The discourse of Russian Nationalism in the separatist
‘Donetsk People’s Republic’
A discourse analysis in ‘state’ media, leadership and public opinion:
the case of the DPR
Master Thesis
Name: Margot Louise Karis
Student Number: 1317393
Supervisor: Dr. M.B.D. Benraad
Second reader: Dr. C.W. Hijzen
Leiden University, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs
MSc Crisis and Security Management
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Abstract
The annexation of the Crimea in March 2014 and the Russian interference in eastern Ukraine sparked an escalation of violence, insecurity and political upheaval over the last few years, in Ukraine itself but also in the West. These developments form prime examples of Russia’s ability to destabilise the peace and security of non-Russian regions and to expand its sphere of influence with the purpose of creating a security buffer for the West. At the same time, Russian nationalism has taken an aggressive and imperialistic turn, an underlying development that might have had more influence on the developments in Ukraine than previously researched. Between the combination of (new) Russian nationalism under Putin’s reign and the developments in (eastern) Ukraine interconnections can be made. This research will examine this interconnection by studying a Russian nationalist discourse in the separatist Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) in eastern Ukraine, during the Ukraine conflict that started in 2014. A comprehensive discourse analysis of DPR-media news articles, DPR leadership speeches and the general public opinion has shown that elements of Russian nationalism are present throughout the media environment, the leadership, and to a lesser extend throughout the public opinion of the DPR. This thesis stresses the importance of analysing pro-Russian separatist states or regions like the DPR from within to detect the true effects that Russian influence has had over the last few years. Further research and thus knowledge on this topic can aid Western policy-makers to adjust and sharpen their foreign policy strategies towards Russia, Ukraine and regions prone to (pro-Russian) separatism.
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Table of Content
Introduction
4Goal of the research 6
Research question 7
Scientific relevance 7
Societal relevance 9
Reading guide 9
Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework
I.
The Construction of (Russian) nationalism
111.1.1 Nationalism 11
1.1.2 Russian nationalism 13
1.1.3 Building a framework 16
II.
Eastern Ukraine and the Donetsk Oblast
181.2.1 History, Identity and Ideology in the Donetsk Oblast 19
1.2.2 Separatism in the region of Donetsk 21
Chapter 2. Methodology
2.1 Research Design – Case Study 24
2.2 Operationalisation 25
2.3 Choice of methodology 25
2.4 Methods of data collection 26
2.5 Internal / external validity and reliability 29
Chapter 3. Analysis
3.1.1 Russian nationalist discourse in DPR ‘state media’ – introducing the source 31 3.1.2 Russian nationalist discourse in DPR ‘state media’ – analysing the source 33 3.2.1 Russian nationalist discourse in DPR leadership – introducing the leadership 42 3.2.2 Russian nationalist discourse in DPR leadership – analysing the leadership 44 3.3 Russian nationalist discourse in the public opinion of the DPR 48
Conclusion
54Bibliography
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Introduction
When Vladimir Putin entered the Kremlin as acting Russian president in 1999, with him came a new impulse to Russian nationalism. An aggressive, sometimes even called imperialistic type of nationalism1, used increasingly to expand Russia’s sphere of influence. Simultaneously, it is used to destabilise and polarise Western societies, endangering their societal and political security. The annexation of the Crimea in March 2014 and the Russian interference in Eastern Ukraine war form prime examples of this development. Between the combination of (new) Russian nationalism under Putin’s reign and the developments in (eastern) Ukraine interconnections can be made. This research will examine this interconnection by studying a Russian nationalist discourse in the separatist confederation state in eastern Ukraine, during the Ukraine conflict that started in 2014. The confederation state is split up in two republics (Luhansk and Donetsk), this research will focus on the People’s Republic of Donetsk (from now on indicated as DPR, or Donetsk People’s Republic)2
The war in eastern Ukraine escalated as an armed conflict in the Donbas region of Ukraine in the spring of 2014. Protests by anti-government and pro-Russian groups grew in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (together called the Donbas region) of Ukraine. These protests were a counter-reaction to the 2014 Euromaidan movement (a pro-EU movement) in Ukraine. The protests were influenced by more extensive groups of pro-Russian demonstrations which took place in the entire south and east of Ukraine and by the Russian annexation of the Crimea which was completed in March of 2014.
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A picture of pro-Russian protesters in Donetsk in March 2014. The banner says “Donbas is with Russia”.
1 E. Pain, ‘The imperial syndrome and its influence on Russian nationalism’, in: P. Kolstø, and H. Blakkisrud, The New Russian Nationalism, (Edinburgh, 2016), pp. 46-74, p. 46.
2 I want to note that the DPR has not been recognized as an official republic. Technically, it is a non-existent
state and still a part of the Donetsk oblast in Ukraine. It is occupied by separatists. However, I will use the name the self-declared republic uses – DPR – for convenience throughout this thesis.
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Eventually the protests in the Donbas escalated into an armed conflict between the Ukrainian government and the two separatist republics, the DPR and the LPR, in the spring of 2014. More than 10,000 people have died during this conflict, and although the heat of the conflict has decreased, cases of civilian casualties are still a reality on both the Ukrainian and the separatist side due to continuous shelling at the frontline (in violation of the Minsk agreements4). Throughout the beginning of the war strong indications were found by journalists and researchers that the leaders of the DPR were of Russian descent. Also, the troops fighting against the Ukrainian government were estimated to consist of 40000 rebels and 6000 Russian paramilitaries.5 Although denied by Russian president Vladimir Putin, Russian interference – both militarily and non-militarily – in the region has been a proven fact.6
Map indicating the conflict-area.7
When the separatists took over the region and pronounced its independent separatist state on May 14th of 2014, a pro-Russian propaganda machine started operating in the DPR. Russian TV channels were (re-)introduced, Ukrainian channels disconnected, and pro-Ukrainian journalists fled and were replaced by pro-Russian news agencies. DPR citizens have had little
4 The original (Minsk I) agreement consisted of ceasefire deal between Russia, Ukraine and the separatists in
2014. This ceasefire was breached in January of 2015. Germany and France stepped in and created a second agreement in February 2015, a comprehensive deal, including a new ceasefire and a plan to solve the conflict, now known as Minsk II.
5 G. Baczynska & A. Vasovic, ‘Pushing Locals Aside, Russians take top rebel posts in east Ukraine’, www.reuters.com, July 27, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-rebels-insight/pushing-locals-aside-russians-take-top-rebel-posts-in-east-ukraine-idUSKBN0FW07020140727, accessed on 4-05-2018.
6 N. Roman, W. Wanta & I. Buniak, ‘Information wars: Eastern Ukraine military conflict coverage in the
Russian, Ukrainian and U.S. newscasts’, The International Communication Gazette (2017), 79(4), pp. 357-378, p. 362.
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access to Ukrainian news-sources ever since. In these DPR media-outlets and also in the DPR leadership, a Russian nationalist narrative can be detected.
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Examples of pro-Russian press in the DPR. The flag of the DPR is on the top-right of the picture.
Since the DPR is a secluded area it is hard to capture inside information about the side of the separatists and the citizens of the DPR and their relation to Russia, Russian influence and Russian nationalism. This in itself is a knowledge gap that can be fulfilled both scientifically and societally. Russian nationalism and its influence can be one explanation of why the people of the DPR actually support the separatist state. The history of the Donetsk region in relation to Russia and Russian nationalism can be a cause of the separatist sentiment. To what extent Russian nationalism plays a role will be examined in this research.
Goal of the research
As the People’s Republic of Donetsk is a pro-Russian self-proclaimed republic, I am wondering to what extent Russian nationalism is actively present in the region and if this influences the citizens of the DPR. This examination of a possible Russian nationalist discourse in the DPR and its influence on the public opinion of the DPR is the specific goal of this research. It is necessary to mention that, during this research, capturing a discourse does not in any case mean to determine complete certainty of (part of) a society’s worldviews. This research tries to make clear how certain actors (DPR leaders and influencers, as well as citizens who support the DPR) construct an argument and how this argument fits into the wider social practices and security issues in the DPR. This requires a broad view of nationalism, Russian nationalism in particular, and its indicators. Also, it is important to historicise the situation in Eastern Ukraine. By doing this, it might be possible to gain a broader view of the current security-related problems in the region, of the influence of
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Russian nationalism and of how strong it is in countries outside the Russian federation. This, in turn, will provide us with another piece of the puzzle of the current discourse of Russian ‘soft power’ (using culture, political values and foreign policies to gain influence in certain countries or to disrupt the security and stability of others).
Research question
The research question that I will attempt to answer is:
To what extent is a Russian nationalist discourse present in the DPR and how does it influence the DPR citizens and the public opinion during the Ukraine conflict (2014-present)? The main research question is supported by the following sub-questions that will help to lead to a balanced conclusion:
- How does the state media of the DPR use/frame Russian nationalism to promote the
separatist republic?
- How does the leadership of the DPR use/frame Russian nationalism to promote the
separatist republic?
- Is there a Russian nationalist discourse present in the general public opinion of the
DPR? If so, how is it framed?
This research question is both descriptive and explanatory as it is needed to extensively describe the concept of (Russian) nationalism – with its indicators – to understand the influence it has on the security implications of the region and specifically on the citizens / public opinion in the Donetsk People’s Republic.
Scientific relevance
In terms of scientific relevance of this paper, as of today, not much research has been done on this topic in terms of extensive analysis of the DPR media and public opinion, especially in relation to a Russian nationalist discourse. It is known that separatist forces are backed by Russian forces and supported by the Russian government, but less is known of why the DPR is supported in the Donbas and whether Russian nationalism plays a large role. Ever since Russian president Vladimir Putin came to power on the last day of 1999 Russian nationalism has been on the rise on the Russian political agenda.9 A Russian nationalist discourse has been propagated, not only domestically but also internationally, especially in regions outside
9 T. P. Gerber, ‘Beyond Putin? Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russian Public Opinion.’ The Washington Quarterly 37(3), pp. 113-34., p.115.
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Russia which are receptive of this influence (e.g. Eastern Ukraine, Crimea, Moldova and Georgia) because of their weak political situations (e.g. Russian-imposed destabilisation due to frozen conflicts), security issues (e.g. high crime rate, corruption) and the demography of the population (e.g. a substantial Russian minority). Since the two ‘republics’ in Eastern Ukraine threaten to become the newest frozen conflict, researching the Russian nationalist discourse in (one of these) republics adds a piece to the Russian ‘soft power’ puzzle.
Looking at the broader context of this thesis, Russian ‘soft power’ with the use of propaganda, disinformation or strategic communication as a method, has been an important part of Russian foreign policy and a potential security threat of destabilisation for the West.10 Since strategic communication (especially Russian ‘fake news’ and the like) though the regular media and social media is an important aspect in warfare and society in general, it is also a subject that has been increasingly researched scientifically. Russia, being one of the main generators of self-serving propaganda in the world, started to promote a narrative in the mid-2000s emphasising the “faults of the United States and the West; the dangers of institutions associated with democracy, such as protests and NGOs; the superiority of Russian values and institutions”11, as researchers Theodore P. Gerber and Jane Zavisca indicated in
their article ‘Does Russian Propaganda Work?’. This narrative is distributed through official government statements and merges into government-orchestrated mass media and social media to be directed at international and domestic (Russian) audiences.12 Russia does the same in Eastern Ukraine. Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili and Sanda Svetoka described this comprehensively in their research ‘Strategic Communications and Social Media in the Russia Ukraine Conflict’: “As the conflict continues to develop in the east of Ukraine, Russia continues to exploit the opportunities offered by new technologies and the new information environment. It does so with the purpose of influencing the hearts and minds of its audiences.”13 This thesis adds to the research on Russia’s use of modern-day propaganda through the use of (elements of) Russian nationalism, filling in the knowledge gap of the Russian-infused DPR media. Also, the DPR is such a new and secluded self-declared state – in terms of accessibility – that much research is still to be done in this area in general.
10A.P. Tsygankov, ‘Russia and the West: a new Cold War?’, www.sustainablesecurity.org, 2 January, 2018, https://sustainablesecurity.org/2018/01/02/russia-and-the-west-a-new-cold-war/, Accesed on 4-05-2018.
11 T. P. Gerber & J. Zavisca, ‘Does Russian Propaganda Work?’, The Washington Quarterly, 39(2), pp.78-98, p.
79.
12 Ibidem.
13 E. Lange-Ionatamishvili & S. Svetoka, ‘Strategic Communications and Social Media in the Russia Ukraine
Conflict’, in: Kenneth Geers (Ed.), Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine, (Talinn, 2015), 104.
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Societal relevance
In terms of societal relevance, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine is a still ongoing – sometimes called ‘frozen’ – conflict and involved, especially at the ‘births’ of the DPR and LPR in 2014, many different separatist groups who either cooperated or completely disagreed in terms of their views. In 2018 the ‘republics’ are more or less settled and have built a ‘democratic government’ led by a ‘president’. The process of this development from a divided, chaotic separatist state with many different actors to a more or less established, functioning ‘republic’ is interesting to analyse because it can give insights as to how separatist states develop. By examining the influence of Russian nationalism on the support of the separatist state of DPR it may become possible to gain more understanding of how the complicated conflict in eastern Ukraine developed, its many different actors and the involvement of Russia in the conflict in general.
The link with security in particular lays within the fact that eastern Ukraine is currently a conflict-zone with an ongoing civil conflict, which endangers the physical security of citizens in that region. Furthermore, Russia has a long-established role in destabilising its surrounding countries and supporting separatist conflicts (which in turn create instability, criminality and corruption and endanger the security in those regions) to achieve this. Examples are Georgia and Moldova.14 Also, the broader concept of this thesis, disruption of the security of a society and supporting war through the use of disinformation in the (social) media, is a topic that is being researched in the security field during the 21st century developments of the so-called Information Age.15
Reading guide
In the sections above, an introduction to the topic is given and the research question(s) are introduced. The further structure of this research is based on an extensive (historical) theoretical framework – which will be the first chapter of this thesis – on Russian nationalism, nationalism literature in general and the history of the Donetsk region. It is necessary to approach this research from a historical perspective because the establishment of the DPR is an accumulation of historical events, as well as an extreme use of historical sentiment in the separatist propaganda of the DPR that can also be found in Russian nationalism. Why this is used in this way and how this has developed needs to be examined through an analysis of the
14 T. Tudoroiu, ‘Unfreezing Failed Frozen Conflicts: A Post- Soviet Case Study’, Journal of Contemporary
European Studies (2016), 24(3), pp. 375-396, p. 376.
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history of the region and its relationship with Russia. In the second chapter, the methodological framework, the methodology of this thesis will be explained and justified. In short, the analysis will be done through discourse analysis because the Russian nationalist discourse in the DPR is being examined. This will be done through analysing articles of an online newspaper, speeches of the leader of the DPR, Alexander Zakharchenko, and through analysing existing surveys on the public opinion in the DPR. Also, I will be looking at symbols that might consist of indications of Russian nationalism, like the use of flags, pamphlets and pictures. The third chapter will include the analysis, which will be conducted through the three questions stated above. The chapter will be divided into three sub-chapters, each introducing the source and then analysing it. The first sub-chapter will be based on the main media outlet(s) in the DPR and its discourse, the sub-second chapter will focus on the leadership of the DPR and its discourse and the third sub-chapter will focus on the public opinion of the DPR, where possible. Finally, the conclusion of this thesis contains an answer to the main- and sub-questions of this thesis.
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Chapter 1: Theoretical framework
I.
The construction of (Russian) nationalism
To fully comprehend this research, the concept of nationalism has to be explored. This is not an easy task, while nationalism is a broadly researched concept and has many different definitions and approaches. For this research, I will first explore and explain nationalism in general, by building a framework (based on definitions and theories of different well-established authors) of nationalism that I can use in my analysis. I will look at the relevant indicators of nationalism and how nationalism is constructed. Also, the current ‘state of the art’ regarding the research on nationalism will be explored. Subsequently, Russian nationalism will be explored and linked to the basic nationalism framework. The basis lies in nationalism in general, but Russia has some specific, altering elements that will differ from the classic, ‘European’ oriented type of nationalism. After all, Russian nationalism is the concept that is going to be analysed in this thesis. Since this thesis is researching to what extent Russian nationalism influences the DPR during the ongoing Ukrainian conflict, it lastly is important to historically explore both the Ukrainian conflict from a security perspective, the region of Donetsk and separatism in the region.
1.1.1 Nationalism
To create a sound basis for this thesis, the concept of nationalism in general needs to be explored. There are many authors exploring nationalism16 but two of the most well-known ones, Eric Hobsbawm and Anthony D. Smith, are described here for the sake of this thesis. These authors can be divided into two camps of nationalist theory, namely the primordialist approach – Smith – and the constructivist approach – Hobsbawm.17 The primordialist approach entails that nations are pre-modern formations while the constructivist approach comprehends the view that nations are imagined communities, or socially constructed categories.18
16 The academic field of nationalism studies is very broad. Other interesting literature on nationalism studies that
is not mentioned due to the word-limit and the scope of this thesis is written by amongst others Ellie Kedourie, Ernest Geller, John Breuilly and Benedict Anderson. They laid the academic foundation, together with Hobsbawm and Smith, for nationalism studies of the post-war period. More contemporary authors to explore are amongst others Maria Montserrat Guibernau, Michael Billig and Craig Calhoun.
17 G. M. Robinson and A. Pobric, ‘Nationalism and Identity in Post-Dayton Accords: Bosnia-Hercegovina’,
Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie (2006), 97(3), pp. 237-252, p. 239.
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Eric Hobsbawm argues in the introduction of his book ‘Nations and Nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality’ that “neither objective nor subjective definitions [of nationalism] are thus satisfactory, and both are misleading. In any case, agnosticism is the best initial posture for a student in this field, and so this book assumes no a priori definition of what constitutes a nation… any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of ‘a nation’, will be treated as one.”19 According to him, objective definitions – based on criteria such as ethnicity or language – often fail because these rigid criteria cannot be applied to a complete population of a so-called nation. Exceptions can always be found.20 On the other hand, he argues that subjective definitions of nationalism – focussing purely more on “consciousness or choice as the criterion for nationhood”21 – ignore the fact that objective elements do play a role in defining nations.22 Despite addressing the criticism on the more subjective approach, Hobsbawm’s constructivist view of nationalism and the imagined community leans more towards the subjective approach.
Anthony D. Smith, a primordialist, emphasises “the importance of symbolic elements in the language and ideology of nationalism, and to the moral, ritual and emotional aspects of the discourse and action of the nation.”23 He continues that “it is not enough to link a
particular national(ist) discourse to specific political actors or social groups, let alone read off the former from the social position and characteristics of the latter.”24 As a primordialist, Smith beliefs that nations and ethnic communities are natural phenomenon that existed throughout history and throughout humanity.25 Also, Smith deems the concept of ethnie important for the mere existence of nationalism. Just like Hobsbawn, Smith also addresses the problematics of seeing nationalism from an either completely objective or subjective point of view.26 He also argues that there needs to be a balance and finds this in the concept of ethnie, or the ethnic community. Ethnie, according to Smith, has attributes like common myths and shared memories27 and nations need these to exist in the first place. In his 1987 book “The Ethnic Origins of Nations”, he mentions six different dimensions of what he considers ethnie: a collective name, a common myth of descend, a shared history, a shared (distinctive) culture,
19 E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, 1992), 8. 20 Idem, 6.
21 Idem, 8. 22 Idem, 8.
23 A. D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010), 3. 24 Smith, Nationalism, 3.
25 A.D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, (Blackwell Publishing, New York, 1987), 12. 26 Idem, 12.
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association with a specific territory and lastly a sense of solidarity.28 He does not deny the importance of invention – which Hobsbawm stresses – but tries to present a different view by linking the concept of ethnie, or ethnic community, to nationalism.
1.1.2 Russian nationalism
In the 1970s, authors like Alexander Yanov, William Laqueur and John Dunlop published numerous works on (contemporary) Russian nationalism29, or in other words; a different, new kind of nationalism from the Russian nationalism of before the Russian Revolution. In the 1970s Russian nationalism was a new phenomenon because prior to this period, most scholars only focussed on Soviet nationalism and in the 18th and 19th centuries on imperial Russian nationalism in the Tsarist empire30 (e.g. Sergei Uvarov and Konstantin Aksakov).
During the 1990s a second increase in contemporary Russian nationalist works evolved, focussing primarily on Russian nationalism on the far-right of the political spectrum with elements such as ‘Nazification’ and ‘Faciszation’.31 The fact that the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991 also played a large role in the emergence of a new kind of Russian nationalism. In fact, this period of time was crucial for the development of the current Russian nationalist discourse. William Laqueur argues that the political swing to the right and the nationalist trend in Russia had been a reaction to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.32 The different perspectives on Russian nationalism in the early 1990s include historian Dmitri Likhachev, who argues that patriotism is the “noblest of feelings” and that it “spiritually enriches the individual”33. Likhachev could be indicated as a national liberal. The educated Russian public agreed with many of Likhachev’s ideas. Moreover, they wanted a free Russia and considered the loss of territories that are populated predominantly by Russians (such as in Ukraine and Belarus) a great loss.34 Thirdly, Laqueur argues, there were the political leaders like Boris Yeltsin and Anatoly Sobchak who insisted ever more frequently on Russian interests and concerns.35 Russian nationalism gradually seemed to take a more aggressive, imperialistic turn. The national liberals also hoped that religion would, like old, pre-1917 times, play a
28 Idem, 22-31.
29 M. Laruelle, Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia, (New York, 2009), 1.
30 According to political scientist Heinz H.F. Elau (1944), Tsarist nationalism had the function to Russificate the
national minorities of the Empire, of perpetuating the absolutism of the Tsars and to aggressively imperialise. Soviet nationalism had the social purpose of “serving the ultimate ideas of the Communist revolution as well as the achievements of Soviet Socialist construction”.
31Laruelle, Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia, 1.
32 W. Laqueur, ‘Russian Nationalism’, Foreign Affairs (1992), 71(5), pp. 103-116, p. 103. 33 Idem, 104.
34 Ibidem. 35 Ibidem.
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large role in the country. Moreover, they believed that there was a lack of future in a Russia deprived from the Crimea, Ukraine and White Russia.36 According to Laqueur, this was the strongest point in their thinking and even the radical democrats, who are much less conservative and Western-oriented compared to the national liberals, tended to agree with this range of thought.37 Looking at the history of Russia and its neighbouring countries, fact is that especially Ukraine has been partially – predominantly the left part – a part of (Tsarist) Russia throughout history from the 17th century onwards. Technically, Ukraine only became independent in 1991.38 The strong feeling of “lost territory” and the glorification of one strong, Russian empire (Eurasianism) is, looking at the history of Russia, not that strange. Another consequence of the fall of the Soviet Union is that Russia ‘lost’ many ethnic Russians under their territory. From 1991 onwards, millions of ethnic Russians’ new reality was that they now lived outside of Russia and had become ethnic minorities.39 These Russians kept their strong connection with Russia and in the 1990s, Laqueur mentioned, there already was growing anger about the treatment of Russians outside Russia.40 The idea that it was the duty of the Russian government to take care and protect Russian interests outside the Russian borders was growing.41
The current discourse regarding contemporary Russian nationalism is somewhat complicated and two-fold. Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisud argue that there are two types of nationalism in Russia at the moment. One comes from the Kremlin and is more statist, as the other type comes from below and is more ethno nationalist.42 Either way, it is tightly woven into Russian society. Laruelle states that “nationalism comprises the common denominator, the constitutive element of social consensus and of ‘political correctness’. Nationalist issues, expressed under the label patriotism, have become defining components of Russia’s political language in the sense that all parties speak it.”43 Laqueur already mentioned this in his 1992 article on Russian nationalism, however.44 The Kremlin’s – or actually Putin’s – nationalism was, especially in the beginning of its power, according to Taras Kuzio, “closely bound with
36 Laqueur, ‘Russian Nationalism’, 105. 37 Ibidem.
38 S. Orest, Ukraine: A History, (Toronto, 2000), 576. 39 Laqueur, ‘Russian Nationalism’, 107.
40 Ibidem. 41 Ibidem.
42 A. T. Isbrekken, ‘Russian nationalism on the rise’, www.nupi.no, published on 22-04-2016, http://www.nupi.no/en/News/Russian-nationalism-on-the-rise, (accessed on 22-11-2017).
43 Laruelle, Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia, 1. 44 Laqueur, ‘Russian Nationalism’, 105.
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Soviet myths and national identity”45. The Kremlin was supposed to become some sort of replacement of the Soviet Union.46 In 2000, Russia’s president Vladimir Putin said in an interview that “[Russian] basic values are none other than patriotism, love of one’s motherland, love of one’s home, of one’s people, one’s cultural values… Everything that makes us a nation, that is the source of our uniqueness, everything that we can be proud of – all this will be the foundation of the [national] idea”.47 Tuminez, just like Kolstø and Blakkisrud, argued in 2000 that Putin’s nationalism fell in the category of moderate statism, which defines Russia largely in civic terms, “including ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, and all others who live on the territory of the Russian Federation”.48 Paul Chaisty and Stephen Whitefield argued in their article “Putin’s Nationalism Problem” that during his current, third presidency, Vladimir Putin has taken on the role of “the saviour of the Russian nation”.49 This
new discourse also includes the mission to protect ethnic Russians that live outside the borders
of the Russian Federation.50 Furthermore, Kolstø and Blakkisrud argue that in the last few years, the Kremlin has adopted elements of ethno nationalism that came from grassroots-organisations.51 Ethno nationalism is a type of nationalism that refers to “the extreme
internalization of national values and policies”52 and it is “the result of emphasis being placed
on national sentiment and identity”53. In 2009, academic Alexander Verkhovsky wrote that
“neither civic nor even imperial, today’s Russian nationalism is instead almost exclusively ethnic”.54 Nationalist organisations, and now also the Kremlin, focus(es) primarily on the identity of the Russian people and place this identity above others.55 Fighting for the interests of the Russian people and the Russian identity can cross the Russian borders, as many Russian minorities live in neighbouring countries and regions like the Donetsk region in Ukraine. As William Laqueur mentioned already in 1992, Russian nationalism prevailed in pre-Soviet, non-Russian republics56 as a result of the former Soviet Union. These facts are
45 T. Kuzio, ‘The origins of Peace, Non-violence and Conflict in Ukraine’, in: Ukraine and Russia: People,
Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives, (2016), 118.
46 Isbrekken, ‘Russian nationalism on the rise’. 47 Idem, 3.
48 Ibidem.
49 P. Chaisty & S. Whitefield, ‘Putin’s Nationalism Problem’, in: Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics,
Propaganda and Perspectives, (2016), 157.
50 Ibidem.
51 Isbrekken, ‘Russian nationalism on the rise’.
52 J.F. Mio, Key Words in Multicultural Interventions: A Dictionary, (1999), 114. 53 Ibidem.
54 P. Kolstø, ‘The ethnification of Russian nationalism’, in: Pål Kostlø and Helke Blakkisrud, The New Russian
Nationalism; imperialism, ethnicity and authoritarianism 2000-15 (Edinburgh, 2016), pp. 18-45, p. 34.
55 Ibidem.
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important for this thesis as the research is done not in a Russian region but in the foreign region of Donetsk in Ukraine.
But the question that is important in this literature review is; how can Russian nationalism be defined? What are the typical elements of contemporary Russian nationalism? Nationalism in general means, according to the Merriam Webster dictionary: “loyalty and devotion of a nation; especially: a sense of national consciousness exalting one nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational groups.”57 Nationalism has served as a powerful mobilizing and legitimizing tool for politicians wanting to maintain, exercise or seize political power.58 The concepts of nationalism can be identified as the feeling of kinship on the basis of race, ethnicity, language, religion, territory or citizenship.59 For Russia, after analysing the current statist and ethno-nationalist discourse in the country, the concepts of ethnicity, language, territory and national history seem to be the most important concepts.
1.1.3 Building a framework
It is quite difficult to capture (contemporary) Russian nationalism in just one of the two typologies of nationalism explained in the first sub-chapter of this thesis. No nation has a nationalism entirely primordial or constructivist. It has elements of both. However, the current discourse of ethno-nationalism in Russia is an indication for a predominantly primordial type of nationalism. Although the argument above was that nationalism ‘from above’ (from the Kremlin/Putin) has been statist and ‘from below’ ethno-nationalist, it was also mentioned that in the last few years, Putin has slowly adopted elements of the ethno-nationalist discourse. This is important when analysing contemporary Russian nationalism. Theodore P. Gerber analysed Russian nationalism and states that Putin has “invoked a range of nationalist images, themes and tropes over the years in his efforts to define his goals, justify his policies and maintain public support.”60 He names examples that fit Smith’s ‘dimensions’ of ethnie. First of all, Gerber names the threat that Western powers pose to Russia as an example.61 This can create a strong sense of solidarity because when continuous emphasis is being put on a ‘common enemy’ (the West), a nation is ‘in need’ of solidary supporters to potentially fight this enemy. The same discourse – but, of course, much more severe – took place during the
57 Merriam Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalism, accessed on
12-05-2017.
58 A. Tuminez, ‘Russian Nationalism and Vladimir Putin’s Russia’ (April 2000), PONARS Policy Memo 151, 1. 59 Ibidem.
60 Gerber, ‘Beyond Putin?’, 115. 61 Ibidem.
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Second World War, when Russia was invaded by Germany and the term ‘The Great Patriotic War’ was used, instead of Second World War or World War II, which was and is commonly used in other countries around the world. The term ‘Great Patriotic War’ indicates, using the word ‘Patriotic’, that this was a war fought for the fatherland (the then Soviet Union) and it created a strong sense of solidarity and willingness to fight against this common enemy (Germany). To this day, the term has been used in history books at Russian schools. Although a full-fledged war – as with Germany in the 1940s – cannot be compared to the current situation between Russia and the West, it presents an example of how strong this sense of solidarity in Russia has been and still can be.
Secondly, Gerber names the distinctive culture of the Russian people, being their Orthodox faith, collectivism or traditional family values.62 This links to Smith’s dimension of the shared distinctive culture.63 In a speech that Putin gave on Russia Day in 2016 (June 12th) he stressed the value of Russia’s past, its great history and the “indissoluble centuries-long ties between generations, our best traditions and the rich heritage of our nation”64. Emphasis lays on traditions and culture in this speech, as it often does in Putin’s speeches. Also, president Putin often gives speeches at religious affairs or holidays. Here, he emphasises the importance of the Orthodox religion65 and links the religion directly to the Russian culture.66
Thirdly, Gerber mentions the historical greatness and achievements of Russians.67 This links to Smith’s dimension of a shared history.68 Again, the Great Patriotic War could be named as an example. In 2014, Putin attended the opening of a new building for the Belarus State Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War where he stressed greatness of the Soviet achievement and the continuation of this achievement today: “Our fathers and grandfathers won because they stood together, and this will continue to be the case”.69 Although this is not a solely ‘Russian’ achievement, it is still seen, as already mentioned, as one of the most important historical achievements in Russia.
62 Ibidem.
63 Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 12.
64 Vladimir Putin, “Speech at the official reception to mark the national holiday Russia Day”, (speech, Moscow,
June 12th, 2016), Kremlin, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/52145 (accessed on 28-11-2017).
65 Vladimir Putin, “Speech following a prayer service at St Panteleimon Monastry”, (speech, Greece, May 28th,
2016), Kremlin, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/52033 (accessed on 28-11-2017).
66 Vladimir Putin, “Speech at a meeting with the Holy Kinot”, (speech, Greece, May 28th, 2016), Kremlin, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/52033 (accessed on 28-11-2017).
67 Gerber, ‘Beyond Putin?’, 115.
68 Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 12.
69 Vladimir Putin, “Speech at a ceremony marking the opening of a new building for the Belarus State Museum
of the History of the Great Patriotic War”, (speech, Minsk, July 2nd, 2014), Kremlin,
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Fourthly, the importance of a strong, centralised state, also for protecting Russians, is deemed as an example by Gerber.70 Smith can be incorporated here with both the dimension of the association of a specific territory and the dimension of a common myth of descend.71 Of course, the Russian territory as it is now is important for Russia, but the territorial question goes beyond the current Russian territory. In 2014, the annexation of the Crimea has been a bold move that indicated the fact that Putin reaches further in terms of territory and ‘protecting’ Russians outside its territory. Also, the Russian involvement in Eastern Ukraine has indicated this. These moves are not just geopolitical power-games, but can be explained additionally by the complicated common history of Russia and Ukraine. In Smith’s words, it can be explained by a common myth of descend. In Putin’s (in)famous 2014 speech regarding the annexation of the Crimea, he stated the following:
To understand the reason behind such a choice it is enough to know the history of Crimea and what Russia and Crimea have always meant for each other. Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptized. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian empire are also in Crimea. This is also Sevastopol – a legendary city with an outstanding history, a fortress that serves as the birthplace of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Crimea is Balaklava and Kerch, Malakhov Kurgan and Sapun Ridge. Each one of these places is dear to our hearts, symbolizing Russian military glory and outstanding valor.72
Common history and a certain myth of descend clearly come forward in this speech. Also, indications of the importance of the Crimea as Russian territory come forward as well – Sevastopol as the “birthplace of Russia’s Black Fleet”, for example.
II.
Eastern Ukraine and the Donetsk oblast
To understand the situation and the forming of the Donetsk People’s Republic in eastern Ukraine and especially the oblast, or region of Donetsk, a small historical framework of the region should be demonstrated. The history of the region will bring more clarity in why the separatist discourse has been so present.
70 Gerber, ‘Beyond Putin?’, 115.
71 Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 12.
72 Vladimir Putin, “Speech on Crimea”, (speech, Moscow, March 19, 2014), Prague Post,
19
73
Map of Ukraine. Pink/purple area is the Donbas region.
1.2.1 History, identity and ideology in the Donetsk Oblast
The Donetsk region is a Ukrainian region in the east of Ukraine, bordering Russia. Throughout history, the region has been part of Russia off and on. The area is highly debated by historians as to who settled in the Donbas first – before Czarist rule. Ukrainian historians claim that the area should be considered native Ukrainian because the area was under control of the Kyivan Rus’ in Middle Ages and in the 16th century under the influence of the Cossacks. On the other hand, Russian historians argue that the Donbas has been a no-man’s land between Ukraine and Russia and both ethnicities (Russian and Ukrainian) started settling in this area from the 16th century onwards.74
What is not debated is that the Donetsk oblast has been a largely industrialised area since the industrialisation from the 1860s onwards, which attracted large numbers of Russian migrants. A second wave of Russian migrants entering the region took place after World War II.75 Even before the industrialisation, during the 15th-18th centuries, Ukraine was conquered by Russia. During that time, Russian Czarist policy considered the Ukrainian people as part of the true Russian nation. As a result, Ukrainians were expected to assimilate to Russian culture and language.76 In 1917-1920, Ukraine was independent77 but this changed again after the Russian Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet Union. Ever since, especially in the
73 Image retrieved from: www.voanews.com, September 15, 2017. Accessed on 5-05-2018.
74 J.G. Janmaat, Nation Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Educational Policy and the Response of the
Russian-speaking Population, (Utrecht/Amsterdam, 2000), 14-15.
75 Janmaat, Nation Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine, 15. 76 Idem, 16.
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centre, south and east of Ukraine, Russian migrants entered and settled in the country. The Russian presence in Ukraine is so large, that Jan Germen Janmaat goes as far as indicating Ukraine as bi-national; Russian and Ukrainian.78 In the Donetsk region almost 40% of the population is considered ethnic Russian79 and most people use the Russian language as their main language and speak it at home.80
81
Map of linguistic division in Ukraine. Donetsk and Luhansk are predominantly Russian-speaking regions.
In terms of culture, the East of Ukraine identifies with the Ottoman and primarily the Russian culture, while the centre and the West of Ukraine identifies more with Central Europe. This has been the case since the beginning of the 20th century and this discourse is still strong.82 Researcher Riabchuk explains this interesting division of visions of the Ukrainian identity of the past and the future in Ukraine. On the one hand, there is the National Ukrainian or Eastern/Central European vision, which holds that Ukraine is a European nation that has been occupied for long periods of time by Russia and the Soviet Union, but strives to ‘return to
78 Janmaat, 18.
79 2001 Census. State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/, accessed on
29-10-2017.
80 L. Bilaniuk and S. Melnyk, ‘A Tense and Shifting Balance: Bilingualism and Education in Ukraine, in: Aneta
Pavlenko, Multilingualism in Post-Soviet Countries (2008), p. 85.
81 Image retrieved from www.polgeonow.com, 8-03-2014, Accessed on 6-05-2018.
82 M. Riabchuk, ‘Ukraine’s ‘muddling through’: National identity and postcommunist transition’, Communist
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Europe’ and follow the course of for example Poland or Lithuania.83 On the other hand, there is the ‘project’ that Riabchuk names ‘Little Russian’ or ‘post-crypto Soviet’ or ‘East Slavonic’. This view is a lot more fluid and difficult to explain than the European/Ukrainian view, but it comes down to superiority of the Russian culture and language as well as the historical view of the superior Russian urban colonizers against the backward Ukrainian provincials. This view is highly conservative, anti-Western, pro-Soviet, Ukrainophobic and authoritarian.84
1.2.2 Separatism in the region of Donetsk
In the 1990s, politically, the population in the east of Ukraine supported leftist and centre-left parties, which “[had] strong ties with Russia, advocate the adoption of Russian as a second language and oppose to economic reform”.85 The Donetsk region in itself was the base for Ukraine’s main pro-Russian political faction, namely the Party of Regions. This party became part of the Ukrainian government in 2002 and grew to be the largest party between 2006 and 2014. It was also former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych’86 political party. In 2004,
the Party of Regions wanted to establish a new political project which was called the South-East Ukrainian Autonomous Republic, in which the Donetsk region was also included. Already politically divided and distanced from the west of Ukraine, unrest was instigated in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions by the Party of Regions on the eve of the escalation of the conflict in 2014. Since 2014, the Ukraine conflict escalated into a civil conflict between Ukraine and the pro-Russian separatist forces of the Donetsk-Luhansk region. The region was not satisfied with Kyiv’s pro-European approach and on April 6th, 2014 they self-declared the People’s Republic of Donetsk, based in the heart of the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine.87
83 Idem, 443.
84 Ibidem.
85 Janmaat, Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine, 20.
86 Viktor Yanukovych was president of Ukraine between 2010 and 2014. He was removed from power in
February of 2014 and fled to Russia due to the pro-Western Ukrainian revolution.
87 A. Renner, ‘Euromaidan and Donetsk: peace paradigm analysis of the Actors, Causes and Goals of Donbas’,
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88
Separatists occupying the city Hall of Donetsk, right after the announcement of the DPR on April 6th 2014.
Some scholars see the separatist movement as a ‘grass-root’ movement with ‘genuine popular support’89 while others have put the blame on Russia as a provocateur of the conflict.90 The situation in Ukraine can be described as a civil conflict or civil war because it is a “war between organised groups within the same state or country”91. In this case, the government of
Ukraine fights against the separatist forces in eastern Ukraine.
Although it is clear that the Donetsk region was highly dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine on the eve of the declaration of separation, the specific (public) reasons for support of the separatists have not been brought to the attention yet. Researcher Elise Giuliano has conducted a research project on the appearance of separatism support in Donetsk just before the establishment of the DPR and during its first couple of months in 2014. She indicates that in April of 2014, 27.4% of the respondents of a survey on separatism support reported that Donetsk should secede from Ukraine and join Russia.92 Although not a majority, it is one third of the five million inhabitants of the region. She identifies numerous reasons for the grievances and the turn to separatism of the public in Donetsk. The first, but certainly not the only one, is political loyalty to Russia. Giuliano explains that especially the older generations in Donetsk identify with present-day Russia because they see the Russian Federation as the closest construction to the USSR. The pro-European Maidan-protests in Kyiv in 2014 deepened these assumptions.93 A second reason for separatism support has economic roots, Giuliano argues. She claims that redistribution in Ukraine was seen as discriminatory and that there were negative perceptions of potential EU membership on the economic welfare of the
88 Image retrieved from www.springtimeofnations.blogspot.com, Accessed on 1-06-2018. 89 R. Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, (London, 2015), 149.
90 Kuzio, “The Origins of Peace, Non-Violence and and Conflict in Ukraine, 112-113. 91 J. Fearon, ‘Iraq’s Civl War’, Foreign Affairs, (March/April 2007).
92 E. Giuliano, ‘The Origins of Separatism: popular grievances in Donetsk and Luhansk’, PONARS Eurasia
Policy Memo No. 396, October 2015, 1.
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region.94 The Donetsk oblast has had a flourishing industrial history, which means that a large part of Ukrainian economy is dependent on the region and many separatist supporters indicated this as unfair because they felt as if they had to work harder than the rest of the country.95 In terms of potential membership of the EU, many residents of the Donetsk region felt more culturally and economically connected and attracted to the Eurasian Customs Union (with Russia) and believe(d) that EU membership would destroy the status quo in terms of stable jobs and income.96 Thirdly, the supporters of the separatist republic felt betrayed by Kyiv for the following reasons: 1) Kyiv’s condemnation of the Berkut special police – which former Ukrainian president Yanukovich used to put down Maidan-demonstrations97 –, of whom many came from the Donbas, 2) the government’s failure to put down the Ukrainian nationalist far right – Ukrainian ultra-nationalism, with xenophobic and Russo-phobic features98 – which created fear and resentment in Donetsk, and 3) the Ukrainian parliament’s attempt to withdraw the law on Russian language.99
Against the background of the reasons, posed by Giuliano above, the separatist state of DPR was able to form in 2014. There are multiple reasons for support of separatism in the region and in this thesis the focus will lay on the identification with Russia and the influence of Russian nationalism in Donetsk. Looking at previous research projects and at the history of the region, there are certainly indications that Russian nationalism, or at least Russian sentiment, is present in Donetsk. In the next (methodological) chapter of this thesis, it will be made clear how these assumptions can be indicated and analysed.
94 Ibidem. 95 Idem, 3. 96 Ibidem. 97 Idem, 4. 98 Idem, 5. 99 Idem, 2.
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Chapter 2: Methodology
2.1 Research design – Case Study
For this research, a case study will be conducted in which the case(s) studied are the state media, the leadership and (in short) the public opinion of the Donetsk People’s Republic between 2014-present. The chosen design allows to provide a more in-depth picture of how the Donetsk People’s Republic conducts its leadership and frames itself politically and whether Russian nationalism plays a large role in this frame (and therefore possibly in the Republic in general). This, in turn, indicates an underlying explanation of the war-situation in the Donbas area, endangering the security on multiple fronts of the citizens in that area. The decision not to look at more than three cases was made due to feasibility issues. The limited time period would not have allowed an in-depth analysis that is needed to answer the main research question. The choice for the case of the Donetsk People’s Republic lies in the fact that it forms a prime example of a region receptive to the Russian sphere of influence and Russian soft power, which is the overarching subject of this thesis. The analysis of the Russian nationalist discourse is one method to funnel this broad subject. The choice for the Donetsk People’s Republic and not the Luhansk People’s Republic derives from the fact that the Donetsk People’s Republic has established a media-empire (Donetsk [International] Press Centre, or DONi News) with several outputs (Facebook page, V-Kontakte page, Twitter account, a news-website translated in many languages and a YouTube channel) also available in English. The DONi News centre is the “official” state media source since September 1st, 2016.100 The website of the leader of the DPR, Alexander Zakharchenko, is also available in English (including transcripts of speeches). This makes researching this case easier, as the language barrier (Russian) is less present. There are more news websites available in Russian supporting the DPR (one example being Donetskaya Narodnaya Respublica (www.dnr-online.ru) propagating the same pro-Russian and pro-DPR media frame. Lastly, it is necessary to capture the public opinion in the DPR (in relation to the Russian nationalist discourse) to complete the triangulation of the methods and draw a wider perspective.
The general time frame is 2014-present because in 2014, the Eastern Ukrainian conflict escalated and simultaneously the Donetsk People’s Republic had been self-declared as an
100https://dninews.com/?q=content/about-us. IMPORTANT NOTE ON 8-06-2018: as of the 8th of June 2018,
the DNI news website seems to be down. This has happened before (due to a hack, assumingly by the Ukrainian government) and came back a few weeks later. If the website will not be up again in the next few days/weeks, I refer to the attached document with a selection of articles I collected from the website and copied into a separate document, to check the authenticity of my sources.
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independent republic. However, the analysis of the news-articles conducted will be based upon a research from fall 2015 until present, as the DONi news website did not exist before that time.
2.2 Operationalisation
The operationalisation of this thesis will take place in the analysis part. The main concepts of this thesis are (Russian) nationalism and (pro-Russian) separatism and the Donetsk region. For Russian nationalism I will use a primarily primordial, ethnicity-based approach – following Anthony Smith’s research – with indicators like a collective name, a common myth of descend, a shared history, a shared (distinctive) culture, association with a specific territory and lastly a sense of solidarity.101 I will look for these indicators through media content analysis such as news-website/paper articles and the analysis of speeches of the leader of the DPR. Down below, the details of the specific sources that I will use will be further explained. In terms of separatism, I will look at indicators such as political views, feeling of suppression, economic grievances, identity and ethnicity. Again, media analysis will be done (news-website and newspaper articles) as well as the analysis of speeches of the leader of DPR. Lastly, the Donetsk region is an important concept because the region in itself is a geographically and historically complicated region and a potentially important reason for the appearance of Russian nationalism and separatism.
2.3 Choice of methodology
For this research, a qualitative approach will be used and this approach will be discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is a qualitative research method used in many different academic disciplines. Due to this diversity, discourse analysis has different meanings in different academic fields.102 According to D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen and H.E. Hamilton, all meanings fall into the following three main categories: “(1) anything beyond the sentence, (2) language use, and (3) a broader range of social practice that includes non-linguistic and nonspecific instances of language.”103 Generally, classic discourse analysis is used in linguistics studies. However, Critical Discourse Analysis is broader and not only focused on the linguistics of a text. As Van Dijk argues, “critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are
101 Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 22-31.
102 D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen & H.E. Hamilton, ‘Introduction: What is discourse analysis?’ in: T.A. van Dijk, ed.,
Handbook of Discourse Analysis. Vol. 1: Disciplines of Discourse, (London, 1985) 1-10, 1.
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enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. With such dissident research, critical discourse analysts take explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality.”104 It focuses primarily on understanding and analysing social problems and political issues through the use of texts. Norman Fairclough is one of the most well-known scholars on CDA. He and Wodak have summarized ten characteristics of CDA:
1. CDA addresses social problems 2. Power relations are discursive
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture 4. Discourse does ideological work 5. Discourse is historical
6. The link between text and society is mediated 7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory 8. Discourse is a form of social action. 105
Using (critical) discourse analysis in this research is valid because the concept of nationalism is part of a power relation (often used as a tool to exert power), is often of influence on society or culture (or comes forth from it), is ideological, and often formed by history. Furthermore, the link between the texts I will analyse and society is definitely important, because the texts try to influence society in a certain way. Van Dijk explains that the functions of ethnocentrism, antisemitism, nationalism and racism discourses (in mass media, literature and film) are to emphasize the superiority of the own nation, ethnicity, race, the “Us” etc. and represent the “Other” as intellectually, morally and biologically inferior.106
2.4 Methods of data collection
For the media analysis, a selective sample of articles of the DPR online newspaper ‘DONi Donbas News Agency’ will be taken. Since 1 September 2016, DONi News Agency is considered as the ‘official’ state media of the DPR. The website contains of different ‘sections’ of news articles – Donbas life, Defence, Editorial and World – and I will primarily focus on the ‘Donbas Life’ section. In this section articles are posted focussing on everyday life, national holidays and the general public opinion. These articles contained most
104 T.A. van Dijk, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, in: T.A. van Dijk, ed., Handbook of Discourse Analysis. Vol. 1:
Disciplines of Discourse, (London, 1985), pp. 352-372, p. 352.
105 N.L. Fairclough and R. Wodak, ‘Critical discourse analysis’ in: T. A. van Dijk (ed.), Discourse Studies. A
Multidisciplinary Introduction, Vol. 2. Discourse as Social Interaction, (London, 1997), pp. 258–84, pp. 271-80.
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information and indicators about the potential Russian nationalist discourse in the DPR. I will use articles that are relevant for a possible indication of Russian nationalism. Below, I created a table to show the indicators I will analyse and how I will find them in the text.
Table 1:
INDICATORS EXAMPLES WORDS/THEMES/PHRASES IN TEXT
Collective Name - Russia, Malorossiya, Novorossiya
Common Myth Of Descend - Malorossiya, Novorossiya
- Russian Myths (e.g. Zukhov & Vatutin, two Russian-Soviet war-heroes)
- Russian language, Russian descent (e.g. “We are all of Russian descent…”)
Shared History - Great Patriotic War (e.g. “Our heroes fought…”) - Russian national holidays (e.g. Russia Day) - Russian history
Shared (Distinctive) Culture - Russian values (e.g. “Our true Russian values…”, anti-gay, collectivist)
- Russian culture (also national holidays) - Orthodoxy
- Russian Orthodox Church - Symbols
Association With Specific Territory
- Territorial phrases (“Russian world”,
“Malorossiya”, “Novorossiya”, “Russian lands”) Sense Of Solidarity - Partnerships with Russia (e.g. “The Russian
Orthodox Church donated…” “Russian convoy’s entered the DPR…” “Russia donated…”)
- Establishment of Russian language (e.g. “Russian language now first language again in schools DPR…”)
- Vladimir Putin (“The great leader…”) - Symbols
Extra: Ukraine as the evil “Other”
- Ukraine as the enemy (e.g. “criminals”, “corrupt”, “Ultra-nationalists”)
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- Ukraine and Nazi ideology (e.g. “Nazis are in power in Kiev”, “Ukrainian Neo-Nazis”)
- Anti-Ukrainian myths/history
To illustrate my method, I will use an example of one article that was published on the DONi news website on the 5th of June, 2016. I have highlighted all possible indicators and
interpreted them:
Sunday, June 5, 2016 - 13:37
Donbass is a historic part of Russia (=common myth of descend, association with territory), said the Head of the LPR Igor Plotnitsky at the forum "The Great Russian Word" in Yalta.
'We are glad that the Crimea has returned to the harbor of Russia. There is no taiga here (in Donbass), but in our vast fields we know for sure that it is an ancient area of a bear habitat (= bear is symbol for Russia, so connected
to common myth of descend + territory). It is well known that "a bear does not give up its taiga", said Plotnitsky.
According to him, the most important task for both Donbass and Ukraine is the struggle for forming the Russian consciousness in children (= shared distinctive culture).
'The first thing we asked from Russia as humanitarian aid (= sense of solidarity) was not food, but textbooks of Russian history, language, literature (= shared history + shared distinctive culture),' said the Head of the LPR. The head of the DPR parliament Dennis Pushilin agreed with him. According to him, the result of the nationalist propaganda in Ukraine is 'the youth who are considering normal to burn people, and then do selfies against their background'. (= Ukraine as the evil “Other”)
Plotnitsky said that last year only the Crimea provided about 2 thousand citizens of the Republic of Lugansk with rest.
'However, it should not be only rest, we need joint camps to let children communicate. They have a lot of things to tell each other,' suggested Plotnitsky, adding that the Orthodox Church should also be involved (= shared
distinctive culture) in the educational work.
According to him, in Ukraine there are still many supporters of the Russian world. (= sense of solidarity) 'We know that the people there are just intimidated,' (= Ukraine as the evil “Other”) said Plotnitsky. DONi News Agency
https://dninews.com/article/plotnitsky-called-donbass-part-russia
The sample of the articles will be a selective sample as I have to filter the articles myself and indicate which ones are relevant for my discourse analysis and which are not. However, I will remain critical throughout the research process and not ignore possible contradictory articles to my discourse.
Speeches of the leader of the Donetsk People’s Republic, Alexander Zakharchenko, will also be analysed in the same way as I illustrated above. Furthermore, symbols such as flags or certain typical Russian images (e.g. the bear) will be considered a supportive element of my analysis. Lastly, surveys on the topic of the public opinion in eastern Ukraine will also be used, especially for the last sub-chapter of the thesis. My research will in general be supported empirically by using articles and books.
