Sino-Institutionalism: the Chinese institutionalised foreign policy strategy in Africa

Supervisor: Dr J. Y. Gruin

Second Reader: Dr S. J. Lim

MASTER OF SCIENCE: POLITICAL SCIENCE -INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Sino-Institutionalism:

The Chinese institutionalised

foreign policy strategy

in Africa

Master Thesis

Rick Tenhaven – 11934085 22.06.2018

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ONTENTS

1. Introduction ... 2

1.1 Literature review and Contribution ... 4

2. Liberal Institutionalism ... 7

2.1 Liberal Institutional Theory ... 7

2.2 Hegemony and Power in the International System ... 9

2.3 The Success and Crisis of the Liberal International Order ... 12

3. The Rise of China ... 15

3.1 The Communist Party and the Interests of the PRC ... 15

3.2 The Role of China in the International System ... 18

3.3 China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft ... 20

4. China and Africa ... 23

4.1 Unwinding the Sino-African Relations ... 23

4.2 Historical Recap of Sino- African Relations ... 25

4.3 China’s Interest in Africa ... 26

4.4 The Forum on China Africa Cooperation ... 28

5. Theory and Operationalisation ... 30

5.1 Foreign Policy Analysis ... 30

5.2 Multilateralism as Foreign Policy Strategy ... 32

5.3 Bilateralism as Foreign Policy Strategy ... 33

5.4 The Potential of Content ... 35

5.5 Content Analysis ... 37

6. Empirical Analysis ... 40

6.1 Analytical Framework and Findings ... 40

6.2 Inquiry Step 1 ... 42

6.3 Results Step 1... 44

6.4 Inquiry Step 2 ... 46

6.5 Results Step 2... 47

7. Discussion and Conclusion ... 48

7.1 Discussion ... 48

7.2 Conclusion ... 51

References ... 53

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HESIS

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NTRODUCTION

This quote by General Secretary Xi is one of many examples in which he highlights, that the rise of China has boosted the economic, financial, military and political standing of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). One way to conserve these newly acquired power capabilities is to invest in the cooperation with international partners by establishing an institutional framework. As a consequence of this, the international system witnesses a new emerging institutional statecraft of China, entailing a network of individual but interlinked institutions with various scopes and functions. For instance, in 2000 the PRC launched a new type of forum diplomacy which enhanced its cooperation with the African states and institutionalised the Sino-African relations. These forum institutions are targeted cooperation mechanisms, that combine elements of multilateral institutions and bilateral foreign policy into a new model for international cooperation. Strikingly, the PRC opted for an extraordinary institutional approach rather than engaging with the African states bilaterally or integrating them into their existing institutional framework. The establishment of international institutions, however, has traditionally been a foreign policy strategy of liberal democracies, especially of the US. Few authors have attempted to analyse the institutional foreign policy of China and the scholarly debate has not yet produced convincing arguments about the function and reasons of these phenomena.

Thus, it remains puzzling why the PRC establishes distinguished institutions and especially why it decided to pursue this specific form of forum diplomacy with the African states. Therefore, the following evaluation sets out to investigate the Chinese efforts in Africa and to answer the question: “Why does China establish " Within a short span of several decades, China has accomplished what took developed countries hundreds of years [...]

by becoming the world's largest manufacturing country and second largest economy, China has testified to the success of its probe […] We should draw on as much as possible the experience of the advanced countries, and choose an industrialization path suited to our national features and conditions. With new circumstances come new opportunities. China and Africa should embrace our proud tradition

of sincere friendship and enhance mutual assistance and cooperation. (Speech by Xi Jinping at the China-Africa Business Forum, Johannesburg, 2015)

forum institutions for their cooperation with certain regions of the world?”. As the state of the art of contemporary IR theories is characterised by the absence of an appropriate conceptual background for answering this question, this thesis proposes the establishment of a Sino-Institutional theoretical framework based on liberal institutionalism. According to this approach, states with considerable power capabilities can choose to opt for either a bilateral strategy and approach states individually or create an overarching institution to cooperate on a multilateral basis. While the multilateral strategy is beneficial for the spread of norms and conserving of power, the bilateral approach enables the initiator to increase their control over the individual states. Thus, it is highly relevant whether a state follows a bilateral or a multilateral strategy as it can give insight into the objectives of the initiating state in the target area. However, for evaluating the reasons and motivations for a state to engage in either strategy, it is crucial to have a solid conceptual background. The issues of China’s forum diplomacy and its emerging institutional statecraft are highly interdependent. Liberal institutionalism provides an array of explanatory concepts for the utility of institutional frameworks, why they emerge and how they can give insight into the ambitions and objectives of the initiating state. Nevertheless, the ideas of liberal institutional scholars centre around the Western concepts of liberalism, democracy and human rights which prevent their universal application. These concepts have to be developed further to be applicable to the Chinese norms and its exceptional features. Therefore, in the following, there will be an elaboration about the potential of liberal institutional thought to become the basis for a new model of Sino-institutional theory.

This thesis strives to contribute to various aspects of the literature on Sino-African relations and the more theoretical understanding of institutions as part of foreign policy strategies. Specifically, it develops a conceptionally feasible framework to investigates the Forum on China Africa Cooperation as a case of a contemporary Sino-institution. Consequently, this thesis contains two parts. The first one connects liberal institutionalist thoughts to China and its rise in the international system to establish a suitable theoretical background and propose the establishment of Sino-institutionalism. The second one conducts a foreign policy analysis of the Chinese forum diplomacy in Africa to demonstrate the applicability of the theoretical assumptions. In the end, the findings of the empirical part are connected to the theoretical elaborations in a discussion about the forum institutions as part of the new institutional statecraft of the PRC.

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The rise of China has sparked many debates about the future of the PRC as well as its role and place in the international system (Buzan 2010; Chan 2008; Ikenberry 2008; Mearsheimer 2010; Saunders 2006; Schweller & Pu 2011; Shambaugh 2013; Waldron 2005; Zhang 2013). These debates mostly focus on the significance of the rise of China for previously existing international patterns and disregard the consequences of the structures and institutions created by the PRC that sprout all over the globe1_{. In the}

context of China's new institutional statecraft and its engagement towards developing countries, there is a lack of studies focussing on the international institutions that guide the Chinese cooperation with different regions (Ikenberry 2017). Furthermore, the effective use of bilateral approaches to international cooperation is vastly under-researched, even though bilateral strategies in foreign policy are one of the major approaches for international cooperation (Cha 2010). The PRC cooperates with the member states of the African Union (AU) through a new type of transnational diplomacy institution that is called Forum on Africa China Cooperation (FOCAC) (Alden 2017). Through the investigation of this particular form of international cooperation, this thesis aims to uncover the central mechanisms behind the Chinese forum diplomacy and explain the reasons for the PRC to choose this form of institutionalised foreign policy strategy in the context of contemporary Sino-African relations. However, to understand the behaviour of the PRC it is necessary to place the regional strategy of China in Africa in the larger context of the rise of China. International relations and regional cooperation are severely interlinked (Alden & Alves: 152, 154; Zhao 2011: 60). Consequently, the FOCAC as a regional strategy of China in Africa can only be understood by first elaborating on why the PRC expands its international reach in the first place.

Liberal institutionalism is one of the most successful theoretical schools when it comes to assessing the reasons behind state behaviour and why states cooperate through institutions. Recently, this school has encountered difficulties, as opposed to their concepts of democracy and liberty, there are increasingly autocratic and restrictive forces on the rise (See: Ikenberry 2018). Nevertheless, if the contradictory ideas are replaced by generally applicable concepts, liberal institutional theories have the potential to also fundamentally foster the understanding of the behaviour of non-democratic states like China. This

1 _{The major examples for Chinese international institutions are for example the Belt and Road Institutions, The Asian}

investigation, therefore, attempts to contribute to the liberal institutional theory and help resolve the explanatory crisis that it experiences since the decline of the US liberal order became apparent (See: Mearsheimer 2010; Nye 2010). As the theoretical background to the rise of China is situated on the system level of analysis and the elaboration on China’s Strategy in Africa plays out on a regional level, the inquiry was split into two parts. The empirical Part II contains a content analysis of relevant documents that aims at uncovering the mechanisms behind the case of FOCAC and to demonstrate the theoretical assumptions made beforehand2_{. Content analysis requires an in-depth contextualisation before being conducted to}

construct a reliable basis for the creation of the most reasonable variables for the analysis (Berg & Lune 2017: 186). Hence, the theoretical discussion in Part I starts from scratch and systematically discuss the relevant concepts for the contextualisation of China’s emerging institutional statecraft and the strategy behind it. The second part then includes the insights gained from the first part to construct an analytical framework for the analysis of Chinese forum diplomacy. It is then possible to draw conclusions about the reasons and utility for the PRC to establish forum institutions and the resulting implications for the international order.

The work with contemporary developments like the rise of China and its expanding institutional statecraft requires a certain amount of flexibility. Since the PRC is to some extent exceptional in the study of international relations (IR), it is challenging to incorporate it into classical theories (Rosenau 1994: 524-602, Zhang 2013). Chinese exceptionalism is a scholarly debate on its own, revolving around the question whether the PRC can be examined with generalised IR theories or whether its unique cultural history, factual dimensions and contemporary form of state make it an exceptional case that deserves its own approach. In this context, the thought of a Chinese IR school that bases its arguments on the exceptionality and perspective of the PRC has been proposed (Kim 2016). Such an approach would definitely have its perks, but it would entirely dismiss the existing state of the art of contemporary IR, lack comparability and basically reinvent the wheel. Hence, it is more efficient to adapt and alter existing theories than creating a distinct and isolated model based on a Chinese perspective. Scholars like Feng Zhang and William Callahan have already assessed the issue of exceptionalism. They concluded that while features and patterns of Chinese behaviour definitely entail exceptional features, this does not mean that the PRC acts outside of measurable and rational patterns of IR theory (Callahan 2012; Zhang 2013). These scholars have identified the possibility of applying general concepts in a way that it covers both the rational behaviour of the PRC

2 _{The relevant documents refer to the official declarations and action plans of the FOCAC conferences. See: FOCAC}

and its exceptional features. Nevertheless, they omit to demonstrate how Chinese exceptionalism can be incorporated effectively in the scholarly debate of IR, leaving a loose end in this regard. As a consequence of the mentioned exceptional features, it is not possible to simply apply IR theories to cases of the PRC’s foreign policy behaviour without elaborating on the points that differ towards the behaviour of other states. For example, the Chinese choice to establish the FOCAC for its cooperation with Africa cannot simply be approached without considering the domestic pressures, the exceptional political model as well as the values and norms that drive the foreign policy interest of the PRC. Consequently, a much more in-depth discussion of theories with an elaboration about the exceptional and common behaviour of the PRC is needed. Thus, in the following, the necessary demonstration of how the PRC’s foreign policy can be assessed with contemporary IR theories without neglecting its exceptional features will be revealed. The theoretical and conceptual background for this inquiry was constructed under the core principles of various conceptual stances including liberal institutionalism, foreign policy analysis and the sub-branches of these theories. More specifically, the ideas of the powerplay theory and performance legitimacy were added to John Ikenberry’s theory of order formation and the emerging institutional statecraft of China, in order to shed light on China’s rational yet distinctive behaviour on the international stage. In addition to the liberal concepts, the foreign policy analysis (FPA) of Alden and Alves about the PRC’s Sinosphere strategy was consulted because it problematises the debate and connects the theory methodologically to the foreign policy of the PRC (Alden & Alves 2017). These two perspectives of liberal institutionalism and FPA overlap to some extent and complement each other by closing the gaps and completing the thought of a Chinese institutional foreign policy strategy. Liberal Institutionalism delivered a contextualisation and a general explanation for the overall results. FPA then added extraction and explanation tools for the major mechanisms regarding the outcomes of the analysis. In this regard, it will be shown that institutional statecraft and foreign policy strategy are deeply intertwined and thus require a versatile approach.

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In the context of the unilateral global liberal order of the 20th _{century and the hegemonic status of the US,}

liberal institutionalism developed convincing arguments about the mechanisms and reasons for powerful states to create different types of international institutions for cooperation (Jackson & Sørensen 2013: 110-111). Being in a constant debate with realist theorists, liberalists choose the state as the primary unit of analysis and discuss their relations within the anarchical system, on the international level (Waltz 1979: 91; Keohane et.al. 1995). Despite their controversies, these two theoretical branches draw from each other and liberalist scholars base part of their ideas on the realist assumptions about international anarchy and rational behaviour of states. The different branches of liberalism heavily developed during the last century because political and social realities also underwent considerable changes after the World Wars and later the Cold War (Keohane et.al. 1993: 104-106). Through these periods, liberal institutionalism established the study of the mechanisms and reasons behind the creation of the international institutions that make up the US-led international order. These insights now provide a solid base for the study of China's approach to international cooperation. Theorists slowly adapt to the distinctive aspects of the rise of China and incorporate them adequately in the construct of their theories. Thus, through their fundamental understanding of international relations in term of institutional cooperation, liberal theories can deliver essential concepts to understand the logic behind China's foreign policy in Africa. Since these theories are conjugated and adapting to the shifting realities of international relations, their validity constantly needs to be tested and translated into the context of the phenomena that they are set to describe (Kim 2016). The theory of liberal institutionalism sees institutions as the crucial part of international cooperation because they generate structures aside of the global anarchy and provide the basis for state interaction without conflict (Keohane & Nye 1971: 335). Under the assumption of complex interdependence, sovereign states striving for absolute gains have the capability to rationally assess their economic and cultural interests to pursue peaceful cooperation (Keohane et.al. 1995: 44). Liberalists proclaim that the interaction between states is not a zero-sum game which means that the gains of cooperation can be mutually beneficial.

According to the idea of division of labour, the states can specialise according to their expertise or comparative advantages to yield a higher total gain. Consequently, a gain for one state does not automatically entail a loss for the other, as for example, it would be the case under the realist assumption about relative gains (Jackson & Sørensen 2013: 106-109). For example, in the case of Sino-African relations, it is more reasonable for both parties to cooperate peacefully and share the absolute gains of cooperation. Liberal institutionalism recognises the importance of economic and cultural cooperation as the underlying principle for the study of interstate relations. Furthermore, the idea of division of labour between states strikes as the most valid explanation for the economically driven interaction between China and Africa, because both sides specialise within their expertise and engage in cooperation to achieve their respective goals (see: Besada & Bright 2017; Taylor 2006; Tull 2006). A major example is the Sino-African trade-exchange regarding the finance of development in exchange for an increased energy security. While the PRC provides comprehensive development aid and infrastructure investments, African states offer access to their natural energy resources (Alden 2008: 148; Kaifeng 2012). Eventhough this statement might be vastly generalised and simplified, it still shows that the liberal ideas of cooperation apply to the foreign policy of China. The creation of an institution like the FOCAC was preferred over an aggressive military strategy and now both sides can, to a certain extent, yield absolute gains in form of their desired economic and cultural interest.

Despite the ideological quarrel with the realist school of thought, liberalism is rather open to integrating concepts of expanding- and substitutional- theories. Therefore, this elaboration fully acknowledges the existence of alternative explanations that could potentially be delivered by distinct theories. For example, a constructivist approach could shed more light on the identity formation of the PRC regarding their Africa policies. Especially the repeated efforts of China to assure mutual benefit and how it positions itself as the leader of the developing states inherit valuable potential for closer research (Alden & Alves 2008, Eisenmann 2015). Other, rather practical stances like international political economy or critical geopolitics could help to understand the material dimension of this cooperation and dig deeper into the “why” direction of the research question (see: Flores-Macías & Kreps 2013; Taylor 2006). The potential in these theoretical schools shall not be dismissed. Nevertheless, since these approaches focus much more on specific areas of the cooperation and hinge on the conceptual background for the elaboration of strategic institutional foreign policy-making, they would not be able to produce reasonable answers for this type of investigation. Eventhough these theories might explain parts of the processes and reasons behind the Chinese foreign policy towards Africa, they lack the structural assumptions necessary to elaborate on a general strategic institutional approach on a system level. Subsequently, liberal institutionalism delivers the most suitable conceptual background for the analysis of state behaviour within institutional frameworks and the effects

that institutions can have on the international system. Furthermore, the current crisis and the ongoing transition processes in liberal theory enable a much more flexible approach to the contemporary debates and allow an explorative adaption to the emergence of China's institutional statecraft. Up until now the basis of liberal thought has been outlined. In the following, it is important to deal with the specific dynamics and more concrete utility of cooperation in the international system. To understand how liberal institutionalists describe the global order, it is necessary to first outline their concept of power and how this interacts with the notion of international cooperation.

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The rise of China and its institutional statecraft is part of a larger process of declining hegemony, emerging multipolarity and shifting power structures. The concept of power capabilities is crucial for the liberal institutionalist lens because a state will not be able to shape international relations without a certain amount of power (Keohane 1984). While evaluating the interactions of states, differences in power-capabilities are essential features to consider for every structural IR theory, since the way that conflict or cooperation plays out highly depends on their respective differences in capabilities. The more capable a state is in terms of power resources, the higher is its bargaining leverage (See: Nye 2003). Furthermore, the concept of hegemony is essential for liberal institutionalists, since the hegemon in a system has a substantially different status than any other state involved. For example, the US takes a central defining and characterising role in the liberal international system, since its predominance enabled it to shape the international arena (See: Cha 2010, Ikenberry 1999, Keohane 1984: 31-32). Power and hegemony can be understood in various ways and thus it is necessary to lay out the respective ideas of liberal thought about these concepts in the international system.

Hegemony can be achieved if a state gains significantly more power than the other states within a system (Mearsheimer 2010: 387). The most common way to measure a state’s power capabilities in IR is through an elaboration of their hard power resources. Nye S, Jr. has presented a full roll-up of the world’s strongest states, measured according to their basic3_{- military- and economic- resource data in 2000 (Nye 2003: 37;}

see Table 1.). This presents a rather cursory way to portray the capacities of a state, especially regarding its strengths and shortcomings in terms of power capabilities. Recently, also the soft power of a state in terms of their cultural and social influence on other states has been added to the focus of the debates (Ibid: 9). For the liberal institutionalist idea of power, these different building blocks of a state’s overall power capability are interdependent and connected. Therefore, to describe the power of a state, the hard and soft power capacities are brought together by utilizing the IMEP model of Michael Mann (Lawson 2006). While intertwining the dimensions of ideological (I) military (M) economic (E) and political (P) power the IMEP model is built on all these separate factors, which are ultimately united to create the notion of a combined state’s power capability. These different kinds of state power-dimensions are all separately important and contribute to the overall capability, enabling an evaluation of a state’s overall power through the investigation of the respective areas. The core weakness of this all-comprising approach is the inaccuracy of data and the unavailability of the entirety of information about the realities on a global level. Nevertheless, the power capability of a state is measured in its relation to the other states in the global system and even if global data pools are not entirely accurate, they can still contribute as an indicator for international trends and provide an idea of the overall situation. Therefore, the IMEP model fits the purpose of the analysis and can serve to observe the different capabilities of state actors.

Unipolarity means that one prevailing hegemon in the international system utilizes the power gap to rise upon all its contesters. After the second World War, the US took this hegemonic position on the grounds of its prevailing power gap towards other major forces (see: Barma 2009; Waltz 2000). This predomination, concerning the superiority of US power resources, has not significantly changed despite the nuclear threat during the cold war. Consequently, at the beginning of the 21st _{century, the US is still unchallenged in this}

regard.

Source of Power USA CHINA RUSSIA EUROPE

Basic resources strong strong strong strong

Military strong strong medium medium

Economic strong strong medium strong

Science/Technology strong weak weak strong

National cohesion strong strong medium weak

Universalistic culture strong medium medium strong

International Institutions strong medium medium strong

Table 1. Power Resources of major forces. Source: Nye 2003: 35-40. Modified by Jackson & Sørensen; Own illustration.

Table 1. simply but clearly outlines the different dimensions of power sources that qualify the US to claim the position of a global hegemon. Moreover, it is possible to see that there is no single power resource

defining a hegemon entirely, but rather the United States’ superiority in all the various aspects has ensured its supremacy over other major forces like China and Russia.

What happens if the gap in power capabilities shrinks and other states approximate to challenge the position of a hegemon? The power transition theory, for example, claims that the PRC is a hedging contester state that challenges the declining hegemonic position of the US (Tammen & Kugler 2006). However, there are strong cases against this scenario put forward, since aside of the actual capability to overthrow a hegemon, the state must be in discontent with the order that was created (see: Chan 2008). Furthermore, these scenarios argue that the unipolar order will only be replaced by another unipolar order and totally disregard the option of a multipolar or rather multi-layered alternative. In the end, multipolarity appears as the more reasonable destination for the contemporary transition processes, since assumed contester states like the PRC are already entirely incorporated in the liberal system (Buzan 2010; Li Xiaojun 2010). The approach that explains both, the rise of multipolarity and China’s hedging power is based on the concept of regional hegemony. Usually, the hegemon is seen as the only leading power in a unilateral system. Under the emerging multipolarity though, there will be other powerful states that dominate certain regions next to the global order, resulting in a regional hegemony (Mearsheimer 2010: 387-388). These regional hegemons can construct their own regional order without a direct challenge to the global liberal order of the US. The concept of regional hegemony means the coexistence of hegemonic capabilities aside from each other, or even aside an overarching global hegemony. These thoughts enable the application of liberal institutionalist concepts about the global order to the case of the rise of China. The PRC can be treated as an emerging hegemon in its regional setting without critically contesting the global liberal order4 _{(Schweller & Pu 2011:}

62). Consequently, repealing the idea that China is an active contester to global hegemony and treating it like a regional hegemon makes the findings that liberal institutionalists have extracted from the study of the US hegemony highly relevant to the rise of China. The analytical framework of how a hegemon behaves within its sphere of interest could then serve as the basis for an elaboration about the Chinese behaviour in the global system. After the consequences of power capabilities and the role of hegemony have been explained, it is important to come back to the fundamental thought of liberal institutionalism: cooperation. Despite power capacities, the hegemonic position of a state is fundamentally connected to its influence on other states (Nye 2003: 40). This is where the liberal ideas unfold their explanatory strength since they

convincingly argue that the institutional dimension of power capacity takes a special position in the making and sustaining of hegemonic power (See Table 1.).

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Liberal institutionalists argue that a hegemonic state cannot convince other states to follow its lead in the long run only based on its superior power capabilities. The material capabilities create the necessary condition for a state to become a hegemon. However, the sufficient condition that enables the hegemon to create an order within the anarchy of the international system is the establishment of international institutions. In his institutional theory of order formation, the liberal theorist John G. Ikenberry shows how the US was able to keep its hegemonic position over more than half a century (Ikenberry 1999). According to his theory, a hegemon can conserve its power and achieve long-term power gains through the creation of an institutional framework for its sphere of influence (Ibid: 55). In this process, the hegemonic state creates international institutions to willingly lay down part of its autonomy in an act of strategic restraint, which signals the weaker states that they neither have to fear dominance nor abandonment (Ibid: 54,68). Therefore, an institutional framework enables the hegemon to control its sphere of influence through cooperation and not aggression, which in turn creates long-term returns to power (Ibid: 55). The hegemon conserves its power because it stabilises its sphere of influence, while additionally gaining from the cooperation rather than losing its resources on maintaining its position forcefully. Even if the power of the hegemon decreases, the institutions will stay in place and ensure its superior position further on (Ibid: 56-62). The conceptual assumptions that underlie the benefit of individual institutions for state to state cooperation are projected on the level of international frameworks and transnational systems. Utilizing this theory, Ikenberry concludes that the US created institutions that embody the liberal international order to strategically restrain its power and gain from the cooperation in the long term. The international order has been persistent because it is transparent and accountable for its members. Since they gained trust and comfort in the existing structures, they are less likely to choose alternative institutions, thus creating returns to institutions (Ibid: 73).

Figure 1. Constitutional Character leads to Increasing Returns. Source: Ikenberry 1999; own illustration

There is, however, a crucial issue with this theory. Ikenberry argues that in order to apply to the underlying concepts, the institutions have to be western and of a liberal democratic nature. This line of argument prevents the valuable insights of the theory to be applied to non-western, or less liberal states like the PRC. This is a case where liberal institutionalists have successfully manoeuvred themselves into an explanatory dead end resulting in their inability to adapt their concepts to developments like the rise of China. Democracy and liberalism may be supporting features for the creation of a persistent order. Yet, the argument that it is a necessary feature is not convincing anymore, considering the recent developments in IR5_.

Consequently, whilst being vastly successful in explaining the international relations of the 20th _century,

liberal institutionalism faces challenges with contemporary phenomena. The decline of US power and new developments like the rise of China challenge the global liberal order and urge the neoliberal and liberal institutionalist theory to adapt its concepts about liberal institutions to a more compatible version. Especially the differences in legitimacy, norms and scope of successful autocratic states make it hard for liberal institutionalist to apply their concepts as they are based on the thoughts of liberty and democratic peace. However, contemporary institutionalists are aware of this explanatory crisis and incorporate these issues as self-developing features into the theory (Ikenberry 2009). Just like the rise of the US and the liberal system has reshaped traditional liberal thoughts into new forms of neoliberalism and liberal institutionalism, the rise of China will now shape the future thought of these schools (Kim 2016: 71). The focus of the research has shifted from investigating the usefulness and reasons behind liberal international cooperation to explaining how states interact within the new context of interconnectivity and interdependence (Keohane & Nye 1987: 730-733,748). In this framework, Ikenberry established the thought of three different stages of liberal internationalism, with the third stage describing an expected future scenario as a conceptual guideline for the liberal thought to develop into.

5_{The main development contradicting liberal ideas is the rise of authoritarianism. See: Levitsky & Way 2002.}

Constitutional Character

Strategic Restraint Transparency and Accountability

Increasing Returns

Liberal Internationalism 1.0 Liberal Internationalism 2.0 Liberal Internationalism 3.0 Universal membership not tied to regime

location or character.

Western-oriented security and economy system

Universal scope, expanding membership in core governing institutions to rising non-Western states

Westphalian sovereignty defined in terms of an international legal order affirming state independence and non-intervention

Modified Westphalian sovereignty, where states compromise legal independence so as gain greater state capacity

Post-Westphalian sovereign, with increasingly intrusive and interdependent economic and security regimes

Flat political hierarchy

Hierarchical order, with American hegemonic provisioning of public goods, rule-based and patron-client relations, and voice

opportunities

Post-hegemonic hierarchy in which various groupings of leading states occupy governing institutions

Rules and norms operate as international law, enforced through moral suasion and global public opinion

Dense inter-governmental relations, enforcement of rules and institutions through reciprocity and bargaining

Expanded rule-based system, coupled with new realms of network-based cooperation Narrow policy domain restricted to open trade

and collective security system.

Expanded policy domains, including economic

regulation, human rights, etc. Further expansion of policy domains Table 2. Source: Ikenberry 2009: 74; Own illustration.

While most contemporary liberal theories were based on the setting of the liberal internationalism 2.0, they must now be developed further to fit the characteristics of the 3.0 order. The declining international order 2.0 is in crisis since the order it describes was tied to the authority of US-American supremacy and the resulting unipolarity in the system. “The old American-led liberal hegemonic order is giving way to something new” (Ikenberry, 2009: 80). And just like the Pax- Americana, the former liberal ideas have to give way for the ideas of the international order 3.0. Hence; liberal institutionalism is in a transition phase that, just like the transitioning global order, adapts gradually to the new realities and emerging leading states (Ibid: 80). Liberalists basically repined to accept the retreat of unipolarity and adjust their ideas of institutional cooperation to the shifting realities. Currently, it is unclear whether the future order creates a new unipolar, multipolar or bipolar system. Thus it is crucial to test and adapt the existing concepts to the emerging realities (Ibid: 83). Central features of this new international order are already gradually developing, and they further define the thoughts of liberal internationalism 3.0: increasingly post hegemonic, increasingly interdependent and non-Western influences are expected to shape contemporary international relations (See: Table 2.). These transition processes must be picked up by liberal institutionalists through an exchange of conceptual variables and a continuous testing of different underlying assumptions. The probably most suitable phenomena to develop these new thoughts are the rise of China and the Chinese foreign policy because they will have indisputable consequences for the transition of the different structures that make up the global order. This does not mean that only dealing with the case of China will automatically solve the entire crisis of liberalism but dealing with the PRC as an increasingly dominant actor is a necessary step in this process. Consequently, the rise of China is partly responsible for the crisis of liberalism and adapting to the implications of the new Chinese foreign policy becomes a crucial element in resolving it. Eventhough the fall of the liberal international order 2.0 cannot only be explained with Chinas emerging international influence, it is still impossible to establish new theoretical foundations

for the liberal international order 3.0 without its undeniable impact on the transition process. Thereupon, the establishment of an institutional theory based on the study of the PRC constitutes an important step in the theoretical development of liberal institutionalism.

Especially the shift in the perception of institutions has contributed to a transformation of liberal institutionalism into an adaptable and increasingly universally applicable theory. As explained earlier, institutions were traditionally discussed with a focus on their liberal attributes, their autonomy and ability to negotiate (See: Jackson& Sørensen 2013:112; Keohane & Nye 1993). This perception has changed, particularly during the debate with realist scholars, towards a more strategic approach focused on the emergence and function of institutions. Since nowadays the range and autonomy of institutions as well as their components and areas of application vary immensely, the debate focuses more on the reasons for their existence and their effects on the states involved. Institutions are taken as tools set in place by states to establish cooperation under complex interdependence, but without the necessity of them being liberal or autonomous. Hence the crux of the theory demonstrates that sovereign states put institutions willingly into place in order to achieve an underlying goal. Because of this, the methodological idea behind liberal institutionalism is that institutions can provide insight into the nature of state interests and motivations to cooperate. For example, the institutional theory of order formation uncovered how the liberal institutions can give further insights into the US intentions to conserve their hegemonic influence and achieve long-lasting power gains (Ikenberry 1999: 55). It becomes apparent that the building of institutional statecraft and the creation of international institutions, in general, is a strategic way to pursue foreign policy interests. To gain an understanding of the interests and features of the Chinese system, the following sections identify the differences and similarities of the Chinese approach to creating a persistent order.

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The PRC fundamentally changed after the leader of the communist revolution Mao Zedong, former Chairman of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and alleged father of the nation passed away in 1976. As a consequence of the Dengist reforms, which opened the Chinese market to the world economy, a rapid economic development sparked and started the process that is known as the rise of China (Wright 2011: 182-188). The market liberalisation, however, did not mean democracy for the changing PRC, which

economically integrated further into the liberal international order created by the West, albeit politically moving further away. Democratic participation and freedom were seen as a threat to the ruling CPC and subsequently after the Cold War, in the Post- Tiananmen era of the 1990s, the PRC turned away from liberalising its domestic politics (Ibid: 194, 207). At the dawn of the 21st _{century, China is steadily leaving}

the industrialisation stage behind and gaining increasing international influence through its economic strength (Zhao 2011: 54).

The PRC has established its own unique uniparty-system, in which the CPC centrally governs the entirety of domestic and foreign affairs (Meidan 2016: 3-5). In an exceptional concentration of regulatory power, the centralised system allows the functionaries of the party to coordinate the military power, as well as the economic and social capacities. Consequently, the interests of the PRC are strongly connected to the interests of the CPC, which follows the reasonable goal of any political party: obtain power within the system and secure its governmental position. State governments must legitimise their rule before their national population in order to gain the necessary backing to govern (Beetham 2013: 25-35; Zhu 2011:126-128). In modern democracies, this legitimacy is established through popular votes (Kemam 2014). Autocracies, in which these legitimising mechanisms are missing, either still try to claim democratic values anyways or tend to be challenged, overthrown or replaced sooner or later (Burnell 2006: 547-550). How did the CPC manage to govern China for nearly a century without being overthrown, even throughout the legitimacy crisis that revolved around the Tiananmen incidents6_{? Yuchao Zhu convincingly argues that the}

CPC has installed an extraordinary mechanism he calls performance legitimacy in order to authorise its rule before the Chinese population (Zhu 2011). The Chinese emperors formerly legitimised their rule by claiming they inherited a “Mandate of Heaven” which became visible in their success as rulers and would be withdrawn if they were unsuccessful in defending their realm (Wright 2011: 18,19). After the communist revolution, the CPC legitimised its rule through the revolutionary spirit. The central idea behind this type of revolutionary legitimacy is that the communist party “not only governs China but is China” (Zhu 2011: 129). This notion explains why the CPC does not allow another party to run since the existence of another party would contradict the idea of the communist party being part of the population and threaten the thought of a unified China. However, the perceptions of the Chinese public have changed in the post- Tiananmen era, since the government has clearly positioned itself as distinct from the protesters in the incidents. With a growing middle class and an increasingly educated population, the rise of China has imposed further obligations for justification on the CPC. Subsequently, the government now bases its legitimacy on its

ability to assure economic growth, social stability and national unity (Ibid: 130). As long as the party ensures that these three pillars remain constant, it achieves the legitimacy of rule by performing well in achieving these tasks. Through good governance, the CPC vows to provide public goods in order to prove that it legitimately rules for the benefit of the population. This strategy of performance legitimacy functions in a way like the contemporary version of the Mandate of Heaven and constitutes the anchor for most of the policies that the CPC pursues. Furthermore, it appears to be a solid alternative for democratic legitimacy because it successfully creates the same notion of accountability. While other state governments might also utilise this legitimising mechanism, the PRC has adopted a very specific and solid version of performance legitimacy due to its unique historically oriented political culture7_.

Figure 2. The role of performance legitimacy. Based on: Zhu 2011

As explained earlier the major concern for any governmental party is to stay in power and the CPC is no exception. It always comes back to the central concept that the CPC’s main interest is to retain its power through performance legitimacy because this mechanism authorises their rule. Therefore, the idea of performance legitimacy takes a fundamental role in explaining the motivations and interests for the PRC to act in their domestic and foreign policies. The party’s interests converge with the interests of the PRC as an international actor due to the concentration of power in the central government. In retrospect, the party has to ensure that the public is satisfied with its performance in supplying public goods. Consequently, the three pillars of Chinese performance legitimacy define the main motivations of the CPC’s policies and can, therefore, help to explain why the PRC pursues certain policies or why it acts in a certain way on the international stage. For example, the Chinese policies of peaceful coexistence are most relevant as they promote the non-interference with other states on the one hand but anticipate that, in turn, international actors should not interfere with their acclaimed domestic policies (Shambaugh 2013: 174). Therefore, the

7 _{See: Mandate of Heaven; Wright 2011}

Main interest of the CPC

Performance Legitimacy

Economic Development

National Unity

PRC takes any discord with their national politics like the One-China policies as a serious offence8_{. The}

sovereignty, autonomy and undependability of state elites in the way they steer their countries internal affairs is the highest principle for the CPC. The principle of internal autonomy has an exceptionally high value, since as explained before the national unity is also connected to the legitimacy of the one-party system and connects to the second pillar of national unity.

3.2

T

R

C

I

S

The rise of China is an ongoing phenomenon. In the course of the 21st _{century, the PRC has already risen}

immensely when it comes to nearly every aspect of political, economic or social development, resulting in a growing international influence. With these newly gained capabilities, the scholarly debate now seeks to evaluate how China is going to make use of its position. Institutionalists argue that this power can be stored and sustained by the creation of international institutions (Ikenberry 1999). In order to understand how these ideas can be applied to the PRC’s institutional statecraft, it is necessary to take a step back and explain how the rise of China fits into the liberal institutionalist understanding of international order.

The behaviour of China, now that it is rising to power, resembles the efforts of the US after the Second World War when they increased their international engagement and constructed the liberal system. Hence, the PRC, much like the US, strategically uses its increasing economic power to invest in different regions of its interest and creates bilateral and multilateral structures to guide cooperation and gain strategic control over the foreign policy behaviour of smaller states (Alden & Alves 2017, Ikenberry & Lim 2017). In terms of power capabilities, the situation is comparable as well. While after the Second World War, the most important power resource has been military strength, the end of the Cold War has reduced the importance of this aspect, due to the nuclear standoff between major powers as well as the ongoing globalisation and democratisation of the system (Ikenberry 1999: 48; Rauchhaus 2009). This is also the fundamental difference between the realist and the liberalist angle of perception because realists would still uphold the military power as the most crucial element of a state’s position in the international floor (Mearsheimer 2010). Under the liberal assumption of complex interdependence, the economic dimension prevails, since

8 _{The One-China policies regard the CPC’s standing, that the Republic of China, also known as Taiwan, is no autonomous}

states are rather prone to cooperation than conflict (Ikenberry 2008: 28; Keohane 1987: 727). Consequently, connecting the liberal stance to the IMEP model, it can be argued that economic strength is an indicating factor for the emergence of a hegemon (Betts 2017: 168-170).

Figure 3. The economic history of China in the world economy. Share of Gross world product. Source: Maddison 2010; Own creation

Comprehensive research about economic data was collected by Angus Maddison and this database can provide a broad idea of how the economic strength of different forces has evolved over time (Maddison 2010). First, it is possible to observe how the US has peaked in its economic superiority around 1950 after the end of the second World War. Second, the rise of China is visible here, starting shortly after the death of Mao Zedong and the following economic liberalisation around 1980 steadily pushing back other economies in the gross world product. Eventhough the Chinese military capabilities do not compare to the proportions of the US, it is still possible to observe a substantial increase in spending and tactical activism in this regard (See: Godwin 1996; Mearsheimer 2010: 384; Saunders 2006; Waldron 2005). Finally, the PRC increasingly exports its culture and eagerly enhances its soft power capabilities (See: King 2013; Nye 2005; Paradise 2009). While offensive neorealist scholars have also recognised the hegemonic potential of the PRC and its similarity to the former situation of the US, they rightfully assume that China will very likely behave in a similar pattern as the US did (Mearsheimer 2010: 390). Liberal institutionalist thought also needs to perform the same turn in conception and treat the PRC as an emerging hegemon in order to allow their insights about international cooperation to contribute to the case of China.

As aforementioned, it is important to recognise that at least for now, the PRC does not strive for global but regional hegemony (see: Buzan 2010; Section 2.2). The Chinese foreign policy mainly concerns its direct

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 1870 1900 1913 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2008

Rest of the world Japan

India Russia

Total Latin America European Countries Total Africa China United States

neighbourhood and the so-called “great periphery” or “outer ring” which also includes Africa, Europe and parts of America (Swaine 2014: 3-5). However, as the result of the former unipolarity, the regions that the PRC has targeted are still substantially linked to US influence. How is it possible for China to emerge in the respective regions as regional hegemon without directly confronting the US? The PRC does not have the required gap in power capabilities to directly balance against the US and therefore utilises a more subtle approach. Making use of international institutions, economic leverage and diplomatic manoeuvring, China has engaged in a soft balancing strategy that indirectly opposes the US and the liberal institutions (Nye 2005; Zhao 2011: 60). Moreover, despite its domestically authoritarian character, the foreign politics of contemporary China follow the logic of a liberal international system (Buzan 2010: 48; Ikenberry 2008: 31-33). The PRC is situated in-between the internal “vision of cultural and political nationalism [and the external] economic liberalism” (Buzan 2010: 34). China promotes free trade, the eradication of trade barriers and aims towards transnational cooperation on the international floor (Xi 2015). This shows that PRC does not entirely challenge the liberal system per se but integrated itself and defends its interests from within and slowly enhances multipolarity (Ikenberry 2008). Consequently, the concepts of liberal institutionalism can help to understand the PRC’s foreign policy and institutional statecraft inductively but also gain from the analysis deductively by uncovering important transitional features that hint further towards the liberal institutionalism 3.0.

3.3

C

’

E

I

S

Ikenberry and Lim have tried to answer the question: “what is the logic of China’s emerging institutional statecraft?” (Ikenberry & Lim 2017: 1). Examining the case of the Asian infrastructure investment Bank (AIIB), they developed a typology to understand why rising states create institutions in the first place (Ibid: 16). Being in the position of a hedging regional hegemon, the PRC faces the dilemma of how to approach its sphere of interest in the light of the existing order. The hedging state must decide which foreign policy strategy it will choose to approach the weaker states that surround it. As explained before, a hegemon is characterised by a gap in power towards the other state in a system. Hence, the foreign policy strategy of the hegemon also defines the future relationship of the states that it approaches, because they have an overall weaker position and thus they can only react to the foreign policy strategy that the coming hegemon evokes upon them. Under the anarchy of the system, the week states are exposed to whether the hegemon drives an aggressive or cooperative strategy and can only react to that. Consequently, the foreign policy strategy

that a hegemon chooses is fundamentally significant for the system and if it will be characterised by cooperation or conflict. Ikenberry and Lim have defined five pathways that an emerging hegemon can follow when emerging in a system. It is interesting to see how the authors utilise the insights they gained from the liberal international order of the US and apply these patterns to the institutions put in place by the PRC (See: Ikenberry 1999). Here it is possible to observe that the liberal institutional conceptual assumptions are shifting from a western-centric analysis to a more universal approach.

Status-Quo Stakeholder Authority-Seeking Stakeholder Institutional Obstruction External Innovation Opposition Join; participate within existing rules

and practices.

Join; seek greater voice through redistributing decision-making

authority.

Join; alter, impede, or contain the pursuit of undesirable rules, practices, and norms

Build new institutions; (1) offer alternative node of cooperation; (2) promote alternative rules/ norms within. Outright opposition to or nonparticipation in existing institutional arrangements

Table 3. Possible pathways for an emerging hegemon. Source: Ikenberry 2017: 7.

The PRC created an array of different institutions in the course of its rise. It is therefore evident that it opted for external innovation and adapted an institutional foreign policy strategy to cooperate with its sphere of influence. This step might not come surprising, considering that one core weakness of China’s power resources is its institutional capacity (See Table 1.). Some of these institutions are of comparable nature to the multilateral institutions of the liberal order, like for example the AIIB which resembles the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) of the World Bank (Callaghan 2016: 117). Also comparable to the western security structure NATO is the Chinese Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Distinctively, the Belt and Road institutions like the silk road fund are tied closely to China, while officially being designed to bring a mutual benefit for all participating states (Szczudlik-Tatar 2013). Finally, the PRC created forum institutions like the FOCAC which embody a different type of multilateral approach for international cooperation. Shambaugh argues that “China uses multilateral institutions to constrain and dilute American power and influence, using ‘multilateralism’ as a means to achieving ‘multipolarism.’” (Shambaugh 2013: 123). It is important to differentiate here, since the institutions of the liberal order function worldwide, albeit the Chinese institutions are regionally designed and mostly concern the PRC’s direct sphere of interest. Nevertheless, this connects to the idea of regional hegemony, since for now, the PRC may not strive for global predominance, but rather regional hegemony to secure its power within the areas that are of primary concern for it. Eventhough the power of the US and the liberal order will be weakened by the Chinese external innovation, the immediate goal is multipolarity, not an alternative unipolar system.

Ikenberry and Lim have shown how the PRC installs multilateral institutions comparable to the liberal institutions (Ikenberry & Lim 2017). Yet, as typical for liberal institutionalists, they picked an example of an obviously multilateral institution that fits exactly the pattern of liberal thought: the AIIB. On the one hand, they have successfully tackled the explanatory crisis by applying their thought to a non-western state and acknowledging that the mechanisms of institutional cooperation can be universally applicable. On the other hand, they do not complete this thought process, since they still assume that the Chinese statecraft is successful because of its alleged liberal features. The thought process, however, can only be complete when recognising the exceptional features of the PRC and incorporating them into the analytical structures. If the norms and rules of the western system are exchanged with Chinese features, the picture becomes complete. An institutional framework consists of norms and rules on the one hand and the manifested bureaucratic organisations on the other (Keohane 1993: 733). This is an important distinction to make as it divides the causal mechanisms from the ideological basis of liberal institutionalism. It is typical for IR theories to develop thoughts and themes on the ground of the analysis of certain societies at a certain point in time and extract the generalisable elements for theory building (Della Porta 2008: 200). Therefore, the operational elements of liberal institutionalism will be extracted and applied to a new framework that can be applied to the Chinese case. The “hull” made of conceptual mechanisms that result from the manifested bureaucratic organisation (strategic restraint, conservation of power) stay in place and provide solid guidelines for the theoretical explanation of Chinese institutional statecraft. The set of norms and values, however, will be exchanged with the Sino-specific instances. After all, it is not unlikely that the PRC has adopted successful elements of the liberal order and added its own set of values and characteristics to it.

The United States of America The Peoples Republic of China

Type of Hegemony

(Based on Mearsheimer 2010) Global Regional

Institutional Framework

(Based on Ikenberry 2017)

Bretton Woods (f.e. World Bank), NATO, UN

OBOR institutions (f.e. AIIB), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Regional Forums

Legitimacy

(Based on Zhu 2011) Democracy Performance Legitimacy

Values/Norms

(Based on Alden & Alves 2017) (FOCAC 2009b: Art. 1.4)

Washington Consensus: Liberalism, Democracy, Human Rights

Non-Conditionality, Equality, Mutual Benefit, Non-Interference in Internal Affairs, Pursuit of Common Progress, Amicable Settlement of Differences Table 4. Differences in the institutional framework of the US and the PRC

Table 4. shows the summary of what has been discussed before and provides an overview of the crucial differences in composition, scope and outline between the US and the Chinese hegemony. While the different concepts of liberal institutional thought about the impact of institutions and hegemony remain in

place, the reason for the hegemon to act (legitimacy) and the rules that guide the cooperation (values/norms) become variables that can be adapted to a larger variety of cases. It can be concluded that exchanging variables in the liberal institutionalist framework can help to analyse the PRC in the international system rationally without neglecting its differences and exceptionalities. As a result, the liberal institutional theory becomes more of a Sino-institutional approach. The challenging and most interesting aspect of Chinese foreign policy is situated where their choice of measures or behaviour is exceptional. Consequently, for liberal institutionalism to gain valuable insights for their concepts out of these phenomena, it is useful to elaborate on cases where the institutions they established work distinctively from the typical liberal international counterparts, like the regional forum institutions. Since these institutions function differently than the common liberal institutions, it is reasonable to introduce FPA as a deviating but complementary methodology to the discourse. The first part of the elaboration delivered a contextualisation of the rise of China and placed the phenomena into a Sino-specific conceptual background that was forged on the basis of liberal institutional thought. The following part tests the established framework in the case of FOCAC, by demonstrating how the presented ideas can be applied to the international relations of China.

P

ART

II

4.

C

HINA AND

A

FRICA

4.1

U

S

-A

R

The relation between the PRC and Africa has, just like China itself, various extraordinary components that make it particularly interesting to study. First and foremost, the considerable difference between China and Africa is important. Why would it be reasonable to treat an entire continent as an adequate partner for the PRC? While the PRC rose to the most rapidly developing country in the 21st _{century, the members of the}

AU and especially the Sub-Saharan countries remain the least developed region on earth. To put it bluntly: “China neither does nor is small. It is a truly massive country by just about any measure imaginable.” (Wright 2011: 209). The PRC is exceptional and through its capacities and dimensions clearly superior to any single African country. Eventhough Africa is primarily a geographic term, through the establishment of the AU and the increased solidarity among African states, scholars started to treat this collective of states

as one actor on the international stage (Magliveras & Naldi 2002). The AU “represents the most concrete manifestation towards the realisation of a process of political cooperation and economic integration of the States of the African Continent” (Ibid: 425). With 55 sovereign states, Africa is the continent with the biggest frequency of state entities, which makes it genuinely difficult for scholars to describe a coherent African agenda. Nevertheless, in this regard it must be recognised that the African states still mostly act individually but benefit immensely when adapting a unified voice through the AU. In the end, China and AU are two actors which are immensely different and difficult to compare and thus this relationship is foremost characterised by the distinctive features of each side. However, it can be useful to quickly point out the most striking differences to show the disproportions in power.

Peoples Republic of China African Union

Population 1.409.517 1.256.268

Surface Area 9.600.000 km² 30.311.000 km²

GDP (million current US$) 11.158.457 2.267.610

GDP per capita (current US$) 8.109,1 1.914,4

Table 5, Source: UNSD 2018

While population-wise the AU and China are quite similar, it is worth noting that despite its considerably larger surface area, Africa’s combined GDP falls far behind the one of the PRC. This neither means that the AU as a whole should be treated as an equal to the PRC nor does this imply that individual African states cannot effectively cooperate with China. However, as soon as states take collective actions as a union, their overall potential and bargaining leverage in negotiations rise immensely (See: Garrett & Weingast 1993). Therefore, it illustrates that the AU can be considered as a more adequate or fitting actor to cooperate with the PRC than the 55 African states individually. The gap in power capabilities is much smaller when dealing with the AU as a collective and the character of the cooperation becomes increasingly multilateral because the weaker states increase their bargaining leverage. Following the liberal institutional logic of cooperation, the African states will be much more inclined and accessible for the PRC when approaching them through the multilateral setting of the AU. Nevertheless, the different dynamics between these various actors and states is far more complex and cannot be understood by merely comparing their numbers. For a more comprehensive and in-depth view of Sino-African relations, the existing literature on this topic is evaluated in the following.

4.2

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R

S

-

A

R

An elaboration about the Chinese methods for the cooperation with African states needs a contextualisation on the PRC’s material interests in Africa to gain substance. Without knowing what the direct interests of China in the different African states are, it is not possible to analyse the more general objectives behind the chosen method of cooperation. Moreover, having an idea about the material interests enables a more elaborate discussion of findings. However, the Sino-African relations have been evolving over time and it is crucial to first understand the respective transformation processes in order to adequately approach the contemporary state of affairs.

Historically, China and Africa always had close relations, starting in the fifteenth century with the early merchant and navy fleets of the Ming Dynasty conducting trade with the rural eastern African regions (Besada & O’Bright 2017: 656). During the colonial era, these ties were severely cut as both areas were under colonial control. The reconnection of China and Africa and the birth of modern Sino-African relations gained traction between 1989 to 1993, starting with the end of the Cold War. The PRC presented itself to the African states as an alternative to their former colonial perpetrators and the morally obliging cooperation with the US. While the Western States have tied their cooperation to a fundamental commitment to their values, China with its non-interference policies constituted a welcomed alternative to the western democratisation projects in African countries (Taylor 1998: 447, 448). In a way, the Sino-African relations in the late 20th century developed on the grounds of solidarity between developing states that face the same alleged neo-imperialist pressures from the developed west. These contemporary relations had their debut following the Tiananmen-square incidents. In the aftermath of the PRC’s forceful answer towards the peaceful Tiananmen-square protests, the West and its allies condemned China for its actions (Besada & O’Bright 2017; Taylor 2006: 939). In this period, the PRC desperately searched for new partners and found them in the African state elites, which had been denunciated for their own domestic policies (Taylor 1998: 450,451).

The other factor that shaped the Sino-African relations was China’s shift from being oil exporter to a net-importer in 1993 (Albert 2017, Taylor 2006: 943). Every country’s economy and development is crucially vulnerable when it comes to energy security and the supply of energy resources. Without the availability of energy, a state’s economy and social structures would experience serious shortages, slowing down nearly every social and commercial process (Yergin 2006). The rise of China has boosted the industrialisation