The Swedish Decision Towards
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Anne Meilien Kootstra
10001725
anne.meilien@gmail.com
Political Science
Governance and Public Policy
Bachelor Thesis Nuclear Proliferation
Dr. Saira Khan
Dr. Rosa Sanchez Salgado
January 30, 2013
University of Amsterdam
Word count; 7319
Chapter outline
Abbreviations 4 1. Introduction 5 2. Literary review 6 2.1 Realism 6 2.2 Liberalism 6 2.3 Constructivism 7 2.4 Critique 7 3. Theory 9 3.1 Methodology 9 3.2 Case; Sweden 9 3.3 Conceptualization 103.4 IR theories and their combined appliance on non-proliferation 10
4. Analysis 15
4.1 The weakening of security, the perceived security threat and 15
the intensity of regional conflict
4.2 Cooperation/Interdependence 16
4.3 DPT 17
4.4 Norms supported by dominant nations and the legitimacy of norms 17
4.5 Persuasion 18 4.6 Social conformity 19
4.7 Identification 19
5. Conclusion 21
Abbreviations
DPT democratic peace theory
FOA Defence Research Establishment (Försvarets Forskningsanstalt) IR international relations
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
SAP Swedish social democratic party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti)
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
1.
Introduction
After the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States of America (USA) in 1945, the world expected a rapid growth of states trying to acquire nuclear weapons. The exact opposite occurred: “Since the advent of the nuclear era, thirty-three countries have had known or
suspected nuclear weapons programs or have seriously considered acquiring nuclear weapons. Nine of these states currently have nuclear weapons.” (Davis, 2009: 2).
Besides the states that have proliferated, a growing number of states are indicated as latent proliferators, as a result of technological and economic development. These states have the
appropriate infrastructure, skills and resources to produce a nuclear capability (Meyer, 1984: 1). In 1992, Stoll estimated that forty-eight states already possessed a latent capability (Stoll, 1996). This number has been growing since.
One of the states that acquired a latent capacity in an early stage is Sweden. Sweden is a particularly interesting case because the country actively pursued the acquisition of nuclear weapons during the 1950s and 1960s. For some reason though, Sweden decided to abandon its nuclear desires in the late 1960s and signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968 (website UNODA a). Apart from this, Sweden is not protected by a nuclear umbrella as the country is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (website NATO). Being unprotected against nuclear threats could be a significant incentive for a state to acquire a nuclear capability. Therefore, the aim of this thesis will be to answer the following research question; Why did Sweden not continue to proliferate?
The answer to this research question will be sought in a combination of the biggest theories of international relations (IR). The theories discussed and used in this thesis will be realism, liberalism and constructivism. A combination of their core-principles will be used to analyse the Swedish case of non-proliferation.
The scientific relevance of this thesis lies in the fact that most of the research on proliferation focuses on the states that have proliferated and not on the ones that have not (Rublee, 2009: 1). This thesis thus contributes to the small area of research on non-proliferation. Besides having a scientific significance, this thesis has a societal relevance. Knowledge on why states that have all the
capabilities for going nuclear, but choose not to proliferate can have significant relevance on future actions in approaching these states and maintaining their latent status (Rublee, 2009: 2).
2.
Literary review
Most of the research on proliferation, as has been mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, focuses on the states that have proliferated. Significantly less has been written on the non-proliferators and the latent proliferators. In general, the existing literature on latent proliferation is written within one theoretical paradigm in IR, such as realism, liberalism or constructivism (Hymans, 2010). This is also true for the existing research on the Swedish case. The Swedish case has been analyzed regularly, mainly because of the interesting fact that Sweden did at first explore its nuclear options, but then stepped out and joined the non-proliferation regime (Paul, 2000; Davis, 2009; Rublee, 2009). However, also on the Swedish case, analysis has always been from one perspective. Therefore, the general IR theories will be discussed briefly in the subsequent section. The theory and analysis sections will discuss the theories in more detail and connect them to the Swedish case.
2.1 Realism
The realist paradigm is the most dominant one in IR and in research on nuclear proliferation. The basic assumption of the realist view is that states are constantly trying to survive within an
international anarchy of states. Therefore, states are constantly dealing with security issues and have an ultimate urge for power (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010: 59).
The urge for power that realism assumes all states have, constitutes the basic argument of realism in the field of proliferation. Realists argue that states will always try to overrule each other’s conventional weapons capability to have more power over the other. Since nuclear weapons are destructive, there is no need to acquire more than necessary. From a realist viewpoint, nuclear weapons stop the power-race between states and create a deterrent capability. This is the reason realists are surprised no more than nine states have proliferated and still assume all states will eventually proliferate, because of national security interests (Hymans, 2010).
While the dominant realist thought on proliferation is similar to the notions described, there has been a realist voice in the non-proliferation literature. Although the realist non-proliferation argument also derives from the fixation on national security and power politics, realism does partly cover the question of non-proliferation. The realist research on non-proliferation asserts that some nations would be enhancing their security on an even basis or more, by not going nuclear (Schneider, 1994: 213).Also, according to the realist approach, proliferation could destabilize relations with other states, which could effectively be a reason not to proliferate (Paul, 2000: 14-16).
2.2 Liberalism
Liberalism draws upon the individual human being, while realism focuses on the state. A strong emphasis lies on human reasoning by which mutually beneficial cooperation can be reached. When
this is applied to the state, liberalism believes not only conflict, but also cooperation can work in international relations (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010: 124).
The liberalist focus on international cooperation causes that there is less conviction that nuclear weapons will be spread. The liberalist argument against proliferation is most feasible for democratic states. These states, pursuing liberal economic policies, are interdependent within the global economy and international community and therefore may decide it is not in their interest to proliferate (Solingen, 1994: 17). Furthermore, as Chavetz states, the probability that a state will go nuclear can be generated from its position in the world order, dividing the world’s core states from the periphery in which the former are the expected non-proliferators (Chavetz, 1993).
2.3 Constructivism
Constructivism, as liberalism, starts off from the individual as level of analysis. The constructivist theory states that every individual constructs its own version of reality. Knowledge will always be subjective. This makes all concepts, including the state, historical constructs composed by the people (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010: 179). As a critique on realism, constructivists state that self-help does not necessarily result from the realist notion of anarchy because identities and interests of states are created through the process of interaction between states (Wendt, 1992: 394). Norms of behaviour in international society influence these identities and interests (Finnemore, 1996: 128).
Constructivism entered the area of research on proliferation only a decade ago, finally challenging the dominance of realism in the field, focusing on “(...) nonmaterial incentives for states
in a socially constructed international environment.” (Rublee, 2009: 3). Constructivists believe that
norms and institutions can influence a state’s identity and interest and therefore its decision to proliferate or not (Rublee, 2009: 14). Internationally appreciated norms or institutions, such as the NPT, can help transform a state’s decision on proliferation (Rublee, 2009: 32).
2.4 Critique
As all three IR theories described above have a strong theoretical significance, they all conjointly contribute greatly to the various fields of IR as well as research on proliferation. Nonetheless all three theories carry a bias and only focus on one aspect of the matter, thereby ignoring other perspectives one could have on proliferation.
Realism explains thoroughly the security factors that contribute to the decision for states on proliferation, but does not cover the domestic factors that also determine this decision for a great deal (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 55).
Liberalism, on the other hand, does cover these domestic factors. The problem of liberalism is that it ignores the decision-making in the domestic realm (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 55) and the
importance of preferences in the domestic factors it studies (Rublee, 2009: 11). Therefore, liberalism does explain that these factors are important, but not how they are important.
Constructivism effectively covers the importance of preferences in the domestic realm and emphasizes the role of international norms and values that can effect a state in its decision to go nuclear or not. The challenge here is that constructivism can never fully explain how these norms and values were constructed, because this is completely subjective.
Due to the fact that all three IR theories are only able to explain part of the question of non-proliferation, a combination of the persuasive points of all theories will be used to analyze why Sweden did not continue toproliferate. The usage of a combination of theories will provide a broader perspective on the case and will explain the research question more thoroughly.
3.
Theory
3.1 Methodology
Research on proliferation is generally of the qualitative kind. Only a few scholars have conducted quantitative research (Jo and Gartzke, 2007; Meyer, 1984; Stoll, 1996). Especially in research on the states that have proliferated, quantitative research is hard to accomplish. This is due to the fact that the amount of actual proliferators is very small, only nine states proliferated. On non-proliferation and latency, quantitative research is more feasible, although still rare.
This thesis will also follow the qualitative trend in research on proliferation. A basic case study will be conducted, using Sweden as case. The general question researched in this thesis is the following; Why did Sweden not continue to proliferate? The theory used to analyze this question will be a combination of the IR theories briefly described in the literary review above. These theories and the combination of them will be discussed in more detail below. The core of the arguments posed by these theories will be used as indicators of non-proliferation and analyzed using the Swedish case. The data used consists of literature from the area of research and of official documentation by recognized international organizations.
3.2 Case; Sweden
Although Sweden has executed a policy of neutrality since a long time, non-proliferation has not always been Sweden’s strategy. Short after the Second World War – in 1946 – Sweden commenced
“(…) a research program that began as an effort to produce nuclear weapons.” (Cole, 1997: 233).
Sweden initially started the program because it saw a great security threat in the Soviet Union that could not be met by conventional weapons (Bergenäs, 2010). Besides this reason, the country wanted to level other technologically well-developed nations (Cole, 1997: 234). By 1957, Sweden first acquired a latent capability (Meyer, 1984: 41).
By 1958, however, the research and development of nuclear weapons was prohibited by the Swedish government, though research on defence against nuclear weapons was still permitted (Bergenäs, 2010). This governmental decision complicated the issue severely because the line
between an offensive or defensive nuclear capability is very thin. The situation that was created could not be sustained because at a certain moment, research would cross the thin line that was drawn by the policy (Cole, 1997: 243; Bergenäs, 2010). In addition to this ambiguous policy, Sweden’s public opinion changed enormously; from in favour of toward against a nuclear capability (Cole, 1997: 242-243). Therefore, by the late 1960s, Sweden completely abandoned its nuclear research and
development program, and signed the NPT (Bergenäs, 2010).
Since its membership of the NPT, Sweden has been very active within the non-proliferation regime. The country joined several treaties and agreements, such as the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Safety Convention (website CNS). However, Sweden is not a member of NATO (website NATO), so has no protection of a nuclear umbrella. Scholars have mentioned though that Sweden does expect to receive protection from NATO or the USA may the country be attacked by a nuclear state (Cole, 1997: 239).
Although Sweden has abandoned its program to develop nuclear weapons a few decades ago, it does possess nuclear reactors for energy supply. Today, ten nuclear reactors are operating in Sweden, which produce half of the country’s energy (website SRSA).
The Swedish case is an interesting one within the field of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear latency. It is very fascinating why the nation abandoned its program on nuclear weapons and why it still did not proliferate again. Furthermore, the case of Sweden is interesting as the nation has all the abilities to proliferate without much costs and efforts. In addition, Sweden is not a member of the NATO and therefore not under a nuclear umbrella.
3.3 Conceptualization
To avoid confusion, the most important concepts will be defined, so there will be no differences in the interpretation of the concepts when reading this thesis. The most important concepts that need to be defined are nuclear proliferation, its opposite; nuclear non-proliferation, latent nuclear proliferation or latency, and nuclear umbrella.
Nuclear proliferation can be explained very shortly as the acquisition of nuclear weapons (website UNODA b).Therefore, non-proliferation is the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons. Latent nuclear proliferation can be conceptualized as possessing “(...) the necessary industrial infrastructure
and scientific expertise to build nuclear weapons on a crash basis if they chose to do so.” (Sagan,
2000: 19). Last, a nuclear umbrella will be defined as a protection alliance between a nuclear and a non-nuclear state to protect the non-nuclear state against any nuclear attack (ILPI, 2012).
3.4 IR theories and their combined appliance on non-proliferation
Realism Realism approaches the state as the central actor in world politics. Within a state, the authority is with a hierarchical government, but since there is no higher authority than the state, anarchy is the result in the international sphere (Donnelly, 2000: 10). In this anarchy, “(...)
states can never be certain about the intentions of other states.” (Mearsheimer, 1994/95: 10). For
states can never trust each other, their ultimate goal is to survive within the international anarchy (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010: 59). Consequently, states are constantly competing with each other in terms of power, especially military, but also economic and political power. In spite of this, realists do not state that international relations is always a field of conflict or war (Mearsheimer, 1994/95: 9). Cooperation between states is possible, but only when it is in the national interest of the individual state. This means all international treaties and agreements are conditional. When a state’s interests change, so can its loyalty to a certain treaty or agreement (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010: 60).
The realist perspective on non-proliferation and latency derives from the core principles of the general realist theory in IR. Even though realism has a tendency towards proliferation, due to its focus on maximizing security, realist approaches to non-proliferation and latency do exist.
The first realist explanation of non-proliferation is the weakening of the security of the state. Realism argues that some states believe proliferation would make them a target. This would
undermine the nation’s national security and therefore it will not try to acquire a nuclear capability, since maintaining a security as high as possible is the ultimate goal. A better option for these states would be to join the non-proliferation regime (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 46).
A second explanation of non-proliferation that realism provides would be the argument of the perception of security threats. This argument states that when a nation perceives a high security threat, it would be more inclined to pursue nuclear weapons, while it would give up its nuclear program if this threat diminished (Rublee, 2009: 8).
Moreover, attributing to the previous realist argument, (latent nuclear) states within zones were there is a low or moderate amount of conflict will probably not proliferate. This is due to the fact that the advantages of proliferation would not weigh up against the huge costs that a nuclear
capability poses. Proliferation could also reinforce the intensity of conflict, which would endanger a state’s level of security. This argument however, does not go for the regions where there is a high level of conflict (Paul, 2000: 24-25)
Another argument that realism offers for non-proliferation is the avoidance of nuclear war. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have scared off states to acquire a nuclear capability because of its dangers and destructiveness: “The desire to avoid the incalculable dangers and
destruction of a nuclear holocaust – either another Hiroshima or a multitude of Hiroshimas – has been the most powerful disincentive to the spread of nuclear weapons.” (Epstein, 1977: 17). This is a
very feasible argument, but it would be too general to use as an indicator since it can be assumed all states seek to avoid any unnecessary war.
The core of the arguments presented by the realist paradigm will be used in the analysis of the Swedish case. These will be the weakening of security, the perceived security threat and the intensity of regional conflict.
Liberalism As stated in the literary review, the level of analysis applied within the paradigm of liberalism is the individual. All individuals form specific groups, which together compose society. Society precedes the state: “Society is analytically prior to the state, and domestic
state-society relations constitute the central issue of politics.” (Moravcsik, 1992: 5). Liberalism does
recognize the pursuing of self-interest by individuals and the competition between them, but at the same time emphasizes the shared interests between individuals. These mutual interests evoke cooperation (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010: 96). When applied to the state level, the equivalent argument holds; states share common interests with each other through which they can reach
cooperation. Liberalism seeks cooperation especially within the economic realm. Economic
interdependence generates prosperity for all participating states. Therefore, nations would not easily risk conflict (Walt, 1998: 32). Besides a focus on interdependence, democratic peace theory (DPT) is a strong element within liberalism. Liberalism has a strong belief that “(...) liberal democracies are
more peaceful and law-abiding than are other political systems.” (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010: 109)
and therefore do not go to war against other liberal democracies (Owen, 1994: 93).
Because of liberalism’s focus on cooperation, as posed in the literary review, liberalist theory can generally be found within non-proliferation research. This focus differs from the realist theory as it centres more on proliferation.
Drawing upon the argument of interdependence, Solingen asserts that democratic nations pursuing a liberal economic policy would rather cooperate on non-proliferation than the more isolated countries with more radical beliefs because a democratic political system addresses the conditions for the maintenance of a nuclear program. Furthermore, the economic consequences for proliferation are not worthwhile for most liberal economies (Solingen, 1994: 3, 18).
In addition to Solingen’s argument, Chavetz creates a distinction between core states and peripheral states. Core states are generally liberal democracies that attain national security through economic and political cooperation with other states, which makes it less likely these states will proliferate. Peripheral states, on the other hand, do not cooperate as much in the international system. A feeling of isolation due to non-participation in world politics and economics increases the chance peripheral states will try to acquire a nuclear weapons capability (Chavetz, 1993).
As Roberts draws upon DPT, he states that since democracies do not attack each other, and democratization is increasing, democratic nations do not feel the need to proliferate (Roberts, 1993: 153-154). If democratization occurs, the DPT can be a useful explanation of the decision not to acquire nuclear weapons. Cooperation/interdependence and DPT will therefore both be used as persuasive arguments within liberalism to analyze the case of Sweden.
Constructivism Other than realism and liberalism – which are generally materialistic theories – constructivism states that “(...) the most important aspect of international relations is
social, not material.” (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010: 160). This is due to the fact that constructivists do
not see the world as a given entity that materially exists beyond human awareness. According to constructivists, everything is socially constructed by ideas and norms of a certain people at a certain time. When these ideas and norms change, the essence of the particular concept changes (Walt, 1998: 40-41).The state is therefore also a social construct. For everything is constructed through ideas and norms, knowledge will always be interpretative and subjective as ideas and norms are different for every individual (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010: 162).
Therefore, interstate relationships are constructed by interaction processes between the states concerned. These relationships are not necessarily built upon self-help or cooperation, but depend on
how identities and interests are structured through interaction between states, as has been mentioned earlier in the literary review (Wendt, 1992: 394). Another influence on states’ identities and interest are the norms of international society imposed on states through international organizations: “States
are socialized to accept certain preferences and expectations by the international society in which they and the people who compose them live.” (Finnemore, 1996: 128). This socializing of states to
accept international norms and values is done through international organizations (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010: 169).
As Sagan compares different motivations to go or not go nuclear, he analyzes the influence of norms on this decision. The argument holds that international norms can be an incentive not to proliferate, but only if supported by the dominant nations in international society. Norms such as the NPT subscribed by powerful states can shape a state’s identities and interests (Sagan, 2000: 40).
In addition to this argument, Schneider states that since the increased legitimacy of the international non-proliferation regime, the norms involved have become more respected and provide better means of limiting and deciding against those who disobey international non-proliferation (Schneider, 1994: 213).
Rublee offers three constructivist explanations – or what she calls expectations – of non-proliferation. The first explanation she suggests is that a change in a state’s perception of the concept of security can lead to non-proliferation. This is what she calls the expectation of persuasion (Rublee, 2009: 27). This is different from the realist argument of perceived security threat in that not the actual threat diminished, but rather the entire way in which a state constructs security has changed. This new concept of security is one that “(...) encompasses diplomatic, economic and “human” security, all of
which are less than compatible with a nuclear weapons program.” (Rublee, 2009: 27).
In her second argument, Rublee argues that states do no proliferate because they think conforming to social norms will reward them. These states also fear that proliferation will be accompanied by enormous social costs (Rublee, 2009: 27).
Rublee’s third and last argument asserts that a state could decide not to proliferate because it wants to build or preserve a valued relationship with a state that is already a member of the non-proliferation regime. In this case, states are more likely to identify with, and therefore abide by, the norms of the state they value a certain relationship with (Rublee, 2009: 28).
In the analysis of the Swedish case the following constructivist indicators will be conducted; norms supported by dominant nations, legitimacy of norms, persuasion, social conformity, and identification.
Combined appliance As elaborated before, each of the employed IR paradigms has its own view
on non-proliferation. All the different arguments the theories assert will be applied to the Swedish case in order to compose a broad perspective on why Sweden did not continue to proliferate. As mentioned above, the indicators derived from these arguments will be the anticipated weakening of
security, the perceived security threat, the intensity of regional conflict, cooperation/interdependence, the DPT, the norms supported by dominant nations, the legitimacy of norms, persuasion, social conformity, and identification. The case of Sweden will be analyzed on each of these indicators separately through examining its military, political, economic and social environment.
4.
Analysis
4.1 The weakening of security, the perceived security threat and the intensity of regional conflict
Sweden’s reasons to abandon its proliferation program and to join the NPT could have been based upon the nation’s perceived national security endangerment. The three possible non-proliferation arguments posed by realism will be outlined below as a common historical background is necessary to analyse the arguments together.
The Swedish program on nuclear weapons once started because of a perceived security threat from the Soviet Union. Throughout the history of Sweden, threats always came from the East:
“Indeed, to this day, Charles XII stands in the middle of Stockholm pointing to the East.” (Cole, 1994:
58). Sweden initially believed that an attack from the East could be conducted in two different ways. The Soviets would either attack Sweden as part of an extensive invasion into Europe or would direct an attack intended purely at Sweden (Rublee, 2009: 170). The attack could be planned over land from the North or over sea from the South (Arnett, 1998: 35). Therefore, it is not surprising Sweden felt the urge to develop its own weapons to deter a possible Soviet invasion.
Somehow, in the early 1960s, the Swedish view on Soviet threat changed drastically. The government and military, as well as the public opinion expected that acquiring a nuclear capability would not enhance the nation’s security, but would actually diminish it. Sweden’s proliferation would make the state a target for a Soviet nuclear attack, whilst non-proliferation would preserve the
country’s neutrality and probably decrease the chance of aggression from the Soviet Union. Even though Sweden only admired a defensive nuclear capability, conducting a nuclear program of any nature “(...) would increase suspicion and ensure that in the event of conflict these countries would
more likely be readily targeted for total destruction.” (Davis, 2009: 5). In addition, by 1960 the
Swedish Defence Research Establishment (FOA) estimated that a nuclear war would kill more than a quarter of Sweden’s population (Arnett, 1998: 38). If refraining from nuclear weapons would make this option less likely, this was the best choice Sweden could make. Therefore, the realist argument of the weakening of security by proliferating would be a plausible one in the Swedish case.
Besides apprehending proliferation as a decline of the state’s security, Sweden’s perception on security threats changed. In the beginning of the Cold War, Sweden held on to the believe that the Soviets would opt on an isolated attack on Sweden, not as part of a larger European intrusion. Simultaneous to the advancement of the USA and Soviet nuclear arsenals, this perception changed. Sweden’s trust in an isolated attack faded and this left the option of invasion only if the Eastern and Western front were already at war. In this case, Sweden did not think a nuclear capability of its own would contribute as a deterrent means (Wallin, 1991: 373). The Soviet threat did not actually diminish. During the mid-1960s the Soviet Union repeatedly infiltrated Swedish territorial waters
(Rublee, 2009: 171) and expended “(...) its bases on the Kola peninsula in general and the naval base
at Murmansk in particular.” (Cole, 1994: 61). However, the perception that an isolated attack on
Sweden was no longer an option was sufficient for the country not the pursue its nuclear desires. Stating the previous makes the realist argument of change in perceived security threat feasible as well as its argument of weakening the state’s security through proliferation.
According to realism, the decline of intensity of regional conflict during the time Sweden abandoned its program could also have attributed to this decision, but the opposite is true. By the time Sweden restricted its program and only allowed further research on defence against nuclear weapons – in 1958 – the Cold War was at full strength. Crises like the Korean War in 1949-1950 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 (CWIHP, 1995: 1) had its impacts on stability in the European region. Europe had a central place in the Cold War battlefield, since the continent was divided between the Western bloc supporting the USA and the Eastern bloc which favoured the Soviet Union. Conflicts and crises between these two blocs caused a high intensity regional conflict. By the time Sweden completely abandoned its nuclear program during the late 1960s, the Cold War was still enduring and regional conflict was still of severe intensity. Therefore, the realist argument of the demise of intensity in regional conflict causing non-proliferation is not applicable to the Swedish case.
4.2 Cooperation/Interdependence
To draw upon the liberalist argument of cooperation and interdependence, Sweden as core state could have decided not to pursue proliferation because of the nation’s cooperation and interests in
international society. To achieve further cooperation in world politics and economic realm, Sweden could have considered proliferating would not contribute to this goal.
Sweden has, before and since the Second World War, been a cooperative nation. Among many other internationally valued treaties and agreements, Sweden achieved membership of the United Nations (UN) in 1946, the International Monetary Fund in 1951 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1961 (website Swedish government).
Whereas the desire for a nuclear capability had been developed during a period in which Sweden already was an active co-operator in international political and economic affairs, this does not mean cooperation and interdependence could not have been a reason for Sweden to abandon its nuclear program after some time again. Sweden eventually believed they should be part of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and abide by its rules and negotiations to be a credible co-operator: “(...) the
Swedish elite clearly wanted to be seen as representing a peaceful, neutral state that favored
cooperation over conflict.” (Rublee, 2009: 181). Furthermore, Sweden had already been pledging for
non-proliferation and test ban norms in the UN since the 1950s. The nation would have lost its international integrity if it would have continued its nuclear ambitions. In addition, Sweden would also have endangered its agreements with other countries on technical cooperation on nuclear energy, if it had continued its nuclear weapons program (Johansson, 1986: 34). As argued above, the liberalist
argument of cooperation and interdependence influencing a state’s decision on proliferation is feasible when applied to the Swedish case.
4.3 DPT
Another reason for Sweden to stop its nuclear program and to join the non-proliferation regime, could be found in the influence of the DPT. A possibly present wave of democratization (i.e. Huntington’s third wave) at the time could have insured Sweden there was no need to enhance its national security through proliferation. This action would derive from the assumption that democracies do not go to war with each other but reach agreement through cooperation and therefore do not need nuclear weapons.
As Huntington argues, democratization so far has come in waves and reverses between those waves. Sweden conducted its nuclear program during what Huntington indicated as the second wave of democratization, which lasted from 1943 to 1962: “Allied occupation promoted inauguration of
democratic institutions (...)” (Huntington, 1991: 18). Arguing against DPT, the Swedish nuclear
program was abandoned during a period of reverse, from 1958 to 1975. In this wave of reverse, especially nations in Latin America but also in other continents returned to an authoritarian regime (Huntington, 1991: 19). Sweden seems to have done the complete opposite of what DPT expected it to do. The country’s program started in 1946, was restricted in 1958, and was finally abandoned somewhere during the mid-1960 (Bergenäs, 2010). One could therefore argue that the argument of DPT posed by liberalism does not hold in the Swedish case.
4.4 Norms supported by dominant nations and the legitimacy of norms
Norms can influence a state’s decision to proliferate or refrain from nuclear weapon acquisition. Sweden could therefore have been motivated to not further pursue its nuclear program by international norms supported by dominant nations. Furthermore, the growing legitimacy of the international non-proliferation regime could have been an incentive for Sweden not to proliferate.
Three of the five declared nuclear weapon states, the USA, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom (UK), have been the leading states in the non-proliferation regime. Since these states were dominant in the field of proliferation and in world politics, these states would have been the states able to influence Sweden’s decision. The USA, the Soviet Union and the UK were the instigators of the non-proliferation regime. They have been the depositories of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (website NTI a) and the 1968 NPT (website NTI b), among other non-proliferation norms.
Sweden’s ideas and interests are likely to have been shaped by the non-proliferation norms mentioned above. For the preservation of Sweden’s image as a peaceful cooperative state, the country would probably have thought it was important to abide to the norms supported by the dominant Western liberal states, the USA and the UK. Furthermore, support of non-proliferation norms by the Soviet Union would have been an extra incentive for Sweden as the country they most feared also
abided to the non-proliferation regime. It would not be in Sweden’s interest to disobey the norms as this might make the Soviet Union feel suspicious and threatened (Davis, 2009: 5). Therefore, the argument that norms supported by dominant nations influenced a state’s decision on proliferating is applicable to the Swedish case.
As the dominant nations supported and promoted the non-proliferation regime, by the 1950s the world’s public opinion was almost unanimously opposed to nuclear weapons. All over the world protests and actions against the weapons arose. For example, a test ban petition was signed by more than eleven thousand scientists in 1958 (Rublee, 2009: 173). The non-proliferation regime became widely respected and since and increasing amount of nations joined the regime, it gained more legitimacy. Sweden could not stay behind: “This emerging international norm, the negotiations being
conducted to support it, and the Swedes’ own involvement in these negotiations had an impact on Swedish decision-making.” (Rublee, 2009: 174).
Attributing to the growing legitimacy of the non-proliferation norms that Sweden could not ignore, the country historically had always put an effort in reducing international conflict (Rublee, 2009: 174). By neglecting this effort through pursuing proliferation, Sweden would lose its credibility in the international realm. Taking the above into account, Sweden’s decision not to proliferate was influenced by the growing legitimacy of the international non-proliferation norms, confirming the constructivist argument.
4.5 Persuasion
Following the argumentation Rublee asserts, Sweden could have decided to not further proliferate because their perception of what security entails had changed. Sweden historically had been armed and neutral. Swedes identify themselves with a strong defensive capability and a distinct diplomatic quality to negotiate conflict. This, however, did not initially stop the nation from pursuing a nuclear weapon capability, as long as it was in line with the strengthening of the defensive capability (Rublee, 2009: 172).
Somehow, this attitude towards nuclear weapons changed. The left wing of the Swedish social democratic party (SAP) converted from a strategic way of thinking to an ideological one, changing its entire perception of security (Cole, 1997: 238). When this faction of SAP won enough terrain, it was able to proclaim this anti-nuclear ideology to the public. The women’s organization within the SAP made sure the issue was constantly and thoroughly put through public debate
(Johansson, 1986: 33). What resulted was that public opinion in Sweden changed drastically. Civilian protests arose and “By 1967, 69 percent of Swedes were against nuclear acquisition.” (Rublee, 2009: 171).
The duration of the development of the bomb might have contributed to this change. FOA estimated to able to acquire a bomb by 1956. This deadline, however, was not met and gave more time for Sweden’s political opinion towards proliferation to change (Arnett, 1998: 39). Ultimately, the
domestic public debate convinced the majority of Swedes that nuclear weapons were not compatible with the Swedish neutral identity and changed the Swedish perception on the concept of security (Rublee, 2009: 184). Therefore, the constructivist argument of persuasion is feasible for the Swedish case.
4.6 Social conformity
Conformity with the internationally accepted norms, as Rublee argues, could have been another reason for Sweden to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Sweden could have thought non-proliferation would reward them, or they feared the enormous social costs adherent to non-proliferation. Since Sweden already participated in the international realm a lot, reward could not be in the form of offered cooperation or anything. Therefore, seeking for international reward would not be a reason to conform by the non-proliferation regime (Rublee, 2009: 27). However, Sweden could have feared the international social costs clinging to the disobedience of the accepted norms through proliferation. One of these costs could have been an excessive loss of international cooperation on, for example, civilian nuclear energy, which would harm national interests (Johansson, 1986: 34).
Despite this fact, the argument of conformity is not strong for the Swedish case. States forbearing a nuclear capability because of conformity are not exactly willing to give up. For this reason, states acting on conformity would not adhere to the non-proliferation norms voluntarily and would seek every possibility to get out. Through abandoning its nuclear weapons program, Sweden became an active member of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in which it voluntarily joined initiatives and ratified treaties and agreements without struggle. Sweden even opted to add more restrictive additions to certain treaties (Rublee, 2009: 183). The constructivist explanation of social conformity leading to non-proliferation does, taking the above into account, not apply to the case of Sweden.
4.7 Identification
Sweden could have decided to not further proliferate because of a (future) relationship with one of the core states in the non-proliferation regime. In order to strengthen this presumed relationship, Sweden could have believed it to be necessary to identify with the state in question. It would therefore abide by its norms and values, including the non-proliferation norms.
If Sweden would have wanted to identify with any nation, it would have been with the USA. The argument of identification would explain Sweden’s agreement for cooperation with the USA. Through this agreement Sweden acquired American light water reactors for civilian purposes, “(...) in
exchange for the recipient’s assurances that it would not divert the technology and materials to military purposes (...)” (Long, 1996: 86). In this case, Sweden would have identified with the USA to
more economically efficient than the heavy water reactors being developed by Sweden itself (Long, 1996: 89).
However, as Rublee argues, Sweden did not forbear nuclear weapons due to identification. Sweden rejecting NATO membership, a treaty greatly supported by the USA, is a first sign on non-identification (Rublee, 2009: 183). Furthermore, Sweden and the USA enjoyed numerous
confrontations due to Sweden’s tendency of harassing the USA. The relationship between the nations worsened in the late 1960s. An example of Swedish provocation of the USA is Palme’s comparison of the bombings of Vietnam by the USA with the Nazi concentration camps (Cole, 1997: 240). Since
“(...) identifying states are not expected to harass or confront the states with which they identify.”
(Rublee, 2009: 183), identification is not an argument that will hold in the Swedish case.
5.
Conclusion
This thesis has argued that several reasons can be given for the Swedish decision towards proliferation, deriving from different IR paradigms. Conducting the various explanations for the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons to the Swedish case has proven this argument to hold. Sweden did decide to not further proliferate, because of a variety of reasons not to be placed within one theory of IR.
First of all, two out of three of the realist arguments are applicable to the Swedish case. As Sweden feared proliferation would only attract Soviet attention and thereby increase its chance on facing a nuclear attack from this nation, the anticipated weakening of security finally resulted in the abandonment of the Swedish nuclear program. In addition, Sweden started to believe that if they did not defy the Soviet Union, an attack would only be implemented if the East and West were already at war. Sweden was convinced its nuclear capacity would not contribute as a deterrent in this case. Therefore, the perceived security threat shrunk and there was less desire for Sweden to proliferate. However, regional conflict did not diminish during the period Sweden decided to not further pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons, since the Cold War was still at full range. The argument of declining regional conflict leading to non-proliferation is not supported by analysing the Swedish case.
Liberalist theory has also been proven to partially account for Swedish non-proliferation. The argument of DPT did not hold because Sweden oddly decided in favour of proliferation in times of democratization and towards it during one of the reverse waves. The cooperation/interdependence argument liberalism asserts is however applicable to the Swedish case. To sustain its reputation as a cooperative nation, Sweden believed it could decide no different than opposing proliferation.
Especially since the country had already been active within the nuclear non-proliferation regime while continuing its nuclear program, Sweden had to stop its nuclear desires at some time to maintain its credibility within the international political and economic realm.
The constructivist paradigm has also attributed greatly to the explanation of Swedish non-proliferation. The influence of dominant nations joining the nuclear non-proliferation regime resulted in Sweden not further proliferating. It would not have been in the nation’s interests to disobey these norms, since it feared the Soviet Union which abided by it. Furthermore, Sweden wanted to prove its largely cooperative identity to the USA and UK. In addition, as the non-proliferation regime gained international respect and legitimacy, Sweden could not stay behind because this would discredit the nation’s history of cooperation and reducing conflict.
Furthermore, the persuasion argument as one of the three expectations asserted by Rublee is feasible in the Swedish case. Acting on its old perception of the concept of security, Sweden saw a nuclear capability as contributing to its historically strong defensive capability. This attitude changed
into one in which nuclear weapons were regarded as immoral weapons incompatible with the Swedish policy of neutrality.
However, Rublee’s arguments of social conformity and identification affecting the Swedish decision on proliferation are not supportive. Sweden has been too active within the
non-proliferation regime, even proposing more restrictions to certain treaties, to be influenced by
conformity. Identification has neither had its influence in the Swedish case, assuming the USA would be the most likely nation to identify with. Sweden did not become a member of NATO and there have been several encounters between the USA and Sweden due to provocation from the Swedish side.
It should now be clear that numerous factors have affected Sweden’s decision to not further acquire nuclear weapons but abandon its program. Swedish non-proliferation has been the result of a combination of security, domestic and normative reasons. Therefore, the Swedish case of non-proliferation should not be analysed from one paradigm, because it would offer too narrow of a perspective. The variety of arguments given by the different IR theories should be used in a combined way to create a broader view on the case. This can also be applied to any other case.
As Reiss argues “(...) that motivations for and against nuclear weapons acquisition vary from
one state to another, and that it is unwise to generalize about proliferation dynamic.” (Ogilvie-White,
1996: 48-49), the findings of this case cannot be generalized to other cases. However, the theoretical framework applied to this case could be conducted to other cases in research on their proliferation decisions. An analysis through combined perspectives could shed more light on a case than an analysis from a single perspective would.
Despite the fact the findings of this thesis cannot be generalized upon other cases, some simple policy implications can be conducted. It is important for policymakers to understand that every case is different and has different reasons for going nuclear or deciding to refrain from nuclear
weapons. The theoretical framework in this thesis however, is applicable to every other case as it offers these different reasons and analyses on which reasons do and which do not fit in a specific case. In policymakers’ attempts to impose non-proliferation strategies, they should analyze the case
thoroughly from all different perspectives mentioned above. Applying this broad perspective would provide a more detailed analysis of the case, clarifying why a nation did or did not chose to
proliferate. With this information, policymakers can develop a case-specific strategy for transforming a nation into a non-proliferator, or for preserving the non-proliferation decision of a certain state, thereby spreading the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
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