In Maiore Patria?
Effects of a Study Trip on European Identity in Dutch Secondary School Education.
MA Thesis in European Studies
Identity and Integration Track
Graduate School for Humanities
University of Amsterdam
By
Maurice Wielens
12095990
June 2019
First Supervisor: Dr. M.J.M. Rensen
Abstract
In this MA thesis, I observe possible change of European identity in upper class pre-university education students in the Netherlands as the result of a study trip. EU projects such as the Erasmus+ project focus mainly on learning mobility of tertiary level students. Contrary to studies on the effects of the Erasmus+ program, this case study aims to research the effects of a study trip in secondary education on students’ European identity. It is observed that study trips might downplay as well as emphasize differences between visiting and visited societies and that depending on the learning objectives that a school wishes to reach through didactic instrumentalization of the study trip, the literature seems to present some recommendations as to the instrumentalization. Schools that aim to increase their students’ European identity or their students’ Europe competences should create assignments through which students interact with the visited society on a higher level of immersion, and teachers must anticipate on possible frames of differences that might be triggered through certain activities as to avoid the resurgence of differences between cultures through the study trip.
Table of Contents Introduction ...4 Chapter 1: Identity ...9 What is Identity? ...9 Plurality ... 11 Markedness ... 12 European Identity ... 14
Euro-state allegiance, Europeanness, and salience of EU identity ... 17
Chapter 2: Education and Identity ... 20
Citizenship Education ... 20
Dutch Citizenship Education ... 26
European Union Citizenship Education ... 29
Chapter 3: Mobility ... 35
Learning Mobility ... 35
From Immersion to EU Identity ... 40
Ceiling in Identification with Other ... 43
Objectives of Secondary School Study Trips ... 47
Chapter 4: Case Study ... 49
Procedure ... 49
Results of Pre-Trip Survey ... 51
Results of Post-Trip Survey ... 54
Change in European Identity ... 55
Cultural or Political Identity? ... 60
Immersion ... 61 Changes in Competences ... 65 Conclusion ... 67 Discussion ... 71 Works Cited ... 74 Appendices ... 81
Appendix 1: Pre-Trip Survey ... 81
Introduction
Thomas Greven, associate professor of political science at the Freie Universität Berlin, observes a rise of illiberalism around the beginning of this millennium and an increase in European illiberalism mainly after 2010 (2-3). According to Greven, in illiberal movements “the common people are juxtaposed against a liberal, cosmopolitan elite ready to sell out the country to foreign interests” (3). Illiberal political parties are often right-wing, often aim to put the interests of the nation over other interests, and often aim to put the interests of the common people over the interests of the alleged elites. With the uprising of these illiberal forces in the EU since the beginning of this millennium, many right-wing political parties have gained momentum over European politics resulting in (further) questioning of the European project in member states. Topical, for example, is the Brexit in the United Kingdom. Further examples of Eurosceptic forces that gain momentum in the EU are the uprising of the political party of Forum for Democracy in the Netherlands as well as the success of other right-wing political parties in, for example, Austria, France, Germany, and Hungary in both national as well as European elections. The revival of such illiberal movements across the European Union might be related to the alleged identity crisis in the EU. It seems an apparent trend that many parties and movements in EU member states question further participation in the EU.
The questioning of EU participation is related to the question of European Identity in these countries. Although identity is defined to be pluralistic and thus goes beyond a singular affiliation “that any person belongs to one group and one group only” (Sen 26), it is often the emotional attachment to the nation state and its related imagined community that is stronger than the attachment to the European Union, potentially resulting in the questioning of EU identity (Tajfel 255). While EU identity is not necessarily contradictory to a nation state identity, it might be perceived as such by citizens whose identification with the national identity
is stronger than the European Union identity as these individuals observe greater perceived similarity between individuals in the nation.
The relation between EU and national identities has been analyzed quit extensively by scholars in the humanities, focusing on the understanding of both the concepts of EU identity and national identities, the origins for EU and national identities, and the (in)compatibility of EU and national identities. In this thesis, the focus will not be to explore these already lengthily discussed subjects. Instead, the focus in this thesis will lie on analyzing European identity in relation to education, focusing especially on the instrumentalization of learning mobility in education.
Attachment to a national imagination according to scholars such as Smith and Pykett is the result of socialization of citizens through education. Anthony D. Smith, in his authoritative book Nationalism and Modernism first published in 1998 and republished in 2013, argues that “the mass public system of education is given the fundamental task of instilling ardent loyalty to the nation in its citizens [through] a universal system of mass public education” (39). A national education system allows individuals that hold legislative power over the education system in a given polity to use this education system to influence the perceptions of individuals that go through this system: its young citizens.
Interestingly, whilst an uprising in illiberal democracy is observed since the beginning of this millennium, scholars of civics and political education observe the introduction of a new secondary school subject around the same time: citizenship education. Citizenship education focuses on maintaining a liberal order and affects “the newer democracies of Europe and the established Western democracies” (Naval, Print and Veldhuis 107). These two concepts came to be at around the same time in the EU, and citizenship education might be a result of a political implication to counter the rise of illiberalism with liberal schooling.
Where schools might be instruments of a political actor to socialize its citizens, the EU as a political actor may also try to influence the education systems of its member states (Veugelers 44). Educationalist Henk Oonk suggests that “the EU contributes to the development of high-quality education by encouraging cooperation between the member states and by supporting their activities as necessary” (24). It seems that the EU aims to foster a transnational influence in the national education systems by encouraging cooperation and communication between EU individuals.
A well-known example of EU interference in education is the Erasmus+ program. The Erasmus+ program focuses on learning mobility between EU countries by encouraging students in different member states to do parts of their education in another EU member state. Quite some research has been conducted on the effects of Erasmus+. For example, by Theresa Kuhn, associate professor of political sciences at the University of Amsterdam. Kuhn argues that when focusing on enhancing EU identification of students, the Erasmus+ program might target the wrong audience as students in tertiary education might already have reached their ceiling of identification with Europe (“Why Educational Exchange Programmes Miss Their Mark” 998). According to Kuhn, the level of education that a person went through directly affects the extent to which an individual’s European identity might be effected as a result of a study trip: the higher the level of education, the smaller the effect upon European identification (“Why Educational Exchange Programmes Miss Their Mark” 999).
The present study therefore focuses on a different audience: students in secondary education who are both younger and in a lower level of education. This target audience is thus less likely to have received the ceiling in European identification. It will be analyzed if a study trip to a foreign European country affects the European identity of these participants. Yet, learning mobility in secondary school tends to be briefer than at the tertiary level. Secondary-school students do not often go abroad for a long period as is conventional in Erasmus+, but
tend to partake in short-term trips. Two variables differ between the group assessed by Kuhn and the group assessed in this research, namely time spent abroad and level of education. Therefore, this research will not present a contrastive analysis, but rather aims to contribute to the bigger question on how learning mobility in education may influence the European identity of students. As well as to the question on how a perceived tension between multiple identities, which are promoted through the education system, affects the identity of young citizens. The following research question will be central in this thesis: To what extent does a compulsory study trip to a foreign European country influence the European identity of Dutch upper classes
pre-university education (5VWO) students?
In order to answer this question, the thesis will be divided into multiple chapters. Because of the interdisciplinary nature of this study, sources from multiple disciplines will be used including sources deriving from political sciences, educational sciences, social sciences, tourism studies, policy studies, culture studies, and imagology. The first chapter explores the concept of identity, the salience of a European Identity, the relation between a European identity and a national identity in an individual, and explores Benedict Anderson’s notion of the imagined community. The second chapter investigates EU and Dutch influence upon education, and investigates the effects of these influences on Dutch and European identities. The second chapter includes observations of the importance of education upon identity by Anthony D. Smith, and observations on developments in contemporary European education by professor of education Wiel Veugelers. The third chapter explores the concept of learning mobility, and studies the concept of immersion as posed by cultural anthropologist Neriko Doer and scholars of educational sciences Streitwieser and Light. The final chapter presents a case study of Dutch secondary school students partaking in a trip to another EU country and assesses the change in identity of these students in contrast with the level of immersion that these students reported.
The first three chapters will be literature reviews. The data collection of the fourth chapter is based on surveys filled out by the participating students and will be analyzed quantitatively as well as qualitatively. Participants are students at a secondary school in the fifth year of pre-university education (5VWO) in the Dutch city of Hilversum who will participate in a study trip to either Barcelona or Rome. A Dutch secondary school is chosen, since the policy context of the nation state in which the school is located is to be observed, and participating students are to participate in the study in their native language as this makes it easier to express one’s thoughts. Since the native language of the researcher is Dutch, this allows for an analysis of the policy-context as well as an interpretation of students’ answers. The study trip was not sponsored by either the European Union or the Netherlands.
Of course, it is understood that considering the size of this research, the answer to the central research question cannot be definitive. Instead, this thesis is intended as to offer an insight into the effects of a study trip upon students’ European identity in which the particularities of the study trips assessed must also be incorporated in the research.
Chapter 1: Identity
In order to understand to what extent a compulsory study trip to a foreign European country influences the European identity of Dutch 5VWO students, the concepts of identity and European identity must first be understood. This will be done through a literature review of previous work on these issues. To contribute to the central research question in this thesis, this chapter outlines the concept of identity, introduces contemporary debates on a European identity, and assesses the differences between a European Union identity and a European identity in contrast to a national identity. The main question in this chapter is therefore: What is European Identity, how does it relate to a European Union identity, and how does the
European Union try to cope with the alleged identity crisis?
What is Identity?
Before elaborating upon the European context, a brief outline of the concept of identity will be given in order to understand what identity is and how it works. Understanding of the concept of identity is important to analyze the different identities that students might report in the case study. Anthony Smith, an authoritative professor in the field nationalism and ethnicity studies, observes that a distinction can be made between individual and collective identities (“National Identity and the Idea of European Unity” 59). Individual identity might refer to an identity formed through a profession or a hobby, hence identifying as a medical doctor or swimmer. Individual identities are affected by the personal circumstances of the individual, such as being a father, medical doctor or swimmer. Contrastingly, a collective identity is a group identity, such as being German or being a cosmopolitan. The focus in this thesis lies on the collective identities as it contrasts possible changes of a European collective identity to a Dutch collective identity. Collective identities might be less straightforward. Benedict Anderson, in his authoritative study Imagined Communities that was first published in 1983, but of which a 2016
reprint is used, defines that collective identities are often imagined because “members […] will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in each lives the image of their communion” (6). Collective identities thus have an imagined characteristic and affect multiple individuals who together have to decide upon the meaning of a collective identity.
Smith furthermore argues that whereas individual identities are situational and subject to change, “collective identities tend to be pervasive and persistent. They are less subject to rapid changes and tend to be more intense and durable” (Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity” 59). An individual’s personal identity might change more rapidly because of external influences that allow for a shift in an individual’s identity. This is often a result of the different context or situation in which an individual finds itself. When at a pool, the individual who identifies both as a father, medical doctor, and a swimmer, will probably identify more strongly as a swimmer than as a father or medical doctor. According to international relations scholar Thomas Risse, the fact that collective identities are less apt to change is because of the socially constructed nature of these identities (22). The collective of individuals together maintain a certain norm for this identity. Deviation of one single individual from this norm does not change the norm of a collective identity, but Others this one individual from the collective. Allowance for change in the collective identity, such as the change of a normative image of the community, must be done in accordance with those individuals that maintain a group norm. In contemporary European democracies this often results in a public debate which is slower than a possible change in individual identity as result of variations in time and place of one single individual. This does not make the collective identity less relevant to the individual than an individual identity. To the contrary, individuals who are part of a collective identity related to nations have a certain degree of emotional attachment to this identity (Tajfel 255). This emotional attachment is created through “culture as a driving social
force” in nations as a result of which “culture and community become one and the same” (Guerrina 142-3). Collective identities have importance to the individual in terms of cultural attachment with the other individuals united in this imagined community. In the case study in chapter four, students might report collective as well as individual identities.
Plurality
An individual might have multiple individual as well as collective identities. An individual might identify to be Dutch, German, and European. These identities may exist in the same individual at the same time. Amartya Sen in his authoritative 2007 book Language and Identity observes this too and suggests that individuals need to decide upon both their relevant identities and the relative importance of these identities to the individual:
We do belong to many different groups, in one way or another, and each of these collectivities can give a person a potentially important identity. We may have to decide whether a particular group to which we belong is – or is not – important to us. Two different, though interrelated, exercises are involved here: (1) deciding on what our relevant identities are, and (2) weighing the relative importance of these different identities. (24).
Sen’s notion of belonging to groups ‘in one way or the another’ refers to the fact that some identities might be more ‘given’ than others, in which some identities are consciously adopted by the individual, other identities are recognized by the individual, and yet other identities are ascribed to an individual. Identities can be ascribed to an individual based on things an individual cannot change, such as their physical features, that in the perspective of the norm of a particular collective are defined to be Other (Anderson 143; Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity” 62). First, an individual has to decide upon their relevant identities
through adoption of or recognition of identities, then the relative importance of these identities must also be decided upon. Yet, these two steps are continual processes for an individual. Not only are affiliations to groups fluent, but the relative importance of their identities is also fluent as this depends on external influences and the situation of an individual at a certain time and space: “as the product of situated social action, identities may shift and recombine to meet new circumstances” (Bucholtz and Hall 376). This does not only hold true for individual identities, i.e. prioritizing identity of medical doctor and a swimmer depending on the context, but is also valid for the collective identities of this individual: a European identity might be prioritized over a national identity and vice versa depending on the situation. The fact that certain identities at certain moments are not prioritized does not mean that an identity does not exist within that person, but merely that an individual gives more importance to the performed identity in that particular situation. The present study will examine if students prioritize either Dutch or European identity over the other.
Markedness
As the concept of identity has now been introduced, it must be examined how differences between identities are perceived. In their article “Language and Identity” published in 2004, linguistic anthropologists Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall, observe how the linguistic term markedness is valid in group identity formation and the recognition of group identity. Markedness linguistically refers to recognizing an individual’s language use as different from the standard, whereas unmarkedness refers to language which follows the standard. The standard here being what is the collectively common use of language, which in turn can be divided into sub-commonalities such as dialects or accents. Bucholtz and Hall apply the term markedness to group identities in general in which group identities - alike language use - follow or deviate from such commonalities. Markedness of group identities then is defined as “the
process whereby some social categories gain a special, default status that contrasts with the identities of other[s]” (Bucholtz and Hall 372). This means that differences in group identity can be perceived by the extent to which an individual corresponds to and behaves according to certain norms or standards of a social category; a collective of individuals united in an identity. Whereas marked performance of identity refers to performing behavior that is different from the standard, unmarked performance of identity defines a certain standard or norm for the social category that is not perceived to be different and thus will not stand out to another individual which is part of the Self. Performance of this behavior is recognized by individuals as part of the Self and individuals may thus use markedness to express differences between groups of Self and Other. Travelling students in the present study might use their normative image of the collective of Self to contrastingly report on the collective of an Other. Or they might define the visited culture as similar to the Self.
For example, if individuals in a certain social category have a standard way of dressing at an important moment of portraying the national identity - i.e. during a national holiday or important sports match – wearing something different from the standard is marked. When individuals collectively wear orange shirts to express Dutchness, and they meet another individual who instead of wearing an orange shirt wears a shirt with the South-African flag on it, this will be perceived as marked to both Self and the Other. The individuals will understand that they do not all belong to the same social category, hence mutual understanding of difference of this particular act. However, if all individuals wear orange, and thus adhere to the standard of a certain sociocultural context, they will mark less differences between each other and will recognize each other to be more alike. Yet, what is unmarked behavior to one social category can be marked to the Other. Therefore, the performance of unmarked behavior can include the individual into one social category, whereas it simultaneously excludes the individual from participating in the social category of the Other. Identity can be constituted only by looking at
a larger image of behavioral patterns among social categories, and that participation in a collective identity can be observed through performativity. It must be noted, however, that an identity consists of more than just one performance of behavior and that different behaviors may overlap between identities.
The aforementioned identities only show identities that easily unite in one individual. Some identities might inherently be conflicting based on contrasting normative behavior (Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity” 59). For example, performing homosexuality whilst at the same time actively practicing a religion that does not approve of homosexuality is conflicting: fully performing the unmarked behavior of either identity excludes an individual from being able to perform the unmarked behavior of the other identity. When a certain duality between identities exists, individuals should choose to conform to one or to the other identity in order to be able to fully perform the unmarked identity of either.
European Identity
So far, the general concepts of identity and identity-formation have been elaborated upon. In this section, a European identity will be elaborated upon and contrasted to a European Union identity. It is important to understand the differences between these seemingly related identities to be able to analyze if the Dutch students participating in the study trip seem to perform either identity. Contemporarily, the debates – both academic as well as public – regarding membership of the European Union do not seem to find common ground, hence the alleged identity crisis. Some politicians in member countries such as the United Kingdom, but also Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, and the Netherlands, seem to question their position on the desirability of the EU. This results in increasingly opposing views among politicians pleading for further integrations against those who prefer complete withdrawal from the EU. Besides a public debate on desirability, the understanding of the EU also seems topical in the academic community.
It will be elaborated upon how scholars have conceived of a European identity in context of other identities and social contexts. Firstly, it is important to note that Micheal Wintle, professor of European history at the University of Amsterdam, observes in his 2002 “European Identity: A Threat to the Nation?” that there are two types of European loyalties: a cultural affiliation with Europe and loyalty to a European state. The latter is an affiliation with the European Union as an institution and thus is a political association, whereas the former refers to a pre-European Union awareness or idea of Europe which is a cultural association. There seem to be two European identities: political EU identity and a European cultural identity. Heikki Mikkeli, professor of general history at the University of Helsinki in his book Europe as an Idea and an Identity published in 1998, links the cultural European identity to an idea of
Europe. This idea of Europe relates to pan-European events that affected the shaping of the history of the continent of Europe, such as history of mythology and geography of Europe, the description of Europe by inhabitants in the middle ages, and the empires of Napoleon and Charlemagne (242). The idea of Europe is induced by images of Europe, myths of Europe, and of events that happened on the European continent. Evert van der Zweerde, professor of practical philosophy, describes in his 2009 article “Plurality in Unity” a similar division between a European cultural and political identity, of which the political identity is EU-fostered and the cultural identity is related to this idea of Europe, but describes this idea of Europe as “a rather high-brow intellectual tradition of ‘thinking about Europe’” which could explain “the widespread perception of Europe as something of and for an intellectual and political elite” (15). Whereas there might be a cultural and political affiliation with Europe, the cultural identity might affect the perception of the political identity.
Alike Wintle, Van der Zweerde expresses his belief in a European Union political identity. He suggests that the people of a European state are not homogeneous but heterogenous in nature (14). In this sense, it is complicated to constitute a shared identity, since it seems
almost that what Europeans have in common are their differences: Europeans seem to be similar in the extent to which they are diverse. This is not a strong basis for identification considering that identity revolves around perceived similarity. Europeans can in this view more easily be identified through things that they are not, rather than things they are (Van der Zweerde 19). Van der Zweerde gives five examples through which EU identity is defined negatively:
1. To be European means to speak with other people in another language than your native one without identifying them as foreigners, but it also means to recognize that no single language can lay claim to being the European language;
2. To be European thus means to acknowledge and defend that no religion can lay claim to a public impact that goes beyond the actual size and weight of its community of faithful;
3. To be European thus means to reject the idea of ethnic purity;
4. To be European thus means to have a historically informed sensitivity to injustice;
5. To be European thus means to reject the idea of a mono-logical account of history. (16-9).
Although point four might not necessarily define EU identity negatively as it seems that sensitivity to injustice might be something that Europeans have in common, the other examples seem indeed to promote that EU identity is defined negatively. Yet, political philosopher Furio Cerutti argues in 2008 that exactly this tolerance towards diversity might be a feature of an EU identity (6). The EU seems to distinguish itself from other political actors in the extent to which diversity within the polity is allowed and promoted.
Euro-state allegiance, Europeanness, and salience of EU identity
It is established that identities can – but not necessarily have to – be incompatible or contradictory. Citizens who are subject to multiple governments that maintain contradictory objectives might not be able to unify these identities, since performing unmarked identity of either will be marked in the other identity. It will now be theoretically examined how national identities and an EU identity may be conflicting or complementary, since it is important to understand the extent to which students in the study trip may contrast and compare the national and EU identity. It must be highlighted that the discourse of the government of a particular member state of the EU is targeted at those that participate within this identity and see this corresponding government as their central point of reference. This national discourse is thus limited to those united within this polity. The discourse spread by the overarching government of the EU is available to all subjects of the European Union. Since both the government of the EU as well as the national government to which an individual is subject to are political identities spreading their own separate discourses, these discourses could hypothetically be conflicting.
Menno Spiering, professor of modern European literature at the University of Amsterdam, argues in 2002 that EU’s legitimation problem will continue until either the EU experiment is terminated, or until a single European people or nation has come into being (74). Professor of international relations at the University of Copenhagen, Ole Weaver, however suggests that “whether European integration is allowed to proceed will depend on the ability of nations to secure their own survival. A nation will only allow integration when it is secure that its national identity will not be threatened” (404). An EU member state will not proceed into further political integration with the EU if integration threatens the continuity of the state. Note that continuity and sovereignty are not synonyms, but that in particular cultural contexts these terminologies might be interpreted that way and the interpretation is thus a matter of perspective. Recently, many conflicting narratives between member states and the EU are about the states having the sovereignty to decide upon their physical borders. An example of such is
Brexit. The UK decided to leave the European Union to reclaim ownership over their borders. In this particular case, a significant number of UK citizens apparently felt that the integration into the EU threatened the national Self and therefore decided to leave the collective.
Yet, the continuity of states does not necessarily derive from ownership over the systems of Self. Being bound to the European Union during the financial crisis, Greece for example, arguably benefitted from the lesser sovereignty. In return to the loss of sovereignty Greece received aid from the European Union as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which may have enhanced the continuity of the state of Greece. Through membership of these institutions, Greece might give up a certain degree of sovereignty through being bound by supranational treaties to which the member state must conform, but instead of threatening the continuity of the state, the loss of sovereignty here enhanced the continuity of the state of Greece. Although it must be stated that this is not the only perspective within Greece and that popular discourse has also promoted using the Drachma as a currency again as devaluation of the coin is seen as another instrument to remain competitive. Albeit that countries lose sovereignty through the membership of the EU, the membership could actually enhance continuity of a state because of solidarity between EU member states. EU integration thus depends on perceived continuity of the state in which member states need to decide if perceived loss of sovereignty through membership of the EU improves or diminishes perceived continuity of the state.
Furthermore, the EU offers a discourse of inclusion that does not threaten but aims to incorporate the different national identities of the member states into a larger collective. Hence, unity in diversity. In this sense, the EU aims to create an overarching framework or matrix that encompasses the separate frameworks of EU member state identities. Within this larger framework, the separate identities of member states are then components that together form this matrix. Sociologist Monica Sassatelli observes this in her 2009 book Becoming Europeans by
claiming that “we can single out an approach enhancing the unity of Europe as a culture and identity and resonating with federalist claims, as well as another emphasizing its plurality, or diversity” (26). Essentially, Sassatelli claims that a federal EU aims to unite the member states
in a political polity, that in its unity emphasizes the diversity to create common ground between the member states. What member states then have in common is their mutual recognition of their diversity and tolerance towards diversity in order to reach a common goal which is continuity and regional stability. The discourse of the EU will therefore not be conflicting to the discourse of the member states, since the EU provides a framework for the member states in which their diverse frameworks can be positioned and thus essentially together form the EU framework as a group identity on a larger conceptual scale. A feature of European Union identity is the tolerance towards diversity among EU peoples that hold similar values with a degree of shared destiny.
Despite that the observations allow for identification with the EU, the latest Eurobarometer of the EU published in 2018, shows that EU citizens tend to prioritize their national belonging over their European belonging, stating that “Europeans are primarily interested in national political matters” (European Union, “Standard Eurobarometer 90” 37). Data in the Eurobarometer suggest that the majority of Europeans who face a better future for their country outside of the EU is at an average of 30%, with the United Kingdom having the highest number of people who state this with 44%, and the Netherlands the lowest number of people who state this with 9% (European Union, “Standard Eurobarometer 90” 81). Yet, across the EU 56% of the people support further Europeanization (European Union, “Standard Eurobarometer 90” 161). Despite the slight majority in favor of Europeanization, the EU is not warmly embraced either. The support for the EU thus seems a rather negative one: whereas 70% think it is better to stay in the EU, the number of people who want further Europeanization
is lower. The EU seems to be perceived as a necessary evil. Contemporarily, Euroscepticism prevails.
Chapter 2: Education and Identity
To understand the extent to which a compulsory study trip to a foreign European country influences the European identity of Dutch 5VWO students, the influences of involved polities on identity formation in education must be understood. This will be done through a literature review of previous work on these issues as well as an analysis of both Dutch and European Union educational policy. In order to contribute to the central research question in this thesis, this chapter will investigate the concept of citizenship education, provide examples of Dutch and EU policies on citizen education, and assess the importance of mobility to the EU. The main question in this chapter is therefore: What are the effects of the Dutch and EU policies upon teachings of educational institutions in the Netherlands and to what extent do these
policies aim to create and succeed in creating a European identity among students?
Citizenship Education
Many scholars observe that the relation between education and nation has been rather tight since the 19th century and can be used to alter subjectivities of students (Meyer, Ramirez and Soysal 131; Pykett 626; Sunier 1561). In context of any recently established nation that has a mass education system, Gellner as quoted in Smith argues that:
the mass public system of education is given the fundamental task of instilling ardent loyalty to the nation in its citizens [through] a universal system of mass public education based on a standardized curriculum, especially in ‘national’ subjects like literature, geography, history and physical education. (qtd. in Nationalism and Modernism 39).
Citizens are familiarized with images of the nation through narratives of the nation in these allegedly national subjects. Because of mass access of students to this system, and as they are thus being exposed to the same narratives, students may be united into an imagined community as taught in their particular education systems. In their authoritative 1992 article “World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870-1980” educational sociologists Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal, consider “education as a central feature of an articulated cultural project” (131). Professor of Latin-American Studies and Modern Language and Literature, George Yúdice, in his authoritative 2003 study The Expediency of Culture, moreover observes that cultural objects spread a particular discourse and can be used politically as a resource to promote a certain ideology (10). Often, culture, when used as a resource, will promote ideologies or interests of the producer who derives from a particular social category in a particular time and place. This can be done nationally, for example by a state promoting its ideologies in news media on state channels through which the discourse of the state is conveyed to the citizens. The usage of schools to expose students with a particular image about the Self is a way to use culture as a resource. By observing cultural objects as a product of a certain people in a time and place, the culture of this people can be observed. The government of the European Union, recognized here as a collective effort of both parliament and council of the European Union, might as well try to influence its citizens ideologically. Smith continues his argument in his authoritative book Nationalism and Modernism, which was first published in 1998 and of which a 2013
republication is used in the present study, by assessing the situation in modern societies at the time of publication. He argues that the mass education system in advanced societies is used to promote “the ideal of ‘multiculturalism’, using the resulting cultural diversity to enhance the quality of a more composite ‘national identity’” (Smith, Nationalism and Modernism 41). Contemporarily, the education system may still be used to promote certain images of the community among its young citizens, and the promoted ideologies nowadays seem to be more
inclusive than upon introduction of mass education. As a result, schools might be more open to highlighting multiculturalism. The study trip could be a result of such fostering of a multicultural objective.
More recently, citizenship education as a curriculum subject has come to the horizon as a rather new instrument to strengthen ties between citizen and state. Pykett argues that:
citizenship education in particular should not be underestimated; this new national curriculum subject is concerned with the reformulation of state-citizen relations. Analysis of its content, implementation and pedagogy can inform our understandings of the political implications of educational reforms, contemporary practices of governing and formulations of citizenship. (622).
Pykett analyzes that citizenship education, introduced as a new national curriculum subject in the United Kingdom in 2002, reflects the relation between the state and the citizen as the state is important in forming the citizen and can particularly influence the outlooks of its citizens through formal education. Rather than covertly ‘hidden’ ideologies in the teachings of secondary school, this new subject seems to overtly teach the principle of the community to students. The emergence of citizenship education in the United Kingdom is not unique as it affects “the newer democracies of Europe and the established Western democracies” (Naval, Print and Veldhuis 107). Especially, since every EU member state requires its citizens to have gone through a basic level of formal education and considering that education is the responsibility of the individual member states of the EU, the extent of possible influence of the curriculum on the identity formation of students can be reasonable.
Whereas citizenship education arised in the separate member states since the beginning of this millennium, European citizenship education was officially introduced in 2015 when the
Paris Declaration was signed by the minister of education and the European commission “to reinforce the role of education in promoting citizenship and the common values of freedom, tolerance, and non-discrimination” (European Union, “Citizenship Education at school in Europe 2017” 17). Despite that this interest into citizenship education to define the relation between state and citizen is not new, it is certainly no less relevant in a time in which membership of the European Union is heavily debated in multiple member states such as in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Hungary, and Austria. A study conducted in 2009 observed an increase in attention given towards citizenship education as a term closely related to the nation state, in which a national government could use citizenship education curricula to define the ties between citizen and multiple levels of governance (Keating, Hinderliter Ortloff, and Philippou 145-6). In his report published in 2017, historical pedagogical scientist Levering, comments on the alleged identity crisis in the European Union in relation to questions this alleged crisis raises for the educational sector and the creation of the curriculum. Levering examines that after the second world war, and especially after the fall of the Berlin wall, all kinds of physical and non-physical borders in Europe seemed to have been overcome or decreased, but that the contemporary identity crisis in the EU raises questions in policy-makers about the extent to which a national identity should be taught in school (133; 135). Given the abovementioned history of the second world war in Europe, teaching chauvinism would be problematic, but it is also recognized that a certain sense of belonging to a socio-cultural community is important to the individual as this provides a sense of continuity and therefore security and recognition (Anderson 11). Historically given, the extent to which nationalism is ought to be taught thus is contested, let alone the teaching of other subjectivities based on other geographical identities that come to the fore. Audrey Osler, emeritus professor of human rights education and citizenship, notices in her 2011 “Teacher Interpretations of Citizenship
Education: National Identity, Cosmopolitan Ideals, and Political Realities”, that through these different levels of governance in citizenship education:
an apparent binary is established, between those who see the primary purpose of citizenship education as nation-building, and those who want to promote global solidarity. Within EU member-states, this binary between education for national and global citizenship is troubled by the issue of ‘European citizenship’ and ‘European belonging’. (2).
It seems that – similar to public opinion – it is perceived that teaching either excludes teaching the other, although Osler rejects this “inevitable tension” between forms of citizenship education for similar reasons as Sen in the first chapter allowed for multiple affiliations in individual identity (Osler 3). Citizenship education thus is on the rise in Western and European democracies, but public opinion might be contested as to the extent to which form of citizenship should be taught.
Wiel Veugelers, professor of education at the University of Humanistic Studies Utrecht, observes that there are two simultaneous processes that can be observed in relation to this increased interest in citizenship education, the processes of widening and deepening. The abovementioned affiliations to polities refer to a widening of citizenship education to include more and more polities (Veugelers 44). Deepening of citizenship education is observed when the teaching of citizenship goes beyond the political affiliation when “it also influences the social, political and interpersonal levels” (Veugelers 44). Rather than just creating political affiliations with a polity, deepening aims to try to influence how individuals within the state interact with one another. One such example of deepening that is quite often discussed by scholars is the teaching of societal or (liberal-)democratic citizenship (Van Hoof 143; Naval,
Print and Veldhuis 108; Pyket 627; Keating, Hinderliter Ortloff and Philippou 147). Societal or (liberal-)democratic citizenship education is to be observed through encouragement by the state for “the young on becoming knowledgeable, active citizens whose civic engagement and application of democratic values can sustain their democracy” (Naval, Print and Veldhuis 108). By doing so, the state aims to interfere in the future culture of its citizens often to maintain the current democratic principles on which governmental institutions are based in these Western countries. Through the deepening of citizenship education policy-makers aim to alter future culture of its citizens via interfering in education by imposing a different norm that aids towards the continuity of the state.
Study trips might be used as instruments to achieve objectives of creating affiliations to polities and to promote certain values among students. Professor of education, Jan Vermunt, in his authoritative 1996 article “Metacognitive, Cognitive and Affective Aspects of Learning Styles and Strategies” observes three types of learning activities: cognitive, affective, regulative (26). Cognitive learning is related to the memorization of facts, affective learning is related to perception and generation of emotions, and regulative learning is related to planning and testing (Vermunt 26). The second learning type, affective learning, is a learning style that can be used to reach objectives of creating affiliation and promoting values. The Dutch Education Council – the advisory board of the Ministry of Education – in a 2003 report underlines the importance of out-of-school learning activities to achieve personal and social competences necessary in a knowledge society (Onderwijsraad 50-1). It seems that out-of-school activities, of which study trips are an example, are affective learning activities that may affect the societal perception of students partaking in these trips and may thus be used as instruments to in socializing students with particular values. In the next two sections, Dutch and EU policies on citizenship education shall be explored. Policy documents reflect often long-term objectives of an authority. An
analysis of policies allows for assessment of their implementations for students’ identities in terms of altering of subjectivities in students.
Dutch Citizenship Education
In the Netherlands specifically, there are roughly two types of schools: public and particular education. Both types receive government funding. Public schools are owned and state-maintained, but particular schools are state-maintained yet not state-owned. The constitution of the Netherlands states that:
all persons shall be free to provide education, without prejudice to the authorities’ right of supervision and, with regard to forms of education designated by law, their right to examine the competence and moral integrity of teachers, to be regulated by Act of Parliament. (Netherlands, “The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 2008” 23.2).
This means that anyone in the Netherlands can open a school and teach according to their own individual beliefs, but that these schools should also stick to laws on education as provided by the parliament. Especially the latter part of the sentence gives authority to the government to intervene in the education system even though some schools are not state-owned. Since public schools are state-owned, these schools will automatically be subject to government interference. The focus in this section will therefore lie on possible state interference in the particular schools in the Netherlands as it seems less apparent there. In addition, to be able to study this, the participating school in the present study was chosen based on them being a particular school. Particular schools, which can include schools that teach based on religion or schools that use non-standard types of education, differ from the public school, but are still obligated to take
part in, for example, the national final exams as held in May in which students’ knowledge of kerndoelen and einddoelen are tested. These are learning goals as stipulated by the government
that provide the framework of educational contents of knowledge that students going through secondary education in the Netherlands should have acquired in order to graduate (“Over Kerndoelen en Eindtermen” 3). To a certain extent, particular secondary schools are thus free in the design of their curricula but are restricted to a framework of knowledge that students should have upon graduation. Due to the relatively limited time students spend in schools, however, having to teach according to the learning objectives as stipulated by a state of course limits the time that can be spend on other matters that the particular school deems important; the learning objectives thus not only affect the manner in which particular information must be taught, but the teaching hereof also limits the possibility to teach other matters.
Over the course of the last ten years, moreover, many argue that Dutch government interference in education has increased through an expansion of the framework of knowledge as stipulated by the learning objectives through introduction of citizenship education (Broeksteeg 18; Levering 140). Sunier, professor of cultural anthropology at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, in his 2009 “Teaching the Nation” refers to a report by the Dutch Education Council that explicitly mentions to put greater emphasis on the socializing task of the school within what Sunier calls “a time of hot debate in the country about values and norms, violence at school, and not least, the alleged growing radicalization of young immigrants” (1571). These policy-decisions further limit the liberty of particular schools to design their own education as this trend ties schools to teaching these subjects limiting both liberties to select their own learning objectives as well as time to be spend on other matters. This might be related to the alleged identity crisis in the European Union in which member states, among which the Netherlands, as claimed by Sunier, might react to this public debate by giving in to strengthening socialization with Dutch norms in secondary education. The extension of the state
curriculum might to some extent be regarded as a return to or revival of 19th century nationalism in Dutch schools in order to strengthen the ties between citizen and state.
The government of the Netherlands can thus specifically influence the Dutch education system, but how does this influence the identity of students? The coalition agreement of the current coalition governing the Netherlands, reads that the coalition is to invest in culture “to increase knowledge about our [Dutch] shared history, values and freedoms, as these are what make Dutch society” (Netherlands, “Confidence in the Future” 23). In order to reach this goal, the following investments should be made according to the 2017 coalition agreement:
• Children will be taught the Dutch national anthem at school, and have its origins explained to them;
• All schoolchildren have the chance to visit the Rijksmuseum and the Dutch parliament;
• Invest in raising awareness about sites that play a significant role in Dutch history and making them as accessible as possible;
• A copy of the historic canon as published in 2006 by the Dutch government will be issued to all young people when they reach the age of 18, and to those who acquire Dutch citizenship. (Netherlands, “Confidence in the Future” 23).
Interestingly, whereas ‘Culture’ and ‘Education and Research’ both have a separate header within the chapter ‘Investing for All’ of the coalition agreement, the objectives as stated under Culture seem to mainly address objectives that have to do with education or the use of cultural objects within education: Dutch students will be made familiar with the anthem and visit the parliament and the Rijksmuseum (which in English promotes itself as the Museum of the Netherlands). This seems to imply that cultural objects as stipulated are also used as a resource
by the Dutch government to change the culture of citizens to maintain, alter, or reinforce the imagined community. It seems that the selection of exposure to culture and the selection of out-of-school activities, i.e. study trips to The Museum of the Netherlands and the Dutch parliament, seem to bind these individuals more strongly into a Dutch narrative.
European Union Citizenship Education
The previous paragraph established that the education system in Western and European democracies, of which the Netherlands is part, is methodologically national and saw the introduction of a new subject in citizenship education that might be used to increase state-citizen relations on a national level. Van Hoof pleads for a further increase in learning objectives through introduction of European learning objectives to the official curriculum to strengthen EU state-citizen relation (135-6). According to Van Hoof, this is important as information on Europe does not always reach citizens, structural teaching of the EU would eventually result in better monitoring of the EU by citizens and more attention given towards Europe in journalism and politics (135). Notwithstanding that the learning objectives on Europe in member states are limited and the EU does not hold competence towards education, this does not mean that the EU cannot influence the national education systems. It will now be examined to what extent the European Union may influence the education system and thus reformulate EU state-citizenship relations.
For example, the EU can influence national education systems through soft conditionality. Among others, Claske Vos, lecturer of European Studies at the University of Amsterdam, argues that soft conditionality allows the EU council to integrate EU objectives in strict funding criteria of projects to push its own agenda into projects that are then ratified by the polities in the member states (Vos 680; Sacchi 77-8; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 662). Essentially, these scholars describe an indirect way of the EU to influence policies in the
member states by which the EU can ratify its own objectives into sectors in which the EU has no competence, which might be referred to as a “bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 662). Professor of international relations, David Galbreath, observes that the process of conditionality is often observed in candidate member states in which integrating objectives of the EU in national policies often is a requirement for obtaining full membership (70). Yet, analysis of Sacchi clarifies that conditionality is not exclusively used towards candidate member states, but also affects member states. When in 2011 Italy faced a market confidence crisis, it received financial aid by the European Central Bank under the condition of implementing structural reforms in economic policies (Sacchi 78). The EU might thus influence sectors of member states in which it has no competence through conditionality by posing certain EU objectives as conditions for an EU intervention that is voluntarily adopted by a member state.
Henk Oonk, during his time as a researcher at the University of Groningen, observed that EU education policy “implies constantly having to steer a course between the need to preserve national identity on the one hand and the wish to reinforce European cooperation on the other” (21). Despite the national context of education, “the EU contributes to the development of high-quality education by encouraging cooperation between the member states and by supporting their activities as necessary” (Oonk 24). The European dimension thus incorporates itself in the national system by creating a European platform that encourages trans-national participation. Cris Shore mentions this interweaving of trans-national and European levels of policies as an “attempt by European elites to invent the EU as an imagined community [which] has been central to the cultural politics of European integration” (221). This comes to the fore as “the ‘European dimension in education’” […] focus[es] attention on foreign languages, instilling a sense of European citizenship using cultural heritage of the member states, and promoting active citizenship” (Oonk 25). The ability to speak multiple European
languages makes it easier for a student to participate in a context that goes beyond the member state and to communicate with other European peoples. Using cultural heritage of the member states to instill a sense of Europeanness seems like a creation of a European narrative beyond the member state which binds the member state into Europe. Furthermore, the notion of active citizenship which Naval, Print and Veldhuis, as has been argued, link to the application of democratic values and sustaining of democracy, interweaves European citizenship education towards national citizenship education which also aims to install a participatory democratic norm. It seems that through these acts, the EU aims to create an EU imagined community with a European public communicative sphere and a sense of continuity of the EU.
There are many examples from practice that show how the EU aims to intervene in the education systems. Such as EUROCLIO, European Schools, the Global Citizen Network, distribution of educational material, trips to the EU institutions on demand, and organized events such as EUROSCOLA. The most prominent interventions will be elaborated upon. EUROCLIO is a European association for history educators, which is co-funded by the EU Europe for Citizens Program and aims to reach educators by “advocat[ing] a sound use of history and heritage education towards the building and deepening of democratic societies, connecting professionals across boundaries of communities, countries, ethnicities and religions” (“What We Do”). The use of the word sound here implies that the organization holds a particular view on what historical and heritage narrative is plausible. Given the further explanation of deepening democracy across multiple boundaries, it seems that this allegedly sound narrative leads up to transnational democracies. This inherently is a call for acceptation of plurality which might normatively affect values of students taught by material and teachers adhering this philosophy.
European Schools have a similar objective which is clearly stated in the objectives following the words of Marcel DeCombis in the past century:
Educated side by side, untroubled from infancy by divisive prejudices, acquainted with all that is great and good in the different cultures, it will be borne in upon them as they mature that they belong together. Without ceasing to look to their own lands with love and pride, they will become in mind Europeans, schooled and ready to complete and consolidate the work of their fathers before them, to bring into being a united and thriving Europe. (qtd. in “Principles and Objectives”).
It seems that European schools promote a similar outlook on education and a normative way of life between European peoples as the EUROCLIO organization does by aiming to do away with boundaries between European peoples. The number of schools however is rather limited: thirteen across six member states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain) with four of the schools located in Brussels. A 2006 qualitative study of Savvides, lecturer in international education, assesses that especially the diversity of students and focus on learning languages helped towards creating an EU identity in students of these European schools (325). According to Savvides’ research, then, the objectives of the European Schools to do away with borders between its students, are quite successful. The EU thus maintains an education policy based on plurality and linguistic diversity to try to downplay borders between European peoples.
Another organization in the Netherlands that promotes a European learning environment at school is the Global Citizen Network (GCN; previously known as ELOS and NIVO). This organization is supported by the European Commission. In contrast to the European school, there are many more schools united in this organization than there are European schools in the Netherlands. At the time of writing, sixty secondary schools across
eleven provinces of the Netherlands are part of this organization (“Wat is het Global Citizen Network?”). GCN provides a “Common Framework for Europe Competence” that describes four domains that guide the acquisition of Europe competences in secondary school students at these GCN schools. These competences are: (1) having relevant knowledge about Europe (2) effectively communicating in a European environment (3) constructively cooperating with peers from different member states (4) having competences to study and work in a European and international environment (“Common Framework for Europe Competence”; my translation). These competences have six levels on which students can be scored. VWO students at GCN schools need to score a level four out of six on these competences upon graduation. As students in the present case study are in their pre-final year of pre-university education, students at GCN schools should score on level 3 to 4 on these competences. In terms of domain two, students are expected to be able to talk about stereotypes in a multicultural group (level three) and to adapt their form of communication to that of the visited country without losing their individual identity (level four; “Common Framework for Europe Competence”; my translation). Students should thus be able to adapt to the visited society which requires a rather high level of participation in and adaption to this society of these students. GCN schools which make up about 10% of the total number of secondary schools in the Netherlands, seem to have a rather high level of Europe competences. Presumably, due to the added attention of these schools towards these competences, GCN school students will probably score higher on these Europe competences than other types of schools, and the level of these competences will presumable not be representative for other secondary schools. Possibly, the effects of a study trip on GCN students and other secondary school students in the acquisition of EU identity through a study trip is different as the level of these Europe competences is higher in GCN students.
Possibly, the EU’s most well-known intervention in education is the Erasmus+ program. Erasmus+ is a program created by the European Commission to provide resources for mobility between EU member states. In its “Erasmus Annual Report 2017”, the European Union states that Erasmus+ focuses on mobility within Europe to increase intercultural awareness and increase democratic participation among the youth (19). It is furthermore stated that the number one key action of Erasmus+, learning mobility of individuals, “received 55% of the Erasmus+ total budget and was mainly implemented by the National Agencies” (European Union, “Erasmus Annual Report 2017” 19). It seems indeed that by establishing a framework and providing money to facilitate mobility, the EU affectively uses soft conditionality as agencies in separate member countries voluntarily take part in this process. By incorporating this policy, the EU can effectively promote a platform for transnational communication among its citizens.
Moreover, the “Erasmus Annual Report of 2017” in the section “Positive Impact on Participants”, reads that participation in the program had the following effects on participants: more receptive to multiculturalism, increased adaptability to act in new situations, improved language skills, and improved tolerance towards other values and cultures (European Union, “Erasmus Annual Report 2017” 25). Scholars such Papatsiba in her 2006 “Making Higher Education more European through Student Mobility” state that Erasmus+ strives to through transnational communication between peoples the EU strives to “forge a European consciousness” (99). And Mitchell, in her 2012 “Student Mobility and European Identity” argues that this transnational and intergroup contact would be a mechanism for identity-formation and would indeed reduce intergroup bias (491). It seems that the EU instrumentalizes mobility to foster European identity and to downplay differences between European peoples.
Chapter 3: Mobility
To understand the extent to which a compulsory study trip to a foreign European country influences the European identity of Dutch 5VWO students, the concept of learning mobility and the effects of travelling on students’ identities must first be understood. This will be done through a literature review of previous work on these issues. In order to contribute to the central research question in this thesis, this chapter will investigate to what extent learning mobility affects students, and to what extent a change in European identity can be observed in these students. The main question in this chapter is: To what extent does spending time in a different member state than the member state of origin affect the identity and especially European
identity of individuals?
Learning Mobility
The previous chapter discussed that the EU maintains an education policy that is aimed to teach principles of plurality and linguistic diversity to try to do away with borders between European peoples. The Erasmus+ program and EUROCLIO have been observed to be instruments with which the EU aimed to reach this. From the analyses of EUROCLIO and Erasmus+ it can be observed that these organizations provide transnational or European platforms through which the EU intends to create a European space that allows for contact between peoples to transcend borders between Europeans. Encouraging mobility is not limited to the EU’s policies on education. The EU generally tends to invest in bringing its citizens from different backgrounds together to allow for such transnational communication. For example, the European Capitals of Cultures Program allows regions to present themselves to other European peoples, who in turn are invited to visit this region. Such mobility often implies for at least one of the conversation partners to move across nation state borders to another EU member state. Therefore, the EU focuses quite some of its resources on mobility. As learning mobility seems to be a key term in
