoun (Ibid) makes the claim that nowadays states more often give a humanitarian justification of wars. He gives the example of the United States presenting its invasion of Iraq as a ‘humanitarian intervention’. Another example was the bombing of Kosovo, which I used in the last paragraph to illustrate humanitarian reason by governments and thus states. This relates to Fassin’s theories and his idea of humanitarianism as a governing rationality. Actions are justified in another way, to a de-gree where governments are increasingly using the humanitarian argument as a base for their (armed) interventions. (Fassin, 2012:7)
To understand what the humanitarian discourse in border enforcement is, I need to explain what is meant by the ‘humanitarian border’. According to Walters (2011:137), the humani-tarian border emerges when the crossing of the border becomes a matter of life and death. It is a situation where ‘borders of states and gateways to the territory become themselves
zones of humanitarian government’. (Ibid, p.138) Clearly, not all borders are humanitarian
borders. The border becomes humanitarianized only in certain places and specific circum-stances. Humanitarian borders emerge at the world’s ‘frontiers of poverty’, for example the zones between North Africa and the Southern European states. (Ibid, p.145) Furthermore, the crossing of this border has become a matter of life and death. These humanitarian borders are being secured with military tactics like armed guards, watchtowers, razor wires and surveillance technologies like cameras. (Ibid, p.146) This is all legitimized because they are needed to defense the borders of the Global North against an ‘invasion’ of mi-grants. (Ibid) Moreover humanitarian borders are not fixed, rather they are determined by
the shifting routes of the immigrants. (Ibid, p.148) It is important to notice that with the hu-manitarian border a regime of biopower and biopolitics is involved since there is a certain concern for the migrant as a living subject. (Ibid, p.151)
Human Rights and Humanitarianism
Now that the concept of humanitarianism has been highlighted, the concept of human rights needs to be defined. My argument is that the consequences for Human Rights are negative in a humanitarian border enforcement. In this section I will also touch upon the relationship between humanitarianism and human rights. Human rights are defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a ‘common standard of achievement for all
pe-oples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote res-pect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and internatio-nal, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their ju-risdiction’. (UN, Universal Declaration of Human Rights Preamble)
There is a relation between humanitarianism and human rights. However, the basis for humanitarian law is to minimize ‘unnecessary suffering’ while the basis for human rights law is setting up standards for states how to treat their own people in times of peace. (Leebaw, 2011:261) Furthermore, ‘humanitarian rights’ are defined by the goal of preser-ving human life. While human rights are about more than that, they are also about protec-ting human life. (Ibid, p.273) In recent years there have been debates about how human rights law has influenced humanitarian law. These debates can be divided into three per-spectives. The first one is mostly advanced by Sikkink in her book ‘The Justice Cascade’. In her book she argues that humanitarian law is now mostly focused on international justi-ce, democratic politics and human rights. (Sikkink, 2011) The second perspective argues that it is impossible to be good at both justice and charity. In a speech by Pictet about the principles of humanitarianism he said that he believed that justice and charity were in ten-sion with each other: ‘Justice rewards each person according to his rights and is to
separa-te the good from the bad, the just from the unjust. Charity is the mainspring of immediasepara-te action by an individual in the face of a stricken victim and gives to each according to his suffering.’ (Pictet, 1979:22) An organization can not be a judge and make public
pronoun-cements about violations of international laws and gain access to victims and thus provide relief to the suffering. This perspective is shared by Fassin (2011) and Tictin (2011). The
third perspective is that humanitarian and human rights laws and norms are used too easi-ly as an alibi to use violence. (Leebaw, 2011:262) This is what I have argued in the earlier section about humanitarianism. Teitel (2008) argues that international and humanitarian law have come together in a new set of norms. She calls this ‘humanity law’ which is a ‘dynamic unwritten constitution’.
Security theory
Another major concept that needs be highlighted in order to understand my argument is security theory. Has the securitization of borders really reduced migrants mortality rates and has it not made the migrants life more insecure? After the Cold War the defense of and security of humanity has become more visible within the political constructions of se-curity and insese-curity. Bigo (2006:89) defines protection as a ‘defense against enemies, to
the vulnerability of oneself or someone else and to the creation of physical borders ensu-ring safety inside by purification and ‘frontieralisation’. The traditional discourse of
protecti-on is the protectiprotecti-on of the territory. The biggest security threat in this discourse is the inva-sion of the territory by the ‘other’. (Ibid, p.88) The traditional understanding of security is ‘freedom from threat and survival’ (Ibid, p.93) So, protection is more about the self and the relationship between the self and the others. Security is more about life and death and the right to live. Wæver describes security issues or threats as phenomena that are construc-ted in order to mobilize opinion and constitute legitimacy and authority for the means of dealing with that ‘threat’. (Neal, 2009:335)
Bigo introduces the concept of the ‘paradox of protection’. With this he means that there is a paradox between the protection of the individual against harm, and the protection of bor-ders and an internal space. (Bigo, 2006:89–90) The subjects (irregular migrants in this case) are both at risk but become a risk once they enter the space marked by the border. (Andersson, 2012:8) There is a security risk for example for the European Union and there is also a risk for the migrant who is literally risking his or her life to enter the European Union. (Ibid) Migration is increasingly interpreted as a security problem. Huysmans (2000:752) argues that in the European Union migration has been securitized: it has in-creasingly been presented as threat to public order, cultural identity and domestic and la-bour market stability. In the 1960s and 1970s political rhetoric has increasingly been linked migration to the destabilization of public order and immigration became more and more a subject of public concern. In the 1980s security discourses penetrated the migration policy of the EU. An example is the 1990 Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of June
1985 which connected immigration and asylum to terrorism, transnational crime and bor-der control. (Ibid, p.756) Within security theory, multiculturalism is seen as a cause of so-cietal disintegration. Within this discourse migration is identified as one of the main factors that weakens national tradition and societal homogeneity. (Ibid, p.758) Even though this discourse has been there for several decades already it is still a hot topic within political parties such as the ‘Partij van de Vrijheid’ from Geert Wilders and ‘Front National’ now led by Marine Le Pen. We can see an indirect link between the securitizing of migration policy and racism and xenophobia.
The security and policing of territory is associated with the construction of the national space as a smooth and safe space. Policing is often framed as humanitarian, since force is justified in the name of peace and right. (Ticktin, 2005:12) The securitizing of the bor-ders has resulted in increased policing and increasingly sharp immigration policies and controls. Ticktin (Ibid, p.9) defines policing as ‘an expression of power with no normative
legal constraints, and a regression in the state of democracy’. An example was the
creati-on of the creaticreati-on of a commissicreati-on in 1994 within the Ministry of Interior of France. This was the first time that in France an institution had been created with the one and only pur-pose of policing immigration, and it became responsible for the coordination of all the acti-vities of the national police against undocumented immigration. (Ibid, p.7) At the border, the police polices both territory and human lives. The policing of human movement across borders as can be described as ‘a boundary-maintenance procedure and the policing of
territorial rights across borders as a frontier maintenance procedure’. (Zureik, E. and B.
Salter M.B, 2005:17)
With the terrorist threat after 9/11 and the growth in negative sentiments towards immigra-tion countries came a resolve to reassess their border policies. (Turner, 2007:3) There is a tension between the mobility of populations and territory. The ability of humans to move around territory can threaten the control of the territory. Walls and fences are a physical barrier between the movement of populations and the need for territorial control. (Ibid, p.6) In contrast to a globalized world without borders the shift to security policies resulted in the wish to ‘harden’ the borders through the building of walls and fences to prevent undesired entrance. (Rosière and Jones, 2012)
Teichopolitics
In this section I will lay down how barriers relate to humanitarian border security/policing through teichopolitics. To do this I will first introduce the term teichopolitics and explain what is meant by it by Rosière and Jones. The term ‘teichopolitics’, the politics of building barriers on borders for various security purposes, is conceptualized by Rosière and Jones. In many countries there has been a trend towards securitized immigration through the building of barriers at the borders. The ’hardening’ of these borders is located at important lines of economic and/or social discontinuity. (Rosière and Jones, 2012:217) This connects with the concept of the humanitarian border by Walters (2011:138), since he argues that these borders also emerge at the world’s ‘frontiers of poverty’. Most teichopolitics show an asymmetrical situation where there is a strong wealth discontinuity. These barriers show a differentiation between two spaces in the field of cultural, economical or political privileges. (Rosière and Jones, 2012:220) As the word teichopolitics is derived from the Ancient Greek ‘teichos' meaning ‘city wall’, teichopolitics is literally the politics of building walls. Teichopolitics includes any politics about the closing of a space which is more or less the foundation of the protection of a territory. (Ballif, 2009:93) Boundaries are an efficient way to demonstrate authority and to have control over an area. However, as stated before, at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century with increasing globaliza-tion there were also new waves of migraglobaliza-tion. Most of the new borders build were to fight against illegal migration. (Rosière and Jones, 2012:221) The ‘hardening’ of the borders does not aim for completely closed borders, but rather a border which attempts to control all cross-border movements. This way, persons are being filtered by new biometric sys-tems where only selected persons gain access to the territory. These syssys-tems analyze the data of the cross-border movements by millions to identify patterns that signals an undesi-red flow. (Ibid, p.218)
The term teichopolitics is linked to Foucault’s notions of biopolitics and biopower, mostly when referring to the practices of modern states and their regulations of individual lives and populations. This happens through ‘an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques
for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations’. (Rosière and
Jo-nes, 2012:219) It is argued by Rosière and Jones (Ibid) that in teichopolitics, biopower is carried out in the denial of the right to move. This is of importance for my argument, since I argue that human rights are lost in the humanitarian discourse of border enforcement. With the denial the freedom of movement article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state’ is being violated. (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article
13) So teichopolitics is not just about fences and walls at the border, but about the whole spectrum of barriers that limit people (and goods) from movement across borders. This can include administrative measures but also military installations separating two zones to support the border. For example, this is the case for example at the frontline between the Western Sahara and Morocco and between the two Koreas. (Ibid, pp.223-224) In teichop-olitics the role of technology is increasingly important. Border barriers are protected with radars, ground sensors, and software all to control the movement around the border. (Ibid, p.226)
Image 2: ‘ Mapping closed international borders’ Source: Rosière, 2009.
With all the technologies involved, the costs for teichopolitics are high. The Secure Border Initiative in the United States costed more than 2 billion US dollar and the Saudi border barrier system has costs approximately 3 billion dollars. (Ibid, p.231) That states are pre-pared to pay the costs not shows that the attempts to securitize are high priority. Rosière and Jones (Ibid, p.232) argue that we could consider these barriers as ‘a preventive first
step in a migration war.’ According to Bauman (2000) teichopolitics includes all systems to
in-ternational borders. It is clear that the closure border movement is affecting almost all con-tinents. (Rosière, 2009:11) The fences are a tool to govern population through biopolitical security. In 2012 it was estimated that 13,2% of the world’s borders were marked with some kind of barrier. (Ibid, p.222)
Methodology
I introduced my research question ‘‘What happens to human rights when border security is
humanitarianised?’ in the introduction of this thesis. To prove my argument that human
rights are lost in a policy where only the right to life is respected and where the security of territory plays an important role I have chosen the case of Ceuta and Melilla. Although it is a single case study I will analyse three distinct events that happened at the Spanish en-claves Ceuta and Melilla. As said in my introduction the enen-claves of Ceuta and Melilla are ‘famous’ for the fences that have were reinforced in 1995 with the purpose of stopping il-legal immigrants. The three events that will be analyzed are the fences at Ceuta and Melil-la, the events on February 6 2014 in Ceuta, and the push-backs executed in the name of the Spanish-Moroccan agreement.
Approach and methods
The data that I will use for my thesis will be analyzed with an interpretive approach. All the written material and images are used to illustrate my argument that human rights are lost in a humanitarian discourse of border enforcement. In the social sciences, interpretative approaches focus on how meaning is given in social contexts.
Data collection
In my analysis I will use three types of written data: political documents, reports from hu-man rights organizations and news articles. Political documents include official documents and reports of the European Union and the Spanish government. I have chosen to use both EU and Spanish documents to see if there is a tension between the national and Eu-ropean levels. The reports from human rights organizations include reports from well known international organizations like Human Rights Watch but also from local Spanish Human Rights Organizations like the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía (APDHA). I have chosen to use reports from multiple human rights organizations to be able to compare the outcomes. News articles are derived from trusted newspapers, online and offline versions, from within Spain but also from other countries. These newspapers are for example El País, El Mundo, Der Spiegel and the New York Times. I have chosen to use newspapers from multiple countries from inside and outside the EU in order to be able to compare their views and findings. By using news articles and reports from NGOs, I have tried to focus on what happens in practice. I did not just look at the theory from the EU and the Spanish government but I tried to interpret what is really happening and not only at
what people are saying. Besides the written data I have also used images to analyse what the fences do as objects. How are the fences are organized, and how they work as a tool for teichopolitics. I have included images to show that the fences are not only borders but moreover they are gateways. People cross the border everyday, so the fences are not just barriers but also entrances.
Analysis
Introduction
In this part of the thesis I will analyse the borders around the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla keeping my research question ‘What happens to human rights when border security
is humanitarianised?’ in mind. Furthermore, I will connect this analysis to the theories of
humanitarianism, security and teichopolitics. As said in my introduction, the enclaves Ceu-ta and Melilla are ‘famous’ for the fences that have been reinforced in 1995 with the pur-pose of stopping illegal immigrants. As stated in the methodology section, I will use an in-terpretative approach to analyse the consequences for human rights at these borders. I will illustrate my argument through my analysis, namely that human rights are lost in a po-licy where only the right to life is respected and where the security of territory plays an im-portant role. In order to do this, I have chosen to analyse my data in three major events. These events are the use of fences at Ceuta and Melilla, the events at February 6 2014 in Ceuta, and the push-backs executed in the name of the Spanish-Moroccan agreement. Because it is impossible to describe all the events that have happened at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla, I have chosen to use these three events because they have serious im-plications for Spain and the EU and have been broadcasted extensively in the news. Mo-reover these events connect well with the theory explained in my theoretical framework. The main focus of the analyses will be to look at what happens to human rights when bor-der security is humanitarianised.
Tragedy at Tarajal, Ceuta on February 6 2014
On the 6th of February 2014, el País ("At least nine immigrants die in desperate bid to cross Ceuta border", 2014) reported the first mass attempt of that year by immigrants to reach Spanish soil. During this attempt around 400 migrants tried to reach El Tarajal, Ceu-ta. Half of them tried to do this by foot and half of them by sea. El Tarajal is the only official border crossing point between Morocco and Ceuta. During their attempts some of the mi-grants used violence and the Guardia Civil reported being pelted with rocks. (El País, “At least nine immigrants die in desperate bid to cross Ceuta border", 2014) The first mass at-tempt of 2014 ended in a tragedy with deaths. 9 bodies had been recovered by Moroccan authorities already by February 6. The tragedy happened when the immigrants tried to reach a seawall that separates the territory form Morocco. El País (“Immigrant death toll from assault on Ceuta beach border could rise to 14”, 2014) reported one day later that the victims either drowned or died after heavy waves slammed them against the fences
between Ceuta and Morocco. The death toll had risen to 14 deaths one day after the inci-dent, finally the tragedy has caused 15 deaths. This is one of the biggest tragedies that have happened in the Mediterranean in 2014. One day after the incident some migrants accused the Guardia Civil of firing their weapons at them. The immigrants said that this has caused panic and resulted in the tragedy and deaths of the immigrants. However, sources at the Guardia Civil said that these reports were false. This is the start of accusa-tions back and forth between the reports of the immigrants, reports of human rights orga-nizations, the Spanish Government and the European Union. Furthermore, videos showing Guardia Civil guards leading survivors of the incident from the beach straight back to Moroccan territory appeared. (Human Right Watch, 2014)
At the end of February 2014, it emerged that the Guardia Civil had hidden information in their official reports that were produced between February 6 and 8 about the tragedy at the beach of Tarajal. The president of the Guardia Civil Arsenio Fernandez de Mesa, has sta-ted in various interviews on the radio on February 7 and 8 that rubber bullets ‘have never
been used against immigrants in the water’. He stated that according to his information ,
rubber bullets have only been used at the fences. Moreover, Fernandez de la Mesa said that NGOs have caused great scandals with untrue accusations, and that the use of rub-ber bullets would be inhuman. (El País,”La Guardia Civil ocultó en sus informes la carga con pelotas de goma en el agua", 2014) On February 12th Fernandez de la Mesa traveled to Ceuta and admitted to his final version of the story: rubber bullets have been used in the water but that they were never fired at immigrants directly. The rubber bullets were only used with the intention to ‘define a imaginary line’. The Spanish Minister of Interior, Fer-nandez Diaz admitted on the 13th of February in the Spanish Congress that the Guardia Civil had used rubber bullets against immigrants in the water. However, he denied at every turn that the rubber bullets were fired at the immigrants. (El País,”La Guardia Civil ocultó en sus informes la carga con pelotas de goma en el agua", 2014) On March 19th 2014, the deputy of the Minister of Interior, Fransisco Martínez, presented the government’s ac-count of what happened. This statement included audio and video material. In his state-ment, Martínez insisted that the migrants drowned because they had misjudged the high tide and could not swim, not because of the rubber bullets and tear gas from the Guardia Civil. (Human Rights Watch, 2014)
The European Union expressed their concerns about the tragic events. Furthermore the European Union sent a message to the Spanish government to ask for clarification. The
European Commissioner of Interior, Cecilia Malmström, even tweeted that she was ‘very
concerned about the Spanish border police using rubber bullets to deter migrants in Ceu-ta. I expect clarifications from the authorities’. (European Council on Refugees and Exiles,
2014) The Guardia Civil did not take this very well and presented a complaint against Malmström. They were offended by Malmström’s suggestion that the actions of the agents caused the tragedy in Ceuta where 15 immigrants drowned. They did not understand how the European Commissioner could accuse the guards of a crime that serious when it is af-firmed that ‘they were not targeted directly, but it created such a panic that people
drow-ned’. They argued that they ‘haven’t killed anyone’. The Union of Guardia Civiles believed
that Malmström argued from ignorance and that ignorance humiliated them, so now she had to be to be brought to justice. (El País, "La Unión de Guardias Civiles se querella con-tra la comisaria europea", 2014) This is where the pointing fingers started. The EU was concerned about Spain not taking responsibility to protect the external European border. At the same time, Spain looked at the EU and argued that this is an European problem and it needed more help and money from the EU in order to protect the borders in a decent way. Finally the Guardia Civil was offended because they were trying to do a difficult job under great pressure from the Spanish government and the EU but it is the first one who to get blamed in this tragedy. But in the end, 15 humans died in this tragedy that nobody took responsibility for.
The Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía (APDHA) presented in their Annual Report of 2014 their concerns about human rights at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla in their Annual Repport of 2014. They argue that the events on the 6th of February 2014 were not an unfortunate incident, but rather a direct consequence of more than two deca-des of political, legal, and policing procedures to control the borders in Ceuta and Melilla. (APDHA, annual report 2014) Human Rights Watch (2015) argued that a year after the in-cident there has has been little progress toward justice for the 15 migrants who drowned on February 6 2014 after the Guardia Civil fired rubber bullets and teargas at the water. Different NGOs have reported the use of excessive force by the Guardia Civil but rather than tackling these practices, the Spanish government has sought a way to institutionalize the policy of push-backs. No Spanish official was indicted or officially disciplined for the Tarajal tragedy. The judicial investigation into the deaths, injuries and summary returns that day proceeded at a snail’s pace. Judith Sunderland, a senior Western Europe Re-searcher of Human Rights Watch stated that ‘these were horrific deaths, and very serious
deserve to know the truth and see justice done.’ (Human Rights Watch 2015) A debate in
the Spanish parliament about the creation of an ad hoc committee to investigate the tragic incident of February 6 was blocked by the ruling Partido Popular using its majority. The APDHA called for a legal process in the courts of Ceuta for the 15 deaths that occurred on February 6, 2014 at the border of the Tarajal. Furthermore, the APDHA asked for a clarifi-cation of the facts and the debugging of political responsibilities. (APDHA, annual report 2015)
When I try to analyse this event keeping my research question What happens to human
rights when border security is humanitarianised?’ in mind, it seems clear that the
protecti-on of the territory was more important than human rights in this incident. The Guardia Civil does not want to be accused of murdering the immigrants because they believe they did not. The argument that they did not shoot directly at the immigrants, but only to define an imaginary line might seem odd to us. The Guardia Civil did not mean to kill the immigrants, they believe they were respecting the right to live. However, the immigrants constituted a direct threat to the border the Guardia Civil wants to police and protect. Not shooting at them directly might be thought of by the Guardia Civil as protecting the Spanish border and territory in a humanitarian way, since ‘bare life’ is respected. But reading all the news papers and reports by human rights organizations it can be concluded that the firing of the Guardia Civil caused panic and this resulted in the deaths of the immigrants. According to Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ‘Everyone has the right to life,
liber-ty and securiliber-ty of person.’ It can be concluded that the right to life was not respected and
that security was not provided by the Guardia Civil to the immigrants. Rather they were concerned about the security of the territory. No wonder why human rights organizations are concerned about human rights at the border of Ceuta in the tragedy of the 6th of Fe-bruary 2014. Not only the deaths themselves were tragic where human rights were clearly lost, but the tragedy lies also in the absence of a legal process to find out what has truly happened. As touched upon in the section above, no Spanish official has been indicted or officially disciplined for the Tarajal tragedy. You can wonder if there would be more haste for a legal process if it were not migrants dying in the sea but Spanish or European citi-zens. It is clear that the protection of the territory and the security of the territory played a more important role on February 6 2014 than human rights. In this event it is clear that in the dilemma between respecting human rights and maintaining the territory of the Euro-pean Union, the Guardia Civil guards chose to protect the territory.
The fences at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla
As stated multiple times in this thesis the fences at Ceuta and Melilla were reinforced in 1995. Like all medieval cities the enclaves were surrounded by stone walls to protect them from external attacks. But since 1995 new fences have been built, mostly renovating the existing ones on the border. (Saddiki, 2010:2) From a simple fence, these fences have been modernized to the imposing fences full of technical aspects. The fence at Ceuta is a double fence one of 6 meters and one of 10 meters, both 8,2 km wide and are protected with sensors and 37 cameras of the Guardia Civil. In Melilla there is a triple fence, also 6 meters high and 10 km wide. (El País,”El ‘blindaje’ de Ceuta y Melilla", 2014) In 2013 the Spanish Minister of Interior, Fernandez Díaz, has decided to reintroduce the barbed wires at the fences of Melilla. These barbed wires were first installed with the re-enforcement of the fences in 2005 but removed in 2007 because they caused deep cuts on the hands and legs of the immigrants trying to enter Melilla by climbing the fence. There has been pro-tests by Spanish and international NGOs about the effects of the barbed wire and finally, under international pressure, they were removed in Melilla by the Zapatero government. However, the migration stream that has increased significantly over the last years has ur-ged the Minister of Interior to reintroduced the barbed wires. The Rajoy government ar-gues that they have been reinforced for security reasons. (El País, ”Las cuchillas no frenan a los inmigrantes”", 2014) The barbed wires are situated at the places where according to studies the most climbings take place. (El País, ”El Ministerio del Interior reintroduce las cuchillas en la verja de Melilla", 2013) At the borders of Ceuta the barbed wire was also installed in 2005 but was never removed.
After a visit to Melilla the Spanish Minister of Interior, Fernandez Diaz, announced that af-ter the tragedy at Tarajal a new plan was needed in order to protect the borders of Europe and that ‘anti-climb’ fences would be the solution. These fences were installed in Melilla in October 2013 at the exterior of the fences. These fences exist of some iron cables with 1.4 mm in diameter with 1,3 by 1,3 cm squares. Moreover there are sprinklers with peppered water. However, sources at the Guardia Civil say these have never been used. (El País,”El ‘blindaje’ de Ceuta y Melilla", 2014) However, sources within the Guardia Civil argue that the immigrants are not stopped by these ‘anti-climb’ fences since they will look for other ‘weak spots’ at the border. The immigrants who do try to jump the fence at a point where there are barbed wires protect themselves with gloves and layers of clothes. (El País, ”Las cuchillas no frenan a los inmigrantes”", 2014) Fernandez Diaz defends the barbed wires
by arguing that they have a passive and not aggressive character. Furthermore, he ar-gues, they are legal. (El País,”El ‘blindaje’ de Ceuta y Melilla", 2014)
Image 4: ‘planned fence for Ceuta and Melilla’ Source: Spanish Interior Ministry
These fences are a great example of the territorialisation of the border. The fences at the borders of Melilla were reinforced with barbed wires out of ‘security reasons’. This can be connected to Bigo’s security theory in which he argued that the biggest security threat in this discourse is the invasion of the territory. (Bigo, 2006:88) Furthermore, the theory of teichopolitics fits perfectly to the border practices and the fences at Ceuta and Melilla. The threat at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla is obviously migratory. The fences are reinforced with barbed wires making it more dangerous to climb over the fences. Moreover there are cameras, alarm systems and sprinklers with irritating liquids to make it more difficult to cross the border. These fences follow the logics of biopolitics that is discussed in teichopo-litics. The use of fences against the risk migration comes with great costs. According to re-ports by Amnesty International Spain allocated 290 million euros in the period 2007-2013 for the control of the external borders. This is more than Italy (250 million euros) and Greece (207 million euros). (APDHA, annual report 2014) Even though there were at-tempts to make the fences at Melilla safer, such as rope traps included to catch migrants so they didn't fall, they have nothing to do with humanitarianism. It is not a case of life and death, not a case of respecting life. It can be argued that they are very unhumanitarian and an example of securing a border.
Thousands of people cross the borders of Ceuta and Melilla everyday. Without the move-ment of people the enclaves would not survive, since their economies strongly relies on Moroccan products and the movement of goods, so they need people to move. The inter-actions with their hinterlands are of great importance of the economic sustainability of the enclaves. If the city were to be closed the residents would starve since they don’t produce enough food. There is an exception that allows Moroccans from Tetouan and Nador to en-ter visa-free, and this allowed the development of irregular cross-border trade. This trade is an important pillar of the economic system of Ceuta and Melilla. Moroccan citizens work in small businesses or are employed in the so-called domestic sector (women) and in the building sector (men). Furthermore, Moroccans work in hotels and restaurants, as tourism is also important for the economy of Ceuta and Melilla. Because of all the cross-border work in Ceuta and Melilla, the cities coexists with the highest unemployment rates in Spain and one of the highest in the EU. (Ferrer-Gallardo and Planet-Contreras, 2012:34) Fur-thermore the enclaves are attractive due to their duty-free ports and beneficial tax laws: the taxes apply at only half the rate one would pay in Spain. This means that a lot of Mo-roccans go shopping in the enclaves.
From the outside, with their impressive fences, Ceuta and Melilla might look like fortress cities, but this is not the case. The fences are not there to stop people, since people cross the border everyday, for example to work. Because of this, we should see the fences as a tool to govern population in a biopolitical security. The fences are a way to filter who is pri-vileged to enter, and who is not. This is a great example of teichopolitics since it is not just about fences and walls at the border, but about the whole spectrum of barriers that limit people (and goods) to move across borders. Persons are being filtered by new biometric systems where only selected persons are gained access to the territory. The privileged persons at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla can be seen in an hierarchic way. The Spa-nish/European citizens are at the top, then the Moroccans who stimulate the economy by either working in the enclaves or buying things at the enclave, than finally below are the irregular migrants. The migrants are not allowed to enter the enclaves because they have nothing to bring there. They don’t bring money or workforce.Teichopolitics aims to stabilize centers from undesired (migratory) flows from the periphery. In this case, the European Union is the centre where immigrants from Sub-Sahara and more and more from Syria and the Middle East as the periphery try to enter. As can be seen in Image 3 and 4 the (planned) fence is not just a simple fence, but it has also more forms of control. So at this teichopolitic border it is about who is privileged enough to enter. The securitizing of the
en-claves with the fences and the selective governing of populations entering the enen-claves is the result of what Ferrer-Gallado (2008) calls a ‘mélange of security, economic, and
politi-cal needs that originated at different spoliti-cales.’
However, the idea behind humanitarianism is that we are all universal, and this is clearly not the case at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla. Although some actions by the EU or the Spanish government are legitimized based on the logic of humanitarianism it is clear that there is a hierarchy at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla. This example makes clear that humanitarianism is never absolute. We have to look at whose well-being is preserved. Clearly, the human rights of the migrants are ignored here. There is not only a denial of movement, but they are also not treated the same way as the Moroccan workers or Euro-peans. The humanitarian discourse of providing basic life might be too simple since all the time there are negotiations about whose security is protected, whose well-being is provi-ded, and whose life is more important. Spain has the right to secure its borders, but in pro-tecting those borders Spain has the duty to respect human rights, like propro-tecting migrants against inhuman treatment. In this selective humanitarianism through teichopolitics it is clear that the human rights of the immigrants are lost. They are on the bottom of the hier-archy of the border-crossing at Ceuta and Melilla.
Push-backs
The last event I am going to analyse to find out what happens with human rights in a hu-manitarian discourse of border enforcement is the so called ‘push-backs’ that happen at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla. According to Amnesty International, push-backs happen when ‘people are pushed back to the country they are trying to leave – or in some cases
into the high seas – shortly after they cross the border, without an opportunity to challenge their forced return. Push-backs usually involve a group of people (migrants or refugees). The deportation of a group of people without looking at each case individually is a collecti-ve expulsion and is prohibited under international law.’ (Amnesty International, 2014:20)
At the borders of the enclaves these ‘push-backs’ are an increasing problem. There are reports from migrants who state that the Guardia Civil forced them through the gates in the fences back to Morocco without any legal process. Immigrants who had already reached Spanish territory were pushed back into Morocco, often in a violent way. This happens in the name of an agreement between Morocco and Spain. On February the 13th 1992 Mo-rocco and Spain approved the ‘Agreement between The Kingdom of Spain and the
who have entered illegally’. This agreement is the framework for the cooperation between
Spain and Morocco on the efforts to stop the flow of illegal migration between Morocco and Spain. To demonstrate their cooperation in the fight against immigrants, Charki Drais, a delegate of the Moroccan Minister of Interior, said that during 2014 his government had blocked 80 massive jumps of the fences at Ceuta and Melilla and had arrested 37,000 il-legal immigrants. 20.000 of them were just jumping off the fence. Furthermore Morocco has increased its patrols to intercept ‘pateras’, the boats at the sea. This has been such a succes that the migration flow to the Canary Islands has reduced a lot. However, the mi-gration flow has moved to the borders of Ceuta and Melilla. This has put more pressure on the Guardia Civil guards who are protecting these bordes. (APDHA Annual Report 2015)
The push-backs as discussed above have been reported multiple times by NGOs like Prodein, a Spanish NGO at the borders of Melilla and Ceuta. A few times, this has even been filmed. One example is a video where we can see Civil Guard agents hitting a Came-roonian trying to jump the fence. The CameCame-roonian was returned to Morocco in an irregu-lar way without any legal process. The Spanish government seeks to legitimize these situ-ations with the modification of the ‘Ley de la Extranjeria’, or the Aliens Act which allows these push-backs. (APDHA Annual Report 2015) European Commissioner for Human Rights, Muižnieks, stated in his speech during his visit to Melilla in January 2015 that: ‘the
proposed amendments to the Aliens Act aimed at legalizing push-backs of migrants arri-ving in Ceuta and Melilla currently discussed in Spain are in clear breach of human rights law. The adaptation of the amendment to Spain’s Aliens Act falls short of providing clear guarantees against refoulement and collective expulsions, and of establishing adequate safeguards for the right of every person to seek and enjoy asylum, irrespective of the way they reach Spanish territory.’ (Council of Europe, ‘Nils Muižnieks: Migrant law changes
would put Spain in “clear breach” of human rights standards.’, 2015) Different NGOs like Human Rights Watch (2015) also protested against the push-backs without any legal pro-cedure. They argue that the Spanish and Moroccan authorities should affirm procedures to protect rights for migrants and reject summary returns at the border. Judith Sunderland from Human Rights Watch stated: ‘Pushing people back across the border without due
process or screening for protection violates Spanish, European and international law.’ (Human Rights Watch, 2014) Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights
states that ‘everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.’. (ECHR, Article 1) States are requires
to provide this protection also to foreigners who are within their jurisdiction. If the immi-grants have reached Spain by climbing over the fences of either Ceuta or Melilla, this means that they are within the Spanish and European jurisdiction. Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights states that ‘the right to asylum shall be guaranteed with
due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on Eu-ropean Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EuEu-ropean Union.’ (EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, Article 18) So if the migrants have stepped into Spanish/European Union territory they have the right to claim asylum. Article 6 (2) of the Dublin Regulation (Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013) obliges states to ensure that individuals have an effective opportunity to lodge an application as soon as possible. However, EU law does not provi-de for ways to facilitate the arrival of asylum seekers. Since most asylum seekers are not qualified for a visa they may have to cross the border in an irregular manner. This is what happens at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla. With the Asylum Procedure Directive the pro-cess for applying asylum is similar throughout the EU. The fingerprints of the applicants are taken to be sent to EURODAC, a database that is used to help to identify which EU Member State is responsible for the application in line with the Dublin Regulation. More-over, the applicant is interviewed to determine whether he or she is qualified for refugee status or subsidiary protection. Article 3(1) of the Dublin Regulation (Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013) requires that ‘EU Member States examine any application for international
pro-tection lodged by a third-country national or a stateless person and that such application be examined by one single Member State. The EU asylum acquis only applies from the moment an individual has arrived at the border, including territorial waters and transit zo-nes’ This whole process is denied to the migrants who are literally pushed back into
Mo-rocco without any legal process. Thus, the push-backs are in breach with European hu-man rights law.
In January 2015 the European Commissioner for Human Rights, Muižnieks, visited Melilla. In his speech he stated that ‘Push-backs must stop and should be replaced by a practice
which reconciles border control and human rights.’ Furthermore he urged Spain to
consi-der human rights in their borconsi-der management by stating that ‘Migration is certainly a
com-plex issue which requires a concerted European response, but this does not exempt indi-vidual States from their obligations. Spain has the right to establish its own immigration and border management policies, but at the same time it must uphold its human rights obligations, in particular those assumed under the European convention on Human Rights
and the 1951 Convention Relating the Status of Refugee.’ (Council of Europe, ‘Nils
Muiž-nieks: Migrant law changes would put Spain in “clear breach” of human rights standards.’ 2015) Reports from migrants show that many of them struggle to understand why they are returned to Morocco, just when they thought they had reached Spain. In some interviews they show scars and broken bones that are said to be the consequences of violence by the border police. A delegate of the Spanish government in Melilla said in an interview that Spain ‘uses force only when it needs to — and it’s possible that there are unfortunately
some injuries.’ (New York Times, 2014) Not only do the Spanish border police uses
violen-ce, it is proven that the Moroccan security forces frequently beat, abuse, and sometimes even steal from sub-Saharan migrants who fail in their attempt to reach Ceuta or Melilla or who are returned to their custody by the Guardia Civil. (Human Rights Watch, 2014) said. Pushing the immigrants back to Morocco while knowing that they are at risk of being bea-ten by the Moroccan security forces is in breach of Article 19 of the EU Charter ‘Protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition' which includes the prohibition of refoule-ment. Furthermore, turning away an immigrant, whether this is at the border or somewhere else within a state’s jurisdiction, and putting him or her at risk of torture or inhuman or de-grading treatment or punishment, is prohibited by Article 3 ‘Prohibition of torture' of the ECHR. In extreme cases, for example a removal, extradition or expulsion may also raise an issue under Article 2 ‘Right to life' of the ECHR.
In February 2014, there was commotion about 23 immigrants who arrived at Ceuta. The Spanish Minister of Interior Fernandez Diaz denied that the push-backs of these grants was in violation with international human rights law. He argued that these immi-grants had never reached Spanish territory, since the immiimmi-grants had never passed a line of officers posted on the shore. Therefore Spanish and European legislation was not appli-cable. (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2014) Sunderland stated: ‘The
argu-ment that a person is not actually in Spain until he gets past a police officer boggles the mind, Spain cannot move the border as it sees fit, nor can it side-step EU law and interna-tional human rights standards.’ (Human Rights Watch, 2014) But a delegate to the Spanish
government responded that the fences are not in the exact geographic spot, thus on the border. Furthermore Spain ‘would never have expanded the security perimeter, as it did in
2005, or bothered building three fences, he said, ‘if just by touching the first fence you had already reached Spain.’ (New York Times, 2014) However, The EU asylum acquis applies
from the moment an individual has arrived at the border, including territorial waters and transit zones.
Morocco recent asked for more money for their help from the Spanish government in order to smoothy continue the push-backs to Morocco. The official story is that the Moroccan government feels like they have to do a lot against the stream of illegal migration that strongly increased in 2014. After the deaths of the migrants at Tarajal in February 2014 the Spanish government has urged Morocco to apply Article 11 of the bilateral treaty of 1992. 1 Morocco responded that it is not ignoring the treaty but doing everything it can at its own pace. Furthermore, the Moroccan government wants to send two messages: they are do-ing all they can and they have not diminished their efforts but they have increased them. (El País, ‘Marruecos pide más dinero a España para la devolución en caliente de inmi-grantes.’, 2014) Data collected in the Spanish newspapers about the jumps over the fence of Melilla in 2014 is difficult to analyse. The different media do not have the same criteria to consider one jump independent to another. But it is clear that the amount of jumps have increased in a great deal compared to 2013. (APDHA, annual report 2015) It is clear that there is great pressure on the shoulders of the Guardia Civil guards. But often, in their at-tempts to protect the borders, human rights are violated. It is clear that the security theory connects with this event.
Spain keeps defending the violent practices by saying that they are carried out in the name of Europe’s border security. However, it can be argued that the border enforcement carried out by the Guardia Civil is humanitarian, since they respect the right to live. The answer to my research question: ’What happens to human rights when border security is
humanitarianised?’ seems clear. Human rights are lost in this policy of push-backs set up
by the bilateral agreement between Spain and Morocco. Human rights are not only lost in this policy, it can even be stated that they are violated. As stated before the push-backs are a violation of Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. All the more so since migrants pushed back into Morocco often experience violence and other abuse by the Moroccan security forces, so they are not much protected. (Human Rights Watch, 2014) Security of the territory seems to play a more important role than compliance with human rights at the borders of Ceuta
Article 11 of the 1992 bilateral treaty between Spain and Morocco: ‘A Spanish-Moroccan Joint Committee is
1
hereby established, under the authority of the Ministers of Interior, which shall resolve all contentious cases that may arise from the implementation of this Agreement and monitor the implementation of its provisions. The Joint Committee shall review the procedures and criteria for compensation of the financial imbalances resulting from the readmission of the expelled foreigners. This Committee will organize mutual assistance in the development of border control measures, especially in regard to equipment and training of border control personnel.’
and Melilla. Once again, this may be legitimized by the Spanish government under the name of humanitarianism since they don’t kill the migrants, but only push them back. They yet live, the respect to life is upheld, however no-one is allowed to claim asylum. This, as stated above is in clear breach with human rights law. The Guardia Civil clearly chooses to prefer security over the territory before thinking about human rights. Furthermore, human rights are being abused in their attempts to keep the migrants out in order to secure the territory.
Conclusion
In the first part of this thesis, the theoretical framework, the focus was on framing the defi-nition and discourses around humanitarianism, security theory and teichopolitics in order to understand my research question and my argument. Throughout this thesis, I have wor-ked with the definition of humanitarianism as formulated by Fassin and Barnett and Sny-der. Furthermore I introduced the paradox of protection by Bigo and the security theory by Huysmans. The second part of this thesis was focused on analyzing three major events around the border enforcement at the borders of the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla. The three events I have analyzed in the previous part were the fences at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla, the tragedy at Tajaral in February 2014 and the push-backs that are car-ried out in the name of the ‘Agreement between The Kingdom of Spain and the Kingdom
of Morocco on the Movement of People, the Transit of the Readmission of Foreigners who have entered illegally’. My research question in analyzing these events was: ’What hap-pens to human rights when border security is humanitarianised?’ My argument and answer
to this question is that human rights are lost in a policy where only the right to life is res-pected and where the security of territory plays an important role. The increasing stream of immigrants at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla has made it clear that the dilemma between respecting human rights and respecting life and maintaining the territory of the European Union has emerged.
The tragedy at Tarajal, Ceuta, where 15 immigrants died in the panic caused by the firing of rubber bullets by the Guardia Civil, seems to be the ultimate way of defending the terri-tory. Not shooting at them directly is thought of by the Guardia Civil as ‘protecting’ and even the individual and even a ‘humanitarian’ of protecting the Spanish border and territo-ry. The respect to life is guaranteed by not shooting at the immigrants directly, but rather firing to ‘define an imaginary line’. The violence used is framed as humanitarian and justi-fied in the name of protecting the territory. Security of the territory seems to play the most important role in the border policing of the Guardia Civil. According to Bigo, the biggest se-curity threat is the invasion of territory. In order to prevent this invasion the fences play an important role. The concept of teichopolitics explains the border practices and the fences at Ceuta and Melilla in a perfect way. The fences are built to protect the territory for the migratory flow. The fences are not just a fence, they are ‘decorated’ with modern alarm systems, camera’s, sprinklers and of course at some parts, barbed wire. This is another example that the security of the territory plays a more important role than the rights of the
