University of Amsterdam
Faculty of Humanities
Research Master
in
Rhetoric, Argumentation Theory and Philosophy
The Objectivist Epistemic Challenge
and the Distinction between
Reasonableness and Effectiveness
By Franziskus-Benjamin Weissbarth
November 2018
Supervisor: Dr. J. H. M. Wagemans Second reader: Dr. B. J. Garssen
I
Table of Content
1 Introduction ... 1
2 Reasonableness and not only Effectiveness: An Overview of the Pragma-Dialectical Approach to Argumentation ... 3
3 Overview of the Criticism by Proponents of Epistemological Approaches to Argumentation .. 7
3.1 Pragma-Dialectics and the Aim of Argumentation: Persuasion and Rhetorical Effectiveness ... 7
3.2 The “Extra Criteria of Reasonableness”... 9
4 Responses to the Epistemological Challenge ... 10
4.1 Overview of the Responses by Botting ... 10
4.2 Overview of the Responses by Garssen and van Laar ... 12
5 Discussion of the Responses to the Epistemological Challenge ... 15
5.1 The Responses by Botting ... 15
5.1.1 Betting on the Long Run: Critical Discussions without “Extra Criteria of Reasonableness” ... 16
5.1.2 Pragma-Dialectics and Rhetoric: Reasonableness or Persuasion and Rhetorical Effectiveness? ... 19
5.2 Discussion of the Responses by Garssen and van Laar ... 21
5.2.1 Fallacies and Handsome Politicians: Reasonableness or Persuasion? ... 21
5.2.2 Fallacies and the Notion of Problem-validity as an “Extra Criterion of Reasonableness” ... 25
5.2.3 The Critical Spirit of the Pragma-Dialectical Approach as an “Extra Criterion of Reasonableness” ... 29
5.2.4 The Charge of Relativism: Persuasion and Nothing Else? ... 32
6 Conclusion ... 34 Bibliography ... II
1
1 Introduction
The pragma-dialectical theory (PD) developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992, 2004) considers argumentation as being part of an implicit or explicit discussion that is aimed at resolving a difference of opinion on the merits by critically testing the acceptability of the standpoint at issue (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 21, 52). Based on this understanding of argumentation, pragma-dialecticians have developed an ideal model of a critical discussion. A core component of this model are the rules for a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 135–157, 190–196). These rules regulate such a discussion by prohibiting argumentative moves that hinder the resolution of a difference of opinion on the merits and which are therefore evaluated as fallacious (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1987, p. 284, 2004, p. 190). PD has been criticised by Lumer (2010, see also 2012) and Siegel and Biro (Biro and Siegel respectively) (1992, 2006, 1997, 2008, see also 2010). The main criticism by said proponents of epistemological approaches is that PD shares an undesirable closeness to rhetoric, persuasion (Siegel & Biro, 1997, p. 282), and unqualified consensualism (Lumer, 2010, p. 43). According to their criticism, since the PD rules only prohibit the use of premises and inferences that are not accepted by the addressee of the argumentation, it follows that a difference of opinion can be resolved in a way that is reasonable from the perspective of PD, while being irrational or unreasonable from an epistemic perspective. As they argue, this can happen because discussants may accept, and rely on, false beliefs and problematic rules of inference and reasoning (Biro & Siegel, 1992, pp. 90–91; Lumer, 2010, pp. 64–65; Siegel & Biro, 1997, p. 282, 2008, pp. 194– 195). In their view, PD must incorporate norms about what is epistemically good in order to be considered as a theory that is not only about persuasion and about rhetorical effectiveness (Biro & Siegel, 2006, p. 5; Lumer, 2010, p. 67; Siegel & Biro, 1997, p. 284).
The criticism by said proponents has been responded to by Garssen and van Laar (2010) and Botting (2010, 2012), who reject the view that PD must prevent discussants from resolving a difference of opinion by means problematic premises. In their discussion of the criticism, Garssen and van Laar (2010, p. 127) have explicitly acknowledged that PD does not have such constraints nor should there be such constraints. In their view, argumentation theorists should not a priori rule out certain premises. Hence, for example, discussants are free to accept premises, such as “the most handsome candidate is the best candidate”, in order to resolve a difference of opinion about for whom they should vote in an election (2010, p. 126). Similarly, Botting’s (2010, 2012) discussion of the criticism concedes that discussants are free to decide which premises or inferences they may find acceptable and therefore discussants are free to commit the gambler’s fallacy (2010, p. 423).
However, it appears that there is problematic tension between the responses by Garssen and van Laar (2010) and Botting (2010, 2012) and the way PD is presented and applied by pragma-dialecticians. The reason for this is that the responses seem to blur the distinction between the soundness of an argument and its rhetorical effectiveness, which is an important distinction from the perspective of PD. In particular, PD is presented as a theory that considers certain argumentative moves as unreasonable, i.e. fallacious, even if these moves may be rhetorically effective, and which defines such ‘derailments of strategic manoeuvring’ as instances in which the pursuit of (rhetorical) effectiveness is achieved at the expense of reasonableness (van Eemeren, 2010, pp. 39–43). The tension between the responses and the way PD is presented is that it is unclear whether the responses have defended PD as a theory that is able to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable argumentative moves and evaluate them accordingly. The responses thus raise the question whether they can be regarded as an adequate defence of PD as such a theory. In order to answer this question, this thesis is going to examine whether the presentation of PD as a theory that is claimed to be able to distinguish instances in which the pursuit of effectiveness has been achieved at the expense of reasonableness, can be regarded as warranted, if we would accept the responses by Garssen and van Laar (2010) and Botting (2010, 2012). This will be mainly investigated by asking whether argumentative moves that are regarded as unreasonable from the perspective of PD, can be considered as unreasonable in light of how PD has been defended by said responses, that is, whether these moves can be regarded as unreasonable if PD rejects the adoption of norms about what is epistemically good.
By approaching the responses against the criticism by proponents of epistemological approaches in this way, this thesis is aimed at discussing to what extent their criticism can be considered as a challenge to the claimed ability of PD to distinguish between reasonableness and (rhetorical) effectiveness. This thesis will be concerned with the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable argumentative moves and therefore the criticism that has been directed against critical rationalism, as the philosophical basis of PD, is not immediately relevant for present purposes. However, this thesis will nonetheless discuss specific parts of the response by Garssen and van Laar (2010) against said criticism. The reason for this is that Garssen and van Laar (2010) have outlined the advantages of PD in their discussion of said criticism, which means that certain parts of this discussion are relevant for present purposes and need to be duly taken into account. This thesis will be structured as follows. First, this thesis will provide an overview of PD that focuses on the standard of reasonableness underlying the pragma-dialectical approach and how the notion of strategic manoeuvring and derailments thereof can be regarded as a central element of PD (§ 2). Next, this thesis is going to provide an outline of the points of criticism against PD that challenge PD’s ability to distinguish adequately between reasonable and unreasonable arguments (§ 3). This chapter will distinguish between the criticism that claims that there is no
substantive difference between PD and persuasion (§ 3.1), and the criticism that asserts that PD needs to specify certain criteria in an epistemically adequate way to avoid the slide into persuasion (§ 3.2). Further, this thesis will provide an overview of the main arguments by Botting (2010, 2012) and Garssen and van Laar (2010) (§ 4.1 and § 4.2 respectively). Finally, the adequacy of the defences by Botting (2010, 2012) and Garssen and van Laar (2010) will be investigated by comparing the responses, the criticism, and the way PD is presented and applied (§ 5).
Each response will be examined separately. The adequacy of Botting’s (2010, 2012) response(s) (§ 5.1) will be investigated by examining whether PD is able to evaluate unreasonable argumentative moves in light of how he has defended PD (§ 5.1.1); and whether the response distances PD from rhetoric in a way that ensures that the criticism by pragma-dialecticians against rhetoric cannot be applied to PD. The adequacy of Garssen and van Laar’s (2010) response (§ 5.2) will be investigated by determining whether their response challenges PD’s claimed ability to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable argumentative moves (§ 5.2.1); and whether the response provides criteria the that allows PD to make this distinction (§ 5.2.2). Further, it will be discussed to what extent the claimed advantages of PD distance PD from rhetoric (§ 5.2.3), which will then be finally determined by taking into account the discussion of their response (§ 5.2.4).
2 Reasonableness and not only Effectiveness: An Overview of the
Pragma-Dialectical Approach to Argumentation
Pragma-dialecticians emphasise that the study of argumentation should provide an adequate understanding of argumentative discourse by specifying which modes of arguing are acceptable to a rational judge in view of a certain philosophical conception of reasonableness (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 7). In PD, the philosophical conception of reasonableness is strongly influenced by critical rationalism (CR), which constitutes the philosophical basis underlying PD (van Eemeren, 2015d, p. 225, 2015a, p. 89, van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 7, 1995, p. 128, 2004, pp. 17, 131–132, 2015b, p. 212; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015a, p. 246; Garssen & van Laar, 2010, p. 124). The significance of CR for PD can be seen by taking into account that PD stresses the importance of philosophical reflection to theory-formation by arguing that argumentation theory should be practised from a perspective that is philosophically justifiable (van Eemeren, 2015a, p. 85; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 13). By taking CR as their point of departure, pragma-dialecticians have adopted a critical-rationalistic view of reasonableness, which they regard as an extended version of the Popperian critical perspective (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 17).
Based on their adopted philosophical conception of reasonableness, they have developed an ideal model of argumentation. This model is aimed at giving shape to the adopted philosophical perspective by explicating what it means for a rational judge to judge reasonably and which thus
plays an instrumental role in linking abstract philosophy with actual reality (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 18–22). In order to do so, each argumentation is regarded as a critical testing process of the standpoint at issue that is aimed at resolving a difference of opinion the merits (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 21, 52). The ideal model thus specifies the four different stages through which the discussion has to go through and indicates the rules that must be followed in order to lead to such a resolution (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 18–22). The four discussion stages, namely the confrontation stage (explication of the difference of opinion), the opening stage (determining which procedural and material starting points are acceptable to the discussants), the argumentation stage (advancement of the arguments in defence of the standpoint), and the concluding stage (establishment of the result of the difference of opinion) need not always be explicitly passed through. But in order to achieve a resolution of a difference of opinion, each stage of the resolution process must be properly dealt with, whether explicitly or implicitly (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 59–62). To accomplish this, pragma-dialecticians have developed rules for a critical discussion. These rules (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 135–157, 190–196) are an essential element of the PD model because each rule is viewed as necessary in order to prevent argumentative moves that pose a potential threat to the resolution of a difference of opinion. All violations of the PD rules are consequently regarded as incorrect discussion moves that hinder such a resolution and which are therefore considered fallacious (van Eemeren, 2015d, p. 228, 2015e, p. 45, 2015c, p. 130, van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1987, p. 284, 2004, p. 190, 2015a, p. 558; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015d, pp. 168–169). It is claimed that the rules derive their problem-validity from the fact that they do not allow any fallacies (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 22), i.e. the rules are claimed to be fallacy-proof (van Eemeren, 2015e, p. 34, 2015a, p. 94; van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 25).
By considering fallacies as argumentative moves that violate the rules for a critical discussion, the term fallacy is in PD systematically connected with the rules for a critical discussion (van Eemeren, 2001, pp. 157–158, 2015b, p. 586; van Eemeren & Garssen, 2015, p. 282; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1987, p. 284, 2015a, p. 558). Since these incorrect discussion moves roughly correspond to the argumentative flaws traditionally known as “fallacies” (van Eemeren, 2015a, p. 94; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 22), it is claimed that PD provides a common rationale for the study of the fallacies as argumentative moves that are unreasonable from a critical perspective (van Eemeren, 2015d, p. 228, van 2015b, pp. 584–585; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2015a, p. 558; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015b, p. 407).
It is important to notice here that the PD rules for a critical discussion are not a set of instructions simply to be followed, that is, they are not meant to be applied “algorithmically”. Instead, they are better characterised as “heuristic” and how the rules are to be viewed depends on critical rationalist insights (van Eemeren, 2015a, p. 103). We can thus draw the conclusion that the critical
rationalist conception of reasonableness is of central importance in order to interpret and apply PD. This seems to be in particular important in light of the fact that a critical discussion should not be regarded as being aimed at maximizing agreement but as being intended to test standpoints as critically as possible (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 188; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015d, p. 166). By adopting a critical rationalist perspective, it is claimed that the concept of systematic critical scrutiny and testing is taken as the guiding principle of problem-solving (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 32; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, p. 16, 2004, p. 131, 2015b, p. 212). In order to capture the insight that arguers are not only interested in resolving a difference of opinion in a reasonable way but may also try to get their standpoint accepted (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 39), pragma-dialecticians have further developed their theory by introducing the notion of strategic manoeuvring. From a pragma-dialectical perspective, in principle, all argumentative moves are aimed at serving two aims simultaneously, namely being reasonable and being rhetorically effective. The notion of strategic manoeuvring describes this balancing between reasonableness and effectiveness in argumentation (van Eemeren, 2010, pp. 39–40, 2015e, p. 45; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015c, p. 361).
While it is well recognized that arguments can be effective because they are reasonable and thus reasonableness and effectiveness must not be regarded as mutually exclusive (van Eemeren, 2015c, p. 137), – arguments can be very effective because they are considered reasonable – pragma-dialecticians insist that there is a fundamental difference between reasonableness and effectiveness. The reason for this distinction is that sound, i.e. reasonable, argumentation will not always be convincing due to other, for example, more psychologically tinted factors (van Eemeren, Garssen, & Meuffels, 2009, pp. 32–33). That PD distinguishes between reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness may even become more clear if we take into account the criticism by pragma- dialecticians (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 129–130, 2015b, p. 209) against Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969). In their criticism, they have argued that considering argumentation to be sound if it succeeds to convince the target audience, means that soundness is equated with effectiveness. The soundness of arguments is thus made dependent on the criteria of an arbitrary judge (the audience addressed) because argumentation, which is sound in one case, need not be so in another. This means, according to the criticism, that an extremely relative standard of reasonableness is chosen. In principle, if reasonableness is equated with effectiveness, there could be just as many standards of reasonableness as there are judges at a given point in time.
Furthermore, it has been argued that reasonableness does not depend in the first place on what people think is reasonable. PD thus rejects a purely intersubjective conception of reasonableness, to which, according to the criticism, most rhetoricians adhere to, although in different forms. Nonetheless, from the perspective of PD, there is not solely an external dimension to
argumentation (van Eemeren, 2015d, p. 224). This can clearly be seen by taking into account that it is not enough from the perspective of PD that the justificatory or refutatory force of arguments is in accordance with problem-valid testing procedures. Instead, PD is claimed to be a theory of using arguments to convince others by making an appeal to the other party’s reasonableness, which requires that the problem-validity of the arguments must also be intersubjectively accepted by those who need to be convinced (van Eemeren, 2012, p. 452, 2015f, pp. 194–195, 2015d, p. 224; van Eemeren et al., 2014, pp. 597–598; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 38). Hence, we can say that PD can be regarded as being aimed at taking into account that reasonableness and effectiveness are not the same and that both dimensions are important in order to study argumentation.
The notion of strategic manoeuvring does not only take into account that arguers are, in principle, always pursuing two aims simultaneously. It also captures that the aim of resolving a difference of opinion on the merits is sometimes overruled by the aim of persuading the opponent (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015c, p. 361). In the pragma-dialectical view, if arguers fail to or intentionally do not keep the appropriate balance between reasonableness and effectiveness and their pursuit of effectiveness is achieved at the expense of reasonableness, then their strategic manoeuvring is regarded as derailed (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 41). Such arguments are considered as fallacious because they do not comply with the rules for a critical discussion, which means that the aim of being effective is constrained by the PD rules for a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015a, p. 250). According to the notion of strategic manoeuvring, all derailments of strategic manoeuvring are regarded as fallacious, and all fallacies can be considered as derailments of strategic manoeuvring that violate the rules for a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015c, p. 361). Hence, we can conclude that the notion of strategic manoeuvring is aimed at extending PD by taking into account rhetorical insights without changing the understanding that the pursuit of reasonableness and effectiveness are two dimensions that should not be conflated.
This chapter has shown that PD is claimed to give shape to the critical rationalist conception of reasonableness by developing an ideal model that incorporates said standard of reasonableness and according to which, argumentative moves that hinder the resolution of a difference of opinion are regarded as unreasonable and thus fallacious. We have further seen that PD takes into account that arguers are not always interested in resolving a difference of opinion in a reasonable way but in getting their standpoint accepted. Pursuing these two aims simultaneously leads to a constant balancing between reasonableness and effectiveness that can result in derailments of strategic manoeuvring that are regarded as fallacious. However, many of the points mentioned here have been criticised by the proponents of epistemological approaches to argumentation. The aim of the
following chapter is to provide an overview of their main points of criticism in order to understand what they regard to be the problem with PD.
3 Overview of the Criticism by Proponents of Epistemological Approaches
to Argumentation
The major criticism by Lumer (2010, 2012) and Siegel and Biro (Biro and Siegel respectively) (2006; 1997, 2008, 2010) is that PD does not evaluate arguments regarding the right criteria. In their view, the task of argumentation theory is to provide standards that help us to distinguish good from bad arguments based on whether the arguments provide good reasons for accepting the standpoint at issue (Biro & Siegel, 1992, pp. 90–91, 2006, p. 7; Siegel & Biro, 2010, p. 474). To achieve this, it is not regarded as sufficient to study only the activity of argumentation. Instead, it is also necessary to understand the objects with which the activity concerns itself (Biro & Siegel, 2006, p. 2; Siegel & Biro, 2010, p. 467). Viewed from this perspective, they regard PD as normatively deficient – by which they mean epistemically deficient – because they consider the PD rules for a critical discussion as insufficient to prevent discussants from resolving a difference of opinion by means of epistemically problematic arguments (§ 3.1). As it is acknowledged by the critics, this ‘rhetorical’ interpretation of PD can be considered as uncharitable because PD contains certain additional criteria of reasonableness that would, as Siegel and Biro (1997, p. 283) put it, ‘avoid the slide into rhetoric’. Since these identified additional criteria are regarded as not adequately developed or ambiguous, it is nonetheless maintained that PD is normatively deficient (§ 3.2). The two main points of criticism against PD just mentioned are thus closely connected but will be presented separately.
3.1 Pragma-Dialectics and the Aim of Argumentation: Persuasion and Rhetorical Effectiveness
The main objection against the PD rules for a critical discussion is that these rules are only aimed at ensuring that a difference of opinion can be resolved without paying any attention to the resolution itself (Biro & Siegel, 2006, p. 6; Siegel & Biro, 2008, p. 194). This is regarded as problematic for two reasons.
Firstly, it is criticised that PD conceives argumentation as an interactional procedure that is aimed at resolving a difference of opinion and that is regulated by the PD rules by means of prohibiting only argumentative moves that hinder or frustrate the achievement of this aim. This is regarded as undesirable because disputes can be resolved in an epistemically rational way and in an epistemically irrational way (Biro & Siegel, 2006, p. 7; Siegel & Biro, 1997, p. 285, 2008, p. 194, 2010, p. 458). As it is argued, this means that a resolution of a difference of opinion depends on
nothing more than reaching agreement, i.e. being persuaded (Biro & Siegel, 2006, pp. 3, 7), and about reaching unqualified consensus (Lumer, 2010, p. 45).
The main reason for this criticism is that PD puts no constraints on the inferences and premises that may be employed by discussants. This makes it possible that a difference of opinion can be resolved in a way that is irrational or unreasonable from an epistemic perspective but nonetheless reasonable from the perspective of PD (Biro & Siegel, 1992, pp. 90–91, 2006, p. 7, Lumer, 2010, pp. 45–46, 64–65, 2012, p. 52, Siegel & Biro, 1997, pp. 282, 285, 2008, pp. 194–195, 2010, pp. 458–459, 474). Since such resolutions are possible, it is criticised that the notion of dialectical reasonableness is insufficient to establish particular resolutions as reasonable in any serious sense (Biro & Siegel, 2006, p. 7; Siegel & Biro, 2008, p. 194). Similarly, Lumer (2010, p. 45) argues that the old criticism against rhetoric applies to PD because aiming at unqualified consensus may lead to disastrous decisions and more disorientation about the world. This line of criticism has been has been illustrated by the “handsomeness example”, the “gambler’s fallacy example” (Biro & Siegel, 1992, pp. 90–91), and further examples that concern two voters who resolve a difference of opinion about for whom they should vote in an election based on their racist prejudices (Biro & Siegel, 2006, p. 7; Siegel & Biro, 2008, p. 194). These examples all have in common that they are regarded as not violating the PD rules for a critical discussion if the reasonableness of an argument is only a matter of agreement between the discussants.
Secondly, it is criticised that fallacies are determined based on their tendency to frustrate or hinder the resolution of a difference of opinion, i.e. based on whether the argumentative moves are acceptable to the particular antagonist(s) in question, and not based on their epistemic qualities or lack thereof. This is regarded as undesirable because on this understanding an argument can be fallacious according to PD, even if there is nothing wrong with the argument in question in the sense that the reasons offered warrant the conclusion (Siegel & Biro, 1997, pp. 284–285). This structural asymmetry of the PD rules that makes the antagonist the final arbiter of what is considered reasonable and what is not has also been addressed by Lumer (2010). As he points out, the rules for a critical discussion are designed in a way that ultimately leads to a dictatorship of the ignorant or the uninformed because if the protagonist fails to defend a standpoint by means of arguments that are acceptable to the particular antagonist, then the standpoint must be retracted (2010, p. 47). In other words, it is criticised that the protagonist must retract a standpoint even if the failure to defend that standpoint is a consequence of the antagonist(s) ignorance on the issue under discussion.
In summary, it seems that the criticism basically asserts that the problem with PD is that there is no substantial difference between PD and rhetoric or persuasion. On this reading of PD, argumentation is considered as sound if it succeeds to convince the audience to which the argument is addressed to, i.e. the antagonist(s) in question (first problem), and regarded as
unsound and thus fallacious if it is considered unpersuasive by the target audience (second problem). The criticism can thus be understood as claiming that PD equates the soundness of an argument with its effectiveness if the PD rules are only aimed at ensuring that a difference of opinion can be resolved.
3.2 The “Extra Criteria of Reasonableness”
As indicated above, the criticism outlined in § 3.1, according to which PD is only about persuasion and rhetorical effectiveness, presupposes that certain additional criteria of reasonableness are not adequately developed. In particular, Biro and Siegel (Siegel and Biro respectively) have admitted that their ‘rhetorical’ interpretation of PD would not be warranted without their criticism against the identified additional criteria of reasonableness (Biro & Siegel, 2006, p. 7; Siegel & Biro, 1997, p. 283). This means that the criticism presented can be characterized as deliberately ignoring that, for example, pragma-dialecticians have argued that a difference of opinion should be resolved by modes of arguing that are acceptable to a rational judge in view of a certain philosophical conception of reasonableness (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 7).
Such an “extra criterion of reasonableness” is claimed to avoid the slide into rhetoric because not any argumentative move will be acceptable to a rational judge (Siegel & Biro, 1997, p. 283). However, the “extra criterion of reasonableness” is criticised for being completely without content. According to the criticism, it only states that argumentative moves are reasonable if they are deemed reasonable by a rational judge and PD offers no criteria based on which it can be determined whether a judge is rational. This means, in their view, that it is completely unclear what makes such a judge rational. Thus, it is argued that without specifying what the “extra criterion of reasonableness” amounts to, PD has not articulated an additional criterion of reasonableness and without articulating such an “extra criterion of reasonableness”, PD cannot avoid the slide in rhetoric (1997, p. 283).
Additional criteria, such as “in accordance with a critical philosophy of reasonableness” and “reasonably weigh up the arguments for and against the standpoints at issue” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 50), are also regarded as inadequate. As it is argued, these criteria are not adequately specified and even ambiguous because it is not regarded as clear whether these criteria should be interpreted in an epistemic or in a dispute resolution sense (Biro & Siegel, 2006, p. 5). The same issue has also been addressed by Lumer (2010). As he points out, the constraint that argumentative moves must be in accordance with ‘problem-valid’ procedures could be regarded as an additional requirement if the notion of ‘problem-validity’ were adequately defined. In his view, interpreting the notion of ‘problem-validity’ as an additional requirement is, however, questionable because the “problem” is equated with a difference of opinion, which challenges the idea that the notion of “problem-validity” can be seen as an extra criterion of reasonableness
(2010, p. 49). Hence, the criticism ignores the strong claims of rationality of PD because they are regarded as inadequately developed. Further, the many elements of epistemic rationality found in PD are regarded as ambiguous in the sense that they can be interpreted in a consensualistic or epistemological way, which has been in particular criticised by Lumer (2010, pp. 49–50).
The possibility that some of the “extra criteria of reasonableness” can be interpreted in a dispute resolution or an epistemic sense is regarded as problematic. It is argued that the commitment to dispute resolution and reasonableness – understood in an epistemic sense – creates a problem for PD. According to the criticism, dispute resolution and epistemic legitimacy sometimes pull in opposite directions. Without a clear commitment to epistemic normativity, there is no way of ranking these conflicting criteria (Siegel & Biro, 1997, p. 284). Further, it is argued that if the goal of argumentation is dispute resolution and nothing else, then it would not matter how such a resolution is accomplished, and the discussion by pragma-dialecticians of critical rationality and reasonableness is idle. If, however, argumentation is not only about dispute resolution, then, in order to take the talk about critical rationality and reasonableness seriously, it must be specified what it amounts to (Biro & Siegel, 2006, p. 7). In the latter case, it is argued, if the “external” criteria of reasonableness are genuinely independent of rhetorical considerations concerning persuasiveness and dispute resolution (Siegel & Biro, 1997, p. 284), that PD is committed to some sort of epistemic approach (Biro & Siegel, 2006, p. 5; Siegel & Biro, 1997, p. 284). In their view, such a commitment is necessary in order to be able to say something about the evaluation of arguments, i.e. in order to distinguish good arguments from bad arguments (Siegel & Biro, 2010, p. 458). As Lumer (2010, pp. 64–65) has argued, PD has no means for externally criticising a defence of a standpoint against an antagonist because the acceptability of premises is only a matter of consensus between discussants.
In summary, the identified “extra criteria of reasonableness” are regarded as not adequately developed and ambiguous. It is considered unclear whether they should be understood in a dispute resolution or an epistemic sense. If they should be interpreted in a dispute resolution sense, they are regarded as inadequate because disputes can be resolved in an epistemically rational or irrational way, which was, in particular, Lumer’s (2010, p. 49) objection against the notion of ‘problem-validity’. The criticism thus claims that PD is either only about persuasion and nothing else or committed to some sort of epistemic approach, which is regarded as in particular important in order to be able to distinguish ‘good’ from ‘bad’ arguments and to evaluate them accordingly.
4 Responses to the Epistemological Challenge
4.1 Overview of the Responses by Botting
The defence of PD by Botting (2010, 2012) is aimed at showing that PD is not epistemically deficient because PD does not incorporate norms about what is epistemically good and
consequently does not prevent discussants from resolving a difference of opinion by means of problematic premises or inferences. As Botting argues, standpoints that have the unqualified consensus of all discussants can be assumed to be epistemically sound (2010, p. 414), or at least, that it can be considered as a default that an unqualified consensus is likely to be epistemically sound (2010, p. 433). He concludes that the PD concept of reasonableness is an epistemic norm, or more precisely that the PD rules for a critical discussion must be considered as being truth-conducive (2010, pp. 414, 433).
In order to defend what he calls the normative claim, according to which “standpoints that have the unqualified consensus of all participants in the dispute will generally be epistemically sound” (2010, p. 414), two lines of arguments are presented that together establish said claim. As the short description of Botting’s (2010, 2012) defence suggests, in his view, PD is not, as the criticism claims (§ 3.2), ambiguous. Since, as it has been explained, the ‘rhetorical’ interpretation of PD would not be warranted without the criticism that claims that the “extra criteria of reasonableness” are ambiguous and not adequately specified (§ 3.2), the first line of defence consequently engages with this criticism. This is not done by explaining that, for example, the notion of a rational judge is defined in a way, based on which it is possible to distinguish ‘good’ from ‘bad’ arguments. Instead, according to the first line of defence, it is argued that it must be considered as a presupposition of a critical discussion that discussants have a reasonable or critical attitude because arguing in order to win a discussion by any means necessary cannot be regarded as arguing by definition. The reason for this is that the presupposition of reasonableness is embedded in the felicity conditions for a speech act complex of argumentation. Thus, one cannot argue and observe the felicity conditions if one does not have a reasonable attitude (2010, p. 417, see also 2012, pp. 269–270). This attitude of reasonableness, as he argues, must be understood as being more than rationality because it requires “a considered use of the mind” (2010, p. 423). This understanding is in line with what pragma-dialecticians have argued. According to PD, rationality is only considered as a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition of reasonableness (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 124–125, 2015b, p. 204). As they claim, being reasonable is understood as using rationality in an appropriate or considered way (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 29; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 124, 2015b, pp. 205–207). Botting thus draws the conclusion that there is indeed an epistemic norm involved in the PD understanding of argumentation because, as he asks rhetorically, “what is epistemology if not the study of how to use reason in an appropriate way?” (2012, p. 269).
The first line of defence can thus be regarded as dealing with certain points of the criticism outlined in § 3.2 in the sense that PD is not regarded as ambiguous. Moreover, the need to specify certain criteria seems to be unnecessary from the perspective of the first line of defence because reasonable arguers will, in order to argue well, only give arguments that they believe to be
epistemically sound (2012, p. 270). According to the second line of defence, it is then argued that it can be assumed that the accumulated wisdom of past critical discussions, which, as Botting admits, is not built into the PD rules of a critical discussion in the sense that PD does not import substantive norms about what is epistemically or logically good (2012, p. 271), must be considered as being among the starting points of discussants (2012, p. 284). The reason for this is that each critical discussion, which is based on a consensus regarding the premises and inferences that may be used by discussants and ends with consensus regarding the acceptability of the standpoint (2010, p. 416), starts with the accumulated wisdom of past experience and not with a fresh slate (2010, p. 428). As he explains, there is a continuity between one argumentation and the next that ensures that inferences and propositions that may be taken for granted in one discussion have been critically tested in another discussion. It is, therefore, wrong to assume that discussants will rely on inferences and propositions that “drop out of the sky” (2010, p. 431). Further, even if a difference of opinion may get resolved by means of false premises or inferences, this is not regarded as problematic. As he argues, critical discussions that are in accordance with the PD rules provide a self-correcting mechanism that eliminates inference rules that are epistemically bad when used iteratively (2012, pp. 279, 283). Consequently, the possibility that there are cases in which discussants are using false premises or inferences, i.e. fallacious arguments, is insufficient to establish that the PD rules are epistemically non-normative because, in order to be epistemically non-normative, it must be shown that they do not converge to the truth on repeated application (2012, p. 277).
In summary, Botting (2010, 2012) argues that it is not the case that PD is not epistemically deficient. As we have seen, this is mainly based on the claim that having a critical and reasonable attitude is considered as a presupposition for conducting a critical discussion. This attitude of discussants ensures that they will use only arguments they consider epistemically good and that a critical discussion provides a self-correcting mechanism that eliminates epistemically bad premises and inferences when used iteratively. Consequently, by endorsing this line of defence, pragma-dialecticians have argued that if the notion of problem-validity is properly understood, arguers will not adopt problematic inferences or propositions as starting points, if there are better alternatives available. Instead, arguers who want to resolve a difference of opinion on the merits would use the best material and procedural starting points they have access to (van Eemeren, 2012, p. 453, 2015f, pp. 195–196; van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 599). This captures the basic idea of the defence by Botting quite well.
4.2 Overview of the Responses by Garssen and van Laar
The response by Garssen and van Laar (2010) is divided into two parts. The first part is aimed at showing that PD is not normatively deficient. The second part is dealing with the objections
against PD and its critical rationalist basis. As it has been explained, this criticism will not be dealt with in this paper and has therefore not been presented. Nonetheless, since Garssen and van Laar (2010) have made certain remarks that appear to be relevant for present purposes, this overview will include parts of their responses addressed to the criticism against CR as PD’s philosophical basis.
The first part of Garssen and van Laar’s (2010) response discusses the “handsomeness example” and very briefly the “gambler’s fallacy example”. These examples, as we have seen, have been proposed in order to illustrate the criticism against PD, according to which a resolution of a difference of opinion can be resolved in an irrational way without violating the PD rules for a critical discussion (first problem § 3.1). This criticism is, as we have seen, not only the basis for the claim that PD is normatively deficient but it has also been claimed that PD must be committed to some sort of epistemic approach in order to be regarded as a theory that is not only about persuasion and rhetorical effectiveness (§ 3.2). Consequently, in their discussion of the criticism that PD is normatively deficient, Garssen and van Laar (2010) engage with this criticism as well. Confronted with the “handsomeness example”, Garssen and van Laar concede that discussants are free to accept premises, such as “the most handsome candidate is the best candidate” in order to resolve their difference of opinion (2010, p. 126). As they explain, it is not the case that a normative argumentation theory should prevent discussants from agreeing on principles that can be called absurd, nor does it follow that PD is normatively deficient, i.e. relativistic. The reason for the former is that argumentation theorists should not a priori rule out certain premises because matters may be contentious. Since argumentation is most pertinent in situations in which there are no clear criteria for deciding what is true, and since PD wants to be able to evaluate arguments in such situations, there are, therefore, good reasons to leave it up to discussants to decide which starting points are acceptable (2010, p. 127). Furthermore, as they point out later, from a dialectical perspective, the notions “known truth” and “justified belief” need further clarification because it is unclear who is to decide that a certain statement is a “known truth” or a “justified belief” if matters are contentious (2010, p. 129). In addition, Garssen and van Laar (2010, p. 138) explain that PD differs from Popper’s philosophy of science, which is motivated by the quest for truth, because the goal of a critical discussion as defined in PD is not whether a standpoint is acceptable “as such”. Instead, the aim of a critical discussion in the PD sense is merely aimed at determining whether a particular standpoint is defensible against a particular antagonist with particular starting points (2010, p. 138).
Regarding the criticism that PD is normatively deficient, i.e. relativistic, if PD does not prevent discussants from agreeing on principles that can be called absurd, the following is argued. As long as the freedom of adopting starting points is regulated by the general norms of a critical discussion, PD should not be regarded as genuinely relativistic. Their reason for this is that the general norms
of a critical discussion incorporate the ideal of a critical discussion that is applicable to argumentation in all settings and therefore universal. As they claim, only making these general norms dependent upon audiences would make PD genuinely relativistic (2010, p. 127).
Concerning the criticism that arguers are free to employ problematic inferences, as illustrated by the “gambler’s fallacy example”, it is argued that logical schemes or argument schemes must be valid because if arguers adopt argument schemes or logical schemes that lack problem-validity, then the outcome of a critical discussion may just be a pseudo-resolution. As they explain, in order to be problem-valid, it is required that the adoption of the logical or the argument scheme is instrumental for the resolution of the difference of opinion (2010, pp. 127–128). What this amounts to is illustrated by way of example.
The example taken is the so-called pragmatic argumentation scheme, according to which a protagonist establishes that a certain action should be carried out by arguing that the action has certain consequences and that these consequences are desirable. In their view, a problem-valid argument scheme enables the discussants to offer arguments that promote criticism in line with the points of departure adopted by the parties. Hence, the scheme is not problem-valid because it is objectively the case that practical issues should be decided by weighing the utilities of a course of action, but because it allows discussants to critically assess the standpoint in question from their perspective. They conclude that the notion of problem-validity is formulated entirely in terms of critical testing and that therefore the use of argumentation or logical schemes is not a question of agreement between the discussants. This means that argumentation and inference schemes are not assessed based on their epistemic soundness but based on the degree to which the scheme promotes criticism (2010, pp. 128–129).
By arguing that the ideal of a critical discussion is universal and that there are good reasons – such as the contentiousness of the issue in question, the lack of clear criteria in order to decide what is true etc. – the first part of the response can be regarded as having explained why PD should not be considered as normatively deficient and why the adoption of an epistemic approach is viewed as problematic. The second part of the response engages with the criticism against PD’s critical rationalist basis. By doing so, Garssen and van Laar (2010) also outline the advantages of PD in terms of critical testing. These remarks are relevant for present purposes and will be taken into account here because it has been argued by pragma-dialecticians that the systematic testing of standpoints in accordance with a critical philosophy of reasonableness distinguishes PD from rhetorical approaches (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 50).
In order to stress the advantages of a critical approach over justificationism, Garssen and van Laar (2010) explain the advantages of the critical perspective underlying PD. According to Garssen and van Laar (2010, p. 130), the PD model of critical discussion can be understood as a proposal
that promotes criticism in a way indicated by Bartley (1984). He argues that we should, in order to counteract and eliminate as much intellectual error as possible, expose our beliefs, conjectures, policies etc. to maximum criticism, independently of whether they can be justified (Bartley, 1984, p. 113). The reason for the claim that PD should be understood as such a proposal is that dialectic, as understood by PD, is the study of conversational norms that promote criticism. Doing so, as Garssen and van Laar (2010) point out, takes fallibilism more seriously than justificationism because it incorporates the central idea of the critical approach, according to which opinions and theories should be systematically and critically tested (2010, p. 132). In their view, argumentation should be regarded as a by-product of the primary process of weeding out intellectual errors and not as a device with which to guarantee a position in a secure enough foundation (2010, p. 137). As they explain, this understanding is in line with Bartley’s (1984) distinction between justificational philosophies of criticism and non-justificational philosophies of criticism. He argues that in the former, criticism is considered the same as a demand for justification, and in the latter, the one PD endorses, criticism is aimed at eliminating errors (Bartley, 1984, pp. 116–117). In summary, Garssen and van Laar (2010) have defended the claim that PD is not normatively deficient by arguing that a normative theory does not need to prevent discussants from agreeing on absurd principles as long as the freedom to do so is regulated by the general norms for a critical discussion. Moreover, it was argued that there are good reasons to leave the adoption of premises to the discussants because it was claimed that it is unclear who is to decide that a particular statement is a “known truth” or a “justified belief” if matters are contentious. They have further clarified that the adoption of logical schemes or argumentation schemes is not a matter of mere agreement between discussants because such schemes must be ‘problem-valid’. As they have explained, this means that such schemes must promote criticism. The importance of criticism was also visible in their discussion of the second part of their response, in which they have stressed the importance of critical testing and the elimination of intellectual errors.
5 Discussion of the Responses to the Epistemological Challenge
5.1 The Responses by Botting
This chapter will be divided into two parts in order to investigate whether Botting’s (2010, 2012) line of defence can be regarded as an adequate defence of the way pragma-dialecticians present and apply their theory. In the first part, this chapter is going to briefly discuss potential problems with Botting’s (2010, 2012) defence and whether aiming at unqualified consensus can be regarded as being desirable from the perspective of how PD is presented and applied, which will be done by way of example. In the second part of this chapter, it will be investigated whether Botting’s (2010, 2012) response distances PD from persuasion and rhetorical effectiveness or whether the
criticism against rhetoric by pragma-dialecticians is also applicable to PD if we would accept Botting’s (2010, 2012) defence.
5.1.1 Betting on the Long Run: Critical Discussions without “Extra Criteria of Reasonableness”
As we have seen, according to Botting (2010, 2012), a critical discussion that is in accordance with the PD rules provides a self-correcting mechanism that eliminates inference rules that are epistemically bad when used iteratively. This assumption has defended by arguing that it must be considered as a presupposition of a critical discussion that discussants have a reasonable or critical attitude and that reasonableness, since it requires the use of one’s rational faculties in an appropriate way, is an epistemic norm. Botting’s line of defence thus rests entirely on the assumption that arguers have a reasonable or critical attitude and that this attitude ensures that arguers are making epistemically sound arguments.
Defending PD in such way is, of course, a possible way of arguing that the “extra criteria of reasonableness”, contrary to the criticism by proponents of epistemological approaches (§ 3.2), do not need to be defined in a way that allows us to distinguish between argumentative moves that would be acceptable to a rational judge and argumentative moves that are not acceptable to such a judge. The problem with this line of defence is, however, that PD is presented by pragma-dialecticians in a way that indicates that PD distinguishes between the soundness of an argument and its acceptability. In particular, pragma-dialecticians claim that arguers are not always influenced by critical considerations of a purely rational nature, but also by psychological factors (biases, prejudices etc.) that negatively affect their ability to judge arguments critically and rationally (van Eemeren et al., 2009, p. 213). Making such a distinction between critical considerations of a purely rational nature and consideration that cannot be regarded as being purely rational, already presupposes that there is a distinction between what arguers may find acceptable and what is reasonable. After all, biased and prejudiced arguers may accept arguments that appeal to their biases and prejudices, and they may resolve a difference of opinion in accordance with the PD rules based on considerations that are not of a purely rational nature. As we have seen, this was exactly the criticism by proponents of epistemological approaches against PD, according to which the PD rules are insufficient to ensure that a difference of opinion can be resolved in a reasonable way (first problem § 3.1). Only that this time pragma-dialecticians seem to agree with proponents of epistemological approaches that there is a distinction between reasonableness and acceptability. They even seem to agree on how this distinction should be made because the considerations that are regarded by pragma-dialecticians as being not of purely rational nature (biases, prejudices etc.) are also viewed as unreasonable by proponents of epistemological approaches. As we have seen, this is well illustrated by the example of the two
voters who resolve a difference of opinion about for whom they should vote in an election based on their racist prejudices.
Furthermore, pragma-dialecticians argue that if arguers fail to or intentionally do not keep the balance between critical standards of reasonableness and (rhetorical) effectiveness, then such cases are considered as derailments of strategic manoeuvring because the pursuit of effectiveness is achieved at the expense of reasonableness (van Eemeren, 2010, pp. 39–41). By conceding that arguers are free to employ problematic premises and inferences and are thus free to commit the gambler’s fallacy (Botting, 2010, p. 423), it seems that Botting’s (2010, 2012) line of defence would make it quite difficult to determine whether the pursuit of effectiveness is achieved at the expense of reasonableness. In particular, arguments that are rhetorically effective may be effective because they are considered epistemically sound by the antagonist in question. It even seems that it is not plausible that an argument can be persuasive if the addressee recognizes that the argument in question is unreasonable. This means that the addressee accepts the argument as sound at the moment in time in which he or she is persuaded by the argument in question. It thus appears that without analysing the soundness of arguments in terms of their premise-conclusion relation, it cannot be said whether the acceptance of an argument is due to its persuasiveness or due to its reasonableness, which appears to be quite difficult if discussants are free to make unreasonable arguments.
It seems that Botting’s (2010, 2012) line of defence faces the problem that it does not allow us to distinguish reasonable from unreasonable argumentative moves, if these argumentative moves are rhetorically effective and to evaluate them accordingly. The issue with this can be illustrated by the following example, which has been originally analysed by Kienpointner (2006) and has been discussed by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2015b). The example concerns the fallaciousness of a certain kind of spam emails (Nigeria Spam Letters). In these fraudulent emails, an attempt is made to persuade the addressee to transfer money to the sender by usually presenting a tragic story and one or several appeals to God, such as claiming that the addressee was ‘nominated’ to the sender ‘through divine revelation from God’. It is argued by pragma-dialecticians that the appeal to God amounts to an abuse of authority and that the argument should be considered as an argumentum ad verecundiam. It is claimed that the ability to detect such fallacies is not just an intellectual challenge but that it is an important social task to unmask the kind of fallacies upon which the success of these letters is based (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015b, p. 404).
However, this example, as we will see, does not only challenge Botting’s (2010, 2012) line of defence because it is explained later in the same contribution that an argument from authority may be regarded as sound strategic manoeuvring (a) if the antagonist accepts that an appeal to authority is legitimate, and (b) that the antagonist’s acceptance allows an appeal to a specific authority (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015b, p. 415). The acceptability of an argument from authority is
therefore entirely a question of what the antagonist in question considers acceptable at a given moment in time, which is in line with Botting’s defence. Thus, the acceptability of argument from authority is entirely an empirical question, which means that we have to take into account that it is entirely plausible that the appeal to God was acceptable to those people who accepted the arguments in the fraudulent emails and who thus transferred a considerable amount of money to the fraudulent sender. In other words, the problem with these letters is not necessarily, contrary to the evaluation by pragma-dialecticians, that the claim that God ordered the writer to send the letter misuses God’s authority for argumentative purposes (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015b, p. 413). Instead, the issue with these letters is that it is clearly unreasonable to accept the arguments made in these letters but also perfectly possible that the victims of these letters accepted all the absurd starting points mentioned in these letters. It thus follows that the evaluative standard used in this example starts from an evaluation of the premises of the argument based on which it is found that the argument is unreasonable and the fact that it has been accepted by the victims of said spam letters must mean that the argument is deceptive. This means that the argument is not evaluated as fallacious/unreasonable because it violates the rules for a critical discussion. Instead, it violates the rules because it is unreasonable and its unreasonableness is a question of the (epistemic) premise-conclusion relation, as it should be according to Siegel and Biro (1997, p. 285).
These letters are a very good illustration why it has been criticised that aiming at unqualified consensus may lead to disastrous decisions and more disorientation about the world and why it has been regarded as problematic that a resolution of a difference of opinion can be reasonable in the PD sense, while being irrational or unreasonable from an epistemic perspective (§ 3.1). After all, it is not established that the victims of these letters did not accept the arguments at the moment in time in which they transferred the money and thus became victims of such fraudulent practices. Furthermore, these letters can also be regarded as showing why proponents of epistemological approaches claim argumentation theory should provide standards that help us to distinguish ‘good’ from bad arguments based on whether the arguments provide good reasons for accepting the standpoint at issue. Such letters are not the only instances in which arguers are trying to convince others by dubious methods. These methods are not necessarily dubious because they are not in agreement with discussion rules that put no constraints on the premises and inferences that may be acceptable to discussants. Instead, they are dubious because they are not in accordance with standards that proponents of epistemological approaches want to make accessible to a wider public (see for example Lumer, 2012, p. 80, regarding the major task of argumentation theory). Since pragma-dialecticians, as we have just seen, claim that it is an important social task to unmask the kind of fallacies upon which the success of these letters is based, it seems that it is undesirable from the perspective of PD to speculate on whether the PD rules for a critical discussion could self-correct in the long run by relying entirely on the attitudes of arguers. To this,
it might be objected that the protagonist in the example did not have the right kind of attitude because the protagonist was not interested in making epistemically sound arguments. The problem with this objection is, however, that we can say that only because the protagonist in this example did not provide ‘good’ reasons for accepting the standpoint in question and we would not say that the protagonist did not have the right attitude if the arguments would provide good reasons for accepting the standpoint. Moreover, it seems that the motives of the protagonist should not matter because it is undesirable to evaluate arguments based on the motives, intentions, and attitudes of the people who make them and not on their merits. We can thus conclude this discussion by observing that Botting’s (2010, 2012) speculations, according to which critical discussions will function in the long run as a self-correcting mechanism, do not provide an adequate defence of PD as a theory that considers it as an important social task to unmask unreasonable arguments. 5.1.2 Pragma-Dialectics and Rhetoric: Reasonableness or Persuasion and Rhetorical Effectiveness?
In light of the discussion above, this section is going to investigate whether Botting’s (2010, 2012) defence distances PD from rhetoric and persuasion by asking whether the criticism against rhetoric by pragma-dialecticians is also applicable to PD if we would accept his defence. As we have seen, the notion of strategic manoeuvring and the understanding of derailments of strategic manoeuvring as instances in which the pursuit of effectiveness has been achieved at the expense of reasonableness presuppose that there is a difference between reasonableness and effectiveness. This means that it is quite important that there is a difference between PD and rhetoric.
As mentioned above, according to the criticism by pragma-dialecticians against rhetoric, reasonableness is equated with effectiveness if an argument is considered sound, if it succeeds to convince the audience to which the argument is addressed. This was regarded as problematic. It seems unclear whether a consensus that is regarded as reasonable as long as an argument must be acceptable to a particular antagonist with certain starting points, distances PD from rhetoric in a way that can be regarded as adequate from PD’s own perspective. Thus, it is crucial to take into account that Botting’s (2010, 2012) line of defence is based on the claim that it must be considered as a presupposition of a critical discussion that discussants have a reasonable or critical attitude. However, as long as it is not defined what it means to resolve a difference of opinion in a reasonable way, it seems that these additional requirements do not distance PD from rhetoric because the defence is not based on the merits or demerits of the PD rules but on the attitudes of discussants. As a consequence, it seems that rhetoric can defend itself against the criticism by pragma-dialecticians in a way that is similar to the defence of PD by Botting (2010, 2012). In particular, it can be argued that the audience to whom the argument is addressed will only be convinced if they consider the argument epistemically sound. Since an argument must be
acceptable to the antagonist and the protagonist would violate the PD rules by using starting points or inferences that are not acceptable to the particular antagonist in question, it seems that the antagonist has a similar role in PD as the audience in rhetoric in the sense that the soundness of an argument ultimately depends on the antagonist. This means that if PD can be defended by arguing that a reasonable and critical attitude can be assumed that ensures that inferences do not “drop out of the sky” because there is a continuity between discussions, rhetoric can be defended along the same lines. The reason why this is possible is that the people to whom an argument is addressed to do not change their attitudes and lose their knowledge about the world just because they are called the audience in rhetoric and not antagonist(s) as in PD. Thus, it can be argued against the criticism by dialecticians against rhetoric that the mistake that pragma-dialecticians make is in supposing that the propositions and types of inferences that are acceptable to the audience addressed by the rhetor drop out of the sky. In other words, pragma-dialecticians can be accused of making the very same mistake that proponents of epistemological approaches, according to Botting (2010, p. 431), allegedly make.
Furthermore, the PD rules do not actually require that a standpoint has been tested as critically as possible. This would require additional rules that specify how certain claims must be tested in order to be regarded as having survived severe critical tests. Thus, it seems that it cannot be objected against this comparison that the systematic testing of standpoints in accordance with a critical philosophy of reasonableness distinguishes PD from rhetorical approaches (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 50). The reason for this is again that the additional requirements of Botting’s (2010, 2012) line of defence do not distance PD from rhetoric because the defence is not based on the merits or demerits of the PD rules but on the attitudes of discussants. After all, as long as the PD rules prohibit only the use of premises and inferences that are not acceptable to the particular antagonist, it cannot be said that the PD rules require something more than the rhetorical notion of audience demand. This means that even the claimed self-correcting mechanism of critical discussions cannot be regarded as distancing PD from rhetoric. Again, this mechanism is not a consequence of the merits of PD but the result of the reasonableness of discussants, and there is again no reason to assume that arguers will be more critical and more reasonable just because PD and rhetoric have a different conceptual understanding of argumentation.
The problem with Botting’s (2010, 2012) line of defence is, however, not only that his defence is not based on the merits or demerits of PD. Instead, it seems that a reasonable and critical attitude is not even in principle suitable to ensure that the criticism by pragma-dialecticians against rhetoric cannot be applied to PD as well. The reason for this is that the criticism claims that the problem with equating the soundness of an argument with its effectiveness is that argumentation which is sound in one case need not be so in another. Having a critical or reasonable attitude may
ensure that a protagonist only makes arguments he or she considers to be sound but it does not necessarily follow that the arguments will be sound. As we have seen, this is not considered problematic by Botting (2010, 2012) because he argues that the possibility that there are cases in which discussants are using false premises or inferences is insufficient to establish that the PD rules are epistemically non-normative. In his view, this can only be established by showing that they do not converge to the truth on repeated application. The problem with this is that PD is not only presented by pragma-dialecticians as a theory that is able to distinguish reasonable and unreasonable argumentative moves, but also as a theory that does not require that a fallacy is committed intentionally in order to be regarded as a fallacy. As pragma-dialecticians argue, an argumentative move can be considered as rhetorically strong as well as dialectically acceptable to the offender, but it is still a fallacy from the perspective of PD (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015c, p. 361). Since a protagonist who commits a fallacy unintentionally may nevertheless have a critical and reasonable attitude, it follows that the attitude of the protagonist cannot be considered as a relevant criterion in order to distinguish reasonable from unreasonable argumentative moves that may be rhetorically effective.
We can thus conclude this discussion by observing that that Botting’s (2010, 2012) line of defence seems unable to establish that PD is not about persuasion and rhetorical effectiveness because the criticism by pragma-dialecticians against equating reasonableness with effectiveness is applicable to PD as well if PD is defended by appealing to the critical and reasonable attitudes of arguers.
5.2 Discussion of the Responses by Garssen and van Laar
This chapter will be divided into four parts in order to investigate whether the response by Garssen and van Laar (2010) can be regarded as an adequate defence of the way pragma-dialecticians present and apply their theory. This chapter will firstly discuss the response to the “handsomeness example”. Secondly, it will be examined whether the notion of problem-validity can be considered as an “extra criterion of reasonableness” that is not a matter of mere agreement between discussants. Thirdly, this chapter is going to investigate whether the claimed critical spirit of PD can be considered as an advantage of PD in light of the previous discussion. Finally, it will be discussed whether the criticism by pragma-dialecticians against rhetoric can be applied to PD as well if we would accept the defence of PD by Garssen and van Laar (2010).
5.2.1 Fallacies and Handsome Politicians: Reasonableness or Persuasion?
Garssen and van Laar (2010) argue in response to the “handsomeness example” that a normative argumentation theory must not prevent discussants from agreeing on principles or premises that can be called absurd. This assertion seems to be in tension with the claim that the PD rules for a critical discussion are fallacy-proof, which is considered as the litmus test that the PD rules for a critical discussion have to pass (van Eemeren, 2015e, p. 34; van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 25). The
