The fog of hybrid warfare : conflicts lacking evident adversaries, arms, strategies and

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Abstract

In this research I set out to make a conceptual analysis of hybrid warfare, -actors, and -conflicts. I have examined the concept by trying to apply it to three different conflicts; the crisis in Eastern Ukraine, the campaign of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and the civil war in the Central African Republic. This analysis was conducted in order to find out whether the hybrid concepts are truly a valuable addition to the lexicon in academic-, military-, and policy-making circles.

Kay de Jonge, 10771166

kay.dejonge@xs4all.nl

Bachelor’s thesis Political Sciences

NBvdV, Ursula Daxecker / Jana Krause

9.281 Words

21-6-2017

The Fog of Hybrid Warfare:

Conflicts Lacking Evident

Adversaries, Arms, Strategies and

Definition.

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Introduction ... 1

Warfare in academic literature ... 3

Hybrid war concepts, a theoretical framework ... 5

Research design and

methods………...6

The Ukrainian case: two people’s Republics and one annexed

peninsula………9

The Caliphate’s campaign: how Islamic State redrew Sykes –

Picot………...………13

The Central African Republic: Torn from within……….……….16

Conclusion

……….19

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1

Introduction

Years after the Cold War ended, the historical East-West tensions firmly re-established themselves, when – an often called “resurgent” – Russia annexed Crimea in early 2014. The Russian campaign included unmarked- and later marked “boots on the ground”, a heavy propaganda campaign and an intense cyber presence throughout the Western world. Russia is also accused of supporting the armed uprising in Eastern Ukraine with heavy weaponry, including a missile system which took down a passenger airliner. The Dutch minister of Defence called Russia’s hybrid threat “the most potentially damaging of all threats” (Hennis-Plasschaert 2017: 5).

Roughly 1500 kilometres to the southeast, in the borderlands of Syria and Iraq, another so-called hybrid conflict has taken shape since 2011. The in 2014 self-proclaimed caliphate in parts of Iraq and Syria – Islamic State, or IS in short – has conquered vast stretches of land in an aggressive land campaign with initially little pushback from the nations which fell victim to them. Whilst former US President Barack Obama called IS a hybrid threat (Kroft 2014), some argue that the American-led alliance to defeat IS, makes use of hybrid tactics itself.

Lastly, the Central African Republic, a state plagued with coups, corruption and conflicts, presents itself as another theatre for hybrid conflicts. The chronically unstable nation in the heart of the continent has seen its share of slaughter in the still ongoing conflicts between the government and the Séléka, and anti-balaka movements. The former is a Muslim revolutionary group, rampaging Christian villages. The latter is a Christian reactionary group, pillaging Muslim villages. International coalitions of intercontinental troops are still trying to lead the country on its path to stability (Andrews 2015: 94-96). This so-called “Clash of Civilizations” has been labelled as a “hybrid war event”, which could endanger neighbouring nations’ stability (Korybko 2017).

These three conflicts seem to have more differences than commonalities between one another. However, all of them are still considered an example of hybrid warfare (HWF), either in popular-, policy- or academic circles. This prompts the question; what is a hybrid conflict? The term has had a lot of loose definitions over the past few years. However, recently a more persistent definition has emerged. Frank Hoffman, an authority in the academic literature of warfare, defines it as a combination of “a full range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics […], terrorist acts, […] and criminal disorder” (Hoffman

2007: 8). The application of this one concept to

each of these conflicts could mean one of two things. Firstly, does it imply that perhaps these conflicts are more alike than they seem? Or alternatively, does it lay bare that the concept of hybrid warfare is a hollow phrase in and of itself? It is important to try to answer this question, because this very ambiguous and still highly contested concept is used in academic studies and policy alike, aimed at very specific cases and problems. If the concept of hybrid warfare indeed is a well-defined concept, that would make it possible for researchers and policy makers to adopt a general framework in how to

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2 either research and / or counter hybrid threats, which might be a revolution in contemporary conflict research and -resolve. Current policies on hybrid threats are already being developed. For example, the Czech Ministry of Interior has on January 1st_{2017 opened}

the Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats. The centre’s definition of a hybrid threat ranges from security implications of migration and radicalisation all the way to foreign disinformation campaigns (MVCR 2016). Finland as well has recently established such a centre as a part of the strengthened cooperation between NATO and the EU (EEAS 2017). This cooperation is in itself somewhat remarkable. The EU, a more or less strictly political IGO, was somewhat able to clearly define aspects of hybrid warfare1_{, whereas NATO, a strictly military IGO could not. Attendees of a}

recent event organized by the Atlantic Council were told no conclusive definition of HWF could be agreed upon by the member states (Van Puyvelde 2015). This leads to the undesirable situation that an intergovernmental organization is trying to combat a threat which it cannot even adequately define, let

alone effectively counter. A reason for this rush

to make policy on an ill-defined concept might be explained by organizational theory. It is often argued that when an organization – i.e. NATO, the EU, government ministries or agencies – detects a threat to its organizational survival (not being adaptive or responsive enough, for example), the organization will pursue a risky strategy, focussing on actively addressing issues of the stakeholders most influenced by these issues (Jawahar & McLaughlin 2001: 404). This makes organizations prone to exaggerating presumed threats or responding quickly to unclear issues. Related to the case of hybrid warfare, stakeholders such as states and governments might feel threatened by the diminishment of purely conventional wars and reach for all tools at their disposal to swiftly respond to newly emerging threats. The mentioned organizations feel compelled to do so, because organizations need to seem

useful to survive. Even before HWF

made its way into the military lexicon, the debate about its definition, historical uniqueness and validity has taken shape in academia and the professional military literature. However, this did not start with a discussion on hybrid warfare. After the end of the Cold War, academics have tried to encapsulate the newly emerging modes of war in concepts, some more successful than others, but often still heavily debated. Before HWF came for instance “compound wars”, “4th_generation

warfare”, “5th_{generation warfare”, “three block warfare” and others (Chuka & Born 2014: 3). Some of}

these will be properly addressed in the literature review, to shed some light on the academic sphere of warfare. The HWF debate comes down to prominent proponents such as the aforementioned Frank Hoffman, arguing that hybrid threats are becoming more and more predominant, whereas other

1_{The European Union has defined hybrid warfare as “the mixture of coercive and subversive activity,}

conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare. There is usually an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target and on generating ambiguity to hinder decision-making processes. Massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalise, recruit and direct proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats” (European Commission 2016).

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3 scholars such as Gray and Glenn dismiss HWF as a hyped buzzword representing nothing new, because historical records show every war has been hybrid to some extent (Idem: 4; Glenn 2009: 7; Gray 2009: 22). According to these authors, HWF concepts suffer from severe conceptual stretching, which leads to inaccurate studies and policy, where these should be tailormade to offer a useful perspective or solution. I will examine the usefulness and applicability of the concept by examining three cases of conflict, which differ greatly from one another. If all of these cases can legitimately be labelled hybrid conflicts, a logical conclusion would be that the concept is of little use in making a general framework on how to analyse and counter hybrid threats in both academic- and policy circles.

Warfare in academic literature

Throughout history, wars have always been waged against rivals of all sorts. Together with societies, technologies, economies and politics, it has changed and adapted to new environments and situations. However, when people think of war, an image often conjured up, is that of conventional warfare; war as we know it. Conventional warfare is encompasses “armies of one state or alliance of nation-states fighting those of another” (Sullivan & Dubik 1993: 9). Furthermore, it is a war fought with “industrially manufactured, technologically advanced equipment, deployed by recognizably military organizations”, as well as “the doctrinal thinking, the organisational structures, the rules of engagement, and even the appropriate goals of violence” (Payne 2012).

Until the end of the Cold War, conventional interstate war dominated security studies, despite only 10% of the total number of armed conflicts could be considered an interstate war. This is mostly to blame on the realist paradigm in international relations theories. There is simply no room for conflicts like civil wars in its state-centric, anarchical theories of world politics. Core realist assumptions do not line up with the presence of an overarching government and individual actors at war within states (Paris 2001: 99; Gleditsch 2007; 294; Mack 2002: 516).

This has changed over time, because scholars realized one of the most prominent type of wars, is a civil war. This can include insurgencies, coups d’état and other armed uprisings against a government. Civil wars are contained within a state and involve combatants from that state fighting for the political control of said state. Academics have emphasized that a conflict can be labelled a civil war when state violence is sustained and the number of casualties on each side is significant (McLean & McMillan 2009: 81). Civil wars are often categorized within three modes of warfare; the aforementioned conventional warfare, symmetric nonconventional wars (SNC wars), and irregular warfare, often labelled as insurgencies. To apply the label “conventional” to a civil war, such a conflict is fought with clearly defined frontlines and symmetric capabilities when it comes to heavy weaponry (Balcells & Kalyvas 2014: 1391). It is also important to mention the use of conventional weapons only. This excludes the use of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological, chemical and nuclear agents (Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy). A civil war can be labelled as an SNC war “when it entails a symmetric interaction at a low level of military capacity”. Whereas a

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4 conventional civil war is fought with symmetric capabilities in all levels of military capacity (Balcells & Kalyvas 2014: 1395). This leaves one last categorization of (civil) warfare to be discussed; irregular warfare. However, because this is such a crucial concept, not just to understand civil wars, but also hybrid warfare, I will discuss it more elaborate below. The civil war criteria might apply to at least two of my cases very well; IS and the CAR, once again revealing that it is highly problematic to try to fit complex conflicts within neatly defined categories. However, this is beyond the scope of this research. After discussing conventional wars and civil wars to a certain extent, I have yet to cover insurgencies, guerrilla style fighting and other unconventional tactics. Insurgencies and guerrilla style fighting are often contained within the concept of “irregular warfare” (IWF). Modern irregular warfare is often cited as a consequence of globalization, and western military superiority. Militarily inferior troops have to wage war with new strategies and tactics to make a “meaningful” difference (Hoffman 2006: 397). IWF differs from conventional warfare in several characteristics. Firstly, the adversary is highly unlikely to be a state actor. Secondly, the most important battle takes place in the hearts and minds of civilians; garnering support for the cause is vital. The practical implication being, that in IWF, one is also fighting or supporting an ideology, as opposed to a military conflict for purely financial- or territorial gain. Lastly, time is an essential factor. A greatly disadvantaged, irregular, enemy might think it to be wiser to keep quiet and outlast you, and to seize the opportunity when it presents itself. This leads to a situation wherein there is an absence of constant fighting on defined battlegrounds, which in turn raises the likelihood for guerrilla warfare to occur (Gray 2007: 42-45). Also, there is the so called “Grey Zone”. Conflict within this grey zone are described as activities both “coercive and aggressive in nature, but deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of conventional military conflict and open interstate war”. These tactics are often used by resurgent or “revisionist” powers, who seek financial-, territorial-, or strategical gains, which are usually associated with victories in wars. However, an all-out war is deemed undesirable by these actors. To prevent escalation, military operations in grey zone conflicts are characterized by unconventional tactics. This includes, but is not limited to, cyberwarfare, propaganda, political warfare, economic coercion and sabotage, sponsorship of armed proxy fighters and slow militarization and military expansionism (Brands 2016: 1-2). This concept suffers even more from conceptual stretching than hybrid warfare. HWF insists on a fusion of several different modes of warfare, whereas the grey zone only requires one mode of warfare at the time. This ambiguity led to a publication which contained the activities of Russia, China, Iran, ISIS and Boko Haram within this one concept (Ibid; Pomerantsev 2015a). It is noteworthy that the same author that same year contained activities from China, Russia and ISIS within hybrid warfare, full-spectrum warfare, non-linear warfare, next-generation warfare and ambiguous warfare, to add to the conceptual mess that is academic warfare literature (Pomerantsev 2015b). Lastly, there is the concept of “unrestricted warfare”. Where conventional warfare draws the line on biological, chemical and nuclear agents, the Chinese concept accepts those as legitimate weapons. That, as well as domestic terrorism,

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5 the hacking of financial networks and manipulating the media, together with the aforementioned modes of warfare (Hoffman 2006: 398).

Hybrid war concepts; a theoretical framework

As I have shown, the conceptual realm of warfare is as its theories; broad and often vague. It is filled with ambiguous concepts and definitions, sometimes even concepts without proper definitions, such as “ambiguous warfare” (Connell & Evans 2015:3). All of these concepts can often be prone to conceptual stretching. This entails that with the world growing more complex and intertwined, so have concepts in the discipline of political science. Traditional concepts did not fit the changing times, so these concepts were changed to include new cases. The stretching has led from robust, clear concepts to “vague, amorphous conceptualizations” (Sartori 1970: 1034). This is a process that often occurs in comparative politics, a field to which the study of political violence belongs. Once a scholar has tested a certain set of hypotheses in a couple of cases, the next priority is to increase its generalizability. In order to increase this, additional cases have to fit under the conceptualization. When this does not seem like a viable possibility, the concept might get stretched up a little bit. Just enough to include the new cases on one end, but also enough to practically render the previous categorization of cases no longer entirely appropriate (Collier & Mahon 1993: 845). This is problematic for the obvious reasons that results acquired in the past, are no longer usable in academia or policy making in the present or future, when one makes use of a concept too broad to adequately encapsulate a specific phenomenon.

Conceptualizations of hybrid warfare sit somewhere in the middle of all this turmoil. To assess whether or not HWF concepts are indeed such stretched, undesirable, catch-all concepts, it is necessary to acquire a solid, widely accepted definition. The concept of hybrid warfare in its current form was first published in a 2005 paper by Erin Simpson. She placed emphasis mostly on who was fighting, not how this fighting was conducted. Simpson names the Vietnam- and Iraq wars as prime examples. Here, state actors – the US operating on foreign soil – combat non-state actors (Simpson 2005: 4). However, due to the generality of the word “hybrid”, the term hybrid warfare – solely as a term, not a concept – was mentioned before Simpson in 2003 Then it described a combination of “civil war, inter-state war and cross-border insurgencies” (Carayannis 2003: 232). Hereafter the concept of HWF began to take the shape which it nowadays has. In an influential article – then Lieutenant General, now Secretary of Defence in the Trump administration – James Mattis and Frank Hoffman defined HWF as a merger of four different modes of warfare; “the traditional, the irregular, the catastrophic, and the disruptive” (Mattis & Hoffman 2005: 18).

I chose to follow Frank Hoffman’s later, most detailed definition of the concept, as he is an authority in this field who has extensively written about HWF and has been published in numerous publications. He defines a hybrid threat as “any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behaviour in the battlespace to obtain their political objectives” (Hoffman

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6 2010: 443). This definition includes both states and non-state actors. It stresses that all four elements must be employed by the adversary at some point in the conflict. Hoffman states often that the combined use is critical to his conceptualization of HWF. I have already elaborated on conventional weapons and -warfare, as well as irregular tactics. However, “terrorism” and “criminal behaviour” still need to be addressed, because an understanding of these elements is crucial to understand HWF concepts. Firstly there is the concept of terrorism. This concept itself is often subject to academic debate, but a fairly clear definition has emerged in recent years. Terrorism is regarded as a fear-inspiring method of repeated violent activities, undertaken by (semi-) clandestine individuals, groups or even state actors. These violent actions are often undertaken for criminal-, political-, or idiosyncratic reason, whereby the direct victims are often not the real targets. These immediate human casualties are often randomly chosen (wrong place, wrong time), or selected as representative or symbolic targets; they serve as message generators. In this definition, any act de-individuated violence against civilians because of political, religious, criminal or psychopathological reasons can be seen as an act of terrorism (Weinberg et al. 2004: 780-781; Schmid 2004: 200-201). Secondly, there is Hoffman’s opaque mention of “criminal behaviour”. He himself briefly addresses narco-terrorism, the poppy production in Afghanistan and activities such as drug production and -trafficking, as well as extortion to undermine local- and / or state authorities (Hoffman 2010: 443-444). These examples, as well as his referencing material lead me to believe that Hoffman is mostly talking about organized crime and not just any criminal activity. In said referencing material, organized crime is conceptualized as “a set of illicit activities appropriated and utilized by various entities for specific purposes. Terrorist organizations, insurgents, ethnic factions, sectarian groups, and militias all use organized crime activities as a funding mechanism” (Williams 2009: ix).

In this definition of hybrid warfare, the combined use of conventional- and irregular strategies, -weapons and -tactics, as well as terrorism and organized crime is essential. This, because if the combination of these conceptual elements were to be excluded, almost every armed conflict could be categorized as a hybrid conflict, whereas now, it “only” seems to apply to a multitude of contemporary conflicts. The Grey Zone concept suffers from this possible applicability to a too wide array of conflicts. However, this might still leave too much wiggle room to attribute the concept of hybrid threats, -warfare and -conflicts to a lot of international disputes and its actors. As I will try to assess in my analysis, vastly different conflicts may still manage to be included under the concept of hybrid warfare. If this is the case, this renders the concept a lot less usable, because when theoretically everything is hybrid warfare, practically nothing is hybrid warfare.

Research design and methods

I have selected three cases, which I believe to be very different from one another. I will assess whether they all qualify as a hybrid conflict in accordance with Hoffman’s provided definition. If this is shown, hybrid warfare is potentially a catch-all concept which does not add to academic studies, as well as

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7 policy making. The analysis will draw on both academic and journalistic literature, because some of the cases are still very alive and developing as of the time of writing. Secondly, To come to a full understanding of tactics, strategies and modes of warfare in the selected cases, it is essential that I draw on sources close to the conflict, describing it as it unfolds.

The three chosen cases are the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the campaign of IS in Syria and Iraq and the ongoing conflict in the Central African Republic. The cases vary on a lot of variables both indicative of the likely nature for a conflict to arise, and of the conflict itself. Figure 1 explores these

differences. Figure 1) Differences between cases2_{, in the IS column the upper numbers represent Iraq, the lower Syria} What we can see in table one is that there are very sharp contrasts in developmental indicators such as literacy rate, urbanization, median age and human development index score. Other large differences can be found in the conflict source, where the Ukraine conflict focusses on nationalist and separatist sentiments, IS relies heavily on religion and the CAR suffers from ethnic-, tribal-, and religious troubles, as well as social- and political grievances. One remarkable point is that all of the cases can in some way be understood as insurgencies. Although it is necessary to note that in the Ukrainian case the insurgency only applies to local regions seeking autonomy and is not widely

2_{Sources: CIA Factbook, UNDP, Freedom House and several sources mentioned later in the analysis (all}

included in the Literature section).

Ukraine Conflict IS Campaign CAR-conflict

Ethnic Dispersion in % 77.8, 17.3, <1 75-80, 15-20, 5 90.3, 9.7 33, 27, 13, 10, 7, 4, 2 Main religious dispersion in % ~60, N.A. 55-60, 40, <1 74, 13, 10, 3 35, 25, 25, 15 Urbanization 69.7% (2015) 69.5% (2015) 57,7% (2015) 40% (2015) Median Age 40.4 19.9 24,1 19.6 Literacy 99.8% (2015) 79.7% (2015) 86,4% (2015) 36,8% (2015) Human Development

Index before conflict 0.746 (2013, high) 0.659 (2012, medium) 0.635 (2012, medium) 0.370 (2012, low)

Civil Liberties 1 – 7

before conflict 3 (2013, Partly free) 6 (2012, not free) 7 (2012, not free) 5 (2012, partly free)

Political Rights 1 – 7

before conflict 4 (2013, Partly free) 5 (2012, not free) 7 (2012, not free) 5 (2012, partly free)

Press Freedom 0 – 100

before conflict 60 (2013, Partly free) 69 (2012, not free) 89 (2012, not free) 62 (2012, not free)

Conflict source Nationalist / separatist

sentiments Religious Religious Ethnic/religious/social /political grievances

Conflict typology Interstate war / state

sponsored insurgency Civil war / insurgency Civil war / insurgency Civil war / (counter)insurgency

Adversarial foreign

involvement Yes, Russian military Yes, foreign fighters Yes, foreign fighters Yes, pre-colonial tribal fighters

Internally displaced

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8 desired, and in the CAR one of the movements could be considered a counterinsurgency. These characteristics and more will be explored and described more thoroughly in the analysis.

The units of analysis will be the anti-state actor or the aggressor. I have made this choice because the concept of hybrid warfare – as conceptualized by Frank Hoffman – is viewed through a governmental lens, on which policy should be anticipated. It specifically speaks of a hybrid threat as an adversary deploying a certain combination of methods. Therefore I assume the role of a sovereign state in selecting the units of analysis, which are the enemies of the incumbent regime. In the conflict in Ukraine these are Russia and pro-Russian militias. In Iraq and Syria, IS will obviously be the unit of analysis. In the case of the Central African Republic, both the Séléka and the Anti-balaka movements will be considered as the adversary, as both groups commit atrocities and attack civilians and government officials. These cases will be analysed in order to examine whether or not they can indeed justly be called hybrid conflicts, according to Hoffman’s definition. To do this, the given definition of hybrid warfare has been broken down in conventional- and irregular modes of conflict, as well as terrorist activities and criminal behaviour. Each of these components has its own characteristics, which will be used as indicators to determine whether the studied case is indeed a hybrid conflict (figure 3). The given definition of HWF leaves little room for speculation on indicators. Hoffman mentions “conventional weapons”, “irregular tactics”, “terrorism” and “criminal behaviour”. I have mentioned earlier that the fusion of these elements is of great importance in understanding HWF, because otherwise it would just qualify as either conventional or irregular. This leads me to the belief, that whenever any adversary makes use of these four elements in a combined fashion, it can be labelled a hybrid threat. The provided figure encompasses each of the three elements which can be considered modes of warfare of violence. These are accompanied by indicators to look

for, when assessing the adversary in question. The element of “criminal behaviour” – or organized crime – is not included in this table, as it cannot be measured by the same indicators as the other three elements. It has received its own indicator figure; figure 2. From Hoffman’s referencing material we can distinguish the criminal acts “theft, diversion and smuggling of oil and other resources”, kidnapping, extortion, (armed) robbery, smuggling of drugs and other commodities such as cars, the trade in weapons and people, as well as document fraud (Williams 2009: 63, 105, 157, 162, 163, 167, 174, 177, 182, 184). Each of the chosen conflicts will be studies extensively. From here onwards the units of analysis will be addressed as adversaries. The studies of adversaries’ conventional and irregular strategies and tactics, as well as criminal behaviour and terrorist activity will result in a comprehensive overview of the used

Theft, diversion and smuggling of oil and other resources Kidnapping

Extortion (Armed) robberies

Smuggling of drugs and other commodities Trade in weapons and people

Document fraud and forgery

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9 strategies per adversary. This overview will be compared to the indicator figures after each individual case, in order to assess whether the adversary can be considered a hybrid threat according to Hoffman’s definition.

Figure 3) Indicators of the three different modes of violent struggle (largely derived from Merari 1994: 401).

Conventional war Irregular war Terrorism

Unit size in battle Large (armies, corps,

division) Medium (platoons, companies, battalions) Small (usually less than ten persons)

Weapons Conventional weapons

and the full range of military hardware (air force, armour, artillery, etc.)3

Mostly light infantry-type weapons, but sometimes artillery pieces as well

Hand guns, hand grenades, assault rifles and specialized weapons, such as bombs

Tactics Usually joint operations

involving several military branches

Commando-type attacks Specialized tactics4

Targets Mostly military units,

industrial and transport infrastructure

Mostly military-, police-and administration staff, political opponents

State symbols, political opponents and the public at large

Intended impact Physical destruction Mainly physical attrition

of the enemy Psychological coercion

Control of territory Yes Yes No

Uniform Wear uniform Often wears uniform Do not wear uniform

Recognition of war

zones War limited to recognized, geographical zones

War limited to the

country in strife No recognised war zones. Operations carried out world-wide

International

legality Yes, if conducted by rules Yes, if conducted by rules No

Domestic legality Yes No No

The Ukrainian case: two people’s Republics, one annexed peninsula

After Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych decided to abandon an agreement on closer ties with the European Union in November 2013, he pursued closer relations with Russia. Initially, this was met with small protests. However, the harsh and violent reaction by riot police, sparked nationwide outrage. Never before, has such repressive violence been used by the Ukrainian government forces to oppress a protest. Thousands of people came out to the Maidan square in the centre of Kiev; birthing the Euromaidan protests (Diuk 2014: 9-13; BBC 2014). This number multiplied to 800.000 December and led to the occupation of Kiev’s city hall. This was followed by the storming of regional government offices in western Ukraine, after parliament passed restrictive anti-protest laws. In February, 88 people were killed within 48 hours in Kiev. Videos showed government snipers taking aim at protesters holding makeshift shields. Later that month, on February 22nd_{, president Yanukovych}

fled to Russia (BBC 2014). Right hereafter, a pivotal move by the Ukrainian parliament

3_{Excluding biological, chemical and nuclear agents, used as weapons of mass destruction}

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10 sparks the outrage in Eastern Ukraine, which is the onset for the conflict which I will address in this research. In the days after Yanukovych’ departure, parliament voted to ban Russian as second official language. This move sparked outrage in Russian-speaking regions in the east, which had remained quiet until this point. This was such a turning point because of the persistent ideological Russian ethno-nationalism in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Most of modern cities in this region were founded under the reign of the Romanov Dynasty, especially under Catherine the Great of Russia, who sent Russian colonists to those regions. Right until the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine and Crimea were Russian. This resulted in the situation that a lot of people living there, still feel more connected to the Russian state and people than to Ukraine. Moreover, Russia has framed the new Ukrainian regime as fascists and Nazis, effectively conjuring up painful memories of the Great Patriotic War – World War II – from which Russia suffered so much. (Montefiore 2016: 227, 232; Biersack & O’Lear 2014: 250, 254-255). Then, on the 27th_{of February, the infamous “Little Green Men” appeared at strategic}

locations all over the mostly Russian-speaking, Ukrainian peninsula Crimea. Above the Crimean parliament in Simferopol, soon flew the Russian flag (Morelli 2017: 3; Reeves & Wallace 2015: 367).

These so-called little green men were masked and wore completely green, military outfits. These outfits did not have any recognizable insignia in order to prevent tying the occupational force to any nation. However, the uniforms appeared Russian-made, the weapons were typical Russian military weapons and the soldiers spoke Russian (ibid.). Despite all of that, Russian president Vladimir Putin was quick to dismiss the invading forces as “local Crimean self-defence forces”. Later, both he and former Black Sea Fleet commander Kasatonov contended that the little green men were indeed Spetsnaz; an elite Russian commando group (Birnbaum 2015; Sputnik 2015). As these forces at the time were already widely assumed to be Russian, the Ukrainian army made an effort out of not letting the conflict escalate. The soldiers retreated to their military bases and withheld fire (Interfax 2014), which can be seen on the middle cover image. Russia could easily take control of the Crimean territory, as their military presence on the Ukrainian peninsula had been big before the takeover. This was made possible by long time leasing agreements for over one thousand naval facilities, two airfields and a training facility. Within a week of the seizure of the Crimean parliament, Russia had complete operational and territorial control over the peninsula (Reeves & Wallace 2015: 379). Russia took the conflict a step further when in March Russian troops were spotted regrouping in great numbers at Ukraine’s eastern border. These troops did not come into action, but they did embolden pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine. Protesters in the region stormed and occupied important government buildings and broadcasting facilities on April 6th_{(Reeves & Wallace 2015: 369). This led to the}

eventual establishment of the unrecognized Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. The Ukrainian government released several statements wherein they accused Russian intelligence services of infiltrating, funding and materially supporting separatist groups, thereby actively orchestrating the whole ordeal. They backed this up with photographs and video’s (Morelli 2017: 22). Meanwhile,

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11 the war continued on a much smaller level. Pro-Ukrainian advocates, journalists and foreign correspondents were often kidnapped, tortured and / or murdered. One of these cases was Vladimir Rybak. He participated in a pro-Ukrainian flash mob in the eastern city of Horlovka. Thereafter he tried to enter the town hall to remove the Donetsk People’s Republic flag flying on top of it. He was pushed away by bystanders. After an exchange of words with the crowd, Rybak went home with a friend. While walking home, a Kia pulled up, out which four men, dressed in somewhat military attire and masks, grabbed him and drove off. A couple of days later, his tortured body was found weighted down at the bottom of a river. Other known stories include the beating of mayor and the kidnapping of his police chief, as well as an American journalist, several Ukrainian reporters and another local mayor. In one week, at least 16 people had been kidnapped in Slavyansk and Horlovka, of which two were found murdered. This trend of kidnappings and beatings of pro-Ukrainians has been attributed to pro-Russian separatists by the Ukrainian government (Harding & Grytsenko 2014). But there are more rogue irregular tactics attributed to the separatists. In February 2015 a car bomb hit a pro-Ukrainian rally in Kharkiv, killing four people. In the summer of 2016, an anti-Russian investigative journalist – and a personal friend of Boris Nemtsov – died in a car bombing in Kiev, well within supposedly safe territory (BBC 2015; Zinets & Chorokondratenko 2016).

In the summer of 2014, the conflict in Ukraine regained salience when on the 17th_{of July, Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was shot down with an advanced surface-to-air missile,}

killing all of the 298 people on board. Later investigation concluded that the missile came from a Russian made BUK installation. It was launched from then separatist-held territory, and after the incident driven to Russia (Reeves & Wallace 2015: 369-370; Morelli 2017: 22; OVV 2015; Bellingcat 2016). The use of this advanced system, as well as separatist access to armoured personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, tanks, drones, electronic warfare and other heavy weaponry led to the believe Russia was actively arming the separatists in Eastern Ukraine, if not being embedded within them (Reeves & Wallace 2015: 370; Morelli 2017: 22; Monaghan 2016: 68). Later it was suggested that Russia actively crossed into Eastern Ukraine with infantry, artillery and other heavy army material (Walker 2014). Then there is the presence of organized crime by separatists in Eastern Ukraine. I found this to be an underreported element in both the academic literature, and in journalistic sources. Nonetheless, here have been reports of smuggling Ukrainian coal and Russian oil through makeshift pipelines. Smuggling is called “a key source of revenue for Ukraine’s separatist elite”. Apart from the theft, diversion and smuggling of energy recourses, large shipments of weapons were reported as smuggled goods. There is also a growing fear concerning the safeguarding of nuclear material in Eastern Ukraine. The war-torn Donbass region has a very active black market for smuggled goods and a number of nuclear installations, which are no longer under official Ukrainian or international control. Currently, there are no indications to assume nuclear or radiological material was at some point stolen or diverted from is location, but the fears are growing this might have gone by unnoticed or is a crime waiting to happen, due to the presumably weak state- and professional nuclear

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12 supervision (Losh 2016; Rempke 2017; NSS

2016; Prentice & Zverev 2016). There is more organized crime in Eastern Ukraine. Due to the blockade of the self-proclaimed People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, common supermarket products have become a scarcity, leading to the smuggling of everyday products (Vitkine 2016). There have also been reports of business schemes and extortion, which are said to

generate tens- to hundreds of thousands of dollars a day (Shynkarenko 2014).

Figures 4 and 5, as well as the presence of an ideology, lead me to establish with great certainty that the Conflict in Eastern Ukraine can legitimately be called a hybrid conflict. I have shown that a professional military was present and active, as well as irregular military forces, terrorist activities and organized crime. Both the Russian military and separatist forces used conventional weapons, high-end military equipment and -technologies. As well as large armies, and medium-sized military units with lighter weapons. The targeting was such as predicted in the indicator table per given category, as well as the recognition of certain war zones. Terrorist bombings took place in areas controlled by the Ukrainian government, not in the separatist-held East. Moreover, commando type attacks and defined military battles took place. There has also been a lot of criminal activity in Eastern Ukraine following the war; both for personal enrichment, as well as funding for the separatist cause. As I have shown, Hoffman’s label of “hybrid adversary” is clearly applicable to the Russian military and separatist forces in the Ukrainian case.

Figure 5) Indicators of the three different modes of violent struggle – the Ukrainian case (presence in adversary highlighted)

6_{Kidnapping, assassinations, car bombing, hijacking, barricade-hostage, etc.}

Extortion (Armed) robberies Smuggling of drugs and other commodities

Trade in weapons and people Document fraud and forgery

Figure 4) Indicators of organized crime – applied to the Ukrainian case (presence in adversary highlighted)

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War limited to the

International

The Caliphate’s campaign: how Islamic State redrew Sykes – Picot

For entirely different reasons in an entirely different political climate, another insurgency sprung up, in the wake of what was hailed in the West as the Arab Spring. In Syria and Iraq this spring has turned into a bitter winter, of which the definite end is not yet in sight. The Islamic State (IS, previously ‘ISIS’) still controls a significant amount of territory in the border region of both countries and continues to wreak havoc upon the civilians living there, though it needs to be noted that at the moment of writing IS is losing more and more ground per day, and the international coalition has launched an offensive on the capital; Raqqa.

IS originates from a small, obscure militant group; Jamaat

al-Tawhid wal Jihad. It was created in 2000 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The group evolved over the

years; it got different names and different leaders. ISIS was not born until 2011, when the Syrian civil war broke out. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, of what was then called ISI, decided to take up arms against the secular Assad regime. Baghdadi sent veterans of the Iraqi insurgency against the US into Syria to pave the way for ISI’s entry. This group eventually broke loose from him as Jabhat al-Nusra. This splinter organization fared well in Syria. It successfully established food and medicine transports into the destroyed city of Aleppo and was acknowledged by locals as ‘Syrian’, despite the large numbers of foreign fighters. This was a sharp contrast to ISI. Which was described as a foreign occupier, unwilling to cooperate with other jihadist groups, where al-Nusra was more pragmatic. It appeared their goal was to overthrow Assad, whereas ISI – now named ISIS – was more occupied with establishing its own rule. The two organizations, fighting against a common enemy – and each other – under Al Qaeda command, never reconciled. In February 2014 Al Qaeda cut all ties with ISIS (Hashim 2014: 69, 77-78). In June 2014 ISIS began its Iraq offensive. It convinced several local military and government leaders to resign and flee their posts, inspiring modern day stab-in-the-back myths. Those who remained on their posts were targeted by suicide bombers, assassination squads or fell victim to mass executions, all in order to scare away other remaining officials. Video material of these vile actions were widely distributed throughout the region and the Iraqi military’s front line. This caused many Sunni soldiers to desert the Shia Maliki regime. Because multiple Iraqi army divisions fell apart due to desertion, massacres and combat avoidance, ISIS was able to seize tremendous fire power, which was left behind by the retreating and murdered forces. This included “1500 armoured Humvees, large numbers of mortars,heavy artillery pieces”, and even American-made tanks. One of the seized US M1A1 Abrams tanks is pictured on the bottom

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14 cover image. In Syria, ISIS took control of large stocks of weapons from the regime’s army, as well as older Russian tanks and Man Portable Air Defence Missiles. When ISIS seized a city, they went straight for security- and government buildings, as well as core infrastructure-, water- and electricity installations. This ensured swift material and territorial control in what can be described as a more

conventional strategy (ibid; Terrill 2014: 17-18). The ISIS

forces often work with military precision and professionalism, because they are trained to do so. Baghdadi recruited several high ranking officials from Saddam Hussein’s long disbanded army. These people knew the strategies, the battlefields and the people. According to American officials, this made ISIS “the perfect hybrid of terrorists and an army”. IS has also taken the size of a decent army, with about 30.000 fighters. Because of its size and the knowledge of the battlegrounds and strongholds, ISIS was extremely efficient in holding down territory. Further cementing the feelings of professionalism of the ISIS army, is the fact that the group fights in uniforms, adapting to the expected battle environment. Uniforms are also used to distinguish ranks and tasks (Idem: 19; Gigova 2016; Hubbard & Schmitt 2014; RBSS).

From June 9th_{onwards, ISIS began referring to itself as IS (for Islamic State), and its}

territories as a caliphate, Ruled by al-Baghdadi as Caliph. This tipped the territorial scales heavily. Scared by the victories of IS, villages and smaller militias surrendered to a peaceful occupation, in order to avoid imminent destruction by the group. The border between Iraq and Syria disappeared almost completely, erasing the colonial Sykes – Picot carve-up (Hashim 2014: 79). IS succeeded in establishing a function pseudo-state in this region, with a complex administrative structure, limited service providing in health, education and infrastructure, justice administration and a refined (social) media presence (Laub & Masters 2014; Cronin 2015: 91; Laub 2016). IS has often been referred to as a terrorist group. It was until much later that it was seen as the militarily advanced threat, which it was. Terrorist organizations have hundreds of members at maximum, where IS had tens of thousands of fighters. It also held territory quite successfully, had extensive military capabilities, maintained lines of communication, funded itself and could carry out complex multi-branch military operations (Cronin 2015: 88). IS has been funding itself largely by taking control of- and exploiting Syrian and Iraqi oil fields. At a certain point it controlled an estimated 60% of Syria’s production capacity, while it also seized at least seven oil-production sites in Iraq in the summer of 2014. The oil is sold on the black market in both countries, as well as allegedly to the Assad regime, Jordan and Turkey. IS made an estimated $1 million to $3 million per day with oil sales (Idem: 91-92). However, oil is just one of the many sources of IS revenue. There also was the selling of young girls into (sexual) slavery and the hostage-taking of civilians, foreigners and journalists. In 2014, ransom payments to IS were worth an estimated $20 million (Stathis 2015: 14; Laub 2016). It has made active use of its newfound territory. While seizing control over bigger Iraqi and Syrian cities, central banks were looted, antiquities and artefacts stolen and sold on black markets, as well as other commodities such as “jewellery, cars, machinery and livestock” from civilians. Moreover, as IS established itself as

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15

Extortion (Armed) robberies

Smuggling of drugs and other commodities Trade in weapons and people

Document fraud and forgery

a de facto state, it has successfully conquered major transportation points. Here, toll is being charged and taxes are being levied on the transportation of goods. IS also birthed a wide-ranging extortion racket in the form of taxes, targeting all owners and producers within their territory, as well as minorities facing an extra tax. These taxes are collected on basically everything; from cell-phone service providers, to water delivery companies and electricity distributors. In some estimations, the taxes have been “netting upwards of $8 million a month. IS has been valued as an impressive $2 billion empire (Cronin 2015: 92; Laub & Masters 2014; Laub 2016; Kurdi 2016: 7-8).

The ruthlessness of IS’ terrorist acts in Syria, Iraq and neighbouring nations like Libya, have made headlines worldwide; hangings, drownings, crucifixions, beheadings, mass executions and burnings, but the organization also made their mark in the Western world. Attacks coordinated and/or inspired by IS have taken place in Paris, Nice, Berlin, Brussels, London, Manchester, Sousse, Ankara, Istanbul, San Bernardino, Copenhagen, Melbourne and Stockholm (Stathis 2015: 13). This world-wide modus operandi has been attributed to its ideology, calling on the killing and subordination of all non-Muslims. IS clings on to a radical Islamic ideology which calls for the establishment of an Islamic state in the Iraqi-Syrian border region. Said ideology is rooted in the literal interpretation of later Quran texts which detail Mohammed’s violent conquests in modern day Saudi-Arabia. Through divine sharia law, it deems crucifixion, slavery and beheadings as acceptable, where this in earlier texts is completely discarded as pure barbarism. It is a matter of which texts one chooses to relate to. However, IS’ sole purpose is the establishment of a caliphate and the complete annihilation or submission of what they deem as infidels

(Wood 2015).

We can conclude that IS qualifies as a hybrid adversary according to Hoffman’s definition as well, based on figures 6 and 7. IS has firmly established itself as a pseudo-state, waging war through tactics and strategies encompassing conventional-, irregular-, and terrorist means and methods. The movement has amassed immense wealth through numerous illicit activities, which can be categorized as organized crime, through which it funded its state and army, allowing them to conquer ever more swaths of territory. Their ruthless and vile tactics have made them feared not only in their primary operating area, but across the world, anxiously awaiting whether they might be IS’ next target. It does once again need to be noted however, that at the time of writing, the destruction of Islamic States’ material empire seems imminent, since Kurdish forces and US-led bombings on Raqqa – the Caliphate’s capital – have launched a great offensive.

Figure 6) Indicators of organized crime – applied to the Iraqi / Syrian case

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Figure 7) Indicators of the three different modes of violent struggle – The Iraqi / Syrian case (presence in adversary highlighted)

War limited to the

International

The Central African Republic: torn from within

Ever since its independence from the French Republic in 1960, the Central African Republic (CAR) has been one of the most chronically unstable nations in the world. It is found continually at the bottom of nearly every list on development, governance or peace, and is stained by extraordinary levels of corruption. After its short-lived free independence, it was turned to a relatively stable and peaceful, but harsh dictatorship in 19656. It was consequently renamed in 1976 as the Central African Empire by the self-proclaimed Emperor Bokassa I; Colonel Jean-Bédel Bokassa. He ruled his “empire” until 1979, when he was overthrown by French troops. This led to numerous failed democratization attempts and coups, leading up to an all-out civil war in 2004 (Andrews 2015: 94-96).

Three years later a peace was negotiated, but never fully implemented. In late 2012 the mainly Muslim insurgent group Séléka (coalition) seized many northern towns and marched southwards to Bangui, the CAR’s capital. Here they installed the first Muslim to lead the CAR; Michel Djotodia. The Séléka followed their victory with a bloody rampage against the country’s overwhelming majority of Christians. They had been favoured by previous governments for far too

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17 long, the Séléka found. The Christians founded their own counterinsurgency; the anti-balaka (anti-machete). These groups were in no way more merciful than the Séléka. In pure savagery, this time Muslim towns were pillaged. Meanwhile, Djotodia was not accepted as legitimate president by other African states and was forced to resign in 2014. Ever since the CAR’s independence, French troops have been stationed there to try and keep the peace, as well as other African nations’ troops, which eventually led to a 10.000 troops strong UN mission, in a country which boasts a national military of 4500 (Ibid.), whereas the Séléka are reported to have an estimated 20.000 fighters.

In this analysis I will take the opposing groups of

Séléka and Anti-Balaka together as anti-state adversary. In the context of the conflict this obviously

does not ring true to reality, but it does not pose a problem within the scope of this analysis. Because of this, there will not be two of each indicator figures at the end of this analysis.

Due to the complete state failure of the Central African Republic, the groups are rather diverse. Besides religious and ethnic rifts, the groups are – also internally – torn over resources, power, prosperity, healthcare, education and infrastructure. Each individual member may have his own reasons for joining one of the movements. To reduce it to a purely religious conflict would be very short-sighted in the least (Arieff 2014: 5; Herbert et al. 2013: 5). This poses a strong juxtaposition to the pro-Russian separatists or IS combatants, who join their respective causes with very similar, unitary motivations and goals.

Séléka ranks were estimated

to be as big as 20.000 troops at the end of 2013. Making it army sized, if they would operate with proper command structures, which is highly doubtful (idem: 6). This because – as the translation of the name implied – the Séléka movement is an alliance between several rebel groups with somewhat similar goals. However, the leaders of these fragile groups seem either unable or unwilling to fully control their troops (Herbert et al. 2013: 4). Despite these claims, it was still reported that Séléka forces seized control over customs revenues and mining concessions. Whilst the group was still roaming the country in unison, it often attacked state institutions such as ministries, courts and police stations. There are also reports that they went from door to door in Bangui neighbourhoods, seizing men over the age of fifteen, with the sole purpose of executing them. They have also started to target suspected supporters and members of the anti-balaka (Arieff 2014: 6; Schneider 2013). Séléka militias pillaging the villages have been reported to wear military uniforms with red and green berets (top cover image). They used a multitude of light infantry weapons; “Kalashnikovs, rocket-propelled grenades and heavy calibre machine guns”. In these raids essential survival structures and houses with its inhabitants inside got burned down. Civilians got randomly shot at and often village chiefs were taken hostage. Only to be returned after a payment of ransom money. In the search for valuables, extortion lied right around the corner. Civilians often had to give up everything they possessed at gunpoint; livestock, clothing and food. Both groups also fired at will at one another with heavy artillery (Townsend 2013; Anguida 2014; HRW 2013; HRW 2014; Jones

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18 2015).

Which brings me to the anti-balaka. The group consisted originally of mostly young men, seeking revenge at the Séléka who murdered their family members. While it is true that this group initially fell victim to Séléka violence, their retaliation leaves little room for any imagination. They too, fire with artillery at their enemies, raid villages and kill innocent civilians. The anti-balaka went after pretty much everything Islamic they could find, in order to cleanse the nation. (Welz 2014: 603-604; Anguida 2014; Lombard & Batianga-Kinzi 2014: 54). As recent as May 15th _{2017 news stories}

reported that anti-balaka forces killed up to 30 civilians and six UN Peacekeepers. Tens of thousands of people fled The countryside amidst fear over the Christian death squads. Scenes of cannibalism and the dismemberment of Muslims prompted the massive

flight (VOA 2017; Flynn 2014a).

Both groups take part in the selling of diamonds and gold to fund their operations, as well as the previously mentioned extortionary measures imposed on civilians. In one of the Séléka controlled mines, labourers pull up 15 kilos of gold a month. On the local markets it should be worth $350.000. This amount can be doubled, when sold internationally. Another big source of revenue comes from diamonds. The Kimberly Process imposed

an export ban on raw diamonds from the CAR. However, a UN panel estimated that since that ban $24 million worth of diamonds had been smuggled out of the country (Flynn 2014a; Flynn 2014b). The taxes being levied on the populace by both groups reach from all sorts of trade to road taxes. The latter alone has an estimated revenue of $2 million per year. The groups have also charged locals for “protection”. This can be bought in payments from $1000, in a nation where the average annual

income is $600 (Oakford 2015). Looking at figure 9,

this conflict seems the most ambiguous on whether or not to classify it as an example of hybrid warfare. Mainly because the three coloured blocks in the conventional column can be reasonably expected to fall within the other categories as well. However, if we look back at Hoffman’s definition, he only mentions “conventional weapons”. Which practically comes down to every sort of weaponry imaginable, with the exception of biological, chemical and nuclear agents. Having considered that, it is evident that the Séléka and ant-balaka can be considered hybrid as adversaries as well, in accordance with Hoffman’s conceptualization of the concept. This, because of the aforementioned use of conventional weapons, the irregular tactics and terrorist actions such as targeting civilians at random. I have also spoken about the indicator of criminal behaviour, in this case the smuggling and trade of minerals, as well as the levying of taxes and other extortionary measures such as the commandeering of possessions and livestock and kidnapping. Lastly, the presence of ideology in the battling groups seems evident, because one of the main cleavages between the two groups is the social divide between

Theft, diversion and smuggling of oil and other resources Kidnapping Extortion (Armed) robberies Smuggling of drugs and other commodities

Trade in weapons and people Document fraud and forgery

Figure 8) Indicators of organized crime – applied to the Central African Republic case

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19 Muslims and Christians within the nation. Each group feels disadvantaged by the other and both are willing to take up arms in order to attack the out-group.

Figure 9) Indicators of the three different modes of violent struggle – applied to the Central African Republic case (presence in adversary highlighted).

War limited to the

International

Conclusion

I have addressed three very different conflicts and assessed whether or not they might qualify to fit within concepts of hybrid warfare. I set out on this research, because the concepts of hybrid warfare, -threat, or -conflict arise more and more in both academic and policy-making circles, despite the vagueness surrounding the concept.

At the least, this analysis has shown that conflicts do not fit in neatly defined categories, because there is such a vast amount of context which needs to be attributed to each case. Moreover, when multiple conflicts can be captured within the same concept, one would be inclined to think that the same methods can be applied to analyse and / or solve these conflicts. Taken to my three cases, I am inclined to think that the tactics deployed against IS – a multinational bombing coalition and the training of local militias – and in the CAR – deployment of French, African Union, and UN troops – could serve as a catalyst for an enormous war when deployed in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. It would after all be a direct attack against Russia. The western response to the Ukraine conflict – sanctions and

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20 tough talk – would not harm IS or CAR combatants in the slightest. This leads me to believe that HWF concepts are illusive catch-all terms which do not lend itself to the proposition of academic- and/or policy-making frameworks.

I conclude this, because when everything is hybrid warfare, nothing is hybrid warfare. Conflicts deserve tailor-made academic research and policy responses in order to address them properly. Hence, I think the concepts surrounding HWF do more damage than good to those trying to encapsulate these conflicts in a research, or those who actively work to solve them. A concept should mean there are enough similarities between cases that the same approach could be used to solve- or research them all. However, the broadness and vagueness of the concept undoes this aspect of useful concept-building. There might truly be new forms of conflict emerging in our contemporary world, and these conflicts deserve it to be taken seriously enough, to not easily be brought under the concepts of HWF. Further research should look deeper in contemporary conflicts and try to find concepts which are worthy of basing research and policy on.

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The fog of hybrid warfare : conflicts lacking evident adversaries, arms, strategies and

Kay de Jonge, 10771166

kay.dejonge@xs4all.nl

Bachelor’s thesis Political Sciences

NBvdV, Ursula Daxecker / Jana Krause

9.281 Words

21-6-2017

The Fog of Hybrid Warfare:

Conflicts Lacking Evident

Adversaries, Arms, Strategies and

Definition.

Table of contents

Introduction ... 1

Warfare in academic literature ... 3

Hybrid war concepts, a theoretical framework ... 5

Research design and

methods………...6

The Ukrainian case: two people’s Republics and one annexed

peninsula………9

The Caliphate’s campaign: how Islamic State redrew Sykes –

Picot………...………13