30.06.2017 Research Seminar Conflict Resolution and Governance
Alexandra Graszk (11249471) alexandra.graszk@student.uva.nl
Thesis- Supervisor: Assistant Professor Dr. Polly Pallister-Wilkins Second Reader: Assistant Professor Dr. Michelle Parlevliet
Master-Thesis
Impartiality and translation: A science and technology perspective on
knowledge production at the International Crisis Group taking the example of
Turkey
Abstract
In this thesis I aim to identify practices of knowledge production at the International Crisis Group taking Turkey as an in-depth example. By looking at organizational ways of knowledge production I hope to gain insights into the practices of current systems of conflict prediction and the socio-technical early warning devices that aim for securing and preventing war and open violence. Having said that I also attempt to understand how particular ways of knowledge processing lead to a particular outcome when conducted by particular people in terms of policy and action. By doing so this thesis aims to shed light on essential moments of translation of knowledge and its formation along the way. This study is limited to one case, one region and a four-week field work trip.
Key words:
Knowledge production, Science and Technology Studies, Paris School, Critical Security Studies, conflict early warning, International Crisis Group, conflict prevention, Turkey, impartiality, power. Word Count: 20515 Page Count: 56
2 Yolculuğumda benimle yürüyen herkese teşekkür ederim.
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1Image on top: ICG Field Office Istanbul, 5th floor, 04.05.2017, Image below: Office Building, ICG Headquarters on 14th floor, Brussels,10.05.2017, pictures by author.
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List of Contents
Introduction: Opening the black box of knowledge production ... 6
1. Data and methodology ... 10
1.1. Challenges of ‘studying up’ - Interviewing professionals ... 10
1.2. A case study ... 11
1.3. Semi-structured and narrative interviews ... 11
1.3.1 Expert Interview ... 12
1.4. Participant observation of office structures ... 12
1.5. Discourse analysis ... 13
1.6. Limitations and reflection on my role as a researcher ... 13
2. The International Crisis Group and Conflict Early Warning ... 14
2.1. The ICG, Crisis Watch and the PKK casualty count ... 14
2.2. Conflict Early Warning ... 17
3. Security, technology and reality - theoretical concepts ... 21
3.1. Security practices and devices ... 21
3.2 Science and Technology Studies ... 24
3.3. Actor Networks beyond the laboratory ... 27
3.4. Association and translation within networks ... 30
4. Results: Impartiality and knowledge production at the ICG ... 33
4.1. Impartiality as a value ... 33
4.2 Stages of knowledge translation ... 36
4.2.1 Nusaybin Report ... 37
4.2.2. Crisis Watch Entry ... 43
4.2.3 Developing immutable facts: PKK-Conflict casualty count ... 48
4.3 Translated knowledge and impartiality ... 52
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6. References ... 58
6.1. List of references ... 58
6.2 Image and Graphic Sources ... 62
6.3 Social Media Source ... 63
7. Appendix ... 64
7.1. List of Interviews ... 64
7.2. List of Observations ... 64
7.3. List of Documents ... 64
7.4. Graphic: Crisis Watch Information Flow ... 65
7.5. Example: Crisis Watch Entry, Turkey May 2017 ... 65
List of Abbreviations
ANT Actor-Network-Theory
ICG International Crisis Group
STS Science and Technology Studies
TİHV Turkish Human Rights Foundation
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Introduction: Opening the black box of knowledge production
In a coffee shop near the International Crisis Group’s Istanbul Office, I sat down with my interviewee Analyst A. His research fascinated me. Working on the PKK2 Turkish government conflict to him
means speaking to all its parties and taking an ‘outside’ position in order to build trust. In the summer of 2015, the two yearlong ceasefire had collapsed (Kafanov 2015).Open war in Eastern, predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey and many attacks in urban centers had followed. Analyst A expressed that his ‘impartial’ approach enables him to have direct access to both PKK officials and parliamentarians of the governing party AKP3. It also helps him to estimate the conflict developments, to be ‘fair’ in his publications and to transmit an ‘objective’ account of the situation publicly. I was fascinated by the deep insight Analyst A could reach through this approach. His story reminded me of the high value that is often attributed to impartiality in mediation. Taking the role of a third-party intervenor can build on impartiality in order to successfully facilitate negotiation between conflict actors (Kent 1998). When all parties perceive the mediator as a ‘neutral’ supporter of the process rather than an advocate for one side or a specific outcome, each parties’ interests can be acknowledged. In Analyst A’s case 'objectivity' is essential, as it is part of the result but is also a condition for his work in terms of access.
Analyst A works for the ICG, which is an international organization and think tank that produces conflict knowledge in the form of country reports and the Crisis Watch conflict early warning database and bulletin. The ICG also understands itself as a conflict prevention organization through engaging in early warning. This means that its publications are dedicated to inform about conflicts for policy makers who deal with uncertainty in conflict realities. The knowledge they use, is of special significance since it may help to prevent outbreaks of violence. Analyst A’s narrative reflects the ICG’s organizational self-portrayal as a ‘neutral’, ‘independent’ conflict knowledge provider. In their own words, they are the “independent eyes on the ground” (ICG 2012). Does this mean they represent the ‘pure facts’ or ‘truth’ about a conflict or crisis? Impartiality and objectivity in Analyst A’s account facilitate his conflict related research and analysis. This raises the question what impartiality and objectivity mean for the ICG’s conflict knowledge data.
2 Abbreviated for Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, Kurdish Labourers Party.
7 Looking at this data from a science and technology studies4 perspective tells another story. STS scholars
question whether knowledge production can be objective (Haraway 1988; Law and Mol 2001; Jasanoff 2004). An information that Analyst A has gained in his research will pass through various passages until it reaches its final form. Ways of processing, translating and interpreting information, it is argued here, establish a scheme that draws a particular narrative about a conflict or crisis. Collected data from the moment research is planned will run through several eyes, hands and documents until its final publication and application by the end user. STS offers the theoretical approach to analyze every step along the way. For STS scholars like Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, Annemarie Mol and John Law the production of ‘facts’ is a process performed within a network of interaction of human and non-human, technological actors. Bruno Latour has conducted several studies in laboratories showing how science is made. They challenge the common understanding of science and the assumption that facts represent the truth about reality. He suggests taking the approach of Actor-Network-Theory5, which allows one
to understand this process of knowledge production by tracking information and its development through the network (Latour 1987). This thesis connects to Latour’s study but takes Actor-Network-Theory beyond the laboratory into the field of conflict knowledge production. This thesis will look into organizational ways of knowledge production taking the International Crisis Group as a case study and Turkey as an in depth country-example. It centres around the question:
In what ways does the International Crisis Group gain, translate and process information to “produce knowledge” used for conflict prevention and early warning in the case of Turkey?
Asking this question entails examining the procedures through which information is gained, what patterns and procedures of translation and interaction look like and how forms of knowledge production structure things in a particular kind of way, for a particular kind of crisis. The ways in which knowledge within the ICG is gained serves the purpose of nurturing reports and the Crisis Watch database which itself asks for specific information limited by categories and format itself. As such it is considered as a socio-technical device. Understanding how knowledge of conflicts comes into being in an organizational context is an attempt to open the black box of socio-technical devices in conflict early warning and prevention. I argue that knowledge at the ICG is a product of numerous interactions of analysts and operational systems of databases moving fluidly within a network. I further argue that every step of knowledge translation decreases the impartiality and objectivity along the way. As more actors and devices get involved in the process, the initial knowledge changes and it is subject to the
4 In the following STS. 5 In the following ANT.
8 particular interaction between the device and the actors. Experts, analysts, their documents as well as the databases themselves are considered as part of the network in which the knowledge is produced. One of the pillars of the ICG’s work is high level advocacy. Its reports and early warning bulletins address policy makers directly. As such they may deliver the foundation for governmental action and broader conflict resolution practice and are therefore worth investigating. The presentation of the ICG’s data is key here. Similar to what Analysts A explains, impartiality, independence and neutrality is stressed by the ICG and strongly contributes to the perceived quality and reputation of the organizations publications. This is not surprising, considering that policy makers want to make their decisions based on what they perceive as objective data. Richard Rottenburg and Sally Merry explain that in comparison to qualitative data, evidence-based policy making, which builds on quantitative data is perceived as “objective and less prone to misuse, but also more transparent, more democratic” (2015: 1). Now, the ICG does qualitative research, but in Crisis Watch it is rendered and visualized in a way that makes it look transparent to the end-user: Arrow up in green for an improvement, arrow down in red for a deteriorated situation and a brown straight arrow for no development in the specific crisis. As such, the data provided by the conflict early warning system can also be located in the context of the so called “data revolution” 6 where technological devices are used to combat uncertainty (Read, Taithe, and Ginty
2016: 1315). In a digital age data has been given special attention specifically in regard to security issues (Aradau and Blanke 2015). The data that reports of the ICG and Crisis Watch offer are then used to take action to establish security and prevent war. Knowledge production that specifically aims at conflict prevention adds another dimension to the significance of understanding the process through which this knowledge has come into being. The system is part of practices that aim to make life more secure - a security device used by experts, practitioners and policy makers. This topic thus stands at the intersection of STS and Critical Security Studies. Since I focus on the practice of knowledge production I draw on the analytical framework of the of the Paris School and “(in)securization”, which argues that security is understood in relation to what is defined as a risk (Bigo 2001). What is considered as a risk is determined through security practices (ibid). The ICG reports and data-bases draw attention to specific issues and conflicts and create a strong narrative about it. Less dominant voices, narratives and ideas run risk of remaining unheard or less influential, which creates unequal power relations.
Studying the ICG offers a chance to learn about knowledge production at a powerful expert organization within the field. Taking Turkey as a country example allows us to observe how knowledge is produced in an open-conflict situation. Over the past few month Crisis Watch has switched its alert status for
6 A report by the United Nations Secretary-General’s Independent Expert Advisory Group on a Data Revolution for Sustainable Development (IEAG) states: “Data are the lifeblood of decision-making and the raw material for accountability. Without high-quality data providing the right information on the right things at the right time; designing, monitoring and evaluating effective policies becomes almost impossible” (IEAG 2014: 2).
9 Turkey between deteriorated and unchanged a few times, and no improvements have been tracked especially since the military coup attempt. The various reports and briefings published by ICG on conflicts in Turkey mostly feature the Turkish Government–PKK conflict and the border situation with Syria. Recent internal developments in Turkish politics, and spill-overs of the conflict into the EU make Turkey very visible and relevant to a broad audience.
To answer above questions, I offer four chapters. The first part of this thesis will lay out my research design and my personal reflection on the process. In the second part I introduce the International Crisis Group and their early warning system as well as present the current literature on Conflict Early Warning. The third part will locate conflict early warning systems as security devices. I will then move on to STS scholarship needed to understand processes of knowledge production, specifically ANT and theories of translation. In the fourth chapter I will discuss the concept of impartiality in relation knowledge production at the ICG. I will then follow three objects in their production process, all publications by the ICG: The Nusaybin- report, the Crisis Watch database, bulletin and map and the interactive data-collection of the PKK casualty count. Throughout field-work I had the chance to gain insight in their production process. In a last step this thesis will critically discuss the role of impartiality in knowledge production processes and explain how it is problematic in terms of power and security.
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1.
Data and methodology
This thesis is based on a case study of one organization and the expertise they produce for one specific country. In my research I chose a mixed methods approach of narrative and semi-structured interviews as well as discourse analysis. From a STS perspective, scientific knowledge cannot be considered as ‘objective’, since particularity, as opposed to universality, is added throughout the production process7. Objects, such as this thesis are then result from particular interactions in a particular context. It may deliver in-depth information on a particular case to the extent possible in a four-month thesis-process and four-week field work trip to Brussels and Istanbul. The presented results can only be seen as valid in this very specific context and as a result from my interaction with people and systems involved in the process. Common concepts of reliability, validity and objectivity do not apply for this reason. Instead, it is argued in this thesis that acknowledging the particularity of research reflects processes and consequences in reasoning in a much more comprehensive way. I will now first look at the setting of my field work before explaining each part of the research design.
1.1. Challenges of ‘studying up’ - Interviewing professionals
Fieldwork often focuses on the marginalized, those oppressed by others, the weak, the poor (Nader 1972: 5), or put in a different way, anthropologists prefer to study the “underdog“ (idem: 18). In the conflict resolution field this often leads scholars to study those directly affected by conflict in their homes, families and livelihoods. This study chose to examine those who hold power by drawing practitioners’ and policy-makers’ attention to a particular conflict situation. Laura Nader urges a change of perspective in anthropological study towards governments, organization and firms, and those structures that direct life, by asking:
"What if, in reinventing anthropology, anthropologists were to study the colonizers rather than the colonized, the culture of power rather than the culture of the powerless, the culture of affluence rather that the culture of poverty?“ (Nader 1972:5).
Commonly ‘studying up’, as Nader calls this change of perspective, faces problems of access, which can be resolved through building rapport (Nader 1972:18). This was also a requirement of my field work. It was clear to me that studying a professional, elite organization would require me to pass gatekeepers. I attempted to establish rapport by working through pre-existing networks and using references to carefully connect to the ICG. A fellow student’s loose connection to the Istanbul office’s
11 analyst provided the reference for my first e-mail. After not receiving a response, after two weeks and one reminder, the second step entailed using a network with higher reputation. A connection of a professor and experienced conflict resolution practitioner lead me to an ICG inside contact in London, who then agreed to provide support and contact analysts in Istanbul. Finally, through the London reference I was able to build rapport and received immediate response. The fact that I was only allowed access through established individuals within the conflict resolution community shows a certain degree of closeness of the organization itself and the broader community that the ICG moves in. It also points to networking as an essential skill within the organizational culture. The next part of this chapter will present the methods used for data collection.
1.2. A case study
Michael Burawoy explains that standard research in social sciences presupposes an embedded objectivity that relies on models given in social science theory, which he calls industrial modes (1998: 28, emphasis added). He suggests instead that in an extended case method, reflexive science or as he calls it craft modes offer better evaluations of the data through the researchers’ observations within the particular case (ibid., emphasis added). I chose a case study design in order to understand the knowledge production process from within one particular organization, the ICG. My aim was to study a network, its boundaries and its entities, actors and technological systems. The notion of the network was applied in a broad sense8 here, including the ICG, its employees, analysts, reports and online conflict early warning systems. A case study of one organization and one country example enabled me to study the particular process of knowledge production in detail. I had the chance to look at specific documents, their different versions and the steps in their production process. It also helped me to understand how theoretical assumptions about conflicts and peace within the organization speak to the ICG’s model of conflict early warning. I consider the ICG as a worthwhile case given its standing in the conflict resolution field, it’s clear self-positioning towards conflict prevention and their current system of conflict early warning that is built on field research9.
1.3. Semi-structured and narrative interviews
I conducted seven semi-structured interviews with eight interviewees. Three of the interview partners were identified previous to my field work. I met two of the interview partners during field work in the Istanbul office. Although I had contacted several permanent staff in each the Istanbul and the Brussels office, I spoke to only one person each. In both cases about 2- 4 people are working closely together in one department, they communicated among themselves and decided who is going to speak with me.
8 As will be explained in chapter three, a narrow understanding of networks refers to devices or objects as assembled networks themselves (Law 2002: 97).
12 Through my interviews I aimed to learn about the research process, identify when and how an event or development gets recorded and is considered as relevant for the crisis groups work. By speaking to one analyst at the ICG headquarters, where Crisis Watch is made, and one in the field office, where information for Crisis Watch comes from, I attempted to understand connections and communication between the local and the international level and see how knowledge is formed through and within these channels. The third part of my questions related to office routines in order to understand daily information flows, locations of actors in the network and see how power relations and hierarchies formulate. The interviews were conducted in English, Turkish and German10, all translations are my own.
In my first interview I identified connections to another organization, the Turkish Human Rights Foundation (TİHV11),which is part of the network since it provides the ICG with death toll of the PKK-Government conflict which the ICG uses in its interactive-online- graphic. I consider them as one actor within the network I am researching. Their narrative provides information on their own research and also tells why the ICG may consider their information as valuable to their own work.
1.3.1 Expert Interview
All of the analysts I spoke to can also be considered to be early warning experts. One additional interview was conducted with one conflict early warning expert from Swisspeace, a Swiss peacebuilding organization which ran the FAST conflict early warning system. The purpose of this interview was to hear another narrative on conflict early warning and to observe the differences or commonalities in research, structure and purpose of the systems. The FAST Early Warning system itself is not studied in this thesis.
1.4. Participant observation of office structures
Participant observation was conducted to identify office routines, get a sense of the setting and an idea of how field research is conducted within the office. The aim of observation was to observe the steps in knowledge production that analysts or employees do not speak about since they are usually a part of their daily routine and are considered as ‘normal’. Those moments are often essential to understand the knowledge production process. I conducted participant observation for two full office- working days in Istanbul. I had the chance to observe the publication of the Nusaybin report, in the final day of a three-month long research process.
10 See Appendix 1 for a list of conducted interviews.
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1.5. Discourse analysis
I conducted discourse analysis of public and internal documents that I received though desk research and was given by analysts in Istanbul. These documents are considered as objects within the network. As such they are part of tracing the production process. I analyzed the Crisis Watch Turkey entries since 2003, and identified structural changes and categories within them. In addition, I conducted a social media analysis of Turkey-related and Crisis Watch related ICG employees specifically surrounding the event of the publication of the Nusaybin report. I specifically looked at positioning of the analysts, presentation of the research conducted and retweets in order to understand connections within the organization and to the outside.
1.6. Limitations and reflection on my role as a researcher
Since every actor along the way, every space shapes the outcome of a production process this research is limited in its perspective to my own western –European, white-privileged background, and routine of ordering and sense-making. It is also limited by the guidelines of the Amsterdam based institution University of Amsterdam, its workings and procedures. It must be taken into consideration what effects my background as a student has on studying up, but much more than that what affects my personal background has had on the research process: Starting with the questions I raise, interaction in interviews, being present in the office doing observation, up to drawing conclusions. The presented data is limited by two days of participant observation, seven semi-structured interviews and analysis of internal and public documents. As such my work cannot be considered as a full ethnographic study of knowledge-production at a conflict prevention organization, since that would require much longer periods of observation of daily routines and better in-depth access to more documents. In this thesis I attempted to open a window for further research of this kind to be conducted.
As a researcher I am an outsider, not only to Turkey but also to the organization and the local office in Istanbul. The challenge in my approach was to build trust and respect the safe spaces of individuals and the organization. I made sure that my ambition of conducting observation was transparent and asked for consent before doing so, during accessing specific information, as well as interviewing employees of the office. I observed and listened carefully to understand the boundaries set, and refrained from further inquiry when this moment arose. To be able for individuals and the organization to define boundaries it was necessary to inform all participants about my person, the aim of my research and the purpose of my stay. It was important to stress that I did not conduct an audit of the organization’s work, which could lead to stress and unwanted tensions. The ICG is an organization with a high reputation among practitioners, policy makers, government and economic actors. Research results are presented anonymously. High attention had to be paid to the fact that Turkey at this moment undergoes structural changes in the political system and society that lead to a general caution among non-governmental organizations.
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2.
The International Crisis Group and Conflict Early Warning
“Knowledge about the future revolves around practices like simulations, prognoses, risk analyses and probability measurements regarding politically relevant events in the future and how they are related to present action” (Bliesemann de Guevara 2014: 548).
Early warning systems such as FAST12 and Crisis Watch aim to prevent conflict by informing the public
about ongoing conflict situations, their current developments and possible future developments. By trying to create more certainty about the future these systems can help policy makers and practitioners take ‘informed’ decisions. This thesis looks specifically at conflict-related early warning. The first part of this chapter will introduce the ICG, its aims, structure and location within the broader conflict resolution field. It will then explain the Crisis Watch database and the PKK casualty count, which are the technological systems the ICG uses for conflict prevention and early warning. The second part will look at the purposes and different forms of data collection in conflict-early warning. It also summarizes the academic discussion, which seems to be dominated by evaluations of effectiveness and the responsibility of governments to engage in conflict prevention, rather than looking at practices itself.
2.1. The ICG, Crisis Watch and the PKK casualty count
Being a “highly visible, vocal, hard-to-ignore conflict expert” (Bliesemann de Guevara 2014: 546), the ICG takes a hegemonic position in the field of conflict-knowledge production. Addressing mainly policy makers, the ICG provides “independent analysis and advice” (ICG 2017a, Website: Who we are). The same focus is visible in the organizations online self- portrayal:
“Crisis Group sounds the alarm to prevent deadly conflict. We build support for the good governance and inclusive politics that enable societies to flourish. We engage directly with a range of conflict actors to seek and share information, and to encourage intelligent action for peace“ (ICG 2017a, Website: Our Mission, emphasis in original).
As seen above the ICG presents itself mainly as a conflict prevention organization. It provides specific information on conflicts and conflict developments in form of publications such as reports, OP-ED’s and the Crisis Watch, an early warning database and bulletin, which is the most visible “product” of
12 FAST is abbreviated for: Frühanalyse von Spannungen und Tatsachenermittlung (German), meaning early analysis of tensions and fact-finding (translated by author).
15 ICG as Researcher A explained13. With Crisis Watch the ICG monitors specific conflicts within 70
countries and offers monthly updates on their developments. (ICG 2017a, Website: About Crisis Watch). Its results are presented in an interactive world-map online (ibid.):
(Image 1: Screenshot Crisis Watch Map 23.03.2017, view: February/March 2017.)
It targets “busy readers in the policy community, media, business, civil society and the interested general public” (ibid.). In that regard Crisis Watch stresses time-effectiveness, accessibility and a user-friendly format for mobile devices (ICG 2017a, Website: About Crisis Watch). Crisis Watch is always published by the research department in Brussels on the first day of each month (ibid.). It has a limited word count of 250 words in which it summarizes dates and events of a specific conflict (See Example in Appendix). The evaluation of a development builds on comparison with the previous month (Researcher A, May 2017, Brussels). The map itself highlights developments categorized by improved situations, deteriorated situations for the previous month as well as conflict risk alerts and possible resolution opportunities expected within the current month:
(Image 2: Crisis Watch Monthly Overview for May/June 2017)
13 This information is grounded in online statistics that the ICG’s communications department keeps track of (Researcher A, May 2017, Brussles).
16 In addition to Crisis Watch the ICG Turkey project is publishing a data collection work on the PKK conflict on an interactive website14. This info-graphic publishes the casualties in the PKK conflict since
the 20th June 201515 (ICG PKK Casualty Count 2017). The numbers are presented in sum as well as in categories that show form of association and role within the conflict. Employee B notes that this collection is numerical but not quantitative since it does not provide indices (May 2017, Istanbul).
The ICG’s overall methodology stresses three pillars: “field research, sharp analysis, and high level advocacy” (ICG 2017a, Website: How We Work). The ICG presents this methodology as “independent, impartial and inclusive” (ibid). The distinguishing feature or 'added value' is the qualitative data that is collected on the ground, in ‘conflict-areas’ (Researcher A, May 2017, Brussels). In the ICG’s public presentation their practice involves “rigorous, fact-based reporting” (ICG 2017a, Website: How We Work). Independence is not explained directly but presented as the basis for a ‘special’ access which allows them to reach all conflict parties (ibid). The organization’s headquarters are located in Brussels, London and New York while the field offices are in ‘conflict- affected-areas’ and are separated in regions and projects, one of which is the Turkey Project. All publications are available in English and most of them in a local language. For the case of Turkey, the translations are not necessarily important for Turkish policy makers but instead are used to present to potential interviewees as a proof of their “fair” judgement of the situation (Analyst A, April 2017, Istanbul).
Little has been published on the International Crisis Group organization and its inner workings. Analyses made are mostly perspectives from the outside (Bliesemann de Guevara 2014), or evaluations of the ICG’s reports (Kosmatopoulos 2014) or its recommendations and work in a specific country or conflict (Hochmüller and Müller 2014, Koddenbrock 2014), all of which are published by the Third World Quarterly in one issue. Most criticism of the ICG points to the powerful framing of conflicts that may develop into specific policy action (Bliesemann de Guevara 2014: 547). Bliesemann de Guevara argues that the organization has reached this status by successfully accumulating symbolic capital and expert authority, or “perceived accuracy, insight and objectivity” (idem: 546), in comparison to other organizations (2014: 552). As such the symbolic capital would obscure the ‘actual usefulness of reports’:
“That the ICG is currently ranked among the world’s top think-tanks is not, however, predominantly a reflection of its ‘real’ success in ‘working to prevent conflict worldwide’ or some sort of ‘objective usefulness’ of its reports to Western and international policy circles” (Bliesemann de Guevara 2014: 552).
14 See: http://www.crisisgroup.be/interactives/turkey/ (Last Access 29.06.2017).
17 In addition, the ICG has a special structure with the Board of Trustees composed of prominent figures, such as former prime ministers, presidents, diplomats and business people with the aim to facilitate high level advocacy among political and societal elites (ICG 2017b, Europe Report No 243: 33). This adds to the symbolic capital of the organization. As Analyst A explained the Board also helps with publicity for reports (May 2017, Istanbul). It further explains that ICG knowledge, in order to have success must be “marketable” (Bliesemann de Guevara 2014: 549). In a similar logic Researcher B notes that Crisis Watch is an ICG brand and product (May 2017, Brussels).
The ICG’s office in Istanbul was set up in 2007. The team consists of one project director, one analyst, one office manager and two part-time volunteers. It is located in Galata, the city centre of Istanbul. The Nusaybin report and the PKK casualty count are published from that office. In collaboration with the research department in the Brussels headquarters it creates the Crisis Watch entry for Turkey. Researcher B explained that all publications of the ICG, including reports and Crisis Watch are part of their early warning. She acknowledges that actionable early warning would entail predicting the future (May 2017, Brussels). Early warning at the ICG entails monitoring and drawing attention to severe developments within a specific conflict (ibid).
2.2. Conflict Early Warning
In 1992, one year after the outbreak of the Yugoslav War the United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali released the Agenda for Peace. In this document the Secretary calls for preventive diplomacy by intervening in crises before societal tensions turn into open violence. He urges the Security Council to find ways of early warning to address social and economic conditions that can lead to disaster, crisis or conflict (UN Secretary General 1992 Article 26). Considering that various economic and social conditions may lead to conflicts, preventive diplomacy, it says, needs early warning systems based on “information gathering and informal and formal fact finding” (idem: Article 23). In this way knowledge constitutes an essential part of early warning systems and conflict prevention efforts. This raises the question: What kind of information is perceived as necessary in order to detect, understand and properly react to those tensions or ‘threats’, and by what means and methodology is information collected? Given that conflicts are often chaotic and complicated it also brings into question how this information can be developed into a comprehensible account or a system explaining what is happening on-the-ground. Governments, international organizations and private organizations have attempted give estimations and early warnings.
During the 1990’s conflict early warning and conflict assessment systems set up by non-governmental organizations experienced a boom (Wulf and Debiel 2009: 11). The untimely response and the inability to foresee the Yugoslavian war and genocide in Rwanda led international organizations to call for new
18 solutions (Expert A, June 2017, Geneva/Amsterdam). For the first five years, ICG’s Crisis Watch Map competed with FAST, the swisspeace program that operated between 1998-2008 and FEWER16 among
others.
Literature discussing conflict early warning systems often points to the gap between early warning and early action (Zenko and Friedman 2011). Many authors argue that this gap arises from the habit of conflict resolution actors to react to a conflict rather than engaging in proactive policy within the field (Whittall 2010: 2140). Other reasoning relates the gap between early warning and early response systems to inabilities of using of technology and data effectively (Whittall 2010: 1240). Actors within the conflict resolution and humanitarian community would not be capable to understand and interpret Early Warning data (ibid.). Literature related to humanitarian crisis early warning systems is much more extensive than conflict-related early warning systems. This is not surprising since the roots of early warning systems are found in humanitarian work that aims to prevent human suffering (Adelmann 1998: 45). Even though not all early warning follows this objective. Dating back to the 1950’s the prediction of conflict events also originates in military and intelligence agencies as part of planning strategic moves and predicting an attack (Austin 2004: 4). One of the reasons for this, is that uncertainty about crises inhibits bureaucratic and planning efforts that require a certain degree of predictability (O’Brien 2002, 792). As a result of their various origins motivations of different actors in their respective fields of early warning thus may be very different. On the other hand, both conflict prevention and humanitarian efforts respond to human needs and are closely interrelated, as conflict can be not only a cause but also consequence of a humanitarian emergencies (Harff and Gurr 1998: 552). Consequently, they are not easily separable.
Relating back to the gap between early warning and early action several attempts have been made to evaluate the effectiveness of Early Warning Systems’ possibilities for conflict prevention (See O’Brien 2002, 2010; Stępka 2016). Early warning systems themselves can only have an impact if organizations’ or governments’ have a willingness or capacity to react (Miskel and Norton 1998: 318). This also implies that governments and International Governmental Organizations have an interest in taking informed decisions, as such they are reliable information about developments in looming conflicts (ibid.). In addition to the academic discussion of conflict early warning, international organizations, some of whom are engaged in early warning themselves, published reports on their early warning efforts and strategies. Several examples are OECD (2009), Susanne Schmeidl and Eugenia Piza- Lopez for swisspeace and International Alert (2002) and Edward Laurence for the Carneige Commission (1998). The Crisis Group recently published a special report giving recommendations on how to address the gap between early warning and early action (2016). What is missing, is an academic discussion about
19 the practice of early warning. A discussion about analysts, experts, bureaucrats and the way they set up and use their concepts, methods and databases in an attempt to make more sense of unpredictable conflict realities. The conflict early warning product, I argue, is produced collaboratively by human and non-human actors in a network. Technological systems of data collection and presentation is what I refer to as non-human actors, as will be discussed extensively in chapter three.
In the field of conflict early warning these technological systems generally distinguish between those using qualitative, those using quantitative methods, and those using combined forms of data collection17
(OECD 2009:14). Quantitative methods are perceived to have strong capabilities of predicting crisis and state failure, whereas qualitative ones are seen as providing contextual analysis (ibid.). The analytical frameworks that inform conflict early warning systems vary and relate to different ideas about conflict and peace (idem: 16). In the following two different systems tracking conflict knowledge will be looked at briefly: The Uppsala Conflict Data Program18 (UCDP) of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at the Uppsala University which used solely quantitative data and the Early Warning Program FAST International by Swisspeace which used both qualitative and quantitative data. The UCDP Project is a map and database of conflict fatalities and countries in conflict:
Image 3: UCDP Website, fatalities view 24.03.2017.
It also lists actors, and distinguishes between fatalities resulting from state based violence, non-state violence and one-sided violence. It variations of red, time-scales and bubbles to display conflict as seen in the image above.
17For a list on systems and their methodology see Austin (2004:12). 18 In the following abbreviated: UCDP.
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Image 4: FAST Analytical Framework Angola (May 2007).
The FAST Early Warning Program was active from 1998-2008 (Swisspeace 2017). Image four shows one example of a country specific analytical framework that the program used. It presents the equation: Root causes plus proximate causes impact on likelihood of armed conflict. Expert A explains that for each country that FAST was covering, a fact-finding team was sent to the conflict region (June 2017, Geneva/Amsterdam). The analytical framework resulted from these research-trips (ibid). In addition, FAST offers suggestions of different intervening factors that could impact the conflict positively or negatively. The equation reminds of Edward Azar’s classic conception of protracted conflict (1990), since it displays escalation, here the likelihood of armed conflict that is affected by root and immediate causes. Both systems present rendered visualizations of conflict. Crisis Watch as a conflict tracker and early warning database builds on qualitative data and is published through the online map. Presentations of conflict realities leave out or stress specific aspects of a conflict: The death toll and linear graphs as in the UCDP, the structural aspects of conflict cycles as in FAST or the recent status of a conflict situation as Crisis Watch. In that way, all three systems convey different understandings on what conflicts result from, consist of and how they could potentially be addressed in political decision-making or conflict prevention action.
We have seen so far, that the ICG inhabits a powerful position within the field. Their contribution to preventing war lies in the production of conflict knowledge in form of reports, Crisis Watch and the PKK casualty count, all of which are technological systems. In the following we look at production processes of such systems and locate them in the realm of security practices.
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3
3.
Security, technology and reality - theoretical concepts
This chapter serves the purpose of locating the ICG’s knowledge production processes and early warning systems within two theoretical frameworks: STS and Critical Security Studies. It will be argued that the practices of analysts who are doing conflict early warning need to be analyzed within Didier Bigo’s conception of management of unease (2001). The systems they use then also become security
devices. A device, as we will see in this chapter has the capacity to shape interactions in a specific way,
while at the same time being constructed though human action. Science and Technology Studies provide with explanations of how these processes can be understood. One suggestion is to follow an object in its making (Latour and Woolgar 1986).
3.1. Security practices and devices
As seen in the previous chapter, conflict early warning systems have been set up for the purpose of dealing with uncertainty within a conflict. They aim at contributing to prevention of further outbreaks of violence and eventually to save human lives. This specific form of establishing ‘security’ entails practices such as information gathering, researching, estimating, rendering, ordering and presenting, all contributing to the conflict early warning practice itself. Critical Security Studies and specifically the Paris School offer an approach to understanding security through practices of security agents. In his study of the security agencies police and the military, Didier Bigo19 finds that their fields of engagement
show various overlaps and confuse the binary of the national and the international realm (Bigo 2008: 12), a classic distinction which is made in international relations. Going beyond the governmental sphere, private professionals working in the field of security also find their work in between, across or affecting both, the international and national area. The ICG moves in a similar transnational realm, having the headquarters in Brussels, London and New York, and working with European policy makers while aiming to prevent conflict internationally.
Using the analogy of the Möbius ribbon Bigo and Tsoukala explain that external and internal security are not distinguishable but fluidly developing into each other (2008: 5). Bigo argues that internal and external problems must be seen in a semantic continuum20 of (in)security (Bigo 2001: 12). Accordingly,
19 Didier Bigo currently holds professorships at the Kings College London and Science Po Paris. His work is related to Critical Security Studies in specific the Paris School and deals with questions on freedom and liberty and how they relate to dispositives of risk, crime and war (See http://didierbigo.com/, accessed 15.06.2017).
20 Bigo here gives the example of fighting terrorism externally or internationally and announcing states of exception in order to identify the “enemy within” at the national level. Purpose and meaning of both actions merge.
22 ‘exceptional’ threats such as international terrorism and the ‘simple’ fear of crime are not distinguishable and are both part of the general feeling of unease (ibid). In the same way as the national and the international are confusing, insecurity and security are intimately connected and do not display clear boundaries (ibid). Bigo calls this thinking the new topology of security (idem: 3).
Security and (in)security are not understood as opposed to each other but as “interrelated and interdependent” thus part of the same act, termed (in)securitization. (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 70). Accordingly securing x will necessarily insecure y (ibid.). In this way insecurity is conditioned by the definition of security. This raises the question on how security is defined then. In this new topology practices become key. By managing the so called unease or risk the very same is defined. In international political sociology this shift in focus towards the analysis of practices is called practice turn (Salter 2013: 86). The theory results from criticism of functionalist ideas of security as a reaction to insecurity taking the form of ‘objective’ risks21, threats and dangers (Bigo 2001: 1). Bigo contradicts this understanding of the done determining the doing, and argues that instead the doing
determines the done (idem: 5, emphasis added). Thus what is considered as (in)security is shaped by
the practices security agents are engaging in (idem: 1). Security agents or “managers of unease” do so by drawing on their expert authority:
“Such professional managers of unease then claim, through the “authority of the statistics”, that they have the capacity to class and prioritize the threats, to determine what exactly constitutes security” (Bigo 2008:8).
Experts within the field of security are then thought of as holding secret and supplementary ‘knowledge’ which is reaffirmed and qualified through routines and technology (Bigo 2008: 27). Seen in the quote above, their capacity as managers of unease is justified by the technology that supports it. As such they possess discursive power in defining the ‘real threat’ and the capacity to delineate orders (C.A.S.E. 2006: 457). This should not lead to the assumption that actors can determine the exact outcome or effect of their practices (Bigo& Tsoukala 2008: 5). It is much more subject to competition, consolidation and acceptance of the audience, who receives the “monopoly of the legitimate knowledge on what constitutes a legitimate unease, a “real” risk”” (Bigo 2008:5). Bigo argues that practices are part of a power- knowledge relationship (2001:5), that this theory enables us to study:
21 The Paris School and the Copenhagen School of critical security studies share the thought that “objective” risks do not exist. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde argue that security and in reverse a threat must be seen in the context of its enunciators and cannot be considered as a natural given (1997: 26). Bigo and Tsoukala share the idea that security must be seen in the context of its enunciators, but instead of seeing the origin of a security definition in “speech acts” but through practices (2008: 4).
23 Thus, to attend to the study of securitization is to focus on the creation of networks of professionals of (in)security, the systems of meaning they generate and the productive power of their practices (C.A.S.E. 2006: 458).
Practices of managers of unease are diverse, thus each security agency also has their own repertoire of know-how, technology and action (Bigo 2001:5). This also means that the theory encourages us to analyze security practices separately in order to understand the different forms and qualities of (in)security that they produce in each case. The management of unease then also contributes to the form that governmentality takes, leaning to Foucault’s terminology (Bigo 2008: 6). This means that reactions towards what is defined as (in)security are shaped by the practices and the technology, and finally the knowledge as part of the network, that Bigo calls a dispositif. Speaking about security in Europe and migration he explains:
„Like the panopticon dispositif, this ban-opticon dispositif of morphing produces a knowledge, as well as statements on threats and on security that reinforce the belief in a capacity to decrypt, even prior to the individual himself, what its trajectories, its itineraries will be“ (Bigo 2008: 44).
Anthony Amicelle, Claudia Aradau and Julien Jeandesboz argue that devices are assembled and can emerge within such “dispositifs of governance” (2015: 295). They argue for an analytics of security through its devices and by doing so acknowledge their materialized role within security practice (2015). In their view this new analytics, also called the “material turn”, is necessary in order to develop research angles that help identify the role of devices for security (idem: 294). This results from their notion of the device, that doesn’t merely understand it as an instrument or tool of security professionals or agencies (idem: 295) but rather as a device that has a productive capacity of its own:
“For us, devices – mundane, discursive, technical or theoretical – are performative in that they (re)configure social spaces, (re)draw boundaries and (re)distribute meanings. Therefore, security devices are performative in that they not only enact or alter particular realities and categories depending on the successful stabilization of complex socio-technical configurations, but also draw legal, gender, race or class boundaries and lines of exclusion” (Amicelle, Aradau, and Jeandesboz 2015: 299).
This means that devices are not just intermediaries or neutral tools but “socio-technological devices” and part of governmentality (idem: 296). In a Foucauldian logic, technology or technique contributes to a specific ordering of social relations through formalized knowledge and codification, of which security devices can be built of (ibid). Going beyond the simple object, what makes devices political or
24 normative then is the processes through which they have been designed (idem: 297). Devices, such as maps, reflect conventions, norms and values and deliver a particular spacial interpretation (idem: 296f.). For security devices, such as conflict early warning systems this means that the picture they convey is closely linked with the underlying knowledge production process and the actors involved in it. It also means that as early warning systems convey definitions of (in)security, conflicts and crises in a particular way that may have an impact on social ordering. In our case here the technological aspect or the system is thus part of security practice. In general, the device then needs to be looked at as an essential non-human actor within a network, as will be explained in the course of this chapter.
So far we have seen that boundaries of the international and national realm blur as (in)securization takes place within a continuum. We have also seen that security agents define risks, crisis or danger through their practices as managers of unease. In order to legitimize their action and establish themselves as professional experts they draw on data and technology. Security devices that managers of unease produce, interact with and use are not simply tools but contain productive power within themselves. In this way devices are essential parts of the (in)securization process that justifies specific action towards an issue framed as a risk or here as a conflict or crisis. This raises the question of what the interaction between the technology and the analyst specifically looks like. This question will be addressed in the following section.
3.2 Science and Technology Studies
Science and technology studies offer a specific approach to the relationship of humans and technology. As seen in the previous chapter devices and data are often used to legitimize practices, in this particular case here to prevent conflict. Science and technology studies scholarship helps to answer questions on how interactions between the analysts and the device or technology specifically look like. This leads to questions about the production of what is considered a ‘fact’ or a ‘reality’ represented by ‘knowledge’. I will now first look at the academic field of STS, identify the meaning of socio-technical devices, then explain the central notion of the actor-network and finally how practices of translation are performed within it. To start with, the core idea of STS is related to truth:
“It seems that the “old,” positivistic image of science, as an abstract, timeless search for infutable facts – ending the pain of uncertainty, the burden of dilemma and choice, separable form “society,” and leading inexorably to technical innovations for the good of all – exhibits an apparently puzzling tendency” (Edge 1994: 18).
This positivistic view assumes that a “scientific truth” build on naturally given facts (Edge 1994: 19). In more objectivist terms this also means that scientific knowledge would have the capacity to represent
25 what the world is like (Knorr-Cetina 1981: 1). The puzzle science and technology studies opens then, questions these views and abilities. Karin Knorr – Cetina explains that “facts are not something we can take for granted or think of as the solid rock upon which knowledge is built” (1981: 3). Referring to the etymology of the world fact deriving from Latin ‘facere’ which means ‘to make’, she explains the constructive character of facts as “that which has been made” (ibid.). Edge explains further that STS scholarship challenges the myths and ideologies that legitimize scientific, educational and legal practices (Edge 1994: 19). Since legal and educational institutions are central to many cultures, specifically to ‘western’ ones, challenging such social institutions can be difficult in and of itself (ibid). As Edge puts it in a somewhat consequential manner: “[…] [P]rophets are not always appreciated in their own countries” (ibid).
Science and technology studies derive from three intellectual lineages: the history, philosophy and sociology of science (Fuller 2007: 1). History of science questioned what the constantly reproduced ‘apparent consensus’ is about, as Thomas Kuhn explains:
“Men whose research is based in shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites for normal science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation of a particular research tradition” (Kuhn 1962: 11).
The question here is not only that of reproduction but also how a scientific paradigm comes into being, according to Kuhn this is related to the practice of research itself (Kuhn 1962: 11). Sociology of science was specifically interested in the relationship between structure and knowledge (Law 1986: 1). John Law explains that this relationship at first seems very simple, when understanding it as one-directional knowledge coming from structure (idem: 3). Instead Law argues that it must be seen as a two directional interaction:
“Structure certainly influences belief but belief in turn acts upon structure, acting to sustain it or, indeed, to change it (Law 1986: 4).
The connection between knowledge and belief is telling. As Law explains, belief is perceived as ideologically influences whereas knowledge is seen as simple rationalization (Law 1986: 10). As seen earlier, in science and technology studies the existence of the latter is questioned, since knowledge is subject to its process of construction and cannot be separated from the individuals and systems involved. Finally, knowledge appears to be similar to belief. But, how does this all this apply to technology? Theodor Adorno22 explains that humanity tends to rely on this understanding of technology as a simple
22 Theodor Adorno is related to Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School. He passed before STS scholarship had
26 tool, but forget that humanity created it, and that it is rather an “extended arm” of humans (1970: 100). Connecting to Adorno’s statement, Sheila Jasanoff reminds us that technology could not exist and be meaningful without humans (Jasanoff 2015: 2). In STS systems and science are not deterministic but subject to change (ibid.). This is embodied in the idea that products of science are always contextually specific constructions, that can only be understood and consequentially analyzed as such (Knorr-Cetina 1981: 5). Knowledge produced is thus always situational (ibid.).
Sheila Jasanoff is setting STS in a broader societal context (Jasanoff 2012). She argues that knowledge production and technology must be located within cultural values of society, the process of which she calls co-production (Jasanoff 2012: 439, emphasis added). Jasanoff emphasizes knowledge and material embodiments of knowledge in STS are constitutive for and at the same time products of social life (2015: 3, emphasis added). What is meant by the socio-technical then goes beyond mutual construction. Socio-technical devices contain expectations of the possibilities of technology for society while being shaped in a political and cultural context themselves (Jasanoff 2015: 5). They are clearly assigned with a political role:
“It is to investigate how, through the imaginative work of varied social actors, science and technology become enmeshed in performing and producing diverse visions of the collective good, at expanding scales of governance from communities to nation- states to the planet“ (Jasanoff 2015: 4).
As we have seen so far STS goes beyond understanding science as a fixed entity. The facts that constitute knowledge are rather seen as fluid than solid since they derive from a production process. Science and Technology Studies in this contexts ask where facts constructed and how science is practiced (Law and Mol 2001: 609). Technology as such must be seen in the context of its own production and its productive capacities. STS goes beyond the notion of purely one sided creation of technology. Here STS divides into two trains of thought, external and internal studies of science. Bruno Latour suggested an internal perception and to study “science in action” (Fuller 2007: 2). This is a special entrance to technological systems, and aims to unravel the content of a technological black box that is invisible to the outside (Latour 1987). Fuller locates Actor Network Theory and specifically Bruno Latour and Michel Callon in the third generation of STS (2007: 2). explaining that their ideas emerged in a time of the ‘postmodern turn’, a time of critical reflection of one’s own cultures (ibid). Actor-Network-Theory adds a specific focus to Science and Technology Studies. Rather than judging about objectivity or subjectivity of a statement, Latour suggests to replace this decision by following the statement in the process of its making (Latour 1987, 103).
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3.3. Actor Networks beyond the laboratory
“But where? Where is science if it is not ‘universal’ that is, everywhere?“ (Law and Mol 2001:610).
The question raised above relates to the misperception of science or knowledge as something solid and stable. As seen in the previous section science is not stable, which raises the questions: Does it mean knowledge is fluid now and how can we study its aggregate state? This thesis links up23 with ANT as a
specific method and approach to understand knowledge production in the field of conflict early warning. Bruno Latour, the founder of ANT explains that even though T stands for theory the term theory is misleading, since it does not aim to describe the causes for social actors’ behavior (1999: 19). For this reason using ANT is not possible, ANT is different in every context (Mol 2010: 261). For the same reason it is useful here. As will be seen throughout the next section, ANT does not try to explain something ‘messy’ and straighten it out, it attends processes in specific spaces. It does not try to explain complicated conflict realities but is useful here in understanding knowledge production for conflict early warning systems as a process and practice in an organization. Linking up with ANT is an attempt to understand when and how relational aspects within the inner organizational network of the ICG become productive. I will now look at what is meant by an actor-network and define core terms, then explain the relationship between objects and space to finally understand where and how the production process takes place in the next part.
As outlined above, ANT does not ask for the origin or cause of a social phenomenon, since it is not a theory. Nor is ANT interested in end products or goals (Mol 2010: 255). It rather looks at the effects and processes within a network (ibid). The first ideas of ANT originate in the works of Bruno Latour and Steve Wolgar’s “Laboratory Life” (1986 [1979]). They conducted research within a laboratory to investigate practices of constructing scientific ‘facts’ through anthropological observations of laboratory routines (idem: 27). Studying routines in this way offers insights about the process of knowledge production itself. In this way ANT leads us to shift the perspective from trying to find the core of reality towards attending, seeing and hearing specific events (Mol 2010: 255). The main contribution of ANT to Latour lies in connecting the micro and macro structures and interactions which transform the understanding of the “social form” from seeing a surface or “province of reality” to a circulation (1999b: 19). Let us look at an example of actor network theory from Latour:
23 Since ANT is not ’applicable’ or ’usable’ linking up is the term suggested by Annemarie Mol (2010: 261). She has studied the disease atheroscleorisis (2002) as well as the Zimbabwe Bush Pump (de Laet and Mol 2000) linking up with ANT in two very different contexts.
28 “[W]e start with a textbook sentence which is devoid of any trace of fabrication, construction or ownership; we then put it in quotation marks, surround it with a bubble, place it in the mouth of someone who speaks; then we add to this speaking character, another character to whom it is speaking; then we place all of them in a specific situation, somewhere in time and space, surrounded by equipment, machines, colleagues; then when the controversy heats up a bit we look at where the disputing people go and what sort of new elements they fetch, recruit or seduce in order to convince their colleagues; then, we see how the people being convinced stop discussing with one another; situations, localisations [sic!], even people start being slowly erased; on the last picture we see a new sentence, without any quotation marks, written in a text book similar to the one we started with in the first picture”(Latour 1987: 15, italics in original).
ANT very broadly speaking, is about space and entities within this space. It specifically concentrates on the movement within space (Latour 1999b: 17). Law adds to the discussion that space through which objects move is not neutral but a “specific kind of space” (Law 2002: 94). This means specifically that an object can be sustained despite a change in space (idem: 95). The circumstances under which an object is shaped or stabilized lie in the relations to the other entities within the network (ibid). Thinking beyond classic notions of the actor-network Law suggests further that “spaces are made with objects” (Law 2002: 96, italics in original).
Let us look at the space and entities in more detail. What Law calls an entity here is what Latour means by actor or actant. The word actant refers to both technological devices and humans within a network. Latour and Wolgar perceive the common difference between technological devices and scientists as irrelevant to analyzing science (Latour and Woolgar 1986 [1979]: 29). Going beyond irrelevance, dissolving the dichotomy of object and subject or technological and human is necessary to understanding scientific practice since they interact and function symmetrically, having both impact on practice itself (Latour 1999a: 180).
Human and non-human actors both contain agency and constitute the network (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987: 11). Within the actor-world this takes places through association of heterogeneous entities (Callon 1986: 24). Association can take various forms. Mol suggests other words as “collaboration, clash, addition, tension, exclusion, inclusion” (2010: 259) to describe various ways of relatedness of entities. A semiotic understanding of relatedness is located within the interaction towards other entities in the network (idem: 257). This means that the actor-world defines identity, roles and nature of association (Callon 1986: 24). In a stable network, where all actors are in the same place, an object remains steady as well (Law 2002: 93). Law elaborates by drawing on the example of Portuguese vessels in a lager network:
29 “Navigators, Arab competitors, winds and currents, crew, stores, guns: if this network holds steady then the vessel doesn’t founder, it doesn’t get seized by pirates and it doesn’t sail on, lost, until the crew are broken by disease and hunger. The vessel is an effect of its relations with other entities, and the job of ANT is to explore the strategies which generate – and are in turn generated by – its object-ness, the syntaxes or the discourses which hold it in place“ (Law 2002: 93).
The definitions of networks and actors are mutually dependent. ANT, as Law explains it, sets spacial limits to understanding both the network and its entities within (Law 2002: 102). Actor and network are still not entirely separate and distinct categories. An actor-world can itself be a network (Callon 1986b:32). An actant can be network in and of itself inhabiting other actants (ibid). To take an example, this means that the ICG as an organization is a network itself but at the same time actor within a big conflict-resolution community. The Nusaybin- report is an actant within the inner network of the ICG and at the same time a network itself composed of other actants such as ideas, writing style, word count, paper, Analyst A and ink. Networks are in this way not studied as singular but in their co-existence (Mol 2010: 260). Actors can participate in multiple networks and negotiate between different versions of ‘reality’ (ibid). In this way networks are not necessarily stable but fluid and subject to change. Both an actor and a network consist in context and in relation towards each other and towards the outside (Callon 1986b: 30).
This also points to one specific form of stabilized knowledge within actor networks: immutable mobiles. In order to justify moves an actor is reliant on “things”(Latour 1986: 7). Inscription changes a thing towards an immutable mobile when fulfilling the properties of “being mobile but also immutable, presentable and combinable” (ibid). Law explains that immutable mobiles are a stable form of objects, that pass through an “array of secure and stable surroundings“ (2002: 93). Coming back to the example of the Portuguese vessel, Law notes that in case the circuit breaks the ship loses its form and changes into a different thing (2002: 93). Immutable mobiles are then those objects or ‘things’ that do not change or break despite moving through fluid networks. In Latour’s example this used to be facilitated through the printing press with the aim for large scale reproduction (1986: 13). Today, this can be new data-bases or scanners (ibid). Latour explains further that immutable mobiles, the steady objects “allow translation without corruption” (idem: 8). Coming back to the systems of early warning at the ICG the visualization of the conflict development in arrows as well as the casualty count can be considered as such immutable mobiles. A red down arrow will not run risk to be read as a positive development by a policy-maker.
