The Congo curse : an explanation of conflicts since the Ihusi peace agreements with the Regional Security Complex Theory

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The Congo Curse:

An explanation of conflicts since the Ihusi peace agreements

with the Regional Security Complex Theory

Bachelor thesis Political Science – International relations Danielle Jiskoot (10001330) Danielle.jiskoot@hotmail.com June 27, 2014

Instructor: Dr. Said Rezaeiejan Second reader: Vidya Marapin Word count: 17.059

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Preface

This article is the result of three months intensive research regarding the conflicts in east Democratic Republic of Congo since the 2009 Ihusi peace agreements. Without sufficient foreknowledge, it has been a challenging, but rewarding process. The results have contributed to my interests for the conflict regions in sub-Saharan Africa and stimulated my need to find out more about the subject. Although the road towards the final draft has not been without challenges, it has given me a great amount of joy researching this matter. The need to discover more about conflicts in east Congo has become clear to me and with this research I hope to trigger others to contribute to understanding the conflicts as well.

Before telling you in depth about the aim of this work, it is important to say words of thanks to a few people. In order to get to the conclusions I have come to, much dedication and support from my loved ones has been necessary. First of all, I would like to send love to my aunt Saskia, who passed away on the 4th of May. You’ll be in my heart, always. Also, I want to express my respect to my aunt Anne, who is extremely strong and positive despite her recently discovered illness. My mother, dad, sister, friends and family have been a solid rock of support and for that I thank them from the bottom of my heart. A special word of thanks goes out to my dear friend Lot Feijen. Her happiness, help and motivating words have not only made me a better student, but also kept me going when times got tough. Also, a big hug to Judith, Joost en my mom, who did the final spelling check on my work. Finally, many thanks to my thesis instructor, Dr. Said Rezaeiejan. I probably would not have made it this far if it wasn’t for his support and guidance.

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Abstract

The eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo have been a constant source of disputes since the spill over of the Rwandan genocide in1994. In 2009, the Ihusi peace agreements have been signed between the CNDP, the referent rebel group at the time, and the Congolese government. However, yet again conflicts seemed to arise. How can we explain the conflicts after the 2009 Ihusi peace agreements? In this research, the Regional Security Complex Theory by Buzan and Weaver (2003) is the leading theory in a case study to discover the underlying causes. Along the military, political, economic and societal sector, the analysis has shown the three main actors experiencing extensive security threats towards each other. Additionally, a small Regional Security Complex seems to be present, in which the security interactions take place. The ethnic background of the actors proved to be the leading reason for distrust amongst the units.

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List of abbreviations

DR Congo Democratic Republic of Congo

CNDP Congrèse National pour la défense du Peuple M23 Mouvement du 23-Mars

UN United Nations IR International Relations

RSCT Regional Security Complex Theory RSC Regional Security Complex

EU European Union

NGO Non-governmental Organisations HRW Human Rights Watch

IMF International Monetary Fund LRA Lord’s resistance Army

APCLS Alliances des Partriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverein RCD-G Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma CENI Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante RDF Rwanda Defence Force

ITRI International Tin Research Institute GDP Gross Domestic Product

IPIS International Peace Information Service

FDLR Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda MDR Mouvement Démocratique Républicain

AFDL Alliance de forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo

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List of maps and tables

Map 1 The Democratic Republic of Congo Page 7 Map 2 East DR Congo M23 conflict area Page 10

Map 3 Africa’s Security Complexes Page 24

Figure 5 Defence budget per GDP from 2000 until 2011 Page 27 Map 5 Natural resource areas in east DR Congo Page 37 Appendix

Figure 6 Income from natural resources, percent of GDP Page 57 Figure 7 Natural resource incomes compared to other countries Page 57

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1. Introduction

Ever since Congo’s independence from Belgium in the 1960’s, the country has been an area of almost constant conflict. According to writer and Congo expert Jason Stearns (2013) “It

would be easy to label the Democratic Republic of the Congo an irredeemable mess.”

The most recent and deadliest conflicts in Congo have been a result of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Thousands of Rwandan Hutu’s fled to the eastern regions of Congo that carried the name Zaire at the time, to escape from the genocide committed by the Tutsi’s. In an attempt to scare the Hutu’s away, the Rwandan army invaded Zaire in 1997 (BBC, 2014). Mobuto Sese Seko was the ruling president at the time and got overthrown by anti-Mobutu rebels in May 1997. He was replaced by Laurent Désiré Kabila, who changed Zaire’s name to the Democratic Republic (DR) of Congo. From 1999 onward, the fighting concentrated near the border of Rwanda in east DR Congo, causing the deaths of over 3.3 million people between 1996 and 2003 (Autesserre, 2009: 256). The first peace agreement between the DR Congo and Rwanda was signed in 1999. When it showed to be ineffective and conflicts continued, a second peace agreement followed in June 2003. During three years the actors seemed dedicated to keep eastern DR Congo stable. However, in 2007 large-scale fighting between several armed groups destabilized the region yet again (Autesserre, 2009: 258). A third peace agreement was reached in 2009 between the fighting Congrèse National pour la défense du

Peuple (CNDP) and the Congolese army, and was named the ‘Ihusi agreement’ (Boshoff,

2009: 65). Again, the peace agreements could not maintain peace: after the 2011 Congolese elections were corrupted by Congolese president Joseph Kabila, ex- CNDP soldiers separated from the army, located themselves in the eastern highlands and formed the M23, a highly aggressive rebel group (IPIS, 2012: 5). Rwanda, after having cooperated with the Congo to defeat the CNDP in 2008, allegedly backed the M23 militia through direct military support, changing amity between the states into enmity (Smith, 2013). In November 2013 the Congolese army defeated the M23 with the help of UN forces, the Tanzanian army and South African troops. New reports have shown that the M23 is currently recruiting in Rwanda again, even though it agreed to end the rebellion after it retreated from east DR Congo (News Vision, 2014). Trouble seems to return even after the Ihusi peace agreements and international organisations remain relatively powerless in order to stop the fighting.

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Since the conflicts are located mainly in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, a regionally based conflict theory might be in order to analyse and explain the ongoing conflicts. Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver (2003) investigated colliding Regional Security Complexes worldwide and looked at the tensions between security interdependences between states and non-state actors as an instigator for conflict. Alongside four sectors of analysis as proposed by Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998), this case study will research the sources of the returning conflicts after the 2009 Ihusi peace agreements in east DR Congo and seek to explain the disputes between the main actors: the Congolese government, the rebel group M23 and the Rwandan government. The security tensions investigated in this research will rely on the military, political, economic and societal sectors. In the final conclusions of the research, the four sectors will be compared and it will be decided which sector has the strongest explanatory power on the case. In addition, there will be settled whether or not the security threats take place within a Security Complex. This will depend on the presence of the main variables of the Regional Security Complex Theory in the sectors.

1. 1 Research question

How can we explain the conflicts in eastern DR Congo since the peace agreements in 2009?

1.2 Relevance

One might argue that countless researches for conflict at any level of analysis might already have been done in the past, but it is still important to realise that every conflict has its unique roots and process. No occasion is the same and thorough research about different cases might lead to a better understanding of conflict. Especially post- European colonialized countries in Africa, such as Congo, seemed to have been ruled with policies almost definite to lead to conflict. Colonial structures often ignored the countries’ original political arrangements. Then, using some to rule others, the colonial authorities introduced the ‘divide and rule’ principle, leading to countries prone to becoming weak authoritative states (Bartos and Wehr, 2002: 5). The expectance for conflict is therefore higher in this particular field of research, but does not specify other different causes for ongoing conflict yet. Today, the conflicts in eastern DR Congo still haven’t ceased to exist and therefore it is important to attempt to contribute to the already existing researches concerning the conflicts in DR Congo. Without the appropriate knowledge about the nature of the disputes, it will be impossible to provide profitable aid for

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peace or advice about possible solutions. In addition, there is a necessity to clarify that east DR Congo cannot be called a post conflict area yet. Since December 2002, regional actors have declared the end of the Congolese war and fixed the status ‘post conflict’. From then on, they started working on a new framework: the implementation of peace processes, since east Congo was no longer a conflict zone (Autesserre, 2009: 261). As this research will show, the still present conflicts are more complicated and dangerous than a post conflict zone should entail. Until proper knowledge and research exist, we must keep looking for suitable theories and explanations in order to solve the conflicts. This research will seek to enrich the knowledge about the conflicts in east Congo and add to the unfulfilled cognition about it.

2. Theoretical Framework

This chapter will give insight into the unstable conditions in east Congo since the Ihusi peace agreement in 2009. Furthermore, literature on conflict will be presented in order to pose a view on existing theories. The section thereafter will contain an extensive review of the Regional Security Complex Theory and explain why this theory will be used for this research in particular.

2.1 The conflicts in east Congo and the 2009 Ihusi peace agreement

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In Rwanda, a civil war between the Hutu and Tutsi communities, which lasted from 1990 until 1993, arose again in 1994 after former Hutu president Habyarimana’s airplane got shot down. The result was genocide and large-scale massacre, claiming the lives of over a million Tutsi’s and moderate Hutu’s (Reyntjens, 2004: 177) With the Tutsi’s rising power after the 1994 genocide, approximately one million Hutu refugees fled into the eastern regions of neighbour DR Congo, bringing the rivalries with them. The conflicts soon evolved into a regional war. In 1996, the growing unpopularity of Congolese president Mobuto for alleged Hutu support led to the invasion of the Rwandese army into the country, making spokesperson Laurent Désiré Kabila the new president. However, Kabila quickly turned on his former allies; he fired his Rwandan advisers, ended the military cooperation and implemented hatred against the Rwandese natives in DR Congo (Autesserre, 2008: 99).

Then, in January 2009, the unexpected happened: the Congolese and Rwandese army gathered forces and arrested Congrèse National pour la défense du Peuple (CNDP) leader Laurent Nkunda (Van Reybrouck, 2012: 549). On the 23rd of March 2009, Congolese rebel group CNDP signed the Ihusi peace accord with the Congolese government while their leader stayed under house arrest in Rwanda (Harbon and Wallensteen, 2010: 503). The CNDP had been fought for three consecutive years in the Kivu region in east Congo before the fighting was brought to an arrest in 2009. Rwanda had been the main supporter of the CNDP, but after reaching an agreement with the Congolese government, Rwanda decided to team up in defeating the rebels. CNDP’s new leader, Ntaganda Bosco, showed to be more willing to sign a peace agreement with the DR Congo than Nkunda and therefore did in Kinshasa on the 23rd of March (Harbon and Wallensteen, 2010: 504).

After having had relatively stable years in east DR Congo, conflict arose again in April 2012. This time, the rebellion was led by a new group: the M23. The group derived its name from the 23rd of March, the date on which the peace agreements were signed in 2009, and claimed the Congolese government did not respect the Ihusi agreements (Stearns, 2013). The fair elections in 2011 for the Congolese government, which were agreed upon in the peace agreements, turned out to be extremely flawed and fraudulent. Over 850.000 votes, about 5% of the total, were lost and the election turnout exceeded the amount of registered voters. Joseph Kabila, who took over presidency after the murder of his father in 2001, came out as the victor. But through a seemingly unfair process (Stearns, 2013). The Ihusi peace agreements clearly encompassed that the parties agreed upon the fact that the CNDP would launch itself as a political party and that the Congolese government in their turn would

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recognize the CNDP as a political party (Peace Agreement between the Government and the Congress National pour la Défense du Peuple, 2009: 12). However, Kabila’s corrupt move on the election process instigated new disturbances. In April 2012, almost half of the former CNDP and former Congolese soldiers launched the M23. Over a short period of time, the M23 obtained many new members through personal networks and were able to capture Goma, a city of 500.000 inhabitants, in the North-Kivu region in DR Congo on the 22nd of November that same year (Vlassenroot, 2013: 14). Although an estimated 40 rebel groups terrorized the eastern regions daily, the M23 showed to be the most dangerous and fastest rising rebel group present (Mwenda, 2013).

The M23 started out weak and owed its rapid growth to extensive background support; external aid has been documented by the United Nations Group of Experts and Human Rights Watch. Support by Rwanda in particular has been investigated closely. The UN group of experts concluded that the Rwandan Minister of Defence, James Kabarebe, heads the chain of command of the M23 (IPIS, 2012: 16). Furthermore, the Rwandan government allegedly supplied troops and provided ammunition directly to the rebel group from Rwanda (Bihuzo, 2012: 6).

After a year of political dominance and war crimes in east DR Congo, the M23 was defeated by the Congolese army with the help of UN forces, the Tanzanian army and South African troops (Newsvision, 2014). The rebel group seemed to be stopped at first, but new information has shown that the M23 is still recruiting and military active in Rwanda and neighbouring countries (Nangini et. al., 2014). Conclusively, the Ihusi peace agreements seemed to induce stability at first, but it showed that the peace agreements failed yet again to bring peace in east DR Congo. How can we explain these ongoing conflicts?

2.2 Conflict theories

The field of International Relations (IR) consists of different theories concerning conflict that each have a distinctive view on the reasons for conflict between (foreign) actors. This section will discuss the relevant IR theories and take into consideration why they should or should not be used in this research.

First and foremost, in order to analyse conflict, it is important to conceptualise conflict. A definition coined by Donald Horowitz, obtained through earlier work of Lewis Coser, clarifies

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the nature of the leading subject of this research: “Conflict is a struggle in which the aim is to

gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals.” (Horowitz, 1985:

95) The resources with which these goals are attempted to be obtained will not be specified. In doing so, it will be possible to analyse all aspects of the conflicts in east Congo. The provided and used resources for the conflicts will not be taken into consideration, leaving only the nature of the conflicts to analyse; the disputes have to be aimed at neutralizing, injuring or eliminating the rival party.

After having conceptualised the relevant definition of conflict for this research, the IR theories will explain in depth potential causes for conflict. First, realism and neorealism will be reviewed. Ethnic conflict theories will be analysed thereafter. Finally, the Regional Security Complex Theory will show us a unique perspective on conflict.

Realism and neorealism

An especially important and well known tradition which analyses conflict within the field of international relations is realism. Undeniably, countless other IR theories also reviewed the relationship between states in the international system. For example, liberalism rather looks at international cooperation as the leading purpose for states. However, this will not lead to an explanation for the existing conflict in this case. Realism focusses on international affairs as the leading reason for a struggle for power and the actors involved are self-interested states. If a state grows more powerful than other opponents, it will start using force to expand domination for different possible motives: security, wealth, or others (Snyder, 2004: 55). Classical realists claimed that states, just like human beings, always have a desire to dominate others, which inevitably leads to war. Defensive realists, a separate branch of realism that focusses on states as socialized players, rather emphasized that states merely wish to survive in the world system and large states would sooner generate alliances and choose defensive military postures (Walt, 1998: 31). Offensive realist John Mearsheimer agrees with the classical realists that states are in a constant power struggle, but the drive is not the animal like desire to dominate others. International relations are not a constant state of war, but a state of relentless security competition (Mearsheimer, 1994: 9). The main motives for this security competition are all based on survival of the state. A rather defensive goal.

Mearsheimer hands us five assumptions that can cause a state to be aggressive towards other states. The first assumption is that the international system is anarchic, which means the

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international system exists of independent political units with no authority above them. Therefore there is no higher power to control these states. The second assumption is that states have some sort of offensive military capability, which gives them the power to potentially hurt or destroy each other. Knowing that other states might possess this power can make a state become insecure and consider using force. The third assumption entails the fact that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. The fourth assumption is the claim that states are prone to fight for their survival, because states want to maintain their sovereignty. The fifth and last assumption is that states always think strategically when it comes to surviving in the international system (Ibid: 10).

These five assumptions can then lead to three patterns of state behaviour: states in the international system fear each other, each state in the system wants to guarantee survival and states will attempt to maximize their relative power position over other states. States are both offensively- and defensively oriented. By maximizing their power position, it will be easier to take advantage of others and harder to be dominated (Ibid: 12).

Regarding these assumptions and patterns of state behaviour, Mearsheimer emphasized the aspect of security as the main incentive of conflict in the international system. The neorealist approach agrees with the need for security, but does not look at power as an end in itself. Where political scientist Hans Morgenthau saw the accumulation of more and more power as the ultimate goal, neorealist Kenneth Waltz sees power as a possibly useful means. In crucial situations the aim of states is not for power, but for security (Waltz, 1988: 616). Waltz stresses that in a situation of anarchy the ultimate goal will always be to maintain security. States can only look for tranquillity, profit and power once survival is being assured within the state. Survival, or sufficient security, can be assured with power (Snyder, 2002: 152). Keith Krause and Michael Williams add to this neorealist approach, to the aspect of security, that there can be no security with the absence of state. The security of the citizens is represented by the state and those who stand outside of the state are viewed as potential or actual threats (Krause and Williams, 1996: 232).

It is clear that both realism and neorealism emphasize the role of the state as the main actor in conflict and capture the importance of security in the international system. The aim of this research, however, will be to also analyse non-state actors and not just focus on the conflicts between the Congolese- and Rwandese government. Rebel group M23 will be taking in

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account as well, which cannot be considered a state actor. The element of realism that will be used in this particular research is the main focus on security as an explanation for conflict.

Ethnic conflict theories

A level of analysis looking beyond the state can be found in ethnic conflict theories. Barry Posen (1993) posed a realist theory for ethnic conflicts, such as appeared in Rwanda around the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The breaking down of a multi-ethnic state would provide an anarchic setting for ethnic groups, triggering intense fear and force as the solutions for conflicts. The problems would be even more serious if ethnic rivals coexisted in the same territories (Posen, 1993: 31). Donald Horowitz (1985) also stressed the importance of looking at the local level of analysis when it comes to conflict. He stated that international relations put too much emphasis on the international level, while we should look at conflicts between groups. Therefore, he focusses upon ethnic conflicts (Horowitz, 1985: 95).

In the case of the conflicts in eastern Congo, we can no longer speak of just ethnic conflict, since so many more actors have had an influence on the ongoing disputes. The ethnicity within the fighting groups can surely be called a contributing factor. Although the conflicts may have started as an ethnic conflict from 1994 with the Hutu refugees entering the DR Congo, the conflicts since the Ihusi peace agreements in 2009 have become more complicated. Sévérine Autesserre (2009) indeed stated that the conflicts in east Congo entail micro and macro level rivalries over land, resources and power. National and provincial actors as the main characters in the ongoing conflicts and a combination between political events and the arrival of Rwandese refugees have spiked the conflicts. Besides, Rebel groups with different backgrounds fight with and against each other in the unstable region of Congo (Autesserre, 2009: 256). Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver (2003) have shaped a theory that covers the importance of a regional analysis on conflicts. The ‘regionalist perspective’ sets up a clear explanation for conflicts and security affairs in the post- Cold War world, introducing the ‘Regional Security Complex Theory’. This theory will be the leading theoretical approach in researching the conflicts in east Congo after the Ihusi peace agreements in 2009.

2.3 The Regional Security Complex Theory

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patterned in regionally based clusters 1. Actors inside such clusters are bound to have a stronger security interdependence than actors outside and inside a cluster. Patterns inside a cluster, or complex, may be penetrated by global actors, but the regional dynamics have a certain degree of autonomy nonetheless (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 4). In their work ‘Regions and Powers: the structure of International security’ (2003) Buzan and Weaver investigate the security complexes worldwide.

The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) is a conceptual framework that captures the new upcoming international security system, which they call ‘1+4+regions’. The RSCT contains a model which is able to analyse, explain and anticipate developments in any region. The theory has constructivist roots, because the formation and interpretation of RSC’s depend on patterns of amity and enmity between the units involved in the system. This makes the regional systems hinge on the actions and interactions of actors. They are not just a reflection of a power struggle (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 40). Security regions form subsystems in which the biggest part of the security interaction lies within these systems. The internal security interaction in RSC’s makes up for the fact that states fear their neighbours and look for allies in other regional actors (Ibid: 41). It is not without reason that the theory stresses the regional level for conflict analysis; the national and local view are not without limitations. First of all, the national level is not to be called a reasonable level of analysis. Security dynamics exist of more than state to state actors and therefore have to be viewed on a broader level. Secondly, the local level tends to solely take group conflicts into consideration. The regional approach offers a point of view upon situations in which the security of states and non- state actors are tightly linked and not to be seen apart from each other. Therefore, the regional level is the perfect interplay between the national and local level of analysis (Ibid: 43).

The RSCT’S main variables

The formation of Regional Security Complexes depends on the anarchic structure and the balance of power consequences that are derived from it. Also, pressures of physical proximity between actors plays an important part. Anarchy plus the distance effect plus geographical diversity make up for a regionally based cluster (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 46). In order to

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empirically investigate regional security, Buzan and Weaver set out four levels of analysis, which they call the Security Constellation. The first level is domestically within the states of the region. The vulnerability of a state specifies which kind of security fears it has. The second level is the state-to-state level. The third level is the region’s interaction with neighbouring regions and the fourth and final level looks at the role of global powers in the region. The latter focusses on the connection between the global and the regional structures. All four levels of analysis are always simultaneously in play. The levels of analysis are shaped in order to define the level in which research will take place (Ibid: 51). Additionally, the essential structure of an RSC exists of four main variables:

1. Boundary; this variable looks at what differentiates the RSC from its neighbour. 2. Anarchic structure; An RCS must exist of two or more autonomous units. 3. Polarity; the variable that covers the distribution of powers among the units.

4. Social construction; the last variable that looks at patterns of amity and enmity among the units (Ibid: 53).

Even though the theory explains the importance of territorial motives for conflict, it also explains the necessity to look at non-territorial elements (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 11). For this research, we will also tend to grasp the sectors of analysis that can tell us if there is an actual security threat present in the area of research. “Security Complexes are seen through

the lens of security”. (Ibid: 43) To better understand the content of these security complexes,

it is important to clearly show the elements that shape security. Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998) state that international security has its own distinctive meaning compared to other types of security matters. International security has a more extreme meaning. By saying ‘security’, representatives mean an emergency situation and therefore justify the use of whatever measures necessary to block the potential threat (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: 21). The authors distinguish five sectors of analysis to discover if we can indeed speak of a security threat.

The military sector

The first sector is the military sector. The agenda is largely focussed around states, although a main exception occurs when states spiral into disintegration. This situation can then lead to prolonged periods of anarchy. On this level of analysis, the observation is not always based on the state military, but can also be upon armed groups fighting for their own survival. This

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entails groups that want to, for example, organize a coup on the government (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: 21).

Military security matters arise from the internal and external processes by which communities maintain the machineries of government. Therefore, the military agenda mainly circulates around internal and external military threats. However, the use of military power can also be used for different sources of threat, such as migrants or rival ideologies (Ibid: 50). The referent object of the military can also differ from the usual state to state actors. In many places, tensions do still exist between the ruler and the ruled. States are considerably vulnerable for threats coming from within. Candidates for this specific kind of threat can be unionists, would-be states and revolutionaries. The common factor is that all these groups wish to claim statehood, but lack power, or want to overthrow the government, but do not enjoy recognition of their claim by other states. Rebel movements and militias are a good example of these groups. They do either speak in the name of a state or become self-seeking and self-referencing security entities (Ibid: 53). Where states usually invoke more abstract principles when it comes to military security matters, rebels most of the times clearly define an authoritative leadership (Ibid: 54).

Considering the fear for security, it is common that they are socially constructed rather than objectively present or absent. Neighbours that are heavily armed with a history of aggression can more easily be perceived as realistic threats. Paranoia, however, is possible in some cases as well. The existence of historical enmity and repeated war also tends to worsen the present perceptions of threat. The next step to move towards brute force then shows that actors are willing to surpass normal political relations and let the military sector overrule the political, economic and social sectors (Ibid: 58).

The political sector

The second sector of analysis, the political sector, looks at the organizational stability of the state and the heart is made up of threats to state sovereignty. The political sector will take care of non-military threats to sovereignty. Although all sectors can be called complicated, this sector is actually the most complex. It is easy to get lost between the societal and military sectors and overlooking the political threats. In some sense, however, all threats might be called political (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: 141).

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Usually, political threats are about either giving or denying recognition, support or legitimacy to political actors or the essential patterns of their politics. It is a continuous struggle to obtain this legitimacy in an ocean of change. There are two pillars where political threats can be constructed upon. The first is the internal legitimacy of the political unit, which relates to ideologies and other constitutive ideas and issues that define the state. The second pillar is the external recognition of the state or its external legitimacy (Ibid: 144). Even when there is a relationship of inequality present, actors always want to be seen as the vassal or the lord. Whenever someone who wishes to be seen as a lord only gets recognized as the vassal, security threats might rise. Basically, states and political actors do not tend to witness each other as equals (Ibid: 145).

The main referent object in this sector is the territorial state, but can also be quasi super-states, such as the EU, self-organized groups or transnational movements, which are usually religious. By definition, states have authoritative leaders and the government will usually be the securitizing actor. Considering weak states, the security threats will usually come from within the state and the authoritative state leaders will take the government’s actions on behalf of its own interests (Ibid: 146).

The state situation that applies to the conflicts in east DR Congo is the intentional threats to (weak) states on the basis of their state-nation split. The state and nation do not seem to be in line, so it might be possible for some other actor to raise revolutionary claims. In Africa, many states are weak regarding this characteristic and domestic security problems are often the outcome (Ibid: 155). In this research, however, we will see that the conflicts are not solely domestic.

The economic sector

The third sector, the economic sector, is very controversial and politicized and focusses primarily on the free market economy. In this case, however, the interesting aspects of the sector rely upon the economy as a serious threat to a state by other actors.

What does actually qualify for economic security? Situations that rise above the politicized and affect the other sectors (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 99). This sector might contain individuals through classes and states to the abstract and complex system of the global market itself. The best attempt to securitize the economy is to make clear that it is not a matter of

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economic losses and part of the ordinary business of life whenever the economy is threatened, but a possible collapse of welfare (Ibid: 100). Thus the actors can be found on all levels, but the economic threat has to be one concerning the welfare of individuals, groups or states. For individuals, these threats are usually basic human needs. Individuals live or die according to the provision of basic necessities. States can technically go bankrupt, but cannot be dissolved when entering for example an economic crisis. The risk for states is therefore similar to that for individuals. In case it does not receive its basic needs, the national economy might collapse (Ibid: 105). The key issue is stability, which means changes will only occur within the known limits. A prevention of a chain reaction is necessary, because it might threaten the system (Ibid: 107).

This sector is difficult to apply to the conflicts after the 2009 Ihusi agreements. As will be shown in the analyses, the economy of DR Congo revolves around the natural resources in the eastern region of the country, but the threats posed upon Congo from the M23 and Rwanda circulate around their economic greediness. Security threats existed around the highly economic profitable regions that seemed to have had a large share in the exact locations of the conflicts. The analysis will further explain the relevance of the economic sector for this research.

The societal sector

The fourth sector, the societal sector, aims at separate, collective identities. The focus so far has primarily been on large actors such as the state, but the state is often fixed territory and has formal membership. This sector zooms in at the society, identity and the self-conception of communities, with individuals identifying themselves as members of a community (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: 119).

Factors such as language or location might be involved in the idea of a national identity, but it always remains a personal choice. The social security agenda has been set by different actors, regions and areas and the most common issues are merely three:

1.

Migration; people are overrun or diluted by influxes of other people; the community will not be what it used to be, because others will make up the population; identity is being changed by a shift in the composition of the population

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2.

Horizontal competition; although it is still the same people living in a place, they will change their ways because of the overriding cultural and linguistic influence from the neighbouring culture

3.

Vertical competition; people will stop seeing themselves as a group, because there is an integrating- or regionalist project that pulls them towards wider or narrower identities (Ibid: 121).

There are two separate ways of responding to such issues. It can either be dealt with through activities carried out by the community or the issue could be placed on the political agenda. At state level, this might be carried out through border control or legislation (Ibid: 122)

The referent objects in these cases are large groups that carry the same loyalties and devotion strong enough to refer to ‘we’. The main focus is on the threat of the group’s identity. The most important groups are clans, tribes, civilizations, religions, race and nation like ethnic units 2 (Ibid: 124). All different societies do have different vulnerabilities. In Africa, the referent objects are a mixture between pre-modern (the family, village, clan or tribe) and modern (state-nation) actors. In general, it seems as though African countries do not necessarily experience societal threats from other states, but rather deal with domestic splits in society. The threat, however, might as well be migrational. Africa tends to produce small security complexes that might be cross border on a small scale (Ibid: 128)

The environmental sector

The environmental sector, which is the fifth and final sector, looks at the threat for environmental objects. This entails species, habitats or maintenance of the climate. The sector exists of two different agenda’s: the scientific agenda and the political agenda. The scientific agenda operates outside the core of politics and functions along social constructs. The political agenda is in essence governmental and intergovernmental. The latter tends to follow ordinary politics and the shaping of appropriate policies (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: 73). There are many issues that can and might be linked to the environmental sector and are the issues that can be called very relevant today. We might for example think of the disruption of ecosystems, energy problems, population problems, food problems, economic problems and civil strife.

2

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The referent objects in this sector is the environment as such and focusses upon the loss of civilization. The nuclear weapon lobby, for example, expresses their concerns about risking civilization as such with the presence of nuclear weapons. It is important to note that the environmental security does not evolve around threats to nature or ‘Mother Earth’. The earth has been at the same position for years and what happens on the crust is considered rather unimportant. Therefore, the referent object next to the environment is the nexus of civilization and environment. 3(Ibid: 76). Main actors show a strong commitment to international action on environmental issues in several cases. The actors may be states, but might also be NGO’s (Ibid: 77).

Ultimately, three relationships of threat are able to define the universe of environmental security. The first relationship consists of the threats to human civilization from the natural environment that are not caused by human activity. The best examples are fears of meteorite strikes and concerns about a natural swing back into an ice age. The second relationship entails the threats from human activity to the natural systems of structures of the planet when the changes made do actually seem to pose threats to civilization. Examples are greenhouse gas emissions and the damaging of the ozone layer. At the more regional level, damaging the smaller ecosystems are part of a relationship as such. The third relationship consists of the threats from human activity to the natural systems or structures of the planet when the changes made do not pose threats to civilization. For example depletion of natural resources which are used for advances in technology (Ibid: 80).

The five sectors and the RSCT

The five sectors become the most apparent in the geographical proximity, which helps shape a Regional Security Complex. Threats have shown to travel more easily over short distances than over long ones (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 45). In addition, the sectors open up a possibility to analyse the mutual security interactions within a potential RSC top down; it is sometimes necessary to start from the system level to explain the formation of a complex. The Security Complex is defined by the security threats that take place inside it (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: 200).

3_{A coalition between civilization and the environment as a whole (Buzan, Weaver and De} Wilde, 1998: 76)

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The chosen sectors of analysis are part of the securitization process. Security can be as the instigator to make politics go beyond the established ‘rules of the game’ and can frame issues as either above politics or a very special kind of politics. Securitization can therefore be seen as a more extreme form of politicization (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: 23).

2.4 East Congo and RSCT’s in Sub Saharan Africa until 2003

Referring back to the relevance of this research, the centre of the problem for disputes in Africa is the shaping of postcolonial states. Adopting Westphalian international relations and European state systems turned out to be difficult in many places in the world, but especially when it came to the quickly decolonizing countries in Africa. Countries turned out to be weak as a state and as a power (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 219) Security interaction in Africa is composed more by weakness than by strength. Also, conflicts seem to be formed by states or regimes on one side and an insurgency movement on the other, which partially seems to be the case in east DR Congo as well; the main fighting actors are the Congolese and Rwandese government and the M23 rebel group (Ibid: 232). At the domestic level, state failure generally turns out to be the result of domestic level security dynamics being dominant. The war in Congo in the late 1990’s showed that the Westphalian system with a new renaissance of African leaders had no success on helping the Congolese economic, political and cultural stability. DR Congo, like many other African states, was at civil war. In Africa, it can often be more appropriate to speak about ‘regimes’ rather than states. Some leaders have shown to act completely and solely in their own interest. Mobutu’s Zaire has been a perfect example of the sole reign of an individual. The government of Zaire only cared about its own security and extracted natural resources almost exclusively for the use of the elites (Ibid: 225).

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Figure 1: Africa’s Security Complexes (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 231)

At the regional level, the past has shown that it is particularly difficult to indicate security complexes in Africa. Especially because interactions between neighbours sometimes look like RSC’s, but prove to just be chains of events (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 232). Just after decolonization, there was not even a sign of pre-complexes in the area. All states in central Africa until recently have constantly battled with civil war and dictatorships. Internal problems spilled over into neighbouring countries. This also seemed to be the case during the war in Rwanda, which spilled over into Congo in 1996. The war was not only about political factors though: resourceful east DR Congo was of the interest just as much. In that time, interstate alliances were of short term and barely existent (Ibid: 246). A similar trend can be witnessed nowadays and will be discussed in the analyses of the research.

3. Methodology

‘The Congo Curse’ consists of a case study on the conflicts in east DR Congo. The analysis will look at the three main actors of the conflicts since 2009: the Congolese government, the M23 and the Rwandese Government. Although all five sectors help shaping the Regional Security Complexes, the environmental sector will not be taken into consideration in this research. There is no sufficient data available in order to investigate this sector, so no statements will be made regarding this level of analysis. The other four sectors will shape the

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independent variables of the research, namely the military, political, economic and societal sector. Regarding the Security Constellation as mentioned alongside the RSCT’s main variables, the analysis will take place on the first and second level; domestic and state-to-state.

This research uses a qualitative research method in its attempt to reach more understanding on the conflicts in east Congo. It is important to look at the different motives and points of view of the different parties, which can only be achieved through performing qualitative research. All four sectors will each have their own chapter, in which the three main actors of the conflicts will be analysed separately and conjoined. Considering the fact that Buzan and Weaver’s last analyses on Congo was performed in 2003, the conclusions drawn upon Congo’s place in a security complex can be called outdated. A unique chain of developments has taken place since and this research will attempt to find and explain the security dynamics within the conflicts in east DR Congo. With the use of the Regional Security Complex Theory, this research will eventually attempt to explain the causes of the conflicts in east Congo since the Ihusi peace agreements in 2009 and see whether a Regional Security Complex is present.

Different sources of data will be used in order to answer the central question as posed at the beginning of this research: How can we explain the conflicts in eastern DR Congo since the peace agreements in 2009? The primary data is obtained through several resources, including the UN Security Council, the IMF, Freedom House and Human Rights Watch. Direct data from Congo was impossible to obtain, since the timespan of the research does not allow fieldwork. Reports and interviews obtained from the primary sources will be used as a substitute for the Congolese en Rwandese perspective on the different sectors of analysis. The original websites from the Congolese en Rwandan government will not be deliberated, since they have shown to be inadequately informative on the sectors. Furthermore, the websites might show biased information. The M23 does not have an official source, so for further information on their part, we have to rely on secondary data sources. The secondary data consists of two separate sources of data: news sources and scientific articles. The news sources are articles from respectable American, English, and African media sources or online newspaper websites. The American media source used for this research is CNN and will only be consulted when containing articles produced by Africa or Congo experts. The New York times, a respectable newspaper form the United States, provides us an article written by

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Andrew M. Mwenda (2013), which gives us more insight in the military sector threats between the three actors. For the same sector, The Guardian is the most important English newspaper source, since it contains research articles concerning all three main actors. A physically closer source to the conflicts can be found in the African Confidential, an African newspaper that has been reporting in Africa since 1960. The latter can be used to give us a more specific look at the conflicts, since the African Confidential mainly reports on issues in Africa.

For further research about the background of the conflicts, scientific papers concerning the research case will be applied as well. ‘Mapping Conflict Motives: M23’ by the International Peace Information Service (2012) gives further insight in the motives of the M23, Rwanda and the Congolese army. Very important sources for the analysis are also found in the researches of Séverine Autesserre, who dedicated multiple articles and a book to the conflicts in Congo. Although few of her researches date back from before the 2009 peace agreements, several investigated the conflicts after 2009 as well. These are found to be a useful source in answering the research question. Jason Stearns, Congo expert and former coordinator of the UN Group of Experts on the Congo, provides us with articles suitable for the analysis of the security threats in the four sectors as well. His articles give us more insight on the motives of the different actors and the chronology of the conflicts. Next to these authors, a variety of research papers will help providing information for the analysis of the different sectors and the three authors involved.

In the next section of this research, the interplay between the Congolese government, the M23 and the Rwandan government will be analysed and compared to the four sectors for security from Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998). Each chapter will analyse the role and perception on security of the Congolese government, the M23 and the Rwandan government in the sector. The additional conclusions will provide a summary of the notable security threats between the actors and take a look back at the main variables of the Regional Security Complex Theory according to Buzan and Weaver (2003). Three main variables will be viewed alongside the four sectors: the anarchic structure, polarity and social construction. Only when a main variable becomes especially apparent in a sector, it will return in the sector’s conclusion. The first main variable of the RSCT, boundary, will be reviewed last, since it covers the difference of this specific case compared to other neighbouring Regional Security Complexes.

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4. The military sector

This first sector as described by Buzan and Weaver focusses upon states as the main military actors. However, states spiralling into disintegration, and showing a level of anarchy, could also contain military groups within the country (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: 53). In order to distinguish the security threat interplays between the actors, they will be viewed separately. For each actor, the physical presence and potential threat of the army will be reviewed extensively. The internal and external military, the factors where military agendas mainly circulate around4, of respectively the M23 and the Rwandese government will be shown in the analysis. As a start, the Congolese army presence in east DR Congo after the 2009 peace agreements will be analysed. Thereafter, the M23’s military division and presence will follow. The closing analysis will be the Rwandan Government’s military support.

The Ihusi peace agreements, signed on the 23 of March 2009, showed a mutual acceptance and respect from the Congolese government and the CNDP. However, the agreements did not seem to state a possible retreat from the Congolese government out of the eastern Congolese region. Only the CNDP, led by General Laurent Nkunda, had to put down its weapons (Dagne, 2011: 5). Ever since, a gradual abatement of the Congolese defence budget had been witnessed:

Figure 2: Defence budget per GDP from 2000 until 2011 (Martin, 2013)

Although decreasing, it showed that the army forces had not vanished from the region yet. The reason for this might be found in the constant pressure of rebel groups in the Kivu region:

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“In the absence of a legitimate national army, rebel groups will continue to form, either in

response to or in cooperation with a corrupt army command structure.” (Wagner and Van der

Does, 2013) The Congolese government will have no intention of retreating its troops completely until the region has been cleared of conflicts. Despite having accomplished a relatively stable situation in 2009, the fighting and rebelling in the eastern region seemed to be all but done. In 2010, rebel groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Mai Mai militia kept the Congolese army on their toes, but no major events occurred. Working up to the 2011 elections, the fighting seemed to cease even more (Global Security, 2013). The shaping of the M23, after Joseph Kabila corrupted the 2011 elections, brought the military presence in east DR Congo to a new high. The Congolese army reformed, sent its best soldiers and received strength alongside a new approach from the United Nations to defeat the M23. In November 2013, success was guaranteed (Wagner and Van der Does, 2013). The biggest enemy since the 2009 peace agreements has been defeated, but has not given any reason for Congo to retreat its troops from the east Congo region. During the same month of the M23’s defeat, east DR Congo contained approximately another 40 rebel groups (Mwenda, 2013). At the beginning of January this year, remaining ex-CNDP soldiers clashed with members of the Alliances des Partriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverein (APCLS). The incident triggered fights between three other smaller rebels groups, which had to be stopped by the Congolese army and MONUSCO troops on January 14th (Security Council, 2014). Consequently, the Congolese state army will be present for as long as rebellions exist in the east DR Congo region, thus reacting to internal state threats.

The biggest internal threat over the past years has been the M23. These rebels have been active as an armed group since 2012 and is considered a militia; an illegal non-state armed actor (Nyarwa, 2013: 1). As earlier posed in the theoretical framework, Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998) claimed that rebel groups and militias, such as the M23, are one of the referent objects of the military sector. Additionally, they wish to overthrow the Congolese government for their neglected role in Congo’s political field, which is seen as a main motivation for rebel groups in this sector (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: 53). The rebel group is not a state military, but is formed out of rebelling individuals against Kabila’s fraudulent elections in the DR Congo in 2011. The main part of the rebels consisted of approximately 300 ex-CNDP rebels who mutinied against the DRC government (Nangini et. al., 2014: 4). The dominating figures are known to be general Bosco Ntaganda, who was wanted for several war crimes and crimes against humanity, and Chief Sultani Makenga, who

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has been accused for the recruitment of children and several massacres in eastern Congo. In 2012, Human Rights Watch documented the recruitment of at least 137 young men and boys from the Rutshuru region in eastern Congo, who were abducted at their homes, from the markets or taken while working on the land. All allegations were denied by the leadership of the M23 (Human Rights Watch, 2012). The amount of crimes committed by the M23 were plenty and consisted of ethnic massacres, summary executions and rapes. On November 22 in 2012, an apex was reached when Goma was taken over. After the fast rise, the group experienced a rapid demise. Congolese troops, backed by a 3000 man strong UN brigade, South African, Tanzanian and Malawian troops, were able to stop the rebellion on November 5th 2013. By that point, the M23 had already been sufficiently weakened by internal struggles between Ntaganda and Makenga, which led to a divide within the group. Once Makenga celebrated its victory and Ntaganda turned himself in at the Rwandan government, the group could not be rebuilt to become as strong as it was before (Nangini et al., 2014: 4). Despite declaring to end the rebellion after November 5th 2013, the group was found recruiting again in January 2014. The top UN envoy stated that there are ‘credible reports’ that show that the group is resuming its activities (Lederer, 2014). Hence the M23 might have been defeated after causing a serious internal threat for the Congolese government, but continues to do so by recruiting in Rwanda. The Rwandese government, consequently, has had its fair share in the military threat in the east DR Congo region.

The Rwandan government has not had a complete national military physically present in the Democratic Republic of Congo since Kabila removed all Tutsi representative from the political arena and military in 1998. Nevertheless, they have comprehensively backed the M23 operating in east DR Congo (Autesserre, 2009: 256). An earlier example of Rwanda’s support to armed groups can be traced back to 2007, two years before the Ihusi peace agreements. Large scale riots broke out because of severe ethnic cleavage in the eastern region of Congo. Sources explained the outbreaks as running along the same dividing line as the national and regional political cleavage; president Kabila on one side and the

Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma (RCD-G), backed by the Rwandan

government, on the other side (Ibid: 258). Another example has been the extensive support to the CNDP until 2008 (Harbon and Wallensteen, 2010: 504). The Rwandan government fought its battles through supporting rebel groups, thus not personally intervening in DR Congo. Its military presence since the Ihusi peace agreements has been in a similar fashion. Allegedly, the Rwandan government has given support in multiple ways to the M23 armed rebels. Daniel

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Bekele, Africa director at Human Rights Watch, stated that Rwanda has allowed the M23 to recruit soldiers on their territory and obtain equipment in order to commit numerous rapes, killings and other crimes. The findings are based on more than 1000 interviews since March 2013, including former M23 fighters who have left the group between March and July 2013 and residents near the east DR Congo- Rwanda border, many of which were victims of the crimes (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Top Rwandan ministers have been caught by the UN providing the ammunition, weapons and troops, including Minister of Defense James Kabarebe (Bihuzo, 2012: 6). Reportedly, the M23 got Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) troop support to an extent where the rebel group could not operate without the reinforcement. International pressure on the Rwandan government eventually led to reducing troop support (Nangini, 2014: 4). Rwanda has also been called out by the United States upon recruiting child soldiers for the M23, which Rwanda got sanctioned for (Smith, 2013). Rwanda’s military involvement in the conflict in east Congo since 2009 has not been directly through a national army, but has been noticeable through lending support to the rebel groups operating in eastern Congo. Thus, it is reasonable to claim that there is a realistic presence of the Rwandan government in the eastern Congo regions, causing an external threat for the Congolese government.

4.1 Conclusion: security threat in the military sector

For the Congolese government, the main threat seemed to be coming from within the country. The M23 existed of mutinied anti-Kabila soldiers and performed as a self-referencing security entity. Joseph Kabila, in his turn, did not seem to have any choice but to stop the militia with an army. The Rwandan government, turned out to be the unexpected guest that made the threat both internal and external. With the support of troops for the M23 and its history of enmity against the DR Congo, Rwanda turned into a realistic threat. According to Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998), all these factors place these security threats into the military sector. However, the military security threat turns out to be layered. The M23 is seen as an autonomous actor, but receives direct extensive military support from Rwanda. The two actors therefore seem to overlap in this sector.

Considering the main variables of the Regional Security Complex Theory, it seems that the second main variable, the anarchic structure, is safeguarded. There must be two or more autonomous units present in a Regional Security Complex (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 53). In

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this case, the Congolese government might be seen as one autonomous actor. The M23 militia and the Rwandese government seem to overlap because of Rwanda’s military support to M23’s army. Therefore, the M23 can be viewed as one autonomous actor, with which the Rwandan government can be grouped. The Rwandan government does not operate with its own national military, but will nonetheless be considered an autonomous unit. The external threat of the Rwandan government can be called realistic because of the present troops and support to the M23. Therefore three autonomous actors exist in the conflicts after the 2009 Ihusi peace agreements in east DR Congo. The fourth main variable of the RSCT, social construction, shows the patterns of amity and enmity among the units (Ibid: 53). In this sense, we might consider the prolonged history of enmity between the Congolese en the Rwandan government. As shown, the support of Rwanda for rebel groups in eastern DR Congo have been apparent even before the Ihusi peace agreements. The RCD-G and the CNDP are merely examples of their support and there is a chance more groups received their backing (Autesserre, 2009: 256). A switch to a relation of amity was made in 2008, when the Congolese en Rwandese government joined forces in order to defeat the CNDP in east DR Congo (Van Reybrouck, 2010: 549) In supporting the M23, Rwanda restores the relation of enmity between the two states. Regarding this aspect, the social construction variable of the RSCT seems to be apparent between the Congolese en Rwandese governments in the military sector as well.

5. The political sector

The political sector analyses the heart of the state, which is made up of threats to state sovereignty. In this sector, self-organized groups can be taken into consideration as well (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: 146). As stated before, the political sector turns out to be the most difficult sector amongst all of them. It is easy to squeeze the sector in between the military and societal sector (Ibid: 141). Since the disputes know so many layers, difficult might be an understatement in the case of the conflicts in east DR Congo since the Ihusi agreements. Defining the political sector is problematic to say the least. According to Mohammed Ayoob (1995), the political sector should be the priority in third world countries, because the other realms are often filtered through the authoritative political sector first. The internal vulnerability is so centrally placed by political elites that even their status in the international system turns out to be an extension of the internal security situation (Ayoob,

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1995: 191). Whether the political security threat is indeed as prominent, will become clear after the analysis. Two pillars of political threat will be introduced along the analysis: the internal and external threat of legitimacy form a political unit. Again, the Congolese government will commence in this sector. Secondly, the M23’s political security threats will be reviewed, after which we close with an extensive review of the Rwandan government. First, when we look to analyse the Congolese government, it is disputable to call DR Congo a ‘Democratic Republic’. After having suffered under the authoritarian regime of Mobuto Sese Seko for thirty- two years and the four year reign of Laurent Kabila, Joseph Kabila has not proven to pursue a democratic political system either. After he took over presidency of his father in 2001, Kabila carried out the abuse of power by the political elites and pursued economic dominance. Many of the reforms stated in a new 2005 constitution were not implemented, including the creating of three new courts, organizing local elections and decentralizing politics to the regional level (Stearns, 2012: 2). In 2009, after signing the Ihusi peace agreements in March, parliament passed changes to the laws on the Congolese election commission (CENI), after which the majority of the election commissioners and the body’s president were to be chosen by DR Congo’s ruling party. On the 25th of January 2011, the government approved an overhaul of the constitution by changing eight articles and limiting the voting rounds down to a one-round election (Africa Confidential, 2011). Kabila ended up being the victor of the 2011 elections, but the results turned out to be based on fraud. Groups of votes were either duplicated or let out, potentially leading to the election outcomes (Willis and Howden, 2011). These were not the only irregularities shown at the 2011 elections. The haste with which the elections were organized were questionable as well. CENI hurried to meet the constitutional deadline in December to announce the election’s winner. Also, the Election Day in March turned out to show many flaws. Some voting stations lacked candidate lists, others did not possess enough ballots and a few did not have any voting materials at all (Carter Center, 2011). In 2013, the Freedom House Index scores showed a political worst score with a 6.0 out of 7 for the Democratic Republic of Congo. According to Freedom House, the country is not an electoral democracy because of the several disputable incidents around the 2011 elections. Also, hundreds of millions of dollars are embezzled every year. The country was ranked 180 out of 185 in the Doing Business survey of the World Bank and 160 out of 176 in the transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index (Freedom House, 2013).

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As shown before, the formation of the M23 in 2012 commenced after Kabila’s fraudulent elections and disrespect of the Ihusi peace agreements (Stearns, 2013). Political threats are about denying recognition, support or legitimacy to political actors or the essential patterns or their politics. This matter relies upon two pillars: the internal and external recognition of the state (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: 144).

The first pillar, the internal threat to sovereignty for the Congolese government, can be found when analysing the rebelling M23’s political standpoint towards the current Congolese government. Since the mutinied soldiers that formed the M23 were part of the Congolese army, it is safe to say the threat was indeed internal (UN Security Council, 2013: 26). The political motives of the M23 rebel group had everything to do with their perspective towards their mistreated position since the 2009 Ihusi peace agreements. The peace agreements noted that all parties had to agree upon an integration of the CNDP within the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Also, the rebel group had to transform into a political party in order to participate in DR Congo’s political arena (Peace Agreement Between the Government and the Congress National pour la Défense du Peuple, 2009: 12). In practice, the agreements turned out to be executed otherwise. At the beginning of 2011, measures were taken to reclassify positions within the army. This way, important CNDP leaders would turn out to be placed on lower ranks in the army. CNDP leader and General Bosco Ntaganda was slowly being pushed off of his top position. A reason for this could have been to hide the fraudulent course of the elections and maintain a popular position for Kabila; moving Ntaganda to the side would satisfy the communities in east DR Congo which were tormented by CNDP atrocities in the past. The combination of events caused a large group of CNDP members to separate itself and rise against the unfair treatment by Joseph Kabila (Vlassenroot, et. al., 2013: 8). Allegedly the M23 has even reached out to the political opposition in Kinshasa. By doing so, the group hoped to receive Congolese political support to rebel against the current government. However, the opposition refused firmly (IPIS, 2012: 16). The political motivation of the M23 points towards the depreciating view of the Congolese government upon reintegrating the CNDP into the political and military arena. According to the rebels, the peace agreements were not respected. Their motivation could be seen as a wish for more power and equality. The first pillar of political threats is present in the position of the M23 towards the Congolese government. Members of the M23 came directly from the Congolese army, therefore being a threat to legitimacy of the government from within the country. Conversely, the Congolese government has shown to pose an extensive

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threat to the M23 as well by diminishing their position in politics and the army as agreed to in the 2009 peace agreements.

The unwilling consequence of this matter leads us to the second pillar of the political sector: the external sovereignty of the state. According to Congolese Member of Parliament Medard Mulangala LwakaBwanga, the rebelling M23 in the eastern regions rather seek backing from DR Congo’s neighbours than listen to the fraudulent government far away in capital Kinshasa (LwakaBwanga, 2014). This fact leads us to the political threat of the Rwandese government. The Rwandese government can also not be considered an electoral democracy. The latest 2010 elections turned out to be administratively correct, but showed a lack of political choice. Also, the constitution calls for ‘national unity’ between all participating parties, omitting political pluralism. Political parties are allowed to exist, but only under strict controls. The current seated president of Rwanda is former Tutsi rebel leader Paul Kagame (Freedom House, 2013). Regarding the fact that the DR Congo still houses Hutu refugees in eastern Congo, it might come as no surprise that the political strife of Rwanda towards DR Congo revolves around the old Rwandan genocide. The Rwandese government resents the DR Congo government until present for harbouring Hutu refugees in the eastern regions of the country. According to the United Nations Security Council, the M23 has become a proxy for Rwanda. In supporting the M23, the Rwandese government pushes just enough resistance towards the Congolese government decisions without intervening directly into the political field (UN Security Council, 2012: 3). The fact that Rwanda uses the M23 for their political grudge towards DR Congo confirms that the second pillar of the political sector, the external recognition and legitimacy of the state, is being confirmed as well. The Rwandan government resents the Congolese government for its position towards the Hutu community in the eastern region of the country. Additionally, by supporting a rebel group which fights against the current president, it can be proven that there is no external recognition of legitimacy of the DR Congo government by the Rwandan government. Furthermore, from the Rwandan respective, we notice a threat coming from the Congolese government as well. By harbouring the Hutu rebels in east Congo, the Congolese government shows disrespect towards the Tutsi led Rwandan government. Therefore, we find the second pillar of a threat of external recognition form the Congolese government towards Rwanda likewise.