Missed opportunity foretold : exploring the co-governance of humanitarian aid in conflict-affected Colombia : case study of the Mocoa mudslide 2017

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MISSED OPPORTUNITY FORETOLD

Exploring the Co-Governance of Humanitarian Aid in Conflict-Affected Colombia: Case Study of the Mocoa Mudslide 2017

Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Master of Science at the University of Amsterdam

By

Erin Hedwig Christina Kuipers 10153055

Research Master International Development Studies University of Amsterdam

June 2018

Supervisor (first reader): Isabelle Desportes Second reader: Michaela Hordijk

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Agradecimientos

The fulfilment of this master thesis would not have been possible without the support and participation of wonderful people. First, I want to express my deepest gratitude to those in Mocoa who were willing to share their painful but resilient stories with me. My admiration and respect go out to them.

Thank you to all my respondents, who shared their experiences, critical thoughts and reflections with me. To Ana Maria Arango, Lenka Sobotova, and Patty Florez for your invaluable support and guiding me through the beautiful facets of Colombia. Colombia,

me robaste el corazón.

Thank you to Isabelle Desportes for guiding me through the writing process and above all for your kindness. My grateful thanks are extended to Michaela Hordijk, for all your support these past two years, and for believing in me. I would like to also express my gratitude to Thea Hilhorst, for allowing me to be part of this fascinating project that is DisCoRD.

Special thanks to Eliot, Jonathan, and Santiago, for being awesome roommates and for watching out for me.

Finally, my eternal thanks to my parents and to Michiel, for your patience, support and your unconditional love.

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Abstract

In recent years, humanitarian governance has experienced a fundamental shift from classical humanitarianism to resilience humanitarianism. This paradigm shift not only signifies a change in humanitarian action, but a change in our own perceptions and understanding of humanitarianism. At the same time, policy attention is shifting to the co-incidence of disaster and conflict. However, the emerging body of research has not yet provided a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted phenomena involved.

In light of the changing dynamics resulting from the paradigm shift, humanitarians must find new ways to define their relationships with the state, local responders, and finally the crisis-affected people themselves. This thesis advances three core debates pertaining to those changing relationships. The 2017 mudslide in Mocoa provide a context-specific lens into an increasingly recognized field of humanitarian operation, that of the conflict-disaster dyad. By drawing on the actor-oriented approach of the humanitarian arena, this research explores the different ‘interfaces’ between the diverse set of actors within the arena.

Drawing on four months of fieldwork in Bogotá and Mocoa in 2017, this thesis reveals how the interfaces between the different actors in the humanitarian arena of Mocoa were characterized by collaboration, competition and sometimes even confrontation. The relationship dynamics between aid, state and community can thus be characterized as complex and highly problematic. The organization of the disaster response not only failed to deliver effective aid to the disaster victims but also failed to contribute to restoring state-society relations.

The case of Mocoa exemplifies how the narrow scope of classical humanitarianism can have detrimental effects on the multi-faceted state-aid-society relations, and ultimately for communities who are not only disaster victims, but also citizens of a conflict-affected state. The research also show that the global shift from narrow classical humanitarianism to the broader mandate of resilience humanitarianism still happens largely on paper instead of in the field. Despite the global recognition of the inherent flaws of the current humanitarian system, the response in Mocoa reflects a relapse into the traditional paradigm and unequivocal repetition of previously acknowledged errors. This highlights the urgent need for a broader humanitarian scope to be implemented, so that aid actors do not continue to fall into the same pitfalls.

Keywords: Colombia; humanitarian governance; natural disasters; conflict; non-governmental actors; disaster response; Mocoa.

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List of Acronyms

CSO Civil Society Organizations

ELN National Liberation Army (‘Ejército de Liberación Nacional’)

FARC The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (‘Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia’)

HCT Humanitarian Coordination Team IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

INGO International Non-Governmental Organizations

JAC Community Action Platforms (‘Juntas de Acción Comunal’) LCT Local Coordination Team

LNGO Local Non-Governmental Organization

PMU Unified Command Post (‘Puesto de Mando Unificado’) UN United Nations

UNGRD National Unit for Disaster Risk Management (‘Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres’)

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs WHS World Humanitarian Summit

List of figures and tables

Figure 3.1 Conceptual scheme ... 17

Figure 3.2 Map of the research locations ... 18

Table 3.1 Overview of study participants and interviewees ... 19

Table 10.1 Operationalized concepts ... 7

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1 | Introduction

In the early morning of April 1st, 2017, the city of Mocoa suffered a massive mudslide when the three smaller rivers Mocoa, Mulato and Sangoyaco burst their banks triggered by torrential rains and released a giant flow of water, mud and rocks onto the city. What followed was the destruction of half the city, wiping out entire neighbourhoods. Official reports stated the death of 290 people, injury of 332 and a total of 1.518 flood-affected households (Colombia Humanitarian Team, 2017).

“During the morning it had started to rain and later it started to rain even harder. We were used to it raining but it had never rained so much as that day […] We were about to leave the house when all the lights went out and we were in the middle of the water, as we were floating on our back inside the house [..]. We started to beg God to calm the water [..] people were begging for help, and houses that we could see from the distance up high fell down like cardboard boxes”. (interviewed community member, 07-12-2017)

Both the causes and impact of the Mocoa mudslide - called avalancha by the residents - are entangled with the Colombian civil conflict. Located in the Amazon basin amid a confluence of rivers, Mocoa was already at higher risk of natural hazards. However, the impact of the disaster was significantly worsened by the huge influx of new residents, many fleeing violence and seeking protection from the civil conflict. Mocoa has been the municipality with the largest reception of victims of the armed conflict for the department of Putumayo. In the last twenty years the population of Mocoa has increased from 40.000 to approximately 100.000 inhabitants. Nearly half of the current population of Mocoa has come to escape violence in other parts of the country, leaving the city to deal with pressure of unplanned urbanisation. Shortage of housing and lack of territorial regulations led many people to build informal settlements near the river bank. It therefore comes as no surprise that the largest proportion of the flood victims were internally displaced persons (IDPs). Nearly half of the population affected in the mudslide was also a victim of the armed conflict.

The situation of Mocoa is not unique to Colombia, which shows numerous interconnections between conflict and natural disasters. Both the civil war and the 'war on drugs' have led to large-scale displacement of the population (Wisner and Gaillard, 2012). Many have been forced to migrate to areas particularly exposed to hazards and live in conditions that make them highly vulnerable to both disaster and violence. Moreover, the majority of IDPs have been marginalised groups such as children, Afro-Colombians, indigenous populations and poor women (Wisner et al., 2003). Over the years Colombia has also experienced a number of high-profile natural disasters; The 2011 La Niña season was marked by extensive flooding and mudslides which threatened over 70% of the country’s territory (Floodlist 2013; Hernandez Vargas 2014), made international headlines and led to the declaration of a national state of emergency; February of this year, heavy rain and flooding occurred in the department of Nariño, affecting over 25,000 people; Most recently in April, the Mocoa avalancha made both national and international headlines as being one of the worst natural disasters in Colombia in recent years (The Guardian, 2017).

The Mocoa avalancha however distinguishes itself in that it is one of the first major natural disasters to occur after the Colombian government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) signed a final agreement on the termination of the Colombian conflict. The historic peace agreement (‘Acuerdo de Paz’) that was signed on November 24th of 2016 formally ended over forty

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years of civil conflict, reputed to be the longest contemporary conflict in the Western hemisphere. Subsequent peace has been fragile however, and in order to build a stable peace and prevent resurgence of violence, the Colombian state has to strengthen its commitment to restore its relationship with its citizens in the formerly FARC-dominated areas and tackle the issues of political exclusion and socio-economic disparities that had originally been at the root of the conflict (Albertus, 2016; KROC Institute, 2017). Against the backdrop of these post-conflict processes, the Mocoa mudslide has therefore presented the Colombian government with a unique opportunity to show its commitment and improve state-society relations through its humanitarian assistance.

1.1 Thesis aim

This research examines the case of the disaster response in Mocoa, set against the backdrop of the Colombian civil conflict and post-conflict processes. The mudslide in Mocoa provides a context-specific lens into an increasingly recognized field of humanitarian operation, that of the conflict-disaster dyad. By drawing on the actor-oriented approach of the humanitarian arena, this research explores the different ‘interfaces’ between the diverse set of actors within the arena, and tries to uncover the interplay between the institutions, actors, discourses and aid practices in the humanitarian arena of Mocoa. Following what has transpired in Mocoa, this thesis sets out to advance three core debates that are held within the broader scope of humanitarianism, and pertain to the changing relationships with the state, local responders, and finally the crisis-affected people themselves.

This study is part of a large-scale research project ‘When disasters meet conflict’ (DisCoRD1₎ that focuses on the disaster response of humanitarian aid and local state and non-state institutions in different conflict scenarios. Three types of political and institutional instability: high-intensity conflict (HIC); low-intensity conflict (LIC) and post-conflict situations. to account for the diversity of conflict dynamics and specific conflict drivers. The research consists of a series of qualitative case studies on disaster response in conflict situations. These case studies systematically investigate how international agencies interact with the state and non-state actors, such as rebel movements, NGOs, the private sector, communities and the media. The Colombia case study is part of the LIC case study series. Specifically, this study contributes to the field through integration of conflict- and disaster studies; through its focus on the interaction between international aid and state and non-state actors; and through the use of disasters as an entry point to study institutional change in conflict situations.

1.2 Roadmap

The thesis chapters are organized as follows:

§ Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical underpinnings of the research, elaborating on the conflict-disaster nexus, the heterogeneity of humanitarian action, the core debates with which contemporary humanitarianism finds itself confronted.

1_{The 2015-2020 DisCoRD project is funded by the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek}

(Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research) and based at the International Institute for Social Studies, The Hague.

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§ Chapter 3 explains the methodology behind the study, delves into the epistemological, ontological and methodological choices made when designing this research and reflects on their implementation, limitations and ethical considerations.

§ Chapter 4 situates the research in the wider socio-political and historical context of conflict-affected Colombia. Furthermore it describes how Colombia is structurally impacted by natural disasters, and how that has shaped national disaster policies, and explains how the situation in Mocoa is shaped by both disaster and conflict dynamics.

§ In Chapter 5 we are moving into the main part of this thesis. This chapter deepens the first debate in this thesis, which underlies the dynamic and often constraint relationship between humanitarian agencies and the state. Following exploration of how this debate played out in Mocoa, the chapter reflects on the position of humanitarian actors towards nation-states. § Chapter 6 deepens the second debate regarding the call for a ‘localized’ humanitarian

response, and outlines the key issues and questions surrounding localization. Following exploration of how this debate played out in Mocoa, the chapter reflects on

§ Chapter 7 deepens the third debate, which pertains to the crisis-affected people and their perceptions and agency in the crisis as well as the humanitarian response. Following exploration of how this debate played out in Mocoa, this chapter reflects on

§ Finally, chapter 8 draws on the findings discussed in the empirical chapters to answer the main research question. It synthesizes my findings and collected insights into the humanitarian arena of Mocoa to thicken the three core debates, and highlights the urgent need for a broader humanitarian scope to be implemented.

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2 | Theoretical Framework

This chapter outlines the theoretical underpinnings of this study. First, it elaborates on the ways in which conflict and disaster are interconnected phenomena. Next, it moves onto the topic of humanitarian action and shows how the humanitarian realm is comprised of a heterogeneous network of agencies, discourses and institutions. The chapter then introduces the three of the core debates with which modern humanitarian action currently is confronted, (1) the humanitarianism-sovereignty clash, (2) the localized response, and (3) social navigation of the humanitarian arena. Lastly, it explains the actor-oriented concept of the humanitarian arena and explores the arena’s central working mechanisms.

2.1 When disaster meets conflict

Recent high-profile disasters in fragile countries and conflict-affected areas have led to increased attention to the links between disasters and conflict (Harris, Keen, and Mitchell 2013). In 2004, an earthquake with 9.0 on the Richter scale triggered a tsunami in the Indian ocean which hit the coast of war-torn Aceh, Indonesia; The 2005 earthquake in Kashmir hit the contested areas at the heart of the decades-long low-intensity conflict between India and Pakistan (Özerdem 2006); In 2010, an earthquake struck post-conflict Haiti. Its weakened government proved incapable of organising disaster response (De Ville De Goyet, Sarmiento, and Grünewald 2011:3). The interconnected nature of risks associated with natural disasters, conflict and poverty has been increasingly recognised. People in fragile and conflict-affected areas are often disproportionally impacted by natural disasters compared to other disaster-affected regions and a considerate number of high-profile disasters is understood to have been shaped by the conflict and state fragility in the affected areas (Harris et al. 2013; Kellett and Sparks 2012). Conflict has a major impact on societal ability to respond to disasters, weakening institutional response capacity and hampering aid provision. Vice versa, natural disasters can exacerbate or even incite conflict, thus impacting conflict dynamics. However, the co-incidence of disaster and conflict poses additional challenges.

2.1.1 The nature of disasters

Popular and media interpretations often present natural disasters as extreme phenomena with external causes. Global news coverages abound with images of violent geophysical destruction. This focus on the natural processes frames natural disasters as events uninfluenced political structures, as if to say, “nature affects everyone without discrimination”. This notion, however, has long been deemed inaccurate and unjustified by the scholarly community. Conventional notions of disaster as a “single, discrete event” with solely “external” causes have largely been overturned (Wisner et al., 2003). Natural disasters do not arise solely from physical external causes, but also contain a significant social component. In fact, disasters are a result of interactions between natural- or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions (Hewitt 1995; O’Keefe, Westgate, and Wisner, 1976; Wisner et al., 2003). The UNISDR (2005) posits that disaster risk can be written as a function of the intersection between hazard and vulnerability:

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In this equation, the natural event itself is represented as only having a limited effect on disaster magnitude. Geophysical processes, with varying degrees of intensity and severity, offer a relatively limited contribution to people’s risk to disaster (Nel and Righarts 2008). Additionally, the equation makes a hard distinction between hazards and disasters. Natural hazards are often classified according to speed of impact, from rapid-onset (e.g. earthquakes, tsunamis, floods and landslides) to slow-onset events (e.g. environmental degradation, drought, or changes in flood lines). Disasters however, are much harder to classify along those same lines; framing disasters as sudden-onset events incorrectly assumes that “disasters are departures from ‘normal’ social functioning, and that recovery means a return to normal” (Wisner et al. 2003). Rather, hazards often act as a “trigger event”, aggravating underlying societal tensions which ultimately determine the disaster.

Instead, vulnerability serves as main explanatory for the overall manifestation of the disaster, constructed by social, economic and political factors. As understood through the equation, a hazard becomes a disaster through vulnerability, and the amount of vulnerability determines the impact of the disaster. Vulnerability is defined by Wisner et al. (2003) as “the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard”. Human vulnerability emerges from a combination of factors that “determine the degree to which someone’s life, livelihood, property and other assets are put at risk”. Adverse economic conditions may force people to live in less habitable regions with increased chance of natural hazard occurrence (Paton 2006; Wisner et al. 2003). Vulnerability affects allocation and distribution of resources. Existing social systems and power relations impact different social groups, resulting in unequal distribution and access to resources, knowledge and information, or unfair allocation of welfare and social protection (Manyena 2012). Overrepresentation of poor people in hazard-prone areas affirms the social nature of disasters (Winsemius et al. 2015). Additionally, vulnerability is not a static attribute of society. Patterns of migration, urbanisation and globalization all influence underlying exposure and vulnerability (Harris et al. 2013). Although often used interchangeably, the distinction between vulnerability and risk is important. Vulnerability can be defined as community susceptibility to harm due to social, biophysical, or spatial characteristics, whereas risk indicates the degree of potential loss due to exposure to hazards (Alexander 2000:13; Horekens 2007; Paton 2006). As a result, the disaster governance narrative has also experienced a shift: from viewing disasters as disruptive singular events to framing them as manifestations of unresolved development problems or failed development (Manyena 2012; Yodmani 2001). Conversely, disaster events put considerable strain on development efforts and act as principally contributing factor to the impairment of the economic and social situation of lesser developed countries and poorer regions (Horekens 2007).

2.1.2 The conflict-disaster nexus

Violent conflict has an enormous impact on people and societies and can significantly increase disaster vulnerability through exacerbation of existing inequalities. People in fragile and conflict-affected areas are often disproportionally impacted by natural disasters compared to other disaster-affected regions (Hilhorst 2013). Interactions between natural disasters and pre-existing conflicts may lead to reduction of certain drivers while exacerbation of others (Harris et al. 2013; Hilhorst 2013; Wisner et al. 2003).

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Violent conflict can deteriorate human vulnerability through crippling of infrastructure, basic service provision and livelihood security. Violent conflict also impacts disaster risk through large-scale displacement, forcing people to migrate to areas more exposed to hazards (Harris et al. 2013; Wisner et al. 2003). Unequal distributions of power can lead to marginalisation of certain groups that are often already vulnerable to begin with. Alternatively, others may achieve economic gains from conflict and consequently reduce their disaster risk or vulnerability from its negative impacts (Harris et al. 2013; Wisner et al. 2003). Additionally, conflict can weaken or undermine institutions that are responsible for security and social protection (Harris et al. 2013; Wisner et al. 2003). Inadequate institutional capacity for disaster response and protection may create tensions between state and society. States that fail to adequately protect their population may invoke protests or rebellions. In other instances, states may use disaster situations to strengthen their authority over territories and populations with the aim to enhance their legitimacy. Governments may inhibit aid on security grounds, or appropriate humanitarian aid to support conflict objectives. In other situations, they may refuse international help for fear of undermining their sovereignty. Different conflict dynamics can influence disaster risk in different ways. Low-intensity conflict, also called protracted social conflict or

guerrilla warfare, refers to socio-political tensions resulting in increased exclusion and discrimination

against minorities, and in intermittent outbursts of violent events from both sides (Ramsbotham 2005). Although the state is presented as a strong authoritarian and functional actor in large parts of the territory, there is unequal distribution of its power. Often the state has lost its grip on the lower governance levels and peripheral regions. Consequently, ‘pockets of weakness’ can be observed in which authority is contested by opposing factions, and where the state may be corrupted and fragmented. Rural and isolated areas are often disproportionally affected. Contesting authorities may seek to engage in disaster response to enhance their legitimacy. Overall there is lower internal capacity to deal with disasters, resulting in a large influx of international aid actors. Aid in these contexts may be particularly prone to accusations of being uneven and partisan.

Conversely, natural disasters can significantly increase the risk of violent conflict through exacerbation of existing inequalities (Nel and Righarts 2008). Structures of society may be affected through disrupted economic development and increased economic inequality. Environmental scarcity incites critical competition over access and control of natural resources and may also be an incentive for elite resource grabs. Additionally, contesting parties may exert violence and armed force to extract desired resources. Others have argued that it is not so much scarcity that drives conflict, but the imbalance between scarcity and abundance (Gendron and Hoffman 2009; Harris et al. 2013). Natural disasters can intensify this imbalance, resulting in migration to and competition over remaining fertile and resource-rich areas. Influx of refugees – either due to war, natural disaster or both – can have an immediate effect on vulnerability by suddenly raising the population density and consequent demands on local services, infrastructure and resources. The El Niño floods in 1997 not only lead to massive migration to the fertile Lower Juba valley, Somalia, but also attracted land grabbing and armed conflict between the more powerful clans (Narbeth and McLean 2003:11). The possible role of

disaster diplomacy has also been recognized. In certain cases, disasters may present opportunities to

help build the legitimacy of the state and strengthen state- society relations; thus, unexpectedly providing space for peace-building efforts and conflict resolution (Hilhorst 2013; Wisner et al. 2003). In the case of post-Tsunami Aceh, aid harmonisation and collaboration between aid and state helped to break through the ‘conflict impasse’ (Waizenegger and Hyndman 2010). Similarly, the drought in

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Mozambique in the early 1990s sufficiently weakened the contesting parties consequently ended the war.

2.2 Humanitarian governance

Provision of relief to victims of conflict and natural disasters is part of the humanitarian realm. Humanitarian action is the response to an immediate emergency, conflict or catastrophe. Fassin (2007) defines humanitarian governance as “the administration of human collectivities in the name of a higher moral principle that sees the preservation of life and the alleviation of suffering as the highest value of action”.

Humanitarian action is most often associated with the ideology of classical humanitarianism. This doctrine is embedded in humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality (to refrain from taking sides or engage in hostilities and conflict), impartiality (requiring agencies to deliver relief according to need and without discrimination among recipients), and independence (agencies to be autonomous from political or other objectives that play a role in conflict). Humanitarian assistance is said to take place in the ‘humanitarian space’, defined as a formalized yet metaphorical space, as well as normative framework, in which humanitarian actors come together to work unimpeded and according to the humanitarian principles (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010; de Waal 2010). Modern humanitarianism was first institutionalized through the Sphere project, a collaborative initiative to produce globally applicable minimum standards for humanitarian response in order to improve effectiveness and accountability. The Sphere standards have become an instrument of governance endorsed by both UN agencies and the NGO-community alike (The Sphere Project, 2012). Concurrently, the UNOCHA cluster-approach – formalising the lead roles of particular organisations in key sectors of humanitarian response such as logistics, water and sanitation, shelters, and food – was produced and subsequently institutionalized (Stoddard et al., 2007).

However, the humanitarian realm constitutes more than its ideology and institutions. In past decades, an international humanitarian order has established itself. As such, Barnett (2013) speaks of a ‘global governance of humanity’, or rather humanitarian governance. Humanitarianism is in fact governed by the humanitarian organisations, providing common governance mechanisms for themselves through their institutions. The character of humanitarian crisis as well as its response is often found to be the outcome of a social and political process, shaped by people, institutions, and context (Voorst and Hilhorst 2017). According to Hilhorst, “humanitarian crises attain their specific

realities through the language and practice in which actors negotiate their meaning, communicate about them, and develop and implement responses” (2013). Power configurations and struggles have

become an existential part of contemporary humanitarian action. For example, powerful actors may have a larger influence on how categories of vulnerability and allocation of aid are negotiated. The dissemination of ideas, allocation of humanitarian resources and implementation of relief projects almost always take place within the politics of aid (Fernando and Hilhorst 2006; Hilhorst and Jansen 2010).

The international humanitarian order has come to constitute a complex and heterogeneous network of international, national and multilateral agencies: agencies and departments of local and national governments, various agencies of the United Nations, and national and international NGOs (Barnett, 2013). There are the intergovernmental organisations, such as the UNHCR, UNICEF, UNWOMEN and the WFP; there are faith-based organisations like World Vision, Islamic Relief and

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Caritas Internationalis; there are non-governmental multinationals as Oxfam International, Save the Children and Action Contre Le Faim; there is also a range of smaller national and local non-governmental organisations, each with their own character, conviction and focus. Collectively, these agencies and donors have come to be known as the global humanitarian system (Clarke & Dercon, 2016).

2.3 From classical to resilience humanitarianism

In recent years the humanitarian realm has undergone a fundamental discourse shift. The classical humanitarianism paradigm centred around principled aid has slowly become overtaken by the resilience paradigm. This shift reflects a changing purpose of humanitarianism which extends the moral obligation not only to help during immediate threats of death but also to fight the "root causes" of conflict and instability. Humanitarianism, development, and peacebuilding have become combined under a triple nexus. The inclusion of peacebuilding activities means that "nearly all of the features of state and society have become objects of intervention" (Barnett, 2011: 164), ranging from democracy toward the rule of law, education, and freedom of the press. Humanitarian action has become closely associated with goals more sizable than saving lives and relieve suffering, blurring the boundaries between development and poverty alleviation (Barnett, 2009). Aid agencies once oriented around a single goal are increasingly becoming multi-dimensional, with multi-mandated agencies such as World Vision and Caritas working across the triple nexus of humanitarianism-development-peace.

The shift towards resilience humanitarianism also reflects a renewed respect for the role of the state in humanitarian action, advances building on the local response and reframes disaster-affected people from ‘victims’ to ‘a significant force of first responders’ (IFRC, 2013: 17 as cited in Hilhorst, 2018). Concurrently, it raises uncertainties regarding the identity and legitimacy of humanitarian INGOs and UN agencies. In light of these changing dynamics, humanitarians must revisit their relationships with other service providers.

Outlined below are three core debates with which the humanitarian community has been confronted in their endeavour to find new ways to define their relationships with the state, local responders, and finally the crisis-affected people themselves.

2.3.1 The humanitarianism-sovereignty debate

One of the most central aspects to humanitarian intervention is the interaction and engagement with the host state. In recent years the international humanitarian community has increasingly taken responsibility for the human security of people to the disadvantage of the national state, using humanitarian principles to legitimate their presence and activities. In fact, humanitarian norms challenge central notions about sovereignty, and through their interventions, humanitarian actors implicitly contest the state’s rights and capacity to provide for its citizens (Del Valle & Healy, 2013; Kahn & Cunningham, 2013). State sovereignty has been increasingly contested by humanitarian discourse and practices as a socially constructed concept and thus subject to change. Rather, humanitarianism emphasizes the state's obligations to its citizens rather than its right to authority, claiming that sovereignty is not a right to territorial integrity but a privilege which depends on the capacity to respect the fundamental rights and interests of its population and provide protection and assistance.

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Engagement between state and the international humanitarian apparatus is usually coupled with constraints and distrust. Influx of international actors in the arena often result in fierce competition and power struggles. Harvey (2013) illustrates several dilemmas experienced by humanitarian actors in 2009, such as access constraints in the form of government controls during the displacement crisis in Pakistan; expulsion of INGOs in Darfur, Sudan; and pervasive public discourse of hostility and distrust of humanitarian organizations fuelled by a government-controlled media in Sri Lanka. These strained relationships can be traced back to a fundamental tension between the humanitarian agenda and the agenda of nation-states. The tensions in the humanitarianism-sovereignty nexus is one of the core debates within humanitarian governance, and has raised questions as to whether international presence could be considered in part as burden rather than relief (de Waal 2010).

2.3.2 The localisation debate

Discussions surrounding localization and local capacities of humanitarian action have gained considerable traction following the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. Localization was put forward in an effort to transform an overly centralized humanitarian landscape, in which international responders too often taking over in the arena and encouraging competition rather than collaboration. “As local as possible, as international as necessary” has become the motto of the localization movement and captures the broad goal and meaning of ‘localization’. The end goal, a more locally-rooted humanitarian community that leverages the responsibilities and capacities of states, civil society and affected communities in which international actors primarily play a supporting role. Current humanitarian coordination mechanisms are often very “complex and resource-heavy”, making it difficult to access by national and local actors. Although international actors are generally committed to engaging in partnerships with local agencies and capacities, local NGOs often experience unequal access to the to the disaster efforts, even though they are frequently approached become partners in international programmes. As a result, many local NGOs tend to develop their own mechanisms when responding to humanitarian crises and are reluctant to join existing multilateral networks. Yet, the debate is still largely unformed regarding in which form localization should occur. Critics have argued that it does not give adequate importance to the various humanitarian contexts that exist and the consequently differing responses they might require (Anuja, 2016).

2.3.3 The social navigation debate

People in the conflict-disaster dyad not only have to navigate structural state of social disorder from the conflict and the further disruption brought on by the natural disaster, but also the influx of a large diversity of humanitarian entities that have come to their immediate aid. Although the power of international non-state actors significantly depends on the recognition of legitimacy from those affected by the crisis (Beetham 2013:270), their role in the aid processes is often overlooked. Aid programmes are not imposed on passive beneficiaries but exist in an arena of social actors with competing interests and strategies (Bakewell, 2000). Aid recipients are often strategic in reaching out to agencies and positioning themselves to fit the eligibility criteria for service delivery. “While agencies

derive their legitimacy from their image of being moral actors, recipients derive their legitimacy from the fact that they are in need”(Hilhorst and Jansen 2010). Yet the interactions between aid providers

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other. As such, the global humanitarian system has received heavy criticism regarding the way they deal with the affected communities.

2.4 The humanitarian arena

As said before, humanitarian action is subject to social and political processes, and is shaped by people, institutions and context. Hilhorst and Jansen (2010) approach the humanitarian space as a ‘socially negotiated arena’, with the discourses surrounding humanitarianism as political struggles in itself. The idea of an arena is founded in an actor-oriented approach, which recognizes that humanitarian action is shaped through a range of driving forces besides the humanitarian principles. Hilhorst & Jansen conceptualize social negotiation as encompassing “any kind of strategy, including

coercive violence, written statements, formal interactions, schemes deployed in the shadows of the official process and the banalities of everyday gossiping”. Practices of aid are driven by the different

motives of the actors. Decisions are taken in response to actors’ interpretations of both the needs of the situation as well as in interaction with other actors. From the arena perspective, humanitarian principles itself are seen as contextual, acquiring meaning through the way in which service providers interpret them and use them in their everyday practices. Another important feature of the arena approach is that it recognizes that the humanitarian space is open to a diverse range of actors. Service delivery in crises – although oft associated with traditional humanitarian agencies – also encompasses actors such as “UN agencies, multiple mandate NGOs, suppliers from the international and local

private sector, and military contingents providing aid in inaccessible areas or protecting its delivery by civilian actors” (Voorst and Hilhorst 2017). Thus, disaster response can be posited as the outcome of

social negotiation within the humanitarian arena, based on how actors along and around the aid chain interpret the crisis context and needs, their own role and the roles of others. Humanitarian aid, in this perspective, is “the outcome of the messy interaction of social actors struggling, negotiating, and at

times guessing to further their interests” (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010).

2.4.1 Power, legitimacy and partnerships

In the arena-approach, the central working mechanisms constitute power, legitimacy and relationships between the humanitarian actors. Giddens (1984:257–58) defines power as “the

capacity to achieve outcomes, generated “in and through the reproduction of structures of domination”. Turner (2005) posits that there are multiple ways through which power can be exercised,

i.e. influence, control, authority and coercion. Legitimacy is a crucial component of power relations. Without legitimacy, power is exerted through coercion; with legitimacy, power can be exerted through compliance. Legitimacy can thus be understood as an acceptance of authority by others (Beetham 2013). The power of international non-state actors almost wholly depends on the recognition of legitimacy (Beetham 2013:270), as coercion is by no means an option. Their legitimacy is not only dependent on the cooperation of the beneficiaries, but also on the support of donors and the cooperation of the national government. Actors may attain normative legitimacy through their expertise and experience in the field, or the way in which they represent certain constituencies. Principally, actors must convince local stakeholders and donors of their appropriateness and trustworthiness in order to mobilize funds and support. However, humanitarian aid within the conflict context becomes increasingly politicised; Some may use the language of humanitarian principles strategically to legitimize themselves and gain access to the arena (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010). Others may attempt to use the image of the humanitarian space to conceal their own interests and political

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roles. This poses challenges for agencies to adhere to the ideals of the humanitarian principles as it may unintentionally contribute to the conflict (Fernando and Hilhorst 2006; Kleinfeld 2007; Voorst and Hilhorst 2017). In areas where the state is contested, UN agencies and Western NGOs may be seen as “guilty by association”. Normative characteristics of partnerships generally encompass reciprocity, mutuality, transparency, equality (Fernando & Hilhorst 2006). Effective humanitarian partnerships are not only about common objectives, shared responsibilities and joint activities. They also involve “underlying issues of power, attitudes and styles of working” (Brinkerhoff, 2000). Overall, the nature of these partnerships and decision-making processes and actors’ roles are a result of social negotiation and power struggles (Hilhorst 2013).

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3| Methodology

The following chapter lays out the ways in which the research was developed and subsequently conducted. First it explains the ontological position from which I approached my objects of study. It presents the conceptual scheme through which the concepts are understood, and the research questions are derived. Then, the unit of analysis, and method of data collection and analysis. Lastly, it also reflects on the limitations I faced during fieldwork, my learning process and ethical considerations.

This research draws on the concept of the humanitarian arena, which articulates itself through the ontological position of structured agency. This model, put forward by Giddens – one of its exponents – posits duality of structure and agency as interconnected in character. Structure materializes through complexes of discourses, i.e. comprehensive relational stories which act as key structures of signification and legitimation (Jabri 1996), and through social institutions, i.e. the ‘rules of the game’, from laws to informal norms, and organizations and actors as ‘players of the game’ (Bingen 2000). In turn, agency is embedded within a set of social relationships and institutions and can be observed through social practices. Agents can be understood as those who navigate their life through this environment of structural constraints. As put by Anthony King,

"Human agency is a collective product, germinated with others and dependent upon the social networks in which we all exist. Human agency is better understood as the collective product of social relations [...] than as an autonomous individual power"

Ethnographic enquiry is employed as main methodology and supplemented with qualitative geography and participant observations. visualization and comparison. An ethnography of humanitarian practice can illustrate the ways in which humanitarian actors give meaning to and act upon the humanitarian crisis. By studying the way humanitarian actors shape the reality of aid in the conflict-disaster context, we can explore how principles and policies work in practice. A focus on everyday practices of aid allows the researcher to analyse the processes of power, legitimacy, and partnerships within humanitarian communities (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010).

3.1 Conceptual scheme

The conceptual scheme zooms in on the ways in which my research concepts are interconnected (shown in Figure 1). First, it shows how the humanitarian crisis is influenced by the interaction between disaster and conflict as explored in the theoretical framework. Next, the conflict-affected context impacts which actors present themselves in the humanitarian arena at the time of the disaster response. Organizations may already have established themselves in the geographical area due to conflict-related humanitarian issues and formed alternative governance structures. Second, the continuity of the conflict crisis has its influence on the power, legitimacy and partnerships of humanitarian actors in the arena. Humanitarian actors may use certain discourses and institutions to legitimize their presence and actions from the discourse and institutions (which in turn are influenced by the global context). Humanitarian institutions may determine the ‘rules’ and thus decide how the game is played. Subsequently, how they relate to other actors in the arena is determined by their relative power and perhaps previously existing partnerships. From the arena perspective, the institutionalized humanitarian principles are seen as contextual, acquiring meaning through the way

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in which service providers interpret them and use them in their everyday practices. An operationalisation table of the concepts can be found in the appendix (Table 10.1).

3.2 Research questions

How did the state, non-state actors and humanitarian agencies respond to the disasters in conflict-affected Mocoa, and how did this affect the institutional power, legitimacy and partnerships of these actors?

3.2.1 Sub questions

1. How did the state, non-state actors and humanitarian agencies perceive the humanitarian crisis? 2. How did the state, non-state actors and humanitarian agencies socially negotiate the disaster

response?

3. How were institutional power, legitimacy and partnerships between the humanitarian actors affected by the humanitarian crisis?

3.3 Methods

The case study at hand – the Mocoa mudslide in 2017 – was chosen for two major reasons: The first reason was timing, as it one of the first high-profile disasters that received international attention after the establishment of the Acuerdo de Paz. In fact, the Mocoa mudslide had made international headlines as being “one of the worst natural disasters in Colombia in recent years”. It therefore made a very suitable case to study the complexity of interactions that I intended to explore. Furthermore, in this way I could also target my actors much more accurately, as I was able to identify them through

Humanitarian crisis Global context

Disaster response

Humanitarian arena discourses institutions Power Partnerships Aid practices Conflict disaster Legitimacy

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reports and other documentation. The second reason was location – The Putumayo department, where Mocoa is located, is one of the poorest departments in Colombia, marked by the armed conflict, lack of government investment, corruption, and forced displacement. There is a large indigenous community present, who have been most adversely affected by the armed conflict. Furthermore, due to ‘this pocket of government weakness’, it is region that has been dominated by the FARC for a long time. Mocoa, one of the larger cities in the region, is also deemed one of the safest cities in the region. It has therefore had to deal with a major influx of new residents in recent years, many fleeing the violence from the civil conflict with guerrilla forces. Roughly half of the Mocoa population has come to escape violence in other parts of the country. This meant that there would be a large and varied group of humanitarian actors, international as well as local, involved in the response.

Conflict dynamics were only considered to the extent that they affect disaster response or are affected by it. Respondents’ own assessment of which processes are of importance to disaster response, and where to set the spatial and temporal boundaries of the ‘humanitarian crisis’. Data collection will not only focus on the actions on and framing of the conflict-disaster nexus by the identified relevant actors, but also on the (perceived) interactions between the actors themselves. Disaster response does not have a clear start and end date and can in fact be viewed as a continuous cycle of preparation, response, mitigation, and reconstruction. In order to restrict my scope and keep the research topic manageable, I chose to focus only on immediate relief phase.

3.3.1 Research locations

Bogotá has been my main research location, as the

national government as well as the vast majority international NGOs have their head offices located in Bogotá. I also conducted a field visit to Mocoa itself, in order to obtain the information from local government, local NGOs and local community. Mocoa has a presence of local NGOs, and international NGOs and UN field offices. My field visit also included visit to the affected and destroyed areas to gain a better sense of what the community had gone through.

3.3.2 Unit of analysis

Of interest is the interplay between the institutions and actors within the humanitarian arena, and their discourses and social practices around disaster response within the conflict context. The different domains of disaster response (including affected communities, government, contestants to the government, aid agencies and the media) are methodological entry points into the arena of disaster response. Therefore, the unit of analysis is all actors and stakeholders within the humanitarian arena. Many different actors are involved in disaster management, including government departments, service providers, aid agencies and local institutions. In reality, these domains are overlapping and non-homogenous, as aid agencies and other actors come in very different variations.

Figure 3.2 Map of the research locations. Source: Reuters, 2017

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Nonetheless, there is enough commonality in these domains to make them analytically useful. The various aid modalities of the different agencies set different parameters for discussions of each agency’s principles, humanitarian policy, and decision-making space. The study of social domains allows a focus on the everyday practices and movements of actors negotiating the conditions and effects of vulnerability and disaster.

3.3.3 Data collection

This paper builds on four months of fieldwork conducted in Bogota between September and December 2017, with a field visit in Mocoa to obtain in-depth insights and views of the local context. The main source of data used in this research comes from in-depth, individual and qualitative interviews, involving a total of 25 respondents from various actors involved in the disaster response (see Table 1 for a break-down of the respondents by type). The data was complemented by secondary sources such as humanitarian reports, news articles and other internal documents provided to me by the respondents.

Table 3.1 Overview of study participants and interviewees. Source: Author, 2017.

Actor category Approached

participants

Out of which also participated in an in-depth interview

National government officials 6 5

Local and departmental government officials 3 1

Local NGO staff 5 3

International NGO staff 6 4

United Nations Offices staff 6 4

Local communities 10 5

Contesting authorities 3 -

Member of a research institution, Colombian or

foreign 4 3

Total 42 25

The conversations addressed the disaster response in Mocoa in April 2017, activities, collaborations and decision-making processes, as well as encountered challenges and opportunities. Ethical rules of transparency and informed consent were upheld as much as possible. All respondents were informed about the voluntary terms of participation in this research, the aim of the research and intended use of research findings, and participants were only audio recorded if consent was given prior to the interview.

3.3.4 Sampling strategies

Potential respondents were identified through reports and documentation, as well as through referral sampling. Attention was paid to obtain equal representation of all actor categories; however, because I was confronted with limited access to certain actors, this was not possible for each category. With permission of the respondent, interviews were recorded with an audio device to minimize disruptions during the interview. Selective note-taking, either during or directly after the interview, served as a back-up method should the audio device fail to function (Creswell, 2008). Interviews were conducted in either Spanish or English, depending on the respondent’s preference.

This research uses a combination of purposive and snowball sampling (Bryman 2015). Initial interviews were organized through the researcher’s own social network and contacts provided by the DisCoRD project supervisor. Additionally, aid agencies and local institutions were contacted via email,

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with the aim to establish initial contact prior to arrival in the field. Within the pool of state, humanitarian and non-state organizations, my selection of actors was based on those who were involved in the disaster response of the selected conflict-disaster dyads, as well as those with a broader overview on disaster response processes. Selection of aid beneficiaries and community representatives depended on gatekeepers and was limited by security restrictions for both respondents and researcher. For example, above ground representatives of rebel organizations were approached rather than guerrilla members themselves. Aid and state actors were asked to identify and introduce members of the community they thought willing and able to provide experiences and knowledge relevant to the research. Concerning aid beneficiaries, the aim was to reach an equitable gender balance.

3.3.5 Data analysis

Interviews were conducted in either Spanish and English. The interviews in English were transcribed verbatim and analysed using computer-aided qualitative data analysis Atlas.ti. I employed a local student at the university – referred by my local supervisor – to transcribe the interviews conducted in Spanish verbatim. This was done partly because my Spanish level was insufficient for transcription, but also because I felt that a verbatim transcription by a native Spanish speaker would enable me to review the exact phrasings used by the respondents and thus allow me to gain a better sense of the nuances in my data. During final data analysis, both selective and open coding were used to structure and break down the data into more manageable sets. Data from the interviews, literature, and observations were triangulated to gain a more complete and thickened understanding of the case study.

3.4 Limitations

Because case study research is quite specific to its spatial and temporal context, I made use of thick descriptions I to improve the contextual understanding of my study. Although the case study pertains to Mocoa specifically, the majority of the results could be generalized to the wider Colombian context. Furthermore, the case study is part of a larger comparative study addressing the same themes, thus maximizing the possibility for comparing and cumulating findings.

My personal limitation as a researcher has been my knowledge of Spanish. I had taken introductory Spanish classes before entering the field, and at that time my fluency could be estimated at level A1. My fieldwork schedule included extensive Spanish classes, and in three months I was able to bring up my level to B1-B2, and quite capable of carrying a conversation about disaster response and understand the corresponding Spanish jargon. My level of Spanish largely influenced my decision to postpone my visit to Mocoa until December, because I knew I would have to rely heavily on Spanish alone in order to conduct my interviews with the community. However, in real time I was not always capable of picking up on the nuances and details in my respondents’ phrasing. This was also my reason for employing a native Spanish speaker to transcribe my interviews verbatim, so that these nuances would not be lost.

To ensure fair representation of views, I aimed to have a roughly equal number of respondents for each actor category in my dataset. I made use of an interview guide - translated in both Spanish (checked by native speaker) and English - so that I would be consistent in my questions between the different actors and would be able to compare their views on the same themes – while also allowing

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space for new topics to emerge during the conversation. If new topics arose I would address those in following interviews so that I could cross-check these issues and see if and how they were shared among the other respondents. Many of the same themes returned in my conversations with the respondents, which I feel would lend credence to the results. During the conversations I took effort to ask my questions in an open and neutral manner and without interference of my personal opinions, so they would not be leading the respondent.

During my time in Bogotá I got the general impression that the international community was very closed. I had started with sending interview requests per email, however the response to these was very low. My local supervisor was very helpful in establishing initial contacts within the community. From there, I relied a lot on referral sampling. It turned out to be easier to get an appointment with the central government than with the international NGOs. During the interviews themselves, the respondents often tended to stick to general statements. This was definitely a challenge; after discussing and analysing the outcomes of the first few interviews with my local supervisor I felt able to ask more directed questions in the interviews that followed. Almost all of the people I managed to talk to within the international community expressed a desire that their anonymity be protected. For this reason, I also chose on occasions not to record the interview but to take notes. This way, my respondent would feel much freer to talk.

My background as a white, female, young, European research master student worked both in my favour as well as to my disadvantage. In certain situations, my age and gender undermined my legitimacy and authority as a researcher; in these cases, I chose to enhance my legitimacy by presenting myself as a student of a respected Colombian university, i.e. Universidad Externado de Colombia. I did not encounter situations in which my ethnicity explicitly provoked feelings of distrust and ‘otherness’. Rather, in Mocoa I encountered situations where I felt that it enhanced my legitimacy, because I was perceived as a member of the international NGO community there. In other cases, I felt that my position as female was cause for respondents to perceive me as less harmful and thus invited more open attitudes and honest responses.

For transparency, complete and accessible records have been made of every phase of the research process; problem formulation and selection of research participants are found in my research proposal and fieldwork notes, interview transcripts and notes are stored, data analysis decisions will also be recorded and stored. However, I chose not to make use of respondent validation primarily due to the political nature of the topic and closed attitude of some of my respondents. Secondly, some of my community respondents are difficult to contact, and it would not have been feasible for some my respondents in general to invest their time which would decrease the value of respondent validation.

3.4.1 Reflection on the learning process

During preliminary interviews and informal conversations conducted in August and September, I soon discovered it was going to be difficult to conduct discuss in-depth without the context of a specific disaster occurrence. This was the first major adjustment I needed to make to my research proposal. After deliberation with my local supervisor I made the choice to zoom in on the recent mudslide in Mocoa, for the two major reasons previously outlined.

My second adjustment pertained to my data collection methods. I had initially hoped to do participant observations through attending multi-actor meetings and humanitarian events organized by the actors. However, as it turned out the humanitarian community was very closed, and it was

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difficult to gain entrance. Occasionally events were brought up in the conversations, however when I asked if it would be possible for me to attend, the overall response was negative and that the events were private. My other aim was to do mapping exercises in order to add a spatial dimension and context, but also as a recollection tool during the interviews. This proved not to be feasible due to time-constraints during the interviews; many respondents were only able to give me maximum an hour of their time. Furthermore, the mapping exercises were primarily intended to add a spatial dimension in the answer to my first sub question, i.e. How do state, non-state actors and humanitarian

agencies perceive the manifestation of the humanitarian crisis? However, over the course of the

fieldwork I discovered that this sub question might not be as valuable in answering my main research question as originally thought. With regard to my other sub questions, the spatial element was much less relevant as social negotiation processes do not have a strong spatial dimension.

Lastly, my original proposal included interviews with antagonistic groups such as the FARC and ELN. While I succeeded in making contact with them, in the end I made the choice not to further engage with them and involve them in my research. I made this decision because I felt that their contribution would be limited as I learned that they were never directly involved in the disaster response itself. Adding to that, in my initial conversations with them their attitude was quite closed, and I suspected they would likely only give me ‘political responses’ to my questions or no response at all. On a personal level, I also felt nervous to engage with them and all in all I decided against their direct involvement in my research. Instead, I chose to learn about any potential involvement of antagonistic groups through my interviews with the other actors.

3.5 Ethical considerations

Throughout my data collection I abided by procedural ethical rules of transparency and informed consent (Hilhorst et al., 2016). All respondents were informed about the voluntary terms of participation in this research, the aim of the research and intended use of research findings. Participants were only audio recorded if consent was given prior to the interview.

During my fieldwork I was continuously aware that my research took place in a highly political setting, and that my presence could potentially alter existing dynamics, particularly amongst antagonistic groups. In my position as an outsider I had to be considerate of the research respondents’ feelings of distrust and suspicion in relation to my research. This issue was particularly important with regard to the way that I had initially planned the sequence of my interviews; based on my preconceived ideas of which actors (i.e. the Colombian government) would have a more distrustful attitude toward my research, in so far that they would be able to constrain my actions. I had thus decided that I would approach these actors towards the end of my fieldwork. However, I soon discovered that I could not afford to maintain a selective sequence of interviewing; I had started with sending interview requests per email, however the response to these was very low. My local supervisor was very helpful in establishing initial contacts within the humanitarian community, and from there I was compelled to rely on referral sampling. Moreover, I discovered that my preconceived notions about the distrustfulness of certain actors was entirely wrong. The agencies of the central government displayed a much more open attitude than I had anticipated and sometimes even expressed strong criticism of their actions in the response. In contrast, my respondents within the international aid community were quite closed and reserved during the interviews.

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3.5.1 Positionality

As previously said, I chose to focus only on the emergency response in the first month in order to restrict my scope and keep the research topic manageable. At the same time, I wanted to allow space for new topics to emerge during the conversation. This was difficult to navigate for me, and sometimes I felt guilty yet compelled to redirect my respondents and ignore certain topics that they deemed important. For example, my main interest was aid processes and outputs during the disaster, while my community respondents themselves were very focused on their traumas and losses. I was aware that trauma and conflict could be stirred up through my questions, and I recognized that they might wanted to use the conversation as an emotional outlet. However, in those moments, I was unsure how to deal with this and my immediate response was to steer the conversation back to my original questions. Although my general intent in each interview had been to allow space for new concepts and issues to arise, in these cases I felt like I was dismissing what they thought important for the sake of my own research interests.

3.5.2 Protection of confidentiality and anonymity

All respondents were informed about the voluntary terms of participation in this research, the aim of the research and intended use of research findings, and participants were only audio recorded if consent was given prior to the interview. Furthermore, I ensured that “the identities and records of individuals were maintained as confidential” (Bryman, 2008: 136) in my data storage. Before going into the field, I was very aware that my fieldwork would take place in a highly political setting and that my questions would directly cover those political relations. I was cautious that my questions could negatively affect relations between the different actors, and therefore paid attention not to formulate my questions in an antagonizing manner (e.g. “aid actor” said this and this, how would you respond to that?).

I ensured the security of my data through encrypted online storage and additional off-line back-ups. Respondents’ information was anonymized to protect their identity. Many of my respondents in the aid spheres were mainly concerned with remaining anonymous. There was a sense of distrust, not necessarily towards me but to the potential impact of data publishing. At the beginning of each interview I expressed that the respondents’ information would be anonymized to protect their identity; that data would be analysed through actor categories and not by personal name nor organizational name; that I had the intention of using direct quotes in certain cases but only if they consented and always anonymized. In almost all cases this was sufficient to address their concerns. Some objected to being audio recorded, in which case I took notes. Contrastingly, none of my ‘state’ respondents expressed major concerns with regard to anonymity and confidentiality, nor objected to being audio recorded. There were open also with expressing negative opinions towards the other actor categories. My ‘community’ respondents did not express major concerns regarding anonymity and confidentiality either and were very open in talking about their experiences with the state and aid. Some, however, showed concerns about talking openly about their opinion of the FARC and paramilitaries, expressing their wish for confidentiality. During those occasions it helped that I was an outsider, because they did not think it would reach the rebel groups.