The Culture Machine. Thinking about culture, society and politics beyond the theoretical and physical borders of the nation-state

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UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM

The Culture Machine

Thinking about culture, society and politics beyond the theoretical and physical borders of the nation-state

10880437 Hannah Achterbosch

Supervisor Prof. Dr. H. Y. M. Jansen Second Reader Dr. F. Russo

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Al wat je ooit zag of hoorde, al wat je dacht te weten, is niet meer dat, maar anders.1

Hella S. Haasse

Sleuteloog

(Amsterdam: Querido’s Uitgeverij, 2002)

1_{Translation from Dutch: ‘All that you ever saw or heard, all that you thought to know, is no longer that, but}

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0 INTRODUCTION

The arrival of more than 300.000 Dutch Indonesians in Dutch society between 1946 and 1968 as consequence of the decolonization of Indonesia lies at the very heart of rethinking the relationship between the concepts of culture, politics and society underpinning the Dutch state. No longer was it possible to build on the existing presumed self-evident nation-state, because Dutch politics was gradually undermined by Indonesia’s struggle for independence and Dutch society had to make space for at least 300.000 citizens with another cultural background. Besides these political and societal consequences, the cultural arena served as a place where young Indonesian migrants, such as the Indorock formation, The Blue Diamonds, made the presence of the new cultural group with other cultural expressions visible.

Despite this fundamental historical event resulting in social, political and cultural change, in social-political philosophy the emphasis is still on theorizing within the borders of the powerful nation-state. Admittedly, attempts have been made to elaborate on the cultural component of society, which can be described as ‘the cultural turn,’ described by, for example, Geertz (1973) and Bourdieu (1984) and later by Appadurai (1996). This cultural turn, however, did not lead to a renewed, solid philosophical theory. Subsequent studies focus almost exclusively on national or societal citizenship (see for example: Boele van Hensbroek & Vega, 2012; Koopmans, 2005; Kymlicka, 1995 & Modood, 2007). The focus on citizenship in these subsequent studies results in a theorizing and understanding of the concepts of culture, politics and society limited to the borders of nations-states. This thesis will argue that the understanding of the concepts of culture, politics and society could and should be philosophically deepened.

The sociologist Willem Schinkel (2007 & 2008) and philosopher Gianni Vattimo (1989 & 2003), both enter the academic and public debate about the interrelated understanding of culture, politics and society – and about cultural diversity and cultural emancipation, in particular. Schinkel (2009) criticizes the Dutch obsession with integration in

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particular and even uses citizenship in that respect as an example of problematic thought concerning cultural emancipation. He states that the focus lies too heavily on moral and cultural citizenship, which results in the exclusion of cultural minorities on the basis of their adjustment to Dutch norms and values. Vattimo takes this critique a step further, looking beyond one particular society, and states that philosophers should consider the relationship between culture, politics and society in a more global perspective. His focus is not necessarily on citizenship or exclusion, but rather on how the understanding of cultural emancipation can be refined in the context of globalization. This thesis will discuss the two recent critiques from Schinkel and Vattimo on socio-philosophical thought concerning cultural diversity and cultural emancipation. Their critiques will be examined in the context of a case study describing the introduction and increase of Indonesian cultural expressions in the Netherlands, in particular, Indorock.

Philosophical context

To a large extent, the relationship between culture, politics and society in social and political philosophy still seems to be based on Anderson’s (1989, p. 154) Imagined Communities where he describes the nation as:

‘An imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know their fellow-members […] yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. Communities are to be distinguished […] by the style in which they are imagined.’

What is important in this definition is the role culture plays in the political unity of the nation-state. This political unity results from imagined shared cultural values as Anderson (1986, p.6) states:

‘A nation can be described as an imagined community which is the product of cultural norms and values within a territory.’

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Two important assumptions that are still dominant in recent sociological and philosophical research arise from his definition. The first is the assumption that politics and culture coincide within the nation-state or society. The second is that a nation or society is collectively imagined as a cultural unity, where the concept of imagination is of great importance.

Recent social and philosophical studies still base their assumptions on Anderson’s imagined communities, to the extent that they associate the weakening of the nation-state with the rise of cultural diversity as opposed to cultural unity. For example, Rattansi (2012, p. 4) explains how cultural diversity is assumed to lead to an unravelling of the nation-state on the basis of the ‘triple transition’. This transition consists of the state losing power to separatist demands of minorities, such as global institutions, the unpredicted effects of the use of guest workers, and the retrenchments relating to the welfare state. On the basis of Rattansi, it can be argued that the apparent order that resulted from the creation of nation states is on the wane. For many decades, the nation was considered as an organizational structure with an eternal lifespan, but recently, the question is raised whether nations can be maintained in this century of supranational processes, in which culture plays the leading role.

Moreover, this weakening of nation-states due to the rise of cultural diversity is often not perceived neutrally, but rather as highly problematic by socio-political philosophers, politicians and the majority of the nation (as for example explained by Rattansi, 2011 & Schinkel, 2007). Boomkens (2006, 235) goes so far as to state that the presumed weakening of nation-states is seen as ‘a great discomfort’ or ‘crisis of the community’ amongst philosophers. There are two ways in which cultural diversity is problematized in relation to the decreasing power of nation-states. On the one hand, the majority culture is presented as a reason for protecting the nation and its politics, as people conceive of the nation as a result of a common, homogeneous culture. On the other hand, cultural diversity (the rise of cultural minorities within nation states) is used as an explanation for the lack of power of national policies. In the case of the latter, culture is sometimes described as problematic from the inside – for example, when populations in the Middle East rebelled against national regimes in order to start cultural and political renewal under the name of Arab Spring. It is more common, however, that culture is perceived as a threat from the outside, when migration and refugees greatly affect both national politics and the majority culture because of their ‘otherness’. More philosophically formulated, cultural diversity is seen as undermining the collective imagination of a cultural unity that once resulted in the nation-state.

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The notion of cultural diversity as a causal factor for the decreasing power of the nation-state results in a problematic understanding of cultural emancipation and cultural minorities. Although the decreasing power of nation-state cannot only be blamed on cultural diversity, as an aging population, economic globalization and modern technologies also undermine the power of the nation-state, cultural diversity is represented as the main problem of the nation state (Schinkel, 2007 & 2008). This is supported by Boomkens (2005, p. 63) who states that ‘Politics took on the shape of a cultural war’. Cultural diversity is seen as a problem, for example, because it is assumed that cultural minorities are not sufficiently integrated into the majority, and therefore pose a threat for the national, cultural identity (Koopmans et al., 2005, p. 178; Rattansi, 2011, p. 20; Roggeband & Verloo, 2007, p. 277-278). In addition, both the concrete and the imagined increase of Muslims in the Western world is experienced as a threat to Western identities (van der Veer, 2006, p.121; Modood, 2007, p. 12). In summary, seeing cultural diversity as a causal factor for social and political phenomena results in the notion definition that cultural emancipation and cultural minorities pose a threat to nation-state and society.

Moreover, defining cultural diversity as a causal factor for the weakening of nation-states ignores the effects of globalization. In fact, the imagination of cultural diversity in this manner is still limited to the Imagined community. This suggests that cultural minorities and emancipation can only be imagined in line with the unity and order of the nation-state, while in fact, the nation state is just one of the possible products that can result from (collective) imagination. This criticism is supported by Appadurai (1996) who argues that imagination is formed by five global dimensions of cultural flows or ‘scapes’: ethnoscape, technoscape, financescape, ideoscape and mediascape. For this introduction, a detailed explanation of these scapes is not relevant, but it is important to note that according to Appadurai, these scapes contribute to the fact that imagination has become a collective, social fact providing a diversity of imagined worlds, rather than a homogeneous imagined world as the nation-state (Appadurai, 1996, p.5). Due to the emergence of the scapes, different cultural flows detach from territorial boundaries, spreading globally, allowing for a diverse imagination.. Globalization thus creates a context in which imagination no longer serves cultural unity, but serves cultural diversity.

In the philosophical tradition of Appadurai (1996), an oppositional voice arose from the end of the 20th century onwards, concentrating on the oppressive effects of the national and nationalist imagination, This oppositional voice, of, for example Stoler (1995) challenges

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Anderson’s implicit assumptions that politics and culture coincide, and that society should be seen as a collectively imagined cultural unity. On the basis of Foucault, Stoler challenges the coincidence of politics and culture, arguing that contemporary thought about cultural diversity is still based on a ‘colonial order of things’ (referring to Foucault’s Order of things, 1966). She concludes: ‘The point is to register explicitly that what appears as distinctively French, Dutch or genetically European in the late nineteenth century were sometimes cultural and political configurations honed and worked through the politics of empire earlier’ (Stoler, 1995, p. 208). Many more examples could be cited to show that more and more philosophers contest the idea of cultural imagination within the theoretical and physical borders of the nation-state on which the dominant, western imagination of cultural diversity is based.

Scientific relevance

Two relevant philosophical works that explicitly challenge the inaccurate problematization of cultural diversity as a result of the socio-philosophical tradition based on Anderson are the aforementioned Willem Schinkel (2007 & 2008) and Gianni Vattimo (1989 & 2003). Both Schinkel and Vattimo claim that today’s imagination about cultural diversity and cultural emancipation is too limited as it results from an emphasis on collective unity. The importance attributed to unity is based on an outdated metaphysical tradition in philosophy, where a continuous functional coherence is seen between culture, politics and society. In fact, society is thought of as it is a machine, where the various parts each have a functional role in order to maintain order and unity. For Schinkel and Vattimo, this model of thinking is no longer tenable in philosophy, and therefore they propose two new ways of thinking, or imagining. These new ways build on or perhaps reject the idea of imagined communities, as described by Anderson, in order to actualize cultural emancipation within the context of globalization.

Schinkel defines problematic thinking about society not so much as a machine, but rather as a ‘social body’ that is threatened by the disease of cultural diversity. Society is seen as a homogeneous unity, almost like a body, threatened by different diseases, such as ageing and cultural diversity. ‘Society as a whole is involved with the obsession about corporeality and a fascination with the healthy, young but long-lived and especially beautiful – balanced and symmetric – body (Schinkel, 2007, p. 42-43)’. This obsession results in culturist thinking, which suggests that culture as theoretical concept is constantly, whether appropriately or not, used to explain societal problems such as criminality or a paucity of

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integration, while the dominant culture remains protected from criticism. In fact, this organistic thinking creates a cultural hierarchy in which the dominant culture is the more legitimate form, which limits the imagination of cultural minorities, and even causes a reduction of being of these cultural minorities. To oppose this reduction, Schinkel proposes an ‘integer, utopian thinking’, in which the distinction between dominant and minority culture is abandoned.

Vattimo, however, argues that it is not so much a reduction of cultural minorities that occurs, but rather a weakening of being, in general, due to globalization. This weakening is rather a multiplication of worldviews that results in ‘awareness of the modest position that is taken by one worldview among many others’ (Vattimo, 1989, p. 20). Not only minority cultures suffer from this weakening, according to Vattimo, but so does the majority culture. According to Vattimo, the realization of weakening, actually offers the opportunity to prevent one ideal (or one cultural group) from seizing power too easily. Therefore, he does not propose, as Schinkel, the dissolution between different cultural groups by an integer, utopian imagination, but rather proposes an increasing awareness of ‘otherness’ in order to actualize cultural emancipation. Vattimo therefore proposes a heterotopic, weak thought.

Method and structure

In this thesis, the theoretical work of Schinkel and Vattimo will be used to answer the question: To what extent can a philosophically broader conception of cultural emancipation be formulated that moves beyond the theoretical and physical borders of the nation-state? The aim of this research is to create a renewed understanding of the imagination of culture within a sociopolitical and societal context, by examining the relationship between the concepts of culture politics and society. My hypothesis is that renewed philosophical theory is needed to create this broader understanding. The criticisms of Schinkel and Vattimo serve as a framework for this thesis because both use the rejection of metaphysics in order to arrive at a renewed conception of cultural emancipation, although in the end they arrive at divergent conclusions. Their conclusions will be examined on the basis of a case study concerning the arrival of (Dutch) Indonesian culture in Dutch society, and the rise of Indorock, in particular. Although I have already established that culture moves beyond territorial and socio-political boundaries of the nation-state, the main focus of this research will be on cultural diversity in the Netherlands.

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The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 is an examination of Schinkel’s findings with the emphasis on his work related to integration and cultural diversity: De gedroomde samenleving2 (2008) and Denken in een tijd van sociale hypchondrie3 (2007). Because Schinkel proposes a radical change in thinking about diversity, and because he is one of the few philosophically embedded sociologists in the Netherlands, his work serves as starting point for analyzing and interpreting today’s thinking about cultural diversity in the Netherlands. In chapter 2 Schinkel’s findings will be philosophically explored further on the basis of Vattimo’s essay on weak thought: Dialectics, Difference and Weak Thought (1984) and Vattimo’s books, Nihilism and Emancipation (2003) and The Transparent Society (1989). Vattimo’s findings will be used to complement Schinkel’s sociological view emphasizing solidarity, by paying exclusive attention to ‘otherness’ as an important precondition for cultural emancipation. Chapter 3 will translate both Schinkel’s and Vattimo’s philosophical findings, into societal practice, by the aforementioned case study. Finally, in the Discussion and Conclusion, the central question of this thesis will be answered.

2_{Translation from Dutch: The Dream Society}

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1 REDUCTION OF BEING

‘What about the mortality of society?’ is the central question of Schinkel’s studies, Denken in een tijd van sociale hypochondrie (2007, p. 15) and De gedroomde samenleving (2008) about the integration discourse in the Netherlands. This integration discourse is the totality of vocabulary resembling today’s societal obsession with integration, and the integration of cultural minorities in Dutch society, in particular. Schinkel argues that the integration discourse promotes the belief that cultural minorities threaten society with extinction, while, in fact, the discourse itself is a threat to cultural minorities, as it reduces their right to exist, – i.e. in Dutch society. This reduction of being is caused by the limited representation of a dream society, i.e. an ideal of how society should be instead of how society is. ‘In sociology, the society is as God. She is everywhere, but no one has ever seen her’ (Schinkel, 2014, p. 15). The fact that Schinkel problematizes the ideal of society, and not the presence of cultural minorities in Dutch society, makes his work on integration immensely relevant for studying contemporary thought on the relationship between concepts such as society, culture and politics.

The aim of this chapter is to use Schinkel’s work to explain that not only is society a problematic concept within the integration discourse, but also that culture, as a scientific concept, is an invisible God of contemporary social-political research. In order to do so, this chapter will first elaborate on Schinkel’s general critique on sociology as the scientific discipline researching society (paragraph 1.1). This will be illustrated by his analysis of the integration discourse (paragraph 1.2), in which Schinkel problematizes the concepts ‘integration’ and ‘society’ (paragraph 1.3). Secondly, this chapter will elaborate on the reduction of being of cultural minorities as a result of the integration discourse (paragraph 1.4). Thirdly, on the basis of the former paragraphs, the chapter will explain why culture, as well as society, are problematic concepts within social-political research (paragraph 1.5). Finally, this chapter will conclude with a brief summary of its philosophical findings (paragraph 1.6).

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1.1 A Philosophical Criticism on Sociology

As explained in the introduction (p. 9), Schinkel’s work is a philosophical critique of sociology, going back to the roots of sociological thinking. According to Schinkel, sociological thinking has become a problematic metaphysical consideration of society, that is, the consideration of society as a metaphysical entity, representing one reality. Schinkel relates the metaphysics of society to the main problem of perceiving sociology as a scientific discipline: ‘the affaire of sociology with the scientific method of natural sciences’ (Schinkel, 2007, p. 440-442). In practice, this means that contemporary sociology has a normalizing, standardizing function based on a limited understanding of sociology as a science, while sociology should describe society as complex and contingent as it is. Schinkel formulates three challenges for sociology in order to replace the metaphysics of society with a renewed sociological thinking: becoming more sensitive to language, accepting complexity and contingency, and opting for a new perspective on social reality that moves beyond the dominant perspective (Schinkel. 2007, p. 453-458). He claims that sociologists are too obsessed with numbers, measurements and statistics, neglecting the importance of the complexity of language for social studies.

Despite his rejection of the scientific method of natural sciences as a model for sociology, Schinkel (2007, p. 427) claims one should not forget the distinction between common sense knowledge reflected in everyday language about society and the more complex and contingent approach of science. To put it simply, speaking of societal problems is not the same as speaking of scientific problems. Sociology as a science has a complexity that cannot be understood by the non-scientific members of society because science reflects on society from the outside, and not from the inside (Schinkel, 2007, p. 451). A part of this complexity in sociology results from the fact that sociologists participate in their own research object. In order to take distance from their object of research, sociologists should therefore deviate from what seems normal, the dominant view of social life. The only way sociologists can deal with ‘the normal’ is in explaining why some ideas, concepts or phenomena are considered as normal. This relates to the idea of contingency in sociology, ‘the possibility of being different from the existing’. Sociologists should not rely on common sense explanations and the necessity of causality, but should remain aware of the possibility of alternative explanations.

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Schinkel attaches great importance to the possibility of alternative explanations because alternatives counterbalance metaphysics. As a counterbalance to the metaphysics of sociology, a new perspective on sociology is needed. First, there is a need for a revaluation of thinking in sociology, as ‘sociology lost the appreciation of thought’ (Schinkel, 2007, p. 458). Schinkel suggests that nowadays there is a lack of (alternative) thinking in sociology, especially in thinking about normalized concepts, such as society and integration. Second, a revaluation of thinking and thereby a letting go of convictions about social reality will lead to a new social ontology, ‘a new being of the social’ (Schinkel, 2008, p. 453). This new social reality should relinquish firm ideas resulting from metaphysical thinking, and opt for a double role, by not only critically considering social life, but also by critically examining sociology and its role in science.

1.2 The Integration Discourse

According to Schinkel, the inadequate metaphysical tradition in sociological thought results in organistic thought (2007, p. 42). This organistic thought is illustrated by the description of society as a suffering body, in which the importance of order and unity is emphasized. It formulates a utopia of how society should be, where the sociologist is no longer the researcher or the describer of society, but is seen as the 'doctor of the social' (Schinkel, 2008, p. 411), a doctor who should implement policies in order to cure the social body from diseases that threatens its unity and order. According to Schinkel (2007, p. 33), society is not an ordinary patient, but a patient that suffers from social hypochondria: ‘Society as a whole has been involved in an obsession with the corporality and a fascination for the healthy, young, but still long-lived and especially beautiful – balanced, symmetrical – body.’

Integration is seen as one of the most important threats to this social body, as illustrated by the integration discourse. This integration discourse can be defined as the comprehensive discussion related to integration, which is based on assumptions of society as an organism, balancing between the whole and its functional parts. On the basis of this discourse, people with a cultural background other than the dominant one are seen as a threat to the unity and order of society.

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‘What happens in integration research is the adoption of a dominant view on society, which assumes that some opinions do not belong to society. Thus,

there is nothing to society other than to regard this other opinions as not integrated. It is assumed that society is fixed and homogenous.’ (Schinkel, 2008, p. 44)

Organistic thought thus results in the idea that ‘cultural others’ must integrate in the fixed utopia of what society should be because society as a social body needs to be protected from others who threaten the unity and order of this body.

Many other scholars support the idea that the Western world is dominated by the idea that ‘other cultures’ threaten their ‘healthy societies,’ and therefore should integrate in society (for example: Jansen, 2015 and Kristeva, 1989). The analysis of discourses show that immigrants – or people with another cultural background than the dominant one – are seen as a threat to the unity and order in society, and therefore need to be integrated in order to maintain the unity of the societal body. For Schinkel (2008, p. 52), the Dutch word allochtoon – which literally means not from this soil – is one of the many examples in which immigrants or cultural minorities are characterized as harmful intruders to the established dominant group. Another example of such a discourse is shown in the use of the word stranger (Kristeva, 1989) and the word illegals for refugees (Jansen, 2015, p.15-30). According to Schinkel, the problematic discourse in the Netherlands is the integration discourse, which contain all these problematic words, and this discourse is uncritically taken over by sociology. Therefore, Schinkel (2008, p. 35) does not examine integration itself, but analyzes the phenomenon of society investigating itself on integration.

The main problem of the integrations discourse can be found in the underpinning unequal power relations. This inequality results in a kind of exclusion of certain members of society that represent views other than the dominant one. The integration discourse is typified by the reproduction of inequality between cultural groups. Schinkel (2008, p. 15) claims, for example, that freedom of speech is defended in favor of the dominant class, but is criticized when giving freedom to cultural and religious minorities. In an interview on Dutch television (Ruyg, 2008 in Zomergasten), Schinkel’s point of view is clearly summarized by the interviewer, where he states that a lack of interest in Sinterklaas (the Dutch counterpart of Santa Claus) is not a problem if it is caused by an increasing appreciation of Christmas, but it is a problem when it is caused by ethnic or religious protests of cultural minorities against the colored servants, Zwarte Pieten (Black Petes in English) of Sinterklaas. In his explanation,

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Schinkel refers to Foucault (1975) who criticizes several institutions, apparently defined as neutral, while these institutions – one could see discourse as one of them – produce and maintain inequalities through normalized ideas represented by them.

Until now, Schinkel’s work may not have seemed so revolutionary. Already in 1978 Edward Said wrote the work Orientalism about the Orientalist discourse, which can be compared to Schinkel’s analysis of the integration discourse. Both scholars examine a discourse on the problematic conception of (cultural) otherness. In his book, Said describes the problematic academic conception of the East (the Arabic world in particular) as fundamentally different from the West, and labels this conception as the Orient. On the basis of this presumed opposition, the Orientalist discourse resembles a collection of Western power discourses, and produces thereby simultaneously the superiority and hegemony of the West over the East. Both Said and Schinkel thus suggest that a limited conception of cultural otherness leads to unequal power relations on which an implicit and explicit exclusion of cultural minorities can be based. Said suggests that the orientalist discourse is based on the simple idea that the West is fundamentally different from the East, just as the integration discourse represents immigrants as fundamentally different from society.

Moreover, neither Said nor Schinkel question the distinction between the different groups themselves, but describe the problematic status of concepts such as ´the orient´ or ´integration´ which are rarely questioned because of their normalized status (Schinkel, 2008, p. 35; Said, 1978). The most significant problem in the orientalism and the integration discourse is the reproduction of otherness as a normalized concept, without actually defining what this otherness is. The elusiveness of the term makes it difficult to criticize otherness, because what is there actually to criticize? The discourses may suggest that this question can be easily answered as the concepts and terms are conceived as ‘normal’, while in fact, the question cannot be answered. Schinkel illustrates this problem by examining the terms “society” and “integration”. He states that there is friction between the absence of a definition of these terms and the strong belief that these terms play an important role in examining social life. This friction results in a situation where it is not easy to criticize the terms, or to come up with alternative terms. Schinkel (2008, p. 124) concludes: ‘Above the limited conception of integration as such, the elusiveness and vagueness of terms as integration and society immunize the integration discourse of fundamental critique’.

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1.3 Integration and Society

An important question remains: Why and how did integration and society become such dominant concepts in the integration discourse? More specifically, why are we so certain that integration is an important means of curing our societal body from life-threatening diseases such as cultural otherness? Schinkel does describe how integration is perceived, but insufficiently describes or explains why integration is perceived as such, and why integration and society have become such dominant subjects in contemporary debates. Schinkel suggests that integration is the main focus of his research because of the simple fact that integration dominates today’s discourse. He argues that integration – as a problematic term in the discourse – is ‘one of the unrealistic convictions we should liquidate’ (Schinkel, 2008, p. 34). For Schinkel, integration seems to be just one among many convictions that one should eliminate. Similar unrealistic convictions are, for example, unemployment and criminality, which are also deemed as threatening to the unity and order of the societal body.

On the basis of Schinkel's theoretical work on integration, one can suggest three reasons for why the obsession with integration and society has become so important. Firstly, according to Schinkel (2008, 25-27), the problematizing of integration is a result of the insecurity of the existence and the survival of society, or nation-state caused by globalization. In this respect, his argumentation about the obsession with integration aligns with the tradition of thinking described by Appadurai:

‘The sound intuition that given the growing multiplicity and contingency, there is a sense of radical uncertainty about people, situations, events, norms and cosmologies. Highly differentiated social systems, consisting of complex subsystems, in combination with globalization – influencing locality through large transnational networks of capital and goods – create insecurities

in the identification of the nation and the self.’ (Appadurai, 2002, p. 906):

Moreover, Appadurai (2002, p. 4) argues that the deeper reasons why increased numbers and diversity have sparked such high levels of political conflict are related to the impacts of migration and ethno-cultural diversity on increased uncertainty.

Secondly, one might suggest that nation-states use the concept of integration to place conceived problems with cultural minorities outside the borders of their state or society. Schinkel argues that cultural minorities and immigrants are depicted as a problem from

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outside the nation-state. That is, immigrants and cultural minorities are defined as strangers or others, and on this basis they are placed outside the nation-state. This distinction is paradoxical: On the one hand, groups of immigrants are seen as part of society when depicted as part of the low social class, for example. On the other hand, immigrants are defined as outsiders or strangers. That immigrants are often seen as strangers can be supported by Kristeva (1989), who recognizes that in modern society one fails to see that the stranger is not something from the outside, but that the stranger lives within both the physical nation-state and the imagination of this nation-state. Schinkel argues that the distinction between outside and inside has a social function in creating a utopian idea of society where people are alike, and have the same norms and values. He illustrates this with a comparison of integration and imprisonment. Although the prison comprises a physical location within society, it relegates people who do not meet the standards of the ideal society outside society just as minorities are cast outside society.

The third reason for the rise of integration and society as dominant concepts of the integration discourse is the notion of culture as an explanatory, causal factor for sociopolitical problems. Schinkel defines this notion as the birth of 'culturist' thinking in the integration discourse, which results in ‘culturism’. In this culturism, culture is thought of as an explanatory factor for the way citizens are. Norms and values are explained by the cultural background of citizens. Moreover, culture is used to explain why cultural minorities are different from the majority. For many decades societal problems were explained by economic and social factors, but from the 80’s onwards, there was a shift to where culture was regarded as an explanatory variable for societal problems (Schinkel, 2008, p. 70-80). To conclude, on the basis of these three reasons, it can be argued that integration and society have become part of a dominant discourse as a result of a convergence between the concepts of nation-state/society and culture within a global context.

1.4 Reduction of Cultural Beings

The three explanations for the growing emergence of the integration discourse, as illustrated in the previous section, clearly illustrate why culture has become an explicit part of Schinkel’s analysis. According to Schinkel, the notion of culture as an explanatory factor for societal problems within a global context results in a problematic understanding of culture. In order to explain this, it is first necessary to explain the origin of culture as an explanatory factor. The notion of culture as an explanatory factor was founded in a tradition of thought

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popular in the early 90’s, wherein cultural citizenship was described on the basis of cultural capital. In brief, the line of argumentation based on cultural capital is ‘focusing on citizens capacities for civic virtue or responsible civic action’ (Vega & van Hensbroek, 2012, p. 3). What is important in this argument is that citizenship has become more than a legal status by adding cultural elements to citizenship. Schinkel explains that this debate developed into an idea concerning citizenship, in which culture is not seen as a precondition for civic virtue, but rather as determining the incapability of some cultures for becoming ‘civil’. Additionally, ‘capital’ suggests, on the one hand, that culture is something you can gain or lose, and on the other hand, it suggests that culture is a choice, rather than the consequence of historical development.

An excessive use of culture as an explanatory factor resulted in what Schinkel defines as an essentialist definition of culture.

'The underpinning premise of culturist thought is the idea that culture is something one can maintain. [...] This concerns both the cultural minorities as the dominant cultural group. Culture is seen as something with essential characterizations on the basis of which "this culture" can be defined and identified.’ (Schinkel, 2008, p. 78)

The main problem is that this essentialist definition of culture results in a power inequality between the minority and the majority because the essential characterizations of the dominant culture are seen as more legitimate than those of cultural minorities, and should be maintained. On the contrary, the maintenance of culture by minorities is seen as a causal factor for social problems. In culturism, the essentialist characteristics of the dominant culture are used to explain societal success, and those of the minority cultures are used to explain societal failure. In other words, culturism suggests – other than racism – that the dominant culture is not only more legitimate, but also that ‘those who are not adjusted to the dominant culture are more racist than the dominant culture itself’ (Schinkel, 2008, p. 86).

Schinkel's claim that the dominant culture is seen as more legitimate and tolerant than cultural minorities within nation-statescan be illustrated on the basis of what Modood (2007, p.20) labels as the liberalism bias. In short, this bias is the presupposition that liberalism is the idea of a neutral state accommodating the recognition of cultural differences instead of liberalism as a product of Western culture itself (Modood, 2007, p. 20-33). This bias emerges, according to Schinkel (2008, p. 91-98), when immigrants or cultural minorities are accused of undermining liberal values, such as women’s empowerment, without recognizing

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that the values linked to the empowerment of women are the result of the dominant culture. According to Schinkel, the main problem in this liberalism bias – although he does not explicitly refer to Modood – is not that culture as such is problematized, but that only minority cultures are questioned, while the dominant culture remains immune to questioning. Schinkel (2008, p.33) literally states ‘we only question the empowerment of women when discussing it in relation to minority cultures and forget that also the emancipation of women in Dutch culture is not completed yet’.

That sociology has taken over this fairly essentialist understanding of culture can be evidenced by the way culture is measured in most qualitative sociological research (as supported by Schinkel, 2007, p. 440-442). Several techniques measuring culture assume a limited conception of culture, as Schinkel (2007, 486-487) substantiates with the following examples. One of these techniques is based on the aforementioned liberalism bias, where the degree of integration is measured as the degree of individualization. Here, the assumption is made that cultural minorities claiming group rights is contradictory to individual rights. A second example of a limited measure of integration is genealogy in the measurements. In the Netherlands, successive generations of migrants are called second- or third-generation immigrants (in Dutch allochtoon). They are called immigrants or allochtonen even though these successive generations are born in the Netherlands. Because of their historical background of migration, successive generations are also defined as outsiders in the sociological research discourse

The problematic outcome of culturism is defined by Schinkel (2008, p. 90-91) as violent, as it causes a reduction of being of cultural minorities. Schinkel rightly points out that the implicit assumptions made about culture within the integration discourse result in a reduction of being of minority groups in society. On the one hand, cultural minorities are placed outside society - one might even say excluded from society – on the basis of their cultural characteristics, which are deemed unsuitable for the society’s needs. Therefore, these minorities are not imagined within society as they are placed outside society. On the other hand, and perhaps even more striking, the cultural characteristics of cultural minorities are simultaneously used to explain societal problems or societal failure, even though they had previously been excluded from society. Therefore, minorities are not only not imagined, but they are not even able to participate in the imagination of society themselves as they are seen as citizens who are not able to contribute to society’s success. As Boele van Hensbroek (2012, p. 73) points out, the fact that minorities are not seen as full citizens because of their

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culture is problematic as ‘cultural citizenship should capture such a notion in the definition of cultural citizenship as the ability to co-author the cultural context in which one lives.’

According to Schinkel, the reduction of being of cultural minorities is an ontological problem, which means that minorities are reduced in their (cultural) being. This means that the right of cultural minorities to exist is limited as a consequence of their exclusion from the imagined domain.

‘The exclusion from the imagined domain of society has the effect that some people get more opportunities than others. It causes a judgement on the basis of someone’s being instead of someone’s acting. And it judges therefore about people independent from their actions.’ (Schinkel, 2008, p. 90)

The definition of ontology that is used here is the philosophical study of existence and being. Schinkel claims, in fact, that the ontological state of society is overrated, while the ontological state of cultural minorities is too limited. Schinkel emphasizes the weak ontological status of cultural minorities because it contrasts with the stronger imagined being of society. ‘All dominant imagination is violent, reduces people to less than they are.’ (Schinkel, 2014).

Schinkel (2008, p.1 47) concludes that the essentialist understanding of culture not only results in a reduction of cultural minorities, but also results in the fact that ‘society is reduced to culture’. This conclusion can be approached in two different ways, depending on how one interprets the relationship between the concepts society and culture. The most likely interpretation is that Schinkel tries to explain that society, Dutch society in particular, is reduced to one culture (the ‘Dutch’ culture), as society is imagined as one culture, that is, the unitary, homogeneous system of values and meanings. As mentioned in the introduction, this conclusion relates to Anderson’s theory about imagined communities, where culture and political organization coincide in what we call the nation state. ‘The nation is conceived, imagined, as a deep, horizontal comradeship’(Anderson, 1983, p. 7).

Schinkel builds on Anderson’s theory by arguing that this imagination is still dominant in thinking about the relationship between concepts such as nation-state, society and culture, although this imagination is outdated and limited. Therefore, Schinkel proposes a new form of nationalism that allows for a broader imagination. Schinkel (2012) replaces nationalism with critical nationalism. This nuance is important because it shows that today’s nationalism is based on a noncritical form of imagination that avoids contingency and

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complexity. Schinkel (2008; 2012) takes Anderson’s argument further by arguing that today’s imagination is wrongly reduced to the imagination of the nation-state as representing one culture. He argues that the imagination should be directed towards a new way of living together, or a solidarity which is critical of the 'classical' nation-state, in which only one dominant culture can be imagined in one nation-state. To put it more simply, the imagination on which the nation-state is based, should be more critical about the idea of a ‘horizontal comradeship’.

The second interpretation of the ‘reduction of society to culture,’ as described by Schinkel, is more general. This interpretation emphasizes that theories about society are constantly dominated by culture as an explanatory variable for societal problems, for example, that the structural subordination of migrants concerning income, educational opportunities and housing are increasingly being treated as cultural problems. Typically, the culture of minorities is seen as the underlying cause of a wide range of societal problems, because the cultural background of minorities restrains those cultural minorities from becoming part of the dominant whole. This reinforces the distinction between society and outsiders as represented in the integration discourse. Both interpretations – the reduction of society to one culture and the reduction of society to culture in general – lead to the conclusion that today’s imagining about social and political phenomena is dominated by (a) culture as an explanatory factor, while Schinkel states that society is a lot more than (a) culture.

According to Schinkel, the critical imagination in sociology as an alternative for the imagined homogeneity, as described by Anderson, should focus on integrity and a new utopia (Cohen, 2012; Schinkel, 2007; Schinkel, 2014 in de Correspondent). In general, Schinkel claims that the metaphysical tradition in sociology can only be counterbalanced if imagination no longer focuses on a fixed imagination of society. Sociology should base its imagination on the assumption that social life is complex and contingent, as opposed to society being an ordered unit. He describes this as thinking in terms of integrity, critically examining dominant discourses and creating alternatives to these dominant discourses. Thinking in sociology should not be aimed at conserving what is, like a museum conserving cultural heritage. Instead of holding on to old dreams based on outdated concepts, such as society, new, alternative and more utopian dreams should be developed, in which cultural minorities are no longer seen as outsiders, but are part of the imagination and utopian project of social life. Schinkel (2008, p. 160) concludes: ‘Amid the irony of the dream society is the

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possibility to develop the social world creatively. No one knows what it will bring, but it will be something new, something else. If it is only a better dream.’

1.5 Culture as a Problematic Concept

Although Schinkel proposes a new way of imagining or thinking about social life, he does not explain how cultural otherness is to be imagined within this new social utopia. Schinkel only criticizes the essentialist premises concerning culture as a problematic result of the lack of imagination of society, but does not elaborate on how cultural otherness is to take shape within this new utopia of social life. This raises the question: where is society exactly reduced to if Schinkel does not elaborate on the imagination of culture itself? Schinkel is not able to answer this question as he seems to maintain a limited sociological definition of culture himself in emphasizing the social function of culture. He elaborates on the integration discourse as the result of a problematic imagination of social life or living together more than he elaborates on the problematic imagination of cultural difference. Schinkel is indeed correct when he states that a dominant imagination is violent regarding cultural minorities, but in arguing in favor of a new utopian imagination, he seems to overlook the existence of actual cultural differences. And so Schinkel seems to partially confirm the dominant sociological discourse, which asserts that culture is not separate from the social imagination.

Moreover, Schinkel compares the obsession with culture as an explanatory factor for the breakdown of society’s unity and order with other factors, such as criminality and unemployment. Can culture so easily be related to its economic and sociological counterparts without defining culture itself? And if so, why does Schinkel choose to reevaluate only the obsession with culture, and not the obsession with criminality or unemployment in his research? The only explicit suggestion he makes is that culture is one of the things we subscribe to being a citizen;he nams it moral citizenship (2007; 2008). This addition of a cultural component to citizenship is problematic according to Schinkel because emphasizing the moral terms makes citizenship as a precondition for political and legal equality secondary. ‘Immigrants have to prove their informal capability of becoming a citizen in order to deserve the legal status of a Dutch citizen’ (Schinkel, 2008, p. 21).

In conclusion, it seems that Schinkel wants to make culture less important in the sociological discourse, comparing integration and culture with other explanatory factors for social and political problems. He claims that the integration discourse proves that culture

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plays too important a role in the imagination of citizenship and dreaming about society. This can be illustrated by the aforementioned example of Sinterklaas (see paragraph 1.2, p. 13). Schinkel offers both ‘society’ and ‘Sinterklaas’ as examples of unrealistic convictions that should be liquidated. In the Netherlands, there is an ongoing debate about the national holiday Sinterklaas. The debate focuses primarily on Sinterklaas’ colored servants, named Zwarte Pieten, (Black Petes in English). Briefly explained, cultural (colored) minorities protest against Black Pete, because of racist connotations. For them, Black Pete alludes to slavery. On the other side of the debate, Dutch ‘natives’ (autochtonen in Dutch) claim that Sinterklaas is a children’s holiday, which has nothing to do with slavery, but is simply a Dutch tradition that should be protected. Schinkel states that Sinterklaas, Black Pete in particular, is the evidence of culturism. He states: ‘If you convince Sinterklaas long enough that he is Sinterklaas, he will believe he is Sinterklaas although he does not exist’. His analysis is only partially true. Sinterklaas may not literally exist as a historical figure, and the tradition may be based on a myth, but it exists for better or for worse in the imagination of Dutch culture. Or more precisely, the debate about Black Pete exists in the imagination of Dutch culture. The fact that different cultural groups and countries are debating about a Dutch holiday proves that Sinterklaas is not a false conviction, or a false cultural opposition, as Schinkel claims. Rather it proves that culture is debatable and can move beyond borders.

The basic premise of sociology, as made clear from the former sections, seems to be that there is a paucity of attention for the imagination of cultural difference to deal with culture in a social or political context. Even though the essentialist definition of culture is criticized, culture is never thought of separate from its social or political function. In sociological research, the sociopolitical function of culture is recognized, but a broad cultural imagination (of otherness) is missing. This shortage of imagination of cultural otherness is not only shown in Schinkel’s analysis, but is also shown by the following statement of Modood, which states that the sociological starting point is often difference, rather than culture (or cultural difference) in order to emphasize that group-differentiating dimensions are central to their social constitution. ‘Rather than derive a concept of multicultural politics from a concept of culture, it is better to build it up from specific claims, implicit and explicit policy responses [….] to achieve some form of acceptance and equal membership’ (Modood 2007, p. 36). This raises the question of whether or not it is the reverse of what Schinkel stated. Is it not (a) culture that is reduced to both the physical and theoretical borders of social life?

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1.6 Conclusion

This chapter focused on the problematic imagination of society, which results in a reduction of being of cultural minorities. Schinkel rightly points to the fact that today’s imagination of social and political life is dominated by the idea that the unity and order of society is threatened by cultural minorities and immigrants. According to Schinkel, this problematization of culture stems from an essentialist cultural understanding, which results in a problematic emphasis on cultural otherness. He proposes an alternative imagination that speaks out against the ‘metaphysics of society’ by building on Anderson’s Imagined Communities, proposing an alternative, more critical imagination of social life. However, in doing so, Schinkel neglects to explain how cultural otherness could be imagined. Schinkel not only rejects the essentialist understanding of cultural difference, but also overlooks the idea of cultural difference in general by proposing an imagination focusing on living together, rather than paying attention to the imagination of culture or cultural otherness.

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2 WEAKENING OF BEING

‘The conviction of a degree of unity was accompanied by a degree of monoculturalism, – and this may be rational but is nonetheless “mono”. Today we are aware that, in imposing this kind of universal monoculture, we do violence to others’ (Vattimo, 2002, p. 462). According to Vattimo, this awareness should result in ‘weak thought’, which is ‘by no means a weakness of thinking as such’, rather it is modest thought in the sense that it no longer claims to have a monopoly on the one truth. In his work Dialectics, difference, and weak thought (1984), The Transparent Society (1989) and Nihilism and Emancipation (2003), Vattimo proposes weak thought as the framework for thinking about the day to day practice of cultural emancipation.

At first sight, Vattimo’s work bears some resemblance to Schinkel’s analysis as they both start with the rejection of the metaphysical tradition in socio-political thought conerning cultural emancipation. However, Vattimo’s rejection of metaphysics differs in two important respects from Schinkel’s. First, Vattimo challenges the idea that a reduction of being of cultural minorities takes place as a result of a persistent metaphysical idea of society. Vattimo (1989, p. 13) argues that an inevitable dissolution of metaphysics will lead to a ‘new experience of humanity’ in general: ‘A postmodern emancipation ideal that should be based on an awareness of plurality’. This awareness of plurality is what Vattimo names the ‘weakening of being’. Second, Vattimo does not criticize the limited imagination of society, but rather he criticizes today’s limited imagination of multiple cultural worlds. These two differences result in Vattimo’s proposal for a framework of thought that fundamentally differs from Schinkel’s, as will be explained on the basis of an analogy of the museum. This analogy is essential, as Vattimo opens the way for making culture not only theoretically but also practically visible by using the museum as model for ‘society’.

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The aim of this chapter is to complement Schinkel’s work with Vattimo’s philosophy of weak thought. In order to do so, this chapter will first compare Vattimo’s rejection of metaphysics with Schinkel’s (paragraph 2.1). Next, this chapter will explain the main differences between Vattimo’s and Schinkel’s analysis, firstly, by examining the difference between the reduction of being and the weakening of being (paragraph 2.2), and secondly, by comparing Schinkel’s critique on the limited imagination of one cultural world incarnated in the concept of ‘society’ with Vattimo’s critique on the limited imagination of multiple cultural worlds (paragraph 2.3). Furthermore, on the basis of these two main differences, Vattimo’s proposal for a new framework of thought will be explained) with the model of the museum as opposed to the model of the machine (paragraph 2.4). This chapter will conclude with a summary of the philosophical findings resulting from a comparison between Schinkel’s and Vattimo’s analysis.

2.1 The Machine as a Bad Model

As argued before, both Vattimo’s and Schinkel’s proposals for a new way of thinking about cultural emancipation are based on the rejection of metaphysical thinking. According to them, the main problem concerning metaphysics is the idea that society or culture should be considered as a unity. This way of thinking is no longer relevant because of the contemporary reality of (cultural) pluralism or diversity challenging any unitary view. As previously explained (paragraph 1.1, p. 12), Schinkel opposes the metaphysical thought focused on ‘society’. His book Denken in een tijd van sociale hypochondrie (2011) can be described as ‘proposing a new vocabulary, opposed to the metaphysics of society’. Vattimo’s approach is not aimed at the rejection of the ‘metaphysics of society’, but is based on a more general philosophical shift from metaphysics to postmodernism. In short, according to Vattimo, metaphysics is a philosophy which examines the nature, or the being, of reality. For Vattimo, metaphysics is no longer worth pursuing because it restrains us from imagining (cultural) pluralism as metaphysics represents a problematic monolithic way of thinking.

One could use the model of the machine as an illustration of this abstract description of metaphysics, as the ordinary machine was used for a long time as a model for examining social life (Schinkel, 2007, p. 22; Vattimo, 2003, p. 14). Schinkel (2008) sees ‘organistic thought’ as the contemporary version of this metaphysical thinking, and in doing so, he compares the model of the machine with the model of the body: ‘Both the social mechanism

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and the social body can be seen as perfected by a rational examination. The machine can be lubricated; the social body can be healed.’ Nevertheless, it is wrong to make a too simplified comparison between mechanics and the body, according to Schinkel, because the model of the machine is materialistic, while the model of the body is more idealistic. The main agreement in Schinkel’s and Vattimo’s way of thinking is based on the presupposed existence of a unity, or communality, in which all physical or mechanical parts play a functional role governed by a central control in order to maintain order and unity (Schinkel, 2007, p. 22; Vattimo, 1989, p. 13).

Despite the agreement in their thinking, Vattimo states that contemporary thought concerning social life is still wrongly based.– He uses Adorno & Horkheimer (1944) and Heidegger (1977) as examples of the outdated model of the machine with one central engine which controls the whole. ‘The fact is that Heidegger never escaped from a vision […] dominated by the model of the engine and mechanical energy, so for him modern technology could do nothing except bring about a society subordinated to a central power dispatching commands to a purely passive periphery, as gear wheels are driven, whether these commands were mechanical impulses, political propaganda or commercial advertising’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 14-15). This observation can be translated into the outdated idea that social life is controlled by a central government. Instead of using the old model of the machine for examining social life, Vattimo argues in favour of a postmodern thinking that should be based on a more decentralized interpretation of power (in line with Foucault, 1975), in which it is impossible to define a central engine. To put it simply, according to Vattimo (1989, p. 13) ‘it is impossible to define a centre or essence on the basis of which a distinction can be made about what belongs to reality and what is unreal and marginal’.

Although Vattimo, as Schinkel, criticizes metaphysical thought, Vattimo already perceives a transition towards a new way of thinking. This transition is in line with the philosophical shift from modernity into postmodernity. What is central in postmodernity is ‘the end of the grand narratives’ which Lyotard (1979, p. 85-87) describes as the loss of overarching philosophical theories of science and history which dominated thought until then. Or as Vattimo (1989, p. 18) states: ‘Modernity ends if it is no longer possible to regard the world as a unit’. In fact, postmodernism was a critique on grand (metaphysical) narratives which regarded the world as a unity, in which special attention is paid to culture. This idea is supported by Boomkens (2006, p. 31) who states that ‘Postmodern authors ensured the

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visibility of identities and cultures which were made invisible in the universal discourse of the grand narratives’.

According to Vattimo, who positions himself as postmodernist, this new way of thinking stemmed from political and social changes in the west, as for example decolonization.

‘The decline of the West, meaning a dissolution of the ideas of progress and non-linear historicity, is a complex matter, more social and political than philosophical. […] It was the realization of the European ideal as an ideal among other ideals. It was not necessarily worse than other ideals, but it was no longer able to present itself as the one truth of all people without the use of violence.’ (Vattimo, 1998, p. 20-22)

In stating this, Vattimo emphasizes that social and political change can precede thinking, while Schinkel explains it in reverse, suggesting that thinking precedes social change. For now, no argumentation in favor of one or the other will be laid out, but it is important to keep the relationship between thought and social and political practice in mind.

According to Vattimo, the end of European dominance was the precondition for the ‘end of grand narratives’, also labelled as the birth of nihilism, which can be seen as: ‘the dissolution of any ultimate foundation, the understanding that in the history of philosophy, and of western culture in general, “God is dead” and “the real world has become a fable”’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. xxv). For Vattimo, Nietzsche’s statement ‘God is death’ is more of an announcement of a new way of thinking than a judgement or explanation of this new thinking, as Vattimo argues in favour of a practical interpretation of nihilism. For him nihilism is not so much the loss of Europe’s ideal, but rather the realization that the European ideal is only one way of thinking among many other ways. ‘When western philosophy realizes it is just one ideal among many others, it becomes nihilistic; it acknowledges that its own argumentative process is always historically and culturally situated, that even the idea of universality is “grasped” from a particular point of view’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. xxv).

What is striking in Vattimo’s interpretation of nihilism is not only the historical and practical foundation of the decline of the west, but also his suggestion to not mourn about the loss of foundation. In fact, he interprets nihilism as ‘affirmative’, because nihilism does not mean a loss of reality or meaning in the dramatic sense of the word, rather it means a

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weakening of meaning and reality. Vattimo (1989, p. 24) states: ‘If the multiplication of worldviews means that we lose our sense of reality, it is not a great loss’. Nihilism is in essence the end of absolutist and fundamentalist claims on truth. This formulation suggests that nihilism is more of an increase of meaning(s) than a loss of meaning in general, although these multiple meanings may be weaker than in the modern era of ‘grand narratives’. Therefore, Vattimo interprets nihilism as ‘weak thought’, which he defines as: ‘The impossibility of silencing argumentation and suppressing plurality in the postmodern world, in which difference and dialogue constitute the fundamental factors of every culture, politics and religion’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 180).

To return to the aforementioned relationship between (weak) thought and socio-political practice, Vattimo argues that weak thought developed from a particular social change. Vattimo points to the example of decolonization as a precondition for weak thought, and, generally speaking, Vattimo argues that weak thought originates in the rise of cultural pluralism as a result of diaspora – the dispersion of cultural groups from territorial boundaries. Thought is thus directly related to the social practice, and not purely based on a universal theoretical reasoning. As Vattimo states: ‘They [philosophical currents] accompanied, or at any rate reflected profound social transformations’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 39). Vattimo’s argument suggests that until now, it was assumed that philosophy (thinking) shaped social life, while it neglected to acknowledge that social and historical change also determines thinking.

Although Schinkel also elaborates on the relationship between thinking and modelling social life, he emphasizes that ‘thought’ is a priori for social change. In examining society, Schinkel argues that society does not exist as is a limited imagination based on an unrealistic desire for unity and order. One should bear in mind that Schinkel stated that sociology became prescriptive, rather than descriptive, as a result of the strong conviction that society exists. Vattimo, on the other hand, does not exclusively criticize society as such. He actually argues that thinking itself is unfounded and sensitive for change, rather than arguing that a concept like society is theoretically or philosophically unfounded. After all, new ways of thinking are not the ‘fruits of pure ratiocination. Weak thought realizes this, as it is the consciousness of the unfoundedness of thought’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 39; see also Vattimo, 1984). In brief, Schinkel only criticizes the metaphysics of society, whereas Vattimo criticizes metaphysical thought in general.

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2.2 Weakening of Cultural Being

Now that the relationship between social change and weak thought is made clear, one question remains: What in this social change opened the way for ‘weak thought’? The simple answer, as was already mentioned, is the decline of the West: ‘The dissolution of the idea that there was a unitary significance and direction to the history of mankind’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 30). Subjacent to colonialism, imperialism and nationalism was the idea that there was one universal historical line towards civilization of which the West was the progressive example. It was in this same period that the ‘total organization’ of societies took shape: societies as ordered and unitary functional systems. The dramatic consequences of the First World War and Second World war, followed by violent decolonization, were the practical refutations of the successful functioning of the, until then, so important universal organisation of societies. During the struggle for independence of the colonies, the assumption that this universality was a matter of course was no longer valid (as supported by Boomkens, 2011, p. 246). ‘The collapse of the centrality of the West and its political hegemony has set free numerous cultures and visions of the world that no longer submit to being considered as moments or parts of an overarching human civilization, with the West as its curator’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 28).

But in order to understand the implications of this historical event for today’s thinking, one should move beyond this practical answer, and explore what in this event specifically changes the way of thinking. The underlying philosophical implication of the decline of the West is, according to Vattimo, the ‘transformation of (the notion of) being as such’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 4). The West not only changed in its practical mode of existence because of a transformation of political and social organisation, but it also transformed thought about existence or being. Vattimo defines this as a transformation into ‘an ontology of actuality’. ‘Being’ is no longer conceived as an ‘object’, but as an ‘event’. To put it more simply, because of the decline of the West, ‘being’ can no longer be defined as a matter of course, but rather as something that originates or occurs within a historical and sociological context. As Vattimo (2003, p. 6) states: ‘Being “is” not, but “comes about”’. Finally, this transformed notion of being is exactly what created the ‘identification of philosophy with sociology’.

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Both Vattimo and Schinkel therefore perceive the conception of being as important for today’s socio-philosophical thinking. The main difference between their perspectives is, however, that Schinkel challenges the being of society, in particular, which causes a reduction of the being of cultural minorities, whereas Vattimo challenges the idea of being, in general. Vattimo recognizes that holding on to a being of societies as if they are a unity may result in a wry power relationship between cultural groups, but argues furthermore that everyone ‘suffers’ from a reduction of being. Not only cultural minorities are ‘reduced’ in their being, but also the being of the majority has changed because of this new philosophical idea of being as ‘event’. One could interpret Schinkel’s ‘reduction of being’ as misrepresentation of what being philosophically is, or rather, how being comes about nowadays.

Although both researchers attach importance to ‘being’ as a philosophical concept, Vattimo’s interpretation is far more optimistic, albeit ‘weak’ and ‘reduction’ may seem semantically quite similar. In Vattimo’s argument, ‘weakening of being’ is not so much a reduction as it is a rise of a modest being because of the confrontation with other worlds. According to Vattimo, the confrontation with other cultural worlds does not inevitably lead to a strengthening of ‘society’ and a reduction of cultural minorities, as Schinkel seems to suggest. Although Vattimo indeed sees a possible revival of fundamentalism as an attempt to strengthen being again, he sees this merely as a result of a previous and unavoidable weakening of being. Vattimo does not deny the possibility of an unequal difference in power, but emphasizes that the Western world, or dominant groups, are affected by the weakening of being as well. ‘The West is not only externally in an explosive situation because of the confrontation with other cultural worlds, but also internally, as if the apparently unstoppable pluralization makes every unitary conception of the world and history impossible’ (Vattimo, 1989, p. 22).

This discrepancy in the expected impact of a changed conception of being also exposes a different conception of ‘otherness’ in Vattimo’s and Schinkel’s work. Schinkel emphasizes that integration and society are two words in the integration discourse which represent a false contradiction which needs to be eliminated because it serves the dominant groups. However, according to Vattimo, ‘otherness’ (Vattimo himself uses the word ‘difference’) is necessary in order to create cultural emancipation because his otherness forces the Western world into a dialogue with other cultural worlds. The only way of experiencing the weakening of being is ‘the encounter with other beings, in creating a dialogue’ (Vattimo, 1982, p. 87). In short, according to Vattimo, today’s being comes about

The Culture Machine. Thinking about culture, society and politics beyond the theoretical and physical borders of the nation-state

The Culture Machine

TABLE OF CONTENTS

0

INTRODUCTION

1

REDUCTION OF BEING

2

WEAKENING OF BEING