Deterrence in asymmetric conflicts: Success and failure

(1)

Bachelor project 11: Deterrence and Compellence in International Politics Name student: Ali Maleki

Student number: 1665987

Thesis supervisor: Dr. Huib Pellikaan Date: 17 June 2019

Wordcount: 8393

Deterrence in Asymmetric Conflicts:

Success and Failure

(2)

2

Introduction

The use of retaliation and the threat of violence in international relations has intrigued political scientists and foreign policymakers alike. Mainly because both these measures are used in situations where a state aims to actively persuade another state to perform a given action, as well as in situations where a state aims to passively dissuade another state from performing a given action (Schelling, 1960). The failure and success of both dissuasion and persuasion in diplomacy has practical consequences for the conduct between states, frequently being the cause of heightened tensions and confrontation, both militarily and diplomatically (Brodie, 1959). Therefore, as both academics and policymakers endeavour to uncover when and why these strategies fail or succeed, a considerable amount of research has been done on this particular way of negotiation and conflict resolution. The theories concerning the use of threats and violent retaliation in international conduct between states are called compellence and deterrence theory, where the former constitutes an active and the latter a passive coercive strategy (Brodie, 1959; Schelling, 1960; George & Smoke, 1974; Huth & Russett, 1984).

Despite the extensive theoretical development of deterrence and compellence, their explanatory power is limited. Especially in the case of deterrence theory, this limitation is apparent in explaining interstate asymmetric conflicts initiated by weaker states. One of the few substantial works on this matter has been written by the respected scholar Thazha Varkey Paul. His 1994 study tries to develop the theory by elaborating on six cases in which the deterrence of a militarily and economically stronger state has failed when challenged by a weaker state (Paul, 1994). Although Paul’s work is

thorough, it has been criticised on several methodological matters, which devaluates the worth and contribution of the study (Peterson, 1996, pp. 116-117; Mor, 1996, pp. 234-236; Reiter, 1997, pp. 640-643).

This essay aims to use and build on the valid results and implications of Paul’s study for deterrence theory. Therefore, the research objective is to develop deterrence theory through examining six empirical cases of asymmetric conflicts by incorporating the relevant aspects of Paul’s study. To obtain this research objective the following research question is asked: what factors affect deterrence outcomes in asymmetric conflicts initiated by the weaker state? Answering this question will provide insight on certain factors relation with both deterrence failure and success when a militarily and economically less powerful state challenges a stronger power. This comprehension of

(4)

4

deterrence developments in interstate asymmetric conflicts assists in developing the explanatory scope of deterrence theory, as well as guiding foreign policymakers in their considerations on this matter.

To reach this objective and answer the proposed question, this paper commences with an explanation of the comparative research method and design employed. Also in this primary section, the factors under scrutiny will be determined, the selection of cases will be elaborated on, and the study will be demarcated for time and scope limitations. In the second section, the theory of deterrence will be described in order to form the theoretical framework of this essay. This section also involves a discussion about both the valid and erroneous theoretical implications of Paul’s study. In the third section, the selected empirical cases will be analysed to determine whether the predetermined factors are absent or present to affect deterrence. Subsequently, this paper will run a statistical analysis over the results in order to test whether the factors actually affect deterrence success or failure. This test underlines and substantiates the findings in this study and assists in advancing deterrence theory. Finally, a concluding discussion will finalise and rehearse the arguments and findings of this paper.

(5)

5

1.0 Research Method and Design

Before investigation, it is appropriate to elaborate on the approach taken in this paper to answer the research question and attain the research objective. Considering the objective is to establish whether certain factors affect deterrence in asymmetric conflicts, this paper will combine the structured, focused comparative case study method with

quantitative analysis through statistical testing. This allows for the rigorous selection of cases, the use of possible influencing factors, and the determination of whether the factors actually have influence through a compare means analysis.

The structured, focused comparative method of Alexander George

accommodates the meticulous distillation of variables and cases. Specifically, the method’s focus and clear defined phases restrict the investigator from including irrelevant cases and influencing factors (George, 1979; George, 1997). This rigour is necessary to connect the cases and variables with the theory examined. If performed correctly, empirical generalisations can be formulated to assist in theory development (George, 1979; George, 1997). The strictness of this method to generate theoretically relevant variables, and the statistical analysis of case study results, determines and provides statistical substantiation to the factors affecting deterrence in asymmetric conflicts.

The method’s rigour is embedded in three phases that the investigator has to go through while conducting his research (George, 1979). The phases are respectively: design, case study, and theoretical implications. The first designing phase and its subtasks cover the methodological demarcation of the whole study. The first subtask specifies the research problem; establishes the examined phenomenon; defines the existing theory that addresses the phenomenon; and determines the aspects of the theory selected for analysis. The second subtask commands specification of the factors to be included in the comparison of cases. These factors must clearly relate to the theory selected for examination in the controlled comparison. The third subtask states that the selection of cases is done in relationship with the specifications of tasks one and two. The cases must all concern the same phenomenon to be of theoretical relevance. Task four instructs the investigator to consider in which terms the variance in the outcome and independent variables can best be described. For example, an outcome variable could be described as success or failure. The fifth and last task prescribes the

(6)

6

formulation of data requirements for each case in the analysis. This means that the choice for independent variables is based upon general questions asked of each case in the comparison (George, 1979, pp. 54-55). The second phase covers the study of the chosen cases according to the tasks set out in the designing phase and the third phase constitutes concluding on the theoretical implications of the results generated by the study. Both phase two and three have no further subtasks.

In accordance with the method’s first phase, this paper’s research objective is to establish the factors affecting deterrence failure and success in asymmetric conflicts, endeavouring to develop deterrence theory. Building on previous research, the specific goal is to develop deterrence theory for conflicts where the initiator or challenger is an economically and militarily weaker state and the defender is an economically and militarily stronger state. In concurrence with this research objective, the supporting theoretical framework addressing these deterrent threats and strategies in confrontations between states is the theory of deterrence.

Regarding the determination of factors presumed to affect deterrence outcomes, this paper draws these factors from the general questions asked in the study on

asymmetric conflicts conducted by T.V. Paul (1994, pp. 15-36). Despite its

shortcomings, this rare study executed a comprehensive case-study comparison by using four substantiated independent variables. This research borrows these variables to extend Paul’s research, primarily as both studies endeavour to develop deterrence theory regarding asymmetric conflicts. However, as some methodological issues hamper Paul’s study in developing substantiated empirical generalisations; this study aims to overcome those. The independent variables used by Paul to explain challenges by a weaker state are: consideration of a limited aims strategy, short-term availability of offensive weaponry, great power support, and the domestic power structure (Paul, 1994, p. 20).

1.1 Conceptualisation and Operationalisation

To investigate whether the four above-mentioned factors affect deterrence, a

conceptualisation and operationalisation of these abstract terms is methodologically necessary. The conceptualisation of these terms is drawn from Paul’s study (1994). Subsequently, further operationalising some of these terms by defining their indicators, will clarify and assist in their assessment. Moreover, in accordance with the fourth

(7)

7

designing task, these four variables will be measured in terms of their presence or absence. Allowing a statistical test to analyse and substantialise the case study results. Due to limited research on deterrence in asymmetric conflicts, comprehending the influence of these variables in terms of presence or absence would provide initial information on the factors’ connection with deterrence outcomes. Although this might seem limited, it provides a platform for further research on these factors, since their relation with deterrence outcomes is determined.

The first independent variable is the consideration of a limited aims strategy by the weaker state, wherein strategy is defined as the employment of battle as the means in order to achieve specific policy goals. Paul uses the differentiation of strategy as put forward by John J. Mearsheimer (1983). The limited aims strategy is used when an attacker is solely interested in partial victory or has limited military or political goals to obtain, minimising its cost (Mearsheimer, 1983). The higher costs of an enduring attrition strategy and the difficulty of utilising a blitzkrieg strategy, excludes these strategies from being considered by weaker states (Paul, 1994, p. 24). Indicators for this factor can be statements of politicians and/or military elites regarding a partial claim to territory or a limited goal to gain from the challenge.

The second influencing variable is the short-term availability of offensive capability. The decision-makers of the weaker state could realise that the effect of the acquired weapons is of short duration, creating a window of opportunity before the opponent might acquire weapons of similar or even greater potency in the future (Morrow, 1989, p. 512). Thus, the presence of these offensive capabilities in limited timeframe can increase the likelihood of a weaker state to challenge a stronger power. Moreover, the term offensive weapons used here refers to Boulding’s conception that offensive weapons have the purpose to increase the attacker’s ability to injure and decrease the defender’s ability to injure the attacker (1962, pp. 256-259).Short-term availability of offensive weapons can be indicated by an increase in defence spending or weapon acquisitions preceding the period of crisis.

The third influencing variable used to account for deterrence failure or success is great power support. Paul states that the advantage for the initiator comes from both the decrease in alliance support and retaliatory power for the defender, as well as the increase in military and political support the initiator itself obtains from alliance (1994, p. 31). Indicators of this variable would be formal alliance documents or political expressions of support to the challenging state.

(8)

8

The fourth and last independent variable under examination is the initiator’s domestic power structure. According to Paul, the probability of belligerence will

increase if a belligerent group controls the domestic power structure of a weaker power. This group would perceive a limited war as a chance to achieve domestic and

international support and policy goals (Paul, 1994, pp. 33-34). Indicators are moments at which the initiator’s government is dominated by, or has strong ties with, the military and possesses an aggressive stance towards politics.

These four factors will be compared across cases to determine their presence or absence, and whether they affected the outcome variable, which is dichotomously defined as deterrence success or failure. Deterrence failure implies that the defender has failed to deter the initiator through a passive demonstration, or threat of force, directed at the initiator. Failure would result in war, as the defendant’s objective is to preserve the status quo. Contrarily, when the defendant state has deterred the initiator from challenging the status quo and initiating war, deterrence is considered successful.

1.2 Case Selection

In order to examine these independent and outcome variables, the cases selected in this thesis are all instances of deterrence in asymmetric conflicts. Specifically, they are instances of interstate asymmetric conflicts where the weaker state is the initiator, and where deterrence is defined as using the threat of retaliation as a passive strategy to dissuade an adversary from attacking (Schelling, 1960; Aachen & Snidal, 1989). Otherwise, the cases are not valid for comparison methodologically (George, 1979, p. 50). Also, regarding the research question and objective, it is required that cases of both deterrence failure and deterrence success cases must be included. Comparing cases across both outcomes is necessary to determine whether those variables present in deterrence failure are absent in cases of deterrence success, and vice versa. Without comparing both sets of cases, empirical generalisations cannot be established with confidence since the comparison is incomplete (Huth & Russett, 1990, pp. 472-473). Furthermore, considering that asymmetric deterrence cases with a weak state initiator are very limited, this study conducts the statistical test on the known population of cases.

(9)

9

study, primarily because it is the only known established study that focused on cases of war initiation in asymmetric conflicts. These cases are: (1) the Japanese offensive against Russia in 1904; (2) the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941; and (3) the Argentine invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas in 1982 (Paul, 1994).

Additionally, the three successful deterrence cases are selected from the dataset of Huth and Russett (1990, pp. 500-501). This dataset consists of 58 cases of deterrence failure and success, from which only three were successful deterrence dyads where a weaker power was the initiator. These are: (1) the Iraqi-British confrontation over Kuwait in 1961; (2) the Guatemalan-British territorial dispute over Belize between 1972 and 1976; and (3) the Black September crisis between Syria and Israel in 1970.

These six cases of deterrence failure and success will be analysed thoroughly to determine whether the four influencing variables have any effect on deterrence

outcomes when present or absent. Eventually, the six deterrence cases will be entered in a SPSS dataset to statistically analyse and test the hypothesised influence of the four independent factors on deterrence outcomes.

(10)

10

2.0 Theoretical Framework – The Theory of Deterrence

Considering that the research objective aims to develop deterrence conceptions in asymmetric conflicts, the theoretical framework is embedded in deterrence theory. Additionally, the implications of Paul’s study regarding deterrence theory will also be discussed here, as this thesis aims to build on these.

The theory of deterrence in international relations essentially focuses on the policies and capabilities a defender can utilise to dissuade an attacker from a specified action (Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 469; Huth, 1999, pp. 26-29; Aachen & Snidal, 1989, p. 151). This denotation concurs with the classic definition put forward by Thomas

Schelling (1960). Schelling states that deterrence is the passive strategy of a defendant state to dissuade an adversary from attacking with the goal to preserve the status quo (Schelling, 1960, pp. 195-197). Consequently, the phenomenon covering the cases examined in this study is this passive strategy.

Continuing this classic definition, several academics have developed the theory and extended its scope to include and consider the different dimensions of conflictual relations between states, ranging from great power conflict to extended deterrent strategies (Aachen & Snidal, 1989, pp. 150-152). Although these different components are irrelevant for this study, they all concern the use of threats to induce the adversary to behave in certain ways (Aachen & Snidal, 1989, p. 151).

Notably, it is crucial to separate a deterrent strategy from a compellent strategy, as they possess distinct characteristics. Compellence constitutes the active strategy of an initiating state to persuade an adversary – using the threat of reprisal – to conduct a certain action with the purpose to alter the status quo (Schelling, 1960, pp. 195-197). Both deterrence and compellence have distinct theoretical logic, but can be seen as components of coercive diplomacy since both intent to change behaviour through the communication of threats (Morgan, 2003). Huth and Russett, among others, have however extensively argued for the separation of deterrence and compellence, since mixing the two results in inaccurate, theoretically irrelevant generalisations (1990, pp. 475-477).

According to the original deterrence logic, an attacker is likely to circumvent deterrence when it possesses superior economic and military capabilities relative to those of the defender. This logic is built upon the assumption that decision-makers will

(11)

11

rationally consider the military balance with its adversary and decide to attack when the balance is favourable and to refrain from attack when that balance is unfavourable (Aachen & Snidal, 1989, pp. 151-152). As such, deterrence theory would presume that decision-makers want to maximise their value, and thus not advance military conflict if the costs of attacking exceed the benefits of that behaviour (Aachen & Snidal, 1989, pp. 151-152). Hence, assuming the rational consideration of the military and economic balances, deterrence holds and is successful if the defender has superior economic and military capabilities. Contrarily, when the aggressor would presume the superior capabilities deterrence is most likely to fail, resulting in conflict escalation.

In an effort to extend the existing deterrence conceptualisation, Paul’s study endeavours to fill this void in the classic deterrence rationale to explain why a weaker power would challenge a superior adversary. Predominantly, in assuming that the strong have preponderance over the weak, deterrence theory considers mostly symmetric conflicts between equal powers and asymmetric conflicts where the strong bully the weak. Paul aspired to extend the theory to cover the class of asymmetric conflicts where the weak challenge the strong through the analysis of six cases, but was criticised (1994). Subsequently, this thesis aims to add substantiation to this development by using Paul’s factors and three failed cases to determine if they affect deterrence failure and success when the weak challenge the strong.

2.1 The Theoretical Implications of the Study on Asymmetric Conflicts and

War Initiation

After extensive analysis of six selected cases, Paul’s conclusion proposes insights on why weaker states challenge more powerful adversary’s (1994, p. 167). He argues that the independent variable with the most influence would be the consideration of a limited aims strategy, contending that this variable had a very strong presence in all cases when compared to the other variables (Paul, 1994, pp. 167-168). Additionally, Paul devised two matrices to graph the approximate level of presence of all variables per case. Using a numerical scale from one to ten, the independent variables are valued according to their perceived presence in the case studies, were zero is equal to no presence and ten is equal to a very strong presence. This classification is presented in Figure 1, where Table 1 constitutes positive cases of war initiations and Table 2 represents the negative cases

(12)

12

where there was no war initiation. Relevant for this paper is Paul’s contention that his findings, based upon his classification, have implications for deterrence theory. Paul infers that studying the case through the four independent variables has proven that the calculus of a weaker initiator is considerably more comprehensive than solely contemplating victory and defeat. He highlights the difficulty of obtaining a successful deterrent strategy in an intense asymmetric conflict, especially when the initiator can execute a limited aims strategy. This contradicts the deterrent logic assuming that preponderance in military capabilities would deter a less powerful adversary.

However, Paul’s conclusions are hard to generalise and rather bold. Reminiscing the requirement posed by Huth and Russett, which states it necessary to compare both outcome options to establish substantial empirical generalisations about the

determinants for both outcomes of deterrence (1990, p. 472). It has been observed that Paul’s case selection lacks this requirement, as deterrence success cases are not

considered adequately. After all, his ‘negative’ cases are historical instances of the ‘positive’ ones, but when war was averted. One cannot validly select a moment prior to a case where war was initiated and act as completely independent deterrence success case. Thus, as the study conducted by Paul is successful in generating possible influencing factors and finding data that could account for deterrence failure in asymmetric conflicts, it is not rigid and complete enough to propose empirical generalisation for deterrence theory in asymmetric conflicts.

Moreover, the inferences made for deterrence theory based on solely failed cases is not the only shortcoming of the study. The table in Figure 1 raises doubts on the validity of this quantification. This is primarily because there is no explanation

anywhere in the book on how these variables were measured to generate this particular valuation1. This makes the quantified valuation table rather arbitrary and erroneous, especially considering the fact that he draws his theoretical implications from this table. Therefore, due to the above-mentioned problems and obscurities, the results of Paul’s study are not generalisable to deterrence cases in asymmetric conflicts.

Despite these shortcomings, Paul’s study has value for this thesis. To overcome the quantification and case selection problem, this paper combines the selection of three

1_{When the author was emailed and asked personally about the logic behind this classification, the author}

stated that the quantification was a random decision. Unveiling a rather obscure logic behind this tablulation.

(13)

13

failed instances from Paul’s study, with three successful deterrence instances. This allows for thorough and valid case study analysis, as well as statistical analysis for reliable quantification.

Figure 1: Quantification and valuation of the independent variables in Paul’s concluding chapter (1994, p.168)

(14)

14

3.0 Case Studies

In this section six cases of deterrence failure and success will be analysed based on secondary sources. Commencing with three failed cases and subsequently analysing three successful instances of deterrence in interstate asymmetric conflict. The case studies determine the absence and presence of the four independent variables. The failed cases are: (1) the Japanese offensive against Russia in 1904; (2) the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941; (3) the Argentine invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas in 1982. The successful cases are: (4) the Iraqi-British crisis of 1961; (5) the Guatemalan-British crisis of 1972-1976; and (6) the Black September crisis between Syria and Israel in 1970.

3.1 The Japanese Offensive against Russia in 1904

On 8 February 1904, the Japanese navy launched a surprise torpedo attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur to initiate war. In order to secure their territorial objectives in Korea and Manchuria, the Japanese circumvented the Russian Empire’s far eastern deterrent strategy. The Russians believed that their overall military preponderance would deter a Japanese attack (Malozemoff, 1958, p. 245; White, 1964, pp. 114-121; Okamoto, 1970, p. 105; Walder, 1973, p. 53). The lack of preparation of their Port Arthur fleet to anticipate any attacks also illustrated their passive posture (Romanov, 1974, p. 15; Walder, 1973, p. 59). For these reasons, the Russian strategy failed to deter the Japanese challenge to the status quo, resulting in war.

3.1.1 Limited Aims Strategy

In their decision to strike, Japanese military planners had envisaged a short combat to secure its objectives before the Russians could mobilise additional troops from the Central Asian and European parts of the Empire (Okamoto, 1970, pp. 105-106). The fact that the Chief of the Army General Staff Oyama stated to the Navy Minister Yamamoto that understanding when to stop is crucial, indicated limited aspirations. Also, the Japanese military oligarchy agreed the short nature of the war, since Russia had more resources to win a long attrition war (Westwood, 1986, p. 22). These indications infer that the consideration of a limited aims strategy was present in the Japanese considerations.

(15)

15

3.1.2 Offensive Capabilities

Despite the overall discrepancy in capabilities between Japan and Russia, the Japanese had short-term advantages in the theatre of hostilities (Walder, 1973, pp. 78-84). The Russians had a larger force, but these were scattered over their empire. The Japanese navy generated immediate advantages for the 1904 attack (Ballard, 1921, p. 192). By 1903, their navy was strengthened with six battleships, eight cruisers, twenty-one light vessels, and thirty-four torpedo ships. These were of high quality for their time and compared to the Russian fleet in the Far East (Ballard, 1921, pp. 195-202; Blond, 1961, p. 153). The naval preponderance of the Japanese prior to the war determines the short-term offensive capability factor present in this defiance of deterrence.

3.1.3 Great Power Support

The Japanese alliance relationships changed positively in the early 20th century. Historians generally contend that the Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty of 1902 proved crucial in their decision to challenge Russia (White, 1964, pp. 83-92; Causton, 1936, pp. 114-116; Miller, 2012, pp. 79-83). Additionally, the US were sympathetic towards Japan’s actions against Russia in the Far East (White, 1964, p. 99). This international climate alleviated Japanese fears of great power intervention and made them face only Russia in their challenge. Therefore, the friendly and protective relations with Great Britain and the US indicate the presence of the support factor.

3.1.4 Domestic Power Structure

In the years before the Japanese attack at Port Arthur, the internal political power structure shifted towards the domination by the Katsura cabinet. Prominent hard-line political figures like foreign affairs minister Jutaro Komura, war minister Masatake Terauchi and navy minister Gonnohyoe Yamamoto were all in favour of a belligerent internal and external policy (Okamoto, 1970, pp. 96-97; Causton, 1936, pp. 112-116). When the Katsura cabinet assumed power after the fall of the war-averting Ito cabinet, and the negotiations with Russia did not bear fruit in 1903, the Katsura cabinet pressed for war. The rise of the Katsura cabinet indicates the presence of a belligerent group in the top level of government.

(16)

16

3.2 The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941

The Japanese attack on the US naval base in Pearl Harbour caused US retaliation through a military campaign in the Pacific and their participation the Second World War. The Japanese goal of self-sufficiency and expansion clashed with the US

containment strategy in the Pacific, aimed at constraining Japan in its expansionist drift (Barnhart, 1987, p. 263; Beasley, 1982, pp. 266-270). Before 1941, US foreign policy rested on the belief that their preponderant economic and military capabilities would deter an inferior Japan from a major military move (Dallek, 1995, pp. 335-340; George, 1991, pp. 19-23). Nonetheless, the Japanese attacked the US base in Pearl Harbour to reach their territorial and economic goals (Barnhart, 1987, pp. 263-273; Record, 2011, pp. 38-44).

3.2.1 Limited Aims Strategy

The Japanese military planners assumed that their superior strategy and tactics would paralyze the US reaction. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s surprise attack strategy on the US fleet in Pearl Harbour aimed to impede the US from retaliating in the Pacific (Bateson, 1969, p. 43; Gompert et al., 2014, pp. 99-103). The Japanese admiral advocated this attack as it would avoid a prolonged war with the US through

annihilating the main body of the US navy (Kiyoshi, 1982, pp. 130-135; Gompert et al., 2014, pp. 99-103). As the attack was only to paralyze US capabilities in the pacific, a limited aims strategy is present in this case.

3.2.2 Offensive Capabilities

Between 1930 and 1940, the Japanese had increased their overall military capabilities to match those of its main adversaries in the pacific. Circumventing arms-control treaties to construct a formidable fleet that surpassed the US capabilities regarding aircraft carriers and matched them on other maritime aspects (Belote & Belote, 1975, pp. 28-33; Bateson, 1969, p. 41). This increase in capabilities tilted the balance in favour of the Japanese. Despite the superior economic potential of the US, this short-term favourable balance provided the Japanese a window of opportunity to exploit. This indicates that short-term offensive capabilities were present in this case.

(17)

17

3.2.3 Great Power Support

Regarding allegiances that benefitted the Japanese, it is contended that their alliance with Nazi-Germany and Italy provided support and defensive guarantees against Great Britain and Russia (Meskill, 1966, pp. 7-10; Dallin, 1949, pp. 153-163). The Tripartite pact also presented the US the prospect of fighting a two-front war in Europe and the Far East. However, the alliance was mainly political, as the alliance only militarily supported the Japanese decision through indirect diversion of American forces towards the Atlantic (Presseisen, 1958, pp. 314-317). Although the support was indirect, the alliance was certainly present to influence the Japanese attack considerations in this case.

3.2.4 Domestic Power Structure

The Japanese military’s domination of Japanese politics was illustrated by the abrogation of arms limitation treaties with the US and Great Britain after 1934

(Causton, 1936, pp. 174-180). Eventually, a dispute between Konoye and war minister Tojo resulted in the resignation of Konoye, and the election of Tojo as prime minister eliminated the last advocate for diplomacy (Maxon, 1973, p. 149; Feis, 2015, pp. 283-286). Tojo’s rise to power meant a deterioration in the relations with the US and a military solution was preferred (Brown, 1971, pp. 215-229; Maxon, 1973, pp. 167-176; Gompert et al., 2014, pp. 99-103). This domination of belligerent military elite indicates the presence of the domestic factor.

(18)

18

3.3 The Argentine invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas in 1982

The historical dispute over the Falkland Islands between Argentina and Great Britain resulted in a military confrontation in 1982. When negotiations concerning the British control over the Islands did not produce any concrete results, the Argentinian Junta invoked the military option (Gompert et al., 2014b, pp. 152-154). Notwithstanding their inferior military and economic capabilities vis-à-vis Great Britain, the Argentinian Junta wanted to force negotiation under favourable circumstances through the occupation of the Falkland Islands (Freedman, 2005, p. 160). In this case, the British were unprepared as they did not expect a surprise attack on the Falkland Islands and relied on their general preponderance as deterrent strategy (Freedman, 2005, pp. 168-176; Goodman et al., 2014, pp. 372-375).

3.3.1 Limited Aims Strategy

The main Argentine strategic objective was to occupy the Falkland Islands to put force behind its negotiating position without initiating an all-out war (Gompert et al., 2014b, p. 153; Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse, 1990, p.13). Argentina’s elite considered the invasion nonaggressive, claiming that the British were the belligerents when they retaliated. The British retaliation was diametrically opposed to the Argentine

expectations. They wanted to obtain diplomatic advantage with the British through a limited provocation, without expecting British military reprisal (Gompert et al., 2014b, pp. 155-159; Freedman, 1982, pp. 196-198). This indicates the presence of a limited aims strategy in Argentina’s considerations.

3.3.2 Offensive Capabilities

Argentina’s military capabilities increased heavily when the Junta assumed power in 1976, illustrated by an increase in military expenditure that had risen from 1.6% in 1974 to a peak of 4.7% of the national GDP in 1978 (World Bank, 2019). The increase in defence expenditure is associated with the acquisition of Israeli, French and US fighting aircraft, as well as modernizing their naval capabilities (Corum, 2002, p. 59; Boyce, 2005, pp. 72-73). As the British navy neither was in the direct approximation of

(19)

19

Thies, 2011, pp. 2-3). This again indicates the presence of short-term offensive capabilities for the Argentinian challenge.

3.3.3 Great Power Support

The chief mediator in the Falkland crisis was the United States, having an interest in avoiding war between two friendly related states. Strong currents of support ran to Great Britain, as well as towards Argentina (Coll & Arend, 1985, pp. 89-92; Boyce, 2005, pp. 82-84). Despite strong conviction from both the British side and the Argentine side that they would receive some support for their cause, the US remained neutral and acted as the impartial mediator during the crisis (Dillon, 1989, pp. 140-146). The US neutrality demonstrates an absence of great power support in this case.

3.3.4 Domestic Power Structure

Before the Falklands crisis, in 1976, a new, more bellicose military Junta assumed power in Argentina. The military elite increased Argentina’s military spending and tried to force the retention of the Falklands diplomatically (Arquilla & Rasmussen, 2001, pp. 742). In 1982, when the expulsion of Argentinian settles approached and diplomacy had stalled, the Junta under the leadership of General Galtieri decided for the use of force. His hard-line companions, Admiral Jorge Anaya and General Lami Dozo, also believed intervention was the best option to resolve the issue if diplomacy failed (Bratton & Thies, 2011, pp. 3-4). The domination of the Junta in the decision to invade the Falklands shows the presence of the domestic power factor.

(20)

20

3.4 The Iraqi-British Crisis of 1961

Preceding Kuwaiti independence from Britain in July 1961, the British government perceived Iraq as hostile to Kuwaiti security. This was mostly due to Prime-Minister Abal Karim Qasim claiming Kuwait as Iraqi territory and not recognizing the

independence of Kuwait. Additionally, Iraqi tank movements from Baghdad to Basra escalated the situation further, causing the British intelligence to advise Kuwait to invoke the British protection clause (Rossiter, 2017, p. 87; Ashton, 1998, p. 168; Joyce, 1995). After assessing the situation, the British assisted Kuwait by sending forces towards the Gulf state between June and July of 1961 to deter the challenge posed by Iraq successfully (Rossiter, 2017).

3.4.1 Limited Aims Strategy

Drawing from Britain’s Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessments, Iraq did not consider a limited aims strategy in their challenge to the independence of Kuwait (Abadi, 1998; Ashton, 1998; Mobley, 2001). In the statements from the Iraqi

government claiming Kuwaiti territory, there has been no indication towards a particular strategy to employ or limited goals to obtain. From the available data, it is determined that the complete annexation of the Gulf state would be the primary goal of the Iraqi government (Abadi, 1998; Ashton, 1998; Rossiter, 2017). Thus, a limited aims strategy is not present in the consideration of Iraqi officials during the Kuwait crisis, and will be determined as absent in affecting the deterrence outcome.

3.4.2 Offensive Capabilities

Regarding the availability of short-term offensive capability, Richard Mobley argues that the JIC had provided a detailed assessment of the Iraqi military establishment in March 1961. The Iraqi capabilities consisted of an army holding approximately 60.000 troops, with one armoured and four infantry divisions stationed in central and northern Iraq. Also, the Iraqi army had 500 tanks and around 350 armoured personnel carriers. The JIC concluded that this force was capable of little more than providing internal security (Mobley, 2001; Mobley, 2001b). Despite these capabilities, no evidence

(21)

21

indicates the acquisition of offensive capabilities in the short-term. Therefore, the offensive capabilities factor is determined absent in this case.

3.4.3 Great Power Support

In the standoff between Iraq and Great Britain, there is little interference of other great powers. Since the Iraqi communist party failed to obtain a formal role in Qasim’s government and fell out with the Iraqi leader, the Soviet support or involvement remained very limited (Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett, 1987, pp. 82-83; Tripp, 2007, p. 158). On the other hand, the United States did concur with British concerns regarding the safety of its protectorate, stating that they believed British action in the Gulf ensures peace in the area (Winger, 2012, pp. 662-669). Resulting from this is the establishment that great power support for the challenger was absent to affect the deterrence outcome in this case.

3.4.4 Domestic Power Structure

In 1961 post-revolutionary Iraq, four years after the pro-British Hashemite monarchy was ousted by anti-imperialist republicans, the political power structure had changed substantially (Tripp, 2007). Tripp argues that military officers had played a decisive role in post-revolutionary Iraq, leading to the establishment of General Qasim as prime-minister (2007, p. 144). The preponderance of the anti-imperialist and Iraq-first foreign policies issued by the Qasim government had considerable effect on nationalism and nationalist propaganda (Tripp, 2007, p. 160; Tonini, 2003). Consequently, it is determined that the domestic power structure affected the deterrence outcome in this case.

(22)

22

3.5 The Guatemalan-Anglo Territorial Dispute of 1972-1976

In the 1970’s, Guatemala’s historical claim to the British protectorate Belize caused heightened tensions between both states. In 1972, the JIC concluded that the risk of Guatemalan attack had risen sharply. This was due to improvements in Guatemalan military capabilities and agitating political deliberations regarding Belize with neighbouring states (Rossiter, 2018, p. 786; Shoman, 2010, p. 74). Assessing

intelligence reports, Britain decided to increase military capabilities in the Caribbean supporting the garrison stationed in Belize, thus underlining the British defence

commitment to Belize (Rossiter, 2018, pp. 787-788). The British commitment towards Belize proved successful, as Guatemala was deterred from militarily asserting its territorial claim (Rossiter, 2018).

3.5.1 Limited Aims Strategy

The Guatemalan territorial interest in Belize and the potential military solution to the dispute where both aimed at the whole of Belize (Shoman, 2010, p. 74; Rossiter, 2018, pp. 786-787). Without comprehensive documentation on military decision-making and strategic planning for invading Belize, it is deduced from the general territorial claim that the Guatemalan army aspired the complete incorporation of Belize. The

documentation on the dispute exclusively focuses on the possibility of an invasion to capture the largest city, Belize City (Shoman, 2010, pp. 74-75; Rossiter, 2018, p. 788). From this, it is concluded that the limited aims strategy was not considered in this case.

3.5.2 Offensive Capabilities

According to the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) report of October 1971, the Guatemalan forces were capable of defending the country and performing small-scale operations (DIA, 1971, p. 2). Their military strength is determined to approximately 13.000 trained professionals (DIA, 1971, p. 3). Nevertheless, the procurement of Israeli aircrafts in 1973 agitated Britain and incited them to act rapidly (Shoman, 2010, pp. 106-107). The threat perception increased by the fact that the only airport in Belize was the main lifeline of the British-Belizean garrisoned troops, and its destruction through Guatemalan air capabilities would hamper British reinforcements (Rossiter, 2018, pp.

(23)

23

787-788). Therefore, this short-term acquisition of offensive weapons did affect the deterrence outcome in this case.

3.5.3 Great Power Support

During the hostilities between Guatemala and Great Britain over Belize, Great Power support was largely absent. The United States’ stance towards the conflict was rather ambiguous and distanced itself from difficult decisions (Shoman, 2010, p. 106). Despite claims that President Jacobo Arbenz was overthrown in 1950 with US support because he supported communism and attracted Soviet support, the Soviets did not have any relation with this dispute at all (Rossiter, 2018). Due to these findings, it is believed that the influence of great power support is absent in this dispute.

3.5.4 Domestic Power Structure

In Guatemalan domestic politics, the army plays a pivotal role in the system of

governance (Shoman, 2010, pp. 43-46). In 1970, during a civil war, insecurity provided the opportunity for a presidential candidate with a harder approach, resulting in the election of Arana Osorio (Shoman, 2010, pp. 45-46). President Osorio strengthened the military and state apparatus, causing the military to increase their high influence over the government and pushing for a more aggressive foreign policy (Pérez, 2015, p. 23; Shoman, 2010, pp. 45-46). This supports the view that the increased influence of the belligerent President Osorio and the Guatemalan military affected the escalation in the territorial dispute. Therefore, the domestic power structure factor is present in the deterrence situation in this case.

(24)

24

3.6 The Black September Crisis between Syria and Israel in 1970

In September 1970, Syrian forces intervened on the behalf of the Palestinian guerrilla forces who were fighting to oust king Hussain (Ashton, 2006; Rubinovitz, 2010). When the Jordanian head of state increased his repressive policies on September 20, Syria advanced with an armoured brigade (Ashton, 2006, pp. 105-107). After deliberations about Israel’s assistance to Jordan, Israeli Air Force Phantom fighter aircraft

underscored the Israeli threat of retaliation by creating sonic bangs over the Syrian tanks (Ashton, 2006, pp. 100-115; Rubinovitz, 2010, pp. 698-699; Pedatzur, 2008, p. 308). The bangs implied that worse reprisals would follow if the tanks did not return to Syria, resulting in the success of the Israeli deterrent threat and the retreat of the Syrians (Rubinovitz, 2010, pp. 699-700).

3.6.1 Limited Aims Strategy

Concerning the Syrian strategy in Jordan, Hafez al-Asad, the defence minister of the dominant Syrian Ba’th party, and Salah al-Jadid, the party’s deputy secretary-general approved the intervention in Jordan to solely protect and assist the Palestinians (Ashton, 2006, pp. 108-109; Rubinovitz, 2010, pp. 692-693; Van Dam, 1979, p. 88). Thus, considering the paucity of information on Syrian strategic decision-making, it is contended that the Syrians intervened only to assist the Palestinians (Mobley, 2009, p. 163). The non-use of al-Jadid to use the Syrian air force supports the contention that there was no intention of an all-out attack (Ashton, 2006, p. 109). This assessment indicates that a strategy with limited goals was present in Syrian considerations.

3.6.2 Offensive Capabilities

In the period before and during the crisis, the Soviet-Union was the primary arms supplier of Syria (Laird, 1984, pp. 202-205). The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) states that the Arab Republic imported for approximately 4 billion SIPRI Trend Indicator Value2_{in the period 1967-1971 (SIPRI, 2019). As the}

Syrians predominantly used the tanks bought from the Soviets to support the

2_{This represents the transfer of actual military resources rather than the financial value of the transfers}

(25)

25

Palestinians, it is contended that the Syrians possessed recently acquired offensive capabilities (Laird, 1984, p. 208). The upsurge of Soviet military resource transfer increased the Syrian offensive capabilities and indicates the presence of the factor.

3.6.3 Great Power Support

As the Soviet-Union was politically and militarily backing the Syrian Arab Republic, the communist superpower endorsed the intervention in Jordan (Ashton, 2006, p. 109; Ramet, 1990, pp. 54-55). This is supported by the documented deliberations between the US and Israel, where the threat of igniting Soviet intervention was discussed. Additionally, the deliberations between the Soviet ambassador Nureddin Mukhitdinov and the Syrian President al-Atasi on September 18, confirm Soviet support for the intervention (Rubinovitz, 2010, pp. 690-695; Ramet, 1990, pp. 54-55). Moreover, when the Syrians encountered Israeli deterrent actions, the Soviets advised the Syrians to withdraw their forces (Mobley, 2009, p. 165; Ramet, 1990, p. 56). This indicates that great power support for the initiator was present in this situation.

3.6.4 Domestic Power Structure

From 1964 onward, a power struggle existed between the most prominent Alawi-officers of the Ba’thist party – Hafiz al-Asad and Salah Jadid (Van Dam, 1979). There was a political division between these two high-ranked officers. Salah Jadid’s group prioritized socialist-transformation and rejected collaboration with rightist or pro-western regimes, such as Jordan and Iraq, even if this would undermine the struggle against Israel. Contrarily, Hafiz al-Asad and his belligerent entourage showed Arab nationalistic leanings and prioritised the armed struggle against Israel (Van Dam, 1979, pp. 80-84). Despite this division, it is documented that the political elites together decided for the intervention in Jordan (Van Dam, 1979, p. 88). Therefore, it is not evident that one belligerent group dominated Syrian politics, and this factor is deemed absent.

(26)

26

4.0 Quantitative Analysis

The analysis of six failed and successful deterrence cases in asymmetric conflicts with a weak state initiator provided insights on whether the four independent factors were present or absent during these crises. In this section, the findings of both the failed cases and the successful cases are combined in a SPSS dataset. This complete dataset allows for statistical testing to assess whether the four factors actually affected deterrence in cases of failure and success.

Before reporting the results, it is appropriate to reiterate the independent and dependent variable coding, as well as describing how the dataset is composed. The four independent variables – limited aims strategy, short-term availability of offensive weaponry, great power support, and domestic power structure – are dichotomously coded a 1 for their presence and a 0 for their absence in the individual cases. The dependent variable deterrence is also dichotomously coded and valued 1 and 0, where 1 stands for failure and 0 for success. In the dataset, the three failed cases are combined with the three success cases of deterrence. Accordingly, each case is assigned a 0 for success and a 1 for failure. The four independent variables are valued a 1 for their presence and a 0 for their absence in each individual case. The determination of the presence or absence of the factors in the six selected deterrence cases is drawn from the analysis in the preceding section. Subsequently, Table 1 and Table 2 graphically

illustrate the results of the case studies as inserted into the dataset.

To test whether the variables affected deterrence failure and success, an

independent samples t-test is run over the data. Although a logistic regression was also performed, it provided inadequate and inappropriate results due to the undesirable perfect fit of the model. Therefore, a compare means analyses was more appropriate for our data. The independent samples t-test provides information on how much the mean for deterrence success and failure values increase or decrease when one of the four factors are present. Also, as our cases represent the population of asymmetric conflict cases with a weak state initiator, the statistical significance is not of relevance since we cannot generalise to a bigger population of cases. As such, attention should be focused on the mean difference. Below, in the subsequent paragraphs, the test results are reported for each independent factor individually.

(27)

27

Variable

Cases Limited aims

strategy Short-term capability Great power support Domestic Structure Iraq/UK, 1961 0 0 0 1 Guatemala/UK, 1972 0 1 0 1 Syria/Israël, 1970 1 1 1 0 Variable Cases Limited aims strategy Short-term capability Great power support Domestic Structure Japan/Russia, 1904 1 1 1 1 Japan/US, 1941 1 1 1 1 Argentina/UK, 1982 1 1 0 1

Table 2: Successful deterrence cases Table 1: Failed deterrence cases

(28)

28

4.1 Limited Aims Strategy

There were 3 success cases and 3 failed cases analysed. When the initiator considered a limited aims strategy, deterrence failed (M = 1, SD = 0) rather than succeeded (M = 0.33, SD = 0.58). There is a statistically insignificant difference in the mean limited aims score between deterrence success and failure, t(2) = -2, p = 0.184. The mean difference is 0.67.

4.2 Offensive Capabilities

There were 3 success cases and 3 failed cases analysed. When the initiator had short-term offensive capabilities, deterrence failed (M = 1, SD = 0) rather than succeeded (M = 0.67, SD = 58). There is a statistically insignificant difference in the mean offensive capabilities score between success and failure, t(2) = -1, p = 0.423. The mean difference is 0.33.

4.3 Great Power Support

There were 3 success cases and 3 failed cases analysed. When the initiator enjoyed great power support, deterrence failed (M = 0.67, SD = 0.58) rather than succeeded (M = 0.33, SD = 58). There is a statistically insignificant difference in the mean great power

support score between success and failure, t(4) = 0.71, p = 0.519. The mean difference is 0.33.

4.4 Domestic Power Structure

There were 3 success cases and 3 failed cases analysed. When the initiator had a belligerent group in power domestically, deterrence failed (M = 1, SD = 0) rather than succeeded (M = 0.67, SD = 0.58). There is a statistically insignificant difference in the mean belligerent group in power domestically score between success and failure, t(2) = -1, p = 0.423. The mean difference is 0.33.

(29)

29

5.0 Theoretical Implications and Conclusion

The six case studies of successful deterrence in asymmetric conflict, as well as the subsequent statistical analysis of both successful and failed deterrence cases, have produced implications for deterrence theory regarding asymmetric conflicts. First, this study has established whether the four predetermined variables were present or absent in the selected crises through extensive analysis of secondary sources. It was found that the employment of a limited aims strategy was present in four of the six cases. Short-term offensive capabilities were present in five of the six cases, only being absent in the Iraq-Britain crisis. Additionally, the support of a great power for the challenger was present in three of the six cases, and the dominance of a belligerent group was present in five of the six cases.

Adding to these findings, comparing the three successful deterrence cases and three failed cases in a dataset has allowed for statistical testing on whether these four independent variables genuinely affect deterrence outcomes. To answer the research question; what factors affect deterrence outcomes in asymmetric conflicts initiated by the weaker state, and accomplish the research objective, the results of an independent t-test have established the following conclusions. The first factor, the employment of limited aims strategy, caused the means of success and failure to differ by 0.67. This difference indicates that a limited aims strategy definitely affects deterrence, as the factor incites change in the value groups of the dependent variable. The second factor, offensive capabilities, incited a 0.33 difference in the means of deterrence values. Establishing the relation between offensive capabilities and deterrence. The third variable induced a 0.33 mean value difference in deterrence outcomes, determining that great power support also affects the outcome of deterrence strategies. Lastly, the fourth independent factor, domestic power structure, incited a 0.33 difference in deterrence outcomes. Thus, it can be asserted that all four factors affect deterrence outcomes, since the presence of the factors cause the means of deterrence success and failure to differ statistically. Although the independent t-test results are statistically insignificant, it can be concluded from this study that a limited aims strategy, great power support, and the domestic power structure have a certain relation with the success or failure of a

deterrent strategy in asymmetric conflicts initiated by a weaker power.

(30)

30

outcomes in asymmetric conflicts and furthers Paul’s 1994 study through the use of his variables and his failed deterrence cases. It also adds to Paul’s conclusions by

rigorously and validly examining deterrence cases to establish a relationship between his variables and deterrence outcomes based on a robust statistical test. Through these slight contributions, this study assists in developing deterrence theory to explain more comprehensively why and when a weaker power would challenge a stronger power, which is considered a niche in the general theory.

Despite this humble contribution, it is certainly encouraged to develop this rarely researched topic, possibly enlarging the selection of cases with other instances of interstate asymmetric conflict to increase significance or to determine the relevance of other variables in this subcategory of deterrence cases. Also, this study only considered whether the four variables actually affected deterrence outcomes or not. The amount of influence they were asserting over the outcomes was beyond the scope of this study and could be researched in the future. Moreover, primary sources or recently declassified documents in different languages could produce new insights into this topic as this study was also limited on these aspects. Nevertheless, determining definite causality remains an immense, if not impossible, task in the social sciences. Still, through incremental and thorough research, small relations can carefully be proposed, which was the aim of this study.

(31)

31

Bibliography

Abadi, J. (1998). Iraq's Threat to Kuwait During the Qasim Era. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 22(1), 24. Retrieved from:

https://search.proquest.com/docview/1311902192?accountid=12045

Achen, C., & Snidal, D. (1989). Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies. World Politics, 41(2), pp. 143-169. doi:10.2307/2010405

Arquilla, J., & Rasmussen, M. (2001). The Origins of the South Atlantic War. Journal of Latin American Studies, 33(4), 739-775. doi:10.1017/S0022216X01006198

Ashton, N. (1998). Britain and the Kuwaiti crisis, 1961. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 9(1), pp. 163-181. doi: 10.1080/09592299808406074

Ashton, N. (2006). Pulling the Strings: King Hussein's Role during the Crisis of 1970 in Jordan. The International History Review, 28(1), pp. 94-118.

doi: 10.1080/07075332.2006.9641088

Ballard, G. (1921). The influence of the sea on the political history of Japan. London: Murray.

Barnhart, M. (1987). Japan prepares for total war: The search for economic security, 1919-1941. New York: Cornell University Press.

Bateson, C. (1969). The war with Japan: A concise history. London: Barrie & Rockliff. Beasley, W.G. (1982) The Modern History of Japan. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle

Company

Belote, J., & Belote, W. M. (1975). Titans of the seas: The development and operations of Japanese and American carrier task forces during World War II. New York: Harper and Row.

Blond, G. (1961). Admiral Togo. London: Jarrolds Publishers

Boulding, K. (1962). Conflict and defense: A General Theory. New York: Harper & Brothers.

(32)

32

Brodie, B. (1959). The Anatomy of Deterrence. World Politics, 11(2), pp. 173-191. doi: 10.2307/2009527

Bratton, P., & Thies, W. (2011). When Governments Collide in the South Atlantic: Britain Coerces Argentina during the Falklands War. Comparative

Strategy, 30(1), pp. 1-27. doi: 10.1080/01495933.2011.545592

Brown, D. (1971). Nationalism in Japan: An introductory historical analysis. New York: Russell & Russell.

Causton, E. (1936). Militarism and foreign policy in Japan. London: Allen & Unwin. Coll, R. A., & Arend, C. A. (1985). The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy,

diplomacy, and international law. Boston: Allen & Unwin.

Corum, J. S. (2002). Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War. Air & Space Power Journal, 16(3), p. 59. Retrieved from

http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a2h&AN=9452927&sit e=ehost-live

Dallek, R. (1995). Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945: With a New Afterword. New York: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/login.aspx?direct=true& db=nlebk&AN=143903&site=ehost-live

Dallin, D. (1949). Soviet Russia and the far East. London: Hollis & Carter. Dillon, G. (1989). The Falklands, politics and war. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Defense Intelligence Agency. (1971). Military Intelligence Summary: Section XI –

Central America and Caribbean. Retrieved from: https://search.proquest.com/docview/1679095512/

Farouk-Sluglett, M., & Sluglett, P. (1987). Iraq since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship. London: KPI.

Feis, H. (2015). Road to Pearl Harbor. The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Retrieved from https://www-degruyter-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2443/view/product/459549

(33)

33

Freedman, L. (1982). The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982. Foreign Affairs,61(1), pp. 196-210. Retrieved from

https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/fora 61&id=210&men_tab=srchresults

Freedman, L., & Gamba-Stonehouse, Virginia. (1990). Signals of war: The Falklands conflict of 1982. London: Faber and Faber.

George, A., & Smoke, R. (1974). Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York: Columbia University Press. Retrieved from:

http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.00720

George, A. (1979). Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison. In P. Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (pp. 43-68). New York: The Free Press

George, A. (1991). Forceful persuasion: Coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

George, A. (1997). Knowledge for Statecraft. International Security, 22(1), pp. 44-52. DOI: 10.2307/2539327

Gompert, D., Binnendijk, H., & Lin, B. (2014). Japan’s Attack on Pearl Harbor, 1941. In Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn (pp. 93-106). RAND Corporation. Retrieved from

http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt1287m9t.15

Gompert, D., Binnendijk, H., & Lin, B. (2014b). Argentina’s Invasion of the Falklands (Malvinas), 1982. In Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn (pp. 151-160). RAND Corporation. Retrieved from

http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt1287m9t.20

Huth, P., & Russett, B. (1984). What makes deterrence work? Cases from 1900 to 1980. World Politics, 36(4), pp. 496-526. doi: 10.2307/2010184

Huth, P., & Russett, B. (1990). Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference. World Politics, 42(4), 466-501. doi:10.2307/2010511

(34)

34

Joyce, M. (1995). Preserving the Sheikhdom: London, Washington, Iraq and Kuwait, 1958–61. Middle Eastern Studies, 31(2), pp. 281-292.

doi: 10.1080/00263209508701053

Kiyoshi, I. (1982). Japanese Strategy and The Pacific War: 1941-5. In I. Nish (ed.), Anglo-Japanese Alienation (pp. 125-146). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laird, R. (1984). Soviet Arms Trade with the Noncommunist Third World. Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 35(3), pp.196-213. doi:10.2307/1174128

Malozemoff, A. (1958). Russian Far Eastern policy, 1881-1904: With special emphasis on the causes of the Russo-Japanese War. Berkeley: University of California press.

Maxon, Y. (1973). Control of Japanese foreign policy: A study of civil-military rivalry, 1930-1945. Westport: Greenwood Press.

Mearsheimer, J. (1983). Conventional Deterrence. New York: Cornell University Press. Retrieved from: https://www.degruyter.com/view/product/497848

Meskill, J. (1966). Hitler & Japan: The hollow alliance. New York: Atherton Press. Miller, G. (2012). The End of Splendid Isolation: British Pursuit of an Ally, 1901–1905.

In The Shadow of the Past: Reputation and Military Alliances before the First World War (pp. 63-91). New York: Cornell University Press. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt7v99k.7

Mobley, R.A. (2001). Gauging the Iraqi Threat to Kuwait in the 1960s. Central Intelligence Agency Washington DC Center for The Study of Intelligence. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-

intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/fall_winter_2001/article03.html#_ftn1

Mobley, R.A. (2001b). Deterring Iraq: The UK Experience. Journal of Intelligence and National Security, 16(2), pp. 55-82. doi: 10.1080/714002894

Mobley, R.A. (2009). U.S. Joint Military Contributions to Countering Syria’s 1970 Invasion of Jordan. Joint Force Quarterly, 55(4), pp. 160-167. Retrieved from:

(35)

35

http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a2h&AN=44242103&si te=ehost-live

Morrow, J. (1989). A Twist of Truth: A Reexamination of the Effects of Arms Races on the Occurrence of War. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33(3), pp. 500-529. Retrieved from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/174127

Mor, B. (1996). Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers – Paul, T.V. American Political Science Review, 90(1), pp. 234-236.doi:

10.2307/2082877

Morgan, P. (2003). Deterrence Now. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511491573

Okamoto, S. (1970). The Japanese oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War. New York: Columbia University Press.

Paul, T.V. (1994). Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511598746

Pedatzur, R. (2008). The Rescue of King Hussein's Regime. Civil Wars, 10(3), pp. 294-318. doi: 10.1080/13698240802167959

Peterson, S. (1996). Asymmetric conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers – Paul, T.V. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 27(1), pp. 116-117. doi:

10.2307/206490

Pérez, O. (2015). Civil-Military Relations in Post-Conflict Societies: Transforming the Role of the Military in Central America. New York: Routledge. Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315815183

Presseisen, E. (1958). Germany and Japan: A study in totalitarian diplomacy, 1933-1941. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Ramet, P. (1990). The Soviet-Syrian relationship since 1955: A Troubled Alliance. Boulder: Westview Press.

Record, J. (2011). A War It Was Always Going to Lose: Why Japan Attacked America in 1941. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books. Retrieved from

(36)

36

http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/login.aspx?direct=true& db=nlebk&AN=388800&site=ehost-live

Reiter, D. (1997). Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers – Paul, T.V. Journal of Politics, 59(2), pp. 640-643. DOI: 10.2307/2998205

Rossiter, A. (2018). Getting Out of Belize: Britain’s Intractable Military Exit from Central America. The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 46(4), pp. 784-813. doi: 10.1080/03086534.2018.1452543

Rossiter, A. (2017). “Screening the Food from the Flies”: Britain, Kuwait, and the Dilemma of Protection, 1961-1971. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 28(1), pp. 85-109. doi: 10.1080/09592296.2017.1275514

Romanov, B.A. (1974). Russia in Manchuria: 1892-1906. New York: Octagon books Rubinovitz, Z. (2010). Blue and White ‘Black September’: Israel's Role in the Jordan

Crisis of 1970. The International History Review, 32(4), pp. 687-706. doi: 10.1080/07075332.2010.534611

Schelling, T. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Retrieved from: http://elcenia.com/iamapirate/schelling.pdf

Shoman, A. (2010). Belize's independence and decolonization in Latin America: Guatemala, Britain, and the UN. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2019). SIPRI Arms Transfers Database [Database]. Retrieved 14 May 2019 from:

http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php

Tripp, C. (2007). The republic 1958–68. In A History of Iraq (pp. 143-185). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511804304.012

Tonini, A. (2003). Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim's Years, 1958–63. The Review of International Affairs, 3(2), pp. 232-253. doi: 10.1080/1475355032000240694

Van Dam, N. (1979). The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism and Tribalism in Politics 1961-1980. London: Croom Helm.

(37)

37

World Bank. (2019). Military Expenditure of Argentina. Retrieved 5 June 2019, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=AR Walder, D. (1973). The short victorious war: The Russo-Japanese conflict, 1904-5.

London: Hutchinson.

Westwood, J. N. (1986). Russia against Japan, 1904-1905: A new look at the Russo-Japanese War. Albany: State University of New York Press

White, J. (1964). The diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese war. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton university press.

Winger, G. (2012). Twilight on the British Gulf: The 1961 Kuwait Crisis and the Evolution of American Strategic Thinking in the Persian Gulf. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 23(4), pp. 660-678. doi: 10.1080/09592296.2012.736332

Appendix

Syntax: compare means, independent samples t-test

* Encoding: UTF-8.

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. T-TEST GROUPS=Deterrence(0 1) /MISSING=ANALYSIS

/VARIABLES=Strategy Weapons Support Domestic /CRITERIA=CI(.95).