The Microfoundations of Territorial Dispute:
A Survey Experiment on Positive Rhetoric in Support for Compromise
Master Thesis Political Science International Relations ‘Microfoundations of Conflict’
Author: Laurien Bender Studentnumber: 11785551 Supervisor: Dr. Seiki Tanaka
Second reader: Dr. Ursula Daxecker Hand in date: June 22, 2018
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis attempts to contribute to the literature on the microfoundations of international conflicts in the context of the ongoing territorial dispute on the Senkaku islands. First of all, I would like to thank my colleagues in the Research Project Group ‘Microfoundations of Conflict’, for their constant support and constructive feedback when needed. Also, I would like to thank Julia Bader who initially pointed me in the right direction with regards to the topic of my research. Furthermore, I would like to thank Ursula Daxecker for taking the time to be my second reader. My final thanks goes to my supervisor Seiki Tanaka, for his patience and flexibility, for all the useful literature he suggested, and for always helping me to see the bigger picture.
ABSTRACT
This study examines the role of positive rhetoric on public opinion on international
compromise in the context of the Senkaku territorial dispute. Scholars commonly agree with the underlying assumption that the existence of external threats make individuals more likely to oppose compromise. A Japanese survey experiment was conducted and distributed among 478 Japanese respondents. Results indicate that positive rhetoric invoking the Japanese peaceful identity has the power to influence public opinion in the context of international conflict, despite the existence of external threats. Further analyses find support for how positive rhetoric through collective, community, and individual mechanisms induces people’s support for compromise. This study contributes to the literature on microfoundations of international conflict, as well it provides implications for further research.
TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 2 ABSTRACT 3 1. INTRODUCTION 5 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 10 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 15
3.1 THE EFFECT OF RHETORIC ON COMPROMISE 16
3.2 CONCEPTUALIZING POSITIVE RHETORIC 17
3.3 THE MECHANISMS OF THE EFFECT OF POSITIVE RHETORIC 19
3.3.1 ROLE THEORY 19
3.3.2 STRATEGIC THINKING (OF OPPORTUNITY COSTS) 22
3.4 HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF POSITIVE RHETORIC 25
3.4.1 TRADE RELATIONSHIPS 25
3.4.2 PARTY AFFILIATION 26
3.4.3. KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTIONS 26
3.5 CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 27
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 28
4.1 PROCEDURE 29
4.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 30
4.3 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 30
4.4 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 30
4.4.1 INDEPENDENT SUB VARIABLES 33
4.4.2 CONTROL VARIABLES 33 4.4.3 MODERATOR VARIABLES 33 5. RESULTS 34 5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 34 5.2 MAIN RESULTS 36 5.3 REGRESSION ANALYSES 38 5.4 ONE-WAY ANOVA 39
5.5 POLITICAL AFFILIATION AND SUPPORT 39
5.6 INTERACTION 40
5.7 MECHANISMS 41
5.7.1 SUPPORT FOR COMPROMISE 41
5.7.2 OPPOSING THE COMPROMISE 44
6. DISCUSSION 45
7. CONCLUSION 48
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY 51
9. APPENDIX 60
Territorial disputes are generally considered one of the most salient international issues – scholars find that states are more willing to go to war over territorial disputes than over disputes based on other issue types (Vasquez, 1993; Vasquez, 2009; Vasquez and Henehan, 2001). Territorial disputes between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are no different from other counterparts. The stakes may be even higher for the particular dyad, as the disputed islands involve symbolic, political, economic and historical significance, which makes it painful for both China and Japan to give away to the other side (Koo, 2009). Japan claims that the islands were uninhabited when they first surveyed the Islands in the 1800s, and Japan has been in effective administrative control over the islands. But beginning of the 1970s, the Chinese government began to claim that the islands have been part of Chinese territory since the 15th century. The territorial dispute aggravated recently, in particular in 2012 when the Japanese government purchased the Islands from a private owner of the territory.
Japanese public’s mood over China and the territorial dispute more specifically reflects the hostile relationship between the two governments. Anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan are on a peak today, as a poll conducted by the Pew Reseach Centre in Washington finds that anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan reaches an extremely high point compared to other countries – 93% of Japanese see the People’s Republic of China negatively; this includes 48% of Japanese who have a very unfavorable view of China (Pew Research Centre, 2013). Many Japanese people also perceive that China uses issues such as official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and Japan’s School Education Law controversy as an excuse to gain
leverage over diplomacy and distract domestic dissidents’ attention. This suggests that it may be difficult for Japanese people to accept a compromise over the disputed islands.
However, the same poll conducted by the Pew Research Centre (2013) also finds that 80 percent of Japanese respondents are either ‘very concerned’ (35%) or ‘somewhat
concerned’ (45%) that the territorial dispute could erupt in a militarized conflict, which in turn suggests that the Japanese public may have an incentive to solve the dispute peacefully. This begs the following research question: Under what conditions are Japanese citizens willing to accept a compromise over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute?
Previous work tends to study what induces people’s support (or opposition) for the government’s belligerent action in international crises, and fewer research has been
conducted about what explains public support for a compromise over international conflicts. Among the research over the public’s support for international compromises, Quek and Johnston’s recent work (2018) published in International Security provides a groundwork to
examine the question. Studying Chinese attitudes toward a compromise over Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, they argue that when the government uses rhetoric invoking that militarized conflicts are costly, leaders’ approval rates tend to increase, which in turn helps the government de-escalate the dispute and possibly find a compromise with Japan.
More specifically, they find that two kinds of rhetoric are important in influencing public opinion: (1) peaceful identity and (2) economic development (Quek and Johnston 2018). The former suggests that when the government mentions that Chinese people are intrinsically in favor of peace, they are more likely to support a compromise. The latter suggests that when informed that international conflicts are detrimental to economic development, they become in favor of a compromise. Extending their research, this thesis also argues that Japanese citizens are more likely to support a compromise over the dispute when the government uses the two kinds of rhetoric related to peaceful identity and economic development. Here, I, by no means, assume that the Japanese government is willing to solve the dispute, but I simply examine conditions under which the public is willing to support the government’s compromise when it attempts to solve a dispute through the use of the rhetoric.
However, the thesis goes beyond demonstrating that rhetoric increases the likelihood of a compromise over international conflicts. Although Quek and Johnston (2018) find that rhetoric does have a significant effect on public opinion, they do not explore why this is the case. For example, for the economic development rhetoric, people may support a compromise because an international conflict affects their own economic interest or perhaps because they are concerned about the nation’s economic welfare as a whole. The debates over whether individual-level self-interests or collective (sometimes called socio-tropic) interests matter more have been discussed extensively in other fields such as international trade (Mansfield and Mutz 2009) and immigration issues (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). The thesis draws on the debates from other fields and theorizes why certain rhetoric is more likely to induce people’s willingness to accept an international compromise.
To examine my argument, I conduct an online survey experiment in Japan that embeds survey experiments. I randomly assign three different pieces of information to 478 Japanese respondents: (1) no information (i.e., Control); (2) peaceful rhetoric (i.e., Peaceful Identity Treatment); and (3) economic rhetoric (i.e., Economic Relations Treatment). Given the information, the respondents answer a hypothetical compromise that Japanese
government made over the territorial dispute. By comparing the three groups, I estimate the effect of rhetoric on people’s willingness to accept the compromise. After estimating the treatment effects, respondents answer why they support or oppose the compromise, which I
use to clarify the mechanisms about how rhetoric induces people’s support for a compromise. The survey experiment finds that surprisingly, a large number of the respondents across the three groups support the compromise (59.6 percent). As I expect, the respondents in both treatment groups also show higher support for a compromise than the counterpart in the control group. However, the differences are not statistically significant at the 10% level. The result section extensively discusses the non-findings, while alternative explanations shall be given in the discussion section.
The contributions of the thesis are threefold. First, the thesis contributes to the literature on the microfoundations of international conflicts. In particular, a large number of research find that the existence of external threats increases public support for hawkish foreign policy such as belligerent, retaliatory, or military action. Such threats include ones to territorial integrity; to nation’s reputation; to ingroups; and to superiority (Tanaka, 2015; Hermann, Tetlock and Visser, 1999; Jentleson, 1992; Jentleson and Britton, 1998; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Kam and Kinder, 2007; Herzon, Kincaid, & Dalton, 1978). Despite some disagreements among the scholars, they commonly agree with the underlying assumption that individuals’ threat perceptions make them more likely to oppose a
compromise (Huddy et al., 2005; Maoz and McCauley, 2009; Kam and Kinder, 2007). By examining the effect of rhetoric, the thesis points out that people can support a compromise despite the existence of external threats under some conditions.
Relatedly, a growing body of the literature examines people’s peaceful attitudes. Huddy et al. (2005) argue that people facing anxiety tend to prefer risk aversion behavior, thereby choosing the least risky option that includes opposition for belligerent policies. Tanaka, Tago and Gleditsch (2017b) also find that increased knowledge of economic relations leads to opposition to the government’s hawkish policies. Furthermore, a great amount of literature examines how the (human) costs of war such as casualties, lower people’s support for militarized conflicts (e.g., Gartner and Segura, 1998). Although these research suggest conditions under which people oppose hawkish foreign policies and
militarized conflicts, the thesis directly examines public support for a compromise, which is similar to but different from public opposition to hawkish policies, because support for a compromise can mean that citizens accept legal agreements that can have long-term impacts (e.g., ceding a territory permanently), while opposition to a hawkish policy tends to be one-shot.
Second, the thesis contributes to the literature on the effect of rhetoric on public opinion in three ways. First, rhetoric is often used by conveying negative information and
little is known about the effect of positive rhetoric on public support for a compromise. Here, positive rhetoric means the use of information by the government emphasizing a positive message as means to persuade the public (Quek and Johnston, 2018; Levin, Schneider and Gaeth, 1998). Second, the vast majority of research on rhetoric often examine presidential rhetoric in the United States, and examining the Japanese case should provide additional knowledge on the literature. Third, the thesis examines detailed mechanisms through which positive rhetoric affects people’s attitudes towards a compromise by incorporating both collective and individual considerations for public opinion. The three innovations should contribute to this specific literature, but because the effect of rhetoric on public attitudes toward international conflicts is under-examined, I believe the thesis’s focus on rhetoric also has implications to broader literature on the microfoundations of international conflicts.
Third, the thesis is relevant and timely at times when there is no indication that the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands will be solved through peaceful means. Even though the world is relatively getting more peaceful and threats of interstate conflicts have decreased in recent decades, East Asia remains one of the most dangerous regions with regards to international conflict (Pinker, 2011). With North Korea being an imminent threat to stability and prosperity in the region, international cooperation between Japan and China is considered important (Jiang, 2010) -- both Japan and China are the most important countries in the region that share a major responsibility in safeguarding the stability and prosperity of Asia.
But postwar Sino-Japanese relations has suffered from strained political relationships due to past wars, while economic interdependence between the two countries has flourished over time through increased trade and foreign direct investment, described as ‘cold politics, hot economics’. The unsettled sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands adds another layer to the ‘cold politics’ between the two countries, which can have a negative effect on the Sino-Japanese ‘hot’ economic relation (Pollins 1989; Wood 2009. The literature on territorial disputes find that once a dispute over a territory begins, it becomes more
difficult to end the conflict, thereby producing enduring rivals (Diehl and Goertz, 2001; Huth, 1996a, b; Vasquez, 2009; Vasquez and Valeriano, 2009; Vasquez and Henehan, 2001;
Walter, 2003).
The thesis aims to provide conditions under which we are more likely to observe a compromise over the disputed islands between Japan and China even when the ‘cold’ politics dominate the relationship between the two countries, which should be of interest to countries that are relevant to the region.
the literature of public opinion on hawkish foreign policies and points out where the thesis attempts to fill the gap in the literature. This study then introduces the theoretical framework and argument. The third chapter describes the research design, and the fourth chapter presents the findings of the quantitative analysis. The section also discusses several alternative
explanations for public support for compromise and elaborates on the findings of the theoretical mechanisms. Finally, in the discussion chapter, I briefly interpret the findings of the analyses and discuss alternative explanations and the limitations of this research, which is followed by the concluding chapter that summarizes the thesis and discusses implications to future research.
2.LITERATURE REVIEW
A large body of literature has argued that territorial disputes are generally considered one of the most salient international issues. Territorial issues, especially involving territorial contiguity, are more likely to lead to war than other disputes (Vasquez, 2009; Hensel, 1996, Diehl, 1985; Bremer, 1992). Holsti (1991) argues that a territorial dimension such as the unification of national state and protection of territorial integrity tends to result in a war, and finds empirical evidence that the use of force is often related to questions of territoriality (Holsti, 1991). Territorial conflicts seem to result in particularly aggressive and violent action among neighboring states, and Vasquez (2009) finds that bordering states, either by land or by sea, account for about two-third of interstate militarized confrontations (Vasquez, 2009).
Why do territorial disputes tend to result in militarized conflicts? Vasquez (2009) argues that it is related to human being’s biological nature -- demarcating a territory is a part of human and animal nature, and aggressive behavior is naturally displayed when humans establish or maintain territory and its boundaries (Vasquez, 2009). But the salience of territorial disputes also comes from political and economic added values attached to the territory. For example, Tanaka (2015) summarizes that states find it difficult to solve territorial disputes because a territory is often strongly associated with nationalism and a sense of national unity (i.e., political considerations) and also involve economic benefits including natural resources in and surrounding the territory (i.e., economic considerations).
Accordingly, the world today still observes many territorial disputes (e.g., China and India; Venezuela and Colombia; Eritrea and Djibouti; Iraq and Syria; Crimea; East China Sea; Israel and Palestine), although the number of interstate conflicts has declined over time (Pinker 2011). It is thus only natural that a growing number of scholars analyze how
In order to establish long-term peace, compromise or negotiated settlements is often examined in the literature as a typical example of such peaceful solutions to territorial disputes (Fravel, 2005; Huth, 1996; Goertz and Diehl, 1992; Mousseau, 1998). The
microfoundations of international compromise often focus on the effects of politicians and diplomats on foreign policy (Walker, Malici, Schafer, 2011), but a number of scholars increasingly examine the assumption that public opinion can constrain national leaders in their foreign policy choices, and going against the public will lead to electoral and non-electoral costs for both democratic and autocratic leader (Tomz, 2007; Tanaka, 2015; Quek and Johnston, 2018). Below, to highlight my contribution to the literature, I discuss what increases or decreases public support for a dovish policy and a compromise over international conflicts and, more specifically, territorial disputes.
The existence of threats is the most popular (negative) correlates of support for dovish policies in the literature. External threats generally increase public support for belligerent actions against another state (Gordon and Arian, 2001; Druckman, 1994; Huddy et al., 2005), but this is also the case of territorial disputes – external threats over territorial disputes tend to make citizens more hawkish or make them support for the government’s hawkish policies (Gibler, 2012; Vasquez, 2009), thereby decreasing of support for dovish policies.
Scholars suggest several mechanisms to connect external threats with public
opposition to dovish policies. The first mechanism lies with prejudice against the threatening other, or out-group (Bettencourt, Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Huddy et al., 2005). Prejudice towards out-groups are often based on psychological sources of threat, and scholars find that the feeling of a stronger threat from an out-group activates prejudice against a threatening group, which in turn leads to more support for belligerent policies or support for punitive actions against the group (Gordon and Arian, 2001; Huddy et al., 2005). Second, scholars argue that threats tend to trigger nationalism, thereby resulting in opposition for dovish policies (Hermann, Tetlock and Visser, 1999; Jentleson, 1992; Jentleson and Britton, 1998; Fischer and Smith, 2010; Gibler, Hutchison, and Miller, 2012; Tanaka, 2015). In particular, threats posed to nation’s territorial integrity can trigger nationalism, which makes individuals support their at-risk state, remain unified behind their nation, and support military action to safeguard their territory (Gibler, 2012). By using survey experiments, Tanaka (2015) confirms that individuals tend to oppose to make concessions over territory when a territory
is tied with nationalism (Tanaka, 2015).1
On the other hand, a growing body of literature examines conditions under which individuals tend to oppose belligerent action even with the existence of external threats. First, studies show that anxiety is related to risk-averse decision-making, and opposing belligerent action can be traced back to the psychological link between anxiety and risk aversion (Maner, 2007; Huddy, 2005; Friedland and Merari, 1985; Long, 1990; Lerner and Keltner, 2000; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999).
The literature proposes several mechanisms through which anxiety leads to risk-averse behavior, including opposition to belligerent action (Huddy et al., 2005; Jintleson & Britton, 1998. First, anxiety leads to risk-averse behavior. A general pattern of faster response times in surveys is observed when respondents detect a threat stimulus (Hartley, Phelps, 2012, p. 114). Such anxiety worsens cognitive functioning, as attention is also giving to threatening stimuli rather than nonthreatening stimuli. Therefore, people tend to become risk-averse to avoid hasty mistakes. Evidence indeed suggests that anxiety is related with higher levels of risk aversion (Hartley, Phelps, 2012; Huddy, 2005). Anxious people also perceive higher levels of risk, because they tend to associate risks with personal negative events (Huddy; 2005, Lerner and Keltner, 2000). Importantly, these mechanisms can be applied to the context of international conflicts. Huddy (2005) shows that anxiety leads to an
overestimation of risk, especially when it concerns personal risks such as attacks against your own people, and finds that when the government engages in a belligerent or retaliatory action, anxious individuals tend to perceive this action as personally dangerous and risky, thereby preferring dovish policies over the hawkish policies.
Scholars also find that when individuals perceive costs of war, they tend to oppose belligerent actions (Gartner, 2008; Mueller, 1973). For example, Mueller (1973) finds evidence that the perception about war casualties leads to public opposition to war in the cases of the Vietnam and Korean War. In addition, Gartner and Segura (1998) find that recent national losses in conflicts influence mass opinion and lead to public opposition for military action, as citizens want to avoid further losses in conflicts. Similarly, the probability of war
1 Making a compromise over a territorial dispute can lead to a reputation cost for the country (Tanaka,
2015, p. 520), and this can be associated with nationalism, because individuals may fear that their nation will suffer reputation losses, thereby hurting the nation (Baker & Oneal, 2001). With loss of reputation and damaging the nation’s image, the government in question may seem weak, allowing other states to take advantage of such circumstances
victory is also relevant in determining public support or opposition, and a lower chance of war victory tends to decrease public support for the war (Kull and Ramsay, 2001; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004).
Recent literature further advances the understanding about the relationships between costs of war and public opposition to military action, and points out that for citizens to make the cost-benefit analysis, they need to have sufficient information about costs of war and/or possible likelihood of war victory (Gartner, 2008; Mueller, 1973; Berinsky, 2007; Verba, Brody, & Parker, 1967). Tanaka, Tago, and Gleditsch (2017b) indeed find that when individuals have more knowledge about costs associated with military action, they tend to oppose military action. Further, scholars also discuss how the use of information can reduce hawkish public attitudes about international conflict (Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012; Quek and Johnston, 2018; Tanaka, Tago and Gleditsch, 2017a). For example, Tanaka, Tago, and Gleditsch (2017b) shows that graphical illustrations of cost information tend to increase public opposition to military action than textual illustrations and the authors interpret the results that the graphical illustrations tend to increase people’s understanding about costs associated with military action, which confirms the importance of how information affects public opposition to military action.
Relatedly, a different strand of scholars argues that not mere information, but what kinds of and when politicians provide information matters more. For example, scholars find that citizens tend to listen to information provided only by politicians whom they support -- they tend to trust the opinions of credible elites because the public has relatively little
information on foreign policy (Holsti, 2004; Gelpi, 2010). Within the context of the US, the importance of party identification has increased over time, and this implies that citizens will have greater support for dovish policies, in this case compromise, if the leaders of their own political party propose the compromise (Brutger, 2017).
Quek and Johnston (2018) also find that elites’ rhetoric, by which they mean information provided by the government, influence public opinion. Quek and Johnston (2018) use two types of rhetoric in their survey experiment with Chinese individuals. They provide respondents with either a statement of the Chinese government invoking “Chinese peaceful identity” or “economic costs of conflict on China’s economic development” to persuade the respondents that backing down in a crisis over the Senkaku/Diaoyu territory can be justified (Quek and Johnston, 2018). Quek and Johnston (2018) further make a distinction between positive and negative rhetoric; the former emphasizes benefits and gains (for
on costs and negative outcomes of militarized conflict (see also Levin, Schneider and Gaeth, 1998).
Gelpi’s (2010) studies the formation of public opinion towards war with the case of the surge mission in Iraq2 in 2007, and finds that the framing of information -- either positive
or negatively -- has an effect on public attitudes. More specifically, he examines the effect of presidential rhetoric on three partisan groups: Republicans, Independents and Democrats. Although the results suggest that overall presidential rhetoric by President Bush had relatively little impact on their attitudes toward Iraq, negative presidential rhetoric,
emphasizing the low political progress made (negative outcomes) by Bush has a larger effect on public attitudes than a positive rhetoric (Gelpi, 2010)
So far, I have discussed the literature on the microfoundations of opposition to belligerent actions. Although a growing body of research has examined conditions under which the public oppose belligerent action, few studies have examined when the public supports dovish policies over international disputes, such as compromise. Further, much remains unknown about the role of rhetoric in public attitudes toward international disputes and dovish policies. Even when rhetoric is examined, a main focus of the studies is often on American public opinion and the effect of Presidential and partisan rhetoric. Research on Americans’ support for an international compromise is certainly relevant. However, it is not representative of public opinion across the globe as a whole, and in my opinion, it is
important to study the effect of rhetoric on public support for dovish policies, in this case compromise, in one of the hottest territorial disputes across the globe today: the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
In addition, mechanisms through which rhetoric can increase the chance of public support for dovish policies remains unexplored. Research must be conducted to examine how one can increase the chance of public support for dovish policies in the context of
international conflicts, in particular highly salient issues of territorial disputes. Quek and Johnston (2018) open the discussion and provide an important framework about when rhetoric can increase public support for a peaceful conflict resolution. I extend their research by examining Japanese public opinion and also elaborating the mechanisms.
2The ‘’surge’’ strategy implemented by the Bush administration beginning in February 2007 ‘’involved a change in the mission of U.S. force – to include population protection – but the most salient aspect of the surge to the public was increase in the number of U.S. forces in Baghdad and Anbar province’’ (Gelpi, 2007, p. 93).
3.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This theoretical section explains why positive rhetoric is essential to cancel out the negative effect of threats and how it can increase a chance of public support for dovish policies. As compromise is often examined in the literature as a typical example of peaceful solutions to territorial disputes(Fravel, 2005; Huth, 1996; Goertz and Diehl, 1992; Mousseau, 1998), this research focuses on public support for compromise. In this research specifically, I
link positive rhetoric, rather than negative rhetoric, to public support for compromise based on the recent work of Quek and Johnston (2018). There, I argue that positive rhetoric
functions as the essential link in increasing the chance of public support for a compromise in international conflict. Lastly, I elaborate mechanisms through which positive rhetoric
increases the likelihood of supporting the compromise, followed by a summary of the section with the complete conceptual model and a list of my hypotheses.
3.1THE EFFECT OF RHETORIC ON COMPROMISE
As mentioned, research on public opinion on international conflicts repeatedly indicates that the existence of external threats increases public support for hawkish foreign policy (Gordon and Arian, 2001). Individuals who believe the territorial unity of their nation is threatened are more likely to see the necessity to defend the state’s territory (Tanaka, 2015). Other individuals who experience threats to their group’s resources are likely to have increased prejudice and intolerance to the outgroup, fostering support for aggressive and risky policies (Huddy et al., 2005; Bettencourt et al., 2001).
A growing body of literature directly examines people’s attitudes toward a
compromise such as the recent work by Quek and Johnston (2018) that finds that there are conditions under which individuals, despite the existence of external threats, are more willing to support a compromise. They argue that leaders’ approval rates tend to increase when the government uses rhetoric invoking the costs of military conflicts, which suggests that increasing the leaders’ approval helps the government to de-escalate the dispute and potentially find a compromise with Japan (Quek and Johnston, 2018).
Following Quek and Johnston (2018), this thesis argues that regardless of regime types, rhetoric can increase public support for a compromise over territorial disputes, and more specifically, Japanese citizens, despite the existence of external threats, are more likely to support compromise over the dispute when the government uses rhetoric. Below, I first conceptualize rhetoric based on Quek and Johnston (2018), in which rhetoric is defined as a government statement providing specific information. Subsequently, as the primary focus of this research, I also define positive rhetoric as a government statement conveying a positive message to persuade the public to approve a compromise.
Several scholars examine the effect of the use of mere factual information on public opinion in the context of international conflict (Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012; Tanaka, Taga and Gleditsch 2017b), but research on the use of rhetoric on public opinion remains relatively under-examined. Quek and Johnston’s recent work (2018) seems to be the
exception rather than the rule, and are the first ones to demonstrate that rhetoric can reduce disapproval rates for backing down and increase public approval for compromise in the context of international conflict. Therefore, this research aims to contribute to the academic field by examining the effect of rhetoric and providing new insights into understanding how public opinion can be influenced by rhetoric, in particular, positive rhetoric.
3.2CONCEPTUALIZING POSITIVE RHETORIC
The following section discusses the distinctive effect of negative or positive framing of information on individuals’ attitudes. Rhetoric and information differ in a sense that rhetoric is defined as a statement by the government on a specific issue, while information is mere factual knowledge on an action or an issue (Quek and Johnston, 2018). While rhetoric is usually aimed to influence the public, information does not inherently possess this persuasive function. Although rhetoric and information are substantially different, a shared characteristic is that both convey a message. Therefore, literature that discusses the distinction between negative and positive information is also applicable to the context of rhetoric.
Scholars who study how specific information can influence individuals’ attitudes repeatedly argue that framing the same information in either a ‘’positive or a negative light’’ affects individuals’ judgments and decisions (Levin, Schneider and Gaeth, 1998, p. 150; Druckman, 2001; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). Individuals respond differently to different but objectively comparable descriptions of the same problem (Levin, Schneider and Gaeth, 1998). For example, whether information emphasizes the positive consequences of an issue such as potential gains and benefits, or the negative consequences of the same issue such as potential costs and losses, has different effects on how people perceive the issue (Levin, Schneider and Gaeth, 1998).
So far, the literature attempts to provide an answer to the question of which frame, positive or negative, has a more significant impact on public opinion. It finds that negative information is more likely to affect people’s attitudes than positive information, as
individuals are more highly motivated to avoid a loss than obtaining a gain (Meyerowitz and Chaiken, 1987; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Rimal and Real, 2003; Meyerowith and Chaiken, 1987). Similarly, Gleditsch, Tago and Tanaka (2017b) find convincing evidence in the context of international conflict that despite the existence of external threats, information on the likely costs of military conflict, thus a negative frame, reduces support for aggressive governmental action.
field of international conflict. To be sure, there are exceptions in the literature on
international conflict in this regard. The ‘peaceful identity’ rhetoric in Quek and Johnston (2018) implies a positive frame, where greater emphasis is on the gains and benefits of being peaceful, leading to peaceful resolution of the conflict. The other rhetoric tool Quek and Johnston (2018) use – the ‘economic development’ rhetoric – is considered as a negative rhetoric, because in their formulation, the Chinese government invokes the economic costs of military conflict as a reason for not acting with force. The results of their survey experiment in China suggest that the positive rhetoric (i.e., peaceful identity) increases public approval rate by 9%, whereas the negative rhetoric (i.e., economic development) also increases public approval rate by 8%. Even though the difference of public approval rate between the positive and negative rhetoric is minor, it does suggest that positive rhetoric in the context of
international conflict has an equally persuasive effect on public opinion. This indicates a contribution to the literature on the relationship between information and public opinion that primarily finds that negative information is more effective than positive one.
Drawing on the pioneer study by Quek and Johnston (2018), the thesis focuses on positive rhetoric3. As much remains unknown on the effect of different kinds of positive
rhetoric, in addition to the peaceful identity rhetoric, the thesis adds one more positive rhetoric: economic relations. Quek and Johnston (2018) and Gleditsch, Tago, and Tanaka (2017b) find that information/rhetoric emphasizing economic costs of conflicts increases public support for peaceful solutions over the conflicts. By using the same logic although, with a positive frame, I argue that when the government conveys positive information on the beneficial and prosperous Sino-Japanese economic relation, people are more likely to support the compromise. Both rest on economic opportunity costs, but my ‘economic relations’ rhetoric only suggests such costs implicitly and diverts more attention to positive benefits of preserving economic relations as a result of supporting the compromise. If Quek and
Johnston (2018)’s findings on positive ‘peaceful identity’ rhetoric generally hold, the
positive, ‘economic relations’ rhetoric should have as an equally positive impact on people’s attitudes towards a compromise as the negative, ‘economic costs’ rhetoric. The next
subsection extensively elaborates on the mechanisms through which rhetoric can increase the
3 To reiterate the definition of positive rhetoric, here, it is defined as the use of information by the
government conveying a positive message with more attention to benefits and gains rather than costs and losses as means to persuade the public (Quek and Johnston, 2017; Levin, Schneider and Gaeth, 1998).
chance of public support for compromise.
Please note that Quek and Johnston (2018)’s research is conducted in China where the regime is autocratic. Although Weeks (2008) finds that autocratic regimes have similar audience costs as democratic ones, more information is available, and citizens develop more critical attitudes towards authorities in (advanced) democracies (Inglehart 2006). Thus, it is essential to study the impact of positive rhetoric on a democratic regime and extend the Quek and Johnston (2018)’ research (e.g., Japan for the thesis). However, because Quek and Johnston (2018) and Tanaka, Tago and Gleditsch (2017b) find similar effects of negative rhetoric/information in China and Japan, respectively, I expect that Japanese citizens are willing to support a compromise over territorial disputes when the government provides positive rhetoric.
The following subsection will draw on debates from other fields and theorizes why these two kinds of rhetoric – peaceful identity and economic relations – are more likely to induce Japanese people’s willingness to accept an international compromise.
3.3THE MECHANISMS OF THE EFFECT OF POSITIVE RHETORIC
3.3.1ROLE THEORY
First, I explain three different mechanisms through which peaceful identity rhetoric increases public support for a compromise over territorial disputes. Here, to specify why peaceful identity positive rhetoric has a pacifying effect, I follow Quek and Johnston (2018) and primarily rely on role theory. Although Quek and Johnston (2018) do not consider how role theory affects considerations on different levels, I argue that role theory serves as an explanatory framework for considerations on three levels: collective, community, and individual level.
More specifically, role theory can be subdivided into (1) national role conceptions as collective considerations, (2) social identity as community-based considerations, (3) moral identity as individual considerations. Role theory rests on the logic of appropriateness, wherein action derives from the conception of the necessity to behave according to one’s role, as in to ‘’maintain consistency between behavior and a conception of self in a social role’’ (March and Olsen, 2010, p. 161).
Role theory took its place in the literature during the 1970s, mainly in the field of sociology, psychology and anthropology, which stressed the constitutive effects and the process of recognition. More recently, scholars in foreign policy analysis and international relations give attention to role theory as an explanation for the systemic dynamics of role
change on both state level and individual level (Wendt, 1999; Harnisch et al., 2011). Role theory generally suggests that when people identify themselves a member of social in-group, ‘’they will tend to act in ways consistent with the constitutive norms of that identity’’
(Abdelal et al. 2009; Quek and Johnston, 2018). But the underlying motivations why actors act consistently to their to role can be divided into collective, community, and individual levels.
National role conceptions
On the collective level, national role conceptions explain why states act consistently to their role, as suggested in the framework of role theory (Walker, 1987; Le Prestre, 1997). National role conceptions refer to when a state defines its role as peaceful, the state is expected to perform on a continuing basis to preserve this role (Holsti, 1970). National role conceptions, therefore, serve a utilizing role, as it provides the state with a set of norms to/in which the state should act accordingly to. In this sense, national role conceptions are
primarily normative explanations of state behavior, which may help to understand foreign policy.
Japan’s contemporary national role conception was established during the 1950s and 1960s under the protection of the U.S. hegemon. Japan developed a nonviolent political culture as it developed a passive and anti-militarist stance on its defense and security issues (Katzenstein and Okawara, 2002; Oros, 2008). Ever since, Japan has been dedicated to strive for peace domestically and internationally. Although the claim of Japan having a pacifist national role is empirically unproven, the Constitution of Japan illustrates that Japan is committed to advocate for peace:
‘’We, the Japanese people, … resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government … We … desire peace for all time … and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world’’
If we can assume that as role theory suggests, most “decisions will be reasonably consistent with role conceptions”, going against this role will cause turmoil and imbalance in the international system (Holsti, 1970, p. 360). Some Japanese individuals may be concerned with Japan’s role compliance, as non-conformity will cause an imbalance in the international system. It is, thus, preferable that Japan will act consistent to its peaceful role in the
international system, and solve a conflict with peaceful measures.
its peaceful national role conception. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently suggested a revision of Article 9 of the pacifist Constitution by adding another clause that would legitimize Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, which later provoked a strong public opposition (Japan Times, 2017). As the Constitution has kept the country pacifist for the past 70 years, the public is divided on what amendments can be made (Japan Times, 2017). According to Jiji Press, one of the major Japanese news agencies, 68,4% would oppose the Diet adopting the proposal, while 51,3% of the respondents said they were opposed to amending the
supreme code hastily. 17,1% also said they were opposed to any revision at all (Japan Times, 2017). These numbers indicate that a substantial number of Japanese individuals are reluctant to accept any amendments to the Constitution. This gives rise to the expectation that
collective considerations of Japan’s peaceful national role conception will be the most meaningful to individuals.
In the context of this study, role theory suggests that if the Japanese government invokes the peaceful identity of the Japanese people through positive rhetoric as a reason for compromise over the Senkaku islands, individuals are more likely to support the decision, as they support actions that are perceived to be with Japan’s national role conception of anti-militarism and pacifism.
Social identity theory
The social identity theory interprets role theory and its implications for behavior on the level of the community. The social identity theory, which finds its origins in role theory, refers to how individuals act according to the group or community they feel they belong to. Individuals define themselves in terms of salient group membership, wherein a sense of belonging to people who are similar to them and the perception of ‘oneness’ are essential (Ashfort, 1989). It implies that appropriate behavior can be defined accordingly to the groups that ‘we’ and ‘others’ belong to. Quek and Johnston (2018) rely on this level of role theory and mention that individuals who define themselves as members of a social in-group tend to act consistently to the constitutive norms of that identity. Japanese individuals who
characterize ‘peaceful’ as a central feature to the nature of Japanese people, will tend to act in ways consistent with that feature.
From this, instead of individuals supporting the decision over a compromise based on their belief that Japan as a nation should conform to its national role in order to prevent asymmetry in the international system, this perspective suggests that individuals will support the decision as it is perceived to be in line with the general Japanese identity of Japanese
people. This leads to the expectation that positive rhetoric invoking Japan’s peaceful identity, generates public support for compromise.
Moral identity
Constitutive norms are not only constituted in community settings; but, norms can also be a construct of one’s moral identity. The individual level refers to the perception of the self, where moral identity defines a person’s sense of how he or she is related to his or her actions (Aquino and Reed, 2002). A central tenet to this notion is that a person’s moral reasoning and moral identity motivates moral action and “predicts his or her moral behavior” (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984; Hart et al., 1998). The relation between moral identity and behavior rests on the notion that an individual perceives moral features as being
fundamental to his or her self-concept (Aquino and Reed, 2002).
Moral identity is used, just like other social identities, as a basis to construct the definitions of the ‘self’ (Erikson, 1964; Aquino and Reed, 2002). However, the construction of one’s moral identity differs from the construction of social identity as it is not constructed by reflecting the identity of others, instead it is a reasoning of the self.
As the majority of Japanese individuals raise objections to potential amendments of the pacifist Constitution, we can assume that Japanese individuals value their own moral identity and will act accordingly. Therefore, the exposure of positive rhetoric on peaceful identity will prompt individuals, who believe that peacefulness is central to their identity, to act according to their moral identity and thus support the government’s decision to
compromise.
3.3.2STRATEGIC THINKING (OF OPPORTUNITY COSTS)
Individuals’ strategic thinking is valuable to fully comprehend the pacifying effect of positive, economic rhetoric. Strategic thinking would indicate that individuals make
economic cost-benefit analyses on the benefits of economic relations and the costs of war – in particular, most scholars rely on the notion of economic opportunity costs (Gartzke and Li, 2003). Strategic thinking, in this sense, derives from the logic of consequences, wherein preferences and expectations about consequences drive actions. From this perspective, individuals will act upon the realistic expectations of its consequences with a rational calculation of the cost and benefits (March and Olsen, 2010, p. 160).
These expectations of its consequences can mainly be drawn back to cost-benefit analysis with the emphasis on economic opportunity costs. The concept of opportunity costs refers to the notion that conflict will damage trade and economic relations that can result in
loss of gains for both states. To prevent the loss of these gains, states pre-emptively become more cooperative and less hostile to each other (Polacheck and Xiang, 2010). Some scholars argue that individuals tend to think in the context of opportunity costs in international conflict, as they want to prevent the loss of economic gains (e.g., Tanaka, Tago, and Gleditsch 2017b). Berinsky (2007) also suggests that the public supports the war “if the benefits of action outweigh the costs of conflict” (Berinsky, 2007, p. 975). Below, I argue that these kinds of calculations can be divided into three different levels of consideration: (1) socio-tropic, (2) community, and (3) individual levels.
Socio-tropic considerations
Several scholars suggest that socio-tropic considerations play a substantial role in people’s considerations in general (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Sears and Funk, 1990). Socio-tropic opinion formation involves considerations on the effects of issues on the society at large rather than purely personal circumstances (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981; Kinder and Sears, 1981; Lau et al., 1978). The body of work generally concludes that the majority of people are unaware of their economic self-interest and that other factors such as the well-being of the nation play a much more significant role in shaping their opinions (Fordham and Kleinberg, 2012). In the context of trade, Mansfield and Mutz (2009) show that citizens are more likely to form their attitudes toward trade based on its perceived effects on the national economy and the country as a whole rather than the effect on themselves.4 Sears and Funk (1990)
confirm this by stating that economic-self interest plays a minimal role in shaping political attitudes.
According to Kinder and Kiewiet (1981), socio-tropic voters support leaders and governments that appear to have furthered the nation’s economic well-being. It is thus possible that Japanese individuals are concerned with the nation’s economic well-being as a whole, as deeper economic integration expands choice and lowers prices for consumers by broadening supply sources of goods and services. Furthermore, good cooperative economic
4
However, strictly speaking, it is difficult to entangle individual from socio-tropic considerations. It could be argued that socio-tropic judgments are indirect self-regarding concerns. According to Bitrin, Green, Muste and Wong (1997) people are sometimes unable to see personal implications of general policies and therefore use information about the state of the nation as evidence of their own present future circumstances (Public Opinion toward Immigration Reform: the Role of Economic Motivations, p. 876). For example, some people may be concerned with national-level innovation, but this will benefit themselves in the long run.
relations provide new market opportunities for domestic firms and foreign direct investment, increase productivity and create space for innovation through competition.
Conflict can disrupt economic relations (Polacheck, 1980) which in turn can lead to national unemployment, inflation, and risk of lost goods. The potential costs of conflict induce individuals to prefer peaceful policies to prevent the loss of the economic gains (Polacheck and Xiang, 2010). From this perspective, Japanese individuals who tend to value socio-tropic considerations will be willing to accept a compromise because they believe the compromise can boost Japan’s economic performance, in particular when the government conveys positive rhetoric on the economic relationship between Japan and China.
Community-based considerations
Second, community-based considerations can also play a substantial role in
individual’s support for a compromise over an international conflict, because a disruption in economic relations can affect the economic well-being of the specific community, rather than the prosperity of the state or the self (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981; Fordham and Kleinberg; 2012).
However, some scholars argue that it is difficult to separate community-based considerations from both socio-tropic and individual considerations. Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) argue that community-based considerations are part of socio-tropic considerations that proceeds out of altruistic concern for the well-being of all citizens. On the other hand,
Fordham and Kleinberg (2012) argue it is difficult to separate individual self-interest from group interests. People interact the most with people whom they have corresponding interests with. This results in the fact that individuals may come to hold specific attitudes about
policies that are perceived to be beneficial or harmful to the group.
Japanese individuals who have similar interests with the Japanese community at large will prefer a policy that is favorable for the well-being of Japanese people. Individuals will be prompted to act upon the realistic expectations of its consequences, and prefer a policy that is more beneficial to the economic well-being of Japanese people in general. From this
perspective, positive rhetoric conveying the positive Sino-Japanese economic relation, will increase the chance of public support for compromise as it benefits the economic well-being of Japanese people.
Individual considerations
Third, individual considerations, or ‘pocketbook’ according to Kinder and Kiewiet (1981), refer to how conflict causes personal economic self-interest. Self-interests is defined
as the material well-being of the individual’s personal life (Sears and Funk, 1990). Personal experiences, or in particular personal economic experiences, drive attitudes towards policy. As rational consumers, individuals weigh a war’s anticipated costs and benefits (Gartner and Segura, 2005; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifter, 2005). If individuals’ utility for estimated costs exceeds their estimated value of the benefits, they oppose the conflict. Extending this logic, I expect that if people value economic benefits of a compromise more than its costs, they should be more willing to support the compromise.
People are concerned with preserving good economic and trade relations, as a prosperous economic environment increases stronger wages due to a healthy, competitive business environment. Second, high influx of goods and high export provides Japanese citizens with relatively cheap products made in China, which increases the purchasing power of a household. Furthermore, economic integration provides new markets for domestic producers and increases job opportunities. Thus, in general, economic and trade integration (or no disruption) provide better life opportunities for individuals (Friedman et al., 2011; Newfarmer and Sztajerowska, 2012).
From this perspective, as conflict can potentially damage individual’s economic benefits, individuals are more likely to support peaceful measures to support conflict. Therefore, this research expects that when positive rhetoric emphasizes the positive Japan-China economic relations, individuals will be prompted to make cost-benefit calculations and become aware that the benefits of economic relations outweigh the costs of war, thereby supporting a compromise.
As mentioned previously, it is difficult to disentangle three different considerations, in particular for the strategic thinking (i.e., economic relations rhetoric). In the empirical
analyses below, I attempt to tear them apart and contribute to understandings about when individuals are willing to support a compromise over salient territorial disputes. As literature generally finds that socio-tropic considerations play a much more significant role in shaping opinion (Sears and Funk, 1990; Mansfield and Mutz; 2009; Fordham and Funk, 2012), I expect that individuals find socio-tropic considerations more important than individual, self-interested consideration when they decide to support a compromise, but this is primarily an empirical question.
3.4HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF POSITIVE RHETORIC
3.4.1TRADE RELATIONSHIPS
may vary across different groups of individuals within a society. For example, some
individuals may be more likely to be responsive to positive ‘economic relations’ rhetoric than others, as some individuals have more vested interest in maintaining trade and economic relations (Tanaka, Tago, and Gleditsch, 2017b). Individuals who stand to benefit from international trade or prosperous economic relations will experience greater economic costs of conflict (Fordman, 2008). Those individuals should support the policies needed to ensure an international order in which these activities are possible (Fordham, 2008). This suggests that peaceful measures to solve the conflict such as negotiated settlements are more beneficial for some individuals than for others. Thus, this thesis also expects that Japanese having trade relations with China are more likely to be responsive to positive ‘economic relations’ rhetoric and increase their support for compromise.
3.4.2PARTY AFFILIATION
Scholars find that individuals’ partisanship accounts for the pattern in which
individuals listen to partisan political actors (Berinsky, 2007; Brutger, 2017). Citizens tend to listen to information provided only by politicians whom they support, due to evaluations of credibility of the political actor, and the assumption of shared preferences (Groeling and Baum, 2008; Popkin, 1994; Rahn, 1993). Therefore, the thesis also expects supporters of the Liberal Democratic Party, Japan’s ruling political party, are more likely to be responsive to positive rhetoric by the government, and thus more likely to support the government’s decision to compromise.
3.4.3.KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTIONS
Variation in individual knowledge and awareness about the issues may result in heterogeneous effects of positive rhetoric. Tanaka, Tago, and Gleditsch (2017b) find that the degree of awareness of economic costs affects the effect of information on public opinion, as greater awareness of economic costs is associated with stronger opposition to military
actions. Therefore, this study assumes individuals to be more responsive to positive, economic rhetoric, if they are aware of Sino-Japanese economic relations.
Similarly, individuals who believe Japan is a ‘peace-loving’ country may be more likely to react to the government’s ‘peace identity’ rhetoric. Although this thesis assumes that a ‘peace-loving’ character is an important aspect of Japanese identity in general, it is only natural to expect that some people already have stronger, pre-existing beliefs about the peace identity than others. It is thus possible that the former may be more responsive to the positive rhetoric -- being peace-loving will prompt the individuals to associate more with the positive
rhetoric of ‘peaceful identity’.
3.5CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
Finally, I summarize the theoretical discussion I have so far had. Figure 1.
summarizes the proposed conceptual model that links positive rhetoric to public support for compromise with the existence of external threats. I expect that two kinds of positive rhetoric – peaceful identity and economic relations – will lead to an increase in public support for compromise over territorial disputes by cancelling out the negative effect of threat. From this, I expect at least the followings to be true:
H1: Individuals who are exposed to positive rhetoric emphasizing Japan’s peaceful identity are more likely to support the government’s decision to compromise with China over the territorial disputes.
H2: Individuals who are exposed to positive political rhetoric emphasizing the economic relations between Japan and China are more likely to support the government’s decision to compromise with China over the territorial disputes.
The ‘peaceful identity’ rhetoric expects to increase public support for compromise, because the peaceful identity perceives to be consistent with: (1) Japan’s national role conception; (2) general Japanese peaceful identity; and/or (3) individuals’ own peaceful nature. The economic relations rhetoric expects to increase public support for compromise because it prompts individuals to make cost-benefit calculations and find that the benefits of the economic relations outweigh the costs of war based on: (1) the nation’s economic well-being; (2) the economic well-being of Japanese people in general; and/or (3) personal economic benefits. The empirical analyses explore the plausibility of each mechanism.
4.RESEARCH DESIGN
The of this study is to examine the role of whether positive rhetoric increases the chance of public support for compromise. This has been done by conducting a survey experiment based on random sampling. Previous studies on public opinion on foreign policy predominantly used surveys to conduct research (Johnston & Quek, 2018; Page & Shapiro, 1983; Tanaka, 2015). As the aim of this study is to contribute to the field of research on public support for foreign policy, in this case, compromise, the study would share a similar research design with previous studies on public support for compromise. The use of a survey experiment allows the research to examine the effect of positive rhetoric on compromise through manipulation.
4.1PROCEDURE
Citizens of Japan were asked to participate in the survey experiment through the Japanese crowdsourcing company CrowdWorks. Respondents were redirected to the
Qualtrics survey link and were informed that the topic of the research concerned International Relations with regards to Japan and its territory. Participation in the survey was entirely voluntary and those participating and completing the survey were entitled to receive a small compensation. In addition, anonymity and confidentiality of all information gathered are ensured.
The survey was distributed twice, the first survey was issued on May 4th 2018 issue
and included 307 respondents, while the second was released on May 13th 2018 and included
231 respondents. The reason for a second release was due to a human error, as the first survey excluded the mechanisms questions for the two treatment groups. The researched decided to release the survey for a second time, only including the two treatment groups. The second release was also posted on the crowdsourcing service company CrowdWorks, which
increased the chance of some respondents participating in both surveys. In order to increase the validity of the research, responses of respondents who participated in both the first and second release were excluded from the results. A comparison of IP addresses, responses and end-date and time of the survey were necessary to make an accurate assumption of those who participated in both of the surveys. The decision to exclude these results were due to the possibility that these respondents may reproduce their first answer, and would therefore not be genuine responses. Therefore, 60 duplicates were excluded which resulted in a number of 478 respondents.
After the collection of the 478 respondents, the survey data from Qualtrics was converted into an Excel file. After manually adjusting the dataset into the correct outline, the dataset was exported to SPSS, in which the analysis could be executed. First, a randomization check was conducted in order to check whether the random sample was successful. Thereafter, a
descriptive statistics table of all relevant variables was conducted. After the initial
exploration, the research conducts a regression analysis in order to analyze any statistical significance among the independent variables. The regression analysis includes control variables in order to find the most accurate results possible. If the results suggest non-findings, a calculation of power will help to detect the minimum sample size required for further research. In order to see whether the means of the variables of the groups were
significantly different, the research conducts a One-Way ANOVA test. Also, the creation of interaction variables allows the research to draw further conclusions regarding auxiliary arguments.
4.2EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
As previously mentioned, this study conducts a survey experiment. To test the hypotheses, an original Japanese survey experiment was distributed among Japanese citizens through CrowdWorks, a Japanese crowdsourcing company. Based on the proposed
conceptual model, the expectation is that positive rhetoric cancels out the negative effect of threat, and increases public support for compromise. The survey experiment consists of three groups in which respondents are assigned to: (1) ‘Control’, (2) ‘Peace’, (3) ‘Economic’. Respondents will answer several demographic questions. Subsequently, depending on the group they are assigned to, respondents will read a hypothetical scenario on the territorial dispute. In the ‘independent variable’ section, I will elaborate on the content of the scenario. This study has 478 respondents with a fair distribution between male (49,8%) and female (49,4%), counting 0,8% non-responsive.
4.3DEPENDENT VARIABLE
After randomly assigning the respondents in one of the scenarios, the following question was asked to measure the willingness to support or oppose the Japanese
government’s decision to compromise: ‘’Do you support the government decision?’’ on a 4-point scale: 1 (strongly agree), 2 (somewhat agree), 3 (somewhat disagree), 4 (strongly disagree). Compromise is operationalized in all three scenarios as ‘’The Japanese
government agreed with the Chinese government that they will set up a joint task force to discuss joint resources development and joint sovereignty control over the islands’’.
Comparing the respondent’s answers to different considerations at work should allow me to estimate the effect of positive political rhetoric on approval of the decision to compromise in a setting of threat.
4.4INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
This research examines support for compromise over the Senkaku under three
scenarios, wherein the respondents were randomly assigned to each scenario. All respondents were provided with a hypothetical scenario stating the current state of affairs in the context of the Senkaku islands. To empirically test whether positive rhetoric can neutralize the effect of threat, an element of threat was added stating: ‘the Chinese government has increased activity
around the Senkaku islands’. As existing literature argues that threat increases support for belligerent action, I expect that the results for the baseline scenario show a higher rate of opposing compromise over the Senkaku islands than after positive rhetoric (Gordon and Arian, 2001; Huddy et al., 2005).
The first scenario is the control scenario, where the Japanese government agreed to set up a joint task force mentioned below. Scenario 1 serves as the baseline scenario for all of the groups including a threat by the Chinese government. In the experiment, a hypothetical scenario was developed.
Scenario 1 (as base line and control group): This is a hypothetical scenario. Japan and China have ongoing territorial disputes over the Senkaku islands. Japan effectively controls the Senkaku islands, but China also claims its ownership of the Senkaku islands. The Chinese government has increased activity around the Senkaku islands. According to multiple major Japanese media, today, the Japanese government agreed with the Chinese government that they will set up a joint task force to discuss joint resources development and joint sovereignty control over the islands.
As far as I am aware, this hypothetical scenario seems to be the most realistic
scenario. In the actual dispute, Japan claims sovereignty and exercises administrative control over the islands. Since 2012, China challenged Japanese control by regularly sending
government vessels inside the territorial waters limits. Most recent, on June 5th 2018, Chinese
patrol ships have entered the disputed territorial waters (NHK Japan, 2018). Furthermore, the opening of a military ‘hotline’ between the Japanese and Chinese senior defense officials to prevent military clash in the East China Sea is a modest, but significant step towards
cooperation (Financial Times, 2018). Thus, the scenario of compromise is not an unrealistic one.
However, despite the baseline opposing compromise, this research expects that providing positive rhetoric on Japan’s peaceful identity or the good economic relations between Japan and China will mitigate disapproval for compromise and makes respondents more likely to support compromise. As positive rhetoric is conceptualized as the use of information by the government declaring a positive message, the experimental conditions will emphasize a positive message as a means to persuade the public (Quek and Johnston, 2018; Levin, Schneider and Gaeth, 1998).
Through linking the invocation of Japanese peaceful identity as a reason not to use force, respondents will be more likely to support compromise. Also, I assume that putting
emphasis on prosperous Sino-Japanese economic relations should activate respondents to make cost-benefits calculations about the benefits of economic and trade relations and the potential economic costs of war.
Thus, based on the proposed conceptual model two scenarios were designed to test the experimental conditions of positive rhetoric. The second scenario is the ‘peaceful identity’ treatment, in which an additional paragraph is added to the baseline scenario, mentioned above.
Scenario 2 (peaceful identity): This is a hypothetical scenario. Japan and China have
ongoing territorial disputes over the Senkaku islands. Japan effectively controls the Senkaku islands, but China also claims its ownership of the Senkaku islands. The Chinese government has increased activity around the Senkaku islands. According to multiple major Japanese media, today, the Japanese government agreed with the Chinese government that they will set up a joint task force to discuss joint resources development and joint sovereignty control over the islands. The Japanese government justifies the decision by the fact that Japan is a
peaceful and harmonious country and Japanese would try to resolve the conflict without force.
The third is the ‘economic relations’ treatment in which an additional paragraph is added to the baseline scenario, mentioned above.
Scenario 3 (economic relations): This is a hypothetical scenario. Japan and China have ongoing territorial disputes over the Senkaku islands. Japan effectively controls the Senkaku islands, but China also claims its ownership of the Senkaku islands. The Chinese government has increased activity around the Senkaky islands. According to multiple major Japanese media, today, the Japanese government agreed with the Chinese government that they will set up a joint task force to discuss joint resources development and joint sovereignty control over the islands. The Japanese government justifies the decision by the fact that Japan and China enjoy a good economic relationship, with a vibrant flow of Foreign Direct Investment, and Japan being China’s second biggest trading partner.
