Understanding the Dutch Discourse on the Freedom of Movement

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Understanding the Dutch discourse on the

Freedom of Movement

Master Thesis Public Administration (IEG) by Therese C.H.E. Faber (S1305387), January 2020 for Leiden University, under the guidance of thesis advisor professor B. Steunenberg

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Introduction

As recent media coverage within the Schengen area shows, migration is an omnipresent and contentious issue. Regardless of whether members of the media are giving attention to the refugee crisis, issues of national or international security, or national elections, migration is seemingly a constant topic of discussion. While media coverage both reflects and reports on public opinion, those reports generally favor strongly conflicting points of view with little attention for nuance. Regularly, the different perspectives represented in the media don’t accurately reflect the true variety or prevalence of viewpoints in society. This means that part of the story is left untold and it makes it difficult to judge the strength of differing opinions within the public. Additionally, the underlying motives and beliefs behind people’s perceptions of Schengen and migration often remain underreported or ignored altogether. This is likely why election results can be a surprise- people don’t expect certain discourses to resonate with so many people. If one truly wants to gain insight into how people think about certain issues, it becomes important to not just know how people truly think and feel about migration but why they believe what they do.

The Schengen Treaty officially abolished all border controls in a 26-country region of Europe (for more information on Schengen, see Chapter 2). This research aims to provide insight into and understanding of the different values, beliefs, opinions, and perspectives of the general Dutch population on the Free Movement of People under Schengen. These values, beliefs, opinions, and perspectives comprise the discourses which are the subject of this research. It is assumed here that our thoughts and evaluations of the Fee movement of People under Schengen are not random or isolated but the result of a framework of personal believes and values. Q-methodology is a technique used to uncover thought patterns and their underlying frameworks. Q-methodology is “a method for the scientific study of human subjectivity”, subjectivity simply being “a person’s communication of his or her point of view” (McKeown, Bruce., and Dan. Thomas., 1988, p. 11). When thinking about human subjectivity and scientific research, one may first think of opinion studies (for opinion research on this topic see for instance: European Commission, 2018 or European Commission2,_2018). Q-methodology, however, differs from classic opinion research precisely because Q-research shows us these underlying, often normative, frameworks which shape our thoughts and making it possible to not just explain what we believe but rather why we believe it.

Gaining a deeper understanding of Dutch views on the free movement of people under Schengen is useful because public opinion research does not necessarily provide an understanding of the underlying frameworks and thought patterns that shape these opinions. Furthermore, even insofar as the Dutch discourses about Schengen and migration have been studied, this research adds to that body of knowledge and helps keeps that knowledge up to date.

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At the same time, the results obtained through this research can be used as a foundation for further studies. Large scale surveys on the topic of Schengen, Migration, or the EU could use (part) of the results as a guide for formulating relevant survey questions and answers. Additionally, in combination with the other theses written on this topic, comparative research can be done of the different European countries’ discourses on the topic of Schengen and The Free Movement of People. The research presented in this thesis can be viewed independently but is also part of a collective body of research created by several students who performed a Q-study on the same topic in the Netherlands and other EU countries, all supervised by professor Bernard Steunenberg.

The question this research is trying to answer is: How do Dutch citizens think about the free movement of people under Schengen and what are their underlying motives and beliefs? This thesis is structured as follows: I will start with a brief introduction of Schengen covering the free movement of people, in particular, followed by an overview of some of the European, but mostly the Dutch, public debate and scientific studies on this topic. In the chapter following, I will formulate some expected discourses and aspects of discourses (hypothesis) based on the established framework. After that, Q-methodology and the way it has been applied here to identify Dutch discourses is further discussed in the Methodology section. Finally, I will discuss the research results and their analysis and provide a brief conclusion in which I will also reflect on the meaning of the results found.

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Institutional Background

What is Schengen?

The Schengen Treaty is a European agreement that created the world’s largest international passport-free zone and thereby fundamentally changed European immigration (Livingstone, 2019). The European commitment to Freedom of Movement has allowed for formally unrestricted freedom of movement within the Schengen zone (Livingstone, 2019). This means that currently, about 400 million European citizens can travel freely within the Schengen-zone, along with all non-citizens after entering the same area (whether they are tourists or immigrants) (Livingstone, 2019).

The Netherlands is one of the 26 countries that comprise the Schengen area (Schengenvisainfo.com, 2019) and was even a founding member (Livingstone, 2019). It took until 1997 for Schengen to be codified in EU law through the Treaty of Amsterdam. While all Schengen countries are European, not all are a part of the European Union. Equally, there are 6 EU members (namely Ireland, the United Kingdom, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Cyprus) which are EU members but not a part of Schengen. A map of the whole Schengen zone can be found in figure 1.

Figure 1: ‘map of Schengen Zone’, Source: Europarl.europa.eu on 14-05-2019, link to source: 08/schengen-enlargement-of-europe-s-border-free-area).

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Schengen, Immigration and the Free Movement of People in European Debate

Schengen is a topic of debate in Europe. Dissatisfaction with immigration and fear of terrorism have brought the passport-free zone under scrutiny (Livingstone, 2019). The terrorist attacks in Paris on November 2015 made people keenly aware of the security risks that may be involved with Schengen. This particular tragedy was masterminded from a Brussels neighborhood and involved terrorists from Belgian, French, and non-European descent. In total, the attack claimed over 120 lives (Mariano, C. et al., 2015). In response to the attack, border controls were temporarily implemented by French President Hollande who called the attack “an act of war” (Mariano, C. et al., 2015). Because the attackers organized themselves outside of France, the natural response was to blame and forgo the Schengen Treaty, at least temporarily. The Paris terrorist attack also touches upon the dissatisfaction with immigration resulting from the refugee crisis. Some of the attackers posed as Syrian refugees with fake passports and arrived through the Greek island of Leros into the Schengen area. After arriving in Greece, thanks to Schengen, they were able to settle in Belgium (BBC News, 2016).

Schengen, together with the common labor market, governs migration policy in the EU-member countries. Research shows that approval of the European Union is impacted by satisfaction, this connection being that the more dissatisfied people are with migration, the more likely they are to disapprove of the European Union (Sarface, 2016). For example, the United Kingdom was never a part of the Schengen zone, but it was a part of the common labor market as a member of the EU. Immigration was a central theme in the Brexit campaign, Brexit being the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. During this campaign, anti-immigration sentiment played a strong role, combined with a wish for further border controls, two things only possible if the UK left the EU according to those rooting for Brexit. These anti-immigration sentiments also seemed to align with views held among the British public: according to a 2018 research from the University of Oxford’s Migration Observatory, the majority of the British people have been in favor of reducing migration, both before and after the Brexit vote (Blinder, S. & Richards, L., 2018). Furthermore, immigration was considered the most important issue facing the British public leading up to the Brexit vote (Blinder, S. & Richards, L., 2018). In the book ‘Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union’ (2017), concerns over immigration were identified as the key issue that motivated the public to vote in favor of Brexit. Immigration had been a cause of concern and dissatisfaction for decades among the British public. However, the 2015 refugee crisis combined with the response from Merkel and other European leaders to admit a large number of refugees into the EU fueled anti-immigration sentiment and gave rise to the belief that EU-leaders didn’t care about voters’ concerns. The majority of Leave-voters decided that border control, restricting immigration, and national sovereignty were more important than the possible negative economic consequences of a Brexit (Goodwin, M., 2017).

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Literature on Dutch Discourse

In this thesis, we will explore how Dutch citizens think about the free movement of people under Schengen. We will further explore their underlying motives and beliefs When looking into the literature we can find some research regarding Schengen and public opinion to help find an answer to this question.

Schengen has been undergoing some scrutiny. In 2015, the combination of terrorist attacks in Europe and the refugee crisis led to the reinstatement of border controls between several countries within the Schengen area. The Netherlands did not institute extra border controls, but those countries that did still have not returned to open borders (EU affairs, 2018). Currently, France, Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway have border controls, even though they are a part of what is supposed to be a passport-free zone (EU affairs, 2018).

Additionally, research from the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR.EU, 2019) investigated expert, governmental, and public concerns regarding Schengen. When looking at the Netherlands specifically, the researchers found that the Dutch government is primarily concerned with the economic benefits of open borders and, as a secondary concern, worries about managing refugee flows within the European Union (ECFR.EU, 2019). With regards to the future of Schengen the same concerns remain. Security concerns regarding Schengen were not found to resonate to the same degree with the Dutch government, this in contrast to some other EU-members (ECFR.EU, 2019). Altogether it seems that the Dutch government seems to worry less about security than other European governments.

In her research “Public Opinion and Immigration in the European Union”, Jamie Surface further explores the link between immigration concerns and satisfaction with the European Union and Schengen specifically. When reflecting on a three-decade-long period, Sarface (2016) found that whenever negative tensions towards immigrants grow (whether they are Schengen immigrants or non-EU immigrants), EU-citizens lessen their support for the Schengen treaty. Furthermore, immigration contentions as a whole increase Euroscepticism and can shift the policy of national governments. Possibly most notable, this impact of satisfaction with immigration and thereby Schengen and the EU as a whole is not affected by region, country, or length of EU-membership. Thus, all across Europe sentiments towards migration in the broadest sense are an indicator for European support, and Schengen, all together (Sarface, 2016).

As I have argued, the Freedom of Movement of People under Schengen is an issue that has inherent ties to immigration and the way people feel about the EU as a whole. To further understand the way Dutch citizens think about the free movement of people under Schengen and what their underlying motives and beliefs are, it is, therefore, necessary to go beyond research done on Schengen and migration under Schengen alone, but rather also look into opinion research regarding issues such as migration and EU-support more generally.

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A large body of research shows that politicians and elites influence public opinion by the way they frame issues (i.a. Lundgren, L. 2014, Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997, McGraw, K., Best, S., & Timpone, R, 1995) therefor this next section will explore the Dutch public political debates regarding migration and to a lesser extent the European Union.

The History of the Dutch political Debate regarding Migration

To understand the sentiments in the current political debate, some historical insight is helpful. Cultural Liberalism, a set of political ideas characterized by universalist and cosmopolitan values, gained political ground in the late 1960s with Green parties all over Europe (Kriesi, H., 2014, p. 60). In the Netherlands, the establishment of progressive liberalist political parties like D66 and Groenlinks (GreenLeft) are evidence of this phenomenon. Still today, these parties stand for European integration, multiculturalism, and a vision of a generally open society, altogether ideas that fit into a cosmopolitan and universal normative framework. When looking at migration specifically, the cosmopolitan perspective is generally supportive of migration, or at least neutral on the issue. It needs to be said, however, that Dutch political views in the 1960s regarding migration were generally neutral or positive and that there was little room for, negative, opposing views. This was because during the 1960s, attitudes towards migration were largely impacted by a sense of guilt over the loss of the Dutch Jewish population during the German occupation of the 1940s. This drive for multiculturalism and acceptance was also impacted by critiques of European Colonialism, global white supremacy, and war crimes by the Dutch army in the colonial war against Indonesian nationalists (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015, p. 83-84). Furthermore, multiculturalism gained prominence as a way to think about the integration of migrants. It became more and more accepted that it was immoral for those societies receiving migrants to expect them to give up their culture; it was believed a more open concept of citizenship had to be embraced (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015, p. 84).

It took more time for the more nationalist perspective on migration to come to the forefront of the Dutch political debate. Over decades a group of labor migrants, mostly of Moroccan and Turkish origin, had come to the Netherlands and settled here. Those labor migrants were originally intended as temporary workers, and initially many did only stay for a limited amount of time, but as a result of Dutch law and migration policy, some remained after they were needed as temporary workers. In the 1980s and 1990s, Dutch political elites were concerned with preventing especially these migrants from forming a social underclass and wanted to make sure the extreme right did not take advantage of tensions between Dutch citizens and former migrant workers (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015, p. 86). During this time, while the extreme right had no significant political success, the Dutch population in lower-income neighborhoods already viewed Moroccan and Turkish immigrants as cultural aliens and “welfare profiteers” (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015, p. 88). When Hans Janmaat’s Center Party gained a seat in Dutch Parliament with an anti-immigration agenda in 1982, Dutch politicians and intellectuals became worried that the extreme right would succeed to mobilize voters on the basis of racism. In response to Janmaat’s success, mainstream parties

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formed a “gentlemen’s agreement” to marginalize extreme right, anti-immigration parties and not politicize the issue of migration by ignoring or heavily criticizing those who did raise issues with migration, both on the extreme left (the Socialistic Party, or SP) and the extreme right (the Centre Party) (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015, p. 88). Until the late 1980s, migration remained, therefore, an untouched issue by mainstream politics. During this same period of time, the Dutch government discussed the need for a national immigrant integration policy: governmental reports cautiously suggested the need for an integration policy which would pay more attention to citizenship and compulsory Dutch language courses in order to facilitate integration in the labor market and to improve school results. These reforms, however, remained in the realm of technocratic policymaking and did little to address social and cultural tensions more broadly or became a part of much public debate.

In the 1990s, the backlash to the cosmopolitan view from the 1960s finally arose in the form of right-wing populism all over Europe. These populists replaced traditional authoritarian conservatism values, which found their origin in religious and authoritarian beliefs, with values of nationalism and particularism, which are more focused on politics of ethnicity and (national) identity (Kriesi, H., 2014, p. 63) In the Netherlands, this trend started a little later but is reflected in national politics. The anti-immigration politician Hans-Janmaat struggled for reelection all throughout his career in the 1970s, ‘80s, and ‘90s. However, in 2002, populist Pim Fortuyn with his political party Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) rapidly gained popularity, national attention and dominated the parliamentary elections. Although the LPF quickly fell apart after its 2002 electoral victory, due in large part to the murder of Pim Fortuyn just days before the election, the presence of anti-immigration, rightwing populist politicians and parties have remained a constant in Dutch politics. This is currently reflected in the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) and the younger Forum for Democracy (FvD). The PVV has been a presence in Dutch politics for more than a decade and is currently the second-largest party in the Dutch Lower House, holding as many as 20 seats (Stafdienst Communicatie, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2017). FvD only entered the Dutch Senate in 2019 but holds 12 seats there, making it the largest party together with the VVD (Kranenburg, 2019).

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Amber Davis (2016) found that when anti-immigration parties rise, mainstream parties aim to curb the growth of these new competitors by adopting more restrictive positions on immigration. In the Dutch case, a collective and dramatic move towards restrictive immigration positions among mainstream parties in 2002 served as a response to the rise of Pim Fortuyn’s LPF and the recognition that the Dutch public had shifted further to the right on this issue than they had originally realized. According to Davis, the shift towards restrictive immigration policies in Dutch parties cannot be completely explained by factors (like a migration crisis) other than the success of the LPF. And, after the LPF fell and the PVV came up as a new anti-immigration party, a similar shift on the issue immigration all throughout the political field occurred (Davis, 2016 p. 191-192).

Current Political Debate regarding Migration and the EU and Dutch Political Landscape

The Dutch political landscape has been shaped in part by the debate on migration. Consider the picture above (figure 2) The horizontal axis shows the traditional left-right division between parties- a distinction based on economic beliefs and policies. Commonly, a vertical axis is added to account for the complexity of the political landscape where non-economic issues also play a significant role. While often the vertical axis has conservatism opposing liberalism, the set of axes above, as presented by Bovens (et al, 2017), shows a spectrum from nationalistic to cosmopolitan values. This axis is a more modern way of dividing the political landscape in which the way political parties regard globalization defines their position in the political landscape (van den Berg, 2017). On the cosmopolitan end of the

Figure 2: The Dutch Political landscape 1998-2017’, Source: M.A.P. Bovens, P. ’t Hart, M.J.W van Twist, C.F. van den Berg, M.A. van der Steen, L.G. Tummers (2017) Openbaar Bestuur: Beleid, organisatie en politiek.., link: https://www.montesquieu-institute.eu/id/vkfbaic21bwf/nieuws/progressief _en_conservatief_wie_is_nu

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axis parties frame globalization as something beneficial: they believe in a more open society, think that globalization is responsible for free trade which has brought wealth to many, and regard migration as something that’s necessary and comes with the benefit of cultural enrichment. On the opposing end, nationalists believe that globalization has gone too fast and its effects are unwanted. These parties and citizens oppose multiculturalism and long for a homogenous society. Migration, free trade, and foreign cultures threaten their way of life (van den Berg, 2017).

To explore the positions the parties in Dutch parliaments currently take on the issues of migration and Schengen, these parties’ official websites were used. On these websites, all parties either had policy proposals from the last Lower House election and/or general declarations of their own position stances/viewpoints. These were used to create a profile for each and every party.

Views of political Parties on Migration and the EU per quarter of the Political Spectrum Cosmopolitan Left

Three political parties fully place themselves within the first quarter of the political spectrum: the Dutch Labor Party, the “Partij van de Arbeid” (PvdA), the Dutch Green party named “Groenlinks” and the “Partij voor de Dieren” (PvdD), or the Party for the Animals. On the edge of the quarter, the relatively new party “DENK” positions itself as part of both the cosmopolitan left and the nationalistic left. Because DENK is a relatively recent split-off from the PvdA, DENK will also be discussed in this section.

DENK

DENK is primarily focused on the importance of inclusivity in its party program. The party focusses on subjects like institutional racism and discrimination. The party sees it necessary for the Dutch identity to be primarily based on legal citizenship, rather than a broader concept of identity. DENK demands the Netherlands to be a democratic society in which minorities are protected and heard (van Baarle, 2017, p. 5).

DENK wants the term integration to be swapped for “mutual acceptance”. DENK believes that it is fundamentally wrong to believe that we have “millions of Dutch citizens that need to integrate into society” (van Baarle, 2017, p. 6), rather Dutch society needs to stop this artificial distinction between those that were born in the Netherlands and those that chose to make the Netherlands their home. Dutch society has changed and it is time to not just accept this but embrace our diversity (van Baarle, 2017, p. 6). A lot of the policies DENK proposes aim to establish mutual acceptance and the active defense of minority rights. Things like proposing the office of a “Minister of mutual acceptance”, a national day of Dutch citizenship, a diversity quota for women and people with a migration background for the public sector as the creation of a racism registry to protect people applying for jobs in the public sector are all among DENK’s proposals. DENK does not discuss migration as such

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among its party program. The party entirely focusses on the rights of former migrants and minorities.

DENK supports the European Union as such. The European Union has brought us much good in the party’s eyes including peace and free trade. DENK, however, does worry about the seemingly ever-expanding and undemocratic European bureaucracy (van Baarle, 2017, p. 53). DENK wants the rights of the European parliament to be extended and the rules and regulations coming from Brussels to be reduced. The party also believes less money should go to the Union and the European Commission should be abolished. Furthermore, DENK believes that the Copenhagen criteria for aspiring member states are right as they are and the party does not oppose the enlargement of the EU (van Baarle, 2017, p. 53).

Partij voor de Arbeid (PvdA)

The PvdA claims on its website that it is our (moral) duty as “Europe”, to help countries like Jordan and Lebanon that were hit the hardest by the refugee crisis. Europe needs to be welcoming to refugees out of a commitment to both humanitarian convictions and the universal right to protection. The party does draw a distinction between economic migrants and refugees. As a general rule Economic Migrants are not granted asylum, refugees are. Furthermore, refugees are protected under the United Nations’ Refugee Convention, which the PvdA claims to wholeheartedly support (PvdA.nl1_{, 2019).}

When it comes to concrete proposals, the PvdA believes that the European Union needs to work on collaborative solutions (PvdA.nl2_{, 2019). Refugees need to be spread evenly} among member states. The party recognizes that although many in the Netherlands have helped and supported the refugees that came here in 2015, tensions between the native population and refugees are a reality. To prevent such tensions asylum seekers centers, need to fit the size of the community they are placed in, meaning that a nationally established minimum number of refugees per center is unsustainable (PvdA.nl2_{, 2019). To help with the} integration of refugees they need to learn the Dutch language and become familiar with our cultural values and norms as soon as possible. The key to enabling fast integration is making sure that the asylum application process is most efficient so integration can start as soon as possible (PvdA.nl2_{, 2019). Those that do not obtain asylum need to return to their country of} origin as fast as possible. As a general rule people that come to the Netherlands for family, work or study and meet immigrant requirements should not be unnecessarily hindered in their pursuit to come to the Netherlands. Refugees are equally welcome, but economic migrants should be sent home as soon as possible (PvdA.nl2_{, 2019).}

The PvdA believes in the importance of the European Union for combating climate change, combining forces with regards to military and security threats from outside of the EU and (re)gaining control over companies and multinationals (PvdA.nl3_{,2019). The party} wholeheartedly supports European cooperation and sees the EU as an instrument well suited for serving and protecting EU-citizens and what they value. The European Union stands for

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values like democracy and the rule of law according to the PvdA, the party thinks this is an essential part of the European Union (PvdA.nl3_{, 2019).}

GroenLinks

The political party GroenLinks claims it wants a realistic, humane, and fair asylum policy. Just like the PvdA, this party believes that there is a moral duty to protect refugees. GroenLinks thinks that refugee children deserve extra protections when they become asylum seekers in the Netherlands. Children need to be prioritized in the asylum seekers process, the party wants this prioritizing to become part of Dutch law (Groenlink.nl1_{, 2019).}

According to the party, the European refugee policy needs to be reformed to make sure the refugees are fairly distributed among EU-member states and get the same protections in each of these states. GroenLinks differs from the PvdA in its proposal to start a large-scale resettlement from refugees outside of the EU. The most vulnerable refugees settled in these camps need to be brought into the EU (Groenlink.nl1_{, 2019).}

GroenLinks wants to work towards a greener and fairer Europe. The European Union needs to play a role in policy combating climate change, regulate multinationals and reducing (negative) market forces. Just like other parties on the left, the party sees the EU as a Union bound by values and principles like a shared belief in the rule of law and liberty (Groenlink.nl2_{, 2019).}

Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD)

The PvdD, just like GroenLinks, does not mention migration as such, but only puts policy proposals on its website regarding refugees. With regard to the refugee crisis, this party claims that the Netherlands specifically, but also the EU more broadly, is morally obliged to offer humane care and assistance to those in need. At the same time, it is necessary to tackle the underlying causes of migration. The Party for the Animals’ platform specifically named environmental reasons as underlying causes for migration, like drought, food shortages, and climate change. According to the PvdD, Western overconsumption, pollution, and production are at the heart of much of the causes for migration. Therefore, part of what needs to be done to stop migrant flows is to change the Dutch and European way of life. For example, the party believes that the Netherlands needs to limit its consumption of water, energy, (raw) materials, and land to shrink its ecological footprint to no longer harm men, animals, and the environment at large. Furthermore, fair trade, cracking down on tax evasion, and steadily reducing agricultural subsidies should contribute to shrinking the Dutch ecological footprint.

The PvdD is in favor of providing humanitarian aid generally. Sheltering refugees regionally is most desirable, but shelters do need to be able to meet certain standards and therefore are not always feasible in the region. While economic migrants are not necessarily welcome, those who have become refugees due to violence need to receive all help necessary to find a safe destination within Europe (Partijvoordedieren.nl, 2017). According to

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the party’s program, it is necessary to make European wide agreements to make sure all member states accept refugees. Member states that refuse to meet their refugee quota need to be punished for this by withholding EU subsidies. The Netherlands also needs to advocate for the global ratification of the Refugee Convention (Partijvoordedieren.nl, 2017).

When it comes to asylum seekers, the PvdD holds the position that asylum seekers centers can never exceed 25% of the population of a village or town. Those who apply for asylum in the Netherlands need to learn within 2 years whether or not they will be able to stay here. Children deserve special protections when they seek asylum: When a child has been in the Netherlands for 5 years or more, they need to be able to stay. Lastly, refugees need to learn Dutch in order to become familiar with the culture and have a right to education, housing, and healthcare (Partijvoordedieren.nl, 2017).

According to the PvdD, Europe should not become a federal state and the EU should listen to citizens and be democratic. No new power should be transitioned to the European Union, or at least not without a binding referendum on this power transition. The party also does not want to have a European army or a European pension system because it believes that generally, countries can arrange these and other matters better at the national level. According to the party, the EU has been too focused on economic growth and trade. The monetary union needs to drastically change. The PvdD wants the EU to look into different scenarios for its monetary future, such as a return to national currencies and splitting the monetary union. Exit strategies should also be introduced for member states wishing to exit the monetary union (Partijvoordedieren.nl, 2017)

Cosmopolitan Right

Political parties D66 and 50Plus are a part of the Cosmopolitan Right quarter of the political landscape. The VVD is split between the Cosmopolitan and Nationalist Right in its positioning on the political Spectrum but will be discussed here. D66 has shifted to the economic right over time but has its historical origin as being part of the Green party movement from the 1960s. D66 is traditionally a party that stands for Democratic reform and direct democracy and strives for a progressive cultural policy like reduced restrictions on drug use, abortion, and euthanasia. 50Plus started out as a “single-issue partly”, mostly concerned with the crumbling of the Dutch welfare state and its consequences for Dutch elders (hence the name).

D66

According to D66, the Netherlands needs to uphold the agreements that have been made regarding the rights of refugees. D66 wants the Netherlands to push for a European wide asylum system, with the aim to spread asylum seekers across the European Union and not have border states do most of the heavy lifting (D66.nl1_{, 2019). D66 wants it to be} possible for refugees in the Netherlands to be able to work and study while awaiting asylum. Rejected refugees must not be pushed out onto the street but rather have shelter, care and

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food provided for them. When rejected refugees receive these things and therefore are not pushed into living on the street illegally, the state can work on their return home. The state should support, rather than block municipalities from providing necessary shelter for refugees. At its core, the Netherlands needs to be a welcoming nation towards refugees and support things such as family reunion. The party, just like many within the cosmopolitan Left, does not mention migration as such on its website (D66.nl1_{, 2019).}

D66 believes that "European integration is a guarantee of peace, security, and prosperity". The party believes it is crucial for people to be able to move freely within Europe. As a result, external border surveillance is a priority and member states will, therefore, have to share people and resources more than they do now. D66 acknowledges that Frontex must play an active role in this issue. A shared European asylum policy is also needed to ensure the free movement of people (D66.nl2_{, 2019). The open borders in Europe are one of the main} achievements of European integration, therefore temporary border controls are only permitted in exceptional cases with the approval of the European Commission. According to D66, it should be self-evident, although many people don’t seem to see it, that boarder countries receiving many refugees should receive support from member states with relatively few refugees. D66 wants to achieve a single European assessment of the security situation in countries where refugees come from. That way, it is possible to offer better-targeted conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance in the region (D66.nl2_{, 2019).}

50Plus

50Plus believes that economic refugees and asylum seekers who have exhausted all legal means to receive legal asylum should be sent back to their country of origin. The Netherlands should only accept a limited number of refugees. The number of refugees that we receive needs to be the result of a European quota that divides refugees among member states as a function of their population density (50Plus, 2017, p.9-10). Furthermore, it should take at least 10, not 5 years, before migrants can apply for Dutch citizenship and such an application should only be accepted when they have a municipal "proof of good conduct", speak Dutch, and declare loyalty to the Dutch Constitution. 50Plus also want there to be more control of Dutch borders and improve the border control on European (external) borders. Human trafficking needs to be through stricter penalties. And if at all possible, 50PLUS wants refugees to be sheltered in their home regions, rather than having them come to the European Union (50Plus, 2017, p.9-10).

50Plus believes that EU membership is beneficial to the Netherlands and wants the Netherlands to remain an EU-member, however, this does not mean that further European integration is desirable (50Plus, 2017, p. 13-14). The party wants no new member states to join the Union in the foreseeable future. The party wants less European regulation and wants to limit the Union’s tasks to three fields only: economic and monetary, environmental and energy policy, and issues in the field of security such as defense, border control and foreign policy, including migration (50Plus, 2017, p. 13-14).

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Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)

The VVD believes that money needs to be put towards sheltering refugees regionally, as this will put a halt to European asylum requests (VVD.nl1_{, 2019). The VVD wants the} Netherlands to be in control when it comes to migration (VVD.nl2_{, 2019). It needs to be a} punishable crime to stay in the Netherlands while undocumented, just like it should be a crime to help some stay here illegally. Municipalities need to stop providing shelter to illegal migrants. And those who are staying here illegally, especially criminals, need to be actively searched for (VVD.nl3, 2019). The asylums seeker procedure needs to give definitive closure about whether or not an asylum seeker is eligible to stay here quickly. At the moment, if someone has been rejected for Asylum in the Netherlands, they can still apply for asylum elsewhere in Europe. The VVD thinks it is important to stop the possibility of “stack” asylum requests and wants to completely abolish appeals for repeatedly rejected asylum applications (VVD.nl4_{, 2019). The VVD wants it to become easier for companies and institutions to bring} skilled workers to the Netherlands. A point system would help evaluate which workers can come to the Netherlands based on their income, education level, worked experience and education skill (VVD.nl5_{, 2019).}

The VVD wants it to take 10 years rather than the current 5 before people are eligible allegeable to apply for Dutch citizenship (VVD.nl6_{, 2019). Migrants that come to the} Netherlands should not have the same access to social security as Dutch citizens. When migrants end up being unemployed, they should only receive benefits based on the premiums they have paid over the course of their working life in the Netherlands. Unemployment’s assistance (WW) should not be given before the first ten years after arrival in the Netherlands (VVD.nl6_{, 2019). If migrants are able to receive assistance due to fraud,} the VVD thinks their residence permit needs to be withdrawn immediately. Migrants should also lose their residence permits when they do not make sufficient efforts to integrate, according to the party (VVD.nl6_{, 2019).}

With regard to the European Union, the VVD believes that the Union in principle is beneficial to its members and does not want to end Dutch membership. However, the party does feel like the EU Should mostly focus on strengthening the economy and creating jobs, rather than create “unnecessary rules” and that the Union must stay out of affairs the member states can arrange themselves. The VVD does not ultimately oppose EU enlargement but believes that strict requirements need to be met before new members can join the Union (VVD.nl7_{, 2019).}

Nationalistic Leftwing

The nationalistic Leftwing spectrum only contains one party, namely the “Socialistische Partij”. The SP was founded in 1972. The party is socialist and Eurosceptic in nature and has a strong local, action-oriented basis (Parlement.com, 2020).

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Socialistische Partij (SP)

The SP is the only political party that addresses the issue of internal European labor migration specifically as part of its party program. Large scale and unregulated (European) labor migration is unwanted according to the party (SP.nl1_{, 2019). This is because migration} drains countries and regions of their resources (workers) and destabilizes local communities partly due to brain drain, by which is meant that highly skilled and highly educated workers leave the region while those who are less skilled are left behind thus “draining” these regions. For the countries that labor migrants go to labor migration negatively impacts employees, due to competition in salaries. The fact that the European Union allows for the payment of social insurance premiums in the country of origin, despite the fact that the labor migrant is working in, for example, the Netherlands, creates unfair competition. The SP wants such payments of social insurance premiums to become impossible for migrated workers (SP.nl1_, 2019). Furthermore, the SP deems it necessary that employers should not be able to hire foreign workers when they cannot guarantee to pay the same wage to these workers as to local workers and are able to accommodate housing for these labor migrants. The SP believes that as a general rule we must avoid large scale migration from poor to wealthy countries, but rather invest in poor regions and countries so that people may opt to stay there (SP.nl1_, 2019).

When it comes to the treatments of asylum seekers the SP emphasizes foremost that the Netherlands is bound to international treaties and must comply with those treaties (SP.nl2_{, 2019). Furthermore, the Dutch asylum procedure must be fast, careful, fair and clear.} Asylum seekers that get to stay in the Netherlands have to integrate as quickly as possible while those who are refused asylum must leave the country as soon as possible. During large immigration crises it is deemed necessary by the SP that refugees are provided shelter by various nations, also those far removed from the crisis, not just countries in the region (SP.nl2_{, 2019). When crises occur, refugees will naturally go to neighboring countries looking} for shelter, but some will also move on due to the dire circumstances in overcrowded refugee camps. The United Nations needs to take on an active role in managing migration streams and settlements. Lastly, the causes of migration need to be addressed according to the Socialist Party. Global economic inequality, tax evasion and unfair trade are part of the problems identified by the SP. Military invention is also mentioned as a cause of migration, the party’s website states that “dropping bombs in war zones do not cause the war to end”, the party is altogether critical of military intervention (SP.nl2_{, 2019).}

The SP believes in European cooperation; however, the party does also think the EU is not without problems. The party feels that the EU serves corporate interests over the interest of the public, that lobbyists have too much of an influence in the EU, and that democratic and social interest should be more of a concern generally with regards to the European Union (SP.nl3_{, 2019). The SP also believes that the EU gets too much money, Brussel has too much} power over member states, and the party also opposes the European Commission as such. All

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together the SP is very critical of the EU but does not believe it would be right for the Netherlands to leave the Union (SP.nl3_{, 2019).}

Nationalistic Rightwing

There is a multitude of parties within the Nationalistic Rightwing quarter of the political spectrum. These parties vary in their origin: the PVV and Forum for Democracy are generally classified as populist. The other parties within this quarter are parties with a Christian background, going all the way from the most conservative Calvinist SGP to the moderate Christian democratic party, CDA.

Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)

The PVV is very clear on the topic of migration in its party program. The party claims it wants to de-Islamize the Netherlands and therefore would like to stop all migration from Islamic countries: the borders need to be closed. The party wants to accept no more asylum seekers from anywhere in the world, close all asylum seeker centers/shelters and repeal all temporary residence permits that are currently in use (PVV, 2017). To further halt the influence of Islam in the Netherlands, Islamic headscarves should not be worn by people who work in a public function and other expressions of the Islamic faith that are in contrast with the public order need to be forbidden. Criminals with a double nationality need to be neutralized, thus lose their Dutch nationality, and be put out of the country. Radical Muslims should be locked up preventatively. Those who have gone to fight in Syria should not be allowed back into the Netherlands. All mosques and Islamic schools need to be closed and Koran must be forbidden. Lastly, the Netherlands needs to regain its independence by leaving the EU (PVV, 2017).

Forum voor Democratie (FvD)

The FvD wants to adopt a migration and asylum policy in which the Dutch themselves get to decide who comes into their country. They specifically feel like migrants with political beliefs that are not in line with “Western civilization” should be banned and returned to their home country. It is best to avoid refugees coming to the Netherlands whenever possible, thus Forum proposes to invest government funds in local refugee shelters near the conflict area rather than stimulating migration. For those refugees that do make it to the Netherlands requests for asylum should no longer result in (semi) permanent residence permits but at most grant a temporary stay (Forumvoordedemocratie.nl1_{, 2019). When it comes to refugees} the goal should ultimately be to get people back home. When a request for asylum is legally rejected asylum seekers should have no more than one possibility to fight such a legal ruling.

For migrant workers, the party proposes the introduction of a GreenCard-system after the model of the United States (Forumvoordedemocratie.nl1_{, 2019). Illegal residents need to} be actively removed from the country and their illegality needs to be considered a crime. When serious offenses are committed by those with a double nationality, they need to lose

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their Dutch nationality. Whenever migrants fail to assimilate, remigration needs to be stimulated (Forumvoordedemocratie.nl1_{, 2019).}

The FvD wants to hold a national referendum on the question of Dutch EU-membership. It also went a referendum to be held about the open borders and the free movement of people within the EU. The party is generally considered to be Euro-sceptic (Forumvoordedemocratie.nl2_{, 2019).}

Staats Gereformeerde Partij (SGP)

The SGP wants the European guidelines for family reunification to be adjusted so that the Netherlands can more strictly select immigrants based on their income and age. Generally, stricter European norms for the admission and support of immigration services are needed (SGP.nl1_{, 2019). As long as registered partnership remains a legally recognized} relationship under Dutch law, family unification needs to be possible for those within a marriage or a registered partnership. The Netherlands needs to actively stimulate other European countries to shelter an equal share of refugees (SGP.nl1_{, 2019).}

The government’s aim needs to be to increase shelter within refugees’ regions of origin. The asylum policy’s main aim needs to be to help “real refugees” to the best of our abilities, that means that for those refugees that come to the Netherlands it is necessary they are processed within a reasonable and limited amount of time, this is simply part of good governance (SGP.nl1_{, 2019). Information held by various organizations on migrants and} asylum seekers needs to be exchanged among those organizations. And lastly, the SGP proposes the erection of an advisory commission that will help the minister reach a decision for complex asylum cases (SGP.nl1_{, 2019).}

The SGP openly criticizes the European Union on its website, the party states among others that the EU needs to be reformed and should reject possible new member states (SGP.nl2_{, 2019). According to the SGP, the Dutch government must commit itself to} increasing the power of member states rather than EU institutions and believes that EU institutions such as the European Commission must be given far more of a directing rather than a substantive role while the powers and budget of the European Commission must be considerably reduced (SGP.nl2_{, 2019).}

ChristenUnie (CU)

The CU wants European border control at the EU’s external borders. The party also supports European campaigns against human smugglers and traders that make a lot of illegal migration possible and thinks these campaigns need to continue and be expanded (Voordewind, 2019). The CU also believes that EU structural funds should be used to set up and provide for refugee camps. Member states that receive a lot of refugees can receive more money from those funds to provide for extra resources. Remigration is a priority and an EU approved list of safe return countries needs to be established. All economic migrants will be sent back home. The CU supports the current EU Blue card system for knowledgeable

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workers and think this system can be expanded to further accommodate member states with specific labor shortages (Voordewind, 2019).

With regard to the European Union, the CU is committed to cooperation between member states. Combating tax evasion, human trafficking, forced prostitution and anti-Semitism are among the issues the EU should focus on. The party also believes the EU must commit to a fair refugee policy and good relations with Israel (van der Graaf, 2019). Furthermore, member states need to work together with regards to areas like agriculture, trade, fishing, transport and environmental issues. However, the CU does fear that the EU will take on the form of a supranational state. The party believes member states need to remain independent in certain areas and decide for themselves how they deal with issues of life and death, health care, family and education. The party writes on its website (van der Graaf, 2019): “The Netherlands must stop transferring powers to the European Union. Brussels is not our capital.”

Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA)

The CDA believes that the current migration system needs to be reformed to become more flexible and efficient especially considering how migration streams fluctuate. Making sure that those who were rejected asylum leave the Netherlands as soon as possible after their rejection also needs to be a priority (CDA.nl1_{, 2019).}

Immigrants are themselves responsible for their integration, but society also needs to provide opportunities to let newcomers participate. The CDA thinks the education and integration opportunities for migrants need to be provided by the state. At the same time, the party believes that Dutch citizenship is something to be proud of and thus obtaining citizenship deserves an effort on the part of migrants (CDA.nl1_{, 2019). They should want to} integrate by learning the language, respecting Dutch laws, embracing Dutch freedom and equality and find a job. Asylum seekers that are highly likely to obtain a residence permit and status holders should get Dutch classes already while staying in their asylum center. Newcomers who culpably do not integrate can lose their residence status. Civic integration is and remains a duty to obtain Dutch citizenship (CDA.nl1_{, 2019).}

The CDA believes that the Netherlands needs the European Union and wants to invest in strengthening the EU. The EU is not just an economic union according to the party but is also a community bound through shared values of freedom and justice (CDA.nl2_{, 2019). The} role of the EU is currently being evaluated: there are areas where European rules unnecessarily limit the responsibility of member states but there are themes where a more active role of the EU is desired. New EU members are welcome as long as states meet the Copenhagen criteria (CDA.nl2_{, 2019).}

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Summary of views of political Parties on Migration and the EU per quarter of the political spectrum

The parties within the Cosmopolitan Left quarter are somewhat diverse but do hold several things in common: they all consider sheltering refugees a priority, whether that be regional or in Europe, they all believe it is the Netherlands’ duty to uphold international agreements with regards to refugees or even promote these agreements on a global stage. The parties vary in how critical they are of the European Union but all support Dutch EU-membership and several see the Union as a community of values in which democracy, freedom and the rule of law are protected. Parties do not or hardly mention economic migrants, leaving one to suspect migration in that sense is barely a part of the discourse. Those who mention (economic) migrants say they are all unwelcome. Altogether, these are generally focused on refugees and feel like there is a moral, humanitarian duty to protect them. DENK, which bordered between the Cosmopolitan Left and the Nationalistic Left in some way, stayed away from the topic of migration on its party platform. However, by wholeheartedly focusing on issues like racism and integration this party also reveals itself as based on cosmopolitan values.

When reviewing the Cosmopolitan Right quarter of the spectrum, the parties there seem somewhat divided. D66 mostly focused on the rights and needs of refugees and in that sense fits into the more humanitarian perspective of the cosmopolitan left. The party also clearly stood for European Integration. 50Plus, on the other hand, seemed to be more focused on the worries that come with migrants and focused itself more on the importance of integration and the heightened border control. 50Plus supports European cooperation but certainly does not want further integration, it wants the EU to have fewer tasks, rather than more. The VVD, which bordered the nationalistic and cosmopolitan right is in favor of the EU as is, but does emphasize that the European Union should concentrate on economic policy if anything. The VVD wants to regulate migration, in some ways just like 50Plus, but at the same time, the party does not object to highly skilled migrants coming into Europe, something other parties at least do not explicitly express. The VVD seems to be driven overall by economic benefits.

The Nationalistic Left quarter of the spectrum only contains one political party, that being the SP. This party was unique in so far that it firmly stood for the protection of Dutch and European employees and wanted to make sure unfair competition, especially on wages would be avoided. The SP is quite similar to the parties within the cosmopolitan left in so far that the party also focusses on the value of humanitarianism in its dealing with migrants. The party believes the international treaties protecting refugees need to be observed and that those who are truly in need of protection should receive shelter, whether that be here or regionally. The SP also shows some similarities to some within the cosmopolitan left with regards to the European Union, that being that the party does support EU membership but is also critical of the EU thinking the Union is too focused on economic and particular benefits. The SP is generally perceived as more Eurosceptic then other leftwing parties.

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The Nationalistic Right seems to have two distinct parts to it. On the one hand, there are the two populist parties, them being the PVV and FvD. On the other hand, there are three Christian parties, those being the SGP, the CU, and the CDA.

The populist parties are most critical of migrants and the European Union. They both want to severely limit migration and regain control over Dutch borders. When it comes to the European Union these two parties both question the benefits of European membership. The PVV wants a Nexit, and the FvD wants a binding referendum to be held regarding European membership.

The Christian parties all seem to support EU membership, though some are more enthusiastic than others. The SGP and CU both seem to be concerned with Dutch sovereignty and worry the EU draws too much power towards itself, the CDA is more moderate in its judgment of the EU and speaks of a community of shared values, just like the VVD and some parties within the Cosmopolitan right quarter did. All three Christian parties seem to care about protecting refugees in one way or another, something that was clearly less, if not at all a priority for the populist parties. The parties do believe that strict rules with regards to immigration and integration need to be upheld, something which makes them distinct from the cosmopolitan left quarter.

Views of immigrants and immigration by the Dutch public

While theory tells us that the political discourses may be an indication of discourses among the public there is also research available about opinions held by the Dutch public directly. This paragraph will look into some of those studies and their findings. The contrast that Kriesi found between values of universalism and cosmopolitanism versus values of nationalism and particularism in European and Dutch politics (Kriesi, H., 2014, p. 60) also exists among the Dutch public. Josje den Ridder, Iris Glas, and Paul Dekker found that globalization issues like ones’ views of the European Union and immigration are strongly related to social trust and political self-confidence. This relation is so strong, according to the researchers, that it would be more appropriate to speak of a "globalization and trust discrepancy" rather than a “globalization discrepancy” in society (Ridder, J. den et al., 2014, p. 147). Generally, people with an open attitude towards immigration, integration and the European Union have more faith in political institutions and their fellow citizens than people with a closed attitude. Globalization issues like the European Union and migration are experienced and related to the way people view politics, politicians and governmental institutions in general (Ridder, J. den et al., 2014, p. 146).

Ridder, Glas, and Dekker were able to categorize the Dutch public into four groups based on their finding with regards to globalization (Ridder, J. den et al., 2014, p. 148):

• The first group has the greatest level of social and political trust, is positive towards EU-membership, and sees no real drawbacks of open borders.

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• The second group has a more neutral, or very slight distrustful attitude. This distrust is both social and political in nature. They have a moderate, and slightly positive attitude towards globalization.

• The third group has little social and political trust. They view globalization negatively but are not extreme in their levels of disapproval.

• The fourth and final group has little social trust and extremely little political trust. They are outspokenly negative towards globalization.

Kriesi’s research shows that economic and cultural arguments define and categorize political views for all groups within the globalization and trust discrepancy. All these groups make use of a mix of economic and cultural arguments to support their point of view, meaning there are no purely economic or cultural perspectives (Ridder, J. den et al., 2014, p. 147). This would be similar to the way we see the Dutch populist parties oppose the European Union, both making use of economic (the EU costs too much, the Euro failed) and cultural (the Netherlands need to free itself from the EU because of state sovereignty, EU immigration threatens Dutch culture) arguments.

When just looking at the issue of migration, it is interesting to find that a big chunk of the Dutch population thinks migration is a problem. When respondents were asked in a 2018 research interview to spontaneously name the greatest problems facing Dutch society, 38% of respondents named migration and integration. Migration was the second most named issue Dekker, P. et al, 2018, p. 18). Concerns regarding societal norms and values, especially regarding the way the Dutch treat one another, were spontaneously identified as the number one problem facing Dutch society. Respondents spoke in regards to this about issues like intolerance, mutual respect, antisocial behavior, individualism and bigotry (Dekker, P. et al, 2018, p. 18-20).

So, how does the Dutch public discuss migration? Verkuyten believes that roughly two categorizations in which immigrants are viewed dominate the discourse in the Netherlands regarding migration (2005, p. 225). The first category contains “real refugees” and consists of people believed to have had no choice but to seek asylum outside of their home country. This group of asylum seekers is often described in public debate as being a minority of the total population of asylum seekers. In the other category, migrants are believed to have had a choice in leaving their home country. Asylum seekers in the second category are often discussed in a negative way in public debate. They are called things like “fortune seekers”, “economic refugees”, or “ethnic profiteers” within these debates (Verkuyten, 2005, p. 226). Whether someone has a personal choice is not just central to the way asylum seekers are categorized in public debates but also plays a role in the way Dutch people think about integration. When, as illustrated in research by Verkuyten (1997), Moroccan and Turkish immigrants were painted as to have come to the Netherlands out of free will, research respondents argued that these immigrants needed to integrate and believed they should take responsibility for their own place in Dutch society. When it was emphasized to these (same) research participants that the Turkish and Moroccan immigrants were recruited by

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Dutch companies rather than having arrived in the Netherlands on their own terms, respondents were more likely to embrace multiculturalism.

Views of the European Union and Schengen by the Dutch public

The earlier named research by Ridder, Glas, and Dekker categorizes the Dutch with regards to their views on globalization (Ridder, J. den et al., 2014, p. 148). Views of the EU also follow the four-group categorization ranging from the cosmopolitan side with high trust in the EU and political institutions generally to the opposite end categorized by little trust in political institutions and nationalistic and particularistic values (Ridder, J. den et al., 2014, p. 148).

The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) found in a 2018 study that 50% of the Dutch population supports EU membership, while only 19% opposes Dutch EU membership (Dekker, P. et al, 2018, p. 23), which generally also seems to be in line with the findings from den Ridder (et al, 2014). Additionally, only 16% of the Dutch population seems to support a Nexit (an end to Dutch EU membership) and a majority of 53% actively oppose a Nexit (Dekker, P. et al, 2018, p. 23). The Dutch general public is critical of EU membership while generally supporting this membership at the same time. An example of this is that 48% of Dutch respondents believe that the Dutch government has transitioned too much power to the European level; only 19% believe this is not the case (Dekker, P. et al, 2018, p. 23).

For a Special Eurobarometer report, surveys were conducted in all 28 EU member states to gain insight into the way the people of individual member states think about Schengen (European Commission2_{, 2018). Some of the survey results for the Netherlands, in} particular, are of interest to this study because they give an initial insight into how we can expect the Dutch public to feel about Schengen in general. When asked to evaluate Schengen overall, 77% of Dutch respondents believed that the Schengen area has more advantages than disadvantages for them personally (European Commission2_{, 2018, p. 43) and an even} greater 79% of Dutch respondents believed that these advantages also outweigh the disadvantages for their country overall (European Commission2_{, 2018, p. 44). These last two} results seem to indicate that the majority of Dutch participants in this study have at least a mildly favorable stance toward Schengen. A great majority (79%) of Dutch respondents agreed with the statement that the Schengen Area is one of the EU’s main achievements (European Commission2_{, 2018, p. 39). An even greater number of respondents (91%)} believed that the Schengen Area is good for business in EU countries (European Commission2_, 2018, p. 42), a belief that seems to be in line with the opinion shared by 65% of Dutch respondents that the most positive aspect of the Schengen area is easier trade (European Commission2_{, 2018, p. 45). Beyond ease with trade, ease with daily border crossing and ease} with cross-border cooperation (for police among others), were ranked as the second and third most positive aspects of Schengen by Dutch respondents (European Commission2_, 2018)

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It is interesting to note that all the survey results given above outdo the European average. The only somewhat negative outlier in the Dutch response relative to the EU average is that 48% of Dutch respondents believed that the Schengen Area Contributes to EU Security, making them somewhat less optimistic about Schengen’s contribution to EU security than the European average of 55% (European Commission2_{, 2018 p. 42). At the same} time, it also needs to be said that a lesser 45% of Dutch respondents believed the Schengen Area does not contribute to EU Security (European Commission2_{, 2018, p. 42).}

Understanding the Dutch Discourse on the Freedom of Movement