Albania: The role of North-South divisions
for the country’s EU integration
Linde-Kee van Stokkum
Master Thesis European Studies – Institutional Integration of Europe
Graduation date: 31 August 2014
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Michael Kemper Second reader: Dr. Carlos Reijnen
2
Preface
Albanians live in a land of jagged skylines, towering peaks, precipitous cliffs, windswept plateaus and snow-filled ravines. They don’t call it Albania, but Shqipëria, the Land of the Eagle. They don’t call themselves Albanians, but Shqiptarë, or Sons of the Eagle. Thus they identify with the noblest birds that soars the highest, mates for life, and nest among
one-and-a-half-mile-high peaks.1
Usually when I tell people about Albania, most of them struggle to pinpoint this small western Balkan country on the map. As a result, Albania has often been referred to as the ‘last secret of Europe’. What people neither know is the high pro-European sentiment among the Albanian population: EU support in Albania seems to be even higher than in most present EU member states. On 24 June 2014, the EU granted Albania the EU candidate status and became an official EU candidate state. Keeping in mind the pro-European sentiment and the country’s application in 2009 for EU membership, obtaining the status was received as a milestone in the country’s contemporary history. Aspects as Albania’s political history, its political culture and its strong European conciseness wanted to make me write this thesis about Albania, the Land of Eagles. This thesis is a tribute to the country that has a special place in my heart; however, it is also a critical note to its political landscape.
Acknowledgements
I would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone who supported me during the process of writing my thesis. Special thanks go to Professor Michael Kemper, who has been a very pleasant supervisor. He has been so patient with me from the beginning, when I first asked him to be my supervisor with a completely different subject. I appreciate his wide variety of efforts and supportive and critical guidance. Further, I would like to thank my dear friends and family, who all supported in this thesis process. Special thanks go to my Albanian friends, who became my experts in small uncertainties and interpretations in Albanian language. I am especially grateful to Elga Mitre, who was more than willing to answer all my questions and to share all the information I asked for. A big thanks goes to Jutbina Hoxha, who committed herself in helping where needed and always inspired me with her stories.
Finally, my thanks goes to Assistant Professor Carlos Reijnen, who is willing to serve as a second examiner.
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3
Table of contents
Preface 2
Acknowledgements 2
Table of contents 3
Acronyms and Abbreviations 5
Figure 1: Administrative map of Albania 6
Introduction 7
1. Clan culture in Albania 13
1.1 Clans 13
1.2 Clans in Albania 15
1.2.1 Ghegs 15
1.2.2 Tosks 19
1.2.3 End of clan structure in (North) Albania? 19
1.3 North-South identities 20
1.4 Political networks 24
1.5 Clan structure in political networks 26
1.5.1 Hoxha’s years of government 26
1.5.2 Berisha’s first term of government 28
1.6 Conclusion 29
2. Historical case: Regional rivalry during Hoxha’s years of government 31
(1944 – 1985)
2.1 Foundations of communism in Albania 32
2.2 Regional politics during Hoxha’s years of government 33
2.2.1 Ideological and Cultural Revolution 34
2.2.2 Collectivization 38
2.2.3 Language 39
2.3 Conclusion 40
3. Regional economic differentiation in Albania 41
3.1 Economic differentiation during communism 41
3.2 Contemporary regional economic differentiation 42
3.2.1 RD Index 44 3.2.2 Population 46 3.2.3 Economic activity 48 3.2.4 Employment 50 3.2.5 Social disparities 51 3.3 Conclusion 54
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4. Political cleavages in Albanian domestic affairs 57
4.1 Elections and political networks 58
4.1.1 Parliamentary elections in 2009 58
4.1.2 Local elections in 2011 62
4.2 Parliament and political networks 64
4.3 The role of political networks in Media & Civil Society 70
4.3.1 Media 70 4.3.2 Civil Society 72 4.4 Public administration 73 4.5 Conclusion 77 5. Albania’s EU integration 79 5.1 EU-Albania relations 81 5.2 Pro-European sentiment 89 5.3 Difficulties 90
5.4 Pros and Cons regarding Albania’s EU membership 92
5.5 Albania’s ability as a future EU member state/ Conclusion 94
Conclusion 97
Appendix 1: Profiles of Major Albanian Media Owners (September 2013) 100
5
Acronyms and Abbreviations
ACP Albanian Communist Party
AIIS Albanian Institute for International Studies
ALAR Association of Local Authorities and Regions
CEC Central Election Committee
CEE Central Eastern Europe
DP (A) Democratic Party (of Albania)
EC European Commission
EU European Union
IPA Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
LGU Local Government Unit
MP Member of Parliament
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PM Prime Minister
PDU Party for Justice and Unity
RD Regional Development
SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement
SAP Stabilization and Association Process
SMI Socialist Movement for Integration
SP (A) Socialist Party (of Albania)
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Figure 1: Administrative map of Albania
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Introduction
This Master thesis analyzes one of the most characteristic features of contemporary Albania: its perceived division into North and South. I study this division from several perspectives: clan culture and political networks, twentieth-century history, demography and economy, and contemporary domestic affairs. These factors are then taken into consideration for situating Albania on its path towards becoming an EU member. I want to have a look at the simplified perception of North-South division by looking at the following research question:
‘In how far is the Albanian political landscape embedded in historical and cultural North-South divisions, and what effect does this have on Albania's ability to integrate into the EU?’
Albania is relatively unknown, leaving probably many people ignorant about the fact the country is in the middle of its EU integration process. For the reader to get to know Albania a little better, my work start with my encounter of the stereotypes that Albanians have and maintain about each other. In what follows I would like to briefly present these accounts, always asking the reader to keep in mind that they are stereotypes that may or may not have a factual basis. The images that follow, I gathered from numerous conversations with Albanian colleagues and friends during my work in Tiranë.
North as seen by South and vice versa
Albania is a small European country, located in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula.2
Over the time, the Albanian people became divided into two groups, the Ghegs and the Tosks. The Ghegs historically inhabited the area North of the Shkumbi River and the Tosks lived in the land South of the river. While the main difference between the Ghegs and the Tosks is linguistic, both regions have experienced history through the influence of different outside forces and institutions, and internal leaders from both groups can be characterized as
quite divergent.3 From a historical point of view, the Ghegs and the Tosks are clearly
distinguished in economic, social and cultural domains. From personal experience these internal differences are still present in the contemporary Albanian society. Noteworthy, the Shkumbi River is a relative border between North and South: the difference lies in the different representations of the ‘self and the other’, but are strongly related to geography. For instance, the North is perceived as an area inhabited by backward and dirty shepherds, where
2 Klarita Gërxhani & Arthur Schram, ‘Albanian Political-Economics: Consequences of a Clan Culture’, LICOS
Centre for Transition Economics, no. 92 (2000): 2.
3
Brandon Doll, ‘The Relationship between de Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’,
8
there are no roads and people do not have any contact with the outside, while the South is seen as outside oriented, multilingual and therefore progressive, striving for the development
of their country.4 Here, I assume an important relation between these perceptions and the
geography of the country. Geographically, North Albania borders peripheral territories of the former Yugoslavia and it consists mainly of highlands. Climatically, it is characterized by a very cold winter and a cool summer. In the opposite, South Albania consists mainly of plains and has a warmer and more stable climate. South Albania, especially the coastal areas, is a popular holiday destination for Albanians and Kosovarians. For these reasons, is has
traditionally been easier to economically develop South Albania than North Albania.5 So, in
geographical perspective, North Albania is relatively isolated. Characterized by a mountainous terrain, communication has been difficult and still is difficult in these days. For example, there are several areas in North Albania where phone signals are weak or absent, and where internet is not available. So, the isolated position of North Albania is represented in the quite traditional and primitive way many northerner mountaineers still live, keeping alive the traditional prescriptions of the customary laws. In general, the northerners don’t want to contribute to the development of their country; they prefer to keep their traditional way of living. Like I already indicated, North Albania is characterized by low accessibility and poor mobility, except for the coastal areas in Shkodër and Lezhë. Research turned out
that the level of periphery is strongly related to fewer investments and maintenance.6 For
example, you need about five and a half hours’ by car – preferably a four-wheel drive car – to travel from the capital Tiranë to Valbonë (up in North Albania); a distance of estimated 285 kilometers, taking into account the route from North to South takes 440 kilometers. From my point of view, the low accessibility of North Albania is strongly related to the attitude of Albanians towards North Albania. In general, the literal distance towards North Albania is often less long than the distance people have in mind. For example, according to many Albanians in Tiranë, it is almost seen as impossible to reach places like Valbonë or Thethi up in North Albania during winter time. In their imagination, the idea of a continuous snowfall blocking the roads prevails. In fact, snow only falls now and then. This probably plays a role in the fact that North Albanians are generally labeled as Malok, what means highlander, but in the context of rude and uncouth people, traditional, a little aggressive and not that
4
Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers & Bernd Jürgen, Albanian Identities: myth and history (London 2002): 192.
5 Gërxhani & Schram, ‘Albanian Political-Economics’, 11. 6 UNDP Albania, Regional Disparities in Albania, 97,
http://www.in.undp.org/content/dam/albania/docs/Regional%20Disparities%20in%20Albania%20-%20Analysis.pdf (accessed 18 April 2014).
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intelligent. Northerners are associated with criminality, characterized by the image that everybody has a gun and, therefore, there is a constantly danger in the North of being killed. Remarkably, people from Vlorë (South) are also known for their criminal practices in terms of drugs and prostitution. However, it is said that southerners from Vlorë kill each other for less invalid reasons than the northerners do. For example, people say that northerners kill each other for small cases, like scratching somebody’s car. So, northerners are more violent. Thereby, women in North Albanian do not have rights. The idea rules a northern man can have seven wives. Further, northerners are characterized by their ever-present will to lead and to play a leadership role in any undertaking, their excessive pride and noisiness.
Throughout history, South Albania has always been more influenced by foreign invaders who brought differences and innovation, which formed the breeding ground of the dynamic intellectual and economic development of this part of the country, hosting the bourgeoisie of Albania.
Especially, the interactive relation with southern neighbor Greece – center of the classic civilization – had a progressive influence on this part of Albania. The South was close to big cities where trade dominated – like Thessaloniki – so people had better exchange opportunities in terms of trade and culture. A flourishing economy brought civilization, and partly therefore, Albania’s culture heritage is mainly located in the South. For example, Albanian properties inscribed on the World Heritage List are the southern cities of Berat and Gjirokastër and Butrint. As a result of this foreign interaction, southerners speak traditionally more languages.
Later, in 1912, it was also the southern region – Vlorë – where the Albanian independence was declared. Over the time, Albanian history favored the superior feeling of the southern Albanians. Albanians of the South are labeled with several labels, which in itself are related either to the region of origin or particular features, such as being stingy. For instance, people from Lushnjë and Fier are called Laluc, what means small and not brave, they are even afraid of rabbits. The opposite are people from Vlorë, called Labe, what means very proud, especially on themselves: it is considered they have a hole in their chest, because they are always knocking on their chest and say ‘I, I, and I’. People from the Mallakastra and Berat regions are characterized as stubborn people; people from the Laberia region are typified of having the feeling of being a superior race; and people from the Gjirokastër and Korçë regions are very stingy. A saying teaches us, you should never marry a woman from there, because you marry her mother too. Other typical characteristics of the southerners are their multilinguistic skills; they are more emancipated and have an entrepreneurial set.
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In geographical perspective, North and South Albania are divided by Central Albania, hosting the country’s capital Tiranë. In the context of best accessibility and good mobility, the country’s literal center appears also to be Albania’s economic and political center. So, it appears that the region between North and South falls beyond the traditional North-South division. Though, Central Albania encounters stereotypes as well. Albanians from central Albania are seen by all other regions as villagers, calm and docile, good enforcers, who love consuming raki while creating no hustle.
Religion
The North-South division in Albania is also a matter of religion. Throughout history, religions have arrived in Albania with occupying nations. Traditionally, such religions have been mixed up with politics and have always supported the invaders and had been instruments of power over the people, and agents of division amongst them. Since the
eleventh century, Albania was divided by two religions – Catholicism and Orthodoxism.7 The
Ottoman domination of Albania in the fifteenth century added a new element to the country’s
religious identity – Islam.8 Notably, although Albania was split into three religions each
hostile to each other, Albanians never fought any religious war.9 During Ottoman rule, the
Ottomans failed to control all of Albania. Partly because of geographical conditions, Ottoman power was weak in the northern highland regions. Albanians staged several rebellions, partly in defense of their Christian faith, so Catholicism preserved relatively well in North Albania. However, as result of Ottoman policy of Islamicization, approximately 70% of the Albanian
population had converted to the Islam when the Ottomans withdrew in 1912.10 According to
Italian statistics from the year 1942, of the total population of Albania at the time, there were
69% Muslims including the Bektashi, 21% Orthodox, and 10% Catholics.11 Almost 70 years
later, after religion was officially outlawed in Albania for almost three decades, the 2011 Population and Housing Census of the Albanian Institute for Statistics (INSTAT), demonstrates the Islam still as the largest religion in Albania, representing 56.7% of the population, followed by 10% Catholics and only 6.8% Orthodox. Notably, 13.8% of the
7 Stefanaq Pollo & Arben Puto, The history of Albania – from its origins to the present day (London 1981), 281. 8
D. E. M. Mihas, ‘Religion in Albania’, Modern Believing, nr. 1, vol. 38 (1997): 32.
9 Pollo & Puto, The history of Albania, 281.
10 Edwin Jacques, The Albanians: An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present (Jefferson 1995):
213.
11
11
interviews preferred not to answer and critics question the reliability of the statistics.12 So, it
is generally assumed that approximately 70% of Albanians are of Muslim background, 20%
are Orthodox, and the remaining 10% are Catholic.13 Muslims are found throughout the
country, while Orthodox are concentrated in the South and Catholics are predominantly
found in and around Shkodër in the North.14 Therefore, very general speaking, Catholicism in
Albania can be linked to the northern Gheg culture, while the Tosk culture is more conotated to Orthodoxy and Islam. This division is not strict, particularly in many urban centers, which have mixed populations. In general, Albanians are not religious people, especially after the communist regime, during which organized religion was banned and virtually every sign of
religious activity was suppressed.15 In general, religious differences in Albania do not
constitute a major societal cleavage, mainly because other measures, such as national
identity, remains more important than religion.16 Personally, the Albanian national identity
raises the following key words: unique (for instance, the Albanian language does not belong to any of the language groups), rich (referring to the Albanian cultural heritage), complicated in the sense of social mentality, chaotic with regard to the general Albanian approach to the law, and tolerant in the sense of religion. Furthermore, I was intrigued by the great traditional Albanian hospitality and the importance and commemoration of national heroes. In accordance, I found an appropriate expression of the poet Dritëro Agolli who described
Albania as a country that has produced more heroism than grain.17
In the process of writing this thesis I came to some remarkable conclusions that nuance or challenge the stereotypes of North and South Albania, further elaborated in the following chapters.
Structure
All these personal accounts on North-South divisions and characteristics include several factors that this thesis is going to analyze in individual chapters. In chapter 1 I discuss the Albanian clan culture. I started this work with the idea of writing about Albanian clan politics. However, during the research of the term ‘clan’ – anthropological and metaphorical
12 INSTAT, Population and Housing Census 2011,
http://www.instat.gov.al/media/177354/main_results__population_and_housing_census_2011.pdf (accessed 21 May 2014).
13
INSTAT, Population and Housing Census 2011.
14 Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Albania, 383. 15 Ibidem, 383.
16
Mihas, ‘Religion in Albania’, 39.
17
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– I came to a remarkable conclusion that nuances the idea of Albanian clan politics: Based on the anthropologic terminology of the term ‘clan’, it turned out that Albanian politics are not ruled by clans, but by, what I refer to, political networks. This conclusion made the idea of Albanian clan politics irrelevant. Chapter 2 is a case study on regional rivalry during Hoxha’s years of government (1944 – 1985) in order to follow up the existence of the regional political networks in Albanian politics. In chapter 3 I examine the representation of the North-South division in the economic differentiation of the country. In general, politics and economics are strongly interrelated, so I consider the internal political divisions partly reflected in the economic development of Albania. In chapter 4 I focus on the reflection of the North-South division in Albanian domestic affairs, especially on aspects like elections, civil society, media and public administration. Chapter 5 examines EU-Albania relations and the role the EU and EU integration plays in Albania’s political landscape. Finally, the conclusion links the findings back to the research question and analyses the role of the perceived North-South divisions in Albania’s EU enlargement process, with a specific view on Albania’s ability to integrate into the EU.
Literature
Each chapter is built upon a different set of research literature. I used international and Albanian statistics/reports, newspapers from Albania, historical literature, personal observations and conversations. There has not been one specific book or piece that guides me through the thesis, though; there is one report (BTI 2012 – Albania Country Report) that comes up in all the chapters. Furthermore, the article of Klarita Gërxhani and Arthur Schram (Albanian Political-Economics: Consequences of a Clan Culture, 2000) served as an inspiring piece of literature when I started this work, which I later deported for their different point of view.
Project history
Before I go into the analysis, I would like to say a few words about the history of this project. My work on this thesis started when I came back from an internship at the Embassy of the Netherlands in Tiranë. I was intrigued by the widespread pro-European sentiment of the Albanians, and was also fascinated by the deeply enrooted ideas of cultural and ‘clan’ divisions that I found in Albania. These perceptions of internal division, rooted in culture and history, seemed to translate directly into the political landscape of Albania, with regions linked to one of the two political mass parties. The internal discord, it seemed, was in direct contradiction to Albania's desire to join the EU.
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1. Clan culture in Albania
In the west, clan politics are the subject of an academic discussion, but for many populations across broad parts of the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, East and North Africa and Southeast Asia, clan politics are real-world challenges to governance, economic performance,
and in some cases, stability.18 Clan divisions continue to animate power relations in a wide
array of contexts, and moreover, such kinship-based divisions often lie at the center of
politics.19
Several political scientists and international observers agree about the existence of clans in the Albanian political-economic system. For example, the BTI 2012 Albania Country Report interprets the following:
‘Albanians have a strong sense of solidarity based on family and regional or clan loyalties. This form of traditional social capital has been crucial in sustaining networks that share blood or clan links, but undermines the creation of a culture of civic participation and mobilization beyond narrow family or clan networks.’20
So, I started this work with the idea of writing about Albanian clans. However, what precisely can be defined as a clan? And, subsequently, what is an Albanian clan? Some name the traditional Gheg-Tosk division as clans, others position Albanian clans as criminal groups
dealing with organized crime.21 And others typify the Gheg tribal sense of community as the
Albanian clan system.22 In this chapter, I discuss the term ‘clan’ in an anthropologic way, as
well in a metaphoric way. In contrast to my previous assumptions, I argue that Albania’s political-economic system is not ruled by clans, but by what I label as political networks on regional base in which family relations play a role.
1.1 Clans
Anthropologists define a clan, briefly, as an informal identity network based on kinship ties. Every group, in which demonstrable common kinship underlies membership, is categorized as the term ‘clan’. However, within anthropology, one differs about whether clans are based
18 Edward Schatz, Modern Clan Politics (Seattle 2004), 14. 19 Schatz, Modern Clan, 9.
20
Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012 – Albania Country Report (Gütersloh 2012), 14.
21 Daniela Irrera, ‘The Balkanization of Politics: Crime and Corruption in Albania’, Robert Schuman Center for
Advanced Studies, nr. 18 (2006): 6.
22
Brandon Doll, ‘The Relationship between the Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’,
14
on ethnic relations or the irrelevance of ethnicity and religion of clans. This difference is for example reflected in the work of anthropologists Kathleen Collins and Edward Schatz.
Kathleen Collins studied clan politics and regime transition in Central Asia. She indicates clans as informal identity networks in which kinship or ‘fictive’ kinship forms the binding
element among group members i.e. clan members.23 Edward Schatz studied clan politics and
the relationship between clans and the modern state, as well as the persistence and transformation of clan politics in Kazakhstan. In opposite to Collins, Schatz emphasizes the
ethnic unity of clans.24 Both agree that relations in clans are based on a certain kind of
loyalty, favoring the given clan.
Klarita Gërxhani– associate professor of Sociology – and Arthur Schram – professor Experimental Economy both linked to the University of Amsterdam – studied the impact of clan culture on the Albanian political-economic situation. According to them, the term ‘clan’ is often used to describe the intermediate position between interest groups – based on common interests – and ethnic or religious groups – based on an ethnic or religious relation. In contrast to Collins and Schatz arguing kinship as binding power, they state that clan members are not necessarily bounded through kinship, but also culture, religion, race and
language and political interest are seen as binding powers.25 Notable, it seems they are not
aware of the earlier mentioned different conception about ethnicity in the anthropological model.
According to Collins, clans include both elite and nonelite members, at different levels of society and state. Clan elites are those with power, and often with money, who through birth and accomplishment have status and prominence within the clan. Clan elites provide political, social, and economic opportunities to their network and rely on its loyalty and respect to
maintain their status. Nonelites are both normatively and rationally bound to them.26 Collins
research among interviewees in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, showed that interclan, kin-based patronage and reciprocity enabled individuals to survive periods of
economic instability by informally providing access to goods, resources, and jobs.27 Clan
members favor each other when it comes to assigning jobs. Usually, clan elites hold high
23 Kathleen Collins, ‘The Political Role of Clans in Central Asia’, Comparative Politics, vol. 35, nr. 2 (2003):
173.
24
Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, 26.
25 Klarita Gërxhani & Arthur Schram, ‘Albanian Political-Economics: Consequences of a Clan Culture’, LICOS
Centre for Transition Economics, nr. 92 (2000): 7.
26
Collins, ‘The Political Role of Clans in Central Asia’, 174.
27
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positioned jobs and, therewith, are able to provide professional opportunities to other clan
members. Regularly, clans offer the only employment prospective.28 Notable, clan
membership is determined through birth, so clans do not emerge in times of crisis. Next to clan elites and clan members, Gërxhani and Schram also identify a residual group in their classification. Based on their research on voting behavior of people related to different clans in Albania, this residual group can be divided into two groups. The first group includes the people that are less closely related to a clan, but who profit from party policies favoring a given clan. For example, when a certain clan allocates funds to a certain region, many non-clan members benefit as well. Gërxhani and Schram refer to these as ‘partisans’. The second group includes the people who are not related to a clan at all. They are assumed to determine their political position on general economic conditions. Gërxhani and Schram refer to these as
‘non-partisans’.29
1.2 Clans in Albania
Thus, according to anthropologists, a clan includes a group based on kinship ties, whether on ethnic base or not, providing collective identity and socioeconomic functions. In the following section, I further elaborate the eventual existence of this type of clan in Albania.
1.2.1 Ghegs
Like already mentioned, Albania is roughly divided into two ethnic groups: the Ghegs – with origin in North Albania – and the Tosks – with origin in South Albania. The main difference between the Ghegs is linguistic, represented by divergent dialectal forms of the Albanian language. Next to linguistic differences, the Ghegs distinguish themselves from the Tosks by their traditional social structure, also defined as the kinship model of community. To define the traditional social structure of the Ghegs, I will use the word ‘clan’, although the term ‘tribe’ is a more familiar term in Albanian ethnography. I argue ‘tribe’ as an outdated concept, so ‘clan’ might be more useful, in addition to ‘brotherhoods’ on a lower scale.
Several studies examined the clan configuration typifying the Gheg culture in North Albania; however, it is difficult to determine the exact period when this clan configuration originated. Ian Whitaker mentions that the ‘Berisha clan’ claims to have the longest genealogy,
stretching back to 1370.30
28Collins, ‘The Political Role of Clans in Central Asia’, 177. 29 Gërxhani & Schram, ‘Albanian Political-Economics’, 8. 30
Ian Whitaker, ‘Tribal Structure and National Politics in Albania 1910 – 1950’, History and Social
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Traditionally, the Gheg society was divided into numerous groups of people whose whole life was organized in terms of descent and kinship. The Albanian ‘fis’ has been generally treated
as brotherhood, clan, tribe and traditional extended family.31 Briefly, the ‘fis’ was a group of
people who were distantly related to a common male ancestor or the founder of the ‘fis’;
often a fictitious person.32 One makes a distinction between ‘fis i madh’ (large clan) and ‘fis i
vogël’ (brotherhood or patrilineage). Kahreman Ulqini outlines this distinction in terms of size. The large clan consisted of more than one hundred households and was found in more than two villages, whereas the smaller clan consisted of five to ten kin-related households, rarely containing as many as fifty households. The other distinction between the ‘fis i madh’ and the ‘fis i vogël’ is related to their ancestors. The founder of a ‘fis i madh’ often appears as mythical ancestor from twelve to eighteen generations ago, while there is a specified genealogical tree leading to the ancestor of a ‘fis i vogël’ whose name is corresponding to the ‘fis i vogël’.33
Each clan had its own territory, in many cases related to the geographical separation of the landscape. Relations between clans were regulated according to a traditional
code of customary laws.34 The customary laws and norms of the Gheg social structure was set
out in The Code of Lekë Dukagjini, named after Lekë Dukagjini (1410–1481).35 It is
unknown whether he compiled the code or simply gave his name to it.36
The household was at the core of the clan system and formed the basic residential and economic component of the entire clan system. An extended household, which could compromise as many as seventy people, was led by the oldest member of the household. The household also consisted of brothers, and included uncles and cousins as well. As the household splintered due to natural growth, the leader of the household still held authority over other houses and this leader eventually became known as the chief elder. The authority of the chief elder was controlled by the clan assembly, comprised all the village elders, whose
main responsibility was the administration of justice within the clan system.37 The earliest
recorded clan assembly was in the fifteenth century, when Lekë Dukagjini, who codified the traditional customary laws, is said to have legal points with Skënderbeg (the great Albanian
31 Mentor Mustafa & Antonia Young, ‘Feud narratives: contemporary deployments of kanun in Shala Valley,
northern Albania’, Anthropological Notebook, XIV/II (2008): 92.
32 Whitaker, ‘Tribal Structure and National Politics in Albania 1910 – 1950’, 254.
33 Mustafa & Young, ‘Feud narratives: contemporary deployments of kanun in Shala Valley, northern Albania’,
92.
34 Ian Whitaker, ‘The Traditional Role of Women in Northern Albanian Society’, Anthropological Quarterly,
vol. 54, nr. 3 (1981): 146.
35 Colin Lawson & Douglas Saltmarshe, ‘Security and Economic Transition: Evidence from North Albania’,
Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 52, nr. 1 (2000): 137.
36
Robert Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Albania (Lanham 2010), 224.
37
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national hero) himself at a clan assembly of the men of North Albania.38
Some argue that religious affiliations were a matter to be decided in the light of personal
advantage and family honor. Religion was seen as less fundamental than honor.39 However,
with the exception of Lumë, North Albania represented predominantly catholic clans, or clans
which had been catholic.40 Throughout history, Catholicism in North Albania had to endure
the Ottoman Islamicization policy, as well the total eradication of religion during communism. Although, Ottoman power and communism traditionally have been weak in North Albania, decreasing consequences for the amount of Catholics among the northerners
could not retain.41 Research in the Historical Dictionary of Albania turned out that an
estimated 25 kinship groups are mentioned and can be indicated as northern Albanian clans. These kin-groups are related to traditional regions, now indicated as districts. See table 1 for an overview of this research. However, another source shows the existence of 63 kinship groups in 1918 in North Albania. See figure 2 for an overview of this map. Some of these kin-groups extend into territory of what is now known as Montenegro and Kosovo, or what I now consider as Central Albania. It is unclear which of given kin-groups still exist today.
Table 1: Stocktaking of traditional kin-groups in northern Albania according to the contemporary administrative districts.
District Kin-groups, brotherhoods
District of Malësia Madhe Boga, Hoti, Kastrati, Kelmend, Shkreli
District of Mirditë Mirdita
District of Pukë Berisha
District of Tropojë Gashi, Korasniqi, Nikaj – Mërtur
District of Has Has
District of Shkodër Drisht, Dushmani, Gjoni, Shalë, Shoshi,
Shllaku, Toplana
District of Kukës Lumë
District unknown/ not to be determined Bugjoni, Bytiçi, Gimaj, Gjaj, Kiri, Plani42
Source: Historical Dictionary of Albania
38 Whitaker, ‘Tribal Structure and National Politics in Albania 1910 – 1950’, 261. 39
Ibidem, 274.
40Ibidem, 260.
41 Janusz Bugajski, Political Parties of Eastern Europe: a guide to politics in the post-communist era (New
York 2002): 674.
42
18
Figure 2: An overview of the Albanian clans in North Albania in 1918.43
43
19
In addition, the social structure of the Ghegs also created a certain dichotomy. One clan automatically opposed another clan. So, with the existence of at least 25 kin-groups, I assume the northern Gheg population must have been highly fragmented.
1.2.2 Tosks
Because of the greater geographical accessibility of South Albania, the region was more firm controlled by the Ottomans. Therefore, the traditional Tosk social organization changed from large units of peasant extended families farming cooperatively, to latifundia owned by powerful, to Islam converted landowners. These latifundia were usually confined to the plains, characterizing the landscape in South Albania. Landowners would get peasants into debt, often assisting them during famine, and thus established themselves as feudal patrons of the formerly independent villagers. In this way, the break-up of the collective families did not
lead to a proletarianization, but rather to the creation of a feudal society.44 Thus, the clan
structure typifies the social structure of the northern Gheg culture, but is not applicable for the southern Tosk social organization.
1.2.3 End of clan structure in (North) Albania? During Hoxha’s years of government (1944 – 1985) forced collectivization led to the break-up of the country’s traditional clan divisions, feudal families and traditional Gheg-Tosk divisions. According to Vickers & Pettifer, extended families are now very rare in Albania, and there is general agreement that it would be very difficult to return to the arrangements they entail. They argue that because of its association with the years of repression under
communism, Albanians have developed an aversion to collective life in any form.45 In
chapter 2 I further describe the socialization of the Albanian society and the ideological campaign against clans during communism. In this section, I elaborate on the argument of Vickers & Pettifer and examine if clan connections based on kinship still exist in Albania. After the end of the communist regime in Albania in 1992 and the years of social and political disorder that followed, the Albanian state lost control in many parts of the country and customary practices re-emerged, especially among the rural population in North
Albania.46 Several scholars mention a resurgence of blood feud and other activities related to
Besatzungsgebiet: Albanien 1918, http://www-gewi.uni-graz.at/seiner/deutsch/stammesgebiete.html (29June
2014).
44 Whitaker, ‘Tribal Structure and National Politics in Albania 1910 – 1950’, 276.
45 Miranda Vickers & James Pettifer, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity (London 1997): 138. 46
Ayse Betul Celik & Alma Shkreli, ‘An Analysis of Reconciliatory Mediation in Northern Albania: The Role of Customary Mediators’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 62, nr. 6 (2010): 893.
20
the traditional customary laws and norms of the Ghegs in North Albania.47 The traditional
customary laws governed social behavior of the Ghegs on aspects of church; the family; marriage; house, livestock, and property; work; transfer of property; the spoken word; honor; damages; the law regarding crimes; judicial law; and exemptions and exceptions. Vengeance for instance, was accepted as the prime instrument for exacting and maintaining justice. This
led to a perpetuation of blood feud.48 Statistics show the number of murders in general and
blood feud murders in particular, reached a peak in 1997. For example, in the Shkodër district, out of 76 murders in 1997, 32 were blood feuds. Stéphane Voell describes several characteristics reflecting the role of customary laws in North Albania. It appeared traditional family networks were still the most important social network for the northern Albanians in these times. Respect for the head of the household was no longer unrestricted, but he still had
an important position and conflicts were mostly mediated out of court.49 With the
strengthening of the state apparatus and the increase of security, the number of blood feuds
declined significantly in 2006, when out of nine murders, only two were blood feuds.50
However, in contrast, a Sunday Times report of 2008 claims that 12.000 Albanian youths are
trapped at home in order to avoid becoming targets of revenge killings.51 Saltmarshe
describes the social structure based on kinship in northern Albania as grounded in the ‘nature
of embeddedness’.52
From my point of view, this is the result of the strength of the Gheg culture, characterized by the traditional social structure of a clan configuration. Throughout history, many Ghegs remained their traditional clan structure and unwritten laws to help them
structure their lives and to foster a sense of security and stability.53 However, in accordance
with Vickers & Pettifer, I argue that clan structures in North Albania are not as powerful anymore as in pre-socialist times, however, some elements of the social field of traditional Gheg customary laws still seem to persist.
1.3 North-South identities
Next to an anthropological approach, the term ‘clan’ is often used in a metaphorical way. Many authors use the term ‘clan’ to describe the phenomenon of the existence of antagonistic
47 Doll, ‘The Relationship between the Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, 160; Lawson &
Saltmarshe, ‘Security and Economic Transition: Evidence from North Albania’, 137.
48 Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Albania, 223 – 224.
49 Stéphane Voell, North Albanian customary law kanun as a ‘habitus’, On the occasion of the 8th EASA (European Association of Social Anthropologists) Conference at the University of Vienna (2004): 5.
50
Celik & Shkreli, ‘An Analysis of Reconciliatory Mediation in Northern Albania’, 893.
51
Mustafa & Young, ‘Feud narratives: contemporary deployments of kanun in Shala Valley, northern Albania’, 88.
52
Doll, ‘The Relationship between the Clan System and Other Institutions in Northern Albania’, 160 – 161.
53
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North-South identities in Albania. These regional identities are not based on kinship ties, but grounded on territorial ties and related cultural and linguistic characteristics. Keeping the anthropology in mind, clans in this context can be better defined as regional identities. Albania has three regional identities, which cover North, Central and South Albania. Regional identities have a significant influence in Albania, for example found in party politics, illustrated by the following example. For about two decades, the bus stop in Albania’s capital Tiranë to Tropojë – located in the northern qark Kukës– had been allocated in front of the Democratic Party (DP) headquarters, despite what government was in place. Tropojë is the birthplace of Sali Berisha; former DP leader and Prime Minister (1992 – 1997 en 2005 – 2013). Berisha used to maintain a very close relation with the northern regions, and in opposite, he used to receive a lot of support from his homeland area. In October 2013, the bus station was removed by the Socialist Party-led government and no other place in the city was appointed. Today, the bus drivers are obliged to use a parking area in the suburban of
Tiranë, as station for the passengers travelling to Tropojë.54 This measure pretended to
improve the security in Tiranë, but was actually just intended to vex the northern Ghegs, traditionally supporting the DP.
Accordingly, I argue that the northern identity is linked to the Democratic Party and the southern identity is linked to the Socialist Party. Traditionally, the central identity tended to attract more towards to South, and thus politically to the SP. Table 2 presents an overview of the correlation between regional identities and political parties. However, in practice is not that black and white as represented in the table. Mainly, because local elections have different factors from national elections. And some cities are more developed than others, no matter if they are located in North or in South Albania. For instance, the city Shkodër is characterized by emancipation and economic development, though; it is located in North Albania. Further, according to the political officer of the Dutch Embassy in Albania, Korçë and Gjirokastër have, despite their geographical position in the South, a slight tendency to swift to the right
wing parties (DP).55
54 Conversation with Jutbina Hoxha, Office Administrative Assistant at the Council of Europe in Albania,
October 2013.
55
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Table 2: Overview of Albanian regional identities linked to political parties. Regional identity: Political party:
North – Ghegs Democratic Party
South – Tosks Socialist Party
Central Socialist Party/Democratic Party
One of the characteristics of regional identities is a distinct voting behavior. I considered the election results per region for the Albanian parliamentarian elections in 2009 and 2013. I classified 12 qarks (similar to regions) from North – Kukës, Shkodër, Lezhë and Dibër – to Central – Durrës, Tiranë and Elbasan – and South – Fier, Berat, Korçë, Gjirokastër and Vlorë. Table 3 presents the election results of the parliamentary elections in 2009 for the DP and the SP. Table 4 presents the election results of the parliamentary elections in 2013 for the DP and the SP.
Table 3: Election results of parliamentary elections 2009. Region Total number of valid votes (=100%) Votes for Democratic Party (DP) % Seats Votes for Socialist Party (SP) % Seats Kukës 43.733 25.596 58,53% 3 8.774 20,06% 1 Shkodër 116.427 56.515 48,54% 7 34.294 29,46% 4 Lezhë 69.256 30.504 44,05% 4 21.248 30,68% 3 Dibër 69.755 34.230 49,07% 4 21.168 30,35% 2 Durrës 132.669 60.569 45,65% 7 49.252 37,12% 5 Tiranë 379.788 161.332 42,48% 15 162.757 42,85% 15 Elbasan 153.347 67.653 44,12% 7 57.035 37,19% 7 Fier 173.389 55.033 31,74% 6 83.659 48,25% 9 Berat 81.592 21.805 26,72% 3 39.390 48,28% 4 Korçë 133.608 56.303 42,14% 4 58.289 43,63% 6 Gjirokastër 52.037 18.527 35,60% 2 24.037 46,19% 3 Vlorë 106.016 30.310 28,59% 4 47.284 44,60% 6
Note: Turnout was 50.77%. Out of filled ballot papers, 2.99% was invalid.56
The results of the 2009 elections were a victory for DP-led alliance ‘Alliance of Change Coalition’, who won 70 seats with 46.92% of the votes. SP-led alliance ‘Union for Change
Coalition’ won 66 seats with 45.34% of the votes.57
56 OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Albania – Parliamentary Elections 28 June 2009, 33,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/albania/38598?download=true (accessed 17 February 2014).
57
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Table 4: Election results of parliamentary elections 2013
Region Total number of valid votes (=100%) Votes for Democratic Party (DP) % Seats Votes for Socialist Party of Albania (SP) % Seats Kukës 46.814 22.426 47,90% 3 11.385 24,32% 1 Shkodër 122.048 45.799 37,53% 4 37.984 31,12% 4 Lezhë 80.343 31.605 39,34% 4 26.433 32,90% 2 Dibër 74.582 30.137 40,41% 3 25.103 33,66% 2 Durrës 155.031 52.703 34,00% 5 60.833 39,24% 6 Tiranë 451.407 151.472 33,56% 11 198.837 44,05% 16 Elbasan 173.576 46.788 26,96% 4 75.086 43,26% 6 Fier 202.898 44,18% 22,86% 4 89.637 44,18% 9 Berat 91.396 19.022 20,81% 2 42.897 46,94% 4 Korçë 146.159 47.061 32,20% 5 63.584 43,50% 6 Gjirokastër 59.361 13.509 22,76% 1 25.148 42,36% 3 Vlorë 121.161 21.475 17,72% 3 56.481 46,62% 6
Note: Turnout was 53.46%. Out of filled ballot papers, 1.41% was invalid.58
[Source: website of Albanian Central Elections Commission (http://www.cec.org.al/)]
The result of the elections was a victory for SP-led alliance ‘Alliance for a European Albania’ who won 83 seats out of the 140 parliamentary seats with 57.63% of the votes. DP-led alliance ‘Alliance for Employment, Prosperity and Integration’ won 57 seats with 39.46% of
the votes.59 However, one should take into consideration that Albania was already governed
by a DP-led coalition for the last 8 years and many people voted for the opposite coalition, because of their wish for a change. Thereby, the DP essential coalition partner – Social Movement for Integration (SMI) – changed its partner and formed a coalition with SP.
Since the introduction of political pluralism after the end of communism, Albania formed a two-party (DP and SP) system, well reflected in table 3 and 4. Despite what region, the majority of the votes goes to one of the two dominant parties. Smaller parties have difficulties consolidating their position in the political system and are only able to enter political life
when joining forces with one of the two bigger parties.60 The tables show a decrease in
popularity of the DP between the two elections, and there with an increase of popularity of
58 OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Albania – Parliamentary Elections 23 June 2013, 32,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/106963?download=true (accessed 17 February 2014).
59
OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Albania – Parliamentary Elections 23 June, 33 – 34.
60
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the SP. Where DP won the majority of the votes in 2009, the SP defeated its rival in 2013, after a government period of eight years. The tables demonstrate there is a remarkable difference in voting behavior across regions. Support for the DP is significantly lower in the South than in the North and support for the SP is significant lower in the North than in the South. This supports the notion of a northern identity linked to the DP and a southern identity
related to the SP.61 It also reflects the traditional North-South division and the support to its
political networks in the election results per region.
Traditionally, the North Albania has equalized with anticommunism, the DP and its former leader Sali Berisha. Although, popularity of the DP decreased during the parliamentarian elections of 2013, the DP still received a majority of the votes in the northern qarks. Also during the parliamentarian elections of 2009, the DP received a majority of the votes in the northern regions, as well as in two of the three central regions; Durrës and Elbasan. The same is applicable for South Albania. Traditionally, these regions have been equalized with the former communist regime and the resultant SP. Although, the SP persisted being the opposition party after the parliamentary elections in 2009, the party received a majority of the
votes in the southern qarks.
The election results in the central regions – Durrës, Tiranë and Elbasan – reflect their middle position. Traditionally, the center tended to incline to the southern network of the SP, what still can be seen in the election results. However, in general, voting behavior in Central Albania depends on a certain degree on the general economic conditions, and therefore is more variable than in North and South Albania.
1.4 Political networks
At last, the term ‘clan’ is also used to indicate political networks of loyalty. From 2000 onwards, the Russian-language news media introduced the concept ‘(political) clans’ used exclusively with reference to the political and economic elite and identified either by the name of their most important representative, that is, ‘the Yeltsin family’, or by locality, that
is, ‘the Naryn clan’.62
A political network includes a cohesive and loyal group characterized by multidimensional relationships which include belonging to political institutions,
associations, family relationships, friendships and businesses.63 In the case of Albania, I
assume the existence of two political networks, represented by the two biggest political
61 Gërxhani & Schram, ‘Albanians Political-Economics, 14 – 15.
62 Svetlana Jacquesson, ‘From clan narratives to clan politics’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 31, nr. 3 (2012): 279. 63
Jorge Gil-Mendieta & Samuel Schmidt, ‘The political network in Mexico’, Social Networks, nr. 18 (1996): 357.
25
parties: the Socialist Party (SP) and the Democratic Party (DP). In contrast, the Albanian political networks are not called after their most important representative, but have general political party names.
The existence of these two political networks is for example reflected in Albania’s public administration. When a new government, led by the other political network, takes office, the personnel of the public administration is usually reshuffled to a large extent. Civil servants are dismissed in favor of employees loyal to the new political network. On 23 June 2013, parliamentary elections were held in Albania. After a reign of 8 years, the DP-led government was replaced by a SP-led government. In the first half year of the SP-led reign, a remarkable amount of employees have been dismissed in the public administration. Rumors go that the new SP Prime Minister – Edi Rama – cleaned up the public administration by removing all civil servants loyal to the former government. The following news item can be interpreted as an illustration of these rumors, and, thereby also the role political networks play in the Albanian public administration.
‘On 5 March 2014, a DP parliament member claimed that 5,000 employees have been dismissed by the Rama-Meta government and replaced with party militants. He said that their dismissal was made in violation to the civil servant law, and that 2,706 of them have reported the dismissal to the DP, while another 700 have filed lawsuits with the Administrative Courts.64
Note: The news item was written in the Albanian newspaper ‘Mapo’, which tend to incline to the political camp in power. At the moment, the newspaper works for Lulzim Basha, mayor of Tiranë and leader of the DP. Thereby, the Albanian political climate is characterized by polarization between these two political networks, so reading this news item should be done while taking into consideration the political
ties of the newspaper of origin and the resources of the information in the article.65
The news item symbolizes the traditional rotation of employees in state institutions after a change of government. Since the end of communism, most governing parties have viewed state institutions as property that can be distributed to loyal supporters. This practice has prevented any meaningful progress in ensuring a professional and career-based governmental
administration that follows the letter of law instead of political leaders.66 For example, after
64 Elton Tahirllari & Marçeza Kotoni, OSCE Political and Public Affairs Unit, Halimi: 2,700 reports collected
from dismissed public administration officials, 6 March 2014.
65
Conversation with Elga Mitre, Political Officer at the Embassy of the Netherlands in Albania, 11 March 2014.
66
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the parliamentary elections in 2005, a 2006 parliamentary report on administrative reforms disclosed that within one year of the electoral victory almost 50% of public employees were replaced with party partisans, most of whom had insufficient education and/or experience for
their respective job positions.67 Another example took place after the DP victory in the 2009
elections: The son-in-law of the Assembly Speaker was appointed in 2010 to a high position within the Albanian embassy in Paris. Various media revealed that the 25-year-old singer apparently lacked any university degree as well as any required or relevant experience for the
job.68
In my view, these examples do not necessarily testify the existence of clans – in the anthropological definition of the word – in the Albanian political-economic arena. Here it goes about the loyalty of particular (party) members to their political network. Like earlier mentioned, term clan is often used to indicate political networks of loyalty. Since these ‘political clans’ are not based on kinship, I argue ‘political clans’ as an improper concept. From now on, I will define these ‘political clans’ as political networks.
1.5 Clan structure in political networks
Political networks often shows parallel structures with clan structures. In the following chapter, I look into eventual family-based clan structures in the Albanian political networks. In order to find out, I use two small case studies: Hoxha’s years of government (1944 – 1985) and Berisha’s first term of government (1992 – 1997).
1.5.1 Hoxha’s years of government
During Hoxha’s years of government, the party establishment of the Communist Party proved to be almost as dynastic as a family power structure. Like Jacques argues, through more than three decades, three of the founding families, with origins in South Albania, predominated the
top party functions.69 As most prominent figure, Enver Hoxha headed this so-called
communist network. He served as Prime Minister (1944 – 1954), as minister of Foreign Affairs (1946 – 1953), but above all, he resumed the influential post of party’s first secretary
of the Albanians Workers Party throughout his career.70 Hoxha’s wife, Nexhmije Hoxha,
headed the Central Committee’s Directorate of Education and Culture, including the
67
Stiftung, BTI 2012, 25.
68 Ibidem, 25.
69 Edwin Jacques, The Albanians: An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present (Jefferson 1995):
436.
70
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prestigious Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies.71 Despite the focus on economic
development, education and cultural reforms were important pillars of the socialization of the Albanian society. Mehmet Shehu, the second most powerful man in Albania during the communist regime, was minister of Interior (1948 – 1954) and later served as Prime Minister
until his death (1954 – 1981).72 Shehu’s wife, Fiqrete Shehu, became vice-president of the
People’s Assembly in 1950, and headed the highest party school, the V.I. Lenin Institute. Shehu’s brother-in-law, General Kadri Hasbiu, succeeded Shehu as minister of Interior, and head of the Security forces and the People’s Police. The third ranking leader – as interpreted by Jacques – Hysni Kapo, served as party secretary and headed the Directorate of Cadres and Organizations, while his wife, Vito Kapo, headed the very influential Union of Albanian
Women.73 They all came from the South. Other important figures in communist Albania were
General Beqir Balluku and Spiro Koleka, and may also be added to the dynasty of the founding families. Both were active partisans in the Albanian resistance movement against foreign occupation of Albania (1940 – 1944). General Balluku headed the military policy of Hoxha’s government, served as Chief of the Head Command of the Albanian Army (1948 –
1974) , and, till his execution, as minister of Defense (1952 – 1974).74 Spiro Koleka served as
vice Prime Minister (various terms between 1949 and 1976), as well as chairman of the State Planning Commission (various terms between 1949 and 1968) and Minister of Industry and
Construction (1953 – 1954).
It appears the network of founding families in the party establishment was a horizontal network, in which power was not transferred to the next generation. Hoxha had three children: two sons and one daughter. It is known that his daughter, Pranvera Hoxha, is an
architect and designed the former Enver Hoxha Museum in Tiranë.75 One of his sons, Sokol
Hoxha, had been director of the state-owned Post and Telecommunication Service. According to others, the second son was the director of a development company. Further information of any party and/or regime-related activities of Hoxha’s children is absent in the available documentation. So, especially during the first three decades of Hoxha’s years of government, Hoxha built his own network, rather indicated as a wartime-comrade-based network. This network was composed of motivated freedom fighters against the foreign
71
Jacques, The Albanians, 436.
72 Ibidem, 431. 73 Ibidem, 436. 74
Ibidem, 491.
75
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occupation with a common socialistic worldview, a strong sense of loyalty and joint war experiences. It turned out that family relations were horizontal in this network.
1.5.2 Berisha’s first term of government
The second case study is related to the first term of Berisha’s government. The turbulent early 1990’s were marked by transformation, of which the elections in 1992 were considered as the real start of changes. The first opposition party was established; the Democratic Party, led by Sali Berisha. The DP won the elections in 1992, and a DP government was in office from
1992 – 1997, headed by president Berisha.76
In Albania, it is common knowledge that Berisha’s origins in the North-eastern highland of Tropojë, dictated his approach to politics. Every ministry and institution was employed – Vickers and Pettifer even use the word loaded – with northerners and professed DP loyalists, and their appointment to ministerial office and other positions were accompanied by a vast migration from the North to Tiranë as families sought to capitalize on relations who were now holding high office in the capital. All civil servants were checked to find grounds for dismissing them in favor of DP loyalists or northern clansmen. Competence and merit were
displaced by consideration of loyalty77 – which still characterizes the entire Albanian
administration system of today. This is for example shown by the case of minister of Defense, Safet Zhulali, previously a teacher in mathematics. After he started his ministerial post in 1993, many of his family members were employed in various state jobs. His brother became dean of Tirana University’s faculty of economics; one of his sisters was secretary to Blerim Cela – head of state control – ; Cela’s sister became Zhulali’s secretary; Zhulali’s other sister was made director of the country’s foremost hotel; his brother-in-law became departmental director in the ministry of Education; the first cousin of Zhulali’s wife was made head of the Secret Service; and Zhulali’s cousin married a DP parliamentarian and
party chairman in the Mirditë region.78 The strong profile of Berisha resulted in a sort of
personalized rule. Ministers belonged to Berisha’s own group, individuals with little party experience; and most governments initiatives tend to originate from the Prime Minister’s
office.79 However, as earlier mentioned, the traditional clan structure of the northern Ghegs
was basically extinguished in post-communism. Therefore, I don’t consider Berisha’s northern Gheg administration as an administration characterized by clan politics, but more as
76 Gërxhani & Schram, ‘Albanian Political-Economics’, 2 – 3.
77 Vickers & Pettifer, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity, 244. 78
Vickers & Pettifer, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity, 244 – 245.
79
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an administration where nepotism took place on a large scale. Berisha‘s administration was clearly identified as northern Gheg. According to Vickers and Pettifer, every ministry and
governmental institution was loaded with northerners and DP loyalists.80 So, regional
identity played an important role, but within Berisha’s administration there are no indications of relations with specific traditional Gheg clans or relations based on kinship or brotherhood. Studying the two small case studies of Hoxha’s years of government and Berisha’s first term of government, it turned out; Hoxha’s years of government were characterized by a network of the founding families of the People’s Republic of Albania. This network, mainly applicable on the first three decades of the regime, consisted of motivated freedom fighters against Albania’s foreign occupation with a common socialistic worldview, a strong sense of loyalty and joint war experiences. Family relations turned out to be horizontal. It appeared; Berisha’s first term of government included a large scale of nepotism. In Berisha’s administration every ministry and governmental institution had many northerners and professed DP loyalists, and their appointment to ministerial office and other positions was accompanied by a vast migration from North Albania to Tiranë as families sought to
capitalize on family members and friends who were now holding high office in the capital.81
However, based on the breakup of the traditional social structure of the northern Gheg culture during communism, there are no indications of kinship-based relations between Berisha’s administration and the northern Gheg clans. However, it still seems too early to make real conclusions.
1.6 Conclusion
Several political scientists and international observers agree about the existence of clans in the Albanian political-economic system. However, the term ‘clan’ is used in various contexts. In this chapter, I discussed the term ‘clan’ and Albanian clans. Anthropologists define a clan, briefly, as an informal the identity network based on kinship. The traditional social structure of the Ghegs in North Albania turned out to be based on kinship. In contrast, the social structure of the Tosks in South Albania is not organized according to a clan structure. After the forced collectivization of Hoxha’s communistic regime, traditional clan connections in North Albania seems to be eradicated. However, after the end of the communist regime in Albania in 1992 and the following several years of social and political disorder, several aspects of the traditional Gheg customary practices re-emerged, especially among the rural
80
Vickers & Pettifer, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity, 244 – 245.
81
