The influences of isomorphism and institutional entrepreneurship practices on new business model autonomy in strongly regulated environments : an exploratory case study of new business model autonomy within regulated en

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The influences of isomorphism and institutional entrepreneurship

practices on new business model autonomy in strongly regulated

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Thesis

The influences of isomorphism and institutional entrepreneurship

practices on new business model autonomy in strongly regulated

environments.

An exploratory case study of new business model autonomy within regulated

environments

University Amsterdam Business School, University of Amsterdam Executive Programme in Management Studies

Strategy Track

Student J. N. de Vink

Student number 10499636 Supervisor Dr. M. Stienstra

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Statement of Originality

This document is written by Joanne de Vink, who declares to take full responsibility for the content of this document.

I declare that the text and the work presented in this document is original and that no sources other than those mentioned in the text and its references have been used in creating it.

The Faculty of Economics and Business is responsible solely for the supervision of completion of the work, not for the contents.

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Acknowledgement

This thesis is written on behalf of the Amsterdam Business School, Master of Science in Business Administration. Finishing this thesis means finishing my study, which means a lot to me. Two and half years ago I decided to go back to school, and I am glad I have made this decision because besides the knowledge, it has also brought me new insights and friends for life. Unfortunately it also resulted in many cancellations for fun nights out with friends, therefore I would like to thank my friends for their patience during this last two and half years, and from now on I will attend every fun night out again. I want to thank my boyfriend as he suffered the most from my frustration during long nights and weekends of studying. Also I want to thank my work and colleagues for the inspiration for this research and my manager for his insights.

Last but not least, I want to thank my supervisor Marten Stienstra for helping me during this last thesis period. Besides the fun conversations, you helped a lot with your insights, feedback and your knowledge about the theory. Thanks again for guiding managing me in the right direction, despite sometimes being very stubborn.

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Abstract

According to new institutional theory, organizational forms become isomorphic due to coercive, mimetic and normative pressures. Coercive pressures are seen as formal pressures like law and regulation, mimetic pressures cause mimicry in response to uncertainty and normative pressures occur through informal pressures, like industry culture aspects. Despite these pressures, new innovative business models are

widespread nowadays. How can new business models emerge in the context of strong institutional pressures that favour legitimate organizational forms that are stable, reproducible and accountable? Especially within regulated environments, with strong coercive pressures, this seems a real challenge contrary to new institutional theory, institutional entrepreneurship emphasises how employees within an organization or institution actively look for new opportunities. Institutional entrepreneurs also have to be good at convincing other employees as they can expect much adversity within institutions and organizations, as existing patterns are broken.

Much research has been done on the emergence of new business models, but hardly any research has been done on how institutional entrepreneurs influence isomorphic

pressures to create new business models and operate them in a rather autonomous way. Hence the research question is: How do isomorphism and institutional entrepreneurship practices, both separately and jointly, influence new business model autonomy in strongly regulated environments?

An exploratory case study is conducted at four new business models within two

different industries, financial services and water. In total, six semi-structured interviews were held with managers from both the new business models and the parent companies. In addition, company documents were studied to triangulate some interview results. Results indicate that all new business models emerged due to the existence of

institutional entrepreneurs, but the level of new business model autonomy is influenced by several variables. Direct effects of the three isomorphic pressures show rather predictable results. Mimetic pressures do not influence new business model autonomy. Managers have stressed innovation, with conflicts with imitation. Coercive and

normative pressures tend to reduce the level of autonomy by creating stable isomorphic organizations. Due the roles of institutional entrepreneurs, however, coercive and normative pressures are reversed as results point at mediating effects of institutional entrepreneurship. Institutional entrepreneurs who are highly political skilled can turn the negative effect of coercive pressures on new business model autonomy into a positive influence by acting toward the supervisors (i.e. external regulators) directly, thereby surpassing internal staff department of the parent company. Furthermore, institutional entrepreneurs who have persuasive skills towards shareholders can turn the negative effect of normative pressures on new business model autonomy into a positive influence. As a distance is created between the parent company and the new business model, while simultaneously safeguarding the continuation of the new

business model, informal pressures are not considered negative anymore. New business models can even create their own culture. Combined, this research deepens the

understanding how institutional entrepreneurs transform institutional pressures into institutional opportunities, which positively affects new business model autonomy.

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Abstract in Dutch

Volgens de institutionele theorie worden organisatievormen isomorf door coërcieve, mimetische en normatieve krachten. Coërcieve krachten worden gezien als formele krachten zoals wet en regelgeving, mimetische krachten veroorzaken imitatie in reactie op onzekerheid en normatieve krachten ontstaan door sectoren cultuur gerelateerde krachten. Ondanks het bestaan van deze krachten zijn nieuwe innovatieve business modellen een gegeven tegenwoordig. Echter hoe kunnen nieuwe business modellen ontstaan in een context met sterke institutionele krachten welke voorkeur hebben voor legitieme organisaties die stabiel, reproduceerbaar en verantwoordelijk zijn? Vooral binnen gereguleerde omgevingen, waarbij coërcieve krachten een belangrijke rol spelen, lijkt het een grote uitdaging te zijn, dit in tegenstelling tot de nieuwe institutionele theorie waarbij institutioneel ondernemerschap wordt benadrukt. Institutionele ondernemers zijn medewerkers binnen een organisatie of instelling die actief op zoek zijn naar nieuwe mogelijkheden. Institutionele ondernemers zijn goed in overtuigen van andere medewerkers, gezien ze veel weerstand kunnen verwachten binnen instituten en organisaties omdat bestaande patronen doorbroken worden.

Veel onderzoek is gedaan naar het ontstaan van nieuwe business modellen, maar bijna geen onderzoek is gedaan naar hoe institutionele ondernemers de drie isomorfisme krachten beïnvloeden bij het creëren van nieuwe business modellen en hen autonoom laten opereren. Daarom is de onderzoeksvraag: Hoe beïnvloeden de drie isomorfisme krachten en institutioneel ondernemerschap, zowel afzonderlijk als gezamenlijk, nieuwe autonome business modellen binnen gereguleerde omgevingen?

Een exploratieve case studie is uitgevoerd bij vier nieuwe business modellen binnen twee verschillende sectoren: drinkwater en financiële dienstverlening. In totaal zijn er zes semigestructureerde interviews gehouden met managers van het nieuwe business model en het moederbedrijf. Bovendien zijn er bedrijfsdocumenten gebruikt om de interview resultaten te trianguleren. De resultaten duiden erop dat alle business

modellen zijn ontstaan door het bestaan van institutionele ondernemers, echter de mate waarin autonome nieuwe business modellen worden beïnvloed komt door verschillende variabelen. Directe effecten van de drie isomorfisme krachten zijn voorspelbaar:

mimetische krachten hebben geen tot zeer weinig invloed op autonome nieuwe

business modellen, doordat deze innovatief van aard zijn, is imitatie niet van toepassing. Coërcieve en normatieve krachten hebben de neiging om de autonomie van nieuwe business modellen te verminderen door stabiele isomorf organisaties te willen creëren. Echter door de rol van institutionele ondernemers worden coërcieve en normatieve krachten omgezet waardoor de institutionele kracht als mediërend wordt aanschouwd. Institutionele ondernemers die zeer politiek bekwaam zijn kunnen de negatieve

coërcieve krachten op autonome nieuwe business modellen ombuigen naar positieve krachten door direct met toezichthouders te converseren en daarbij de interne stafafdelingen van het moederbedrijf over te slaan. Bovendien kunnen institutionele ondernemers met sterke overredingskrachten naar aandeelhouders de negatieve normatieve krachten op autonome nieuwe business modellen ombuigen in positieve invloeden. Wanneer er meer afstand wordt gecreëerd tussen het moederbedrijf en het nieuwe business model, terwijl continuering van het business model verzekerd blijft, worden de informele normatieve krachten niet meer als negatief aanschouwd. Nieuwe business modellen kunnen mogelijk zelfs een eigen cultuur creëren waardoor de autonomie verhoogt wordt. Dit onderzoek geeft meer diepgang aan hoe institutionele ondernemers de institutionele krachten transformeren naar institutionele

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List of tables and figures

Table 1 Overview of isomorphic mechanisms ... 14

Table 2 Overview of skills needed within institutional entrepreneurship mechanisms . 16 Table 3 Selected industries ... 18

Table 4 Questions for open semi-structured interviews... 18

Table 5 PWN Technologies characteristics ... 20

Table 6 PWN Technologies year overview ... 22

Table 7 Hydrocare characteristics ... 23

Table 8 Hydrocare year overview ... 25

Table 9 Knab characteristics ... 26

Table 10 Knab year overview ... 28

Table 11 Inadmin characteristics ... 29

Table 12 Year overview Inadmin ... 31

Table 13 Influence of coercive pressures ... 32

Table 14 Political skill levels at institutional entrepreneurs ... 33

Table 15 Influence of normative pressures ... 34

Table 16 persuasive skill levels at institutional entrepreneurs ... 35

Table 17 Meaningful quote overview related to coercive pressures ... 45

Table 18 Meaningful quote overview related to mimetic pressures ... 46

Table 19 Meaningful quote overview related to normative pressures ... 47

Table 20 Meaningful quote overview related to political skills ... 48

Table 21 Meaningful quote overview related to persuasive skills ... 49

Table 22 Pattern overview ... 50

Figure 1 Legal structure of PWN Technologies ... 22

Figure 2 legal structure of Hydrocare ... 25

Figure 3 legal structure of Knab ... 28

Figure 4 legal structure of Inadmin... 31

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1. Introduction

Being an innovative network company in the Netherlands, Alliander1_{prepares itself and}

the Netherlands for the upcoming energy transition. One of these elements is by creating new business models that focus on emerging business areas, an example is sustainable area development that develops, realises and exploits new sustainable infrastructures. New business models can gain experience for the corporate parent, determine the viability of the new business and for example prepare Alliander for the upcoming energy transition. Creating new business models is difficult within regulated environments; Liander, another daughter of Alliander is an energy utility and therefore regulated. How can new business models be created within strongly regulated environments?

“Corporate venturing enables radical innovation within established firms”: Maine (2008). This radical innovation occurs through exploratory initiatives within new markets or with new business models (Covin et al. 2014). New business models increasingly attract scholarly attention. At least 1.177 articles have been written in peer-reviewed academic journals since 1995 about the need of these new business models (Zott et al. 2011). The necessity of this emergence is to meet the high demand of organizational and

environmental change. Greenwood and Hinings 1996 discussed the need for radical organizational change when organizations are confronted with complex political, regulatory or technical pressures by changing the organizational design, but how can organizations create new business models take into account the political, regulatory and cultural pressures that favour the institutional organizational form that exist of stability, legitimacy and accountability?

Many authors have defined (new) business models, but there is one definition that fits within this research. Amit and Zoll (2001) define a business model as follows: ”the design of transaction content, structure and governance so as to create value through the exploitation of business opportunities”. Above definition concludes that new business models are set to create new value. New value creation is necessary when there is a demand for radical organizational change.

An organization is the result of reciprocal influences of formal and informal organization aspects, according to Selznick (1948). This is the basic foundation of the (old)

institutional theory. Subsequently, (Dimaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977) argued that organizations are not only the result of the formal and informal influences, but these influences also make organizations more isomorphic. Becoming isomorphic, hence homogeneous is a focus of the new institutional theory. Dimaggio and Powell (1983) assumed that with this theory the imposed norms, values, rules and procedures become guidance for organizations. As these values are often similar within the same environment, isomorphism occurs; becoming homogeneous within the same society (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Dimaggio and Powell 1983). Three mechanisms through which isomorphism occurs are found; coercive isomorphism, mimetic

isomorphism and normative isomorphism. These three mechanisms tend to derive from different conditions and therefor lead to different outcomes (Dimaggio and Powell 1983).

Becoming isomorphic seems contradictory to the need for radical organizational change and therefore the need to create new business models. Hence institutional

entrepreneurship arose where institutionalized processes, norms, values, procedures etc. are being replaced by other arrangements. DiMaggio (1988) argued “new

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institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient resources see in them an

opportunity to realize interests that they value highly”. Within this research institutional entrepreneurs are seen as one or few persons who were involved during the emergence and operation of the new business model. These people can from inside the

organization, be related to shareholders or hired temporarily.

Following Dimaggio 1988 on institutional theory, new business models arise more easily within entrepreneurial institutionalized environments than within

institutionalized environments. According to Campion et al. (2009) and Nicholls (2010) the mechanisms of isomorphism does influence the organizational design, but hardly any research have been done on how these three mechanisms influence new business models within regulated environments. Institutional entrepreneurship has been applied to the Kyoto Protocol (Wijen and Ansari 2007) and even to the English County Cricket Cup (Wright and Zammuto 2013) but it has practically never been applied to new business models. But how can new business models emerge in the context of strong institutional pressures that favour legitimate organizational forms that are stable, reproducible and accountable? To gain a better understanding of the business model autonomy within an institutionalized environment more knowledge about the influence of the three mechanisms on new business models should be developed. Based on those insights, managers can determine on forehand how the three mechanisms influence new business models, what the consequence of these influences are and how to avoid or reduce these influences.

Hence the research question is:

Do isomorphism and institutional entrepreneurship practice, both separately and jointly, influence new business model autonomy in strong regulated environments?

The main constructs of new business models, isomorphism, corporate venturing and institutional entrepreneurship are written in chapter two. The methodology of this research is described in chapter three and further on in chapter four, the obtained cases have been written down. In chapter five the cross case analysis is shown and in the last chapter, six, the discussion and conclusion.

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2. Main constructs

2.1 New business models

Despite the fact that research about new business model increases, scholars do not agree on a definition for new business models (Zott et al. 2011). The overall goal of new business models creation is the importance to develop your strategy, use the right strategic resources and knowledge exchange (Yuanzhi 2010 and Zott et al. 2011). Scholars claim organizational forms are precursor from new business models as organizational forms are used to develop strategies. Organizational forms seen as precursor expects having the same components and goals, but according to Keen & Qureshi (2006) the link between new business models and organizational forms is ignored by scholars, except for the fact that they are subsequent for each other. Changes in norms, beliefs and practices are induced due to the widespread adoption of new organizational forms (Lee & Pennings 2002). New business models put pressure on existing firms (Ehret et al 2013) therefore more organizations are creating their own business models. According to Cavalcante et al. (2011) new business models exist of two interlinked purposes; “stability for the development of a company’s activities and, at the same time be flexible enough to allow for change (…) explore, seize and valuable new technological and/or market opportunities in time”. These interlinked purposes do clarify the widespread use of new business models nowadays. According to Morris et al. (2005) business model exist of 7 components: factors related to offering, market factors,

internal capability factors, competitive strategy factors, economic factors and

growth/exist factors. How these components are put into practise is the key to success. Cooper et al. 2011 affirms unique benefits to its users, as the most important factor to success, creating unique benefits is easier when being more autonomic. Autonomic business models can be seen as self-configuring, self-optimizing and self-protecting (Yu & Lin 2005). Chung et al. 2004 affirms retaining as an important threat to new business models’ creation and operation; this is clarified due to the fact that autonomic business models are less open to being influenced by retaining.

2.2 Isomorphism

Noticing retaining as important threat to new business model autonomy, the existence of isomorphism can be seen as retaining as well. Broom and Selznick (1955) define institutionalization as “the emergence of orderly, stable, socially integrating patterns out of unstable, loosely organized narrowly technical activities”. Later Selznick (1957) adds the distinction between organizations and institutions by saying that organizations that become institutionalized achieve a distinctive competence. Monitoring this process is a great responsibility, thus the institutional theory can be seen as tracing the emergence of distinctive factors that emerge from patterns of organizational interaction and adaption. These distinctive factors are forms, processes, strategies, outlooks and competences, whereas the patterns come from internal and external environment. Affirmative from the old institutional theory, organizational forms feel pressured that cannot be allocated to only stakeholders, but presence also norms, values, regulations etcetera.

New institutional theory adds even more pressures to formal organizations. Formal organizations are systems of coordinated and controlled activities that arise within institutional contexts. The process of institutionalization may affect organizational forms (new business models), and their implementation. Characteristically of the new institutional theory is their view of the effect of socialization; this is also reflected within isomorphism. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) came up with isomorphism, meaning within the institutional theory: the process of organizations becoming equal within the same society. This process can be seen as a pressure for formal organizations. Three

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mechanisms through which institutional isomorphism change occurs are defined: coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and normative isomorphism.

Coercive isomorphism results from formal and informal pressures exerted by other organizations and by cultural expectations in the society within organizations function. Myer and Rowan (1977) explain the presence of rationalized states and organizations as a cause of organizations become homogeneous, organizational structures increases homogeneity because of the institutionalized rules and legitimacy. Examples of coercive isomorphism are legislation, many laws and regulation exist within a strong regulated environment therefor organizations within this environment are becoming

homogeneous by executing these laws. Whereas coercive isomorphism exists of formal and informal pressures, mimetic isomorphism is encouraged by uncertainty. When environments are changing, goals are not achieved and innovation does not succeed, organizations will feel more secure by imitating competitors or organizations within the same environment that are succeeding. This imitation can also occur unintentionally; via employee transfer, by consulting firms or industry trade associations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This imitation often takes place after similar organizations succeeded with their organizational change. The last isomorphism mechanism through which isomorphism occurs is normative isomorphism. Normative pressures can be seen as the opposite of coercive pressures as it occurs through having management with the same background, education and norms and values. Two important aspects are of interest: the formal education and legitimation produced by university specialists and the existence of professional networks. Changing normative pressures is difficult, for example the professional career track is closely guarded and all top executive management have had the same or comparative education. This is also called homosexual reproduction of management (Kanter 1977). Within this research the informal pressures of normative isomorphism are meant, due to the same norms and values within a company, a new business model can hardly create their own culture, norms and values.

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Table 1 Overview of isomorphic mechanisms Isomorphic

Mechanism Pressures Additional Examples Coercive isomorphism Formal and informal

pressures Cultural expectations in the society Regulatory pressures Existence of a common legal environment affects many aspects of an organization’s behaviour and structure Manufacturers adopt new pollution control technologies to conform to environmental regulations

Non-profits maintain accounts and hire accountants in order to meet tax law requirements Mimetic isomorphism Success of similar

organizations Uncertainty Via consultancy firms, employee transfer or unintentionally

Hiring personnel from your competitors because they are performing better Normative

isomorphism Informal pressures Cultural expectation within an organization Occurs through the same background, education, norms and values of personnel within the firm Top executive management have often the same education and career path and therefor are a homosexual

reproduction

(Source: Adapted from Dimaggio and Powell 1983, Myer and Rowan 1977 and Leiter 2013)

The institutional theory has been a basis for much entrepreneurial research. The

success for this applicability within entrepreneurial research is explained since it played a major role in shaping and explaining entrepreneurial success but also in examining international related topics. As the institutional theory is concerned with influence from regulatory, social and cultural related themes (Bruton et al. 2010 and Roy 1997), the applicability is less within dynamic environments. Nowadays the environment has become more dynamic; therefore the need for being unique increases (Teece 2007, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Teece et al. 1997). Becoming isomorphic can be seen as the opposite of becoming unique, so how can the institutional theory still be applicable these days?

2.3 Corporate ventures

Perkmann and Spicer (2007) claim that institutional entrepreneurs can easily switch to new emerging fields, these new emerging fields can be shaped as corporate venturing or new business models. New business models are developed from the resource-based perspective. This resource-based perspective is the basis for competitive advantage that argues that organizations should develop competitive advantages to gain advantage over your competitors (Barney 1991). Creating new business is creating new

knowledge, but it will only gain an advantage over your competitors if you can share this knowledge within your organization. Corporate venturing can be used for sharing this knowledge.

In the past decade, much academic attention has been given to corporate venturing (CV), according to Ireland et al. (2001) this occurs because CV will contribute to the evolution of a firm’s strategy. CV exists of internal and external CV whereby internal consists of new business models, development and innovation and whereas external CV exists of

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acquisitions, joint ventures and corporate venture capital (Narayanan et al. 2009). Within this further research internal CV is being mentioned when writing about CV. Corporate venturing is rising as the use and success of this strategy is expanding. Using corporate venturing is seen as a possibility to reinvent the company itself. Famous examples are DSM and Philips/ASML. DSM started as stated-owned coal mining company . Later they became chemical producers in what has now resulted in a life sciences and materials sciences company (www.dsm.com). Another company who succeeded with corporate venturing is Philips, they started ASML in 1984 together with another company to develop new innovative systems, in 1995 they even launched an initial public offering and nowadays their net income is three times bigger than Philips (www.philips.com www.asml.nl)

2.4 Institutional entrepreneurship

Institutional entrepreneurship bridges perspectives, isomorphism and corporate venturing. Due to the need for more applicability within dynamic environments, institutional literature emerged. “Institutional entrepreneurship represents the activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones” Maquire et al. (2004). This is related to how institutional entrepreneurship arose according to Dimaggio (1988), when organized actors within an organization find sufficient resources and see opportunities to realize interest that can be valued highly. These actors can be seen as institutional entrepreneurs, who are willing to create new value within existing

organizations. This institutional entrepreneurship arose because an organizational field (organization with institutional pressures) struggled to take place over resources, stake and access within the structured systems of social positions (Bourdieu 1990). It

reintroduced agency, interest and power into institutional organizations (Garud et al. 2007).

Combining entrepreneurship with institutional theory entails contradiction and issues. “Individuals must break with existing rules and practices associated with the dominant institutional logics and institutionalize the alternative rules, practices or logics they are championing” (Garud et al. 2007). Often, peripheral actors want to change and create new activities but lack the power to change the institution, while the dominant actors do have the power but lack the motivation (Maguire 2007). “Institutional entrepreneurs must be skilled actors who can draw on existing cultural and linguistic material to narrate and theorize change in ways that give other social groups reasons to cooperate” (Garud et al. 2007, Colomy 1998, Fligstein 2001, Greenwood et al. 2002). Li et al. (2006) finds three important differences between a normal entrepreneur and an institutional entrepreneur, the amount and type of externalities whereby institutional change is the most important, the type and amount of risks entrepreneurs will take, as institutional entrepreneurs will have besides the market risks also institutional risks. And at last the type of human capital, whereby institutional entrepreneurs not only need the business intelligence, but also have to have political skills in order to manage the institutional change.

Perkmann and Spicer (2007) did research on institutional entrepreneurship and found three different projects with several skills needed: interactional, technical and cultural projects. Within interactional projects, actors are looking for support via bargaining, coalition building and incentivizing other actors while the resources are being mobilized and leveraged. (DiMaggio 1998 and Dorado 2005). The outcome is an innovative

organizational form, which can be linked to new business models. The second type of project is technical projects whereby the institutional entrepreneurs will ‘theorize’ by formulating patterned relationships (Strang and Meyer 1993). The last type is cultural

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projects who “involve institutional entrepreneurs framing institutions in ways that appeal to wider audiences” Perkmann and Spicer (2007).

Table 2 Overview of skills needed within institutional entrepreneurship mechanisms

Project Activities Skills Outcome

Interactional Networking, resource

mobilization and organization building

Political Innovate

organizational form

Technical Studying, analysing

and designing Analytical Theorization of organizational form

Cultural Framing, propagating,

advising and teaching Cultural Diffusion of organization form

(Source: Perkmann and Spicer 2007, page 1117)

Besides these different types of projects within the institutional entrepreneurship, Perkmann and Spicer (2007) also found that institutional entrepreneurs are not only seeking for new opportunities in their own working field, but they could also easily switch to new emerging fields. Research for new business models within

institutionalized environment is hardly done and is mentioned as a subject for further research.

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3. Research methodology

3.1 Research design

Research can be done via quantitative and qualitative research. Quantitative research is often used with deductive research, whereas qualitative research is used for the

inductive approach. According to Eisenhardt (1989), inductive research is being used to develop an exploratory theory from the data. As pointed out in the introduction, hardly any research has been done on the interaction between the three isomorphism

mechanisms and institutional entrepreneurship on new business models, therefor it seems appropriate to develop a framework after the data is collected, an inductive approach. Qualitative research is opportune, as it is known as an approach to get a better understanding of the context of the data (M. Saunders et. al. 2012).

The influence on new business models within regulated environments will be researched via qualitative research. Data collection will be done via semi- structured interviews with executive managers or senior management from new business models. Besides the interviews also annual reports, specific organizational documents and other obtained documents and interviews will be used to collect data and triangulate findings.

3.2 Data collection and sampling

To find any influence of institutional entrepreneurship and isomorphism on new business models within regulated environments, case studies will be used. Regulated environments are an important limitation within this research, this is the main reason this research has been conducted. I have been working at a new business model within a regulated environment myself, and we are experiencing the legislation that applies pressure on the parent company. Therefore the regulated environment implies that parent companies that are supervised by the government.

New business models are broad defined, finding new business models and the existence of a parent company within a regulated environment gives corporate venturing as an outcome. Corporate venturing can also be seen as an elaboration of institutional entrepreneurship, therefore the population is determined on corporate ventures whereas the parent company is in a regulated environment. According to R. J. Sawant (2012) regulated environments are characterized by government regulations, some examples of these government regulations: public transportation-, utility, finance and telecommunications industries. In order to decide what industries and how many new business models should be applied, purposive sampling is used within this research. The Drinking water industry requires the parent company to fulfil clean drinking water to consumers within their service area. Dutch citizens are therefore limited in their choice and cannot chose their own drinking water company. Dutch citizens are obliged to use pension and insurance products and services, but are free to choose from which company. Therefore regulated environments within this research can be defined as an environment whereby the company is required to offer their products or services to customers within their service area, or are offering a service or product that is compulsory to Dutch citizens to purchase.

For this case study, four different cases will be researched that represent two different industries. Requirements for this sampling are;

- The corporate parent acts within regulated environments;

- The corporate parent has hundred per cent ownership of the new business model;

- The new business model may be established not longer than seven years ago; - The new business model acts within the same industry as the parent company

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Regulated environments applied for this research are financial services and the

(drinking) water industry; two different new business models with different corporate parents per industry have been researched.

After the interviews, patterns will be displayed demonstrating how institutional entrepreneurship and isomorphism influence new business models in the financial and (drinking) water industry.

Table 3 Selected industries

Industry New business model Corporate parent

Financial services Knab Aegon

Financial services Inadmin APG

(Drinking) water Hydrocare Brabant Water (Drinking) Water PWN Technology PWN

The semi-structured interviews have been held with the top management of the new business models. Prior to the interview, interviewees have received a short explanation about the research question as well as the topics to be discussed during the interviews. An overview of the subjects and some interview questions are given in table 4.2. As the interviews are semi-structured, there are no a fixed structures. The interviews have been recorded and typed out and can be presented in Dutch upon request, except the interview of Renée Bies (Inadmin) because no permission was given.

Table 4 Questions for open semi-structured interviews

Subject Question

Foundation What was the occasion for starting this business model? Who came with the idea?

Who achieved the foundation? What resources are being used?

Where there any pressures during the start of the new business?

Were the shareholders involved?

Why is the new business founded in this entity? How does the business model works?

Does the parent company have more of these ventures? Activities comparative to

parent company Is there any other department within the parent company who fulfil the same activity? Is it possible that a customer can get the same offer from the parent company as well from the new business?

Is the law and legislation from the new business different than from the parent company?

Does the new business or parent company anticipate to future or not yet existing law and legislation?

Are the responsibilities of the management of the new business different in comparison with management of departments from the parent company?

Does the new business uses the staff departments from the parent company? Is this mandatory or a free choice? Is the dashboard from management of the new business different than management of any department within the parent company? Has this changed overtime?

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business in comparison with the parent company?

Culture How is the culture of the firm in comparison with the parent company, what’s different and why?

3.3 Reliability and validity

This research will provide more insights on how isomorphism and institutional entrepreneurship influence the emergence of new business models within regulated environments as hardly any research has been done before. The proposed methods will generate qualitative data; therefore data analysis can be applied to develop a

framework.

M. Saunders et al. (2012) claims a high level of validity can be achieved via structured interviews by exploring responses and clarify question, therefor semi-structured interviews will be held. The internal validity for this research is high as the interview outcomes show causality. Besides this causality, case studies are known for their internal validity. Hardly any research has been done yet related to the research question; therefore the interviews do have an open character but are semi-structured in order to manage the right outcomes. The topics have been made on forehand, but after the first interview the interview questions have been changed, therefor the construct validity is high. The external validity of this research is also high as the research can be generalizable to network companies within regulated environments within the

Netherlands. The drinking water industry and financial services industry can both be seen as network companies whereas drinking water companies have physical network assets, while the financial sector has an invisible network. The interviews have been recorded and typed out and can be provided upon request, therefore the reliability of this research is high. Before having the first interview, a pilot interview was held with management of a new business model within the utility industry, after this pilot interview there was the possibility to change questions if necessary. Besides

interviewing the management of the new business model, the management of the parent company has been interviewed as well; as this will provide more reliable outcomes. M. Saunders et al (2012) define threats in addition to reliability. Most common threats are bias or errors from the participant of researcher. To counter these threats the

researcher will ask more questions to avoid misunderstandings and to be objective. Through triangulation additional evidence is sought for interview outcomes, company documents and existing interviews will be used for this.

Strengths of this research are the possible outcomes related to different industries. Therefore a comparison of influence in different industries can be made with the conclusions and it explains why the outcome is different per industry. Limitations are the difficulty of generalizing results to other industries. Defining regulated environment is in many scholars done in several ways; therefore the conclusion will not be applicable to every new business model within every regulated area.

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4. Cases

Chapter three discusses the sampling for this research. In this chapter an overview off the obtained data per new business model will be given. These cases are the result of an iterative process whereby data emerged throughout an infolding research model.

4.1 PWN Technologies

PWN Technologies is owned by Dutch Water Utility PWN and makes their experience on water treatment available worldwide (Source: www.pwntechnologies.com)

Table 5 PWN Technologies characteristics

Characteristics New business model:

PWN Technologies Corporate parent: PWN

Founded since 2010 1920

Total employees 25 626

Operating national / international International National

Shareholders PWN Province North Holland

Interviewee and function Gilbert Galjaard, CTO Martien den Blanken CEO

(Source: Interview Martien den Blanken (CEO PWN), Interview Gilbert Galjaard (CTO PWN Technology), www.pwn.nl, www.pwntechnology.com, PWN annual report 2013)

4.1.2 PWN Technologies foundation

PWN Technologies (PWN T) is official founded in 2010 to find water treatment solutions; it used to be the research and development department of PWN before it became PWN T. PWN faced specific problems filtering surface water so an investment was made in research and development. After presenting their solutions worldwide for many years were answered with positive reactions, the willingness to become an

innovative player within the water sector, facing the retained merger with several water utility’s and feeling the necessity to become an attractive employer, was decided to start PWN T. “The origin of PWN T was partly the retained merger, one of the goals of the upcoming merger was increasing the innovative strength”: Martien den Blanken (CEO PWN). During an entire day with the supervisory board, management of PWN and the researchers of the R&D development the decision of founding PWN T and the

organizational structure was made. “In 2010 we have decided to start building the water purification factory in Andijk, this contract was awarded to PWN T whereas they

immediately could start with a big project”: Martien den Blanken.

4.1.3 PWN Technologies entrepreneurial efforts

One of the members of the supervisory board adduced Pieter Spoor, an entrepreneur from another industry with innovative ideas. After the retained merger, two studies have been done on how innovation should be developed within PWN, as it was not certain that the innovation could continue the way it was being developed. “After the merger, we sat down with the supervisory board to decide what next steps we would have to take (…) the outcome was to focus more on innovation, as we already had good

competences”: Martien den Blanken. Pieter Spoor became the director of PWN T; with his entrepreneurial mind he made PWN T the company it is now. “The industry image is not very attractive (…) Pieter Spoor tried to think out of the box and has launched PWN T as it was a new car brand”: Gilbert Galjaard (CTO PWN T).

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4.1.4 PWN Technologies resources

“PWN is lucky to have entrepreneurs who see opportunities and a supervisory board who is willing to take risks and start new business”: Martien den Blanken. Besides the

opportunities PWN created to develop PWN T, the existence of Pieter Spoor is also an important resource, as he can be seen as an institutional entrepreneur who made so much possible. The outcome of his study from 2008: “the R&D department is very

valuable and has more potential, but only when being an independent entity”: Martien den Blanken. Nowadays PWN T has the biggest test environment within Europe, where all technologies can be tested on semi-field scale. “Our power is changing the technology into daily useful applicability’s”: Martien den Blanken. The knowledge of this

applicability is an important resource for PWN T, “we have a big network with

researchers, we can hire people on daily basis from all over the world and if necessary we can also use people from PWN, the possibility, rather than obligation is what makes us unique”: Gilbert Galjaard.

4.1.5 PWN Technologies culture

The culture of PWN T is very different in comparison with PWN. Gilbert Galjaard: “PWN is more hierarchically, this is necessity within production companies, while PWN T is more open”. “The study of Pieter Spoor about innovation assumed that starting a new venture, that is placed further from the parent company, the risk is shielded and there is a

possibility for the venture to create their own culture”: Martien den Blanken. This

supposes the parent company is aware of the negative affect of normative pressures on new business models.

4.1.6 PWN Technologies limitations by shareholders or parent company

PWN Technologies is confined by PWN as the turnover is limited to millions. Gilbert Galjaard:”PWN Technologies has no ambition to earn billions (…) The turnover is limited to 30 million per year maximum, because when the turnover becomes higher, PWN cannot guarantee PWN Technologies projects.” This is confirmed by Martien den Blanken: “When the turnover becomes higher, financers should be attracted as a result in order to invest in projects. But because PWN and the shareholder of PWN want to have exclusive rights, we limit the turnover”.

4.1.7 PWN Technologies law and legislation

“PWN T complies with all existing legislation, however as a SME of a big company, we are looking what laws fits us, for example, we can’t use the benefits of the SME legislation hence we are a daughter of a big organization and on the other side we cannot claim subsidies who are applied for the the parent company because we are a SME”: Gilbert Galjaard. Dutch Politics are encouraging PWN to develop innovative water solutions, as the Netherlands are known for their water knowledge. Martien den Blanken: ”We had several discussions with Topsector Water and Ministry of Economic affairs to see if they could help us with the start of PWN T by covering risks, but unfortunately they only encouraged us to develop PWN T without really helping us”.

4.1.8 PWN Technologies legal structure

PWN T is placed within a holding in order to cover risks. “You have to cover the risks, I have told the shareholders that this cannot be done without risk s, I can only try to limit the risks as much as possible”: Martien den Blanken. The R&D department from PWN is integrated within PWN T, which is why PWN T is placed within a holding, when PWN T Projects will bankrupt, PWN T can still be reintegrated within PWN.

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Figure 1 Legal structure of PWN Technologies

4.1.9 PWN Technologies year overview

Table 6 PWN Technologies year overview

Year Activity

1996 Possible merger with several water utility’s is being researched

1997 Merger is obtained by shareholder of PWN

1997 Study on how innovation could be developed within PWN, done by Rijn Consult

1998 Further research on how innovation should be integrated within PWN, done by Pieter Spoor

1998 Factory in Heemskerk with innovative water solutions is being build

2004 Possibilities for water purification factory in Andijk are being researched

2010 Official start op PWN Technologies

2010 Contract of building the water purification factory in Andijk is awarded to PWN Technologies

2012 Adjustment in organizational structure of PWN Technologies

(Source: Interview Martien den Blanken (CEO PWN), Interview Gilbert Galjaard (CTO PWN Technology), www.pwn.nl, www.pwntechnology.com, PWN annual report 2013)

4.1.10 PWN Technologies autonomy

PWN Technologies can be seen as autonomic organization, with its own location, free choices in using staff departments and creating an opposite culture of the parent

company contributes. Martien den Blanken: “we figured out immediately that besides our technicians, we also needed commercial people”. Not having these commercial people at PWN already shows a significant difference between PWN and PWN Technologies. Gilbert Galjaard: “ We are allowed to hire our own staff departments, but it is not efficient, therefor we use the staff departments from PWN. This is often the best solution, but sometimes it is also seen as bureaucratic and the reports as too extensive”.

PWN

PWN Technologies Holding

PWN Technologies projects

Other, not relevant for this research

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4.2 Hydrocare

4.2.1 Hydrocare

Hydrocare is owned by Dutch Water Utility Brabant Water, who is founded in 2002 after a merger of two water utilities in North-Brabant. Hydrocare consists of the entities that are not working on the core business of Brabant Water. The lessons learned during the start and development of all three entities: Hydrobusiness, Hydroscope and Hydreco are listed under the name Hydrocare.

Table 7 Hydrocare characteristics

Hydrocare Corporate parent: Brabant Water

Founded since 2008 2002*

Operating national / international National National

Shareholders Brabant Water Province North Brabant and 60 other

municipalities from province North Brabant Interviewee and function Lars Kuipéri, CEO Hydrocare,

CEO Hydroscope, GM Hydrobusiness, GM Hydreco

-

* Since 2002 in this entity after a merger between Waterleiding Maatschappij Noord-West-Brabant (1887) and Waterleidingmaatschappij Oost-Brabant (1887)

(Source: Interview Lars Kuipéri (CEO Hydrocare, CEO Hydroscope, GM Hydrobusiness, GM Hydreco, www.brabantwater.nl, www.hydroscope.nl, www.hydrobusiness.nl, www.hydreco.nl, Brabant Water annual report 2013)

4.2.2 Hydrocare foundation

On the evening of the merger between two water utilities in province North Brabant, the Dutch government decided that water inspection departments of water companies had to be separated from the water companies hence there was the possibility for a conflict of interest. Since the merger was upcoming, the two water utilities decided to

collaborate in a new water inspection company (Hydroscope) who was to become a 100% daughter company of the newly formed Brabant Water. “Since the merger

demanded all attention, people found out too late that Hydroscope was not self-sufficient”: Lars Kuipéri (CEO Hydrocare). In 2005 a new interim director was hired to make Hydroscope self-sufficient, this was achieved in almost that same year. Lars Kuipéri: Profit has been generated since 2005; the losses from the first years were erased with profits achieved after 2005”. In 2007 the governance was preparing a new Drinking Water Act, “we have heard that compliance and organizational structure would be one of the issues of this new law, that was for Brabant Water and Hydroscope the cause to reconsider the activities”: Lars Kuipéri. Several activities were not drinking water -related, “shareholders asked us that same year to have a look at seasonal thermal energy storage (STES), since we have knowledge about the soil layers, that is how the first STES systems of Brabant Water were created”: Lars Kuipéri. Being ahead of the upcoming act, Brabant Water decided to place all activities not related to their core business, -

providing drinking water - within a new holding, Hydrocare, with 3 ventures: Hydroscope, Hydrobusiness and Hydreco.

4.2.3 Hydrocare entrepreneurial efforts

The foundation of Hydroscope was not devoted by entrepreneurial effort; hence it was a requirement from the government. The demand for STES systems from shareholders

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can be seen as entrepreneurial effort as the shareholders thought of Brabant Water as a company with knowledge about soil and water. Besides the shareholders of Brabant Water also the CEO of Brabant water has entrepreneurial effort. Lars Kuipéri: “Guiljo van Nuland (CEO Brabant Water) is strong believer of us being independent and objective within the industry, he believes that shareholders should benefit from Brabant Water being an active participator in new developments”. “Even though not everybody within Brabant Water supports our activity within STES systems, they understand that if we do not create knowledge, someone else will do it”.

4.2.4 Hydrocare resources

As can be read in 4.2.3, the culture of Hydrocare is different in comparison to Brabant Water. The need for commercial employees is a big resource for a successful Hydrocare. But with only commercial employees you cannot be self-sufficient. Lars Kuipéri: “After discovering Hydroscope was not self-sufficient, Guiljo van Nuland decided to hire an interim director, he made important changes which resulted in Hydroscope becoming self-sufficient”.

4.2.5 Hydrocare culture

Lars Kuipéri: “When Hydroscope started, employees from future Brabant Water were involved and that culture prevailed”. This led to Hydroscope not being self-sufficient. “Hydrocare had to develop commercial activities to make profit, as failed projects should be recovered, but employees from Brabant Water often do not like to do commercial activities”: Lars Kuipéri. Besides the commercial cultural aspects, Hydrocare is not hierarchical, but very open. “Hydrocare is located in Breda, we rent a wing of a building from Brabant Water, this was mandatory to create synergy (…) I decided to lunch every day in the canteen to be approachable for our employees but also to the employees of Brabant Water”: Lars Kuipéri. Having these opposite cultures within Brabant water suggests normative pressures have less influence on Hydrocare.

4.2.6 Hydrocare limitations by shareholders or parent company

Hydrocare is not limited by the corporate parent, it was launched because of new opportunities submitted by shareholders, and Brabant Water willingness to find new solutions related to soil layers. Benefits of finding your own solutions, is maintaining control over related areas (soil, drinking water etc.) besides these control function, having knowledge of and creating solutions gives Brabant Water the opportunity to obtain the bigger clients. Imposed limitations are technical related; geothermal related projects cannot use the fracking technique, this is supported by the annual report. Also to avoid governance issues, Hydrocare is not allowed to advise clients to use products or services offered by Brabant Water.

4.2.7 Hydrocare law and legislation

De launch of Hydrocare was in anticipation of regulatory requirements, knowing the Drinking Water Act would be changed with a focus on core activities Brabant Water decided to review the organizational structures and departments. Lars Kuipéri: “ Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) came once with questions about a fellow business or competitor, we decided to take a close look at our processes as we noticed that ACM would verify our whole industry, but until today they have never showed up”.

4.2.8 Hydrocare legal structure

Since 2005, Hydroscope was able to work self-sufficient. In anticipation on the new drinking water act, Brabant Water decided to place all not-core activities outside Brabant Water. “As we showed that we were self-sufficient since 2005, we decided to start Hydreco, Hydrobusiness and Hydrocare, where all shares would be at Hydrocare and all shares of Hydrocare would be at Brabant Water”. (…) This was tax-efficient, but especially

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done allowing Hydrocare to have enough influence and control over their daughters”: Lars Kuipéri.

Figure 2 legal structure of Hydrocare

4.2.9 Hydrocare year overview

Table 8 Hydrocare year overview

Year Activity

1999 WOB and WWB were aware of the upcoming merger to become Brabant Water

2001 Start of Hydroscope

2002 Brabant Water emerged from a merger

2005 Adjustment in organizational structure of Hydroscope 2007 Preparations for a new drinking water act

2007 Shareholders demand for STES systems

2008 Start of Hydreco, Hydrobusiness and Hydrocare (as holding company)

(Source: Interview Lars Kuipéri (CEO Hydrocare, CEO Hydroscope, GM Hydrobusiness, GM Hydreco, www.brabantwater.nl, www.hydroscope.nl, www.hydrobusiness.nl, www.hydreco.nl, Brabant Water annual report 2013)

4.2.10 Hydrocare autonomy

“Having quality and independence as important components of our mission statement, Hydrocare will never advise for activities the parent company can or should do”: Lars Kuipéri. Being a commercial organization is the opposite of the parent company and therefore Hydrocare is autonomic. “It was mandatory to use an existing location of

Brabant Water to reduce the distance”: Lars Kuipéri. Using this location of Brabant Water Hydrocare feels compelled to stay closer to the parent company than he wanted.

4.3 Knab

4.3.1 Knab

Knab was introduced in 2012 as customer-oriented bank helping entrepreneurial people to better understand their finances. Being part of Aegon Netherlands, Knab is using the banking licences of Aegon Netherlands. Knab reflects the core of Aegon’s vision, by enabling their customers to make their own choices about their personal financial situation and to achieve their financial goals (source: Aegon Netherland annual report 2014).

Brabant Water

Hydrocare

Hydreco Hydroscope Hydrocare

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Table 9 Knab characteristics

Knab Corporate parent: Aegon Netherlands

Founded since 2012 1983*

Operating national / international National National

Shareholders Aegon Nederland Aegon

Interviewee and function Frits Drost, CCO Knab Rob Scholte, Sr. Innovation advisor Aegon

* Since 1983 in this entity after a merger between AGO (1968) and Ennia (1969) (Source: Interview Frits Drost (CCO Knab), interview Rob Scholte (Aegon) www.knab.nl, www.aegon.nl, Aegon annual report 2014, Aegon Bank annual report 2013)

4.3.2 Knab foundation

René Frijters is founding partner of Alex Investment Bank (1996); after it was sold to Binck Bank, René Frijters already had the new business model of future Knab in mind. During his 100 working days at DSB Bank he pitched his idea of a new business model for a bank where customers’ needs are the key of the business. At DSB Bank there were not enough resources to realise Knab Bank, that is why René Frijters went looking for a new partner with a banking license, money to invest and the right resources. Frits Drost (CCO Knab): “Everything starts with a strategy (…) Knab is part of Aegon because it is an interpretation of the Aegon strategy where Aegon helps customers to create their own financial future”. “The managing board of Aegon Netherland is innovation minded, Marco Keim (CEO Aegon Netherlands) is convinced as no other that without innovation you will not survive in this industry. (…) Marco Keim believed in the idea of Knab and trusted René Frijters almost immediately”: Rob Scholte (Sr. innovation advisor Aegon). During the launch of Knab the goal of 100.000 customers within 5 years is mentioned. After one and a half year, Aegon en Knab decided to adjust their business models, as targets were not met and not enough customers were attracted. Rob Scholte:” within new ventures you know it takes years before it is self-sufficient, or at least on the right track. Within Knab it took two till three years before it was on the right track, that is the reason why Frits Drost joined Knab”.

4.3.3 Knab entrepreneurial efforts

Marco Keim is CEO Aegon Netherlands since 2008, being the CEO of the Netherlands department; he is also in the Aegon board of directors worldwide. He is responsible for the innovation worldwide. Rob Scholte: ”having the responsibility for innovation will always help with the need for being innovation in your own country. (…) Marco Keim has the right feasibility to decide about these big decisions, luckily the shareholders of Aegon Netherlands are willing to invest in innovation”. Marco Keim can be seen as an

institutional entrepreneur within Aegon, together with the existence of René Frijters they are able to do new things. René Frijters is another institutional entrepreneur, he was not a banker but somebody with ideas about a new business models that would change the industry. This is only possible when being entrepreneurial minded. “Marco Keim trusted René Frijters also due to the track record he had with Alex Investment Bank”: Rob Scholte.

4.3.4 Knab resources

Having an idea for a new bank is not easy without a banking licence. This license and the investment possibilities was a necessity resource for Knab. René Frijters (CEO): ”an

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important thing for Knab are the employees, we only hire people with the right genes, for example people from tourism and hospitality industry who are willing to provide service”. Frits Drost: “Knab did not hire bankers on purpose, we wanted young people who liked to provide service and wanted to work in an environment with responsibility.” This is supported in interviews with several employees of Knab.

4.3.5 Knab culture

The culture of Knab is very open minded, people have their own responsibilities and are triggered to contribute ideas. René Frijters: “employees from Knab are working for the customer and not for their colleagues, it’s important to learn from each other, from everyone within the organization”. This culture is different in regards to the culture within Aegon. Frits Drost: “the biggest difference of Aegon and Knab is the young age of employees within Knab, these people have been selected on their ability to provide service and their willingness to do things different than others. We believe in our story and we believe that we can achieve this". Reinforcing their customer orientated approach, Knab also organizes Knab Open, an evening where customers are invited to talk about experiences and improvements.

4.3.6 Knab limitations by shareholders or parent company

René Frijters came up with the business model of Knab but needed a banking license and an investor. Creating your own banking license would cost too much money and time, there for the René Frijters looked for possible investors within their own banking license. Founding Aegon with Marco Keim as CEO, who is also responsible for innovation of Aegon worldwide, an innovative-minded investor was found. But, using the banking license of Aegon leads to strong control from the parent company. Knab uses the compliance, risk and treasury departments from Aegon, partly because of their

experience and knowledge, partly due to efficiency and partly to be controlled by Aegon. New investments are presented to CEO and CFO of Aegon and after every new

investment decision; continuation of Knab for a next period is secured. This is supported by both interviews. Knab has no limitations on growth, Aegon believed in the business model, René Frijters and saw opportunities to execute their strategy.

4.3.7 Knab law and legislation

Legislation is very important to Knab and Aegon, especially because Knab uses the banking license act of Aegon. Being supervised by De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM), Knab is mandatory to fulfill the duties, which have been devised to Dutch banks. Knab do not disturb them to meet these liabilities as their business model is set on this legislation and even thinks the legislation is not always the most advantageous for the customers, as Knab wants to provide more transparency and customer service.

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4.3.8 Knab legal structure

Figure 3 legal structure of Knab

4.3.9 Knab year overview

Table 10 Knab year overview

Year Activity

2007 Rene Frijters sold Alex Investment Bank and already thought of the new business model of future Knab 2009 Rene Frijters worked 100 days at DSB bank and

pitched the business model of Knab. DSB was interested but could not convince Rene Frijters that DSB was the best partner to start a company like Knab 2009 Rene Frijters searched for a partner to start with the

business model from Knab

2009 Partner was found in Aegon Netherlands

2012 Launch of Knab

2013 – 2014 Adjustment in business model of Knab

(Source: Interview Frits Drost (CCO Knab), interview Rob Scholte (Aegon) www.knab.nl, www.aegon.nl, Aegon annual report 2014, Aegon Bank annual report 2013)

4.3.10 Knab autonomy

Using the bank license of Aegon, Knab is mandatory to use some staff departments; still they can be seen as very autonomic. “Though we use the finance, risk and HR department of Aegon, for us it is important to have our own tone of voice, marketing and

communication is very important for us”: Frits Drost. Rob Scholte: “Knab created its own IT systems and therefor it is not comparable with Aegon anymore, but once Knab found IT components proven successfully, Aegon would try to build in these components in their systems as well”. Besides the technical systems, Knab also focuses on other type of employees “we are looking for service oriented employees, people from the hospitality industry who like to improve the service level”: Frits Drost, this is the opposite of Aegon as more often people are hired due their experience.

Aegon

Aegon Bank

Other, not relevant for this research

The influences of isomorphism and institutional entrepreneurship practices on new business model autonomy in strongly regulated environments : an exploratory case study of new business model autonomy within regulated en

The influences of isomorphism and institutional entrepreneurship

practices on new business model autonomy in strongly regulated

Thesis

The influences of isomorphism and institutional entrepreneurship

practices on new business model autonomy in strongly regulated

environments.

An exploratory case study of new business model autonomy within regulated

environments

Statement of Originality

Acknowledgement

Abstract

Abstract in Dutch

Table of contents

List of tables and figures

1. Introduction

2. Main constructs

2.1 New business models

2.2 Isomorphism

2.3 Corporate ventures

2.4 Institutional entrepreneurship

3. Research methodology

3.1 Research design

3.2 Data collection and sampling

3.3 Reliability and validity

4. Cases

4.1 PWN Technologies

4.1.2 PWN Technologies foundation

4.1.3 PWN Technologies entrepreneurial efforts

4.1.4 PWN Technologies resources

4.1.5 PWN Technologies culture

4.1.6 PWN Technologies limitations by shareholders or parent company

4.1.7 PWN Technologies law and legislation

4.1.8 PWN Technologies legal structure

4.1.9 PWN Technologies year overview

4.1.10 PWN Technologies autonomy

4.2 Hydrocare

4.2.1 Hydrocare

4.2.2 Hydrocare foundation

4.2.3 Hydrocare entrepreneurial efforts

4.2.4 Hydrocare resources

4.2.5 Hydrocare culture

4.2.6 Hydrocare limitations by shareholders or parent company

4.2.7 Hydrocare law and legislation

4.2.8 Hydrocare legal structure

4.2.9 Hydrocare year overview

4.2.10 Hydrocare autonomy

4.3 Knab

4.3.1 Knab

4.3.2 Knab foundation

4.3.3 Knab entrepreneurial efforts

4.3.4 Knab resources

4.3.5 Knab culture

4.3.6 Knab limitations by shareholders or parent company

4.3.7 Knab law and legislation

4.3.8 Knab legal structure

4.3.9 Knab year overview

4.3.10 Knab autonomy