Russia’s road to revisionism : the emergence and evolution of a Russian Grand Strategy, 1991-2016

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Master’s Thesis - MSc Political Science: International Relations

Russia’s Road to Revisionism

The Emergence and Evolution of a

Russian Grand Strategy, 1991-2016

Author: Thomas Rijken Student number: 5668522 Supervisor: Prof. G.R.D. Underhill Second Reader:

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Abstract

How can the emergence and evolution of a Russian grand strategy in the period of 1991-2016 be explained? To be able to answer this question, this thesis has firstly identified grand strategic

changes by looking at Russia’s strategic documents and its behavior in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova over time, and secondly and simultaneously, this change has been explained by adopting a

neoclassical realist explanatory model that includes both systemic (i.e. relative material capabilities) and unit-level (i.e. state power and strategic culture) variables.

Russia in the 1990s was characterized by a decline in material capabilities and a weak and divided state as a consequence of a constant debate on Russia’s geopolitical direction between proponents of Yeltsin’s liberal internationalism and of a more nationalist, ‘Primakovian geopolitical realism’, as well as a struggle between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs MFA and Ministry of Defense (MoD) over foreign policy. Russia’s leadership in this period perceived the main threats to its security to be internal, in the form of economic decline and separatism (i.e. Chechnya) and wished to create a benign external environment to solve these internal problems. Russia thus did not have the means and motivation to pursue an expansive grand strategy. Russia’s emerging grand strategy lacked a clear direction, and included elements of cooperation and coercion. However, independent actions by the military and MoD, institutions in which Russia’s strategic culture (i.e. belief in military force as an effective foreign policy tool) was most firmly entrenched, in the near abroad in the early 1990s, to which Russia’s leadership ultimately adapted its foreign policy, dampened the contractionary effects of the material decline on Russia’s emerging grand strategy.

Conversely, Putin’s Russia from 2000 to 2008 was marked by an increasing centralization of power and rapid economic growth (and a commensurate increase in defense capabilities). Russia to some extent resolved its internal threats (i.e. the economy started growing and control over

Chechnya was restored), while Russia perceived NATO as a larger threat to Russia’s security because of NATO’s Kosovo intervention and its eastward expansion. Russia now had the means and

motivations to pursue a more expansive grand strategy and its behavior towards Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova changed in the sense that, in Putin’s second term, it started to use the ‘gas weapon’ to to dissuade the countries form leaving its orbit. Next to this, Putin brought in personnel mainly from the military and security services, that were most likely to propagate a more assertive grand strategy. A change in grand strategy during this period was thus evidenced by a change in Russia’s ranking of threats (external threats trumped internal threats), in Russia’s main strategic goals (i.e. the

prevention of the near abroad’s westward turn instead of creating a peaceful external environment to solve internal problems) as well as in the means with which Russia pursued its grand strategic goals (i.e. from economic incentives to ‘gas coercion’).

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3 Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 marked the next step in Russia’s grand strategic

evolution, in that Russia now used military force instead of economic cooperation or coercion to pursue its grand strategic goals. In the 2008-2016 period, while economic growth lagged, Russia continued to increase its military capabilities. Furthermore, the state came to dominate Russian society even more pervasively. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Russia’s intervention in Syria were the culmination of Russia’s revisionism: it was now willing to redraw borders and protect its national security interests by force not only in the near, but also in the ‘far abroad'

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

AFC Asian Financial Crisis

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States FAS Federation of American Scientists FPC Foreign Policy Concept

GDP Gross Domestic Product GFC Global Financial Crisis MD Military Doctrine

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MoD Ministry of Defense

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NSC National Security Concept

NSS National Security Strategy PfP Partnership for Peace

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SU Soviet Union

UNSC United Nations Security Council US United States

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1 Introduction

This chapter will commence with a brief introduction of the thesis’ topic, after which the research question will be stated and the cases used to answer this question justified. Furthermore, it will provide a summary of the theoretical framework1 to better understand the thesis’ main arguments, that follow after. The chapter then deals with the method applied and sources used throughout this thesis, and lastly, the chapter will give an outline of the structure of this thesis.

It was in 2008 that the author of this thesis, still studying medicine at the time, became interested in Russian foreign policy. Russia’s invasion of Georgia, at worst de facto annexing a fifth of Georgia and at best reinforcing the de facto independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, upended the post-Cold War order in Europe and dashed the hope of many that Russia would become the peaceful player they would want it to be. As would become clear in the years after, the Georgian war was no aberration; it was a reflection of an increasingly expansive and revisionist Russia that was willing to use force to defend its interests both in the ‘near’ as well as in the ‘far abroad’. But how to explain this apparently sudden change in behavior?

This thesis argues that this increasingly revisionist ‘grand strategy’ did not come out of the blue, but has been in the making since the end of the Soviet Union (SU). The emergence and

evolution of Russia’s grand strategy can be best explained by using a neoclassical realist explanatory model, including both structural (i.e. relative material capabilities and the ‘balance of threat’) as well as unit-level (i.e. state power and strategic culture) variables. In the Yeltsin years, Russia was weak, both in terms of state power and capabilities, while internal threats trumped external threats. Russia’s ‘grand strategy’ was incoherent and ad hoc; Russia had neither the means nor the

motivation to pursue an expansive grand strategy. Russia in the decade and a half after continuously increased its capabilities and state power, while external threats (i.e. NATO, the West) gradually came to dominate internal threats. Russia’s grand strategy changed accordingly, becoming more coherent, expansive and revisionist. Russia’s invasion of Georgia, annexation of Crimea and intervention in the ‘far abroad’ (i.e. Syria) were reflective of this newly expansive and revisionist grand strategy.

1.1 Research question and cases

This section will specify the research question at hand, and will identify the research cases that have enabled this thesis to adequately answer this question. The research question is defined as follows: How can the emergence and evolution of a Russian grand strategy in the period of 1991-2016 be

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7 explained? To be able to answer this, the research question has been divided into two distinct parts. Firstly, grand strategic change has been identified and secondly, and simultaneously, this change has been explained.

In short, grand strategy is about determining a state’s core interests and role in the world, from which ultimately flow a nation’s grand strategic choices (Dueck 2006; Layne 2006). This thesis argues that, by identifying changes in those choices, a change in grand strategy can be identified.

Consequently, grand strategy can be measured by referring to policy instruments usually linked to strategic decision-making (i.e. Russia’s diplomatic stance toward and the use of force against

adversaries), by identifying (changes in) Russia’s conception of its stake in the prevailing international order, and by looking at Russia’s overall tone towards adversaries and the international system (Kitchen 2010).

The approach to study these changes in grand strategic choices consists of two elements : first, Russia’s key strategic documents2 have been analyzed, and second, Russian behavior towards Ukraine, Georgia and Moldovia in 1991-2016 has been studied3. The strategic documents offer insights into Russia’s changing conception of its stake in the world and its overall tone towards adversaries and the international system, while identifying changes in Russia’s behavior towards Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova provides crucial information about the means with which Russia tries to reach its grand strategic goals. Together, grand strategic changes can thus be extrapolated from Russia’s words (i.e. strategic documents) and deeds (i.e. actual behavior).

This dual approach of looking at Russia’s words (i.e. strategic documents) and deeds (i.e. actual behavior), which have not necessarily been in sync, was necessary, for an overreliance on security documents would have rendered this thesis too dependent on Russia’s trustworthiness in conveying its true strategic priorities, while only analyzing Russia’s behavior in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova would have led to a loss of vital information about Russia’s conception of its stake in the prevailing international order and the tone of Russia’s stance towards adversaries and the

international system.

In conclusion, this thesis is a case study of Russia’s grand strategy over time. While much has been written about Soviet and Russian foreign policy and grand strategy in different periods, zooming in on and giving detailed analyses of specific events, no single comprehensive explanation has been

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Throughout this thesis, these documents will be referred to both as ‘national security documents’ and ‘strategic documents’, for they are indeed both. For a list of Russia’s key strategic documents, and major events that influenced Russia’s grand strategic evolution, see appendix figure 10.

3_{Studying Russian behavior in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova in this time period could fill several books. This}

thesis has pinpointed the most important events and issues in Russia’s relations with these countries, specifically with the goal of discerning its changing diplomatic stance towards these countries, and thus changes in grand strategy, over time.

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8 given for the emergence of and evolution towards an increasingly revisionist Russian grand strategy. This thesis has taken up the mantle and stepped into this void, hoping to increasing our

understanding of why Russia acts the way it does.

1.2 Theoretical framework: a concise overview

In this section a concise overview will be given of the different theories in the study of grand strategy and foreign policy (a more extensive theoretical discussion will be given in chapter 2). Furthermore, a neoclassical realist model for explaining Russian grand strategy will be posited and justified.

Grand strategy is a state’s strategy to gain security for itself in the international system (Posen 1984). While not only great powers have grand strategies, their grand strategies are most consequential for international politics. The way great powers perceive and act on their security situation has consequences for these countries’ immediate surroundings but also for the global order. Grand strategy thus has a strategic and security element to it, putting the subject within the fields of strategic and security studies.

The fundamental debate underlying the different theories of grand strategy and foreign policy is about which level of analysis is most important in explaining state behavior. Do ideas, domestic politics or relative material capabilities determine states’ grand strategic behavior? In more recent times, there have been serious attempts to build bridging theories, that incorporate both systemic and unit-level factors, of which neoclassical realism is a good example.

There are five broad schools of theories of grand strategy, that are reflective of this debate. Three of these are realist theories (offensive, defensive, and neoclassical), which argue that nations’ grand strategies are determined first and foremost by their relative power position in the international system. Innenpolitik theories, conversely , emphasize the preeminence of domestic political configurations in explaining states’ behavior, while constructivists put the power of ideas at the center of their analytical universe.

Structural realists (or: neorealists) start from the premise that states seek security (Lynn-Jones 2012). States, defined as the foreign policy leaders within a state’s government, are the principal actors and their grand strategic behavior, as said, is shaped by the structure of the system (Christensen 1996). There is a constant competition for power amongst the great powers in the struggle for security, and states balance against powerful states or coalitions of states by either forming alliances with weaker states or by building up their military capabilities (Taliaferro 2006). Structural realists disagree on whether security in the international system is scarce (offensive realism) or plentiful (defensive realism).

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9 Offensive realists argue that the scarcity of security compels states to pursue expansionist, offensive power- and influence maximizing strategies at the expense of their rivals. Since states never know when they have ‘enough’ power to be secure, it will always seek to gain more (Layne 2006).

Defensive realists state that it is not so much power in itself that matters, but the threat that a particular balance of power poses to great powers. States are security maximizers, and since security is plentiful when defense in the international system is easier than offense, as often is the case, and as such great powers are not likely to be attacked, great powers are fairly secure. This leads to a more benign outcome than in the offensive realist world (Walt 1998)

Proponents of Innenpolitik (or: liberal) theories of foreign policy and grand strategy agree with realists that states are the main actors in the international system, but are more positive about the possibility for international cooperation. Liberals argue that nations’ domestic political situations determine their grand strategies, and thus international outcomes. The behavior of states is a product of internal dynamics; understanding foreign policy and grand strategy thus requires one to look at the preferences of key domestic actors (Rose 1998).

Another school of foreign policy and grand strategy, constructivism, emphasizes the role of norms, ideas and culture in explaining international relations. Constructivists view interests and identities as fluid products of history. They focus on the prevailing discourse in society, for this both reflects and shapes beliefs and interests, and forms accepted norms of behavior. Discourse can shape how political actors define themselves and their interests, and can thus modify their behavior and the behavior of nations (Wendt 1992; Walt 1998).

The last school in the study of foreign policy and grand strategy is neoclassical realism, which this thesis has used to explain the emergence and evolution of Russian grand strategy. Neoclassical realists start at the systemic level, focusing on nations’ relative material capabilities, and then carefully trace how these capabilities are translated, through intervening, unit-level variables, into actual grand strategic choices. It is a bridging theory, that views the distribution of power as

determining state behavior in the long term, while deviations from this structurally determined path are to be explained by unit-level variables. There is a simple reason for using neoclassical realism: the world is nót simple. Claiming that only ideas, domestic politics or the distribution of power

determine state behavior, might give a theory a high level of generalizability, but does not reflect the complexity of social phenomena (see section 2.2 for a more thorough discussion of neoclassical realism). Neoclassical realism accepts this complexity and tries, however difficult, to bring different levels of analysis into one theory. Of the theories of grand strategy discussed, neoclassical realism

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10 comes closest to being able to explain the world as it is, not how one wants it to be, which is the key reason for its use by this author to explain grand strategic change over time.

A neoclassical explanatory model of Russian grand strategy

This thesis argues that the emergence and evolution of Russian grand strategy can be best explained by neoclassical realism. The independent variable is Russia’s relative power position in the

international system, measured mainly in economic, but also in military terms. While military

strength ultimately flows from economic fundamentals, in the short term nations can, in the absence of economic growth, increase their capabilities by prioritizing defense spending. However, it is not so much the balance of power that matters, but the threat a particular balance of power might pose. Russia, in short, will thus not only pursue a more expansive grand strategy, seeking more control over its external environment, when its relative material capabilities increase, but also when it perceives greater external threats.

However, more is needed to adequately explain Russia’s grand strategy. This thesis has added two intervening variables, state power and strategic culture, to better understand how Russia’s capabilities are translated into actual grand strategic actions.

A strategic culture refers to those cultural values and beliefs that “relate to the legitimate and efficient conduct of political-military affairs”, that influences the way which international events and pressures are perceived (Dueck, 2006, p. 15). This thesis argues that there is indeed a ‘Russian way’ of thinking about strategic affairs, of which the effectiveness of the use of military force to pursue foreign policy goals is the most important element (de Haas 2010; Johnston 1995).

State power refers to the strength of the state apparatus vis-à-vis society. If states are powerful, then the nation’s policies will be close to the preferred strategies of that nation’s leaders. A weak state is one that is “decentralized, diffuse, and divided” (Zakaria, 1998, p.11).

1.3 The main arguments

In the 1990s, Russia was characterized by a decline in material capabilities and a politically and bureaucratically divided, weak state, while the threats it perceived were mainly of an internal nature (i.e. economic decline and separatism). Russia sought to exert some influence on its near abroad, mainly because of fears that regional (secessionist) conflicts could spill over into Russia’s own restless regions4, but had neither the capabilities nor the motivation to pursue an expansive grand strategy, and pursued a an incoherent, ad hoc strategy.

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The near abroad as an ‘internal threat’ as opposed to as an ‘external threat’ will be dealt with more extensively in section 4.2

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11 Russia in the 2000s was marked by an economic boom and centralization of political and economic power. At the same time that Russia to a certain level ‘resolved’ its main internal threats (i.e. the economy started growing and control over Chechnya was restored), NATO gained a more prominent role in Russian security thinking, and was progressively viewed as the main threat to Russian national security. This NATO threat emerged because of its enlargement into former SU territory, its Kosovo intervention against Serbia, a traditional Russian ally, in circumvention of the UNSC and against Russia’s strong objections, and the color revolutions of 2003 and 2004, that brought to power pro-Western governments in Ukraine and Georgia that vocally pursued NATO membership. Russia progressively viewed the near abroad as an external threat, only fueling the desire to exert more influence on the geopolitical direction of the countries in its direct environment. This desire clashed with the ambitions of the nations in its near abroad to move out of Moscow’s orbit. To a certain extent, Russia in Putin’s first term tried to achieve its grand strategic goals in the near abroad by using economic incentives. In the second term, however, this changed. The Russian government started using the increase of control over the nation’s resources to attempt to stop Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova from moving West. This represented a clear change in the means with which Russia pursued its grand strategic goals, and as such a change in grand strategy5.

Russia thus had now acquired the means and motivation to pursue a more expansive and revisionist grand strategy. When NATO in 2008 officially stated that Ukraine and Georgia could join NATO, and both economic cooperation and coercion had failed to stop western ambitions in the near abroad, Russia used Saakashvili’s forceful attempt to restore Georgia’s control over South Ossetia to invade both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and to recognize these regions’ independence two weeks after this, dashing Georgia’s hopes of joining NATO in the short term. Russia’s capabilities in the years after increased further because of higher military expenditures and military reform (while the economy stagnated), while the Russian state increased its power vis-à-vis society even further, not only over the nation’s material resources, but also over opinion by using the media for propaganda campaign against domestic and foreign adversaries. Yanukovich’ ouster and the Maidan revolution led the Russian leadership to fear its most important former SU neighbor leaving its orbit, and was willing to redraw borders and stoke unrest in Ukraine’s east to prevent this.

Russia had now proven on two occasions that it was willing to use force to pursue its

interests and control its direct external environment. This represented a real change in Russia’s grand strategy. In 2015 however, it went a step further by using force in the ‘far abroad’, that is to say outside former SU borders, to protect its interests (i.e. its only ally in the Middle East and its only

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12 naval base in the Mediterranean). It was the culmination of its increasingly expansive and revisionist grand strategy.

1.4 Methodology and sources Methodology

To study the evolution of Russian grand strategy, this thesis has used the mainly qualitative method of ‘process tracing’. Process tracing, a term fleshed out by Bennett and George in 2005, is aptly suited to studying complex IR phenomena such as wars and the formation of new international security and economic systems, which “often involve interaction effects among many structural and agent-based variables, path dependencies, and strategic interaction among large numbers of actors across multiple levels of analysis” (Bennet & Elman, 2007, p. 171). Although it is not unreasonable to think of process tracing as a qualitative method, it sometimes relies on quantitative information as well (Collier 2011).

Process tracing is a method to identify and test causal mechanisms, defined as “the causal processes and intervening variables through which causal or explanatory variables produce causal effects”. Put in another way, process tracing is a method to “generate and analyze data on the causal mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening variables, that link putative causes to observed effects” (Bennett & George, 1997, p. 4). Process tracing is a particularly well-suited method for neoclassical realists, who “favor beginning intellectually at the systemic level but then taking care to trace precisely how, in actual cases, relative power is translated and

operationalized into the behavior of state actors” (Rose, 1998, p. 166). Neoclassical realism, as does process-tracing, focuses on the unfolding of events or situations over time. Furthermore, the fact that process tracing is a method so well positioned to study strategic interaction across multiple levels of analysis, fits the neoclassical realist paradigm well.

The causal effect of an explanatory variable here is defined as the “change in the probability and/or value of the dependent variable that would have occurred if the explanatory variable had assumed a different value” (Bennett & George, 1997, p. 5). However, in IR, we then run into a problem because this is a counterfactual definition regarding what would have happened if one variable had been different and all others had been held the same. We cannot re-run history and change one variable, which would have allowed us to observe the actual causal effect of that variable (Bennett & George, 1997).

With process tracing, “causation is established through uncovering traces of a hypothesized causal mechanism within the confines of one or a few cases”. Cases may provide a variety of

evidence of how causal mechanisms work, “none of which is directly comparable, some of which may be more important than other pieces, and all of which taken together may allow analysts to draw

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13 conclusions about the adequacy or inadequacy of an explanation” (Bennett & Elman, 2007, p. 183). In process tracing, we can see both an inductive as well as a deductive study of events and sequences within a case. Inductive study might reveal causal processes the researchers had not thought of in advance, while deductively, theories can suggest “which intervening events should have occurred within a case if the theory is an accurate explanation of the case”. Depending on the theory, some of the hypothesized steps in the case may be tightly defined necessary conditions (i.e. structural realism) and others may be defined more loosely (Bennett & Elman, 2007, pp. 183-184).

It is sometimes asked if process-tracing is the same as or anything more than a good

historical explanation. This is the same criticism that neoclassical realist scholars have received; their models’ lack of explanatory power due to historical richness would render them useless in terms of predictive power. However, to counter this argument, it is important to acknowledge that careful description is crucial in all research, and causal inference – whether it be assessed with qualitative or quantitative tools - depends on it (Collier 2011). As a tool of causal inference, the focal point of process tracing is the unfolding of events or situations over time. To adequately grasp this unfolding, one must describe this event or situation at one point in time. As such, this descriptive part of process tracing “begins not with observing change or sequence, but rather with taking good

snapshots at a series of specific moments. To characterize a process, we must be able to characterize key steps in the process, which in turn permits good analysis of change and sequence” (Collier, 2011, p. 824).

A process-tracing explanation, however, differs from a historical narrative because it requires converting a “purely historical account that implies or asserts a causal sequence into an analytical explanation couched in theoretical variables that have been identified in the research design”. Historians complain that, in translating a rich historical explanation into an analytical one, will result in the loss of important characteristics and the particularity of the case. Inevitably, this is indeed the case. Researchers should be mindful of this and consider the implications of the loss of the case’s richness. In the end, however, the task of political scientists who engage in historical case studies for theory development is just different than the task of historians. This justifies converting historical explanations into analytical theoretical ones (Bennett & George, 1997, pp. 6-7).

It is interesting to note here, that the neoclassical realist finds himself caught between the criticism of both historians as well as neorealists. As said, neorealists have a strong focus on structural factors in determining international outcomes as well as foreign policies. They choose parsimony and rigor over richness because it gives a clear model with a high predictive power. Historians, conversely, focus on describing (on not explaining) historical phenomena as detailed as possible. Neorealists criticize neoclassical realists for being too focused on details and richness at the expense of explanatory power, while historians criticize them because of their losing too much

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14 richness in the search for explanations. Finding the right balance between richness and parsimony is a delicate task for scholars in the school of neoclassical realism, as it has been for the author of this thesis.

Specifically, this thesis has identified changes in grand strategy by analyzing both Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, as well as by studying Russia’s official security documents in the period of 1991-2016. To explain these changes, this thesis has looked at Russia’s relative material capabilities and state power over time. Specifically, this thesis’ analysis has been separated into three distinct periods6 because of great differences in Russia’s average real GDP growth between these periods7, as well as because these periods demarcate specific political eras, in which the level of state power differed significantly. The differences in Russia’s economic performance in each period enables us to more closely examine the effect of specific changes in Russia’s material capabilities and state power on its grand strategy. Furthermore, the impact of Russia’s strategic culture on grand strategic choices in this period has been analyzed. Lastly, the key events have been identified that, through their effects on the independent and intervening variables, have had an impact on Russia’s grand strategy.

External and internal validity

The validation of causal paths through process tracing has to address the high standards of internal and external validity. Process tracing is no guarantee that a study will establish internal validity, or that it will uncover merely the relationships that are truly causal. False positives, or “processes that appear to fit the evidence even though they are not causal in the case at hand”, and false negatives, “processes that are causal but do not appear to be so, are still possible through measurement error or under-specified or mis-specified theories”, are still possible. External validity, or “the ability to generalize results to other cases”, will also be hard to attain. After all, the findings of single case study can only be generalized to similar cases, and even then, cases that seem to be similar might differ in an as-yet unspecified causal variable that could lead to different outcomes (Bennett & George, 1997, p. 20).

Specifically, it is rather difficult to obtain high external validity with this neoclassical framework. The inclusion of two intervening variable creates a complex causal path, and makes it

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The first period spans from the end of the SU on 25 December 1991 till the end of Yeltsin tenure on 31 December 1999, the second from Putin’s acting presidency 1 January 2000 till the last day of his second term on 6 May 2008, and the third from 7 May 2008, the first day of Medvedev’s presidency, till now.

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Russia in the period of 1991-1999 was marked by severe economic decline (and thus decrease in relative material capabilities), 2000-2008 by massive economic growth (and an increase its capabilities), and 2008-2016 by very low growth.

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15 difficult to discern exactly what the effects of each variable has had on grand strategy. It is, as said, the price that needs to be paid for truly understanding a complex world.

Sources

To identify Russia’s changing grand strategy, as said, it is important to look at both words (i.e. strategic documents) and deeds (i.e. Russian behavior ‘on the ground’).

As to the former, a crucial part of Russia’s national security policy is to be found in the ‘National Security Strategy (or: Concept)’ (NSS, resp. NSC) which outlines Russia’s “military,

diplomatic, international-legal, information, economic, and other means to meet its objectives”. The political strategy shows what Russia sees as threats, its interests, goals, and methods to reach these goals and deal with threats. From this strategy flow the principal security documents, the most important of which are the ‘Military Doctrine’ (MD) and ‘Foreign Policy Concept’ (FPC)8. Russia’s security documents are a lot more abstract and political than Western ones, thus reflecting the political-strategic level (Blank, 2011, pp. 2-3).These three types of documents are updated every few years and analyzing them has offered great insights into the evolution of Russian grand strategy.

Furthermore, it is crucial to look at the key moments in Russia’s relations with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova over time, from which changes in a broader grand strategy can be

extrapolated. Russian behavior in the former SU has been analyzed by many scholars, by government agencies and different think tanks.

Lastly, several sources have been used to measure the independent and intervening variables. This thesis has used World Bank data on GDP growth, and World Bank and SIPRI data on military expenditures, both of which are crucial in identifying changes in Russia’s relative material capabilities. Next to this, a range of literature, such as journal articles and books, but also websites of governmental or international organizations, newspapers, and think tanks have been utilized.

1.5 Thesis structure

Chapter 1 has introduced the research question and the cases used to answer it. Furthermore, a summary has been given of the theoretical framework as a basis for the overview of the thesis’ main arguments. Lastly, the methodology and sources of this thesis has been discussed and an outline of the structure of this thesis is given.

Chapter 2 will provide the full theoretical framework, including a general discussion on theories of foreign policy and grand strategy and a more thorough review of neoclassical realism. It further sets out a specific neoclassical realist explanatory model, that incorporates both the

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This thesis has used translations of the FPC of 1993 and the FPC, MD and NSC of 2000, as published in a compilation of security documents by Andrei Melville and Tatiana Shakleina (2005). For a translation of other security documents, multiple sources have been consulted.

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16 structural, independent variable (i.e. relative material capabilities and the ‘balance of threat’), and the unit-level ‘intervening variables’ (i.e. strategic culture and state power) to explain the evolution of Russia’s grand strategy (the dependent variable).

Chapter 3 is a short and targeted SU background chapter, containing specific information about Soviet strategic culture (which is important for understanding and identifying Russian strategic culture), Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ (which provides a crucial context for Yeltsin’s first years in office) and Soviet ethnopolitics (which is imperative to properly understand Russia’s relations with Georgia, Moldova, and to a lesser extent Ukraine).

Chapters 4 to 6 constitute the most substantive empirical chapters. In these chapters a chronologically organized explanation of Russia’s evolving grand strategy is given. On the one hand, changes in Russia’s grand strategic evolution is extrapolated both from scrutinizing Russia’s behavior in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova over time as well as from an analysis of Russia’s strategic

documents. On the other hand, and simultaneously, this change is explained by considering, at the beginning of every chapter, Russia’s relative material capabilities and state power. While the effect of Russia’s strategic culture on grand strategy does not have as prominent a role as the other variables (it is not mentioned in a separate section), it will be dealt with throughout the thesis. Lastly, the most important events that affected Russian grand strategy (or were reflective of changes in Russia’s behavior) and the exact role these events played are spelled out.

Chapter 4 deals with Russia in the 1990s. It starts by shortly describing the fall of the SU and creation of the CIS. After this, Russia’s material and state strength are identified, and Russia’s

behavior in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, as well as Russia’s strategic documents of 1993 and 1997, are analyzed. Simultaneously, the most important events, such as the two Chechen wars and NATO’s interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and their effect on the evolution of Russia’s grand strategy are examined.

Chapter 5 gives an account of Putin’s first two terms in office (until 2008) and follows the same structure as chapter 4. First, Russia’s material capabilities and state power are analyzed. Furthermore, the most important moments in Russia’s relations with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova are examined and the strategic documents of 2000 reviewed.

Chapter 6 examines the period from 2008 onwards. As did the former two chapters, this chapter commences by analyzing Russia’s relative material capabilities and state power. After this, this thesis looks at Russia’s many strategic documents9 and its behavior in Ukraine, Georgia and

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In these years, the following strategic documents are published: the 2008 FPC, 2009 NSS, 2010 MD, 2013 FPC, 2014 MD and 2016 NSS. For a full list of strategic documents and major events influencing Russia’s grand strategy, see appendix figure 10.

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17 Moldova. The war in Georgia, its annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbas, and Russia’s intervention in Syria are dealt with separately.

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2 Theoretical framework

2.1 Theories of foreign policy and grand strategy

Before being able to explain the emergence and evolution of Russian grand strategy, first an overview of the different ‘schools’ of the study of foreign policy and grand strategy will be given, with a focus on establishing their strength and weaknesses.

For a long time, international relations theory has been dominated by neorealism and its critics, discussions being mainly on how (if at all) the nature of the international system influences international outcomes (Rose 1998). Neorealism “provides a parsimonious account of the general pattern of behavior to be expected of states at the international level”. While it does make some general assumptions about the motivations of individual states, it claims not to attempt to explain particular foreign policies of states in a specific historical context. Neorealists thus argue that their theory is a theory of international politics (Glenn, 2009, p. 523).

However, to be able explain the topic at hand, Russian grand strategy, a theory is needed that takes as its dependent variable not general international outcomes, but specific foreign policy and grand strategic behavior of individual states. Such theories seek to explain “what states try to achieve in the external realm and when they try to achieve it” (Rose, 1998, p. 145).

Theories on foreign policy and grand strategy, as will be explained below, for a great part focus on great powers. It is not that less powerful countries do not have a grand strategy, but their grand strategies are less consequential for world politics. Also, these countries’ grand strategies are more difficult to entangle because of their limited scope (they are relatively ‘absent’ on the

international stage), and often are difficult to pin down and analyze because of a lack of written documents on national security strategies. Thus, they constitute a less interesting and tangible topic for IR scholars. Grand strategy’s definition (which will be elaborated upon in section 2.5) has a relatively strong security and military element to it: it focuses on how a state can best ‘cause’ security for itself by economic, political, military, and other means (Posen 1984). How great powers then view their security situation and seek to cause security has consequences for their direct environment but also for the global order. This raises interesting questions.

How states view their security and respond to crises not only depends on their relative material capabilities, but also on a nation’s history, culture, ideas , and domestic political configurations. Authoritarian countries, for example, might be less restrained (i.e. there is no domestic political opposition) in adopting certain grand strategies than democratic ones. Great powers might seek to gain more control over their surroundings when their power has increased, or when they expect their power to decrease. Will they try to gain security within the current system, or change the system as a whole (status quo vs. revisionist grand strategies). Are these countries’

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19 capabilities declining or rising, and how does their rise or decline affect both how they view their security situation as well as how they respond to it? And lastly, is a system more stable when it is uni-, bi-uni-, or multipolaruni-, and how does this affect the choices and behavior of great powers?

What these questions make clear, is that they are ultimately concerned with questions of security and strategy. This thesis as such is placed squarely in the field of security and strategic studies. Security studies are mostly concerned with the “study of threat, use, and control of military force”. However, security studies are an interdisciplinary endeavor, and in the course of the years broadened its scope to include topics such as grand strategy and the domestic sources of

international conflict. Security studies literature “overlaps with more general works on international relations, and most of it fits comfortably within the familiar realist paradigm” (Walt, 1991, pp. 211-212). Strategy focuses on the “responses of states and other actors to the international security environment: If security is the condition, strategy is the reaction”. However, it can just as much be the other way around: strategic actions of one state affect the security of another. For example, using military force has a great influence on the security conditions that both the aggressed and the aggressor (as well as other actors) face. Thus, there is an “interactive relationship between strategic studies and security studies” (Ayson, 2008, p. 1).

Underlying the questions mentioned above is a fundamental debate, especially since the end of the Cold War, on whether unit-level variables (such as ideas or domestic politics) or structural variables (such as relative material capabilities) have the most influence on states’ foreign policies and grand strategies. In recent years, there have been attempts to build bridging theories, that incorporate both levels of analysis.

Five schools of studying foreign policy and grand strategy have been identified. Firstly, the structural realist (or: neorealist) school, compromising of defensive and offensive realism, will be examined. This school sees a single structural factor, the distribution of power in the international system, as the most important factor determining state behavior. Next, liberal or Innenpolitik theories, which argue that domestic politics is key to understanding and explaining foreign policies, will be reviewed. Furthermore, a short outline will be given of constructivism, an IR school that focuses on the role of ideas in international relations. Lastly, the neoclassical realist paradigm will be discussed, which seeks to ‘bridge’ the structural elements of neorealism with unit-level ‘intervening’ variables such as domestic politics and the role of ideas in explaining how states respond to their external

environment. This thesis will argue that neoclassical realism is most suited to explain changes in Russian grand strategy. With its focus on the relative power position of states in the international system as the most important factor determining long-term strategic behavior, while also weighing other factors such as domestic politics and ideas, neoclassical realism is a welcome extension of and

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20 alternative to the more singularly structurally focused offensive and defensive realism. There will be a more thorough examination of neoclassical realism’s merits and weaknesses in section 2.2.

Structural realism

Realism is a theory in international relations that places the distribution of power in the international anarchical system at the center of its analytical universe. Realists treat states as the principal actors in world politics and focus mainly on great powers, since these states dictate and shape international politics. But what then are ‘states’ exactly? Steven Krasner and David Lake define states as consisting of the elite foreign policy leaders within the government. For the purposes of international relations theory, there is a useful distinction between the government and those who directly represent the nation abroad (Christensen 1996).

Great countries’ behavior is determined by their external environment, not by their internal characteristics: the structure of the system thus shapes their grand strategies. Calculations about the balance of power command a great deal of states’ attention and there is a constant competition for power amongst themselves in the struggle for security (Mearsheimer 2001). Since the concept of power is so central to realist theories, it is crucial to define power. By far the majority of scholars adheres to a material definition of power as the “capabilities or resources with which states can influence one another” (Wohlforth 1993), a definition that will be adopted in this thesis.

Much of the contemporary realist work on security springs from Waltz’s structural theory of stability and instability in the international system. According to this ‘balance-of-power theory’ states generally balance against powerful states or coalitions through the formation of alliances with weaker states (‘external balancing’) or by building up their military capabilities (‘internal balancing’) (Taliaferro 2006).

However, as Waltz consequently recognizes, his balance-of-power theory is not designed with the intention to explain individual countries’ foreign policies but to explain systemic outcomes (Christensen 1996). However, in practice, “structural realism both requires and implies a theory of state behavior”. Realist theories of foreign policy must clarify how and to what extent structural pressures influence the grand strategies of individual states (Dueck, 2006, p.17). That issue will be discussed below by looking at two distinct structural theories, offensive and defensive realism, that can be applied to the study of grand strategy.

Offensive realism

Offensive realists argue that security in the international political arena is scarce. To gain security, great powers are thus compelled to pursue expansionist, offensive power- and influence-maximizing strategies at their rivals’ expense. Offensive and defensive realists both agree that security is the single most important goal of great powers’ grand strategies. The difference between these two

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21 neorealist ‘currents’ lie in whether great powers are “power maximizers” or “security maximizers”, which means the discussion is mainly about how much power a state needs to secure. Offensive realists state that great powers never come to the point where they have “just enough” power, because it is not possible to know how much power is necessary to be secure. Great powers will thus always try to seek hegemony to gain an ultimately secure position, since the overwhelming power of being a hegemon will dissuade potential challengers. Also, it is the best response of nations to insecurity and uncertainty about other nation’s intentions as well as about present and future distributions of power in the international system (Layne 2006).

For offensive realists, domestic differences between countries are irrelevant, because pressures from the international system in their view are strong and straightforward. To understand states’ behavior, one should only look at states’ relative capabilities and their external environment, which will be smoothly translated into foreign policies (Rose 1998). Offensive realism thus offers the advantage of conceptual clarity and parsimony; by referring to just a few simple variables it claims to be able to explain a lot. However, by suggesting that domestic level variables are not relevant to country’s strategic choices, offensive realism rests upon an assumption that is dubious both theoretically and empirically (Dueck 2006).

Defensive realism

In defensive realism, it is not so much power that matter, but the threat that that power might pose. Defensive realists assume that security is plentiful when defense in the international system is easier than offense, which often is the case (Walt 1998). Great powers can then be fairly confident that others will not attack them and are thus very secure. This leads them to forego expansion and offensive military strategies and focus on mutually beneficial cooperation (Layne 2006). The

international system, as a result, tends to be more benign and states can understand and learn about this over time. Defensive realists see states as security-maximizers, in that they pursue power and security less ardently than offensive realists would predict because they respond only to external threats, which are rare. Even in this unlikely event, states usually respond at an early stage by balancing, thereby deterring the adversary and obviating the need for conflict.

Foreign policy behavior then is the culmination of rational states responding in the ‘right way’ to clear systemic incentives. Conflict is possible, but only in those circumstances when countries feel extremely insecure because of the accumulation of offensive military capabilities by rivals (Rose 1998).

Structural realists willingly choose parsimony and rigor over richness and detail (Wohlforth 1993). They strive for explanations of the interactions of states and emphasize that they do not aim to explain individual foreign policies. For neorealists, domestic politics and ideas are largely irrelevant

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22 in explaining foreign policy. But because they explain systemic outcomes, structural theories

“overlook the fact that the individual strategic circumstances of great powers can vary widely” (Layne, 2006, p.19-20). Even more importantly, neorealists ignore the fact that a particular systemic power balance still leaves great powers with several possible courses of action. Great powers can and have to make strategic choices on the basis of what they construct and perceive to be the most important threats and dangers. This prioritization, essentially a state’s national security interests, is necessary, because resources are scarce.

Domestic political considerations now and then dominate a state’s decision-making process, undermining neorealism’s explanatory power. But as structural realists contend, “there is a price to pay for simplifying reality” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.11). The role of ideas is even more problematic for neorealists. For while neorealists say do not aim to explain foreign policies, neorealism “contains not only a theoretical but also a normative element. It considers a rational foreign policy to be a good foreign policy”. The paradox of neorealism’s treatment of ideas is that as an explanatory theory, it cannot explain the normative influence of its own doctrine on the foreign policies of nations. Neorealism’s normative element thus undermines its explanatory strength so long as it denies the impact of ideas on international relations in general and on grand strategic behavior in particular (Kitchen, 2010, p. 122).

Neorealism is thus too simplistic an explanation for states’ grand strategies. To get a rich understanding of how and why states make certain grand strategic choices and define their national security interests, more factors need to be brought into the fold. Those factors are to be found in both liberal as well as constructivist theories, to which this thesis turns now.

Innenpolitik/liberalism

The liberal tradition is rooted in the Enlightenment, when intellectuals and political leaders strongly believed that reason could be used to make the world a better place (Mearsheimer 2001). It has an optimistic view of international politics and view states as central actors in international politics (Walt 1998). Furthermore, domestic institutions determine who has access to the state, and state preferences are the most important drivers of international relations. International relations are thus, ideally, a reflection of a great number of individual preferences aggregated at the state-level (Rathbun 2008). In reality, however, this seldom is the case because, for one, in non-democracies an aggregation of individual preferences of all people at the state level does not take place, and because even in democracies there will always be people or groups of people that are able to exert more influence on domestic politics than others.

There are three main liberal theories of international relations. The first one states that prosperous and economically interdependent states are unlikely to fight one another (economic

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23 interdependence theory) since the costs, not only of the devastating conflict itself but also of forgone economic growth, are considerable. Another liberal theory emphasizes the peaceful relations

between democracies (democratic peace theory) and the third one assumes that international institutions enable states to avoid war and concentrate on cooperative relationships. This liberal institutionalism asserts that institutions are sets of rules that prescribe the ways in which states should cooperate and compete. These states negotiate and abide by these sets of rules because of self-interest (Mearsheimer 2001; Moravcsik 1997).

Liberalism (or: Innenpolitik) has been a popular approach to study foreign policy. Foreign policy in this narrative is determined by “internal factors such as political and economic ideology, national character, partisan politics, or socioeconomic structure”. How countries behave is thus to be understood as being a result of a country’s internal dynamics and understanding foreign policy then requires looking at the preferences of key domestic actors (Rose, 1998, p. 148).

The biggest problem with these pure unit-level Innenpolitik theories is that they have had difficulties in explaining why states with similar domestic political configurations have often acted differently, and why countries that are much alike regularly act in different ways (Rose 1998). Liberalism’s claims notwithstanding, there is not enough evidence to support the claim that states’ foreign policies are solely a result of the nature of their domestic political systems (Layne 2006).

Constructivism

Whereas liberal theories focus on domestic politics as the key factor in determining foreign policy behavior of states, the constructivist school of thought emphasizes the role of norms, ideas and culture in explaining international relations at the expense of both domestic politics and

international pressures (Dueck 2006). In their view, there are no objective systemic constraints exist at all, international reality is a social construct and, in the words of Alexander Wendt, “anarchy is what states make of it” (1992, pp. 394-395). However, even if there would be objective systemic constraints, states need an interpretive framework to make choices among different grand strategic choices. This is where neorealism meets constructivism, and, as will be argued below, forms the basis for neoclassical realism.

Instead of taking the state as a given and assuming that states just want to survive, constructivists see “interests and identities of states as a highly malleable product of specific historical processes”. Constructivists focus on the prevailing discourse in society, for this both

reflects and shapes beliefs and interests, and forms accepted norms of behavior. Discourse can shape how political actors define themselves and their interests, and can thus modify their behavior. By focusing on discourse, constructivists are very attentive to the sources of change (Walt, 1998, pp. 40-41).

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2.2 Neoclassical realism

Neoclassical realists argue that grand strategies result from the interaction of systemic factors – especially the distribution of power in the international system – and domestic dynamics (Layne 2006). Neoclassical realism seeks to explain foreign policies and not, as structural realism, broad international outcomes. Scholars in the neoclassical realist school, like neorealists, “begin with the premise that states seek security” (Lynn-Jones, 2012, p. 40). Also, they follow the realist argument that the international system – understood in material terms – is the “most important long-term cause of changes in any nation’s foreign policy behavior”. The international system thus determines the ‘bandwidth’ within which nations’ grand strategy can vary. The variation in grand strategic choices in the short- to medium term can then be explained by unit level variables, such as a nation’s domestic political configuration and strategic culture. Thus, what makes them neoclassical is the fact that they are more sensitive to countries’ cultural legacies and domestic politics and try to bring these factors into their analytical equation to increase their predictive and empirical precision (Dueck, 2006, p.18). Neoclassical realists understand that the world is not simple but complex and thus combine structural realist theory with detailed historical analysis. Recognizing that even the seemingly “simplest explanations of a particular state’s grand strategy are complex, neoclassical realists sacrifice “rigor” for “richness””. Case studies of a particular state’s grand strategy in this view need to be conducted by paying close attention to historical context and particularity (Layne, 2006, p. 11).

Whenever one tries to explain the grand strategy of any country, neoclassical realists contend, its position in the international system is always a good starting point. The international system has a “powerful, generalizable influence on any country’s grand strategy” (Dueck, 2006, p. 13). Over the long run, states’ foreign policies cannot “transcend the limits thrown up by the international environment” (Rose, 1998, p. 151). Thus, when states become more powerful and/or face greater external threats to its security, it will adopt more costly and expansive grand strategies. However, there is more to it then the mere global distribution of power can tell us. Policymakers perceive and construct risks, threats, and their responses to these risks and threats in relation to domestic resources and systemic constraints. Culture and domestic factors can in this way – to a certain extent – have an influence on the final choices made by foreign policy makers (Dueck 2006). Hence, in the short to medium term the foreign policies of various countries “may not necessarily track objective material trends closely or continuously” (Rose, 1998, p. 147).

Why neoclassical realism?

In explaining international interactions between and foreign policies of states, analysts often find themselves without theories that can bridge the analytical gap between the theories mentioned

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25 above. Analysts then choose a realist, liberal or constructivist explanation as the focus of their

studies, or list multiple factors in comprehensive but analytically less interesting ways (Christensen 1996). Neoclassical realism to some extent bridges the gap between the multiple foreign policy theories.

As said, neoclassical realism incorporates both systemic variables as well as unit-level ‘intervening’ variables such as domestic politics, ideas and ideology. The biggest criticism of neoclassical realism from the liberal side is that if neoclassical realists can make use of variations in state-society relations as an important explanatory factor, they are closet liberals instead of realists. Constructivists’ argument is similar: if neoclassical realists use as an explanatory variable the

“variations in the definition of state interests that result from ideological differences”, they are closer to constructivism than to realism. “The concept of “realism” has thus been stretched to include assumptions and causal mechanisms within alternative paradigms, albeit with no effort to reconcile the resulting contradictions” (Legro & Moravcsik, 1998, p. 7). Legro and Moravcsik further argue that there is no theoretical rationale to include these kinds of ‘non-realist’ causal factors: their use is at best ad hoc because adding them contributes to building a generalizable theory. Ad worst, in their view, it is a post hoc effort to “explain away outcomes that do not meet theoretical explanations” (as cited in Rathbun, 2008, p. 299).

However, the world is complicated: claiming that only domestic politics or ideas matter, is as theoretically simplistic as claiming that only structural factors count. One has to find a way to incorporate multiple levels of analysis, thereby undoubtedly sacrificing some the theory’s

generalizability. It is a price that needs to paid for understanding the world as it is, as opposed to as one would like it to be. Constructivism does not own ideas, nor does liberalism own domestic

politics. “Domestic politics and ideas are fair game for realism, and neoclassical realists have taken up this mantle” (Rathbun, 2008, p. 301).

To explain the emergence and evolution of Russian grand strategic behavior from the end of the Soviet Union, one both has to look at changes in Russia’s relative position in the international system, as well as to different domestic and cultural unit-level ‘intervening variables’. Two intervening variables, that explain deviations of countries’ grand strategic behavior from their

‘structurally determined long-term path’ (i.e. relative position in the international system), have been included in this thesis: ‘strategic culture’ and ‘state power’.

2.3 The independent variable

“There is”, Paul Kennedy contends, “a very clear connection between an individual Great Power’s economic rise and fall and its growth and decline as an important military power” (1987, xxii).The most important variable determining Russia’s grand strategy is its relative material capabilities and,

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26 flowing from this, its relative position in the international system. This is to be measured best by determining Russia’s economic strength over time. Furthermore, the measurement of Russia’s capabilities can be enhanced by considering its military expenditures10. While nations’ military strength ultimately flow from its economic fundamentals (enabling them spend more on its military), in the short term, nations can prioritize defense spending and as such spend a larger proportion of their budget on defense (even if that budget does not grow). States can thus in the short term ‘compensate’ for their economic weakness and increase their relative material capabilities by spending more on defense. Including military expenditures thus makes the measurement of relative material capabilities at any given time more precise.

Stating that relative material capabilities are key to understanding international politics, relates the ‘balance of power’ argument, which provides a good, but not exhaustive starting point for this analysis. Even though the balance of power matters, the perceived threat that a certain

configuration of the balance of power might pose, in other words a “balance of threat”, is a more potent force driving state behavior. The power of other states can thus be a “liability or an asset, depending on where it is located, what it can do, and how it is used” (Walt, 1987, x). This will be a central issue in explaining the evolution of Russian grand strategy.

In conclusion, when states grow in relative capabilities and/or when they perceive greater threats from abroad, they tend to seek security by expanding the ambition and scope of their grand strategies and foreign policy activities, while a decrease in relative power and/or a lessening of perceived external threats will eventually lead to a contraction in states’ grand strategic ambitions (Rose 1998; Mearsheimer 2001). Furthermore, “if the leadership of a state perceives that the capabilities at its disposal have increased it will usually desire more control over its external environment” (Wohlforth, 1993, p. 304).

2.4 The Intervening variables

By including two intervening variables, ‘strategic culture’ and ‘state power’, this thesis has attempted to provide a ‘richer’ explanation of Russia’s grand strategic evolution, taking into account both the effects of history, culture and ideas, as well as the effect of a varying level of state power on strategic choices.

10

While military expenditures do not equal military strength, in general it can be said that countries that spend more on defense, have higher military capabilities. A more precise calculation of Russia’s military strength over time is not necessary for the purposes of this thesis.

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Strategic culture

The term “culture” refers to a “set of interlocking values, beliefs, and assumptions that are held collectively by a given group and passed on through socialization”. When looking at grand strategy, the relevant cultural values and beliefs are those that “relate to the legitimate and efficient conduct of political-military affairs, while the relevant cultural unit or group is the citizenry of a given nation-state, and particularly its foreign policy elite” (Dueck, 2006, p. 15). Particular states have “different predominant sets of strategic preferences that are rooted in the “early” or “formative” military experiences of the state or its predecessor”. These states are to a certain degree influenced by the “characteristics of the state and state elites as these develop through time”. The effects of “historical experiences and historically rooted strategic preferences” has a constraining effect on states’

responses to changes in the security environment (Johnston, 1995, p. 1). In other words, strategic choices are less responsive to changes in the distribution of power in the international system (Heikka 2000; Johnston 1995). The influence of strategic culture is mainly “entrenched through institutionalization within bureaucratic agencies and/or informal institutionalization through regular discourse”. States’ foreign policy elites can, through regular discourse, to some extent ‘shape’ a strategic culture (Dueck, 2006, p. 15).

A nation’s strategic culture thus influences the way in which international events and pressures are perceived and constructed11. Furthermore, it provides certain causal beliefs as to how to best pursue the national interest and defines those interests by prescribing foreign policy goals (Dueck 2006; Heikka & Neumann 2005).

The discussion above notwithstanding, it is difficult to theorize strategic culture, since culture, as said, is both a cause and consequences of behavior. It is thus very hard to precisely “assess the influence of strategic culture if it is both input and already is inherent in the output”. One things is clear however: “strategic culture is of interest because the concept suggests, perhaps insists, that different security communities think and behave somewhat differently about strategic matters”. Strategic decisions are made at home, and home differs in profound ways from security community to security community (Gray, 2006, pp. 7-9).

With this in mind, this thesis argues that there indeed is a distinct Russian strategic culture, a Russian way of thinking about strategic affairs, of which the effectiveness of the use of military force to further foreign policy goals is the most important element. This strategic culture has been mainly ‘entrenched through institutionalization’ in the security services, the military and Ministry of Defense

11_{If foreign policy elites can to some extent shape a strategic culture, and a strategic culture influences the way}

in which international events pressures are perceived, then elites can thus influence, or ‘construct’, the way in which a society perceives these international events and pressures. Russia’s foreign policy elites thus influence and are influenced by the nation’s strategic culture.

Russia’s road to revisionism : the emergence and evolution of a Russian Grand Strategy, 1991-2016

Master’s Thesis - MSc Political Science: International Relations