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Dar al ifta’ in the Digital Age
Issuing Fatwas and Debate in Saudi Arabia
Inge van der Stap
5894190
3 augustus 2016
Masterthesis
Richard van Leeuwen
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Contents
1. Introduction ... 3
2. Theoretical framework and methodology. ... 7
2.1 Scholarly debate on the relationship between the umara and ulama in Saudi Arabia ... 7
2.2 Methodology ... 15
3. Saudi Arabia, a short introduction ... 17
3.1 Foundation and early years ... 17
3.2 Modernizing influences ... 20
3.3 Religious legitimation ... 22
3.4 Basic principles of Wahhabism... 23
3.5 Wahhabi thought on government ... 24
4. Ifta’ in the digital age ... 27
4.1 Traditional ifta’ ... 27
4.2 Ifta’ in Saudi Arabia ... 29
4.3 Contesting groups ... 31
4.4 Digital landscape ... 33
5. Debate between state ulama, society and non-state ulama ... 36
5.1 Description of the website of the Permanent Committee ... 36
5.2 Navigating the fatwas ... 40
5.3 Social issues under debate ... 41
6. Conclusion ... 60
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1. Introduction
In 1989 the Iranian ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa on Salman Rushdie, the author of The Satanic Verses, claiming that he had written a text against the Islam, the Prophet of Islam and the Quran. Khomeini further claimed that as a result Rushdie was condemned to capital punishment and Muslims all over the world were asked to execute this fatwa.1 As a consequence, Rushdie had to go into hiding. With this act the concept of a fatwa, although previously not unknown in the Western world, became well known throughout the world in a negative sense. In addition, the adverse connotation surrounding fatwas remains until this day as a result of the reprinting of mostly remarkable fatwas by both Western and non-Western news outlets, that through their conspicuous nature draw attention. One example is the fatwa, allegedly written by the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah Al Shaikh in April 2015, that a man can eat his wife when extremely hungry.2 This fatwa led to some heated reactions from different human rights groups as well as to the reprinting of this fatwa in both Western and non-Western media. The Grand Mufti later denied having written the fatwa,3 but by then the damage was already done. The peculiar character of these reprinted fatwas has led to a distorted image of the fatwa in het Western world, and has obscured the real use of fatwas by Muslims in both everyday life and in politics by those in power.
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an interesting country to focus on when investigating the use of fatwas in everyday life and politics alike. The government of Saudi Arabia implements an orthodox version of Islam that is known as Wahhabism. Today the kingdom of Saudi Arabia is ruled by King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, one of the forty-three sons of Ibn Saud, the founder of the kingdom. He succeeded his half-brother Abdullah who died after a reign of ten years in January of 2015. The king rules the country based on the cooperation between the Saudi family, descendants of Ibn Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia, and the Al Shaikh family,
descendants of al-Wahhab, founder of Wahhabism. The entanglement between the Saudis, the royal family, and the Al Shaikhs, the most important family of religious scholars, has been the basis of power legitimacy since the first Saudi Kingdom. This alliance was first formed between Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1744. The current power structure 1 http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~owend/I/islam/fatwa.html 2http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/top-saudi-sheikh-issues-bizarre-5491142 3 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2015/04/10/Saudi-fatwa-allowing-husbands-to-eat-wives-unsubstantiated-.html
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is the result of this alliance between the political power and the religious power and is crucial considering Islamic thought on politics in which the ruler is obliged to uphold the Islamic law while the ulama (religious scholars) are responsible for the interpretation and implementation of the law. In exchange, the citizens are required to obey the ruler without resistance.
What is of vital importance is the fact that Saudi Arabia is more than any other country identified with Islam. It is both the cradle of Islam and the location of the two holiest places in Islam (Mecca and Medina). As a result the ruler is considered the protector of these sites (Khadim al-Haramayn, servant of the two shrines) and of the annual hajj (pilgrimage). In order to perform these tasks religious legitimation is paramount. The religious establishment gives the Saudi monarchy the legitimation that it needs in order to rule these important locations.
The relationship between the umara, the royal family, and the ulama, the religious establishment, is a complex one. Different opinions exist as to what the exact nature is of the relationship and the power distribution between the two parties. This discussion focuses mainly on the political fatwas that are being produced by the Grand Mufti and the Board of Senior Ulama, the highest and most influential religious authority, in order to support governmental decisions. Of importance here is that these ulama, officially independent interpreters of the holy texts and the sharia, have been successfully incorporated into the state system. Multiple
bureaucratic institutions have been set up in which the ulama have an active role. One such institution is ‘The Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions’ founded in 1971 by a royal decree and under the direct supervision of the Grand Mufti. The Committtee’s main assignment is to prepare research for the Board of Senior Ulama and issue fatwas in response to personal inquiries concerning matters of faith, ritual, financial transactions and other social norms.4 The fatwas issued by this committee therefore are exclusively related to social and religious matters and the Committee does not produce political fatwas. The work of this
committee have been neglected in the discussion. More importantly, the extent to which these fatwas are debated or observed within Saudi society also has not been taken into account. So while the religious support for political decisions by the issuing of fatwas has been extensively debated, the fatwas produced by the ulama concerning socio-religious matters have never been thoroughly investigated. To fully understand and to deepen our comprehension of the
relationship between the Saudi umara and ulama and the influence of the ulama on Saudi
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society, the social-religious fatwas need to be incorporated into the discussion. Another
undervalued factor are the fatwas issued by non-state ulama, who due to the growing importance of the Internet have been able to distribute their ideas more easier into society. Both factors are missing in the academic discussion on the political and social situation of Saudi Arabia and are in need of investigation.
In this thesis the assumption that the binary power relationship in Saudi Arabia between the umara and the state ulama is the only power structure that needs examination will be challenged. The focus shifts from the debate between the umara and the state ulama to the debate between the state ulama and their ideas on socio-religious norms, as depicted in non-political fatwas, the non-state ulama and their convictions as can be distilled from their fatwas, and society at large where these fatwas may or may not be implemented. The main research question is; How does the content of the fatwas of the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions, as published on their website www.alifta.org, compare to content of other Saudi websites, news and fatwa, where openly the same matters are being discussed and reported on? The Committee’s fatwas in question have been produced in response to questions posed by Muslims from both within and outside Saudi Arabia. Several selected fatwas have been submitted to content analysis and compared with the content of news articles and opinion pieces published on two English Saudi based websites and the content of other fatwas issued by non-state Saudi ulama. Seven social topics are being discussed in this thesis to argue that in order to understand Saudi society these elements need to be taken into account as well.
With this focus on social fatwas, that are concerned with personal situations, a step away from politics is being taken and the focal point is placed solely on the social norms of the Saudi society. The fatwas subjected to analysis are not political or religious (creed or worship) of nature, but are rather centered on non-political and non-religious social issues. However, given the absolute interconnection of politics, religion and social norms in Saudi society, the
suggestion to totally separate investigating Saudi social norms of politics is unrealistic. Social norms in Saudi Arabia are deeply influenced by the Wahhabi ideology. Furthermore, given the importance of fatwas as an instrument to communicate political, religious and social ideas, every fatwa is brimmed with tension and meaning. Therefore also fatwas on social matters have a political dimension and meaning and consequently this political aspect will not be ignored.
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What will remain undiscussed in this thesis is the geopolitical situation and Saudi foreign policy derived from it. The contest that Saudi Arabia received and receives on the claim to represent the right Islam and the right to speak in the name of Islam from Libya, Iran, Iraq, Hezbollah and Egypt influences domestic policies.5 The closeness of these countries adds to the feeling of vulnerability without which Saudi Arabia’s foreign policies cannot be understood.6 Discussing foreign policies is outside of the scope of this thesis, however, what is relevant to mention here is that conflicts with other radical Islamic regimes, which strikes the Saudi state at its core, have fueled a stronger emphasize on Islamic concepts in domestic policies.7 This mechanism is relevant in understanding the importance and influence of religion, the ulama and their fatwas on Saudi society.
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter Two focuses on the relationship and the power distribution between the umara and ulama in Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, a short
initiation into the most important features of Saudi history and the Wahhabi ideology is given in Chapter Three. This is followed by general and specific notions on ifta’ in the digital landscape in Chapter Four. Chapter Five consists of a description and analysis of the site observation and content analysis of the website of the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and legal Opinions. Chapter Six will give a conclusion.
5
Korany, B. ‘Defending the faith amid change: The foreign policy of Saudi Arabia’ in Korany, B. and Hillal Dessouki, A. (eds)The foreign Policies of Arab States. Oxford: Westview Press 1991: 313
6
Ibid: p. 314
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2. Theoretical framework and methodology.
As touched upon in the introduction, the cooperation between the royal family and the religious establishment is seen as the crucial pillar under the political system in Saudi Arabia. This chapter focuses on the scholarly debate on this union and the distribution of power between the two partners. The second part will target the methodology needed to further deepen the understanding on this relationship by adding the Internet and its influence to the debate.
2.1 Scholarly debate on the relationship between the umara and ulama in Saudi Arabia
The Saudi Arabian political system rests on the cooperation between the king and his family and the ulama of the Wahhabi doctrine. This collaboration can be traced back to 1744 when
Muhammad Ibn Saud, emir of the small town of Dar‘iya, met Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi revival movement. They initiated a partnership that eventually, centuries later, inspired to and facilitated the formation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. A more detailed elaboration on this process will be given in chapter Three. For now it is
important to know is that without this alliance, that has been kept alive through the centuries, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia would not exist as it does today.
This collaboration is seen as the most important part of the political system. It is argued that there exists a mutual dependency between the king and the royal family, the umara in Wahhabi political thought, on one side and the ulama on the other side in order to rule the country. In this partnership the ulama provide the umara with the much needed legitimacy as rightful rulers of the holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, as well as the rest of the country. In return for their support the ulama receive status as well as a privileged position within the Saudi society.
The royal family and the ulama find each other in their mutual interest to sustain their partnership. However, they also regularly collide due to their contrasting ideas on the reasonable influence of modernity and the necessary development of society versus maintaining traditional Wahhabi social and religious norms, based on the teachings of Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyya and Abd al-Wahhab. The umara, while in need of the endorsement of the ulama, dislike and reject the ulama’s right to evaluate the ruler’s policies.8 The ulama in return disagree with many of the
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umara’s policies and express their dislike via fatwas and in private meetings.9 Consequently, these differences create tensions that often find their way into the open and put pressure on the cooperative nature of the alliance. The lack of transparency concerning all political aspects of society in Saudi Arabia causes that only a blurred and vague view on the collaboration can be reconstructed. Several academics have attempted to investigate and analyze this relationship between the umara and the ulama and the tensions that come with it. As a result, multiple interpretations of the power distribution between the two partners of the coalition have been formulated.
Al Yassini, in his book, claims that ‘the ulama lost many of their traditional functions and became merely a pressure group limited to exerting influence over the government’s activities and policies, but never act as an autonomous center of power’.10 He sees the discovery of oil as an important push factor in the development of state jurisdiction by the umara over areas not covered by traditional sharia law and fiqh, which in turn led to the formulation of a complex structure of non-sharia administrative and legislative rules and regulations.11 The state produced non-sharia legislation, subsequently resulting in the marginalization of the ulama which led to the dependence of them on the state for their survival.12 Whereas commercial, labor and
international laws amongst others are formulated by non-religious bureaucrats,13 the activities of the ulama became confined to (most of the) criminal, social and religious aspects of the sharia. Al Yassini determines that the state took over religion, and most importantly the clergy, with the purpose to bring religion in line with national interests. He claims that all the activities of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions are pushed to present the Wahhabi principles to coincide with the objectives of the state.14 The habit of legitimizing the activities of the umara by the ulama elaborates the traditional role of evaluating government policies and activities by the religious establishment. However, Al Yassini claims that the independence of these ulama has been reduced to merely non-critical confirmation most notably in the political domain.15
9 Ibid. 10 Ibid: p. 59 11 Ibid: p. 78 12 Ibid 13 Ibid: p. 79 14 Ibid 15 Ibid
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Bligh argues that an important factor in understanding this distribution of power is the internal situation of the ulama. While the cooperation continues, the ulama have undergone an important internal change; the influence of the Al Shaikh family, the family of the Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, has steadily declined.16 In contrast to the royal family, the members of the Al Shaikh family did not marry multiple times and produce a great number of male descendants, and the male offspring did not always succeed their family members as ulama.17 As a result not all of the high ranking state ulama are now members of the Al Shaikh family, a process that started already in the 1930s.18 Another consequence of the low number of children in the Al Shaikh family is the decline of intermarriages between them and the royal family, starting in the 1940s, which weakened the connection, influence and importance of the Al Shaikh family considerably.19 As so, according to Bligh, the once strong pillar of influence of the Al-Shaikh family in the Saudi coalition is gradually disintegrating20 and consequently the influence of the
ulama altogether. Another important influence was the death of the late Grand Mufti Muhammad
bin Ibahim bin ‘Abd al-Latif al Al Shaikh in 1969. His death was not followed by the
appointment of a new Grand Mufti but instead by the creation of the Board of Senior Ulama in 1971.21 It does not necessary follow that with the decline of the Al Shaikh family the influence and power of the ulama declined, too. The Board of Senior Ulama is still the highest religious authority in charge of the interpretation of Islam and the sharia, as well as responsible for producing fatwas for the king and society alike. However, Bligh argues that the king as head of the state has much more political power than the ulama.22 The ulama are still responsible for the legal and the educational systems, even though with the creation of Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Education the umara have taken a large control over these areas as well.23 Bligh further argues that the ulama are well aware of their very limited political power and the necessity to cooperate in order to survive, leading them to always side with whoever is in power.24
16
Bligh, A. (1985) ‘The Saudi religious elite (ulama) a participant in the political system of the kingdom’, in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol 17, no 1, pp.37-50: p. 37
17 Ibid: p. 38 18 Ibid 19 Ibid: p. 38-39 20 Ibid: p. 39 21 Ibid 22 Ibid: p. 40 23 Ibid: p. 43-44 24 Ibid: p. 49
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Kechichian has a different opinion when he says that ‘[R]religious power and authority continue to be exercised by the ulama in tandem with political figures who derive a dose of legitimacy as a result of this cooperation’.25 Although he refers here to the Muslim world in general and claims that this does not apply exclusively to the Saudi case, his argument is that the issuance of legal opinion on the Islamic sources of law (ifta’) reinforces the relationship between the political figures, umara and the ulama, which is strongest in Saudi Arabia. Although he does recognize the tensions between the interests of the umara and the ulama, he still grants the ulama more influence than Bligh does due to the fact that the umara continue to rely on the ulama for support for their policies.26 He is not wrong when claiming that every change introduced to the kingdom since the discovery of oil has been with the consent and approval of the ulama.27 While not blind to the efforts of the royal family to limit the ulama’s influence by, among other things, the establishment of the ministries of education and justice,28 he argues that the ulama are not and have never been dominated by the royal family.29 He assigns the ulama a large amount of influence over the political and social-religious spheres of Saudi society, much more than Bligh and Al Yassini do.
The Saudi state has a theocratic character, according to Layish, and relies for the formulation of law and interpretation of Islam on the ulama. With this they seek religious legitimation, and in addition the state seeks to integrate the ulama into the state system to make them full partners.30 The fatwas of the ulama, especially their political fatwas, are instrumental for the stability of the Saudi state31 and as such the ulama hold a crucial position within Saudi society. However, this does not mean that Layish believes that the ulama have power or influence on the political structure or policies produced by this structure. He notices that the
ulama have become an integral part of the political elite, and as such identify with the state,32
and as a result they will do anything necessary to maintain the cooperation. The umara have cultivated and nourished the relationship by not bypassing them in all matters of state, because
25
Kechichian, J.A. (1986) ‘The role of the ulama in the politics of an Islamic state: the case of Saudi Arabia’ in Int. J. Middle East Studies. Vol 18, no 1, pp. 53-71: p. 53.
26 Ibid: p. 54 27 Ibid: p. 57 28 Ibid: p. 60 29 Ibid: p. 62 30
Layish, A. (1987) ‘Saudi Arabian legal reform as a mechanism to moderate Wahhabi doctrine’ in Journal of the American Oriental Society.Vol. 107, no 2, pp. 279-292: p. 288
31
Ibid: p. 289
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the integration of the religious elite into the state is in their best interest.33 Nonetheless, the
umara have proceeded to develop legislation without the cooperation of the ulama and the sharia
courts, introducing non-sharia codified laws. The ulama have assisted in this by condoning and even sanctioning it as part of the jurisdiction of the umara under the denominator of siyasa
shar’iyya. The sanctioning of these laws by the ulama will backfire, according to Layish,
because they are unconsciously helping to undermine their own place within society. It can be concluded that modern Saudi ulama ‘have ceased to be one of the two foci of power alongside the umara’,34 though they still belong to the political elite and play an important role, especially in times of crises.35 To conclude, Layish sees the importance of the ulama for Saudi political stability but he does not grant them any political power.
Korany bestows all-pervasive influence onto the ulama as he sees them having direct participation in the decision making process.36 As an even larger relevance for their accredited influence, Korany names the effect of the ulama on the social norms by their direct influence onto the political process, their monopoly over the most important ministries and through the Friday sermon.37 Especially through the Friday sermon do the ulama have a public access point to the public in which they can criticize or support certain social practices.38 With this, he argues, the religious establishment bypasses the secular components of society.39 He even goes as far as to say that ‘if the ulama have not managed to monopolize the Saudi government, they have at least created a parallel one’.40 This is clearly a different opinion in comparison to Layish and also to Bligh and Al Yassini.
An outspoken Al-Rasheed claims that the Saudi state ulama have for their own survival, ever since the early nineteenth century, supported political power, which meant a moderation of their religious ideas.41 The Saudi state, controlled by the royal family, made them into an elite class with no more than a ceremonial role42 in exchange for their submission. She argues that even though it may look that way, the Saudi state is not a Wahhabi state at all, as the policies and 33 Ibid 34 Ibid: p. 729 35 Ibid 36 Korany: p. 329 37 Ibid: p. 329-330 38 Ibid: p. 330 39 Ibid: p. 330 40 Ibid: p. 220
41 Al-Rasheed, M. (2007) Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic voices from a new generation. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press: p. 2
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politics are determined by princes and bureaucrats who do not hold Wahhabi religious
convictions as their reference point.43 In her view, the current Saudi government has organized the governing of the country in such a way, that the religious authorities have renounced their influence over political matters: ‘the Wahhabi ‘ulama contributed to the consolidation of a state that is politically secular and socially religious’.44 She sees the state as secular as, she argues, the Saudi state, the umara, govern the country without any religious notions in mind. She goes on to argue that the state left the social norms to be decided by the ulama, giving them total control over the social sphere.45 She thus concludes that the ulama have no political power at all as they left that to the umara, but do determine all social-religious norms in the country.
In an attempt to analyze and understand the bilateral relationship between the umara and
ulama, Al Atawneh introduces the concept of theo-monarchy, which he explains by saying that
the Saudi state ‘draws power from long-standing religio-cultural norms’.46 He proposes this concept using the definition of theocracy from the Catholic Encyclopedia. According to this Encyclopedia, theocracy is a: ‘form of government in which divine power governs on an earthly human state, either in a personal incarnation or, more often, via religious institutional
representatives, replacing or dominating civil government’.47 Al Atawneh thus sees Saudi Arabia as a country where divine power dominates the civil government through the religious
institutional representatives. The legislative system in Saudi Arabia is divided into two parts: one is based on the sharia directly and the other is based on the concept of siyasa (political authority) and they complement each other.48 The decrees issued by the king and the umara, the civil government, are labelled as siyasa, and to make them in accordance with the sharia they need to be supported by religious fatwas.49 As the producers of these fatwas the ulama play a significant role within the social and internal policies and have a significant influence on the content of legislation and political decision.50 Al Atawneh recognizes the Saudi monarchy as a genuine monarchy accommodating Islam51 in search of a compromise between the two equal authorities 43 Ibid 44 Ibid: p. 57 45 Ibid: p. 260 46
Al Atawneh, M. (2009a) ‘Is Saudi Arabia a Theocracy? Religion and Governance in Contemporary Saudi Arabia’ in Middle Eastern Studies vol 45. No 5, pp. 721-737: p. 721
47 New Catholic Encyclopedia in Al Atawned 2009: p.734. 48 Al Atawned 2009a: p. 729-739 49 Ibid: p. 730 50 Ibid: p. 729 51 Ibid: p. 733
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within the Saudi society. In a different article he suggests that the relationship ‘is based on an ongoing compromise between the two sides’,52 presenting it as a perfect balance and equal partnership with stability as its goal.
In addition, in a third article, Al Atawneh clearly shows how the cooperation between the
umara and the state ulama has been successful in opposing other religious groups and
non-religious ideologies such as tribalism, nationalism and secularism.53 They use the concept of
al-wala’ wa’l-bara (allegiance and enmity) for this. The concept of al-wala’ (allegiance) revers to the
obligation to bear allegiance to Muslims only, in contrast to other alliance groups based on tribal lineage.54
Having briefly introduced the above mentioned scholars, it is clear that they come to different conclusions on the nature of the relationship and distribution of power between the
umara and the religious elite of Saudi Arabia. All of the mentioned authors use examples of
historical events in order to support these opinions. The support for the suppression of the Ikhwan movement in 1927, the violent ending of the occupation of the Mosque in Mecca in 1979, the introduction of radio and television as well as Internet, and the admittance of foreign troops on Saudi soil during the first and second Gulf Wars can all be interpreted as either proving the great influence and role the ulama play or rather as the opposite, the total submission of the
ulama to the umara. What is not doubted is the unique and lasting cooperation between the umara and the ulama in Saudi Arabia, in which the ulama give the umara the religious
legitimacy they require in order to rule the country.
The nature of the Saudi state has been named theocratic, it has been called secular, and even the newly coined notion of theo-monarchistic has been attributed to it. These terms are contradictory, which makes it difficult to see how they can still be used in describing the same society. Instead, it is complicated to argue that, having Saudi Arabia as a main research topic, the state is secular as there is no legal or practical separation between religion and state. On the other hand defining it as a theocracy would prove difficult as well. In the Oxford Dictionary the
definition of a theocracy it is a system of government in which priests (religious clergy) rule in the name of God.55 This is not the case in Saudi Arabia where it is clear that the king is the
52 Al Atawneh, M. (2009b) ‘Reconciling tribalism and Islam in the writings of contemporary ‘Ulama’ in Hatina, Meir (ed.)
Guardians of Faith in Modern Times:‘Ulama’ in the Middle East. Leiden: Brill: p 215
53 Ibid: p. 218 54
Ibid
55
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absolute head of the state and ruler of the land. The term theo-monarchy is a new addition but assumes that the state itself holds a religious and cultural identity, which is complicated for obvious reasons. Rather, a refraining from using these western concepts of secularism or theocracy would be more effective as they do not give us any usable knowledge for
understanding Saudi society. Rather Saudi society should be studied using the concepts and notions they themselves use to for the explanation of their political and social system.
One such important concept in Wahhabism regarding politics is the idea that a
government is absolutely necessary for the implementation of Islamic law and that without an Islamic government it would be impossible to maintain the sharia. It is this concept that is used by the Saudi ulama, and particularly state ulama, as an argument to support the umara even when they do not themselves agree with the all the political decisions made.56 As a result every decision of the ulama should be seen in light of this conviction.
Another important notion to use are the activities that the ulama undertake to give this religious support and legitimacy to the umara. This is done by the practicing of ifta’, the issuing of fatwas. Political fatwas are issued by the Grand Mufti and the Board of Senior Ulama in order to support governmental decisions. Traditionally, a fatwa is a non-binding judgement by a mufti written for a specific and unique situation, brought to the attention by an individual and written for that situation and individual only. Thus in theory, a fatwa has only value for the questioner and the related specific situation. Nonetheless, fatwas are being published to a larger audience, and comprise not only fatwas that support political decisions, but also fatwas that are really personal and unique. This is the result of the fact that in Saudi Arabia fatwas have developed into more than just a written judgment; they have become important instruments of political
processes and the imposing of social and religious norms in addition to legal and judicial procedures.57 The fatwas are being used to communicate ideas, knowledge and norms. It is thus of great importance to investigate the way the religious establishment issues fatwas and
communicates these with society at large, and to examine the response to these fatwas by the Saudi society. These fatwas are now being published online and this gives a unique window into the social norms that are being written down and communicated. By researching the
56
Al Yassani: p.79
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Committee’s fatwas and their reception in society a more sophisticated analysis of the relationship between the umara and the ulama can be achieved.
In addition, the application of Internet has an increasing impact on how Muslims practice their religion, how Islam is presented to the world and on the self-representation of Muslim societies.58 Internet offers the opportunity to build networks, to discuss and to acquire knowledge in a way that was not possible before. It creates new communities and movements that operate as a ‘digital civil society’ in addition or in opposition to the ruling regimes.59 As such the Internet is a valid and ever growing source for investigation.
2.2 Methodology
However, when investigating Internet sources and websites certain new issues concerning methodology arise. The medium Internet is still relatively new and so is the scholarly research. One of the issues to deal with is the fact that websites change their content on a regular basis and have no searchable archive available on their webpages. There are webpages that create
archives60 but they rarely save the entire content of the website and rarely every day. It is therefore important to start research by building an archive, by making screen shots, printouts and save HTML pages in Word on a regular basis, in order to record alterations to the websites.61 When having done this, the analysis of the data can begin. Following Bunt this process has two distinctive steps. His methodology at the one hand focuses on the outlook and the management of the website and on the other hand on the content and material that can be found on the website. The first step is thus site observation. As a methodology it targets design, site management and technical features, in addition to ‘deep searching techniques, site tracking analysis and information management’.62 It looks into the way the website was designed and set up and how information is presented and made accessible. The second step is the analyzing of the content. This consists of analyzing design choices, investigation of links to other websites
58
Bunt, G.R. (2009) iMuslims. Rewiring the House of Islam. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press: p. 3
59
Mandaville, P. (2011) ‘Reimagining the ummah? Information technology and the changing boundaries of political Islam,’ in: Frédéric Volpi (ed.), Political Islam; a critical reader, Routledge, London / New York, pp. 331-352; p. 349
60 The website https://archive.org/web/ saves homepages randomly, but not daily and not beyond the homepage, which in the
case of www.alifta.org is the Arabic version and not the English one that was investigated.
61 Bunt 2009: p. 20-22 62
Bunt, G.R. (2011) ‘Religion and the Internet’ in Clarke, P.B. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion. Oxford: University press: p. 717
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and social media, the refresh rates of the content, and then, finally and most importantly, in depth evaluation and analyzing of what is published on the website.63
The research field aiming to investigate the digital world is young and its methodology and interpretive strategies have been argued to be primitive.64 This could pose a problem when using information coming from such research to make statements and draw conclusions.
However, considering the increasing influence of digital communication on the non-digital world it would be impossible to ignore such a vast amount of data. In addition to the methodology developed by Bunt, the source of the data, who wrote and published it, the content, what is communicated, the target group, with whom does the source want to communicate and the objective, why does the source communicate this information, all need to be taken into consideration in order to analyze the impact and influence of the digital world and society.
For the research done in this thesis, an archive was built of the website of the Committee (www.alifta.org) in order to use it for both site observation and content analyses. In addition, a Twitter account, solely for the purpose of keeping up with news and information on Saudi
Arabia, was sustained. Soon it became clear that a selection needed to be made in order to reduce the amount of data to a workable amount that could be processed by one person.65 The result was the limitation of analyzing and comparing the content of the Committee’s website to two English Saudi based news websites, saudigazette.com.sa and www.arabnews.com, both Saudi based and also available in print, and the content of two Saudi non-state ulama fatwa websites, namely www.islamtoday.com and www.fatwa-online.com. A comparison was made between the content of the Committee’s website, the news websites and the fatwa websites.
Before turning to the data and analyses of above mentioned websites, it is necessary to first give a short historic overview of Saudi Arabia and the religious ideology of Wahhabism that supports the state.
63
Ibid
64 Starret, G. (2007) ‘Islam in the digital age: e-jihad, online fatwas, and Cyber Islamic Environments’ (review) in History of
Religions Vol. 46. No 3; pp. 268-271: p. 269.
65
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3. Saudi Arabia, a short introduction
3.1 Foundation and early years
The current ruler of Saudi Arabia is King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, who succeeded his half-brother Adbullah in January 2015. This succession was merely a next step in a longer tradition in which the ruler of the kingdom is a direct descendent of the founder of Saudi Arabia, Abd al-Aziz ibn Adb al-Rahman Al Saud, known as Ibn Saud, who reunited the different regions of the Arabian peninsula except those belonging to the Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Bahrein and the United Arab Emirates. With this unification he secured his family’s legacy as two versions of the kingdom preceded the current one. All three are based on the same ideological cooperation between the Saudi state rulers and the religious class of scholars. This cooperation started when Muhammad Ibn Saud, emir of the small town of Dar‘iya, met Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi revival movement, in 1744. Despite the fact that the first two versions of the kingdom failed to last long, Ibn Saud eventually triumphed by successfully unifying the Najd with the Hijaz, ‘Asir and al-Hasa. This unification laid the foundation for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as we know it today.
The beginning of the unification and rule by Ibn Saud has to be traced back to the eighteenth century when the Arabian Peninsula was part of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman officials did not effectively control the region beyond the Hijaz, the region of Mecca and
Medina, and the pilgrimage routes.66 In effect the remaining parts of Arabia, including the region of Najd, the central part of Arabia, were ruled by local chiefs who enjoyed a large measure of independence and autonomy67 without significant interference of a great emperor or sultan. In this context, in the town of ‘Uyayna, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was born in 1703 in a family of religious scholars. His father, Abd al-Wahhab ibn Sulayman, was a renowned scholar and a follower of the small and shrunken Hanbali school of Sunni Islamic law.68 As a young man Muhammad started to be openly critical of the, in his eyes, polytheistic beliefs and practices of his fellow Muslims.69 By polytheistic beliefs he was referring to the attributing of religious powers to trees and rocks, the adoration of saints and the building and visiting of shrines and tombs of holy figures. He declared them in contradiction with tawhid (monotheism). His
66
Al-Rasheed, M. (2002) A history of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge: University Press: p. 14
67 Ibid: p. 15 68
Al Yassini: p. 23
69
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behavior and opinions angered the ulama in his hometown and he and his family were forced to leave. After this Muhammed traveled to the Hijaz in the west and Basra and Karbala in the east, and the knowledge that he gained there influenced his thinking and further strengthened him in his conviction of the accuracy of his interpretation of tawhid.70
In 1740 the father of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab died and Muhammad, now living in Huraymila with his family, adopted an even more aggressive line which led him to accept the protection of the ruler of ‘Uyayna, Uthman ibn Mu’ammar. When in ‘Uyayna, Uthman ordered the townspeople to accept the teachings of al-Wahhab, this stirred so much resistance from the established ulama that Uthman eventually gave up his alliance with al-Wahhab.71 After his eviction from his town Muhammad took refuge in Dar’iya. Dar’iya was a small settlement in Najd governed by Muhammad ibn Saud from the Al Saud clan. The Al Sauds did not have an established tribal lineage, nor could they rely on extracting surplus from the inhabitants; as a result the authority of the Al Saud did not reach outside of the small settlement.72 However the Al Sauds had ambitions. When al-Wahhab asked for refuge in Dar’iya he had, with his ideology, already gained followers, also amongst the notables, despite resistance from the established religious authority. He was becoming an established force and the Al Sauds offered al-Wahhab protection in return for his support.73 The coalition between the worldly and religious leaders was sealed in 1744 and resulted in the endorsement of Ibn Saud to extent his control outside of the small town of Dar’iya in exchange for the control of all religious interpretation by al-Wahhab.74
The alliance between a worldly leader, Ibn Saud, and a religious leader, al-Wahhab, was instigated by the fact that both parties had ambitions concerning leadership and control, but independently could not realize them. However, combining their strength did muster enough power to effectively increase their control. By declaring jihad (holy war) on their opponents and everyone who did not adhere to their strict interpretation of Islam, they could effectively defeat them.75 Ibn Saud contributed military strength, al-Wahhab the ideological justification for the armed attacks of neighboring towns and villages. The extension of control over other settlements 70 Ibid 71 Ibid: p. 24-25. 72 Al-Rasheed 2002: p. 16 73 Ibid: p. 17 74 Ibid: p. 18 75 Ibid
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was of crucial importance in order to increase the revenues, by collecting zakat (religious tax), and manpower, under the pretense of jihad, lacking in Dar’iya.76 These fighting forces then advanced first to Riyadh and other towns in Najd and were successful due to the fact that the ideology, especially the strict monotheism of al-Wahhab, was welcomed in the already conservative Najd.77 Thereafter the Saudis pushed forward into al-Hasa and the Hijaz. The eastern region of al-Hasa was successfully subdued. The resistance was greater in the west where the Hijazis ruled, but the Saudis successfully defeated them and established their hegemony.78 An attempt to extend this hegemony to Yemen failed, while the ‘Asir region to the north was successfully occupied. Despite the successes in the beginning from 1811 forward, decline set in on the first Saudi state when the Ottoman empire send Muhammad ‘Ali’s troops to end the Saudi’s advance. After seven years, the Ottomans had defeated the Saudi troops and in 1818 the Saudis surrendered after the destruction of Dar’iyah.79 This concluded the existence of the first Saudi state.
The second Saudi state, which started with the capture of Riyadh in 1824, comprised of Riyadh and several towns in the Najd area, and included a reinforcement of Saudi authority in the al-Hasa region.80 It could, however, not be extended into other areas where they had
previously ruled. It was not a particularly strong or large state, but it survived until 1891. In this year Muhammad ibn Rashid expelled the last Saudi ruler of Riyadh, ‘Abd al-Rahman, to Kuwait and took control of the town.81
The declaration of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, the third Saudi state, was preceded by a long period of slow but sure conquest of the current area of Saudi Arabia. From Kuwait, the son of the expelled ‘Abd al-Rahman, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Saud, known as Ibn Saud, started the Saudi’s comeback by recapturing Riyadh in 1902. The two rivals Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid continued their rivalry by holding and extending power over territory. To do so, they both entered into alliances with foreign powers. The former had an agreement with the British and the latter with the Ottomans.82 After the end of the Second World War Ibn Rashid was left weakened as the Ottomans lost the war and were not capable of providing 76 Ibid: p.18-19 77 Ibid: p. 21 78 Ibid 79 Ibid: p. 23 80 Ibid 81 Ibid: p. 39 82 Ibid: p. 41-43
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support anymore.83 After defeating Ibn Rashid, Ibn Saud went on to capture al-Hasa, the Hijaz and the region of ‘Asir, and successfully unified these regions under his rule.84 The British were of crucial importance for the conquest but did prevent expansion into Kuwait and Trans-Jordan, then British protectorates.85 In 1932 Ibn Saud declared his realm the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.86 The cooperation of the two sides of the partnership, between the umara and the ulama, was of crucial importance once again and cannot be underestimated.
3.2 Modernizing influences
Since the establishment of the kingdom, the umara have undertaken multiple attempts to unify and centralize the areas of the country politically and socially in order to strengthen their control over society. The new state absorbed several feudal-tribal groupings and due to centralization the independence of these groups became restricted.87 In order to peacefully unite the different regions that were still functioning under primitive feudal tribes a strict form of religion was reinforced.88 This religion strongly focused on orthodoxy and refraining from innovations. As long as Saudi Arabia remained outside of the sphere of influence of Europe, modernization and capitalism, this was possible. However, it became increasingly difficult not to adapt to external influences which consisted of both technical means (such as radio, television, Internet, motor transport, electrical and military equipment) as well as organizational forms (ministries and departments, centralized army and education system)89 that were produced by European, modern and capitalist models.
As the traditional way of collecting wealth, by raiding neighboring tribes, became unwanted and unsuccessful in the newly founded state90 an alternative source was necessary. At first the regular collection of zakat and the income from the hajj were the most important sources of revenue for the state. The tax-collectors, who gathered the zakat and hajj income, were now working for the umara and became state actors.91 In addition, a centralized army was formed where the emphasize was placed on defending the country from outside powers instead of raiding local tribes. Furthermore, the educational system was modernized by introducing secular 83 Ibid: p. 43 84 Ibid: p. 44-50 85 Ibid: p. 45-50 86 Ibid: p. 71
87 Vassiliev, A, (1998) The History of Saudi Arabia London: Saqi books: p. 287 88 Ibid: p. 287-288 89 Ibid: p. 288 90 Ibid: p. 303 91 Ibid: p. 306
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subjects, such as geography, technical drawing and foreign languages, in addition to religious subjects that were the main focus of education until that time.92 At the same time the first ministries were set up93 which facilitated the further bureaucratization of the state system.
One of the major influencing factors was the discovery of oil and the subsequent oil concessions in the 1920s. Oil became the number one source of income for the Saudi State, especially after the ending of the Second World War. The umara now had large sums of income under their control that were unrelated to religion, in contrast to previous sources of income such as zakat and hajj. Consequently, they felt they had the means to influence the affairs of the country outside of the direct control and approval of the clergy. In the 1940s and 1950s most of the oil revenue was spend on domestic consumption and to enrich the members of the royal family.94 In 1950s, especially after the passing of king Ibn Saud, who towards the end of his life has difficulties tackling the problems facing the kingdom,95 the oil revenue took off and with it the modernization of the country’s political system. Saudi Arabia became a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA).96 Consequently, the country’s financial and economic policy underwent changes to accommodate the global system. In order to do this the king issued decrees in addition to the system of sharia legislation.
With the increase in complexity of ruling the country and overseeing all decisions, the king delegated tasks to state agencies, institutions and individuals.97 From the 1950s, the state grew with new ministries, councils and institutions. This expansion of government institutions, accompanied by royal decrees, increased the jurisdiction of state structures over a larger number of social areas, also those previously under the jurisdiction of the ulama.98 The influence of the
ulama also declined steadily as a result of the increase of general education of the population, the
emergence of administrative state structures, such as the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Da’wa and Guidance, the increase in interaction between Saudis and foreigners and the introduction of modern media such as radio, television and
92 Ibid: p. 310 93 Ibid: p. 310-311 94 Ibid: p. 402 95 Ibid: p. 333 96 Ibid: p. 403 97 Ibid: p. 436 98 Al Yassini: p 67
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Internet. However, the ulama remained a religious force that the umara could not afford to ignore and so they remained in the dual cooperation.
3.3 Religious legitimation
Of crucial importance to understand the relevance of the alliance between the royal family and the ulama in Saudi Arabia is the status of the country as the cradle of Islam. In addition, the country also holds within its borders the two holiest places in Islam, Mecca and Medina, and as a result the country is more than any other identified with Islam. The ruler of the country, the king, is considered, and presents himself, as the custodian of these sites (Khadim al-Haramayn,
servant of the two shrines). Also, the ruler has the obligation to protect the annual hajj and the visiting pilgrims. Other relevant features of the country are that the population is 100% Muslim, as non-Muslims are not allowed to become permanent residents; that the majority of the
population is Sunni, although a minority of Shia live in het Eastern part of the country, that the sharia is officially the law of the land and public life is dominated by the teachings of
Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyya.99 This becomes visible in the green flag inscribed with the sword and the text: ‘There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger’, used by Saudi Arabia.
All these features contribute to the fact that the umara need religious justification in order to secure their position. Such a justification could have been obtained through lineage if the Saudi family would have been descendants of the prophet, his successors or helpers.
Unfortunately for the family this is not the case. This is where the ulama, the religious scholars of Islam, come into the equation. They are the only ones who can provide the king and the royal family, the umara, with legitimacy and support needed to continue with the current situation. Ibn Saud was conscious of this fact since the beginning of his rule. He, from the beginning, focused on consolidating his power by working on this crucial relationship with the religious
establishment. He ordered to have weekly meetings with the ulama in order to inform them and to get their advice regarding innovations.100 These innovations would come quickly, due to the discovery of oil and the oil concession in 1933 to the American company Standard Oil of
California (SOCAL).101 With this concession and the arrival of American employees a great deal of innovations would arrive in Saudi Arabia. Considering the Islamic character of the country,
99 Vogel, F.E. (2000) Islamic law and Legal System. Studies of Saudi Arabia. Leiden: Brill: p. xv. 100
Al-Rasheed 2002: p. 90
101
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and the cooperation that is the basis for the rule of power, it was crucial that the ulama gave their support to the introduction of these innovations. When such innovations were planned to be introduced, the ulama were consulted and had leeway to alter the propositions. One example is the introduction of an income tax in 1960 where the ulama forced the umara to restrict it to foreigners.102 With the introduction of education for girls, the ulama negotiated to be responsible for the curriculum to remain their influence over the content of education (until this
responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of Education). Other innovations that were introduced with religious legitimation by the ulama are cars, television and Internet.
The cooperation between the rulers and the ulama is of great influence on the daily life of the citizens of Saudi Arabia. The ideology of the Saudi religious class was and still is the
Wahhabi interpretation of Islam.103 This very conservative ideology holds distinctive features that separate it from other trends within the Islamic world. These distinctive features will be described in the section below.
3.4 Basic principles of Wahhabism
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab developed divergent theological ideas that at first made him an outcast and forced him to leave his home, but later provided him with a power base and great political influence. The historic background to his thinking consisted of two notions; first the perception that religion in Arabia had developed into the veneration of trees and tombs and other superstitions that were seen as shirk (idolatry) and bid‘a (innovation).104 Second, the political system in the eighteenth century implied that the ulama were depending for their position on the emir of the town they were living in, while the emir was in turn depending on public opinion and therefore limited by it in his choice to support a particular alim (religious scholar).105 This explains why al-Wahhab was expelled from one town, but later, when having won over public opinion, could team up with local chief Ibn Saud.
Al-Wahhab’s main objective was to revive the observance of religion and therefore his actions can be characterized as a revivalist movement of which there have been numerous in Islamic history.106 His stance was that Islam was corrupted and that a return to the original 102 Vasseliev: p. 440 103 Ibid: p. 300 104
Hopwood, D. (1986)‘The Ideological Basis: Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s Muslim Revivalism in Niblock, T (ed.). State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia New York: St. Martin’s press: p. 25
105
Ibid: p. 26
106
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orthodox version of Islam was necessary.107 One crucial fact in his thinking is the complete obedience and submission to God (‘ibada) which implies a rather rigid and unquestioning attitude towards those in power.108
Al-Wahhab’s reforms concentrated on the notions of tawhid (monotheism), tawassul (intercession), takfir (charge of unbelief), bid‘a (innovation), ijtihad (original legal opinion) and
taqlid (blind imitation).109 Tawhid is a central theme that focuses on the restriction of worship to
God alone as a result of his oneness. Consequently it is forbidden to rely on tawassul
(intercession), intercession of trees, rocks and other objects, including the habit of ziyarat
al-qubur, or the visitation of graves and erection of tombs. The purpose of visiting or praying at
graves is to establish this intercession by asking favors of God via intermediators. The
performance of activities that can be seen as interfering with the tawhid of God can lead to takfir. This is the doctrine that being Muslim alone is not a sufficient protection against becoming a polytheist. One must, in addition to refraining from tawassul also refrain from any kind of bid’a. Al-Wahhab considered all that was not prescribed by God bid’a and therefore forbidden. He rejected all forms of innovation that was not based on the Quran, the traditions (hadith) or the authority of the companions of the prophet. He rejected taqlid of interpretations of all madhhabs (school of Islamic jurisprudence) and instead favored ijtihad. He considered it necessary and obligatory to judge each religious question by consulting the Quran and hadiths instead of opinions of previous ulama.
3.5 Wahhabi thought on government
As a result of the Islamic conviction that God’s law comprises every aspect of life, be it religion, social affairs, business, government etc., a separation between state and religion is not possible in an Islamic state.110 However, how to organize this state is not something that has been
formulated in the Quran or the hadiths.111 As a consequence, it was up to the Muslims
themselves to develop workable notions of statehood. In traditional Islamic thought the purpose of government in Islam is to preserve the sharia. The roots of this conviction can be found in history. 107 Ibid: p. 32 108 Ibid: p. 32 109 Al Yassini: p. 26-29 110 Ibid: p 5 111
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From 622 till his death, Muhammad was both the religious and political leader of the Islamic community, which was the ideal situation. After his death the governing of the community, due to the civil war and the disintegration of the lands of Islam, evolved into a situation where the position of the political leader was without the religious authority that the prophet had. Under Abbasid rule (750-1258), gradually a religious authority, a sort of clergy, the
ulama, developed, with specialized religious functions. The ulama claimed to be the sole
interpreters of the sharia, but without the religious authority ascribed to Muhammad.112 In order to meet the qualifications of an Islamic state, where there is no separation of state and religion, a collaboration between the political leader and the religious authority, in this case the ulama, is essential to meet most closely the ideal situation as it existed under Muhammad. What adds to the complexity is the absence of a head of the Islamic clergy, comparable with the pope, who formulates official religious law. The ruler can therefore take up collaboration with any religious scholar or group of scholars.
The view of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was that obedience to the ruler is obligatory, in consonance with Ibn Taymiyya’s principle that religion and state should not be separated, as he ‘was convinced that Islamic duties (...) could not be fulfilled without state power’.113 In his argumentation the state is necessary in order to meet all the obligations of religion and is ‘a doctrinal as well as a practical necessity’.114 He goes even further by
expressing the view that he would prefer the rule of a non-Muslim to disorder and that living one night of rule is better than sixty nights without rule.115 In this line of thought the ideal Islamic state is a cooperation of two holders of authority, namely the ulama, the religious authority, and the umara, the temporal rulers, the umara upholding the Islamic state and the ulama advising the ruler.116
It is important to note here is that according to Ibn Taymiyya the ulama do not constitute a separate clergy and do not enjoy privileges even though they occupy a high place in society; he rather claims that the people of authority are the ulama and the umara together and that the
umara must rule with the advice and cooperation of the ulama.117 According to Ibn Taymiyya
112
Al Yassini: p. 9
113 Ibid 114
Khan, Q. (1973) The political thought of Ibn Taymiyah. Islamabad: Islamic Research institute institute: p. 32
115 Ibid: p. 38 116
Al Yassini: p. 30
117
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there exist two authorities that have to be followed according to their respective responsibility; the ulama in matters of worship and the umara in ‘matters of jihad, al-hudud, and similar acts…’.118
To summarize, the sharia is God’s law which is formulated by the independent ulama. While the umara’s main obligation is to protect and uphold the sharia, they are not allowed to interpret it or rule outside of it. However, how to protect the sharia and how to rule is not
specified, which leaves much leeway to the ruler. In theory the umara and ulama are in an equal relationship where the umara can only rule within the sharia as interpreted by the ulama. In reality the religious authority became part of the state administration and most ulama still are closely aligned to states as a result of their posts of teachers, preachers, judges and administrators in service of state institutions.119 The balance of power is not always clear. This is also the case in Saudi Arabia where the ulama and umara work in close cooperation to maintain the political status quo but there is much debate as to the equality of the relationship (see Chapter Two). One of the tools the ulama have to influence the behavior of both the umara and the citizens of Saudi Arabia is ifta’ This tool is also handled by the independent ulama who, as a result of the growing dispersion of Internet, can spread their ideas easily. Consequently, they have become a growing influence in the relationship between the umara and the ulama in Saudi Arabia.
118
Ibid: p. 139
119 Hatina, M, (2009) ‘Introduction’ in Hatina, M. (ed.) Guardians of Faith in Modern Times: ‘Ulama’ in the Middle East.
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4. Ifta’ in the digital age
4.1 Traditional ifta’
Ifta’, the issuing of fatwas, has been part of the traditional role of the ulama since the beginning
of Islamic history. This role of the ulama, more specifically of the mufti, is to interpret the holy texts of Islam, the Quran and the hadiths, in order to provide Muslims who are unfamiliar with the holy texts to live their lives according to their content.120 In Islam the sharia, the religious law stemming from these texts, is the most important guiding principle on how to live a righteous life.
A fatwa represents an opinion, based on Islamic law, regarding an issue presented to a religious scholar by an individual. A fatwa, issued by a mufti, is a non-binding judgment, in contrast to a legal verdict made by a qadi, issued to clarify what according to the Islamic law is allowed or forbidden in a certain specific situation. A fatwa, issued to the concrete question of a Muslim to a real life human situation, is a practical implementation of the more theoretical aspects of Islamic law such as substantive law (furu ‘al-Fiqh) and legal methodology and jurisprudence (usul al-Fiqh).121
Ifta’ is embedded in rules. The mufti must be known for his piety and good conduct in
addition to his knowledge. He must, when issuing fatwas, not be in a state of anger, hunger or any other state that can influence his opinion. The question must be formulated in a clear fashion, and in the case of a qadi asking, made in general terms. The mufti should also refrain from commenting outside of the scope of the question and if he does not know the answer should state this clearly.122
In the beginning of Islamic history, the issuing of fatwas was a private matter, done by muftis outside of state control123 but later on this changed. Fatwas started to acquire more importance over time, and the practice was supported by collecting fatwas and the development of them into a distinctive literary genre.124 Caliphs and sultans also noticed this and started to contract qualified muftis to serve in their government.125 Already during the rule of the
120
Masud, M.K, Messick, B. Powers, D.S. (1996) ‘Muftis, fatwas, and Islamic Legal Interpretation’ in Masud, M.K, Messick, B. Powers, D.S.(eds) Islamic Legal Interpretation. Muftis and their fatwas. London: Harvard University Press: p. 8
121 Ibid: p. 4 122 Ibid: p. 20-26 123 Ibid: p. 3 124 Ibid: p.10 125 Ibid: p. 9
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Umayyads (661-750 CE) muftis served as legal consultants for qadis and issued fatwas on the request of governors.126
As religious scholars who are experts in Islamic theology and law, ulama are usually trained in established religious madrasas (schools) or universities. Their knowledge, piety and legal work gained them an important role in society as well as much respect and following.127 Ever since the ninth century the ulama have been a distinctive group within Islamic society whose main function has been the interpretation, promoting and passing on of religious knowledge.128 They even, as a special class, acquired religious authority comparable to that wielded by the prophet.129 Although there is no official clergy in Islam, in reality the ulama have developed into a sort of priesthood that holds the first right over religious knowledge130
following the increase of the importance of fatwas. Also, resulting from their positon as qadis and muftis, they bolstered and influenced the content of the law, religious convictions and social norms. As a result, they have always been one of the pillars of the social order.131 The umara were well aware of this influence and integrated the ulama in the state structures early on. Consequently the ulama gained a place of great influence and economic privileges.132 On the other hand were the ulama aware of their need for order to impose their vision on the world and for this they depended on the umara.133 This led them to grow out to be an elite group, that through self-reproduction formed a powerful corps, however not without being in a ‘very intimate dependency on their political patrons’.134 Since the early years of Islamic history, there has been ideological support of the ulama for the umara, for which in exchange the ulama gained a monopoly on ritual and social norms.135 Thus, the relationship between the two groups of actors consisted of a complex intermix of cooperation and dependency.
126
Ibid: p. 9
127
Moubile, N.(2014) The Clerics of Islam. Religious Authority and Political Power in Saudi Arabia. New Haven: Yale University Press: p. 1 128 Ibid: p. 2 129 Musad: p. 7-8, Moubile: p. 1-3 130 Moubile: p. 1-3 131 Hatina: p. 3 132 Ibid 133 Moubile: p. 3 134 Hatina: p. 3 135 Moubile: p. 3
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4.2 Ifta’ in Saudi Arabia
In this light the relationship between the umara and the ulama of Saudi Arabia is not unique. The cooperative nature of their relationship is merely a result of centuries of Islamic history. Just as their predecessors, the Saudi ulama are trained in one of the many religious faculties that have been established over the years. And just as those before them the Saudi ulama have been incorporated into the state system and as a result grew out to be an elite group. To maintain their position they have attempted to gain the privilege to interpret Islamic law and issue fatwas.
What distinguishes the Saudi situation from other Islamic countries is the significant amount of influence the ulama have on society more generally. Nowadays, the religious establishment in other Islamic counties has far less influence as a result of the process of codification of the law in these countries. During the colonial period this codification coincided with the decline of the standing of the ulama on both society and state affairs. This has not been the case in Saudi Arabia. As a result, the influence of the ulama on the law as well as on society and state affairs was and remains considerably larger in Saudi Arabia in comparison to other Islamic nations. Consequently, dar al-Ifta’ plays a significant role in Saudi society, more so than in other Islamic countries. Fatwas are the medium to formulate and communicate political, social and religious norms within Saudi Arabia and this medium is used by both state and non-state
ulama.136 Fatwas are also very suitable to be used in order to adapt sharia law towards modern ideas and give practical solutions for modern times.137
Before 1953 the issuing of fatwas in Saudi Arabia took place informally.138 In 1953 the
King of Saudi Arabia, king ‘Abd al- ‘Aziz Ibn Sa’ud (d. 1953) appointed Shaikh Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim al Al Shaikh, as head of the dar al-Ifta’ and other religious agencies in an attempt to modernize the religious institutions.139 Shaikh Muhammad held these positions until his death in
1969. After the death of this charismatic mufti the then King Faysal did not appoint a successor. Rather he started restructuring the religious corps in response to the challenges posed by
modernity.140 In 1971 he decreed the foundation of two religious institutions: The Board of Senior Ulama (Hay’at Kibar al-Ulama; BSU) and The Permanent Committee for Scientific
136 Al Atawneh, M. (2010) Islam facing the Challenges of Modernity. Dar al-Ifta in the modern Saudi State. Leiden: Brill:p. xiv 137 Ibid: p. xv-xvi 138 Ibid: p. xiii 139 Ibid: p. xiii 140 Ibid: p. xiv
