Title:
Social perspective taking in moral judgment: The role of mental state inference and ethnicity
Irene Koster (0414506) November 12, 2011
Thesis 2 Research Master Educational Sciences Master thesis Forensic Pedagogical Sciences University of Amsterdam
Title:
Social perspective taking in moral judgment: The role of mental state inference and ethnicity
Koster, Irene, Msc, Universisty of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130, 1018 VZ Amsterdam, I.koster@student.uva.nl
Stams, Geert Jan, Professor of Forensic Child and Youth Care Sciences G.J.J.M.Stams@uva.nl Cristina Colonnesi, Phd. Department of Education, C.Colonnesi@uva.nl
Eveline van Vugt, Msc, Forensic Child and Youth Care Sciences,
University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130, 1018 VZ Amsterdam,
Abstract
This study examined spontaneous mentalizing of boys when they formulate moral judgments in situations involving potentially harmed ethnic out-group and in-group members. The sample consisted of 92 Caucasian white boys (age M = 16.29, SD = 0.93, range 14.85-19.01). Moral judgment was measured with an adapted version of the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-short form (SRM-SF, Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992) containing vignettes with a perpetrator (antagonist) and a victim (protagonist) accompanied by pictures of characters with different ethnicity. In addition, the responses on the SRM-SF were coded for mental state references (beliefs, emotions, desires, behavior intention, physical states and needs). A strong positive relationship between moral judgment and participants' higher level of mental state references was found, such as emotions, beliefs and desires. The ethnicity of the victim did not affect the level of moral judgment or the frequency of mental state references. The discussion focused on the relation between different aspects of mentalizing and moral judgment and the influence of ethnicity on stage inconsistent moral judgment.
Introduction
One important area of research on social perspective taking is moral development. Kohlberg, for instance, assumed social perspective taking opportunities to facilitate moral growth (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007; Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983). Based on the work of Piaget (1965), Kohlberg devised a model of moral development of six hierarchically stages that focused on reasons or justifications for decisions that pertain to just or benevolent social action (Kohlberg, 1964, p.425; Kohlberg, 1984). At the first stage, moral judgment is characterized by orientations of punishment and obedience. At stage 2, moral judgment is primarily instrumental in the sense that right and wrong depend on the direct consequences of the action for the individual (i.e., gain or loss). Principles of mutual care and interpersonal relationships constitute stage 3. At the fourth stage, individuals consider the consequences of moral actions for society as a whole and the interrelatedness of people in society. The highest level of moral judgment consists of stage 5 (social contract) and stage 6 (universal ethical principles) respectively, and is characterized by meta-ethical principles that reflect a prior-to-society perspective (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983).
Kohlberg’s model was criticized at two points. First, as Kohlberg’s original research showed that the highest stages could only be reached by individuals having attended higher levels of formal education, Gibbs revised Kohlberg's model by discarding the two highest stages, proposing a four stage model, with the first two stages constituting the immature level, and a mature level consisting of a third and fourth stage (Gibbs et al., 2007). The second critique was that Kohlberg assumed that moral development was organized by “structures of a whole”, indicating that under circumstances that support the expression of the individuals most mature moral thinking, a person's reasoning is best described by one of the stages from the model or at most two adjacent stages (Krebs, Denton, Vermeulen, Carpendale, & Bush, 1991). Further, the transition to a next stage implies that the principles of the previous stages are gradually replaced (i.e., hierarchically integrated) by the principles of the next stage. It is assumed that people show little variation in the stage principles they use in moral situations, indicating stage consistency (Carpendale & Krebs, 1995; Krebs & Denton, 2005). Although empirical support is found for the developmental sequence of stages, it has also been shown that external factors, like the people involved, the situation/context or type of dilemma in which people make moral decisions, affect their level of moral judgment (Gibbs et al., 2007; Kohlberg, Levine & Hewer, 1983; Krebs & Denton, 2005; Leenders & Brugman, 2005; Van Vugt et al., 2011; Van Vugt, Stams, Dekovic, Brugman, Rutten, & Hendriks, 2008).
One factor that might play an important role in moral decision making is the ethnicity of the person involved in a moral situation. It is suggested that ethnic group bias is rooted in the evolutionary disposition to safe-guard our genes causing positive social biases to those with whom
we share genetic similarities (Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Monteith, 2001). The recognition of the self in others causes an increased concern for the others’ welfare (Brosnan & De Waal, 2002), leading to altruistic behavior towards in-group members, whereas out-group members yield negative social reactions, such as insecurity, fear or threat (Frith & Frith, 2006; He, Johnson, Dovidio, & McCarthy, 2009; Phelps, O'Connor, Cunningham, et. al., 2000; Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem, 2006; Turner, Brown & Tajfel, 1979). Several studies on the relation between ethnicity and moral decision making showed differences in punishment toward in-group and out-group members. For instance, Johnson and colleagues (2002) found that white university students were less harsh in their punishment of white defendants compared to black defendants. Furthermore, Blair, Judd, and Chapleau (2004) found that people with more Afrocentric facial features received harsher punishment for similar crimes after controlling for criminal history. These studies focus on the ethnic out-group member as the moral perpetrator. To our knowledge, little is known about biased moral judgment towards ethnic out-group members in the position of a potential victim.
Ethnicity does not only affect moral decision making, but also processes of mentalizing. Mentalizing or social understanding is the ability to understand and predict behavior by attributing mental states to agents, such as emotions, beliefs, intentions and desires (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2003), and requires an understanding of others as psychological agents with mental states distinct from our own. Sharing others’ mental states influences our attitude towards a social target (Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009). Previous studies have shown that people display less neurological activity when confronted with members of an ethnic out-group compared to in-group members, resulting in lower mental state inference. Moreover, emphatic neural responses are significantly less when we are confronted with a person in pain of different ethnicity (Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010; Chiao & Mathur, 2010; Xu, Zuo, Wang, Han, 2009). This indicates that ethnicity of a social partner affects mentalizing.
As all adolescents are able to mentalize (Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant, & Todd, 2011), it is not so much the ability of mentalizing that is of importance for higher moral judgment, although it is an important precondition, but the spontaneous referencing to other peoples’ mental states (Dolan & Fullam, 2004; Gini, 2006). In other words, “people have to care about the different perspectives that people hold in moral situations” (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006).
Furthermore, the consideration of emotions, beliefs, desires, behavior intention, physical states and needs may relate to different moral principles. Instrumental stage 2 orientations are likely to depend on the inferences of behavior intention, since prediction of how the other person may react in the anticipation of reward or punishment is a characteristic of immature moral judgment. Also, inference of physical states, like hunger, pain, as well as the non psychological needs (e.g., “he needs a car to get there”) suggest concrete superficiality, which is characteristic of immature
stages of moral judgment. Despite the fact that these displays of mentalizing are considered to serve immature considerations, such inference may nonetheless partly rely on an understanding of emotions, beliefs and desires in moral situations (Frith & Frith, 2006).
The competence to reason at the higher and more abstract levels of moral judgment is associated with cognitive flexibility that allows the representation of multiple social perspectives, such as the implications of actions for the well-being of others, the emergence of social concern and consideration of needs (Gibbs et al., 2009). The consideration of emotions, desires and beliefs are are considered higher mental states (Colonnesi, Koops, & Terwogt, 2008) and found to be related to moral concern and understanding of psychological needs in others (Damm, 2010; Lane, Wellman, Olson, LaBounty, & Kerr, 2010; Young & Saxe, 2008). Therefore, the tendency to consider emotions, beliefs and desires in moral situations is expected to be related to judgment at higher stages.
In sum, we hypothesized participants to display lower moral judgment stage and a lower frequency of mental state reference in moral situations involving a victim of out-group ethnicity. We hypothesize that in those situations involving a victim of out-group ethnicity a lower frequency of mental state reference will be found. Further, we will examine whether moral judgment is positively related to mental states of emotions, beliefs and desires, but negatively with behavior intentions, physical states and physical needs. Last, we expect reference to mental states of emotions, beliefs and desires to be related to higher stages of moral judgment, and reference to behavior intentions and physical states and needs to be related to lower stages of moral judgment.
Method Participants
Twenty Dutch schools for secondary education in the Middle-West region of the Netherlands were asked to participate in the study by means of written interviews. Three different schools agreed on participation (the response rate was 15%). Only boys were asked to participate. Participants could win one out of four 25 Euros CD-coupons by lottery. Only Caucasian white boys were considered for analysis. The sample consisted of 99 participants. Seven participants were removed from the analysis due to unscorable moral judgment questionnaires, leaving a total of N = 92 cases (age M = 16.29, SD = 0.93, range 14.85-19.01). The sample consisted of students from different educational levels of pre-vocational education (n=11), general secondary education (n=23) and pre-university education (n=53).
Procedure
pencil SRM-SF interviews was conducted in the classroom. Boys who agreed to participate were given a booklet by the research assistant containing the questions. The administration took about 50 minutes.
Instruments
Moral Judgment. Moral judgment level was measured using an adapted version of the Sociomoral Reflection Measure short form, SRM-SF (Gibbs et al., 1992). The SRM-SF is a widely used production measure of moral judgment, showing good reliability (Langdon, Murphy, Clare & Palmer, 2010) and cross-cultural validity (Gibbs et al., 2007). To measure moral judgment in situations involving characters with different ethnicity, one question of each of the following original SRM-SF domains was selected: Life, Contract and Truth, Legal Right and Property and Law. The fifth domain (Family) was left out, because it was expected that participants would not display ethnic group bias in situations involving affiliation. Moral values were placed in real life contexts which adolescents encounter in their everyday lives, whereas in the original SRM-SF questions participants produce their own appropriate content (Gibbs et al, 2007). The questions were transformed into vignettes with a Caucasian white perpetrator (antagonist) and a potential victim (protagonist). The questions were accompanied by portrait pictures of the characters involved. The victims had the following cultural backgrounds: Caucasian, [South East] Asian, African or Arabian. This resulted in 4 (moral domain) x 4 (ethnicity of victim) = 16 questions. All characters were boys or young male adults to enhance identification, and the faces on the depicted pictures all had an ambiguous look and no piercings, caps, tattoos or aberrant clothing or hairstyle. See the appendix for an example. The SRM-SF interviews were scored and the answers containing justifications indicative of stages 1–4 of Gibbs’ model of moral judgment were summed over all questions and over each ethnic group and divided by the number of scorable answers. Based on 10% of the interviews, interrater agreement (Cohen's Kapa) for the adapted version was .88, which is satisfactory. Cronbach’s alpha of the adapted version of the SRM-SF was .88.
Mentalizing. A coding system was developed to code spontaneous use of mental states in participants’ moral judgment narratives. A similar method has been adopted in previous studies (Begeer, Malle, Nieuwland, & Keysar, 2010; Rhee, Uleman, Lee, & Roman, 1995). Over three sessions of discussion the coding rules were defined. Interrater reliability (Cohen's Kappa) for the coding system was .92. Disagreements were resolved through discussion.
We coded the use of terms referring to emotions (e.g., happy, sad, angry), beliefs (e.g., knows, expects, assumes), desires (e.g., wants, hopes, yearns) and behavioral intentions (will return, is going to take, will help), and physical states (e.g. he will die) and needs. Coding was done
separately for each mental state category, ethnic group and for the potential victim and perpetrator in the SRM-SF situations. Scores consisted of the frequency of mental state references used for each ethnic group as well as a total over all groups. Scores on emotions, thoughts and desires were summed to create a variable indicating the inference of mental states that are considered most important in mature moral judgment, whereas scores on physical states and needs and behavior intentions were summed to create a variable of mental state references assumed to be related to immature moral judgment. See the appendix for the coding system.
Data analysis
Data was screened prior to analysis for correct entry, missing values, univariate and multivariate outliers and assumptions of multivariate analysis. Total mentalizing, composite scores on emotions, beliefs and desires and composite scores on behavior intentions and physical states and needs were positively skewed and therefore square root transformed to obtain normality (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
Results
Differences in moral judgment and mentalizing as a function of ethnicity
We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA to test whether there was significant variability of moral judgment and reference to mental states of the victim within participants as a function of ethnicity. The repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with ethnicity (Arabian, Asian, Caucasian, and African) as the within subject factor and mentalizing and moral judgment scores as the dependent variables. Levine’s test for homogeneity of errors was significant for mentalizing, indicating the assumption was not met. For this reason a more stringent alpha level of α = .01 was used to test the hypotheses. The effect of ethnicity was nonsignificant, with Phillais Trace = .03: multivariate F (6, 726) = 1,80 , p = .097. Univariate tests showed that moral judgment did not differ between ethnic groups F (3, 363) = 0.18, p= .91. The effect of ethnicity on mentalizing was also nonsignificant F (3, 363) = 3.18, p .024, partial η² .026 (see Table 1 for descriptives).
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The relation between mentalizing and moral judgment
to examine whether reference to mental states of emotions, beliefs and desires was related to higher stage moral judgment, and reference to behavior intentions and physical states and needs was related to lower stage moral judgment (see Table 2 for descriptives). We controlled for age since both moral judgment development and mentalizing develop with age (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006; Gibbs et al., 2007).
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Bivariate correlations among variables in the regression model are displayed in Table 3. A significant positive correlation was found between moral judgment and the variable of summed emotions, beliefs and desires, r =.57, p <.001. In the hierarchical multiple regression analysis, age was entered in the first step, in the second step the variable of summed emotions, beliefs and desires and in a third step the variable of summed physical states and needs and behavior intentions.
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Table 4 shows the standardized regression coefficients, t-values and adjusted R² after entry of all three explanatory variables. All predictors combined yielded an R² of .36, F (3, 88) = 16.48, p< .001. The adjusted of R² = .34 indicates that 34 % of the variability in the level of moral judgment was explained by age and mentalizing. Age alone did not significantly predict the level of moral judgment: R² =.02, F (1, 90) =1.62, p = .206.
The variable of summed emotions, beliefs and desires significantly predicted moral judgment after controlling for age, semipartial R²= .33, F (1, 89) = 43.96, p < .001. This indicates that 33% of moral judgment level is explained by reference to emotions, thoughts and desires of the characters involved in the moral situation. The variable of summed physical states and behavior intentions did not contribute to the prediction of moral judgment level after controlling for age and the variable of summed emotions, thoughts and desires, as indicated by a non-significant increase of explained variance of only 2.0 %, F (1, 88) = 2.37, p = .128. Thus reference to physical states and behavior intentions added no explained variance after controlling for emotions, beliefs, desires and age.
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Discussion
In the current study, two claims of the moral judgment model were investigated in a sample of Caucasian white Dutch male adolescents: stage consistency over social contexts and the importance of social perspective taking. In a test of the first claim, we anticipated that participants would display higher moral judgment stage in moral situations involving a perpetrator or victim of in-group ethnicity compared to situations involving a perpetrator of out-in-group ethnicity. Second, we hypothesized that in those situations involving a perpetrator of in-group ethnicity a higher frequency of mentalizing would be found. Further, to investigate the importance of social perspective talking, we hypothesized that reference to mental states of emotions, beliefs and desires would be related to higher stages of moral judgment, but reference to behavior intentions and physical states and needs would be related to lower stage of moral judgment.
Contrary to our hypothesis, ethnicity of the perpetrator provoked no differences in moral judgment or mental state references. In line with our assumption, a strong relation was found between mental state reference and the level of moral judgment for abstract mental states of emotions, desires and beliefs. Contrary to our hypothesis, no relations were found for physical states and behavior intention references and moral judgment.
Participants did not show lower stage moral judgment in situations involving characters of out-group ethnicity, which does not concur with previous research (Johnson et al., 2002). However, most literature on ethnic group bias concerns the bias toward Afro Americans in the United States which may not be generalizable to the Dutch population (Zick, Kuppor, & Hovermann, 2011). Nevertheless, ethnic group bias has been found among Dutch participants when measured through indirect measures of group bias. For example, Dotsch and Wigboldus (2008) found Dutch participants to maintain more distance towards Moroccan characters than towards native Dutch characters. Reasoning is suspect to social desirability. Thus, an alternative account for the consistency in moral judgment reasoning between ethnic in- and out-group characters might be the tendency to provide socially desirable answers. Alternatively, the position of the out-group in the moral situation might cause differences in bias displayed in moral considerations. Unlike the current study, previous studies on racial bias all placed the out-group character in the role of perpetrator or convict committed of a crime. This may more strongly provoke anticipation of threat and fear and moral orientation towards preservation of the in-group.
Our second hypothesis about differences in the consideration of mental states as a function of the ethnicity of the victim was not confirmed, because there were no differences in mental state
references between ethnic groups. Previous studies found less mentalizing activity in neurological correlates of mentalizing in participants when the subject was an ethnic out-group member. We therefore anticipated less mental state considerations when the potential victim was an ethnic out-group member. However, no differences in mentalizing over different ethnic categories were confirmed by the current result. Thus, studies on neurological correlates of mentalizing discussed in the introduction are not in line with our findings. Possibly, this suggests that the lack of measures of automatic mentalizing processes in the current study may explain our deviant results. However, if people fail to show neurological activity underlying mentalizing in ethnic out-group characters, this does not explain why participants spontaneously refer to those mental states of out-group people in the current study. Mentalizing is a process with highly automatic components (Frith & Frith, 2006). Possibly, participants may exhibit differences in mentalizing on this subconscious level that did not affect the use of mental state terms. Also, we should not rule out the possibility that participants simply did not distinguish between different ethnic groups in their consideration of others’ psychological states.
The strong positive relation between spontaneous mentalizing and the level of moral judgment is in line with current literature on the relation between mentalizing and moral performance from non-Kohlbergian measures of moral development, such as moral decision making, moral evaluation and obligation concerns (Lane et al., 2010; Wellman & Miller, 2008; Young & Saxe, 2009). Our current findings support that the relation between mentalizing and moral judgment extends to the moral judgment model (Gibbs et al., 2007; Kohlberg, Levine & Hewer, 1983). Moreover, the current results demonstrate that distinction between different mental states is relevant in moral judgment reasoning. Results indicated that inference of emotions, desires and thoughts are strongly associated with moral judgment, which is congruent with our hypothesis that these mental states pertain specifically to consideration of well-being of others and interpersonal care and as such relate strongly to mature moral judgment.
However, our assumption that inference of behavior intentions and physical states and needs would be characteristic for reasoning in immature stages was not confirmed. It is possible that inferences of physical states and behavior intention are not predictive of moral development, because they occur both in higher and lower stages. Although inferences of physical states and behavior intention thus serve instrumental considerations and orientations of concrete superficiality (Gibbs 2007), they may also occur in mature moral reasoning.
Provided that virtually all adolescents have developed the ability to understand and attribute mental states in their understanding of social situations, the data suggests that mentalizing is not explicitly displayed in all moral considerations or by all adolescents. The higher frequency of spontaneous mental state reference in mature moral judgment narratives supports the notion made
by Gibbs and colleagues that social perspective taking is displayed as a tendency of thought. This notion implies that moral growth is associated with an increasing tendency to shift perspectives and to refer to subtle mental states in the understanding of moral situations (Gibbs et al., 2007; Gibbs et al., 2009). Thus not the cognitive ability of mentalizing, but the willful consideration of emotions, thoughts and desires of those involved in a moral situation is related to higher levels of moral judgment: a concern for what is right or wrong based on considerations involving the welfare of individuals in their community (Damm, 2010). In a similar vein, Carpendale and Lewis (2006, p.223) remark that we should not neglect the issue of moral motivation in that people have to care and value others' differing perspectives. Our results underscore these notions by indicating that spontaneous consideration of mental states of the characters in the moral situation relate strongly to mature moral judgment.
The overall level of moral judgment on the adapted version of the SRM was lower than reports of adolescent’s scores on the original SRM-SF (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007). One explanation stems from earlier research showing that real life moral issues with particular facts and information are found to trigger lower stages of moral judgment (Carpendale & Krebs, 1995, Krebs & Denton, 2005). Krebs and Denton (2005) found that non-abstract, philosophical moral judgment dilemmas tend to pull for higher stage judgment than real life dilemmas. The concrete aspects in the situations provoke an orientation towards these features, which is related to lower stages of moral judgment, whereas general context free formulations will exert general context free principles. To account for this difference a distinction is made between moral competence and moral performance (Gibbs, 2005). The current vignettes yield higher ecological validity than moral judgment provoked by philosophical and abstract situations, advocating the idea that intra-individual variability in moral judgment is a part of our moral considerations in real life settings.
The current study has several limitations. First, the answers participants provided may be suspect to social desirability. However, the moral judgment model presumes that a person cannot consciously influence the stage of moral judgment (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007). As a consequence, if someone would judge a situation involving an ethnic out-group member by lower stage principles, this cannot be masked by socially desirable answering. Thus, although our measurement of moral judgment and mentalizing is considered relatively difficult to manipulate by participants, there is no way to rule out social desirability in current measurements. Further, another shortcoming of the current study is the absence of a measure of ethnocentric attitude. This may be relevant since previous studies have found that general ethnocentrism of people is related to moral judgment (Van IJzendoorn, 1989).
Future research is needed to investigate to what extent these limitations mask alternative explanation for our findings. It could be argued that additional measurement using automatic or
unconscious responses is needed to explore automatic processes and the influence of social desirability more extensively (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Further, including a measure of ethnocentrism in future research would complement current findings by investigating how ethnocentrism moderates the effect of the ethnicity of the characters involved in a moral situation on the level of moral judgment. Regarding the influence of ethnicity on stage inconsistent moral judgment, it requires further research to investigate to what extent the current findings are specific for the Dutch population. To our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate mental state inference in moral judgment narratives. It remains for future research to investigate whether these findings generalize to other populations and to chart more definitely the association of different aspects of mentalizing development and moral judgment.
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Table 1
Means and SD for moral judgment and mentalizing by ethnicity of the victim N=92 boys (prior to square root transformation)
Moral judgment in situations involving
M SD Range
Caucasian victims 2.01 0.53 1 – 3.5
Arabian victims 1.99 0.55 1 – 3.13
African victims 2.05 0.54 1 – 3.17
Asian victims 2 0.55 1 – 3.67
Mentalizing in situations involving
White victims 0.53 0.80 0-3
Arabian victims 0.59 0.73 0-2
African victims 0.46 0.67 0-3
Table 2
Means and SD for total moral judgment and mental state references (adapted SRM-SF)
M SD Range
SRM total 2.02 0.44 1 – 3
References to emotions, beliefs and desires 1.6 1.9 0 – 8 References to behavior intentions and
physical states
Table 3
Correlations between age, higher and lower mentalizing moral judgment
1 2 3
1. age -
2. emotions, beliefs and desires -.04 - 3. behavior intentions and physical states and
needs
-.09 .05 -
4. Moral Judgment -.13 .57*** .15
Table 4
Hierarchical regression of mentalizing and age on moral judgment
β T sr² R²
Age 0.13 1.27 .02 .02
emotions, beliefs and desires 0.57 6.63*** .33 .34
behavior intentions and physical states 0.13 1.54 .02 .36
R² .36
Adjusted R² .34
Appendix A
13 De jongen links staat op straat te eten. Opeens verslikt hij zich ernstig. De jongen rechts ziet dat de jongen links rood aanloopt en niet meer kan ademhalen.
Hoe belangrijk vind jij het dat de jongen rechts probeert de jongen links te redden en waarom vind je dat?
Appendix B
Codeerregels mentaliseren
Eerst wordt een algemene omschrijving per categorie gegeven, daarna volgt een woordenlijst. Met antagonist wordt het subject van de morele behandeling bedoeld en dus het potentiële slachtoffer, met protagonist wordt de personage bedoeld die een morele handeling verricht. Emoties
Emoties verwijzen naar gemoedsbeweging meestal kortstondig.
emotie antagonist (slachtoffer): emoties toegeschreven aan de antagonist (zoals “hij zal teleurgesteld zijn”, hij zal boos zijn, of, hij zal verdrietig zijn, hij zal gelukkig worden,
emoties protagonist: emoties toegeschreven aan de protagonist (voorbeelden zoals hierboven omschreven)
emotie algemeen: emoties genoemd in de argumentatie die niet expliciet aan de personages worden toegeschreven ook al is duidelijk dat ze hierop wel betrekking hebben. Vaak blijkt dit uit het
gebruik van persoonlijk voornaamwoorden “men” of “je”ipv “hij”of “zij”. “je zal erg blij zijn als je geholpen wordt”.
Gedachten
Gedachten verwijzen naar iemands besef, conceptie, denkbeeld, idee, voorstelling, bedenksel, overdenking, of overpeinzing of motivatie
gedachten antagonist de gedachten toegeschreven aan de antagonist (“misschien twijfelt hij, of, hij weet dat dat niet gebeurd is, hij vraag zich af of dat mogelijk is, hij begrijpt het misschien niet, maar ook hij is het vergeten)
gedachten protagonist de gedachten toegeschreven aan de protagonist.
gedachten algemeen genoemd in de argumentatie die niet expliciet aan de personages worden toegeschreven ook al is duidelijk dat ze hierop wel betrekking hebben. Vaak blijkt dit uit het gebruik van persoonlijk voornaamwoorden “men” of “je”ipv “hij”of “zij” . Bijvoorbeeld “anders zit je daar de hele avond op te wachten”- of, waarschijnlijk gaat hij dat niet doen want je zou denken dat hij iets vreemds voor hem in petto heeft., “want zo iemand vertrouw je niet” Verlangens ('desires')
Verlangens verwijzen naar iemands begeerte of wens naar iets iemand of een gebeurtenis. “zal dit graag willen hebben, verlangt ernaar, heeft hier behoefte aan, of, je wilt zelf ook geholpen worden in zo'n situatie.
NB zij willen dit gaan doen (concreet observeerbaar gedrag) valt ook onder verlangens (en niet Gedrag) omdat met het woord “willen”een duidelijk verlangen of wens wordt gementaliseerd, hetgeen van een hoger niveau blijk geeft. Bijvoorbeeld zij willen een reis maken, zij willen vanavond uitgaan, zij willen vast graag wat gaan drinken.
Gedrag
Uitspraken over in de nabije toekomst verwachte gedrag van iemand; iemand doet iets nog niet, maar de respondent verwacht wel dat deze persoon het gaat doen. Het gaat hierbij om bewust gedrag dat concreet observeerbaar is. Bijvoorbeeld: hij zal gaan bedelen, hij gaat dat terugpakken. Maar niet, hij gaat vallen (niet bewust), of, hij zal kwaad worden (geen concreet gedrag).Bij deze categorie is het mentaliseren niet expliciet gemaakt door verbale verwijzingen naar psychische toestanden. De veronderstelling is echter wel dat uitspraken over verwacht gedrag het gevolg zijn van sociale perspectiefname en de interferentie van mentale toestanden (Frith & Frith, 2006). Hieronder valt ook het voorspellen van gedrag dat een reactie is op het gedrag van de ander. gedrag antagonist een uiting van de verwachting dat de antagonist bepaald gedrag zal gaan
vertonen (“hij zal het afpakken”, of, “hij zal het hem betaald zetten”, of, “dan zal hij volgende keer hem helpen”). Ook kan het zijn dat er alleen wordt geuit dat bepaald gedrag waarschijnlijk is (bijv. ik hoop maar niet dat hij hem zal wreken, maar het zou heel goed kunnen, of, “het zou best nog wel eens kunnen dat hij het hem betaald gaat zetten).
gedrag protagonist: zie hierboven
gedrag algemeen “een uiting van de verwachting van bepaald gedrag in algemene zin
geformuleerd, meestal worden woorden als 'je', 'men' of 'iemand' gebruikt.. Bijvoorbeeld, iemand kan gaan slaan, iemand kan wraak nemen, iemand kan je bedanken, men zou het ook terug kunnen doen, of, “dan zetten mensen het je betaald”, of, “dan kun je erop wachten dat je ook zo wordt behandeld”, of, “dan wordt je volgende keer ook geholpen.
intenties vervallen en worden feitelijk een categorie van gedrag, omdat eerder was vastgesteld dat intenties over emoties en gedachten onder die categorieën zouden vallen
Fysiologische toestanden en behoeften
de interferentie van iemands gesteldheid die het gevolg is van fysieke processen of de concrete situatie. Voorbeelden honger, pijn dorst, nodig hebben van, (ergens aan) sterven, dood gaan, verdrinken, stikken, zich gespannen voelen, zich veilig voelen. Maar niet “hij is in levensgevaar” fysiologische toestand antagonist toeschrijving fysiologische toestand als gevolg van
fysiologische of fysieke toestand. Bijvoorbeeld 'hij heeft het nodig (de auto te lenen omdat die van hem stuk is)', hij heeft honger, hij heeft daar trek in, hij lust wel een broodje, hij heeft hoofdpijn, pijn aan zijn knie. 'anders gaat hij dood/verdrinkt hij ' synoniem hij heeft behoefte aan iemand die hem uit het water haalt.
fysiologische toestand protagonist (zie bovenstaande voorbeelden)
fysiologische toestand algemeen in het algemeen zonder expliciete verwijzing naar de personages; je krijgt daar honger van, of, dat kan pijn doen,
Karaktertrekken (Traits)
Toegeschreven karaktertrekken verwijzen naar abstracte niet fysieke eigenschappen van anderen. Het gaat dan om een psychologische eigenschap met een relatief stabiel karakter .Deze stabiele karaktertrekken moeten zijn aangewend als beschrijving voor de persoon, niet de handeling van de persoon. In de uitspraak 'hij is dom' is 'dom' een karaktertrek, maar in de uitspraak 'het is dom [om dat te doen]' is 'dom' geen karaktertrek.
Karaktertrek antagonist hij is dom, hij is onverstandig, hij is slim, hij is rechtvaardig karaktertrek protagonist (zie antagonist)
karaktertrek algemeen; is niet van toepassing
Woorden lijst
deze woordenlijst is niet uitputtend maar geeft termen aan die verwijzen naar de gebruikte categorieën. Het is mogelijk dat een codeur van mening is dat een bepaalde uitspraak betrekking heeft op een duidelijke mentaliseerproces, zonder dat onderstaande woorden daarin voorkomen.
Emoties boos kwaad woedend gefrustreerd verdrietig droevig teleurgesteld chagerijnig beschaamd …. voelen
bijv. gene voelen, (on)gelukkig voelen, fijn voelen, schuldig voelen, spijt voelen/hebben, eenzaam voelen.
emotionele waarde hechten aan gehecht zijn aan
Trots
'down' (engels taalgebruik) jammer vinden bedrukt opgelaten opgelucht geraakt (emotioneel) geëmotioneerd
geïrriteerd zijn gepikeerd balen (niet) blij (niet) vrolijk opgetogen 'happy'(engels taalgebruik) in zijn sas zijn
er schik in hebben genieten
waarde hechten aan ontdaan van slag beledigd zijn onthutst gekwetst ontroerd emotionele pijn (psychisch) afgestompt geërgerd, ergernis gevleid bang
angstig in de rats zitten impact hebben op, psychische gevolgen niet meer op straat durven (=verwant aan bang zijn/angst hebben) Gedachten Denken Twijfelen tobben niet begrijpen vergeten herinneren
rekening houden met vertrouwen in /op veronderstellen dat ervan uitgaan dat zich afvragen of waarderen
….vinden (bijv. stom vinden, erg vinden, vervelend vinden, mooi vinden, belachelijk vinden, belangrijk vinden) van plan zijn
overwegen vergeven
wachten (niet letterlijk op en stoel)
reden (indien psychisch) opzettelijk (iets doen)
Desires-verlangens/wensen
Willen (dat); hij wil dat, zij willen etc. wensen
verlangen begeren hopen
dromen ervan dat (dromen in de betekenis van verlangen en het hebben van een droom tijdens slaap)
behoefte hebben aan (psychische zaken) nodig hebben (psychische zaken)
zij willen dit gaan doen (concreet observeerbaar gedrag) valt niet onder de volgende categorie van anticiperen gedrag omdat met het woord “willen”een duidelijk verlangen of wens wordt
gementaliseerd, hetgeen van een hoger niveau blijk geeft. Bijvoorbeeld zij willen een reis maken, zij willen vanavond uitgaan, zij willen graag wat gaan drinken.
Gedragsintentie/ anticiperen gedrag Hij zal..., of, straks...hij
[stelen/pakken/helpen/ teruggeven/ hulp roepen/ bedanken/redden/ wraak nemen/ springen/ opruimen/ antwoorden/ hem steunen/ zijn best
doen etc]
Fysiologische toestand: Heeft pijn (fysieke) Is gewond
Kan dood gaan, anders gaat hij dood, hij kan stikken, verdrinken, niet: hij is in levensgevaar, niet , hij is er slecht aan toe ed.
heeft honger heeft dorst
heeft het nodig (behoefte-herkenning zonder verwijzing naar mentale/psychische toestand
toestand; als het woord nodig niet genoemd wordt, maar de opmerking wel naar de behoefte van de betrokkene verwijst, is dit gecodeerd als sociale perspectiefname overig)
voelt zich niet lekker voelt zich gespannen zich veilig voelen dronken zijn
