‘
How To Tame a Watchdog?’
A study into the factors of communication strategies that can make
the media follow the frames put forward by a minister facing
reputational threat
!
Lisa Schallenberg (s1429388) 10-06–2018 Den Haag
Thesis supervisors: Dr. S.L. Kuipers and Mr. Drs. W. Jong. Master Thesis
Preface
The past few months I have dived into the topic of ministers facing reputational threat. I have seen them struggling to get a grip when a nasty journalist asked them an ever nastier question. I studied the way in which they tried to talk their way out of accusations and blame. I caught them making excuses, even though at first glance it might have came across as an apology. I have seen them execute carefully crafted communication strategies and I have seen journalists fall for it. I have also seen their communication strategies falling apart while there was a camera pointed at them. What surprised me the most is that while I was sitting in the university library, writing this thesis, I could very clearly see the mistakes they made. At times, I didn’t understand how ministers, who have access to the best spokespersons and communication teams, could not have foreseen the negative impact their communication strategies could have. During one of our first meetings, Wouter told me that crisis communication comes down to common sense, but that the trick is to access that common sense in the middle of a crisis. With that advice in mind, I have tried to approach this thesis. With the benefit of hindsight, it is always easy to identify mistakes. The more interesting question is how you can make sure that those mistakes will not be made in the future. I hope this thesis answers a part of that question.
I would like to thank Wouter for his dedicated guidance from the very beginning. His stories about the communication advice he had given to leaders in various scenarios were not only entertaining, but also helped me in understanding the practical context that leaders in crisis situations operate in. But next to Wouter, I have been privileged enough to have been supervised by another crisis communication experts these past few months: Michel. The support and discussions between the three of us have been very useful. They have given extra gravity to this research.
I would also like to thank Devin for voluntarily reading Benoit’s book in order to understand my obsession with spotting image repair strategies every time we were watching the news. I forgive you for losing the book.
Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to understand how a minister, facing reputational threat, can make sure that their defense becomes salient in the media reports. A comparative case study has been conducted, analyzing the communication strategies of four (junior) ministers who faced reputational threat between 2013 and 2018: Fred Teeven, Ronald Plasterk, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert and Halbe Zijlstra. The analysis of their communication strategies and the way in which these were represented in the media reports brought to light four tendencies that the media have when reporting about ministers in trouble. 1) The political crisis is salient in media reports immediately after the trigger. 2) The media tend to frame the event for which the minister has to account as a symptom of a deeper problem. 3) The media tend to frame the severity of the event as tangible as possible. 4) The media extensively offer a platform to people who are angry with the minister. Deriving from these four tendencies are six factors of communication strategies of ministers that can influence the degree of media alignment. (I) The timing of the delivery of the minister’s counter interpretation, (II) The quality of the minister's counter interpretation, (III) The minister’s ability to anticipate what the media will frame as the underlying problem, (IV) The minister's ability to anticipate the way in which the media will frame the severity of the event, (V) The quality of the minister’s stakeholder-management , (VI) The minister’s ability to identify the threat of a political crisis in an early stage. Based on this thesis, the relationship between the media and ministers can be conceptualized as a dynamic in which both actors influence each other. Understanding the tendencies that the media have contributes to an understanding of how the behavior of a minister influences the behavior of the media.
Table of contents
Introduction
7
Theoretical Framework
10
§1. Political crisis communication: the academic debate this research ties into 10
§2. The concept of media alignment 12
§3. Analyzing the communication strategies of ministers 13
The aim of this thesis
22
Methodology
23
Fred Teeven
29
§1. The facts 29
§2. The minister’s frame 30
§3. The appropriateness of the minister’s image repair strategies 32
§4. The coherency of the minister’s communication strategy 36
§5. The media’s frame 37
§6. Concluding remarks regarding media alignment 39
Ronald Plasterk
41
§1. The facts 41
§2. The minister’s frame 43
§3. The appropriateness of the minister's image repair strategies 45
§4. The coherency of the minister's communication strategy 48
§5. The media's frame 48
§6. Concluding remarks regarding media alignment 50
Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert
54
§1. The facts 54
§2. The minister's frame 56
§3. The appropriateness of the minister's image repair strategies 58
§4. The coherency of the minister's communication strategy 61
§5. The media's frame 62
§6. Concluding remarks regarding media alignment 65
Halbe Zijlstra
67
§1. The facts 67
§2. The minister's frame 68
§4. The coherency of the minister's communication strategy 73
§5. The media's frame 74
§6. Concluding remarks regarding the media alignment 76
Comparative analysis
78
Introduction
“How long do you think you’re going to last in the debate?” (NOS, 2017a) This question was asked by a reporter to minister Hennis. She was on her way to a parliamentary debate to account for the death of two soldiers, for which her ministry was responsible. She was visibly nervous (De Telegraaf, 2017a). She knew that during this debate, she would resign as minister of Defence (NRC, 2017a). Of all the questions this reporter could’ve asked, he chose to ask a question based on the assumption that she wouldn’t survive the debate. A disruptive question at a disruptive time. This type of question illustrates the attitude of the media, that - according to the academic literature - characterizes the current relationship between the media and politics: the media have the incentive to report interesting news, because it sells (Chandler & Munday, 2011; Takens & Van Atteveldt, 2013; Killough, 2007; Bryman & Haslam, 1994; Ahern & Sosyura, 2015). Therefore, they actively look for juicy quotes and sensational topics. This characterization is also referred to as media logic. In short: the media set the tone, the politicians follow.
However, this characterization seems to be an overly simplistic way to describe the relationship between the media and politicians. We know that politicians use communication strategies to influence the public (Chandler & Munday, 2011; Molenbeek & Aalberts, 2010; Mcknight, 2015). We know that they have spin-doctors and spokespersons whose main task is to positively influence media reports. An academic characterization of the relationship between the media and politicians would therefore benefit from the recognition that it is characterized by a struggle for power, rather than an exercise of power, and that the media as well as politicians use strategies to play that game well.
Even though we know that politicians use communication strategies to ‘spin’ media reports, little is known about the effectivity of these communication strategies (Boin, ‘t Hart, McConnell, 2009; Benoit, 2015). This thesis looks at one highly relevant effect of communication strategies: the effect that communication strategies of politicians can have on the behavior of the media. This effect is studied within a specific context: the context of ministers facing reputational threat. Because ministers are national executives, they are under extreme scrutiny from the media. If their reputation is too severely harmed, they might have to pay the high price of having to resign
threats, and a lot of resources for crafting a communication strategy, this is an interesting context to study the effectivity of these strategies.
In this thesis, the main question that will be answered is:
When a minister is under attack, what factors of their communication strategy can make the media follow the frames put forward by the minister?
This question is divided into three subquestions, which will be answered through the method of discourse analysis of statements of politicians and publications of the media.
1. What was the crisis communication strategy of the minister facing reputational threat? A. How did the minister frame the event?
B. Was the frame appropriate? C. Was the frame coherent?
2. To what extent do the media frames align with the frames put forward by the minister under attack?
3. How can the communication strategy of the minister influence the level of media alignment?
The communication strategy of the minister (subquestion 1) will be determined by using the theoretical typologies of Situational Crisis Communication Theory (Coombs, 2007) and the theory of image repair strategies (Benoit, 2015). The exact ways in which these theories underpin this research both theoretically and methodologically will be explained in chapters 3 (theoretical framework) and 4 (methodology) of this thesis.
In order to answer these questions, four cases of ministers under attack will be studied and compared. The cases that are selected were chosen based on three criteria: firstly, the incidents for which the minister had to account should be similar in terms of severity. Secondly, the cases should fall in the same timeframe because the media behaved differently in previous years. And lastly, the ministers should represent different departments, to ensure a variety of communication-teams responsible for the communication strategy.
1) Fred Teeven, junior minister of Security and Justice in cabinet Rutte 2. He had to account for the suicide of Russian asylum seeker Aleksandr Dolmatov.
2) Ronald Plasterk, minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in cabinet Rutte 2. He had to account for falsely accusing the US of tapping 1.8 million metadata of Dutch citizens.
3) Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, minister of Defence in cabinet Rutte 2. She had to account for three Dutch military casualties of a mortar grenade accident in Mali.
4) Halbe Zijlstra, minister of Foreign Affairs in cabinet Rutte 3. He had to account for lying about having met Putin.
When ministers get into trouble, the media tend to hunt them down. This thesis aims to create a deeper understanding of how to make them follow your lead, and how to stay ahead in the struggle for power.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework presented in this chapter does not only form the relevant academic foundation of this research. It also forms the framework of analysis used to study the cases. Therefore, this chapter will be divided into three parts. It begins with a brief overview of the broader academic debate this research ties into. Then, the outcome variable of this research - media alignment - will be conceptualized. Lastly, the theoretical foundation of the framework of analysis, used to study the communication strategies of the minister, will be explained.
§1. Political crisis communication: the academic debate this research ties into
Crisis communication is a broad field of research. It can be defined as the collection, processing and dissemination of information required to address a crisis situation (Coombs & Holladay, 2010, p. 20). Crisis communication serves two main goals: firstly, instructing the public about what's happening and what to do in order to be safe. This is relevant in crises with a physical threat. Secondly, marginalizing the reputational damage a crisis inflicted on the responsible institution.
Not all crises create a physical threat. Even though the definition of a crisis is a highly debated topic (handbook), there is general consensus on key characteristics of a crisis: it is sudden, unexpected, and it has negative consequences for an institution (Brody, 1991; Linke, 1989; Barton, 2001; Fearn-Banks, 1996; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998). The crisis that is studied in this thesis is the political crisis. These are described as a sudden turning point in the legitimacy of governing elites, policy paradigms, political regimes of the political system as a whole (Ansell, Boin & t Hart, 2014). In this research, the specific type of political crisis that is studied is a turning point in the legitimacy of an incumbent minister.
Given the lack of physical threat for the broader public, the first main goal of crisis communication - instructing the public about how to achieve physical safety - is not relevant within the scope of this research. This research is about the second goal of crisis communication: reputational repair.
Figure 1. The way in which reputational repair ties into the broader field of crisis management
The gap within the academic research into political crisis communication
Within the study of (political) crisis communication, the main flaw is a lack of understanding of the effects of communication strategies (Boin, ‘t Hart, McConnell, 2009; Benoit, 2015). Research has been conducted into the types of crisis communication that can be used (Benoit, 2015), theories have been brought forward that prescribe certain communication strategies in certain contexts (Coombs, 2007; Moynihan, 2012; Boin et al., 2010) and studies have developed quantified methods to understand the correlation between communication strategies and political support (Boin, 't Hart, McConnell, 2009). However, a deep understanding of effects of certain communication strategies over others is lacking. This is a highly relevant flaw because of the practical nature of crisis communication studies. Academic research is the foundation of advice for leaders who find
Crisis management Crisis communication Instructing the public Repairing reputational damage
§2. The concept of media alignment
This research focuses on one effect of communication strategies: namely the effect it has on the behavior of the media. This effect is important because a political crisis is considered to be dramatic; it is newsworthy (Coombs & Holladay, 2010; Millar et al., 2004). Therefore, the media tend to report a lot on the political crisis within its time period. The media are also the main channel that connects politics to the broader audience (Chandler & Munday, 2011). For the public, the media are the main source of information about the political crisis. Because of this dependence the public has on the media, media reporting not only define but make salient the conditions of the crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2010; Ansell, Boin & ‘t Hart, 2014). The selective information provided to the audience frame the way in which they interpret the event, as well as how they perceive the role of the minister. Therefore, as a minister, an important way to repair the damage to your reputation, is to make sure that the media provide the information about the political crisis that you want them to. In order words: the ministers interpretation of the event and the strategies they use to repair their image need to be salient within the media in order to make it reach the public. Within a democratic state it is important that the public believes in the good reputation of the minister. Because of this context, the media form the arena in which crisis actors have to convince news-makers to pay attention to their crisis frame (Ulmer et al, 2007; Seeger et al., 2003; Boin et al, 2009).
Even though the media play a big role in framing the reputation of the minister, it is consistently overlooked in the media when studying crisis communication (Boin, 't Hart & McConnell, 2009). More often, opposition parties, incumbent ministers and public opinion form the object of analysis (Coombs, 2007; Moynihan, 2012; Boin et al., 2010). However, media reports can influence all of these actors at once. That is the reason that the mechanism of influencing the media is the central topic of this thesis.
There is debate among academics whether or not the media can even be influenced. Some academics state that the media push through their own agenda, and report on whatever they want (Streitmatter, 1997; Hearit, 2006). Others say that the media can be influenced by communication strategies of politicians (Fearn-Banks, 2007; Ulmer et al., 2007; Boin, et al., 2005). There is not clear answer in this debate and it seems to depend on many factors, such as how well-liked the politician is with the media and on the ideological background of a news broadcaster (Fearn-Banks,
2007; Hearit, 2006). The conclusion of this thesis can help in understanding the nature of the relationship between the media and politics.
The concept ‘media alignment’ thus refers to the question of how salient the interpretation the minister has of the event is in the media reports. Media alignment does not necessarily refer to the degree to which the media explicitly confirm the interpretation of the minister. In democratic states, it is a virtue that the media has the freedom - and the duty - to keep ministers who make a mistake in check. In every democratic state, the media will therefore have critical reports on a minister under attack (Mcknight, 2015). The question is not: how much do the media agree with the interpretation of the minister? The question is: how much do the media report on the interpretation of the politician? Putting forward the interpretation of a minister and asking different actors to comment on it, is also media alignment. Through repeating the frame of the minister, and either attacking or confirming it, it does become one of the dominant interpretations of the media (Takens, Van Atteveldt & Van Hoof, 2013; Chandler & Munday, 2011). One can and should not aim to restrict the freedom of the watchdog of our democracy, by preventing them from bringing criticism. But one can aim to tame it, by making it report on your frames.
§3. Analyzing the communication strategies of ministers
How does a political crisis come about?
In order to understand how a minister aims to decrease their reputational threat during a political crisis, it is first important to understand how a political crisis comes about. As has been defined in the opening paragraph of this chapter, the political crisis that is studied in this thesis is described as a turning point in the legitimacy of an incumbent minister (Ansell, Boin & ‘t Hart, 2009). The question then is, how does that turning point occur?
In order to explain this, there are five core-moments in all four cases that have been studied, that need to be introduced. Firstly, the event. This refers to the negative event that happened for which a minister has to account. For example, in the case of minister Hennis, the event was the mortar grenade accident in Mali.
The turning point - the moment the legitimacy of the minister is put into question - occurs when an authority accuses the minister of an offensive act. An offensive act is conceptualized here as an (in)action of a minister that (in)directly created the context in which the event occurred. For
Dutch Safety Board in which the ministry of Defence was accused of prioritizing the continuation of missions over the safety of the soldiers. This turning point defines the beginning of the political crisis.
The political crisis is the time period during which the minister has to respond in order to decrease reputational threat. The point that marks the end of the political crisis is the debate in which the minister officially accounts for the event in parliament. This debate can either result in the minister staying in office or in their resignation.
The three aspects of communication strategies: content, appropriateness and coherency
Since it is now established when, and in response to what, the crisis communication of the minister occurs, the aspects of the communication strategy of ministers that will be analyzed will be explained.
Within the academic body of literature, four ways of analyzing reputational repair can be distinguished. Firstly, research that focuses on the way in which accused actors frame the event they are responsible for (Boin, 't Hart, McConnell, 2009; Boin et al., 2010). Secondly, research that looks at responsibility and prescribes how much responsibility the actor should have taken, given the entire context of the crisis (Coombs, 2007; Lee & Chung, 2012; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001). Thirdly, research that maps out the image repair strategies that are used by an accused actor (Benoit, 2015; Kauffman, 2011; García, 2011). Lastly, research that focuses on the timing and the
Event
The negative event for which the minister
has to account
Trigger
The turning point of the minister’s legitimacy.
This is caused by an authority accusing the minister of an offensive
act that (in)directly
created the context in which the event
occurred
The debate The debate during which the minister accounts for the event and the offensive acts
they are accused of
The political crisis
understandability of the message that is delivered (Choi & Lee, 2017; Beldad, Laar & Hegner, 2018; Claeys, Cauberghe & Leysen, 2013). Within this thesis, all these ways to analyze reputational repair will be used. The reason for this is because of the explorative nature of this thesis: in order to find factors within the communication strategies that can influence media reports, it is useful to analyze the communication strategy as a whole, rather than focusing on one aspect of it. Therefore, it is the aim of this research to map out the communication strategies of ministers in a holistic manner.
This thesis looks at three aspects of communication strategies, rather than four. The reason for that is that the image repair strategies used (the third type of research) and the responsibility that should’ve been taken (the second type of research) are combined in this thesis and conceptualized as appropriateness. Therefore, the three aspects of communication strategies that will be looked at are (1) their frame of the event, (2) how appropriate their image repair strategies are, and (3) the extent to which their story is coherent.
Communication strategy
Frame 1. Cause 2. Severity 3. Impact on political position Coherency 1. Consistency 2. Timing 3. Quantity 4. Understandability AppropriatenessHow much responsibility should have been taken minus
how much responsibility was taken
(1) Content: how does the minister frame the event?
The first aspect is the way in which the minister frames the event for which they have to account. The frame can also be referred to as the interpretation of the event that the minister gives. This frame consists of three characteristics of the event: (a) the cause of the event, (b) the severity of the event (c) the impact the event has on the political position of the minister (Boin, 't Hart, McConnell, 2010). In the frame about the cause, the minister explains what factors they believe preceded and directly led to the event. The severity of the event refers to the extent to and the way in which the minister attributes negative qualities to the event and its consequences. The required impact on the political position is about the political consequences of this event: is it severe enough for the minister to resign, or can the minister stay in office?
The reason that the frame of the event is relevant for the minister to decrease reputational threat is because it gives the minister the opportunity to alter the accusation by offering a counter-interpretation of what caused the event (Beldad, Laar & Henger, 2018). If that counter-counter-interpretation becomes dominant within the discourse, the frame of the event that the minister has to account for can change to their advantage.
Boin, 't Hart and McConnell (2009) state that the degree to which the media’s reporting align with the frames of an actor depends on the credibility of the actor’s crisis communication. Unfortunately, they never conceptualize credibility. However, they do say that understating or denying obvious problems undermines an actor’s credibility. In this thesis, what Boin et al (2009) refer to as credibility, is conceptualized as the extent to which the minister’s frame of the event relates to the common perception of the event - how intuitive the frame is. Lies, or understatements about the perceived severity without offering an intuitive explanation undermines the intuitiveness of the minister's frame.
Therefore, the first hypothesis in this research is:
H1) If the minister offers a non-intuitive frame of the event, there will be less media alignment
(2a) Appropriateness: how much responsibility should have been taken by the minister, given the context of the crisis?
Apart from looking at the content of the minister’s interpretation of the event, the second aspect that will be looked at is the appropriateness of the communication strategy. Appropriateness is conceptualized as the extent to which the minister takes enough responsibility, given the context of
the crisis. The appropriateness is determined by using the Situational Crisis Communication Theory (Coombs, 2007). This theory explains how much responsibility an actor should take in order to diminish the reputational threat in a crisis, given the entire context of the crisis (Coombs, 2007). The context of the crisis is made up out of three factors. Firstly, the perceived crisis responsibility. Secondly, the crisis history of the institution. Thirdly, the prior reputation of the accused actor.
The perceived crisis responsibility refers to how much stakeholders believe that the organizational actions caused the crisis (Coombs, 2007). This is determined by the type of crisis an actor is dealing with. Coombs (2007) identifies three clusters of crises with subsequent levels of crisis responsibility: the victim cluster, for crises in which the organization itself is viewed as the victim. The accidental cluster, in which the incident is considered uncontrollable by the organization. The intentional cluster, in which human errors or organizational misdeed caused the incident (Coombs, 2007). Based on the cluster that the crisis falls into, the initial reputational threat is determined. Higher perceived crisis responsibility comes with a higher reputational threat.
This initial reputational threat can be adjusted based on two other factors: the crisis history of the institution and the prior reputation of the accused actor (Coombs, 2007). Crisis history refers to whether or not the institution had faced similar crises in the past. If it had, the perception that the institution is not able to control errors and learn from past mistakes arises, and the reputational threat intensifies.
The prior reputation of the accused actor refers to how good the actor’s reputation was in different contexts before the crisis (Coombs, 2007). If the actor has showed little consideration for stakeholders across a number of different domains, the prior reputation is bad and the initial reputational threat intensifies. If the accused actor has a great prior reputation, there is goodwill and the initial reputational threat decreases.
According to Situational Crisis Communication Theory, the higher the initial reputational threat, the more responsibility an accused actor should take in order to repair their reputation (Coombs, 2007).
Type of crisis cluster Associated reputational threat
Victim cluster Low reputational threat
Accidental cluster Medium reputational threat
Intentional cluster High reputational threat
(2b) Appropriateness: How much responsibility did the minister take?
Situational Crisis Communication Theory can be used to assess how much responsibility should be taken. In order to determine how much responsibility was taken by the minister, the taxonomy of image repair strategies by Benoit (2015) will be used. Benoit (2015) introduced a taxonomy of image repair strategies that actors can use when they are accused of an offensive act. The goal of an image repair strategy is to reshape the audience’s attitude about the minister’s character, creating or changing beliefs about the minister’s responsibility for the event and/or creating or changing values about the offensiveness of the act that the minister is accused of. Every defense, apology, excuse or justification that a minister could bring can be divided into the five major image repair strategies. The reason that this taxonomy is valuable in the context of this thesis is that all of these different strategies represent a certain variant and degree of responsibility that is taken by the actor.
Benoit (2015) distinguishes between five major image repair strategies:
(I) Denial is the strategy to deny the action(s) someone is being accused of. In this image repair strategy, someone takes no responsibility for the offensive act.
(II) Evading responsibility occurs when someone admits that they performed the offensive act, but claim that they were not (fully) responsible for it. This strategy consists of four subheadings. Provocation is the defense that the offensive act was provoked by another offensive act. Defeasibility means that the rhetor claims that they committed the act due to a lack of necessary information. Accidents is the argument that circumstances beyond their control caused the offensive act. Good intentions is the attempt to claim that the rhetor is responsible for the offensive act, but
Intensifying factors Quality Effect on reputational threat
Crisis history High
Neutral Low
Reputational threat intensifies Reputational threat is unchanged Reputational threat diminishes
Prior reputation Bad
Neutral Good
Reputational threat intensifies Reputational threat is unchanged Reputational threat diminishes Table 1.2: SCCT - look at intensifying factors
that they had good intentions. In this image repair strategy, someone takes low levels of responsibility: they accept that they did it, but they claim that they are not (fully) responsible for it.
(III) Reducing the degree of offensiveness is the strategy with which someone admits to being responsible for the act, but reduces the offensiveness of the act. This strategy consists of six subheadings. Bolstering is the strategy to emphasize the good attributes of the accused actor to remind the audience of their ‘goodness’. Minimization refers to the claim that the incident actually was not that harmful. Differentiation is the attempt to compare this act with another, worse act to make this act seem better in comparison. Transcendence is the attempt to appeal to higher values, claiming that this bad act was necessary for the greater good. Attacking the accuser occurs when one tries to minimize the credibility of the accuser. Compensation is the strategy with which the accused compensates the victim financially or in another way to reduce the offensiveness. In this image repair strategy, someone takes medium levels of responsibility: they accept that they are responsible for it, but they marginalize the severity of the act.
(IV) Corrective action is the strategy with which the accused promises to install measures that prevent a similar incident in the future. The difference with compensation is that compensation does not address the root of the problem, but rather counterbalances the offensiveness of the act. In this image repair strategy, someone evades the question of responsibility all together: they neither take nor deny responsibility. Instead they divert the attention towards solutions and improvement.
(V) Mortification describes an apology for the act. In this image repair strategy, someone takes high levels of responsibility.
Often, a combination of the above-mentioned strategies are used, and therefore the combination of strategies ultimately determine the overall amount of responsibility that was taken by the minister.
Research into the relevance of past perceptions of leaders on the degree of media alignment shows that the media reports correlate highly with pre-crisis reporting and opinion about the actor (Boin, 't Hart, McConnell, 2009). When an actor was perceived as a bad leader, the media are less likely to align with them in times of political crises than if they were perceived as a good leader. Even though this previous research does not mention the effect that responsibility has on media alignment, it is possible to combine Situational Crisis Communication Theory with these findings. Crisis history and prior reputation both say something about the quality of the leader. When there is a high crisis history, the leader is probably not doing a very good job, because they can't seem to
the crisis itself, it does show negative attitudes about the person of the leader, and therefore can harm the perception of the quality of his leadership. SCCT assumes that taking high levels of responsibility in some way can make up for being a bad leader (Coombs, 2007). Therefore, it could be concluded that taking appropriate levels of responsibility, as a minister, can make up for bad reputation and make the media align with their statements.
Therefore, the second hypothesis is:
H2) With an appropriate response, the media will be more likely to align with the minister
Table 2. Image repair strategies and responsibility
Image repair strategy Substrategies Explanation Responsibility taken
Denial - I didn’t do it none
Evading responsibility Provocation Defeasibility Accidents Good intentions He provoked me I didn't know Beyond my control I meant well low
Reducing the degree of offensiveness Bolstering Minimization Differentiation Transcendence Attacking accuser Compensation
I'm a good guy It’ s not that bad Another act is worse For the greater good You’re not credible e.g. damages
medium
Corrective action - It won't happen again neutral
(3) Coherency: how coherent is the communication of the minister?
The last aspect of the communication strategy is coherency. Coherency refers to 1) whether the statements were not inconsistent, 2) the timing of the statement, 3) the amount of statements, 4) the understandability of the statements. In terms of inconsistencies, research suggests that a disorganized crisis communication diminishes the credibility of the actor and therefore also the degree of media alignment (Fearn-Banks, 2007; Ulmer et al. 2007). Apart from whether or not the message changes, the timing and understandability of the frame also play a role in determining its coherency. Timing refers to how quickly the minister replies, after they got in trouble. Research has shown that the rule of thumb in crisis communication is: present a statement as soon as possible (Claeys, Cauberghe & Leisen, 2013; Beldad, Laar & Hegner, 2018; Seeger et al., 2003). The amount of statements are also a part of coherency. Multiple statements are considered to be better, because it allows a leader to dominate the discourse (Choi & Lee, 2017). Understandability refers to the quality of the message: whether or not it is easy to understand and easy to repeat. Research has showed that the more ready-to-go the frame is, the more likely it is that the media will pick up that exact frame (Choi & Lee, 2017; Sleurs et al., 2003; Strobbe & Jacobs, 2005). This is because of the practical context in which the media operate: the need to deliver well-formulated messages and the time pressure under which they should deliver these messages.
Based on the academic body of literature related to coherency, the third hypothesis is:
H3) The more coherent the communication of the minister is, the more the media will align with the frames put forward by the minister.
The aim of this thesis
What this thesis is not
This thesis does not aim to prescribe ministers what to do when they face reputational threat. When reading this thesis it is important to take into account that decreasing reputational threat can be of secondary importance to a minister. During a political crisis, many different forces are at play and ministers have divergent interests, that need to be weighed-off. For example, a ministry can face legal charges, which makes it difficult to explicitly take responsibility or apologize for a negative event. Political forces can also play a role: admitting that a policy didn't work can be more problematic for a coalition party than dealing with reputational damage for a minister. In short, during a political crisis, decreasing reputational damage is neither the only, nor necessarily the most important goal for a minister.
What this thesis is
What this thesis can do, is provide a deeper understanding of how, in an ideal scenario, one could decrease reputational threat. It is necessary to understand what the possible effects of reputational repair are, in order to weigh the benefits or costs of those effects of against the benefits or costs of prioritizing the political or legal aspect of the situation. Without understanding the process and effects that reputational repair has, one can not attribute an informed relative importance to it.
Methodology
Research Design and Case SelectionThis research will be conducted through a qualitative comparative case study research design. The communication strategies and media reports of four different cases will be analyzed.
The case selection is done based on the following criteria:
Firstly, the severity of the reputational threat a minister faces has to account needs to be similar. If one minister only faces a minor reputational threat and another a very large one, the media sentiment will naturally be different in their style of reporting and it will not be possible to isolate the effect of the communication strategy. Therefore, all cases studied in this thesis have a high initial reputational threat, according to the SCCT.
Secondly, the events need to have taken place in roughly the same time-period. Cases from the early 2000s can not be compared to cases from 2016 because the attitude of the media has changed drastically since then (Chandler & Munday, 2011; Molenbeek & Aalberts, 2010; Van Zoonen, 2000; Killough, 2007)). The present is the most relevant time period to study because it gives us the best insight into how to act when a similar incident would occur now. Therefore, all cases fall within the same half of a decade: from 2013 until 2018.
Thirdly, the cases need to vary in terms of their communication strategies: the content of their frame, the appropriateness and the coherency of their communication strategies. This is necessary in order to be able to compare the effect of different communication strategies on the degree of media alignment.
By applying these criteria, the following cases have been selected:
Table 3. Case selection
Method
The communication strategies of the ministers will be analyzed by doing a discourse analysis on all written and spoken statements of the (junior) minister from the trigger until the debate. The reason that this timeframe was chosen is that accounting for the incident ends at the end of the debate: that's when a final judgement is made. Therefore, the most urgent need to repair their reputation, ends after the judgement of the debate.
Fred Teeven Ronald Plasterk Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert Halbe Zijlstra Political function Junior minister of Security and Justice in cabinet Rutte 2 Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in cabinet Rutte 2. Minister of Defence in cabinet Rutte 2. Minister of Foreign Affairs in Rutte 3.
Event the suicide of Russian asylum seeker Aleksandr Dolmatov on January 17, 2013 Falsely stating that the US tapped 1.8 million metadata from Dutch citizens on October 30, 2013.
The death of 2 Dutch soldiers and a heavily injured soldier as a result of a prematurely detonated mortar grenade during a military exercise in Mali on July 6, 2016. During the VVD-conference in 2016 he lied that he was present in Putin’s Dasja in 2006, and that he heard him talk about wanting to expand to former Soviet territory. Political crisis From April 12, 2013 until April 18, 2013 From February 4, 2014 until February 11, 2014. From September 28, 2017 until October 3, 2017. From February 12, 2018 until February 13, 2018. Outcome of the debate He stayed in office He stayed in office.
Table 4. Operationalization of the core concepts for analyzing the communication strategy of the minister
Table 5. Operationalization of the core concepts for analyzing the media reports
Concept Operationalization Method
Frame 1. Frame of the cause of the
event
2. Frame of the severity of the event and the offensive act 3. Frame of the impact of the
event on the political position of the minister
Discourse analysis of all spoken and written statements of the minister, presented during the political crisis
Appropriateness Amount of responsibility that should have been taken (SCCT)
minus
amount of responsibility that was taken (image repair strategies)
Discourse analysis of all spoken and written statements of the minister, presented during the political crisis
Coherency The level of consistency of the
statements, the timing of the statements, the quantity of the statements and the
understandability of the statements
Discourse analysis of all spoken and written statements of the minister, presented during the political crisis
Concept Operationalization Method
Frame 1. Frame of the cause of the
event
2. Frame of the severity of the event and the offensive act 3. Frame of the impact of the
event on the political position of the minister
Discourse analysis of the media reports during the political crisis that mention the name of the minister (Volkskrant, NRC, Trouw, Telegraaf, NOS
journaal, Nieuwsuur)
Alignment The extent to which the media
frames (cause, severity and impact on political position) correspond with the minister's frames
Comparing the frames of the politician with the frames of the media
Data selection
The alignment of the frames the media use will also be analyzed by doing a discourse analysis. The media that will be studied are the four biggest newspapers in The Netherlands: De Volkskrant, Het NRC Handelsblad, Trouw, De Telegraaf (Haan & Bardoel, 2013). Apart from newspapers, two TV outlets will be analyzed: Nieuwsuur and the NOS-journaal. These TV outlets are chosen because the NOS is considered to be the main and most respected news source in the Netherlands (Van Teeffelen, 2016). Nieuwsuur offers the most extensive interpretation of these political crises, and is therefore a good source to study the media alignment with the frames of the minister.
All television shows and newspaper articles within the time period of the political crisis that mention the name of the minister have been read (in the case of newspapers) or watched and transcribed (in the case of television shows). The most representative frames that were used have been mentioned in this thesis.
Table 6. Data selection
Table 7. Duration of political crises
There is a wide variety of the amount of media reports produced between the four cases. There are a few explanations for this. Firstly, the amount other newsworthy events that took place during the political crisis influence the attention given to the minister. For example, during Hennis’s political crisis, Anne Faber was missing, the referendum for Catalonia’s independence was held and there were leaks from the formation of Rutte 3 (Nieuwsuur, 2017a; Nieuwsuur, 2017b; Nieuwsuur,
Media outlet Teeven Plasterk Hennis Zijlstra
Newspaper articles
63 138 70 38
Television shows 6 12 9 3
Teeven Plasterk Hennis Zijlstra
Duration of political crisis
2017c; Nieuwsuur, 2017d; Nieuwsuur, 2017e). Teeven shared media attention with the terrorist attacks on the Boston marathon (Nieuwsuur, 2013a; Nieuwsuur, 2013b; Nieuwsuur, 2013c; Nieuwsuur, 2013d). This decreased the amount of attention the media could give to these events. The second factor that influenced the amount of media reports is the duration of the political crisis. This depends on when the debate is scheduled in, which is determined by how long the opposition wants to prepare for the debate.
Pitfalls
Determining the communication strategy of the minister is an important aspect of this research. However, what this communication strategy was, is determined based on written statements and media statements. It is not determined based on interviews with spokespersons or the ministers themselves. This can be a pitfall, because for determining the communication strategy of the minister, this research relies for some part on what the media decides to show. This problem has been minimized by looking at a wide variety of news sources. Statements that were not shown in TV reports, were mentioned in newspapers. Apart from that, the parliamentary documents that the ministers wrote were also part of the analysis. These documents are very extensive and therefore present a conclusive overview of what their defense was. Furthermore, it can be an advantage not to know what the minister and spokesperson aimed for in their strategies. This allows the research to approach the political crisis with an open view and to objectively describe what has been said and how that was reflected in the media, rather than by looking to confirm the strategy that was set out by the minister themselves.
Through these methods, the level of media alignment in each political crisis will be established. By mapping out the entire communication strategy of the minister, the factors of that communication strategy that can influence the level of media alignment will be determined.
„This is the consequence of a unique
and tragic turn of events”
Fred Teeven
§1. The factsOn January 17th 2013, Russian asylum seeker and political activist Aleksandr Dolmatov committed suicide in a detention centre on Rotterdam airport, awaiting deportation to Russia (Trouw, 2013).
An inquiry by the inspection for Security and Justice into the suicide, published 3 months later, concluded that the Dutch government made many mistakes in dealing with Dolmatov’s asylum application and detention (NRC, 2013a). Firstly, he should not have been detained. Dolmatov appealed a rejection for asylum and during an appeal you can legally stay in the country. An error in the system attributed the wrong status to him. He was put in detention after Dolmatov called the police in confused state because he had suicidal tendencies. The police checked his status and due to a system-error, assumed he was illegal. They arrested him (Nieuwsuur, 2013b). Here, the second major mistake occurred: Dolmatov was not offered the possibility to call his own lawyer. The third mistake that the inquiry identifies is that, even tough Dolmatov had attempted to commit suicide on two days before his death, the paramedics did not consult a doctor and did not take further precautionary measures such as put him in a observation cell.
The offensive act that Teeven had to account for, as formulated by the inspection, was that he was politically responsible for the department that made so many mistakes in dealing with the asylum request and procedure of Aleksandr Dolmatov (Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie, 2013).
Event 17-01-2013
The suicide of Aleksandr Dolmatov in the detention
centre of Rotterdam Airport, awaiting
deportation
Trigger 12-04-2013
The publication of the inquiry of the inspection for Security and Justice
Accusation for Offensive act
Teeven is accused of being politically responsible for the
mistakes in his department. The debate 18-04-2013 A vote of no confidence was supported by 50 parliamentarians. Teeven chose to remain in office. Teeven’s political crisis
§2. The minister’s frame
Cause
Teeven frames this as an event caused by individual misdeed in the organization rather than by a structural flaw in the system. On the day of the trigger, Teeven is a guest in Nieuwsuur. When asked what happened, he states:
In fact three mistakes were made. Certain procedures were, wrongly, not followed, and also personal mistakes. (Teeven, in Nieuwsuur, 2013a)
The words ‘mistake’, ’wrongly’ and ‘personal mistakes’ all suggest that individuals did not follow the procedures that the ministry set up: procedures were there, and that they could have been followed, but individuals, wrongly and mistakenly, did not.
During the debate, a few days later, Teeven is more explicit about what he thinks caused the event.
Teeven:
12-04 13-04 14-04 16-04 17-04 18-04
Teeven announces that he adopts all recommendations from the inquiry
Trigger: The
inquiry is published
Teeven in Nieuwsuur: “I am politically
responsible”
Weekend: no news
Teeven: I want to stay in office and introduce improvement measures
Opposition: Teeven should not have said this before the debate
15-04
no news
The debate: Teeven
fights to remain in office. 2/3 of parliament support a vote of no confidence
I do not think there are so many structural problems. […] It is described in policy, chairman, it is described what employees have to do. Up to 4 decimals it is described what you should do when someone enters the facilities during the evening hours. If those procedures are not followed then it is a deep tragedy, it is ... but it is not a structural error. (Teeven, 2013)
Severity
Teeven mostly frames the severity of this event in an emotional sense. He does that by sharing his personal feelings, “It affects me”, “I have a hard time with it”, (NRC, 2013b) and by publicly and saliently recognizing the emotional impact this has on Dolmatov’s family (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2013; Teeven, 2013).
I find it very tragic what happened. It has also deeply affected me and others, and I sympathize with the relatives of Mr Dolmatov.
-
Teeven (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2013)His self-presentation enforced this frame. With his mimic and body language, he seemed genuinely hurt by the death of Aleksandr Dolmatov.
Impact on political position
This frame changes throughout the political crisis. On the day of publication, he states explicitly that he can not comment on whether or not he will resign, because it will be up to parliament to decide.
“In the end, parliament will have to decide how they judge this.” - Teeven (Nieuwsuur, 2013a)
Three days later, after the weekend, he makes a seemingly similar comment in the media, but adds a very important sentence:
“Am I the one who must also introduce these improvement measures? Yes, at this moment, I think I can, but I will discuss that with parliament.” (Nieuwsuur, 2013b)
He still states that he will discuss this with parliament, but he explicitly states that if it was up to him, he would stay. That is relevant given the fact that he at that point also had the support of the
Teeven increasingly fights for his position. During the debate on the 18th of April he states: I think I am very capable of implementing these measures. I know the field of Security and Justice very well. I also know what went wrong. But it is up to you, chairman, to your parliament, to make a statement about it. (Teeven, 2013)
Teeven did not get a lot of explicit support from the coalition. Sources within the VVD stated that there was a lot of doubt as to whether or not Teeven could remain in office (Telegraaf, 2013a). Most VVD and PvdA members chose not to comment on the impact on his political position: they emphasized the severity of the accusation in the media, and stated that they would form their opinion about his political position after the debate (NRC, 2013b).
The only one who explicitly supports Teeven is Zijlstra, who states that this event is not comparable to the Schipholbrand in 2006, because this event was caused by execution errors, rather than policy errors (De Volkskrant, 2013a). This aligned directly with Teeven’s frame that this was an incident and not a structural problem.
§3. The appropriateness of the minister’s image repair strategies
Application of Situational Crisis Communication Theory
This incident would fall in the intentional cluster. It were human errors and system failures that created the context in which this could happen. Therefore, the initial assessment of the reputational threat is high.
In order to see whether or not that reputational threat intensifies, the crisis history and prior reputation have to be looked at. There was no relevant crisis history in this case. There were a few cases in the past during which asylum seekers committed suicide. For example, in 2011 Kambiz Roustayi, an Iranian asylum seeker, put himself on fire on the Dam in Amsterdam after his asylum application had been refused (NRC, 2013c). However, those suicides were never directly linked to mistakes by the ministry. Therefore, this did not intensify the reputational threat.
The prior reputation of Teeven is characterized by names as ‘crimefighter’, and ‘law-and-order poster-child’ (Telegraaf, 2013b; NRC, 2013d; De Volkskrant, 2013b). He was known for strict, immigration policy, aiming to keep asylum seekers out of The Netherlands. This reputation became relevant in this context, because opposition members stated during the political crisis that he was not the right type to be a facilitating minister of immigration (Telegraaf, 2013b).
All these factors considered, there was a high reputational threat due to the fact that the crisis fits the intentional cluster. This threat further intensifies because of the prior reputation of Teeven as a minister who does not care about respecting the humanity of asylum seekers, but rather a minister who tries his best to keep them out. According to Situational Crisis Communication Theory, he should have taken high levels of responsibility in order to repair the reputational threat.
Table 8.2 SCCT - Teeven's intensifying factors
Image repair strategies
The image repair strategies that Teeven used were mortification, corrective action, reducing the degree of offensiveness (compensation) and evading responsibility (accident).
In the beginning of the political crisis, the most salient image repair strategy that Teeven used was mortification. Apart from statements in which he expresses how this case emotionally affected him, he also explicitly takes political responsibility, right from the start.
Type of crisis cluster Associated reputational threat
Victim cluster Low reputational threat
Accidental cluster Medium reputational threat
Intentional cluster High reputational threat
Table 8.1: SCCT - Teeven’s initial reputational threat
Intensifying factors Quality Effect on reputational threat
Crisis history High
Neutral Low
Reputational threat intensifies Reputational threat is unchanged Reputational threat diminishes
Prior reputation Bad
Neutral Good
Reputational threat intensifies Reputational threat is unchanged Reputational threat diminishes
I am political responsible (Nieuwsuur, 2013a).
Teeven also used corrective action when the report was just published. In a letter to parliament on the 12th of April, he mentions that he will adopt many recommendations from the inspection, and that he will additional improvement policies (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2013). Corrective action was a very important strategy during the debate on the 18th of April: he eventually receives support from the CDA and PvdA through the use of corrective action: he promises to request an external inquiry into the treatment of asylum seekers in order to learn more about the possible flaws of his policy (NRC, 2013e).
He also monetary compensation to Dolmatov’s mother.
Given the findings of the inspection, I see sufficient ground in this specific case to compensate for the possible damage of the relatives due to the death of Mr Dolmatov. Contact will be made with the relatives to discuss the extent of any damage (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2013).
The final strategy he uses is evading responsibility by framing it as an accident. In the context of image repair strategies, an accident refers to situations in which the incident is a consequence of circumstances beyond your control (Benoit, 2015). By pointing to individuals who did not follow orders, he framed himself and the ministry as innocent, and therefore evaded responsibility.
Table 9. Fred Teeven’s image repair strategies
Two strategies he used seemingly contradict each other: mortification and (explicitly) evading responsibility. How can someone take full responsibility for something and at the same time evade responsibility? The explanation for this is that Teeven distinguishes between two different forms of responsibility. On the one hand there is the institution of political responsibility, which prescribes that a minister is responsible for every mistake that happens on your department, regardless of if you could’ve done anything to prevent it. On the other hand there is direct responsibility: did anything you do or did not do add to the context in which the incident could’ve occurred? Teeven takes on the full political responsibility, but evades the personal responsibility. He wants to make it clear that his policies are not the reason this happened, and that there are no structural problems within his department that he should have been aware of as minister.
The question is, was his frame appropriate, given the amount of responsibility SCCT would require him to take? Based on the analysis and on the ambiguity of his communication, it was not an appropriate frame. The reason for that relates to the fundaments of SCCT. This theory was built on the attribution theory of Wiener, which is based on the premise that people need to assign
Image repair strategy Substrategies Explanation Responsibility taken
Denial - I didn’t do it none
Evading responsibility Provocation Defeasibility Accidents Good intentions He provoked me I didn't know Beyond my control I meant well low
Reducing the degree of offensiveness Bolstering Minimization Differentiation Transcendence Attacking accuser Compensation
I'm a good guy It’ s not that bad Another act is worse For the greater good You’re not credible e.g. damages
medium
Corrective action - It won't happen again neutral
leader for mistakes made in an organization can fulfill that need: it shows that that person knows what went wrong and, if that person is still considered credible, gives consolation that it will not happen again.
However, Teeven did not actually show that he knew what went wrong.
This is the consequence of a ‘unique and tragic turn of events’. (NRC, 2013e)
This implies that it could happen again in the future. Therefore, the need that people had (assigning responsibility for the event) is not met. Taking political responsibility in this case was nothing more than acknowledging that an unwritten rule exists that all ministers are always responsible for what happens on their ministry, regardless of if they could’ve influenced the incident. Teeven uses political responsibility as a hollow frame. His strategy is not appropriate.
§4. The coherency of the minister’s communication strategy
The cause-frame that Teeven brought forward, that it was an incident and not a structural problem, was carefully crafted. It became more explicit, but it was consistent from the first statement onwards. This frame was brought forward in a coherent manner.
The frame of resignation did change. On Friday he stated that he would not comment on that, on Monday he stated that he wanted to remain in office it would’ve been up to him. This shift from not commenting on resignation towards stating that he wanted to stay in office went very gradually. As an anonymous insider of the ministry stated:
‘He said that [parliament has to determine his fate] ten times. But the eleventh time he adds a little sentence ‘En then then the question is: who is going to implement those improvement measure? I think I can.” (Volkskrant, 2013c)
This statement does not directly contradict his previous statements, but it does add crucial new information. Therefore, it can not be concluded that his communication strategy was incoherent. It is possible that this was the strategy from the beginning: start of with mortification, and gradually, towards the debate, focus more on his own political position and make it clear that he wants to stay in office.
Therefore he was able to deliver his own frame very quickly. His frame that it was an incident rather than a structural problem was clear and easy to understand. Teeven's communication strategy can be considered coherent.
§5. The media’s frame
Cause
Many media reports explore the validity of Teeven’s claim: was this an incident, or were there structural problems. To explore that, many possible indicators that there are structural problems are discussed, for example that Teeven’s policy is inhumane (Telegraaf, 2013b) and that Teeven is not open to criticism (NRC, 2013c).
In sum, the salient cause pointed to by the media is that there are structural problems within the organization. However, in all these reports they do state what Teeven's view is. Some headlines directly pose this question "Is it a structural flaw or an incident?” (Trouw, 2013a). Even though Teeven’s frame is not confirmed, his frame does become salient in the media reports. Therefore, there is alignment in the frame of the cause.
Severity
The media frame the severity through illustrations of the emotional impact this had on the relatives of Dolmatov.
Godfroid:
Dolmatova [Dolmatov’s mother] is just as inconsolable as the lsat time we spoke to her, shortly after the death of her son. Aleksandr Dolmatov’s mother still has great difficulty dealing with his tragic suicide. (NOS, 2013a)
Mother:
Deep in my heart, all my thoughts go to Aleksandr. Whatever I do, wherever I am, I think: why is he no longer here? I have lost the purpose of my existence. (NRC, 2013a)
Impact on political position
The question of what political responsibility means arises in the media. What does it mean to take political responsibility, if it does not mean resigning? The media don't dare to make any predictions about whether or not he will resign. They do state what the core question is that the debate will depend on:
Van de Westelaken:
Junior Minister Teeven has to account in parliament tomorrow, and the core question that the debate will depend on is: was the Dolmatov-case an unfortunate incident, or should Teeven have taken action? (NOS, 2013b).
This aligns with Teeven’s communication strategy: if he wins the battle that it was a unique incident he can stay, if loses and parliament considers it a structural problem, he might have to go.
Table 10. Media alignment in the case of Fred Teeven
Frame Minister Media
Cause The incident was caused by
individual misdeed in the organization rather than structural problems in his department
The media report on the question whether it was a structural problem or a unique incident. Therefore, they report on Teeven’s frame a lot as well.
Severity Emotional: he states that he
‘genuinely’ has a hard time with it.
Emotional: focus on the pain of the mother of the deceased Impact on political position Changes: first he states that
parliament would decide on his political decision. Towards the end he fights to stay in office.
It is unclear whether or not he would need to resign, but it would depend on the question whether or not parliament would consider the incident was caused by structural problems in the department, or only by individual misdeed
§6. Concluding remarks regarding media alignment
There is alignment on all three characteristics of the frame: the cause, the severity and the impact on the political position of Teeven.
Teeven's communication strategy can not be considered appropriate. At first, it seems as if it is, because he explicitly takes political responsibility. As time progresses it becomes increasingly clear that he is not in fact taking personal responsibility for the events.
The communication strategy is coherent. He was able to express his interpretation timely, and it was a frame that was easy to understand. This can also be seen by the fact that the media picked up the core question that Teeven wanted the political crisis to revolve around: was it in an incident or a structural problem?
