Master’s Thesis
Euroscepsis: for the few, the many, or the media? – Estonian ethnic groups,
their media diet and Euroscepticism
Piret Pajula
Student ID: 12315532
Graduate School of Communication
Master’s programme Communication Science: Political Communication Supervisor: dr. mr. J.H.P. (Joost) van Spanje
Word Count: 7387 Date of completion: 31-01-2020
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Abstract
Euroscepticism is a common buzzword but also a complex multidimensional concept. Different countries across the European Union have varying levels of Euroscepticism, but does this also apply on the scale of ethnic groups within a member state? The goal of this study was to observe if the ethnic minority group in the country of Estonia has higher levels of negative affection- and identity-based Euroscepticism, and if Russian media consumption increases such attitudes amongst the ethnic Russians. For this purpose, a cross-sectional survey was conducted amongst the ethnic Estonian and ethnic Russian residents of Estonia (N = 165). While there was no recorded difference in negative affection- and identity-based Euroscepticism between the ethnic groups, the ethnic Estonians who consumed more Russian media were more Eurosceptical on the negative affection dimension. The differences in the ethnic groups within a single country deserve more attention including a mixed methods approach when it comes to the subject of media diet within ethnic groups.
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Introduction
While the Western world was baffled by the events in Crimea and the Donbass area of Ukraine in 2014, Estonia looked back on an explosive situation within its own borders in 2007, when the members of the Russian-speaking minority led a violent riot in several cities (Myers, 2007). The Bronze Night brought the otherwise inconspicuous Russian minority roaring to the streets and reminded the native Estonians that up to 25% of the population ("RV0222: Rahvastik soo, rahvuse ja maakonna järgi, 1. jaanuar ", 2017) might not agree with the decisions taken by the popular elected government.
Estonia is a part of the European Union (EU) and carries the obligation to protect its border, since that border is also the perimeter of the single-market area. However, attitude towards such an institution as the EU is not as simplistic as for and against. In recent years, the multidimensionality of Euroscepticism has become the focus of several studies (de Vreese, Azrout & Boomgaarden, 2018; de Vreese, Azrout & Moeller, 2016; Goldberg & de Vreese, 2018) and Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas and de Vreese (2011) have identified five dimensions of Euroscepticism: negative affection, identity, performance, utilitarianism and strengthening. All these dimensions of Euroscepticism have their characteristics, which will be further discussed in the Theoretical background section, but this study at hand will focus on the negative affection and identity subdimensions. These dimensions are more related to the affective, input, community and personal aspects of public opinion towards the EU (Boomgaarden et al., 2011), which could render interesting results between ethnic groups. While national identity, in relation to Euroscepticism, has been the topic of additional studies (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016; McLaren, 2004), it has not been further investigated on the
3 RQ1: To what extent do people in different ethnic groups, within the same country,
differ on negative affection-based and identity-based Euroscepticism?
Turning back to the Estonian example, it has been speculated that in 2007 the Russian Federation used the scarcity of Russian-language news channels in the Estonian public broadcaster, to establish its own news channels and present their perspective of world events ("Avaliku Sõna Nõukogu - Lahendid", 2017). This creates a dangerous situation for the sovereignty and unity of an independent republic.
Unfortunately, these speculations regarding the Russian-minority’s media habits have not been supported by quantitative studies. There is little quantitative research conducted regarding the media diet of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia and even less regarding the content of the channels that reach the Estonian population. As the media landscape changes over time, it is important to keep one’s finger on the pulse of the media diet of all ethnic groups within a country.
RQ2: Are the relationships between ethnic belonging and negative affection-based and identity-based Euroscepticism moderated by the use of foreign media?
While this topic is exemplified from the perspective of Estonia, it is not unique to it. Most EU countries have ethnic minorities and a distinctive history behind it. In a democratic country, it is essential to pay attention to the public opinion and not only in case of the
majority, but also for the ethnic minorities. This study aims to take a step in this direction and hopefully draw attention to the differences in the opinions of the EU within an EU member state.
However, this topic is broader than the EU or its member countries. With the deepening conflict between Israel and Palestine, the Black Lives Matter movement and the painful history of the Republic of South Africa, clashes between ethnic groups are not only an
4 EU issue. Differences in opinions between the ethnic majority and minority groups on any given national matter is a topic, that could have an impact around the world. Going further and searching for the possible influencers of these differences such as media, is a cause worth investing time and resources in.
This study was conducted using a survey to measure the negative affection and
identity aspects of Euroscepticism amongst the Estonian population. The survey also included a quantitative measure for media consumption to provide further information on Estonia’s Russian-speaking minority.
Theoretical background
The focus of this research is ethnic belonging within a member state of the EU and its relation to Euroscepticism; more precisely the negative affection and identity dimensions of Euroscepticism. This relationship could be impacted by people’s media diet, more
specifically the origin country of the consumed media and its possible agenda. The purpose of this chapter is to expand on the relevant previous research on Euroscepticism, ethnic belonging in relation to Euroscepticism and lastly media’s role within these concepts. A conceptual model illustrating the forthcoming hypotheses can be seen in Figure 1.
5 Figure 1 A conceptual model of the hypotheses in this study
Euroscepticism
Public opinion is instrumental to the functioning of the EU, since it is shaped by democratically elected representatives. With the expansion of the union and economic fluctuation (Kuhn & Stoeckel, 2014), the support for the EU is not a given and prevalence of Euroscepticism was only natural. To better understand Euroscepticism, it is important to take a closer look at this concept that has been considered unidimensional: opposition to the EU.
Many authors have maintained a dichotomous definition for Euroscepticism, which can be crudely divided into two aspects: ‘economic’ and ‘emotional’. For example, Hobolt and de Vries (2016) opt for a distinction similar to the economic and emotional aspects with an addition of a ‘translate’ aspect of cue-taking and benchmarking for the public. Hobolt and de Vries (2016) find three dimensions in their literature review: utilitarian (i.e economic), identity (i.e emotional), and cue-taking and benchmarking. They add the latter, which refers to the public’s need for national proxies to elaborate the complex European politics and to
6 provide a moment of comparison of the economic and democratic processes on the national level. Another example of a dichotomous distinction is by McLaren (2002), who
differentiates between attitudes driven by cost/benefit analysis and perceived cultural threat. These revert back to the aforementioned distinction of economic and emotional
Euroscepticism. Also Lindberg and Scheingold’s (1970) utilitarian and affective opinion towards the EU can be viewed as an economic and emotional distinction respectively. This kind of characterization of attitudes towards the EU seems to be salient if it has emerged in many additional works on the topic (Gabel, 1998; Easton, 1975; Kuhn, 2011; Scharpf, 1999).
Boomgaarden and colleagues (2011) take it a step further and distinguish five dimensions of Euroscepticism: negative affection, identity, performance, utilitarianism and strengthening. According to them, the first dimension refers to the emotional fear and threat towards the EU. The second explores the sense of belonging in the EU and pride of being an EU citizen. It also includes feeling close to other European nationalities and symbols such as the European flag. The performance dimension includes EU institution’s decision-making function and overall transparency in the democratic function. The fourth dimension is
utilitarianism, which refers to the country’s support and economic gain from remaining in the union. The utilitarianism dimension also expresses peace-keeping and environmental policies of the EU. Lastly, the fifth dimension relates to the widening of the EU and the depth of its tasks as a decision-making power. Due to the nature of ethnic belonging as a concept, this research will focus on the first two dimensions: negative affection and identity; this connection will also to be addressed in the next subchapter on ethnic belonging.
To better understand these more detailed concepts, Boomgaarden and colleagues (2011) also group the five dimensions as the more utilitarian (performance, utilitarianism and strengthening) and more affective (negative affection and identity). This distinction is
7 this research: the affective trait in Euroscepticism connects more to the second key
characteristic in this study – ethnic belonging – because of the community and people related nature, rather than a cost/effective approach that utilitarian, strengthening and performance dimensions have. Boomgaarden and colleagues (2011) have not only created a more detailed framework for the latent construct of Euroscepticism, but have also compared the
characteristics. Utilitarian, strengthening and performance are all related to governing and power which are central aspects of the EU but tend to touch a citizen less on a perceived individual level. Negative affection is mostly associated to the negative emotions and identity is also deeper than for example monetary stability. Neither aspect needs an opinion nor knowledge on the EU economic policies to be relevant, which is lesser the case in
performance or strengthening dimensions. Negative affection is in fact the only dimension out of the five, that expresses distinctly negative attitudes: to score high on negative affection, means that one is rather more Eurosceptic. It needs to be mentioned that the identity
dimension refers to how much one feels culturally close with other EU countries and to score high on identity expresses unity with the EU on that dimension. This rather counter-intuitive distinction is important to examine the results.
As the literature above suggests, attitude towards the EU is multidimensional and it varies over time (de Vreese, Azrout & Moeller, 2016; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2010). The five dimensions by Boomgaarden and colleagues (2011) were explored by using survey data from the Netherlands but de Vreese, Azrout and Boomgaarden (2018) expanded the research to 21 European countries. This, in turn, showed variance between member countries, but there are less studies on a smaller scale: ethnic groups within the state.
8 Ethnic belonging and Euroscepticism
In the context of the EU, residents of member states can also identify as citizens of Europe. With the broad picture of a unified Europe, it is easy to forget that each member state has its own smaller units of ethnicities due to their unique historical past. The relationship between different ethnic groups in one state can be better understood with the help of social identity theory developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) to explain intergroup behavior. They introduced the interpersonal-intergroup continuum, where on one extreme a person makes decisions based on purely their individual needs ignoring their belonging to a social group and on the other extreme a person makes choices only based on their belonging to a social group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Tajfel and Turner (1979) propose that conflict between groups stems from intergroup favoritism, where individuals try to achieve positive distinctiveness and please their ingroup with preferential treatment. This could help
understand the conflict between people within the same nation state and explain why ethnic groups do not always assimilate over time within a country’s borders. While there are different groups with a different cultural background, they can possibly have a different opinion on the EU. This would remain unnoticed on an aggregate level because usually the ethnic majority’s opinion is recorded as the public opinion. In this study the focus will be on the member state level, where two ethnic groups are compared on their difference on two subdimensions of Euroscepticism.
Even though the literature on differences in attitudes towards the EU within a country is scarce, Theresa Kuhn’s (2011b) transnationalism theory can be employed to elaborate on the role of ethnic groups. Kuhn (2011b) discusses how the European free market and ‘softer’ borders were predicted to bring public support for the union because people get to interact with other nationalities and have more opportunities across the EU. Instead, this has been the case for a small elite while the majority, that does not have the means, only experiences
9 growing economic inequality and a more competitive labor market. Kuhn (2011b) found support for her hypothesis about the ‘winners’ (the benefiting elite) and ‘losers’ (the
majority) of the European project. These results could explain the difference in Eurosceptic attitudes between ethnic groups, since ethnic minorities face more difficulties in finding jobs than the majority (Kahanec, Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2010). Ethnic minorities can in this case be compared to the ‘losers’ even though they do not form the majority. McLaren’s results from 2002 reveal a similar distinction: people, who perceive outgroup cultures as a threat to their way of life, are also more Eurosceptic. To connect the two theories, the ‘losers’ majority described by Kuhn (2011b) can grow to be afraid of the outgroup (the EU in this case), which is threatening their opportunities in the job market. While this combination is not the most intuitive, it is providing a possible explanation to test in a research direction, where there is not a lot of material on attitudes towards the EU amongst ethnic groups. Additionally, building on already existing themes in a previously unexplored way, could be the key to a breakthrough. Unfortunately, both Kuhn and McLaren measure Euroscepticism as a unidimensional concept, which makes it more difficult to further understand the
multidimensionality of Euroscepticism.
As previously discussed, this research will focus on the negative affection and identity dimensions of Euroscepticism. Here, a further elaboration is in order for the choice of
dimensions over utilitarian, strengthening and performance including its relation to ethnic belonging. Firstly, identity-based Euroscepticism also refers to the symbols and closeness to other European nations (Boomgaarden et al., 2011). This makes it an interesting aspect of study, especially, in the case of a non-dominant ethnic group because of their possible higher sensitivity towards identity matters and perhaps split or mixed identity. Secondly, two studies exemplify the close connection of Euroscepticism and identity. Kuhn (2011a) conducted a survey in Germany and France to explore if people living in the border areas are less
10 Eurosceptic than people living further from a national border. She also theorized that this relationship is mediated by goal-oriented and social interactions which can be compared to the previously discussed dichotomous distinction of economic (utilitarian, performance and strengthening) and emotional (negative affection and identity) Euroscepticism respectively. Her results showed that while this border effect was present only in Germany, it was social interaction that was a strong predictor of a more positive attitude towards the EU (Kuhn, 2011a). Meaning, the people who lived in border areas were less Eurosceptic, but mostly because of social interaction with the other EU nationalities and less because of the profit gained from easier access to foreign goods. In relation to this research, it can be theorized that contact with other ethnic identities influences some aspects of Euroscepticism. It is
unfortunate that Kuhn (2011a) did not differentiate between different aspects of Euroscepticism but recorded general support or opposition. While her results show the connection between negative affection and identity aspects of Euroscepticism and ethnic belonging, it is not confirmed if the same effect would occur if the ethnic groups are residing in the same country and competing for the same resources. The second study exemplifying the close connection of (negative affection and identity dimensions of) Euroscepticism and ethnic belonging is Bruter’s (2003) experiment which included the symbols of EU. He distinguished between two types of political identity: civic and cultural (Bruter, 2003). Civic refers to identifying with the EU laws, institutions and governing, while cultural means being more connected to other European nationalities than to non-Europeans (Bruter, 2003). Bruter found that the EU symbols resonate stronger with the cultural aspect of political identity and in this context allows to draw a connection between identity-based Euroscepticism and sense of nationality. This is, in turn, related to ethnic belonging regardless of being the dominant group or not.
11 According to the above, there is a reason to believe that ethnic belonging and the negative affection and identity dimensions of Euroscepticism resonate with both ethnic groups, but to what extent, has not yet been explored. Based on the previous literature
explored in this chapter, it is still reasonable to assume that if the ethnic identity of a minority group is something that differentiates them from the rest of the nation, then one is expected to harbor more negative emotions towards a supranational entity such as the EU.
H1: An ethnic minority group experiences negative affection-based Euroscepticism more than the ethnic majority group.
In a similar way, one can predict that when ethnic identity is a separating factor dividing a nation, then the ethnic majority could be more accepting of a broader identity of a European while for the ethnic minority, it could be another dividing aspect to an already complex identity matter.
H2: An ethnic minority group experiences identity-based Euroscepticism more than the ethnic majority group.
Media and Euroscepticism
Independent of ethnic and national borders, media has crept into almost every home in Europe and has a proven track record of influencing attitudes towards the EU (Bruter, 2003; de Vreese, 2007; van Spanje & de Vreese, 2014; Schuck, Vliegenthart & de Vreese, 2014). While these findings are crucial to understand how these attitudes are formed, the studies tend to have a different focal point and previous research on media in connection with Euroscepticism has not been too varied: van Spanje and de Vreese (2014) and Schuck; Vliegenthart and de Vreese (2014) measured the Eurosceptic votes at the European
Parliament elections and media coverage during the campaign period. Public opinion towards the EU can certainly be measured by election results, but authors also pointed out that the
12 voter turnout in certain countries can be as low as 20 percent (Schuck, Vliegenthart & de Vreese, 2014). This approach is good for drawing general conclusions about the EU, but none of them tap into the more specific attitudes within ethnic groups on a national level.
Lee and Tse (1994) on the other hand, conducted research among the Hong Kong nationals in Canada. The results showed that over time the ethnic minority – Hongkongers – assimilated to the media consumption habits of the Caucasian Canadians. Unfortunately, this research was conducted before the age of Netflix and the media landscape is vastly different in 2020. Also, since the research focused on Canada, it lacks the European perspective necessary to further make conclusions about Euroscepticism. A more recent and relevant working paper expands on a low Euroscepticism ‘pocket’ within an EU nation (on the 31st of January, 2020). Foos and Bischoff (2019) examine a quasi-experiment in the UK where a municipality is considerably less Eurosceptic than its surrounding area. They hypothesize that the main reason behind the phenomenon is that the vocal Eurosceptic newspaper the Daily Mail is not sold in the municipality. Foos and Bischoff’s (2019) paper shows great promise in the field of media effects study, but there remains a need for a quantitatively measured media consumption research in connection with attitudes towards the EU.
It still deserves noting that the extensive works of de Vreese (2007), van Spanje and de Vreese (2014) and Schuck, Vliegenthart and de Vreese (2014) all concluded that while the media effects were present, there were not universal for all individuals and countries. While a definitive answer on media effects is greater than the extent of this study at hand, it is still necessary to capture people’s media diet and examine if it influences Euroscepticism. It is reasonable to assume that people who consume media from different countries also have a difference in opinion on such a union as the EU, especially if one of the countries is in the EU and the other happens to be subjected to sanctions by the EU. The research at hand takes the
13 national approach and focuses on the media habits based on origin country of the media channels.
H3: The relationship between an ethnic minority group and negative affection-based Euroscepticism is stronger for people who consume more media from their origin country.
H4: The relationship between an ethnic minority group and identity-based
Euroscepticism is stronger for people who consume more media from their origin country.
The study at hand will opt for education and age as additional elements. Education has been a predictor in several papers on the topic of Euroscepticism (Carey, 2002; Kuhn, 2011a; Kuhn 2011b, Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007, McLaren, 2002; McLaren, 2004) and the focus for additional studies (Hakhverdian, van Elsas, van der Brug & Kuhn, 2013). If usually the more educated people are less Eurosceptical, then Kunst, Kuhn and van de Werfhorst (2019) did not find such results. They observed if there is a relationship between longer compulsory education and Euroscepticism, but since their results returned mixed and contradictory, then perhaps the key does not lay in compulsory schooling. Nevertheless, the current study will follow the example of several studies before and include education and age to better nest the further analysis.
Methodology
Sample
The survey at hand focused on people who speak Estonian and Russian in Estonia. The overall number of participants was 246 with a dropout rate of 24.39% (60 people). Additionally, one person was excluded due to being underage without consent from a parent. Since the study focused on people living in Estonia, further 18 people were excluded, because they marked their current residence outside of Estonia. With the abovementioned people
14 excluded, the final number of participants was 167 and they were between the ages of 21-80 years (M = 34.90, SD = 10.50) which is younger than the average age of Estonians (40.80 years; "Rahvastiku keskmine vanus ja mediaanvanus elukoha järgi, 31. detsember 2011 - Eesti Statistika", 2012). This number of participants exceeded the minimum goal for subjects, which was 138 cases, calculated with the G*Power tool (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner & Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007). All the participants indicated a gender with the sample being predominantly female (67.70%; N = 113), while in the general population only 52.76% of Estonians are female ("RV021: Rahvastik soo ja vanuserühma järgi, 1. jaanuar", 2019). Education-wise 52.80% of the participants had a higher education (applied sciences, a baccalaureate, or a Master’s degree), which in total is higher than in the
population (35% have a higher education; Servinski, 2019). 31.80% of the subjects had a secondary school diploma (including vocational school), which is less than in the population (45%; Servinski, 2019), meaning the overall sample had a higher level of education than in the population.
Procedure
This cross-sectional study used an online self-report1 survey for data collection2 hosted by the Qualtrics survey environment3. The questionnaire was available in Estonian (appendix A) and Russian (appendix B)4. The ethnic Russians comprise about 25.10% of the population of Estonia ("RV0222: Rahvastik soo, rahvuse ja maakonna järgi, 1. jaanuar ", 2017). To record their responses, four ethnic Russians from the researcher’s network were
1 Only the oldest participant’s (80 years) responses were recorded orally and typed in by the researcher due to
the participant’s poor vision.
2 The convenience sample was gathered from 9th of December 2019 until 6th of January 2020 via social media
site Facebook with three waves of invitations. Facebook was chosen due to its large user count. Two posts with the link to the survey were shared on the researcher’s personal page one week apart (9th of December and 16th
of December) and the third wave on January the 2nd 2020 targeted mainly Russian speaking town’s Facebook
pages (Sillamäe and Narva).
3 The median time it took the participants to fill in the questionnaire was 8.33 minutes. 4 Questionnaire language could be changed at any point in the duration of the study.
15 recruited for a snow-ball sample amongst their network of predominantly Russian-speaking Estonians. This complimented the convenience sampling used to gather the ethnic Estonian’s responses. The number of ethnic Russians in the sample was 37.72% (N = 63) which is higher than in the population. None of the participants received any monetary nor other incentives.
The survey was presented as a questionnaire regarding attitudes towards the EU in Estonia and a battery of Euroscepticism questions were presented right after the active consent form and contact details5. The following block was a table regarding media diet and lastly demographics including first language and a confirming question on the chosen language for the survey. Before launching, the survey was piloted with 12 entries for technical errors and comprehension test6.
Measures
Independent variables
The main independent variable was ethnic belonging (Estonian or Russian), which was determined by the participants’ self-reported first language7. First language was confirmed as an appropriate proxy for ethnic belonging by the question regarding people’s belonging to the nationality and their country: “If you think of yourself as a representative of your nationality and a part of the Estonian people, then where do you see yourself belonging?
5 The email address of the researcher was presented both before the start and at the end of the questionnaire
for comments and complaints. No complaints were received.
6 Those 12 entries were not included to the final dataset.
7 Three people opted to fill out the questionnaire in Estonian while marking Russian as their first language. All
of them were included in the ethnic Russian group since at least one parent was born in Russia/Ukraine and their most frequently spoken language at home was Russian. One participant expressed that both Estonian and Russian are their first languages. Since the participant opted to fill in the questionnaire in Estonian, it was assumed, that they felt more comfortable in the Estonian language space and were considered in the ethnic Estonian’s group. This measure was used following the example of European Social Survey (ESS) since it was also stated in their 2004 report that measuring ethnic identity has to include a component of self-definition and language is in many cases closely related to it (Billiet, 2004).
16 1 stands for “I belong only in my nationality and not at all amongst the Estonian people” and 7 stands for “I belong only amongst the Estonian people and not among my nation”.”8 This question was added following the example of the Estonian Integration Monitoring ("Eesti Ühiskonna Integratsiooni Monitooring 2017", 2017)9.
Dependent variables
The dependent variables in this research are two of the five subdimensions of Euroscepticism: negative affection (M = 2.11, SD = 1.54, Eigenvalue = 5.08; Variance explained = 50.76%; Cronbach’s α = 0.94) and identity (M = 4.35, SD = 1.47; Eigenvalue = 1.29; Variance explained = 12.91%; Cronbach’s α = 0.83). The items were measured on a seven-point Likert scale. The five-item scales were used by Boomgaarden and colleagues (2011) and aside from translation and a random order, the items were not changed. The items for negative affection were “I am afraid of the European Union”, “I am angry about the European Union”, “I am disgusted with the European Union”, “The European Union poses a threat to my identity and culture” and “I feel threatened by the European Union”, where indicating one stands for “Strongly disagree“ and seven stands for “Strongly agree”. The identity subdimension was measured with statements such as “I feel close to fellow
Europeans”, "I am proud to be a European citizen”, “The European flag means a lot to me”, “Being a citizen of the European Union means a lot to me” and “Europeans share a common tradition, culture and history” with identical answer option as for the negative affection construct. The participants did not have the answer option “I don’t know”.
8 The means differed amongst the people, who marked Estonian as their first language (M = 5.43, SD = 1.67), in
comparison to the people who marked Russian as their first language (M = 4.44, SD = 1.43), with ethnic Russians feeling less a part of the Estonian people and more a part of their own nationality. An independent samples T-test also confirmed a statistically significant difference regarding the belonging to the Estonian people in the population, t(165) = 4.10, p < .001, 95% CI [0.51, 1.48], and represents a moderate effect, d = 0.63.
17 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin and Bartlett’s Tests show that the sample size was adequate for a factor analysis (KMO = 0.85, p < .001). Principal axis factoring analysis with Oblique
rotation showed that the 10 items formed two distinct factors as expected. The loadings on the factors are shown in Table 1, with small coefficients under the value of .40 suppressed. The items were then averaged to two values: negative affection and identity. It is worth noting that while these items measure the same latent concept of Euroscepticism, negative affection is coded in a negative frame and identity in positive, meaning that while the means seem to express attitudes on the opposite end of the scales, they are actually expressing a more similar sentiment in the sample.
Table 1 The pattern matrix of a factor analysis shows the loadings negative affection and identity
Item
Neg.
affection Identity
I am afraid of the European Union .89
I am angry about the European Union .86
I am disgusted with the European Union .85 The European Union poses a threat to my identity and culture .84 I feel threatened by the European Union .83
I feel close to fellow Europeans .86
I am proud to be a European citizen .79
The European flag means a lot to me .73
Being a citizen of the European Union means a lot to me .57 Europeans share a common tradition, culture and history .50
Source: own data
Moderator
The moderating variable in this research is the percentage of consumed Russian media (M = 8.69, SD = 19.06) from total media diet (M = 23.10, SD = 27.28) measured in hours.
18 The participants were asked to mark down the average hours on an average week that they usually spend with television, radio, newspaper, online news sites and other mediums such as Netflix. Each medium category was divided in three sections based on the country of
funding/production: Estonian channels (M = 12.57, SD = 15.64), Estonian channels in Russian language (M = 4.66, SD = 15.28) and Russian channels (M = 2.72, SD = 9.95) with some examples of each category to exemplify. For brevity, the overall descriptives of the main media channels used in the case of ethnic Estonian’s can be seen in Table 2 and for ethnic Russians in Table 3. An important distinction here is that the Estonian channels in Russian are usually additions to the major Estonian channels. These Russian-language channels in Estonia are aimed to mirror the main channel’s Estonian content, with a few additional topics that could interest the ethnic Russian community in Estonia. Russian
channels on the other hand are independent from the Estonian channels. The last medium was global media (M = 3.35, SD = 6.92). 16 people marked their total media use as 0. To analyze the moderation effect in people who consume more Russian media, a Russian media score was calculated for each participant. This entailed calculating the percentage of consumed Russian media out of their summed media in hours (M = 8.49, SD = 18.94).
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the consumed media amongst the ethnic Estonians
Media Mean (SD) Min Max N Estonians
Estonian media 17.33 (16.84) 0 80.00 101 Estonian media in
Russian 0.62 (1.92) 0 12.00 19
Russian media 0.35 (1.52) 0 14.00 9
Note: The figures represent hours spent with each media group. Total number of respondents in the ethnic Estonians group was 104.
N Estonians column expresses the number of people, who marked that their hours spent with the
media channel, was greater than 0; choice overlap was possible.
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the consumed media amongst the ethnic Russians
Media Mean (SD) Min Max N Russians
Estonian media 4.39 (8.55) 0 43 38
Estonian media in
Russian 11.37 (23.42) 0 146 45
Russian media 6.64 (15.37) 0 96 31
Note: The figures represent hours spent with each media group. Total number of respondents in the ethnic Russians group was 63.
N Russians column expresses the number of people, who marked that their hours spent with the media
channel, was greater than 0; choice overlap was possible.
Source: own data
Control variables
Further independent variables were age and education. Education is measured with a localized list of 15 education level options available in Estonia, of which the lowest is “Without primary education” and the highest being “Doctorate degree”. For age the participants were able to fill in a numerical answer10.
Additionally, the survey measured the participants’ self-assessed language skills from the example of the Estonian Integration monitoring (2017). People, who opted to fill in the questionnaire in Estonian, were asked about their Russian skills and fillers of the Russian form were asked about their Estonian skills. The language capabilities were measured with 4 items: “I understand speech”, “I know how to read”, “I can communicate myself” and “I know how to write”. The items were measured on a seven-point Likert scale, where
indicating one stands for “Strongly disagree“ and seven stands for “Strongly agree”. These scores were averaged to form a single language skill score.
20 Research design
To study the relationship between ethnic belonging and the Euroscepticism
subdimensions of negative affection and identity, a multiple linear regression analysis was completed with 3 independent variables for main effects. Since the hypotheses state that this relationship is moderated by media diet, then a multiple linear regression provides the most detailed results on predicting the level of Euroscepticism in the population. The statistical analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics software version 25 with Andrew F. Hayes’ extension PROCESS version 3.2.01.
Results
In order to test the hypotheses that there is a difference between ethnic groups and their relationship with negative affection (H1) and identity (H2) subdimensions of
Euroscepticism, while including the control variables of education and age, a multiple regression was conducted. This tested the main effects of this model. The moderation effect by Russian media usage was tested using PROCESS (Hayes, 2018) macro model 1 with 5,000 bootstrap samples. The robustness of the significant result was checked by randomly subsampling 70% of the original sample 10 times and running the analysis on the
subsamples.
Main effects
The total scores of negative affection and identity in the two ethnic groups were not too different with only a 0.01 difference for negative affection and 0.20 difference for identity on a seven-point scale (see Table 4).
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics of dependent variable total scores amongst the ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians
Ethnic group Negative affection Identity
Ethnic Estonians 2.11 (1.58) 4.43 (1.40)
Ethnic Russians 2.12 (1.49) 4.22 (1.58)
Note: Indicators in the table are the means of dimensions and standard deviations are in parentheses.
Source: own data
The analysis resulted non-significant results for H1 showing that there was no difference in negative affection between ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians. The model overall was significant (F(3) = 8.40, p < .001) and the variance in age, education and ethnic belonging does explain 11.80% of the variance in the population, R2 = .12. Although ethnic belonging was not statistically significant, t = 2.40; p = .017; B = 0.10; β = .18. This means that H1 is rejected and there is no relationship in the population.
The only significant variables are age which positively predicts negative affection; t = 2.54; p = .012; B = 0.03; β = .19 and education which shows a negative relationship with negative affection; t = -4.09; p < .001; B = -0.17; β = -.30. The coefficients of the confidence intervals for each variable are in Table 5.
Table 5 Results of multiple linear regression on negative affection as dependent variable
Variable B 95% CI
[LL][UL] SE B β t p
Ethnic Russian -0.01 [-0.47] [0.45] 0.23 -.01 -0.04 .970
Age 0.03 [0.01] [0.05] 0.01 .17 2.54 .012
Education level -0.17 [-0.26] [-0.09] 0.04 -.30 -4.09 .000
Note: ethnic Estonians are coded 0 and ethnic Russians 1.
22 The analysis on the identity variable showed somewhat similar results, which means that H2 is also rejected: there is no observed difference in the relationship between ethnic belonging and the identity subdimension of Euroscepticism in the population. While the whole model was significant, F(3) = 2.89, p = .037, meaning that the variance in age, education and ethnic belonging does explain variance of identity subdimension in the population; the percentage, however, was very small, R2 = .05. This model had one
statistically significant predictor: education, t = 2.40; p = .017; B = 0.10; β = .18. This means that the more formally educated one was, the more they identify with the EU, but this effect was also on the low side. The coefficients can be seen in Table 6.
Table 6 Results of multiple linear regression on identity as dependent variable
Variable B 95% CI
[LL][UL] SE B β t p
Ethnic Russian -0.20 [-0.66] [0.25] 0.23 -.07 -0.87 .377
Age -0.01 [-0.03] [0.08] 0.01 -.09 -1.20 .230
Education level 0.10 [0.02] [0.18] 0.04 .18 2.40 .017
Source: own data
Moderator effect
The whole model for the moderation effect of Russian media on the negative affection dimension of Euroscepticism was statistically significant, F(5, 161) = 6.97; p < .001. Also, the interaction effect was significant with a negative coefficient, B = -0.05; t(161) = -2.82; p = .005, 95% CI [-.09, -.02]. The conditional effects graph of simple slopes showed that this effect is only significant for high consumers of Russian media and the negative coefficient means that this mostly affects ethnic Estonians, who consume higher quantities of Russian media in their media diet. The total number of ethnic Estonian participants, who consumed Russian media was nine. This interaction effect is illustrated in Graph 1. However, these
23 results did not endure the robustness check, with one subsample out of 10 not showing
significant results; this means that H3 is also rejected. One person, out of the nine Estonian consumers of Russian media, reported 14h of Russian media consumption, while the rest ranged from 1h to 4h. Even when the highest consumer (14h) was excluded, the interaction effect was still statistically significant and still showing a higher score on negative affection for ethnic Estonians, who consume higher proportion of Russian media. The effect for medium and low level consumers remained not significant.
Graph 1 Visualization of the Russian media interaction effect on the dependent variable negative affection
Notes: Negative affection was measured on a scale of 1-7 where 1 expressed low levels of negative affection and 7 high levels.
Proportion of Russian media use is expressed in percentage of total media use. The lines represent the different ethnic groups and the coefficients in parentheses mark the predicted increase of negative affection in the population.
24 Lastly, the model for the Russian media consumption’s interaction effect on the relationship between ethnic belonging and the identity subdimension was statistically
significant, F(5, 161) = 2.40; p = .040 but the interaction effect itself was not significant, B = 0.02; t(161) = 1.28; p = .201. This means that also H4 is rejected and Russian media
consumption has no moderating effect on the relationship between ethnic belonging and the identity subdimension of Euroscepticism.
Additionally, an OLS analysis shows that the ethnic Russians’ Estonian language skills have a statistically significant negative relationship with age, F(1, 61) = 14.12; p < .001; B = -0.08; t(61) = -3.76; p < .001 with a moderate effect size, R = .43.
Discussion and conclusions
The study at hand focused on ethnic groups, their differences in dimensions of
Euroscepticism (negative affection and identity) and the role of Russian media as a moderator of that relationship. While there was no observed difference of Euroscepticism dimensions in the ethnic groups, the results of the attitudes towards the EU alone show low levels of
negative affection and above medium levels of identity with the EU. This can be interpreted as support towards the EU on the given dimensions. All the hypotheses established in this study were rejected: there was no recorded difference in the two dimensions (negative affection and identity) of Euroscepticism between the ethnic Russians and ethnic Estonians moderated by the proportion of Russian media use.
Although initially, one hypothesis showed significant results. H3 predicted that ethnic Russians who consume more Russian media, are more Eurosceptical than those who have less Russian channels in their weekly media diet. The results showed that surprisingly the ethnic Estonians whose proportion of Russian media was higher in their total media diet, were more Eurosceptic on the negative affection dimension. Even though the number of
25 Estonians who consumed Russian media was marginal, the results remained when the highest consumer was excluded from the sample. Also, the robustness check showed that one out of 10 subsamples was not significant with a p value of .111. Considering these factors, the results are inconclusive, but certainly interesting. Additionally, this gives base for further research on the ethnic majorities, who consume foreign media, which is often times directed to the minority. While this study does not establish causality due to its cross-sectional
methods, it is still worth testing if perhaps people identifying with the Estonian culture space are more susceptible to the messages intended to the ethnic Russians.
Despite the rejected hypotheses, the control variables of education and age were mostly statistically significant. Education was consistent with previous research (Carey, 2002; Kuhn, 2011a; Kuhn 2011b) and had a decreasing effect on negative affection and an increasing effect on identity. The low coefficient still suggests that higher levels of education have a role in lower levels of Euroscepticism. This has already been seen in studies, such as by Hakhverdian and colleagues (2013) and contradicts the findings by Kunst, Kuhn and van de Werfhorst (2019). Perhaps this further suggests that education and Euroscepticism are negatively linked (in this case on negative affection and identity dimensions) but studying the length of compulsory education might not provide the best reasoning for this relationship. Age increase showed an increase in the negative affection towards the EU, which is
consistent with previous research, when age was only a predictor of Euroscepticism in some models and not in all (Hobolt, van der Brug, de Vreese, Boomgaarden & Hinrichsen, 2011). It could be speculated that older people have higher levels of Euroscepticism, since both Estonia and for example the countries (Ireland and the Netherlands) researched by Hobolt and colleagues (2011) have experienced a history of occupation by foreign forces. This would stay more salient in the minds of people that experienced it firsthand and thus result in a higher level of skepticism towards any foreign alliance as comprehensive as the EU.
26 With all the hypotheses rejected, this study, however, did succeed in smoothly
differentiating between the ethnic Russians and ethnic Estonians. National identity in the Estonian population is a complex matter (Vihalemm & Masso, 2003), but also a prerequisite to the analysis in this study. The combined battery of items used in this research can be a handy tool for future research on the topic of subnational groups in the Baltic region. Every country has a unique national history, but future research would benefit from testing this grouping method for other countries in the Russian near-abroad.
As with any empirical research, the study at hand had its limitations. While the online form supports anonymity and being truthful in one’s answers, the research design itself does not allow to make causal claims on the findings. Another limitation was the recording method for media diet: a surprising amount of people (10%; N = 16) marked their media use as zero, meaning they did not consume any media online, offline nor via any channels. This is difficult to assess, since this survey was distributed online via social media and chat applications. Outliers and typos were also difficult to detect. Regarding sampling, a convenience sample was by far not an ideal method for data collection, due to its
representativeness or rather the questionability of it. Certainly, a more diverse sample with a better balance in sex and area of residence to start with would make the results more
generalizable to the population. Although, it deserves to be mentioned that for example Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman and Freese (2015) found considerable similarities in the results of convenience samples and a representative population-based samples. A convenient student sample they gathered from a university, was statistically significant and did not differ much from the result of a population-based sample. While the research topic and methods differ from the present study (Mullinix and colleagues conducted a survey embedded experiment on the topic of framing), the findings by Mullinix and colleagues (2015) do leave room to
27 Norenzayan’s (2010) White Educated Rich Industrialized and Democratic (WEIRD) sample, which Heinrich and colleagues criticize for not being diverse and helps to form a skewed image in the academia overall. This is only partly an issue within this study, since in Estonia the estimated non-white population is 0.02% (Nael, 2015), albeit the sample was more educated than the population average. Although, when studying ethnic groups in the future, the representativeness of the sample needs to be a priority in more racially diverse countries.
Continuing on the topic of future research, it has become clear that media research is greatly improved by the use of mixed methods. A good example of that is research by de Vreese (2007) where he combined a two-wave survey, content analysis and experimental methods in one research. Since resources for such a multifaceted project are not always available, it is important to see the benefits of combining even content analysis with a self-report survey. While the study at hand did not set out to do a comprehensive analysis of Russian media available in Estonia, such overview would greatly help to contextualize the current findings. A content analysis, focusing on Russian outlets including the channels tailored to the Baltics, would need to determine if there are indeed Eurosceptic frames in both news and entertainment media, since research of frames has resulted in a better understanding of the media landscape within a country (van Spanje, & de Vreese, 2011). Media researches on Euroscepticism have mostly focused on news outlets (de Vreese, 2007; de Vreese, Azrout, Moeller, 2016; Schuck., Vliegenthart & de Vreese, 2014; van Spanje, & de Vreese, 2011), but it would be worth investigating if the Eurosceptic frames are also present in daytime programs. This could help guide further research and determine better if Russian media influences attitudes towards the EU in the context of Estonia. Although, with the ethnic Russians’ improving Estonian skills amongst the youth, perhaps there will not be a market for Russian-language outlets in the future.
28 Looking back at the results, another distinction that could be a good reference point in the future, is current place of residence. In the case of Estonia there could be interesting results in comparing the attitudes of ethnic Russians living in rural areas vs those living in the capital, where there are more job opportunities, since the area with traditionally the highest unemployment rate is also the area with the highest proportion of ethnic Russian residents ("Registreeritud töötus püsib samal tasemel, Ida-Virumaal ei ole enam Eesti kõige kõrgem töötuse määr | Töötukassa", 2018); especially since income has been a significant predictor of EU attitudes in previous studies (Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007; McLaren, 2002). Because of those results, perhaps an income moderator could explain the relationship between ethnic groups. The differences could be economically driven, which was a part of Kuhn’s (2011b) transnationalism theory, as opposed to the difference in media diet.
This study at hand is a steppingstone for further research on the topic of ethnic identity and people’s Euroscepticism on an ethnic group level. This study has its
shortcomings, but despite that, the results show the nuances in the media consumption that have not been explored in the vast research field of Euroscepticism.
29
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35
Appendix A
Start of Block: Intro
Intro1 Tänan Teid osavõtu eest!
See uurimus on osa Amsterdami Ülikooli kommunikatsiooniteaduse programmi
magistritööst. Käesolev uurimustöö keskendub Eestis elavate inimeste suhtumisse Euroopa Liitu.
Küsimustiku täitmine võtab keskmiselt 7 minutit. Te võite igal ajal katkestada küsimustiku täitmise. Küsimustikus pole õigeid ja valesid vastuseid.
Selles uurimuses kogutud andmed on konfidentsiaalsed ning anonüümsed. Vastajate isikut ei ole võimalik hiljem andmearhiivis tuvastada. Kogutud vastuseid kasutatakse vaid
teadustöö raames ning ei jagata kolmandatele osapooltele. Lisainformatsiooni päringud ja küsimused saab saata meiliaadressile piret.pajula@student.uva.nl.
Kui olete nõus uurimuses osalema, siis selle kinnituseks vajutage allolevale märkele ja seejärel edasiviivale noolele.
1. Olen saanud piisavalt informatsiooni käesoleva teadustöö meetodi ja eesmärgi kohta. (1)
End of Block: Intro Start of Block: elukoht
Q42 Mis riigis te hetkel elate? 2. Eestis (1)
3. Venemaal (2)
4. Mujal (3) ________________________________________________
End of Block: elukoht Start of Block: EU
36 EU Kuivõrd Te nõustute järgmiste väidetega? Valige palun üks arv skaalal 1‒7, kus 1
tähendab, et Te ei ole üldse nõus ja 7 tähendab, et olete täiesti nõus.
Ei ole üldse nõus (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Olen täiesti nõus (7) Ma olen Euroopa Liidu pärast vihane (1) 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Euroopa Liit kujutab ohtu mu identiteedile ja kultuurile (2) 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. Euroopa Liidu kodanikuks olemine on mulle tähtis (3) 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. Euroopa Liidu kodanikuks olemine on mulle tähtis (4) 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. Eurooplased jagavad sarnaseid traditsioone, kultuuri ja ühiskonda (5) 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. Euroopa Liit on mulle vastik (6) 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. Euroopa Liidu lipp on mulle tähtis (7) 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. Ma tunnen end lähedasena teiste eurooplastega (8) 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. Mul on uhke olla Euroopa kodanik (9) 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. Ma kardan Euroopa Liitu (10) 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. End of Block: EU Start of Block: Ethn
Con Inimesed võivad tunda erineval määral sidet riigiga, kus nad elavad ja Euroopaga. Kuivõrd te tunnete ennast Eestiga emotsionaalselt seotuna?
37 Valige palun üks arv skaalal 1‒7, kus 1 tähendab, et te ei ole emotsionaalselt üldse seotud, ja 7 tähendab, et olete emotsionaalselt väga seotud.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
()
End of Block: Ethn Start of Block: Ethn2
sun Millises riigis Te olete sündinud?
75. Eestis (praeguse territoriaalse jaotuse järgi) (1) 76. Venemaal (2)
77. Mujal (3) ________________________________________________
Skip To: keel_kod If Millises riigis Te olete sündinud? = Eestis (praeguse territoriaalse jaotuse järgi)
sunb Mis aastal Te asusite esimest korda Eestisse (praeguse territoriaalse jaotuse järgi) elama?
________________________________________________________________
keel_kod Millist keelt Te räägite kodus kõige sagedamini? 78. Eesti (1)
79. Vene (2)
38 isa Millises riigis on Teie isa sündinud?
81. Eestis (1) 82. Venemaal (2)
83. Mujal (3) ________________________________________________ 84. Ma ei tea (4)
85. Eelistan mitte öelda (5)
ema Millises riigis on Teie ema sündinud? 86. Eestis (1)
87. Venemaal (2)
88. Mujal (3) ________________________________________________ 89. Ma ei tea (4)
90. Eelistan mitte öelda (5)
kodum Mis riiki Te peate oma kodumaaks? 91. Eestit (1)
92. Vene Föderatsiooni (2)
93. Muu (3) ________________________________________________ 94. Ma pole kindel (4)
diskr1 Kuivõrd Te tunnete ennast Eestis diskrimineerituna? Valige palun üks arv skaalal 1‒7, kus 1 tähendab, et te ei ole üldse diskrimineeritud ja 7 tähendab, et olete väga
diskrimineeritud.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
()
Skip To: venem1 If Kuivõrd Te tunnete ennast Eestis diskrimineerituna? Valige palun üks arv skaalal 1‒7, kus 1 tähe... <
39 dirkr2 Mille pärast Teid diskrimineeritakse?
1. Nahavärv või rass (1) 2. Rahvus (2) 3. Religioon (3) 4. Keel (4) 5. Etniline grupp (5) 6. Vanus (6) 7. Sugu (7) 8. Seksuaalne orientatsioon (8) 9. Puue (töövõimetus) (9) 10. Muu (10) ________________________________________________
venem1 Olete Te Venemaal elanud/õppinud/sõjaväes käinud või elavad seal Teie sugulased/ tuttavad?
95. Jah (1) 96. Ei (2)
97. Ma ei tea (3)
98. Eelistan mitte öelda (4)
venem2 Kas te saate Venemaalt pensioni või abiraha? 99. Jah (1)
100. Ei (2)
40 venem3 Kuivõrd Te nõustute järgmiste väidetega Venemaa kohta? Valige palun üks arv skaalal 1‒7, kus 1 tähendab, et Te ei ole üldse nõus ja 7 tähendab, et olete täiesti nõus.
Ei ole üldse nõus (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Olen täiesti nõus (7) Venemaa toetab ja aitab venekeelseid inimesi (1) 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. Venemaa esindab minu huve (2) 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. Huvitun vene kultuurist ja väärtustan vene keelt (3) 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. Venemaal asuvad kultuuriväärtused ja kultuuriga seotud paigad (4) 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. Venemaalt on odavam kaupu osta (5) 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. Venemaa on hea paik äritegevuseks (6) 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143.
rahv Eestis elab palju rahvusi, kes kõik kokku moodustavad eesti rahva. Kui mõtlete endast kui oma rahvuse esindajast ja eesti rahva esindajast, siis kelle hulka kuuluvaks Te end peate?
Valige palun üks arv skaalal 1‒7, kus 1 tähendab, et kuulute ainult oma rahvuse ja mitte eesti rahva hulka ning 7 tähendab, et kuulute ainult eesti rahva hulka ja mitte oma rahvuse hulka
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End of Block: Ethn2 Start of Block: Meedia
introM Palun märkige, kui mitu tundi veedate te allolevatel meediakanalitel/programmidel tavalisel nädalal (tundide arvu võib väljendada ka komaga nt 0,5 h). Igal real märkige palun tundide arv antud kanalitel kokku.
41 Antud kanalid on näited. Kui Teie kanal/programm ei ole nimistus, siis palun lisage siiski oma veedetud aeg sellel kanalil. Nt kui vaatate Eesti venekeelset programmi, siis lisage see lahtrisse "Venekeelsed Eesti telekanalid" olenemata, kas kanal on ETV+ või mitte.
Telv Televisioon
_______ Eesti telekanalid: ETV, Kanal 2, TV3, Kanal 11, TV6 (12) _______ Venekeelsed Eesti telekanalid: ETV+ (13)
_______ Vene telekanalid: PBK, NTV Baltic Estonia, TNT and REN-TV, RTR, RTV, Rossija 1, Orsent (14)
Rad Raadio
_______ Eesti raadiokanalid: Kuku, Elmar, Klassikaraadio, Sky+, RetroFM, Uuno, R2, Pereraadio (12)
_______ Venekeelsed Eesti raadiokanalid: Raadio 4, Russkoje Radio, Sky radio, Narodnoje Radio (13)
_______ Vene raadiokanalid: Radio Rossii, Radio Mayak, VestiFM (14)
lehed Ajalehed
_______ Eesti ajalehed: Postimees, Õhtuleht, Päevaleht, Ekspress linnaosalehed (12) _______ Venekeelsed Eesti ajalehed: Stolitsa, Postimees + (13)
_______ Vene ajalehed: Vedomosti, Pravda, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (14)
onl_m Võrguväljaanded
_______ Eesti võrguväljaanded: Delfi, ERR.ee, postimees.ee, Õhtuleht.ee (12) _______ Venekeelsed Eesti võrguväljaanded: rus.delfi.ee, novosti.err.ee (13)
_______ Vene võrguväljaanded: Pravda.ru, RIA Novosti, Gazeta.Ru, Rossiya Segodnya (14)
glo_m Globaalne meedia
_______ Globaalsed uudistekanalid: CNN, BBC, Aljazeera jms (12)
_______ Globaalsete uudistekanalite võrguväljaanded: CNN, BBC, Aljazeera jms (13) _______ Netflix, Disney + jms (14)
42 sotsm Milliseid sotsiaalmeedia keskkondi Te kasutate? (Võib mitu vastutst)
11. Facebook (1) 12. Odnoklassniki (2) 13. VKontakte (3) 14. Twitter (4)
15. Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok jm pildi- ja videojagamiskeskkonnad (5) 16. Muu (6) ________________________________________________ 17. Ei kasuta ühtegi (7)
konta Palun hinnake, kui paljud Teie sotsiaalmeedia kontaktidest on kohalikud venekeelsed elanikud? Valige palun üks arv skaalal 1‒7, kus 1 tähendab, et ükski kontakt pole kohalik venekeelne elanik ja 7 tähendab, et kõik on kohalikud venekeelsed elanikud.
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End of Block: Meedia Start of Block: Demograph
Intro4 Oleme jõudnud viimaste küsimusteni. Tänan, et olete leidnud aega küsimustikku täita.
vanus Vanus _______ (1) sugu Sugu 144. Naine (1) 145. Mees (2) 146. Muu (3)
43 harid Milline on Teie kõrgeim omandanud haridustase?
147. Alghariduseta (alla 4 klassi) (1) 148. Lõpetatud algharidus (4-6 klassi) (2) 149. Kutseõpe ilma alghariduse lõpetamiseta (3) 150. Lõpetatud põhiharidus (7-9 klassi) (4)
151. Kutseharidus põhihariduse baasil õppekava alla 2 aasta (5) 152. Kutseharidus põhihariduse baasil õppekava 2 aastat või enam (6) 153. Kutseharidus koos keskhariduse omandamisega või keskeri-
/tehnikumiharidus pärast põhiharidust (7) 154. Lõpetatud üldkeskharidus (8)
155. Kutseharidus keskhariduse baasil, keskeriharidus või kutsekeskharidus keskhariduse baasil (9)
156. Keskhariduse baasil kutsekõrgkooli, rakenduskõrgkooli diplomiõpe (kuni 2 aastat õpinguid, kuid mitte bakalaureuse kraad (10)
157. Kutsekõrgharidus, rakenduskõrgharidus diplomiõpe või bakalaureus (3-4 aastat õpingud) (11)
158. Ülikooli bakalaureusekraad (3-4 aastat õpinguid) (12) 159. Magistrikraad rakenduskõrgkoolist, kutsekõrgkoolist (13)
160. Magistrikraad (3+2, või 4+2, 5+4 süsteemi järgi, sh integreeritud bakalaureuse- ja magistriõpe), arstiõpe, enne 1992 (14)
161. Doktorikraad (sh kandidaadikraad) (15)
keel Mis on Teie emakeel? 162. eesti keel (1) 163. vene keel (2)
164. muu (3) ________________________________________________
Keel2 Palun täpsustage, kuivõrd Te valdate vene keelt? Valige palun üks arv skaalal 1‒7, kus 1 tähendab, et väide ei käi üldse Teie kohta ja 7 tähendab, et väide käib täiesti Teie
