Private Military Companies and military reform: a case study of DynCorp in Liberia and MPRI in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Private Military Companies and military reform: a case study

of DynCorp in Liberia and MPRI in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Submitted by Rianne Siebenga – s1632078 Department of Governance and Global Affairs

In fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MSc Crisis and Security Management Leiden University – Campus The Hague

Supervisor: Dr. J. Matthys Second reader: Prof. dr. E. Bakker

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Abstract

Private Military Companies (PMCs) are increasingly contracted to perform Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts. Various PMCs are currently deployed in the niche market of military reform and are now engaged in the development, training and fielding of foreign military forces and equipment. Rather than engaging in moralistic discussions, this thesis assumes that PMCs are a reality within the current international system and are ‘here to stay’. This qualitative research qualifies two cases in which PMCs carried out a military reform programme as a ‘success’: DynCorp in Liberia and MPRI in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the aim of gaining a thorough understanding of the conditions which shaped these reform efforts, this thesis employs a framework on the conditions which influence the success or failure of SSR efforts under international auspices. The analysis shows that certain conditions specific to PMCs, such as contractual commitment, a multidisciplinary corporate framework and the ability to pursue innovative models, did indeed shape the military reform in both states. It also suggests that the absence of one of SSR’s key concepts, local ownership, did not necessarily hamper a successful outcome. Finally, the thesis contends that donor states must ensure proper financial management of the PMC contracts and that the US specifically needs to improve its current lethargic evaluative system of PMC contracts.

Key words: Private Military Companies, Security Sector Reform, military reform, Military Professional Resources Incorporated, DynCorp.

Word count: 35.660 words (incl. in-text references).

Herewith, I would like to extent my gratitude to Dr. Joery Matthys for his patience, invaluable insight and his willingness to keep me on track, even from across the Atlantic.

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‘The land in which I was now living bore the scars of secret histories generating emotions and behaviour which, as with the country whose story I have tried to tell, left me spiritually broken, but then gave me the strength

to rebuild myself’. – Mark Huband (1998, p.xxv)

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2.2.1 DEFINITION ... 9 2.2.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ... 10 2.2.3 PRACTICAL BACKGROUND ... 11 2.2.4 MILITARY REFORM ... 12 2.2.4.1 Definition ... 13 2.2.4.2 Background ... 13 2.2.5 SSR & OUTSOURCING ... 14 2.3 BRZOSKA’S SSR FRAMEWORK ... 16 2.3.1 CONDITIONS ... 16 2.3.2 RISK FACTORS ... 18 3 METHODOLOGY ... 21 3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN ... 21

3.2 CASE STUDY METHOD ... 24

3.2.1 CASE SELECTION ... 25

3.2.2 DATA COLLECTION ... 26

3.3 OPERATIONALIZATION ... 27

3.3.1 OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE INDICATORS OF THE RISK FACTORS ... 27

3.3.1.1 Resurgence of violence ... 27 3.3.1.2 Politicization ... 28 3.3.1.3 Militarization ... 28 3.3.1.4 Ethnicization ... 28 3.3.1.5 Informalism ... 29 3.3.1.6 Corruption ... 29 3.3.1.7 Lack of professionalism ... 29

3.3.2 OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE CONDITIONS ... 30

3.3.2.1 Condition i. Capacities & commitments of international actors ... 30

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4 THE ANALYSIS ... 32

4.1 CASE STUDY I–DYNCORP IN LIBERIA... 32

4.1.1 CONTEXT ... 32

4.1.1.1 The Security Sector ... 33

4.1.2 THE CONTRACT ... 33

4.1.2.1 The services delivered ... 35

4.1.3 DEGREE OF SUCCESS ... 37 4.1.3.1 Resurgence of violence ... 37 4.1.3.2 Militarization ... 40 4.1.3.3 Ethnicization ... 41 4.1.3.4 Corruption ... 43 4.1.3.5 Lack of professionalism ... 43 4.1.3.6 A story of success? ... 46 4.1.4 CONDITIONS ... 47

4.1.4.1 Capacities & commitments of international actors ... 47

4.1.4.2 Local ownership ... 51

4.1.4.3 Design & implementation of policies and measures ... 53

4.1.4.3.1 Enabling factors ... 53

4.1.4.3.2 Sequencing ... 54

4.1.4.3.3 Cost-benefit and project evaluation ... 54

4.1.5 DISCUSSION ... 55

4.2 CASE STUDY II–MPRI IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ... 57

4.2.1 CONTEXT ... 57

4.2.1.1 The Security Sector ... 58

4.2.2 THE CONTRACT ... 59

4.2.2.1 The services delivered ... 60

4.2.3 DEGREE OF SUCCESS ... 63 4.2.3.1 Resurgence of violence ... 64 4.2.3.2 Militarization ... 65 4.2.3.3 Ethnicization ... 68 4.2.3.4 Informalism ... 69 4.2.3.5 Corruption ... 70 4.2.3.6 Lack of professionalism ... 70 4.2.3.7 A story of success? ... 74 4.2.4 CONDITIONS ... 75

4.2.4.1 Capacities & commitments of international actors ... 75

4.2.4.2 Local ownership ... 78

4.2.4.3 Design & implementation of policies and measures ... 79

4.2.4.3.1 Enabling factors ... 79

4.2.4.3.2 Sequencing ... 81

4.2.4.3.3 Cost-benefit and project evaluation ... 82

4.2.5 DISCUSSION ... 83

4.3 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ... 85

4.3.1 CONDITION I – CAPACITIES & COMMITMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS... 85

4.3.1.1 Lessons learned ... 87

4.3.2 CONDITION II – LOCAL OWNERSHIP ... 88

4.3.2.1 Lessons learned ... 89

4.3.3 CONDITION III – DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICIES AND MEASURES ... 90

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4.3.3.1.1 Lessons learned ... 91

4.3.3.2 Sub-condition b. Sequencing ... 91

4.3.3.3 Sub-condition c. Cost-benefit & project evaluation... 93

5 CONCLUSION ... 95

5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ... 97

BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 98

ACADEMIC SOURCES ... 98

NON-ACADEMIC SOURCES ... 108

APPENDIX 1–EXCERPTS DECLASSIFIED IDIQ CONTRACT WITH DYNCORP ... 115

APPENDIX 2–EXCERPT OF THE CPA... 116

APPENDIX 3–RESOURCE DONATION MILITARY STABILIZATION PROGRAMME ... 117

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List of Tables and Figures

TABLE 1: PMSC CLASSIFICATION BASED ON SERVICES ... 5

TABLE 2: RISK FACTORS AND INDICATORS ... 23

TABLE 3: CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS ... 24

TABLE 5: A STORY OF SUCCESS? ... 46

TABLE 7: OVERVIEW OF CONDITIONS ... 55

TABLE 8: MILESTONES IN THE MPRI TRAINING PROGRAMME ... 61

TABLE 10: A STORY OF SUCCESS? ... 74

TABLE 12: OVERVIEW OF CONDITIONS ... 83

TABLE 13: CONDITION I ... 85

TABLE 14: CONDITION II ... 88

TABLE 15: SUB-CONDITION A. ... 90

TABLE 16: SUB-CONDITION B. ... 91

TABLE 17: SUB-CONDITION C. ... 93

TABLE 18: SUMMARY OF THE CONDITIONS ... 95

TABLE 19: RESOURCE DONATION MSP... 117

FIGURE 1: CONTRACTORS AS A PERCENTAGE OF US MILITARY WORKFORCE ... 9

FIGURE 2: SSR SECTORS ... 12

FIGURE 3: GRAPHIC OVERVIEW OF THE INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES ... 16

FIGURE 4: GRAPHIC RESEARCH DESIGN ... 22

FIGURE 4: COMPANY PROFILE DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL INC. ... 35

FIGURE 5: MILITARY EXPENDITURE AS % OF GDP ... 41

FIGURE 7: NUMBER OF TRAINED AFL SOLDIERS ... 44

FIGURE 7: COMPANY PROFILE MILITARY PROFESSIONAL RESOURCES INCORPORATED ... 60

FIGURE 8 – MILITARY PERSONNEL FAF ... 66

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFL Armed Forces of Liberia

AIT Advanced Individual Training

ASI Acquisition Support Institute

BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DDR Demobilization, Disarmament & Reintegration

DoD Department of Defence

DoS Department of State

DPA Dayton Peace Agreement

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EO Executive Outcomes

FAF Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina

HVO Croatian Defence Council – Bosniak Croat Army IASSRTF Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force ICG International Crisis Group

ICoC International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers IDA US Institute for Defense Analysis

IDIQ Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quality

IET Initial Entry Training

MINUSMA Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MoD Ministry of Defence

MPRI Military Professional Resources Incorporated MSP Military Stabilization Programme

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO Non-Commissioned Officers

NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia

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OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PA&E Pacific Architects and Engineers

PMC Private Military Company

PMSC Private Military and Security Company

PSC Private Security Company

RUF Revolutionary United Front

SSR Security Sector Reform

UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force

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1 Introduction

‘Write a check, end a war’. – Doug Brooks (2000, title)

For close to forty years, the international system and most of its conflicts had been shaped and dominated by the communist versus the West division (Short, 2010). The end of the Cold War profoundly altered the conflict environment in which asymmetrical threats and blurred security dimensions now predominate. The breakdown of the patronage system left weak states with suppressed conflicts, non-state armed groups and no guarantees for support from any great power bloc. Rwanda and Somalia are the bitter testimony hereof. It was during this time that the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR) found its way via practice into popular academics and has become a steadfast component of many post-conflict arrangements. The argument was made that the security structures in many conflict-affected states were facilitative of conflict rather than effectively expediting development. Reform and reconstruction of said structures would hence facilitate peace and development (OECD, 2007). SSR has become a tool for state building, peacebuilding, establishing the rule of law and good governance. Moreover, after 9/11, it has become a means for countering the spread of terrorism breeding grounds which have a tendency to flourish in conflict-affected territories. SSR programmes however require a great deal of political, economic and military capital from its donors. Capital which, post-Cold War, was no longer abundantly present. The blatant failure of the international community in some of its interventions throughout the 1990s, left many potential SSR donor states reluctant to engage in any SSR efforts. This hesitancy was supplemented by waves of privatization which hit many donor governments. Military and police institutions, often the responsible entities for SSR activities, underwent drastic downsizing and were strained in capacity and funding. These developments amassed the perfect setting for an old acquaintance to make a comeback to the international arena: the Private Military Company (PMC). Although governmental use of private contractors is not a new phenomenon, the private security industry has taken a whole new dimension in terms of size and scope. A direct result of a global tendency to outsource services whose provision was previously viewed as an exclusive trait of the nation state, the PMC has become a regularized actor in conflict situations. Often historically linked to mercenaries, the modern PMC is a legitimate corporate hierarchy comprised of boards of directors and shareholders (Singer, 2003). Contracts worth billions of dollars nowadays buy

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governments, multinationals and even NGOs a broad variety of services ranging from securing humanitarian aid delivery to combat operations (Bures, 2005). The US contracted a single PMC ‘to provide ‘peace verifiers’ in Kosovo, train [the] Haitian police and eradicate coco plants as a part of Plan Colombia’ (McFate, 2011, p. 255). The ‘business of war’ has caused much heated debate in the academic world. Critics assert that the erosion of the state’s monopoly on the use of force and the commodification of security are transforming security into a private good (Branović, 2011). PMC contracts corrupt the military institution (Grant, 1998) as capital otherwise invested in public institutions is now diverted to the public market. Questions of legal and political accountability remain unresolved and the absence of any substantive regulatory framework gives cause for concern (Leander, 2005). These concerns are most certainly not contained to the academic realm: PMCs have been at the centre stage of many media spectacles and have been a captivating topic to society. The Iraq war boldly displayed the US’s reliance on private contractors and, to this day, the US has been unable to present the exact number of hired contractors, their costs or how many were killed or wounded (Singer, 2008). The public became shockingly aware of the industry’s presence after the Abu Ghraib prison scandal when photographs of detainee interrogations displayed grave violations of international law. Some of the allegedly involved were employees of CACI International and Titan, two PMCs. When in 2007 Blackwater contractors killed 14 unarmed Iraqis at Nisour Square, the industry’s reputation took a severe blow; one it is still recovering from. Since, the industry’s presence in media coverage has been largely characterized by billion-dollar contracts and allegations against its employees of criminal activities. Still, governments continue to make use of these companies. Cost-effectiveness, efficiency and highly professional capabilities are arguments on which most outsourcing is based. Whilst recognizing the sensitivity of the matter, some policy-makers and scholars have found PMCs to be more competent than traditional forces in certain areas (Bures, 2005; Fitzsimmons, 2005). Moreover, some argue that if the choice is to involve PMCs or no involvement at all, we should not dismiss PMCs based on moral grounds (O’Brien, 2007; Bures, 2005; Gantz, 2003).

Although something may be said for both sides of the debate, fact is that governments are faced with an increasing amount of SSR activities and are outsourcing them to PMCs (Krahmann, 2007). Many agree that PMC contracting will likely increase in the years to come (McFate, 2014; Krahmann, 2007; Singer, 2003; Brooks, 2000). It is therefore imperative that we gain an understanding of how we can make best use of these entities as ‘in the end, no policy toward

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the phenomenon of military privatization can be effective without an understanding of the industry, and its dynamics, and its range of possibilities and challenges’ (Singer, 2003, p. 242). 1.1 The research objective

Much of the academic literature has a strong focus on these challenges Singer (2003) mentions, substantiating arguments against the use of PMCs. While this is an important angle, it also creates a gap with real-world practice in which PMCs are increasingly contracted. This thesis therefore, moves beyond the moral debate on whether or not the PMC is a legitimate actor in SSR. Rather, it assumes that PMCs are a reality within the current international system and are here to stay. In doing so, this thesis, contrary to the bulk of research on PMCs, will take a ‘positive’ approach and examine the conditions which have shaped the outcome of two case studies which have been labelled a qualified success. With regard to SSR, this thesis focusses on a specific component: military reform. SSR is an umbrella under which sector-specific reform efforts are interlinked. Therefore, to add specificity, military reform as part of a larger SSR effort has been deemed an appropriate scope for this research. Through a two-tier analysis of the case studies, this research will aim to provide an answer to the following research question: RQ: Which conditions shaped military reform by Private Military Companies in Liberia and Bosnia and Herzegovina?

By determining which conditions were present in these two case studies, we can begin to accumulate constructive knowledge, which will in turn inform real-world practice. Moreover, in the absence of any well-formulated theories on the use of PMCs, this thesis aims to form a theoretical building block for future research.

1.2 Thesis structure

This thesis is structured as follows. The next chapter provides a review of the PMC and SSR after which it demarcates the analysis by outlining the framework through which both case studies will be analysed. Chapter two will lay out the scientific foundation of this thesis. The qualitative approach will be justified and the case studies are introduced. In the research design section, the theoretical framework will be further elaborated and operationalized. Hereafter the two case studies will be analysed accordingly in chapter three and chapter four. Chapter three examines the military reform activities of DynCorp in Liberia and chapter four assesses the military reform programme of MPRI in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The findings of each analysis will be compared in chapter five and lessons learned will be presented. Finally, the conclusion provides final remarks.

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2 Theoretical framework

’The private military industry is now a reality. Its emergence raises possibilities and dilemmas that are not only compelling and fascinating in

a theoretical sense, but also driven by their real world relevance’. – Peter Singer (2003, p. 242)

This chapter will demarcate the research by providing theoretical concepts, definitions and backgrounds. First, the PMC will be assessed after which SSR’s theoretical foundation and practical background will be clarified. The final section addresses the analytical framework which will be employed for the analysis.

2.1 The Private Military Company

2.1.1 Definition

Classifying the private military and security industry has proven to be a difficult venture. There is often no clear distinction between what constitutes ‘military’ and ‘security’ activities. In the narrowest sense, PMCs engage in defensive operations whereas Private Security Companies (PSCs) merely provide offensive services. Such a distinction would however confine the definition of the PMC to a few, largely defunct firms such as Executive Outcomes (EO). Much the same as a categorization along the lines of combat/non-combat, armed/unarmed or international/domestic services, such a distinction is artificial and ill-disposed. Hired guards may resolve to violence when attacked by a party to a conflict, and procured arms may be diverted to rebel groups; most services have ‘implications depending on one’s perspective (that is, which end of the gun barrel one is facing)’ (Singer, 2003, p. 91). As a result of this definitional grey area, some scholars (Spearin, 2011; Østensen, 2005) prefer to use the two terms conjointly as Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). One of the leading scholarly categorization regarding the attributes of PMCs has been developed by Peter Singer (2003). In his ‘tip of the spear’ typology he distinguishes three types of military firms based on their range of service and levels of force; the support firm, the consultant firm and the provider firm. This classification however is no remedy to the definitional problematics as many PMCs often do perform and offer services that fall both within the realm of security and the military realm.

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The industry itself, having had to deal with reputational damages after the 2007 Nisour Square incident and the 2004 Abu Ghraib prison scandal, are quick to avoid military terminology and often dub themselves risk management services (Olive Group), mission support companies (PA&E) or integrated security providers (Triple Canopy). A leading initiative in the regulation of the industry, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC), follows this tendency by referring to all its members as PSCs. However, some members, such as Triple Canopy, are often widely considered to be military companies. Adding to the confusion is, as Holmqvist (2005) notes, the reference by the media to the sector as ‘guns for hire’, ‘dogs of war’ or mercenaries, which adds to the already confusing definitional debate. Regarding the, often sensationalist, reference to mercenarism, this thesis contends that PMCs are not mercenaries. ‘Instead of relying on the ad hoc, black-market structuring and payment system associated with mercenaries, PMFs [PMCs] maintain permanent corporate hierarchies’ (Singer, 2001/2002, p.7). Mercenarism refers to a traditional idea of “soldiers of fortune’, occasionally misguided adventurers, often disreputable thugs, ready to enlist for any cause or power ready to pay them’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2002).

This thesis makes use of the term PMC in a broad sense. As an underlying characteristic, all firms which provide services which fall within the second column of Table 1 will be defined as PMCs. Heterogeneous in nature, services within this domain may range from direct combat to intelligence and military logistics.

Table 1: PMSC classification based on services (Schulz and Yeung, 2008)

Services provided by PSCs Services provided by PMCs

 Physical protection  Close protection  Rapid response  Technical security  Surveillance services  Investigative services

 Comprehensive risk assessment and risk mitigation services for private businesses

 Business intelligence, due diligence, political risk analysis

 Military training/consulting for national or foreign troops  Military intelligence  Arms procurement

 Combat and operational support  Humanitarian de-mining

 Maintenance

 Military and non-military support services

 All other services that have been outsourced from the military

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2.1.2 A history of privatized warfare

The practice of using paid force can be traced back as far the reign of Pharaoh Ramses II in Egypt (1279-1212 B.C) who employed Shardana mercenaries. Paying foreign individuals or groups for their military service and advice remained a common practice throughout the centuries. The Persians relied on Greek mercenaries, while Macedonian mercenaries fought against their former employer in the Peloponnesian war (413-404 B.C.) and the Carthaginian Empire witnessed the revolt of its hired units which resulted in the so-called Mercenary War (240-237 B.C.) (Miller, 1984). The Roman Empire (27 B.C.-476 A.D.), even in the Republic Period, employed high numbers of Numidian, Baearic, Gaul, Iberian and Cretan mercenaries, while the Byzantines (330 A.D.-1453) relied heavily on a group of ruthless Vikings (O’Brien, 2008b; Singer, 2003). During these centuries mercenaries were employed for a variety of tasks, ranging from guarding to functioning as military auxiliaries on the battlefield. The popular image of men with no allegiance to a crown or territory, willing to fight for whoever for the right price, can be traced back to this period in time.

Mercenaries remained a prevailing presence during the feudal military system of the Middle Ages. When in the 13th and 14th century the European urban economies began to grow, the condotta (contract) became a means for the wealthier guilds to avoid being send off to war, and contract a private individual instead. It was not before long that these private units began to organize themselves in companies and ‘over time, the agreements that they signed with their employers became highly detailed, specifying the length and terms of service, number of men, and pay’ (Singer, 2003, p.24). The ‘free companies’, as they were called, moved in large numbers to Italy where companies of nearly 10.000 strong would replace the feudal system in which citizens were called to war. Local Italian groups came to mimic the free companies and set up their own units; the condotierri (Devries, 2008). It was during this time that Niccolò Machiavelli wrote that ‘mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe’ (1515, chapter XII). Swiss mercenaries however, became well-known for their efficiency and discipline to such an extent that a large number of the Swiss population was involved in the mercenary business. Their professionalism had been noted by Pope Julius II, who in 1506 elected the Swiss Guard to protect the papacy, which it does to this day (O’Brien, 2008b). Most European armies consisted of various mercenary groups and those involved in the industry of war accumulated great wealth. Singer recounts ‘Louis de Geer, an Amsterdam capitalist who provided the Swedish

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government with a complete navy (…) and most famously, Count Albrecht von Wallenstein, who through the military business became the wealthiest man in all of Europe’ (2003, p.28). The turning point in the history of the privatized warfare was the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). Nearly the entire war, which had been one of great bloodshed, was fought by mercenary units. With the Peace of Westphalia however, national sovereign borders were established and mercenaries were replaced by national armies consisting of citizens. With the rise of patriotism came the decline of mercenarism. One interesting instance of the use of mercenaries after the emergence of the nation state, was the use of mercenaries by the British East India Company and the Dutch East India Company, both of whom retained an army of mercenaries of 100.000 and 25.000 respectively (Singer, 2003). Although mercenaries did not disappear altogether, the market for military services kept progressing into a more professional fashion. In the late 1800s, universal conventions prescribed legislation for the prohibition of hiring foreign forces, criminalizing the mercenary profession. Mercenaries are however certainly not extinct, yet they do no longer play a key role in the international system. During the 1950s and 1960s, some private groups were employed in the de-colonization aftermath. Fighting for the former imperial rulers, individuals such as ‘Dublin-born ‘Mad’ Mike Hoare, Frenchman Bob Denard and Belgian Jean Schramme – nicknamed (…), the ‘terrible ones’ (Shearer, 2008, p.15) led rebels in their fight against UN peace-enforcers in the Congo. With strong linkages to the South African apartheid regime, these private units became a symbol of racism and oppression. This brief overview of the history of privatized warfare, which has broadly focussed on the West, demonstrates that the use of private entities or contractors in warfare is not a new phenomenon. According to Herbst, ‘the private provision of violence was a routine aspect of international relations before the twentieth century’ (1997, p. 117). Hence, this sense of violence as an exclusive trait of the nation state is historically deviant (O’Brien, 2008a). Nonetheless, the current international system is dominated by the sovereignty of the nation state and it is under these circumstances that the corporatization of military services took on a whole new dimension.

2.1.3 The Modern PMC

In the wake of the end of the Cold War, the private military industry grew to proportions not seen before. Globalization, the insecurity in a post-Cold War setting and the renewed conflicts resulting from it, led to an international security setting in which the private sector would flourish. The downsizing of militaries created a skilled pool of future employees for the

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increasingly sizable corporations. Moreover, the technological revolution of warfare led to an increased need for specialized skills; an area the private sector tapped into (Singer, 2003). In the early stages, the most commonly known manifestation of the ‘new’ private military industry was Executive Outcomes (EO). Rooted in the apartheid regime’s South African Defence Force, it provided combat support and training to various African nations. Although EO has denied any direct operational combat activities, some of its personnel have admitted to directly partaking in combat operations in Sierra Leone and Angola (Shearer, 2008). The governments of both these states had contracted EO in their fight against, respectively, RUF and UNITA rebels. Even critics of EO’s active role on the battlefield have had to admit its efficiency in these operations. Its alleged links with mining and oil-corporations, and the fact that its services had been paid for by diamond and oil concessions, made EO one of the more dubious enterprises (Khareen, 1999). After its disbandment in 1999, former EO employees went on to set up spin-off corporations or entered into employment for other PMCs. Some of these spin-off companies, such as Saracen, remain active to this day.

The majority of the PMC industry however has evolved along less questionable lines; the modern-day PMC is a business venture, organized along common corporate structures. They offer their services to both the public and private sector, with some (i.e. MPRI and Brown & Root Service) remaining close ties with their home governments. They are occasionally incorporated within a broader corporate structure, which at times do not fall within the private military realm (i.e. MPRI is now part of L-3, a communications giant). The majority of PMC personnel are former soldiers. While certain PMCs exclusively draw from one national military; MPRI recruits from the US military alone, some entertain a highly diverse personnel database in terms of nationalities. According to Singer, ‘the very name “ex-” – ex-Green Beret, ex-Paratrooper, ex-General, and so on – defines the employee base of the private military industry’ (2003, p. 76). The industry enjoyed a boom in the need for its services after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US. The subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq presented a defining moment for PMCs as they were contracted in profuse numbers for a myriad of tasks. Some were contracted to guard official facilities or offer logistical and maintenance support, while others were hired to train police and military forces or to perform interrogative services. Exact numbers on how many PMC contractors were present lack, but the industry’s global revenue for the year 2003 has been estimated at over US$100 billion (Avant, 2005).

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It was during this time that the industry became the subject of public scrutiny. The previously mentioned incidents at Nisour square and the Abu Ghraib prison horrified many. The private military industry has had to significantly repair its reputation. Many PMCs nowadays steer clear of military terminology, referring to themselves as risk or hostile environment consultants. PMC webpages are rife with corporate social responsibility undertakings and strongly formulated codes of ethics and business conduct. Beyond the more traditional conflict-related activities, they have tapped into new markets. PMCs are nowadays involved in aid delivery, humanitarian operations and disaster management (Joachim & Schneiker, 2014).

2.2 Security Sector Reform

2.2.1 Definition

The emergence of SSR is best explained as a ‘marriage between policy and practice’ (Sedra, 2012, p.182). Rather than being a theoretically founded concept, SSR has evolved within institutional frameworks. Although academic interest in the relationship between security and development grew in the 1980s, it was not until the end of the Cold War when the concept of security underwent drastic changes, that SSR consolidated at the theoretical level. As a result, defining SSR is ambiguous and when defining it one must take into account Miles’ Law – where you stand depends on where you sit. Definitions provided by the UN and major SSR

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% P er ce n tag e (%) US Troops Contractors

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donors do share some commonalities. The definition which shall be used in this thesis is derived from these commonalities culminating into the following:

Security Sector Reform refers to a process of comprehensive reform efforts directed at all institutions and processes which provide security and justice with the objective of enhancing effective and accountable security for a state and its citizens without discrimination while respecting democratic norms, human rights and the rule of law (Sedra, 2015; Fitz-Gerald, 2012; USAID, 2009; OECD, 2007).

2.2.2 Theoretical background

At the theoretical level, two schools of thought dictate academic literature. One of the main tensions in the field of SSR involves the Weberian notion of statehood and the reality of fragmented societies in which authority is often not monopolized by the state but rather controlled by a multitude of public and private actors (Sedra, 2015; Andersen, 2011). This tension has created two different models of SSR: the monopoly and the hybrid model. A brief discussion on the models will present a comprehensive theoretical background on the concept. Authority in fragile or conflict-affected states is often scattered and hence these states fall short of the Weberian sense of statehood. Although both schools of thought agree on this, ‘the key question is whether this fragmentation of public authority is best understood as a ‘fixable’ deviation from a universal norm of effective Weberian statehood, or as a persistent feature of a particular form of post-colonial statehood’ (Andersen, 2011, p.11). The former assumption stems from the monopoly model, which relies heavily on the notion of a strong state capable of maintaining its monopoly of force to ensure sustainable peace (Sedra, 2013). For such a monopoly of force to be established, Western-like state structures must be constructed. According to Andersen (2011) this notion of institutionalization before liberalization, indicates a Hobbesian reality of the liberal state in which the state must ensure that it possesses a higher degree of force capabilities than others to be able to provide security for its citizens. As such, ‘establishing a liberal peace in fragile states involves not merely the taming of the Hobbesian Leviathan but the actual establishing of the Leviathan’ (Andersen, 2011, p. 12). The responsibility for the execution of SSR lies with donors, while those at whom the reforms are aimed are initially no more than bystanders (Sedra, 2013). The monopoly model is not only theoretically dominant; it also largely dictates the real world practice of SSR.

The second school of thought is the hybrid model which is based on the premise that most developing and conflict-affected states never experienced the state as it is institutionalized in

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the Western world (Baker, 2010). The idea that a monopoly of force has to be established as a foundation for the rule of law and justice is dismissed as technocratic. Rather than following a generic blueprint designed by donors, a context-specific approach is desired to promote sustainable peace and security (Andersen, 2011). Particularly the role of informal and non-state actors in the transformation process is emphasized. The main challenge for SSR is to not only engage non-state actors, but to tailor programmes to incorporate informal, existing security mechanisms (Lawrence, 2012, p.6). The hybrid school rejects the normative ideal of mirroring Western state-building as proposed in the monopoly model, and promotes a strategy based on already existing structures (Andersen, 2011). This ‘multi-layered’ approach, as it is often described in policy documents, also forms a path towards state-building, albeit more indirectly than the proposed route in the monopoly model (Andersen, 2011). Although the monopoly model dominates current SSR practice, the hybrid model is gaining momentum. Significant large-scale implementation of the multi-layered approach however has yet to be established (Baker, 2010).

2.2.3 Practical background

In the early 2000s, rapid institutionalization of SSR took place and many development donors and international organizations began using the concept of SSR to address a broad array of issues. Although initially found under the peacebuilding umbrella, at that time SSR also emerged as a foundation for state-building (Van Veen & Price, 2014). In 2007, the OECD emphasized that ‘SSR should be seen as an integral part of ongoing post-conflict and state-building efforts’ (OECD, 2007, p. 116) and in a 2013 report the UN asserted that SSR ‘is acknowledged (…) as a central component of the Organization’s peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development agendas’ (UNSG, 2013, p. 25). The notion of human security and the liberal peace component have moulded SSR into an all-encompassing, holistic remedy to a multitude of interconnected issues; ‘reform or transformation of the security sector is now seen as an integral part of the transition from one-party to pluralist political systems, from centrally planned to market economies and from armed conflict to peace’ (Hendrickson & Karkoszka, 2005, p. 19).

One recent transformative instance for SSR was the US response to 9/11 (Sedra, 2015; Sherman, 2010; Hendrickson & Karkoszka, 2005). The attacks set in motion a two-tier revision of US strategy with regard to SSR. First, US national security policy and structure itself underwent a great transformation. Although much of the literature on SSR focusses on

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Figure 2: SSR sectors (OECD, 2007)

developing states and conflict-affected environments, SSR does not exclude Western governments. For example; the creation of, the Department of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence on top of a reorganization of security institutions altered the US’s security sector considerably (Sherman, 2010). More importantly however was how SSR became formulated as a tool in the ‘war on terror’. With terrorism shooting to the top of the threat charts in many Western states, SSR has increasingly become more about counterterrorism than human security (Sedra, 2015). A breeding ground for terrorism, the developing world must be secured, which has led to what some view as a ‘militarization of US foreign assistance’ (Sherman, 2010, p. 59). Not only are these measures aimed at states as Afghanistan and Iraq; often they are directed at securing the security sector of strategic states like Indonesia and Uzbekistan (Sherman, 2010). In a 2008 US National Defence Strategy it was put as follows: ‘the prospect that instability and collapse in a strategic state could provide extremists access to weapons of mass destruction or result in control of strategic resources is a particular concern. To preclude such calamities, we will help build the internal capacities of countries at risk’ (US DoD, 2008, p.9).

2.2.4 Military Reform

Various sectors fall within the broad SSR umbrella. According to the OECD DAC Handbook on SSR, there are roughly nine at which reform efforts might be aimed (Figure 2). This thesis focusses on the second sector, defence, which is at times interchangeably used with military reform. Military reform can however also be viewed as a specific part of defence reform, as the defence sector ordinarily also consists of a Ministry of Defence and a military intelligence service. In this thesis, military reform will therefore be viewed as a component of defence reform.

 Democratic oversight and accountability

 Defence

 Intelligence and security service  Integrated border management  Police

 Democratic oversight and accountability

 Defence

 Intelligence and security service  Integrated border management  Police

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2.2.4.1 Definition

Military reform as a specific component of SSR has been underdeveloped conceptually and inharmoniously executed practically. In general, it refers to broadly all reform and reconstruction efforts aimed at the military apparatus of a state. This may entail, amongst other things, army size and structure, training and civil-military relations. But also encompasses wider reform efforts of the defence sector such as democratic control of the forces, delineation of roles with other security bodies such as intelligence services and regional military co-operation.

2.2.4.2 Background

The military is a guardian of a state’s sovereignty and must protect a state against external and internal acts of aggression. It may also be deployed for humanitarian or peacekeeping purposes on its own, or foreign territory. More than often however, particularly in weak states, military forces have been found to be at the centre of a conflict with allegations of wide-spread abuse of power, favouritism and even war crimes. Social fragmentation, weak governance and power vacuums leave space for components or even the whole military to fail its obligation to protect its people. Examples of military reform aimed at countering these types of intrusive failures are the US efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the British endeavour in Sierra Leone (OECD, 2007). Each of these donor states has had to deal with unmotivated, underpaid, ethnically imbalanced forces and worked towards improving the quality of soldiers, training, management and equipment. None of these well-known cases are however acknowledged for their success in establishing a well-functioning, sustainable military. They have been both costly and time-consuming.

Not all military reform and reconstruction undertakings are as laborious; there are many more instances of less extensive reforms aimed at, for example, corruption. In Indonesia, the military ran business activities alongside its governmental obligations for years. Here, reform efforts were shaped to counter these activities and enhance budget transparency (OECD, 2007). Downsizing certain military institutions, their arms arsenal or number of soldiers are other possible options. These attempts must be paired with demobilization and reintegration efforts to avoid societal unrest as a result of returning, disgruntled soldiers, war lords or child soldiers. This demonstrates that military reform is not a stand-alone concept, but an integral part of the wider SSR effort.

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2.2.5 SSR & Outsourcing

In a 1998 speech, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan maintained that ‘the world may not be ready to privatize peace’ (Annan, 1998). Now, seventeen years later, private contractors have become naturalized, and are no longer an exceptional presence in many SSR operations. Three simultaneous and mutually reinforcing trends responsible for this evolution can be identified. First, concurrent with the tendency of a ‘rolling back of the state’, the military is one of the many areas which has undergone waves of privatization. In the US for example, a 1995 Defence report ‘suggested that it could save up to US$ 6 billion annually by 2002 if it contracted out all of its support functions to private vendors’ (Ebo, 2008, p. 152). A statement which has been reiterated by the Clinton administration, which nominated military training as one of the first activities to be relayed to the private sector. And later the Bush administration, under which the number of private contractors for military functions steeply increased (Krahmann, 2007).

Secondly, the increased amount of SSR operations, both as part of UN mandates and as part of a multilateral or national effort, has led governments to search for alternatives in the private sector. The transformation of conflict as a result of the security vacuum left behind by the Cold War allowed many supressed conflicts to arise (Singer, 2003). These conflicts are increasingly characterized by non-state actors, criminalization and a cross-border tendency. Peace operations are therefore becoming less and less straightforward and are more and more designed to tackle a broad spectrum of problems. UN peacekeeping for instance, has been transformed from a tool for deterring violence to a holistic practice which actively implements peace programmes. This includes the incorporation of SSR in many of its mandates, while its operating environments have grown rapidly radicalized (Østensen, 2005). This ‘third-generation peacekeeping’ has made the presence of violence in UN operations more plausible, which poses a dilemma for troop-contributors who are increasingly hesitant to place their own troops in such dire situations under the UN flag (Spearin, 2011). The newly found multifaceted character of peace operations has put a serious strain on both financial and military resources. As SSR programmes require increasingly more from the military apparatus, which has undergone waves of privatization, outsourcing some of its tasks appears a logical step. Moreover, at times governments are unable to ‘sell’ sending troops to engage in a high-risk SSR operation to the public. With Somalia freshly engraved in the public’s memory, for example, the US government has had a difficult time rooting popular support for foreign

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intervention. Also, callous as it may sound, contracting a PMC averts the risk of national fatalities for an administration while still being able to conduct foreign policy.

Thirdly, the growing PMC industry has become aware of a potential ‘new’ market for its services and some companies are now presenting themselves as humanitarian partners in peace. The industry has known an impressive metamorphose over the past decade by cleaning up their image, reputational repair and developing the visibility of their corporate responsibility actions plans (Joachim & Schneiker, 2014). More importantly however is the recognition that PMCs may be more efficient or even more competent than traditional forces. In the area of technology for example. Modern conflicts increasingly integrate modern information technologies and strategies. PMCs have speedily developed high-end technological equipment and experience, which may very well be superior to the technological capabilities of certain governments (Singer, 2003). Governments themselves are recognizing the industry’s potential. The UK’s Green Paper for example, states that ‘the cost of employing PMCs for certain functions in peace support operations could be much lower than that of national armed forces’ (FCO, 2002, p.4). A 2005 US Senate report goes as far as claiming that ‘at a minimum such companies [PMCs] should be utilized to supplement the number of blue berets and blue helmets’ and that ‘the United Nations can no longer afford to ignore the potential cost-savings that private companies with proven records of good service and good behaviour can offer’ (US Senate, 2005). The use of PMCs in SSR can thus be viewed as a reverberation of an increased need for their services as a result of the changing nature of conflict and institutional restraints (Lily, 2000), and the awareness of an industry for its potential in a new market segment. As this trend does not appear to be slowing down, it is imperative that we build an understanding of when to best engage PMCs and how to ensure the best possible outcome when contracting them.

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Condition I Capacities & commitments of international actors Condition II

Local ownership Condition III Design & implementation of policies and measures

2.3 Brzoska’s SSR framework

The aim of this thesis is to gain an understanding of the use of PMCs in SSR and which conditions shape a successful outcome. In a 2006 publication in International Peacekeeping, Michael Brzoska puts forward three conditions which influence the success or failure of the SSR effort. To establish whether or not a case was indeed one of success, he lists risk factors, the absence of which determines the degree of success. These are derived from preliminary post-conflict analyses with heavy international overtones. Figure 3 provides a graphic overview of the complete framework. In the following sections, first the conditions will be explored after which all the risk factors will be briefly addressed.

Figure 3: Graphic overview of the independent and dependent variables

Independent variables Dependent variable

2.3.1 Conditions

The first condition refers to capacities and commitments of international actors. Donors have to invest a substantial amount of political and financial capital if they want to play a substantial role in the SSR process. A multitude of experts and professionals have to be involved throughout every stage of the programme. Such a multidisciplinary approach may necessitate the involvement of legal, military, police professionals, but also human resources and labour market experts. For the process to be sustainable, those engaged must cooperate to the best possible extent, while avoiding ‘turf wars’ as a result of duplication and overlapping mandates. (Brzoska, 2006, p. 10-11). One of the main hindrances to sustainable SSR has proven to be the

Success= the absence of:

Resurgence of violence Politicization Militarization Ethnicization Informalism Corruption Lack of Professionalism

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fragmentation of SSR responsibilities between various actors with diverging interests and approaches which has led to inefficiencies and ineffectiveness.

The second condition relates to the principle of local ownership. According to Brzoska, ‘it is vital that reform is seen as an expression of national will and not something imposed by outsiders’ (2006, p.11). In order to succeed, SSR programmes must therefore be viewed by the designated population as a product of their need for it, rather than a pre-packed menu imposed on them by outsiders with little regard to their socio-economic environment. When foreign SSR donors leave, the local population remains. Long-term sustainability and legitimacy thus depend on local ownership to act as a foundation (Ebo, 2008). Both the UN and the OECD embrace this notion: ‘if local ownership is taken seriously, it changes the means and manner of engagement in SSR; as such, SSR assistance should be designed to support partner governments and stakeholders as they move down a path of reform, rather than determining that path and leading them down it’ (OECD, 2007, p.28).

The final condition Brzoska identifies as being influential is the design and implementation of policies and measures. In an earlier version of the 2006 article, Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder (2004) subcategorized this condition into three sub-conditions.

First, there are certain enabling factors to the process. If SSR is integrally embraced in the relevant post-conflict agreements, changes of success of the programme increase. Leaving SSR out of such documents will most likely give leeway to reigniting conflict. Any post-conflict agreements or policies must also portray unambiguousness and the intent to remove the remnants of war. Generally, external SSR programmes must be demand driven. One course of action donor states and organizations could take to encourage a sense of control, is the carrying out of needs-assessments to inform the shape and extent of the SSR programme (Busterud, 2015). SSR measures must flow from assessments before they are picked as ‘the right choice’. When the correct policies are decided upon, they must focus heavily on capacity building of the security forces (Brzoska & Heinemann-Grüder, 2004). If the situation on the ground requires immediate stabilization, emergency measures must target the provision of physical security before long-term necessities.

The second sub-condition asserts that ‘the post-conflict SSR policy sequence should start with deliberations about future tasks of national security, defence and intelligence, then cascading down to changes in organizations and personnel’ (Brzoska, 2006, p. 12). For a sustainable reform of a security sector a haphazard approach is undesirable. Rather, all concrete reform

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and restructuring efforts should flow from national security doctrines decided upon before the commencement of institutional reform. Detailed and concrete plans on goals, structure, budgets, oversight and management must lead and follow timelines for implementation. The final sub-condition relates to the verification of the solidity of the SSR programme. Quantitative and qualitative reviews and audits must determine the quality of various aspects of and at various stages of the process. Effectiveness, relevance, soundness and overall costs must instruct a detailed report on the entire SSR process (Brzoska & Heinemann-Grüder, 2004).

Brzoska’s conditions shape success or failure. Therefore, before any conclusions may be drawn from them, we must take a step back and determine whether or not we can indeed speak success or failure. Conveniently, Brzoska provides us with a tool to do just that.

2.3.2 Risk factors

Preliminary analyses have produced seven imminent risk factors in post-conflict situations which must be addressed by SSR policies (Brzoska, 2003). Each risk factor corresponds with certain indicators, absence of which hence establishes the degree of success. Risk factors are not necessarily all present or equally relevant to each individual case and likewise, indicators may vary per case.

One obvious imminent risk factor is the resurgence of violence. In the aftermath of a conflict, peace agreements or a cessation of hostilities are tools to keeping violent outburst in check. If particular groups however feel unrepresented, left out or duped by any such agreements, the resort to violence is often within hand’s reach. Warlords for example, are prone to these tendencies. Illegitimately held weapons are also a great threat to post-conflict settlements. Many states which have endured decades of violent conflict are faced with a great number of unregistered, illegal weapons held by civilians and rebel groups. Generally, a population is asked to hand over is weapons to the government in return for compensation, but all too often people are hesitant to trust and engage in such efforts, leaving high numbers of weapons outside the governments reach. A main source of illegal weapons are ex-combatants, who may also be the cause of other types of unrest. Many ex-combatants run into problems of unemployment and turn to criminal activities. Grievances and resentment has led this group to return to violence in the past.

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When the independence of security forces is eroded through politicization, SSR efforts run the risk of failing. A disproportionate dependence on political parties or a lack of constraints on political activities create unrest rather than security. Often in conflicts, security forces are a tool of a dictator or authoritarian regime and no longer protect its entire population. They engage in activities to the benefit of its leadership which often has led to their non-mandated use. A ‘cult of the military’ may arise, marginalizing constitutional oversight (Brzoska, 2006). A third risk factor is militarization. Armed conflicts often lead governments to increase their military spending. When such spending is regarded as excessive we speak of militarization. Militarization is characterized by comparatively high numbers of men in uniform per capita (Brzoska, 2006). Moreover, recruitment for military purposes takes on a different format as age and gender barriers are removed in the recruitment standards. The forced recruitment of child soldiers is an example these practices. Military doctrine is taught at schools, leaving society drenched in military sentiments.

A common trait of conflict is the role of ethnicity as was displayed in Rwanda, Burundi and the former Yugoslavia. Asymmetrical and hostile relations between ethnic groups have in the past often led to violent outburst, war and at times, genocide (Young, 2003). When ethnicity dictates governance, it trickles down to its security institutions. Ethnic preferences of security institutions create an unbalanced security sector: ‘when ethnic patronage is built into military, police and security bureaucracies, it corrupts them, weakens discipline, reinforces a sense of impunity and fosters public (and especially minority) distrust of the state itself’ (Luckham, 2003, p.22). Besides ethnicization, institutionalization of any clientelistic bias, be it ethnic, religious, gender or involving the economically disempowered, poses a risk to the SSR process (OECD, 2007).

Another element for sustainable SSR is the existence or creation of formal governing principles. ‘The absence of enforceable and publicly binding norms, particularly constitutional or legislative provisions for control and decision-making of security sector institutions’ (Brzoska, 2006, p.10), leads to what is called informalism. Put simply; informalism is a characteristic of the absence of a rule of law. Logically as it may sound, this pivotal aspect of SSR has often led to complications in past attempts. Post-conflict situations characterized by weak governance lack a constitutional foundation and considerable legislature. Governmental erosion undermines any enforcement efforts and weakens adequate oversight on the security

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sector. Legislative boundaries on control and clear delineation of decision-making are necessary to guide the security institutions.

Another corroding factor for SSR is corruption. Defined by Transparency International as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (TI, nd.a), corruption undermines any reform or restructure effort as it inherently diffuses power unequally. Post-conflict situations are often characterized by war economies in which corruption is an ordinary payment for goods, services or political effort. Corruption is not necessarily the exchange of money as it may also refer to various other activities to further the interest of a political party or one’s family or ethnical group (Philp, 2008). Whichever shape it takes; corruption effectively frustrates any efforts to rebuild the security sector.

The final imminent risk factor which must be addressed by SSR efforts is the lack of professionalism. If security institutions are to become well-functioning and well-rooted entities, they need to display the capability to carry out its mandate in a responsible manner. This requires certain technical standards, military education and training requirements. The institution must become a reliable and integral part of the larger security sector. Top-down, this means that mandates must be conspicuously articulated and achievably designed. As national security doctrines outline the country-specific primary security threats, the main indicator for this risk factor would be to assess whether or not the relevant security institution provides physical security as mandated by law. Brzoska however, acknowledges the difficulty of measuring this. He therefore provides other, somewhat more indirect, indicators such as public credibility, transparency and accountability (Brzoska, 2006).

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3 Methodology

‘There is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas. Discovery contains ‘an irrational element’, or a ‘creative intuition’’.

– Karl Popper (1935, p.8)

Based on the nature of the research question and data availability a qualitative approach to this research has been deemed most appropriate. It is an exploratory cross-country study of a relatively new phenomenon in which concepts are used to demarcate the analysis. This research aims to provide theoretical building blocks to an underdeveloped research area. The analysis itself is two-fold as it first determines whether or not a case study can be qualified as a success and then goes on to assess if the conditions for success shaped the military reform in that specific case. To fulfil the explanatory aim of the research question, a case study approach has been chosen.

RQ: Which conditions shaped military reform by Private Military Companies in Liberia and Bosnia and Herzegovina?

3.1 Research Design

Measuring success and failure is a difficult enterprise, particularly in the ambiguous field of social science. Some scholars do provide us with frameworks through which we can build theory and accumulate knowledge. Michael Brzoska is one of these scholars and has laid out a foundation of indicators and conditions for assessing success and failure of SSR with distinct international influence in post-conflict situations. Brzoska is not the sole scholar who has attempted to create a roadmap for analysis, but the reason this thesis will make use of his framework is that he provides one with great specificity. Others often remain inferred from vague terminology; Nilsson and Kovacs (2013), for example, also provide three benchmark criteria for success (operational capacity, governance and sustainability), but without proper demarcation these criteria will leave us with superficial analyses. The preciseness of Brzoska’s risk factors and conditions and its adaptability to the distinct features of each individual case study should guide thorough analyses. In order to assess the relevant conditions in the two case studies, it must first be determined whether or not these cases are indeed cases of success. Only then can we can move on to an analysis of the conditions. The dependent variable hence is

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‘success’, while the independent variables are the three conditions of success. Figure 4 provides a graphic overview of the complete research design.

Figure 4: Graphic research design

Table 2 gives an overview of Brzoska’s risk factors. Various indicators of these risk factors construe an image of the degree of success of SSR. These factors are risks which have to be addressed from the inception of SSR efforts. It does not provide any predictions for the future hence the degree of success which is measured through this framework is short-term limited.

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Both case studies will rely on slightly different indicators as some are more relevant for one context than the other. The framework can be tailor-made to fit military reform and the challenges unique to Liberia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Some risk factors will be identified as being of particular importance to one case study, whereas others may be negligible or already represented within another indicator or risk factor. As previously stated, this research assumes a degree of success of both cases based on the literature. Brzoska’s risk factor framework is a tool to confirm or to reject this assumption. It will also allow for a more thorough understanding of the context. Brzoska does not prescribe how many risk factors must be absent for a case to qualify as a success. Taking into account external influences and circumstances, the qualification ‘success’ has been arbitrarily set when, at a minimum, 75% of the identifiable risk factors is absent. A concise overview of the utilized indicators is provided in each case study chapter.

Table 2: Risk factors and indicators (Brzoska, 2006, p.9)

Risk factors Indicators

Resurgence of violence - Ex-combatants

- The military as a source of violence - Excessive amounts of (illegal) weapons Politicization - Dependence on political parties

- Lack of constraints on political activities Militarization - High numbers of men in uniform per capita

- Forced recruitment of underage youth - Excessive military spending

Ethnicization - Ethnic preferences & neglect

- Any manifestation of clientelistic bias, i.e. gender Informalism - Absence of constitutional or legislative provisions for

control and decision-making

Corruption - High ranking on the defence anti-corruption index Lack of professionalism - Weak capabilities

- Low public credibility - Low transparency

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Table 3: Conditions for success

Subsequently, Brzoska’s conditions, which according to previously conducted analyses influence the success or failure of the SSR process in post-conflict situations with a strong international presence, will be assessed. These conditions delve more into the why-question of success or failure. In a 2004 publication Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder sub-categorized condition iii. This is useful for this thesis as it adds a level of specificity.

i. Capacities & commitments of international actors ii. Local ownership

iii. Design & implementation of policies and measures a. Enabling factors

b. Sequencing

c. Cost-benefit & project evaluation

The analysis of the case studies will be conducted in four steps. First, the case and its context will be explained. Secondly, a description of the specifics of the contract and the services delivered will be provided after which an analysis of the risk factors will cumulate into an indication of the degree of success of the case. Finally, Brzoska’s three conditions will be assessed to gain a better understanding of the factors influencing the success or failure. The outcome of the analyses does not aim to establish or prove direct causal linkages. Rather, it presents insight into a new phenomenon, research on which so far has been characterized by anecdotal and speculative instances (Branović, 2011). Hopefully it provides further avenues for future research.

3.2 Case study method

For the purpose of this research, a case study design will be employed to answer the central research question. Although the recipient of some critique (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994; Lieberson, 1992), the case study design has proven to be a much appreciated method of research within the realm of social sciences. Defined as ‘an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units’ (Gerring, 2004, p. 341), case studies have the ability to systematically compare and trace processes, support theories and possess strong explanatory and descriptive characteristics. The contextual nature of this particular design provides in-depth knowledge rather than static outcomes. The number of case studies which

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are analysed in a single research is highly dependent on the purpose of that research. Had the aim of this research been generalizability of findings, a higher number cases would have been appropriate. However, as the purpose of this research is exploratory and aimed at in-depth knowledge of a new phenomenon, a multiple case study design of two cases has been chosen. As Gerring puts it: ‘the sheer number of examples of a given phenomenon does not, by itself, produce insight. It may only confuse’ (2007, p.40). The instances of military reform by PMCs are vastly different and the research to date has not yet been developed to the extent that comparative research through a large-n study is possible. Coming back to generalizability, or external validity; it has to be emphasized that this is not the aim of this research. Rather, the analysis privileges internal validity.

Certainly, the case study design displays some flaws; there is the issue of biased case selection, representativeness and ineffective causal effect measuring capabilities (Maoz, 2002). Nonetheless, there is not one ideal-type of research within the complex field of social science. It is up to the discretion of the researcher to determine which approach best suits the purpose of the study at hand.

3.2.1 Case selection

The two case studies which will be analysed in this thesis are the military reform efforts by DynCorp in Liberia and MPRI in BiH. The objective of this research is to gain insight in the use of PMCs in military reform. With the pragmatic assumption that the use of PMCs will increase in the years to come, two instances of military reform by PMCs which have been deemed relatively successful in the literature have been selected. As this thesis falls within a niche research area, there was no plethora of cases to select from. The small number of cases were diluted by problems of availability and reliability of data. A lion’s share of the contracts is classified and the readily available information is oftentimes incomplete. The PMC industry and the contracting governments remain hesitant to provide public records and often national or federal laws prohibit the public disclosure of agreements.

The first case study of this research, DynCorp in Liberia, has received more praise than any of the other relatively successful cases. The International Crisis Group (ICG), an NGO not particularly sympathetic towards the PMC industry, has been cautiously positive of the process and on the vetting process writes in one of its reports: ‘Liberians, from those on the street to the president and her security advisers, seem pleased with the process and consider it comprehensive. Crisis Group agrees’ (ICG, 2009, p. 12). The reform programme in Liberia

Private Military Companies and military reform: a case study of DynCorp in Liberia and MPRI in Bosnia and Herzegovina