Commodity structures affecting the SPLA's use of violence against
civilians living in Boma National Park, South Sudan
A Master thesis by Kevin Peters, in candidacy for the degree Master of Science
Graduate School of Social Science
Master thesis Political Science
Civil wars, state-building and displacement
Supervisor: Dr. A.A. Steele
Second reader: Dr. J. Krause
June 2017
Abstract
During the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005) the dominant SPLA insurgency from southern Sudan used violence against civilians from southern Sudan. A scholarly argument is that pre-war ethnic tensions between the Dinka-led SPLA and non-Dinka communities caused this type of violence. There was, however, a variation in the insurgents’ use of violence against civilians in Boma National Park that cannot be primarily attributed to ethnic tensions. Using process tracing, this study examines whether the commodity structure of the communities living in Boma National Park, southern Sudan, influenced the insurgents’ use of violence against these communities. The primary source of data was academic studies. Weinstein’s (2007) theory was assessed and modified to build a theory that tested if various commodity structures could provide an alternative explanation for the SPLA’s use of violence against civilians. This study shows that, partly in line with the theoretical expectations, the insurgents restrained the use of violence against agriculturalists because of their commodity structure. This study also affirms the relevance of gold being part of the commodity structure that could restrain the insurgents from using violence against communities active in artisanal gold mining. A relevant factor is that pastoralists commodity structure does not protect them from the insurgency using violence against them.1
List of contents
Abstract ... I Abbreviations ... III List of Figures, Graphs, and Tables ... III
1. Introduction ... 1
2. Literature review ... 2
3. Theory ... 6
3.1 Violence in resource-rich areas ... 7
3.2 Insurgency using violence against communities ... 7
Communities active in artisanal gold mining ... 8
Agriculturalists ... 9
Pastoralists ... 12
4. Research design ... 13
4.1 Methodology ... 13
4.2 Case selection... 14
4.3 Sources, data collection, and the limitations ... 14
4.4 Operationalization of the variables ... 16
5. Case study... 18
5.1 The scholarly argument on the SPLA’s use of violence against civilians ... 18
5.2 Area description of Boma National Park ... 20
5.3 The communities and their commodity structure in Boma National Park ... 21
Murle Boma ... 23
Murle Maruwa ... 24
Kachipo Bale ... 27
Lining up the livelihood activities ... 29
5.4 The SPLA and SPLM ... 30
SPLA/SPLM governance ... 30
The SPLA’s use of violence against civilians ... 31
6 Analysis and discussion ... 33
6.1 Summary of the case study ... 33
6.2 Analysis and discussion of the case study ... 34
7. Conclusion... 44
Abbreviations
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia GoS Government of Sudan
SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement SSLM Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
List of Figures, Graphs, and Tables
Figure 1. Map of South Sudan and Boma National Park ... 20
Figure 2. Approximate location of where the Murle Maruwa, Murle Boma and Kachipo Bale in Boma National Park live ... 22
Graph 1. Proportional contribution (%) of the sources of livelihood of the Murle Boma ... 24
Graph 2. Proportional contribution (%) of the sources of livelihood of the Murle Maruwa... 26
Graph 3. Proportional contribution (%) of the sources of livelihood of the Kachipo Bale ... 28
Graph 4. Proportional contribution (%) of the sources of pre-war livelihoods of the Murle Boma, Murle Maruwa, and Kachipo Bale ... 29
Graph 5. Proportional contribution (%) of the sources of livelihoods during the war of the Murle Boma, Murle Maruwa and Kachipo Bale ... 29
Table 1. Dependent and independent variable and their indicators ... 18
Table 2. Comparison of firearms used by communities in this study ... 26
Table 3. Violence used against civilians by the SPLA in Boma National Park ... 32
1. Introduction
The level of violence used by insurgents against civilians varies. Some use violence against civilians while others restrain this use of violence to capture state power. 1983 marked the start of the Second Sudanese Civil War which lasted until 2005. A predominant scholarly argument is that ethnic tensions before the war, within southern Sudan, ultimately led to the Dinka-led Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) using violence against non-Dinka civilians from the south (Hutchinson, 2001; Jok & Hutchinson, 1999; Pinaud, 2014; Salam & De Waal, 2001; UCDP, 2017a; Walraet, 2008). Thus, the scholarly argument is that the SPLA used violence against non-Dinka communities based on their ethnicity. This type of violence is discriminate violence. Accepting this scholarly argument may lead to a misunderstanding as to the causes of violence against civilians because this kind of violence cannot be primarily attributed to ethnic tensions. In the case of Boma National Park, the SPLA did not use violence against the agriculturalists Murle Boma but did use violence against the pastoralists Murle Maruwa. The Murle Boma and the Murle Maruwa share the same ethnicity but are part of a different clan and have a different commodity structure. This study takes the commodity structure of communities living in a resource-rich area into account and offers an alternative explanation for the variation in the SPLA’s use of violence against civilians during the Second Sudanese Civil War in Boma National Park. The following research question will be answered: Does the commodity structure of a community affect the insurgents’ use of
violence?
A political economic theory is that the resource richness of an area influences the insurgency’s use of violence against civilians. Weinstein (2007) argues that the insurgency uses high levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians when it operates in resource-rich areas. However, a modification of this theory is made within this study by taking into account the commodity structure of those communities active in gold mining, agriculture, and pastoralism. This study shows that certain commodity structures influence the insurgency’s behavior in a resource-rich area. Thus, depending on the commodity structure of a community, the insurgency in resource-rich areas restrain the use of violence against civilians in some cases whereas in other cases they do not. The underlying mechanisms are outlined within the theory.
A case study of Boma National Park will be presented to test the relevance of the commodity structure of various communities. Boma National Park is a relatively resource-rich area compared to other areas in South Sudan, due to the presence of gold resources, fertile soil that provides grazing land for cattle and makes crops production possible (Ali-Dinar, 1998; Cordaid, 2016; Deng, 2001; Fryxell & Sinclair, 1988). Non-Dinka communities inhabited this area during
producing crops and rearing livestock. The SPLA used violence against the pastoralists Murle Maruwa but did not use violence against the agriculturalists Murle Boma, and agriculturalists Kachipo Bale who were also active in artisanal gold mining. The variety of commodity structures makes it possible to investigate if this contributed to the SPLA’s use of violence against the Murle Maruwa yet restraining the use of violence against the Murle Boma and Kachipo Bale. Territorial control and ethnicity are variables that are kept constant in this study. From 1985, the Boma National Park was under the constant rule of the SPLA, and the village of Pibor was under the rule of the SPLA when the SPLA used violence against civilians, thus keeping territorial control constant. The units of observations that experienced violence from the SPLA are all non-Dinka communities, thus keeping ethnicity constant.
Three reasons form the motivation of this study. Firstly, an academic contribution can be made by improving the literature on the SPLA’s use of violence against civilians during the Second Sudanese Civil War. Secondly, a theoretical contribution can be made by assessing the validity of Weinstein’s (2007) arguments. Thirdly, a social contribution can be made by assessing if certain commodities restrain insurgents from using violence against civilians. It is favorable to provide communities in conflict areas assistance in transforming their commodity structure if certain commodity structures restrain insurgents from using violence against the civilian population.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, the literature review is outlined which provides an overview of Weinstein’s (2007) arguments on the insurgency’s use of violence that derives from the resource richness of an area. Also, a critique on Weinstein’s (2007) arguments will be presented. Second, a theory is provided which explains the effect a community commodity structure has on the insurgents’ use of violence. Third, the study methodology is described. Fourthly, a general introduction of the scholarly arguments on the SPLA use of violence against non-Dinka communities will be outlined together with a case study presentation of the Boma National Park. Fifth, the case study will be analyzed and the significance of the results will be discussed. Sixth, a conclusion will be provided, and the research question will be answered.
2. Literature review
A number of academics have broadly studied the use of violence against civilians for many years. As previously mentioned, the predominant scholarly argument is that the social divisions and cleavages within southern Sudan led to the SPLA using violence against non-Dinka communities (Hutchinson, 2001; Jok & Hutchinson, 1999; Pinaud, 2014; Salam & De Waal, 2001; UCDP, 2017a; Walraet, 2008). In other words, the SPLA used discriminate violence against non-Dinka civilians,
a variation in the use of violence against non-Dinka communities in Boma National Park. Boma National Park is a relatively resource-rich area (Ali-Dinar, 1998; Cordaid, 2016; Deng, 2001; Fryxell & Sinclair, 1988). An influential study that tries to explain such variation based on the resource richness of an area is the work of Weinstein (2007). Weinstein (2007) theorized and analyzed the differences in patterns of violence and argued that the resource richness of an area attracts certain individuals to the insurgency that influence the strategies, and thus the use of violence, the rebel leader can use to organize the rebel organization. Weinstein (2007) argues that insurgents in resource-rich areas use high levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians living in this area. This theory could provide an alternative explanation for the SPLA’s use of violence against civilians, and for this reason, Weinstein’s (2007) arguments form the basis for this literature review. Below the concept of violence will be explained. Subsequently, Weinstein’s (2007) arguments will be outlined.
Concept of violence
For the purpose of clarity, the concept of violence that Weinstein (2007) uses needs to be explained. Weinstein (2007) separates violence used regarding lethal and non-lethal violence. Non-lethal violence is an act of violence that does not result in death. Lethal violence specifically relates to homicide incidents. A limitation in Weinstein’s (2007) work is that he does not specify the use of lethal and non-lethal violence. For example, Weinstein (2007) does not explain what type of lethal or non-lethal violence is used by insurgents. For this reason, this study takes into account all the kinds of violence that the SPLA used against civilians. I will claim in the theory section that non-lethal and non-lethal violence is not equivalent but that insurgents would use higher levels of non-non-lethal violence than lethal violence against civilians to obtain material rewards in resource-rich areas. Furthermore, Weinstein (2007) makes a distinction in indiscriminate and selective violence. Weinstein’s (2007) expectations, for the insurgency's use of indiscriminate or selective violence against civilians based on the resource richness of an area, is further explained below. The expectations for the insurgency’s use of violence against civilians, based on the commodity structure of a community, is further outlined in the theory section.
Resource-rich areas
Weinstein (2007) argues that insurgents in resource-rich areas commit high levels of indiscriminate, lethal and non-lethal, violence against civilians. He provides the following insight. Recruiting individuals that are willing to participate in civil war is not easy. Being part of an insurgency is dangerous and challenging work. Also, rebels that find ways to capture the power of the political
regime in a country find it hard to exclude nonparticipants from the new freedoms that come with the political change. For this reason, the potential costs for individuals to participate in the insurgency are high and therefore joining the rebellion is undesirable.
It is the task for the rebel leaders to develop incentives for people to take part in the insurgency’s high-risk collective actions. The recruitment strategies depend largely on the available incentives that motivate individuals to participate in the rebellion. Access to economic resources can transform their endowments into selective incentives for individuals to participate. A resource-rich area provides such financial resources for the insurgency. The recruiters generally do not have access to the much-needed information on the level of commitment of individuals. The insurgency that has access to economic resources attract low-committed individuals that are only seeking short-term gains from participation. The rebel leaders then have difficulties in designing the insurgency and engaging with civilians. The insurgency depends on the civilians living in the resource-rich area for extracting the resources. Using violence against them would destroy their base of civilian support. However, rebel leaders appear powerless to discipline the low-committed individuals and therefore could not restrain the use of force in support of the rebel group’s social purposes. The lack of control within the insurgency weakens their organization.
The constant demand for short-term rewards drives the insurgents towards indiscriminate acts of violence such as looting, property destruction, and attacks on civilians. Weinstein (2007) therefore argues that insurgencies in resource-rich areas use high levels of indiscriminate, lethal and non-lethal, violence against civilians to obtain short-term rewards.
Resource-poor areas
Weinstein (2007) argues that insurgents in resource-poor areas use selective, most lethal, violence against the civilian population. A resource-poor area does not provide the insurgency with financial endowments. Other strategies are used to recruit individuals for the insurgency.
Recruiters promise individuals material and collective benefits with an eventual rebel victory. However, these promises are only credible where the insurgency draw on social endowments that link the individuals and the insurgency by ethnicity, religion, or ideology. People that join the insurgency, based on such promises, are dedicated to the cause of the insurgency and are prepared to make investments for the promise of rewards in the future. Rebel leaders can control the group having the capacity to discipline the behavior of the insurgents when it involves dedicated individuals. Civilians living in the area where the insurgency operates have a better expectation of the group’s behavior. This makes it easier for the insurgency to make social and
political connections with the population, in turn strengthening the relationship with the population.
A better relationship with the population enables the insurgency to use violence more selectively and strategically, as the insurgency finds it easier to identify targets. Weinstein (2007) therefore argues that insurgencies in resource-poor areas use selective, most lethal, violence against civilians.
Critique
A critique on Weinstein’s (2007) arguments has been leveled by Gutiérrez Sanín (2008). Gutiérrez Sanín (2008) argues that the resource richness of an area cannot explain the behavior of the insurgency. Gutiérrez Sanín (2008) presents the case of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia (FARC) and the paramilitary in Colombia. The FARC and paramilitary both operated in
the same resource-rich environment, profiting from similar financial bases, but differ as an organization and used violence differently. For example, the FARC makes more use of kidnapping and massacres less than the paramilitary (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2008).
This critique can be leveled by taking the nature of the revenue management system of the insurgency into account. Weinstein (2007) did argue that the FARC’s centralized revenue management system resisted most of their rank-and-file from becoming interested in seeking to obtain material rewards. Thus, the use of violence does not primarily depend on the resource richness of an area. For this reason, using Weinstein’s (2007) theory for explaining the variation in the SPLA’s use of violence against civilians is justifiable, especially when the nature of the revenue management system of the insurgency is taken into account. Insight is provided below that explains the effect of a revenue management system on the structure of the insurgency.
It is possible that the organizational structure of the insurgency can change during a war. Weinstein (2007) finds that economic resource shocks play a major role in this structural change. Weinstein (2007) introduces two counter cases, the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and the FARC. In the case of the UNITA, Weinstein (2007) argues that the revenue boom made within the diamond industry transformed the structure of the UNITA. A significant number of the individuals within the UNITA sought to benefit from material rewards whenever these became available and as a consequence individuals became less committed to the UNITA’s social purposes. As a result, the UNITA became more violent. In contrast, the boom of coca and poppy cultivation in the early 1980s, that began to arise in FARC control areas, did not lead to the transformation of the FARC. The FARC resisted most of its rank and file from gaining an interest in seeking to obtain material rewards. Weinstein (2007) argues that the nature of the revenue
management system plays a crucial role. Whereas the UNITA led a decentralized revenue management system when it gained significant income from the diamond sector. This management system did not prevent that individuals within the insurgency became active in obtaining material rewards. In contrast, the FARC operated a centralized revenue management system. This enabled them to resist organizational transformation. In turn, the FARC could prevent that individuals within the insurgency started to lose interest in the group’s social purposes to obtain material rewards (Weinstein, 2007).
In summary, these counter cases indicate that the nature of the revenue management system is essential. In the case of the FARC, a centralized revenue management system prevented individuals losing interest in the insurgency’s social purposes. In the case of UNITA, a decentralized revenue management system led to the transformation of the insurgency, as individuals started to obtain material rewards.
3. Theory
As outlined in the literature review, the resource richness of an area influences the insurgency and its use of violence against civilians. In this chapter, a theory is constructed that seeks to refine Weinstein’s (2007) arguments. I argue that there should be a variation in the use of violence in a resource-rich area that derives from the ability of insurgents to receive benefit through the acquisition of community commodities. Several hypotheses will be formed based on the commodity structure of a community. The case study of the resource-rich area of Boma National Park provides an insight in the commodity structure of agriculturalists and pastoralists and the SPLA’s use of violence against these communities. There is a further divide examining the agriculturalists in this study; agriculturalists that are active in artisanal gold mining and agriculturalists that are not active in artisanal gold mining. Examining agriculturalists and pastoralists shows that the insurgency will vary the use of violence to acquire different specific commodities. There are underlying mechanisms that connect the commodity structure of a community to the occurrence of the use of violence against civilians. These underlying mechanisms are explained separately in the following parts of the theory section.
3.1 Violence in resource-rich areas
As outlined in the literature review, Weinstein (2007) argues that insurgents in resource-rich areas commit high levels of lethal and non-lethal violence, indiscriminately against civilians. Following this argument, the next hypothesis will be tested:
Hypothesis 1: Insurgents use high levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians living in
resource-rich areas
3.2 Insurgency using violence against communities
The literature review provides insight on why insurgents would use high levels of indiscriminate lethal and non-lethal violence against civilians in resource-rich areas, i.e. randomly; without careful judgment. The constant demand for short-term rewards within the insurgency would lead the insurgency to use this type of violence. However, I argue that even within a resource-rich area there should be a variation in the use of violence against civilians. Communities have various commodity structures. Some commodities are easy to obtain for the insurgency, whereas other commodities are hard to obtain. I argue that certain communities have a commodity structure that would lead the insurgency to restrain the use of violence because violence would result in fewer rewards for the insurgency to obtain or even a total loss of rewards. I will provide a theory below on why the insurgency would restrain the use of violence against communities that have gold in their commodity structure and partly against communities that are agriculturalists. In contrast, there are fewer incentives to restrain the use of violence against communities that have a livelihood of pastoralism.
A single community can have a variety of livelihood activities and therefore a distinct commodity structure. However, some communities are predominantly active in agriculture production and therefore grouped as agriculturalists. Other communities are, for example, predominately active in herding livestock and therefore grouped as pastoralists. I will provide hypotheses based on the commodity structure of a community.
For the purpose of clarity, the dependent variable in this study is the use of violence against civilians. The independent variable in this study is the commodity structure of a community. As previously mentioned, Weinstein (2007) does not specify in which situation the insurgency uses high levels of lethal or high levels of non-lethal violence indiscriminately in resource-rich areas. Weinstein (2007) argues that they use both indiscriminately to obtain short-term rewards. It seems that non-lethal violence is equivalent to lethal violence for Weinstein (2007). I claim these are not equivalent but that insurgents would generally use higher levels of non-lethal violence than lethal
violence against civilians to obtain material rewards in resource-rich areas. Following Weinstein’s (2007) arguments, individuals that join the insurgency in resource-rich areas are low-committed and are mainly interested in obtaining material rewards. Lethal violence is a more severe act of violence than non-lethal violence because using non-lethal violence does not result in death and lethal violence results in death. Therefore, I claim that if these low-committed individuals can choose between using non-lethal or lethal violence against civilians for obtaining material rewards they generally would use non-lethal violence.
There is only one exception. I argue that the insurgency in resource-rich areas would use both high levels of indiscriminate lethal and non-lethal violence against pastoralists, i.e. there is not a significant difference in the use of lethal or non-lethal violence. Weinstein (2007) does not explain the severity of such violence. I expect this to be constant violence against a significant amount of people performed throughout a longer period. The particular case of pastoralists is further explained in the theory section. Furthermore, I will test my claims in the analysis.
Communities active in artisanal gold mining
One of my arguments is that insurgents in resource-rich areas would restrain the use of violence against communities that are active in artisanal gold mining. I refine Weinstein’s (2007) theory by building on Sanchez de la Sierra’s (2017) theory.
Gold as a commodity has a high value to weight and is therefore easy to conceal for artisanal gold miners. This makes it hard for the insurgency to obtain the output of gold at the location where the output is produced, i.e. the artisanal gold mine or at the river where gold is panned (Sanchez de la Sierra, 2017). Efficiently obtaining revenues from the gold production can be done by investing in the fiscal and legal administration, by which I am referring to a governmental institution, of the area where artisanal gold miners live with their family and spend their income. Sanchez de la Sierra (2017) finds that these investments were made to obtain revenues efficiently from gold production in the case of Eastern Congo where non-state actors formed a monopoly of violence. While it would be easier for the insurgency to tax the wealth and consumption of artisanal gold miners, such taxes are more easily avoided by shifting economic activity in particular for gold mining that takes place along rivers.
Reducing tax evasion requires a different taxation method. Sanchez de la Sierra (2017) finds that several forms of taxation are implemented that makes it difficult to avoid tax levied upon communities active in gold mining. Poll tax, mining output tax, agricultural tax, the collection of fees on private actors profiting from public poverty, transit taxes, and turnover tax on business are implemented in the areas where artisanal gold miners live to generate tax revenues efficiently. Order
is essential to make these forms of taxations work. Sanchez de la Sierra (2017) also finds that the administrators within communities that are active in gold mining create a system of law to achieve such order. For example, sexual offenders, tax evaders, spies, and thieves were sanctioned in the villages where the communities active in gold mining lived and spend their income. Furthermore, obtaining popular support for sustaining its rule is necessary for the monopoly of violence. Building a relationship with the population made it possible for non-state actors that formed a monopoly of violence in Eastern Congo to maintain such an extensive taxation system. Sanchez de la Sierra (2017) finds in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) that the leadership of the insurgency managed the relationship with the civilians by creating tax agencies in the area where communities active in gold mining lived. Thus, gold is not easy to obtain, and revenues from gold production could be obtained by the investments made in the fiscal and legal administration.
Following Weinstein’s (2007) arguments, insurgents would use high levels of indiscriminate, lethal and non-lethal, violence against civilians active in artisanal gold mining to meet the demand for short-term rewards. As previously explained, gold is a commodity that is easy to conceal and therefore it would not be easy for insurgents to obtain short-term rewards, i.e. obtaining commodities. An alternative approach was preferred in the case of the DRC to generate revenues; by investing in the fiscal and legal administration of the areas where communities active in artisanal gold mining live and spend their income. Using violence against communities active in artisanal mining would not be rational, as violence would lead to a loss of tax revenues that are otherwise effectively obtained with the method of building a fiscal and legal administration. Thus, the underlying mechanism provided is that investments made in the fiscal and legal administrations restrain the insurgency from using indiscriminate against civilians. In the context of this study, the Kachipo Bale are agriculturalists but also active in gold mining in Boma National Park. I argue that insurgents would restrain the use of violence against communities active in artisanal gold mining. Following these arguments, the next hypothesis will be tested:
Hypothesis 2: Insurgents restrain the use of violence against those communities in resource-rich areas that are active in artisanal gold mining
Agriculturalists
I argue that insurgents would generally restrain the use of violence against communities that are predominantly active in agriculture in resource-rich areas. If the insurgency would use violence against the agriculturalists, I expect this to be during the harvesting season. The same underlying mechanism is provided that would restrain the use of violence against agriculturalists compared to
communities active in artisanal gold mining. The mechanism provided that makes the insurgency to use violence against agriculturalists during the harvesting season follows from the combination of Weinstein’s (2007) arguments and my claim on the insurgency’s use of violence.
The agriculture sector is highly sensitive to disruption. Cultivating soil and producing crops requires long and stable seasons (Straus, 2012). Therefore, Straus (2012) argues that insurgents would use nonviolent measures to secure order in an area where agriculturalists live. Straus (2012) does not specify what kind of nonviolent measures insurgents would use. Insurgents that use high levels of indiscriminate violence against agriculturalists would disrupt the process of cultivating the soil and producing crops. Thus, violence would lead to less, or even destroy, agricultural production and therefore the output, i.e. commodities, that could be obtained by the insurgency. Restraining the use of violence against agriculturalists and investing in a taxation system would be more fiscally beneficial for the insurgency, as there are more material rewards for the rebellion to obtain with this method of extraction.
In the context of this study, agriculturalists are living in Boma National Park. Boma National Park is a resource-rich area because a gold belt runs through the park and the soil is suitable for livestock herding and for producing crops (Ali-Dinar, 1998; Birdlife International, 2001; Deng, 2001; Cordaid, 2016). Following Weinstein’s (2007) arguments, the insurgency there would have consisted of low-committed individuals. These low-committed individuals would have used high levels of indiscriminate non-lethal violence against agriculturalists to obtain short-term rewards. Also, these individuals would have used indiscriminate lethal violence against agriculturalists but on a lower level compared to non-lethal violence, based on my claim that insurgents would generally use higher levels of indiscriminate non-lethal violence than lethal violence.
There is a variation in the availability of short-term rewards in the case of agricultural production. As Straus (2012) points out, agricultural production requires long and stable seasons. Insurgents could gain short-term rewards in the harvesting season, as the predominant commodity agriculturalist produce, i.e. crops, is available in this period. Therefore, I expect that if the insurgency uses violence against agriculturalists, they will use indiscriminate violence during the harvesting season to obtain material rewards. Following my claim on the use of violence, I also expect that the insurgency would use a higher level of indiscriminate non-lethal violence than indiscriminate lethal violence.
In other seasons the material rewards available from agricultural production are low. The primary commodities, i.e. crops, are not ready to be obtained during the sowing, growing and weeding season. In Boma National Park this part of the agricultural production takes a minimum
of seven months (FEWS, 2013). Violence used against agriculturalists during these seven months would disrupt agricultural production and therefore material rewards that the insurgency could gain in the harvesting season. It would, therefore, be logical for the insurgency operating in a resource-rich area to restrain the use of violence against agriculturalists during these seven months. As previously explained, investing in the administration would be a more efficient method for collecting material rewards. Therefore, I expect that the insurgency invests in the administration of where agriculturalists live and spend their income. Using violence in the harvesting season to obtain material rewards would not be rational for the insurgency when it invested in the administration of where agriculturalists live. Violence would disrupt future agricultural production and therefore reduced tax revenues. Therefore, I argue that the insurgency in a resource-rich area would generally restrain the use of violence against agriculturalists.
The underlying mechanisms provided in this section are twofold because I will test two hypotheses concerning the use of indiscriminate violence against agriculturalists during the harvesting season and one hypothesis concerning the insurgency restraining violence against agriculturalists. The first mechanism provided for hypotheses 3 and 4 is that the insurgency in resource-rich areas consists of low-committed individuals that want to obtain short-term rewards. These individuals use higher levels of indiscriminate non-lethal violence than indiscriminate lethal violence against agriculturalists during the harvesting season to collect the crops available.
The mechanism provided for hypothesis 5 is that the different seasons of agricultural production influence the availability of material rewards for the insurgency to obtain. Investing in the administration is a more efficient method for obtaining rewards. In turn, insurgents would restrain the use of violence against agriculturalists in resource-rich areas. Following this theory, the next hypotheses will be tested:
Hypothesis 3: Insurgents use high levels of indiscriminate violence against agriculturalists during
the harvesting season in a resource-rich area
Hypothesis 4: Insurgents use higher levels of indiscriminate non-lethal violence than
indiscriminate lethal violence against agriculturalists during the harvesting season in resource-rich areas
Pastoralists
In contrast to communities active in gold mining and agriculturalists, I argue that insurgents would employ high levels of indiscriminate non-lethal and lethal violence against pastoralists in resource-rich areas. The underlying mechanism derives from Weinstein’s (2007) arguments. The mechanisms that restrain the insurgency from using violence against communities active in gold mining and partly against agriculturalists is not present in the case of pastoralists.
The requirement for pastoralist production in sub-Saharan Africa is generally livestock, labor, and access to key grazing and water resources (Homewood, Trench & Brockington, 2012). Another important feature of a pastoralist livelihood is the use of guns. Leff (2009) points out why pastoralists in the Greater Horn of Africa actively use firearms: “… First, they need to protect their family and livestock from warriors of other tribes and bandits. Second, guns are used to raid livestock from other communities. Lastly, guns are an investment that can be traded for livestock and other commercial goods.” (p. 194). Short-term rewards are easy to obtain for the insurgency by stealing the pastoralists’ primary commodity of reliance as a source of livelihood, i.e. livestock. The sensitivity of a pastoralists livelihood to violence can be deduced from their harsh existence (Leff, 2009).
Previously I have claimed that insurgents would generally use higher levels of non-lethal violence than lethal violence against civilians to obtain material rewards in resource-rich areas. However, in the case of pastoralists, I restate my claim. I argue that the insurgency would use both high levels of indiscriminate non-lethal and lethal violence against pastoralists, i.e. there no difference in the use of non-lethal or lethal violence against civilians. The insurgents using indiscriminate non-lethal violence against pastoralists could lead to the pastoralists using their firearms to protect their community and livestock. Therefore, I expect that the insurgency would use both high levels of indiscriminate lethal and non-lethal violence against pastoralists.
Pastoralists are living in Boma National Park. As mentioned previously, Boma National Park is a resource-rich area. Following Weinstein’s (2007) arguments and my claim on the use of violence, insurgents would use high levels of indiscriminate lethal and non-lethal violence against pastoralists in Boma National Park. There are fewer restraints for rebels to use violence against pastoralists. In contrast to communities active in gold mining, I argue that livestock is not easy to conceal and therefore investing in the fiscal and legal administration is not necessary for obtaining short-term rewards more efficiently. In contrast to agriculturalists, I argue that there are no seasons that influence the availability of livestock and therefore the short-term rewards for the insurgency to obtain. Thus, the underlying mechanism derives from the combination of Weinstein’s (2007) arguments and my arguments on the use of violence, i.e. the resource-rich area would have attracted
low-committed individuals that use high levels of indiscriminate lethal and non-lethal violence against pastoralists to obtain livestock. Following these arguments, the next hypothesis will be tested:
Hypothesis 6: Insurgents use high levels of indiscriminate lethal and non-lethal violence against pastoralists in resource-rich areas
4. Research design
The research design can now be outlined based on the hypotheses specified. Firstly, the methodology used in this study will be discussed. Secondly, an explanation of the justification for the use of the case study of Boma National Park will be given. Thirdly, the sources and data collection of this study and its limitations will be provided. Fourthly, the operationalization of the variables will be discussed, and the research question will be restated.
4.1 Methodology
Answering the research question will be done by conducting a qualitative analysis consisting of a within-unit case study. This type of qualitative research is thoroughly described by Gerring (2004). The within-unit case study makes it possible to analyze for a variation of this study’s cases that lie at the mesolevel, i.e. Boma National Park in this study (Gerring, 2004). The units of observation are the SPLA, the SPLA’s governing unit, i.e. the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), Kachipo Bale, Murle Boma and the Murle Maruwa community living in Boma National Park from 1985 to 2001.
The analysis will be carried out in chapter 6 by the method of process tracing. Process tracing provides clues into what connects a purported independent variable to a dependent variable of a within-unit case study (Bennett & Checkel, 2012; Gerring, 2004). This study examines the deductive observable implications of the causal mechanisms described in the theory section. Generalization can be problematic using process tracing in a case study (Bennett & Checkel, 2012; Gerring, 2004). The causal mechanism in this study is operationalized in the specific case of the SPLA using violence against civilians in southern Sudan. I will explain in chapter 6 and 7 how a future extension of this study could resolve the generalization issue. However, a generalization of the general concept is unnecessary in this study, as answering the research question could improve the literature on the SPLA’s use of violence during the Second Sudanese Civil War.
Counterfactual cases are included in the analysis and discussion section of the study. These are included to illustrate the significance of the independent variable, i.e. the commodity structure of a community. The method of using counterfactual cases is thoroughly described by scholars such as Fearon (1991) and King, Keohane, and Verba (1994).
4.2 Case selection
The case of Boma National Park will be used to test the hypotheses. This is an appropriate case because the Park was under the constant rule of the SPLM since 1985 (Deng, 2001). Also, it is inhabited by different communities that have a variety of livelihood activities and therefore various commodity structures. The Kachipo Bale and Murle Boma are agriculturalists, and the Murle Maruwa are pastoralists (Deng, 2001). These communities are all non-Dinka communities. There is another variation in the livelihood activity of the agriculturalists in this study, as the Kachipo Bale are active in gold mining and the Murle Boma are not. The Anyuak and Jie communities are also living in Boma National Park but are not included in this study, as there is a lack of data on the SPLA relationship with these communities. The presence of gold in Boma National Park makes this case suitable for testing the hypotheses. The SPLA benefitted from a gold belt during the Second Sudanese Civil War that ran from Kapoeta, Eastern Equatoria in southern Sudan, to Kurmuk, in the Blue Nile in northern Sudan (Ali-Dinar, 1998; Cordaid, 2016). This gold belt runs through six regions; five in southern Sudan and one in the north of Sudan. These regions were contested or in some parts in control of the GoS (Mampilly, 2011; Rights Maps, 2001). Cordaid (2016) points out the exact location of today’s artisanal gold mines in South Sudan. The artisanal gold mines that were not in contested area are the ones in Boma National Park, following Cordaid’s (2016) indications. Also, the artisanal gold mining sites of the Kachipo Bale were not in the contested areas following the studies of Sorenson (2016) and the University of Oxford (2017).
The case study provides an insight into the livelihood activities of the Kachipo Bale, Murle Boma and Murle Maruwa in the pre-war period as well as during the war. Also, the case study provides an insight into the SPLA/SPLM’s activities in Boma National Park, particularly since 1985 when it was under full control of the SPLA/SPLM (Deng, 2001).
4.3 Sources, data collection, and the limitations
A historical overview on the SPLA’s and the communities’ activities within Boma National Park is based on academic studies. Data available on this topic is limited because of the almost constant experience of an interstate and intrastate war and one-sided violence in South Sudan (UCDP, 2017b). Collecting original data was therefore also not possible. The experts consulted for this
study could not provide data beyond the current academic studies. Dr. Zachariah Cherian Mampilly (personal communication, May 9, 2017) argued that this kind of study is one with a new area of inquiry, as the predominant studies on commodity/resource-based violence during the Second Sudanese Civil War primarily focuses on oil. Other experts consulted are Dr. Martin Petry2, Dr.
Rens Twijnstra3, Dr. Jeroen de Zeeuw4, and Mr. Matthew Sterling Benson5.
The primary source of data derives from Deng’s (2001) analysis of the impact of conflict on Wildlife and food security in Boma National Park in the pre-conflict situation and during the Second Sudanese Civil War. This source has its constraints and limitations. The study, on which the analysis is based, was only carried out in 2001 during the rainy season when people were fully engaged in cultivation. This affected the amount of time available for households to conduct the survey. Furthermore, the survey was carried out by survey teams that were accompanied by SPLA soldiers, and also, the local authorities, i.e. the SPLM, the community leaders and the local enumerators were made aware about the objective of the survey. This is a significant limitation of Deng’s (2001) research. The SPLM and SPLA were mainly Dinka-led and the communities surveyed were non-Dinka. The tensions between the Dinka and non-Dinka communities could influence the non-Dinka communities’ openness on the topic about the SPLA’s use of violence. Deng (2001) is aware of the constraints and limitations of the survey, but he still concludes that the result findings are reliable, as he argues: “… the reliance on the local enumerators and active participation and involvement of the local authorities and community leaders as primary stakeholders in all stages of the survey had made it possible to generate reliable data for the survey.” (p. 8). This still does not take away the chance that the data is partly misrepresenting the SPLA’s activities in Boma National Park. However, this source still provides an insight into the variation in the use of violence against communities living in Boma National Park. Therefore, I find it justifiable to use this data while accepting the exact number of violence used in this area is likely to be misrepresented. It would have been ideal if Deng’s (2001) survey was carried out by the method of random sampling and would have included more data on the SPLA’s use of violence against civilians, i.e. this study’s dependent variable. This would have made a generalization about the other non-Dinka groups more likely. Also, the actual survey should be carried out without the accompany
2 Main author of the Cordaid (2016) study
3 Main author of a study on the SPLA/SPLM’s taxation and trade networks in South Sudan
(Twijnstra, Hilhorst & Titeca, 2014).
4 Program Manager Extractives of the Cordaid (2016) study 5 Expert on taxation and political authority in South Sudan
of SPLA soldiers and without making local authorities aware about the objective of the study carried out, I expect this to influence the openness of non-Dinka communities on the topic of violence used by the SPLA against them.
4.4 Operationalization of the variables
The variables described in the theory section need to be operationalized. The dependent variable in this study is the use of violence against civilians. Obtaining reliable information on the SPLA’s use of violence against the non-Dinka communities for Deng’s (2001) research would not have been easy, as the communities were non-Dinka and the soldiers that secured the survey team was predominantly Dinka. As previously discussed, misrepresentation of the SPLA’s use of violence is, therefore, likely. Due to the lack of data, the only indicators for the dependent variable are the number of civilians killed that belongs to a community, i.e. lethal violence, and the number of people displacement that are part of a community, i.e. lethal violence. Both lethal and non-lethal violence are types of violence that are included in the theory. I explained in the theory section that I expect insurgents in resource-rich areas to generally use higher levels of indiscriminate non-lethal violence than indiscriminate non-lethal violence against civilians when they decide to use violence to obtain material rewards. I also argued that insurgents in resource-rich areas would use both high levels of indiscriminate non-lethal and lethal violence in the case of pastoralists.
The independent variable in this study is the commodity structure of a community. The commodities held in a community determines the commodity structure of a group. Deng’s (2001) findings on the livelihood activities of various communities living in Boma National Park forms a reliable indicator for the independent variable because he offers detailed information on the livelihood activities of various communities. For example, he provides an insight into the proportional contribution of the sources of livelihood of communities living in Boma National Park. I expect that communities described as agriculturalists who significantly tribute in farming as a source of livelihood activity to have a commodity structure that consists for a large part of the agricultural produce. In turn, I expect that communities described as pastoralists and that significantly contribute in livestock herding as a source of livelihood activity to have a commodity structure consisting mostly out of pastoralist production, i.e. livestock. Thus, the livelihood activities of a community define the commodity structure of a community.
Ethnicity and territorial control are two variables that I keep constant in this study. The communities examined in this study are the Kachipo Bale, Murle Boma, and Murle Maruwa. While the Murle Boma community is a different clan to that of the Murle Maruwa, they share the same ethnicity. The Kachipo Bale does not share the same ethnicity as the Murle clans. However, these
three groups are non-Dinka and thus ethnicity is constant. As briefly mentioned in the introduction, a scholarly argument is that pre-war ethnic tensions led to the Dinka-led SPLA using violence against non-Dinka communities during the Second Sudanese Civil War. This argument will be further explained in the case study section. A variation in the use of violence against these communities can indicate that this cannot be primarily attributed to ethnic tensions. This will be further discussed in chapter 6.
Territorial control is another variable that I keep constant in this study. Kalyvas (2006) argues that the use of indiscriminate or selective violence by an armed organization depends on the level of territorial control. Selective violence is employed by the insurgency where it has partial control, and indiscriminate violence is used where it has little control, as Kalyvas (2006) argues. The theory applied in this study was primarily built upon Weinstein’s (2007) arguments. As previously explained, Weinstein (2007) claims that insurgents use high levels of indiscriminate violence in resource-rich areas. A variation in territorial control could account for the difference in use of violence, despite the different outcomes predicted by Kalyvas (2006) and Weinstein (2007). For example, territorial control as a factor would have contributed in explaining the variation in the SPLA’s use of violence against communities if one community in this study lived in a government-controlled area and another community was living in an SPLA-controlled area. However, territorial control cannot explain the variation in the SPLA’s use of violence against communities in Boma Nation Park. The Park was under the constant rule of the SPLA since 1985, and the village Pibor was in control of the SPLA from 1987 to 1992, and the violence used by the SPLA against the communities tested in this study was from 1991 to 1992, as I will further outline in chapter 5.
Table 1 provides an overview of this study’s dependent and independent variable and their indicators. Before turning to the case study, the research question can be restated now the variables have been operationalized. The research question, specified on the case study, that will be answered is: Did the commodity structure of a community living in Boma National Park affected
Variables Indicators
The use of violence against civilians (dependent variable) Non-lethal violence Displacement of civilians (number of civilians displaced) Lethal violence Killing of civilians (number of civilians killed) Commodity structure of a community
(independent variable)
Livelihood activity
(agriculture/gold mining/pastoralism) Table 1. Dependent and independent variable and their indicators
5. Case study
The case study section is laid out in four parts. Firstly, the predominant scholarly argument is outlined that tries to explain the violence used by the SPLA against civilians. Secondly, the area of Boma National Park is described. Thirdly, the communities living in Boma National Park and their commodity structure/livelihood activities are outlined. Fourthly, an overview is given of the SPLA/SPLM governance structure and the SPLA’s use of violence against communities in Boma National Park during the Second Sudanese Civil War.
5.1 The scholarly argument on the SPLA’s use of violence against civilians
Historically, ethnic groups in southern Sudan have been marginalized by the GoS. Marginalization of the South intensified after Sudan became independent in 1956 from its British and Egyptian rulers, eventually leading to the First Sudanese Civil War in 1963-64 (Rolandsen, 2011; Young, 2003). The dominant insurgency from southern Sudan during the First Sudanese Civil War was the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) (Mitchell, 1989). The SSLM has its roots from Equatoria in southern Sudan (Mampilly, 2011). The Addis Ababa Agreement that formally ended the war in 1972 gave southern Sudan a significant amount of autonomy (Mampilly, 2011; Mitchell, 1989; Young, 2003). The then non-Dinka political power of the South wanted to divide the South into Equatoria, Bahr el Ghazal, and Upper Nile by creating despair among the non-Dinka population for potential Dinka domination (Mampilly, 2011). This led to ethnic tensions, as the demographic dominant Dinka community lacked political representation (Badal, 1994). The Dinka eventually gained political positions in the late 1970s due to their demographic strength and refused to divide the South, leading to the spread of insecurity among the non-Dinka population.In 1983, the GoS triggered the Second Sudanese Civil War by dividing the South by Presidential Decree. This reduced the autonomy of the South and made it possible for the GoS to remove oil fields from southern jurisdiction (Badal, 1994; Mampilly, 2011). The Dinka-led SPLA rapidly gained control over southern Sudan during the civil war (Mampilly, 2001). The SPLA did little to build support from non-Dinka communities and often used violence against these communities from southern Sudan based on their ethnicity (Human Rights Watch, 1994; Hutchinson, 2001; Jok & Hutchinson, 1999; Mampilly, 2011; Pinaud, 2014; Salam & De Waal, 2001; UCDP, 2017a; Walraet, 2008). Thus, the type of violence is discriminate violence as the SPLA used violence against non-Dinka civilians based on their ethnicity, following the scholarly argument.
In 1991, SPLA commanders Riek Machar, belonging to the Nuer people, and Lam Akol, belonging to the Shilluk people, had a falling out with John Garang, belonging to the Dinka people and leader of the SPLA/SPLM, over leadership and the direction of the SPLA/SPLM. This falling out resulted in Machar and Akol forming the SPLA-Nasir insurgency that predominantly consisted of Nuer people. The SPLA-Nasir was later renamed SPLA-United (Mackenzie & Buchanan-Smith, 2004; Young, 2003). The scholarly argument is that the split of the SPLA/SPLM in 1991 further intensified ethnic hatred within southern Sudan and let to more discriminate violence used against non-Dinka civilians (Mackenzie & Buchanan-Smith, 2004; Young, 2003).
UCDP (2017a) reports that the SPLA used one-sided violence against civilians, killing 1,366 civilians between 1989-2005. These civilians were predominantly from southern Sudan. Schneider and Bussmann (2013) report that the SPLA killed 2,662 civilians between 1985-2008. Exact numbers on the SPLA’s use of non-lethal violence against civilians is unknown. However, I expect this to be high, as one million have fled the country, and around six million people were displaced within the country during the same period (Van Baarsen, 2000; Verney, 2006).
The communities living in the SPLA/SPLM governed Boma National Park and examined in this study are the Kachipo Bale, Murle Boma, and Murle Maruwa. The SPLA/SPLM was predominantly Dinka led (Mampilly, 2011). Their neighbors perceived the Dinka as: "… power-hungry groups that oppressed minorities …. The Murle were perceived as hostile, aggressive and backward .… the Kachipo were perceived as having a culture that encouraged killing for fame and respect …” (Mackenzie & Buchanan-Smith, 2004, p. 11). The pre-war social divisions between these communities led to ethnic hatred between the Dinka and non-Dinka communities that lived in and around the area Boma National Park (Araba, 2007; Kebbede, 1997; Nyak, 2017; Verney, 1995). The following aspects of this case study provide information on Boma National Park and how the SPLA/SPLM operated in this area.
5.2 Area description of Boma National Park
Boma National Park is a rural area situated in the east of South Sudan and close to the Ethiopian border (Birdlife International, 2001; Deng, 2001; Robertson, 2001). The Park covers approximately 22,800 square kilometers, 8,800 square miles, an area that is somewhat smaller than the state of New Jersey in the United States of America or around half the size of the Netherlands (Robertson, 2001). Figure 1 below shows the Boma National Park in South Sudan.
Figure 1. Map of South Sudan and Boma National Park
Rivers and swamps surround and cross the Park. The river Kangen is located to the west of the Park, the Oboth river to the east, the Kurun river runs from the south to the Guom swamps in the north, and the Rabrah river runs east-west through the Park (Birdlife International, 2001; Deng, 2001). Artisanal gold mining areas are in the rivers and the hills of the plateau (Cordaid, 2016; Deng, 2001).
Around two-third of the Boma National Park is fertile flat plain lying on the western side of Boma plateau (Deng, 2001; Fryxell, 1985). The average temperature range for the area is 38-40 degrees Celsius, or 100-104 degrees Fahrenheit. The area experiences two seasons, the rainy season which lasts from May to November and the dry season from December to April (FEWS, 2013).
Dense thickets, bush shrubs, and savanna grasslands characterize the vegetation of this area. The flat prairie provides rich grazing land which makes the land more suitable for herding livestock than producing crops (Deng, 2001; FEWS, 2013). The principal occupation in this area is pastoralism (FEWS, 2013). Crop production is possible but very limited. The semi-arid conditions limit this production, the common land cultivated is around 0.4 hectares per household. The main food crop produced is sorghum, which is harvested between August and September. The local livestock includes cattle, camels, goats, and sheep. During the dry season, pastoralists in this area move to the Kong-Kong River and Guom swamps in the north of the Park (FEWS, 2013; Fryxell, 1985).
The eastern part of the Park has a landscape characterized by its various hills and the plateau (Deng, 2001). The vegetation in the east is marked by woodland while the plateau itself is characterized by predominantly bush shrubs and grasslands (Deng, 2001; FEWS, 2013; Fryxell, 1985). Also, crop production is possible at the plateau (Deng, 2001). The average temperature is similar to the western part of the Park (FEWS, 2013). The rainy season last from April to November and the dry season from December to March. The soil is to a greater extent fertile compared to the ground in the West, which makes rain-fed crop farming and a livelihood of sedentary cultivation possible. The common land cultivated in this area is about 1.25 hectares. The food crop production consists of maize, sorghum, millet, sesame, cowpea and on a smaller scale of sweet potatoes, cassava and groundnut. Livestock kept in this area are mainly goats, sheep, and poultry. The hills on the east also provide fruits, berries, and leafy vegetables. The production of crops starts with the preparation of the land from January to March, followed by sowing in the months of April to mid-June. Weeding of crops takes place between June and July when the highest rainfall peak occurs. This is followed by crop harvesting between August and December (FEWS, 2013).
There are an additional number of hills in Boma National Park, i.e. Maruwa Hills, Lola, Kassingor, and Locherel Hill (Birdlife International, 2001; Deng, 2001). The east of the Park has an elevation between circa 600-900 meters, 2,000-3,000 feet, before losing altitude at the Ethiopian border (Deng, 2001).
5.3 The communities and their commodity structure in Boma National Park
The clans of the ethnic groups investigated in this study are the Murle Boma, Murle Maruwa, and Kachipo Bale. These groups live in Boma National Park. In 2001 6,967,817 people were recorded as living in southern Sudan, most of whom are from the ethnic Dinka group, representing 40% of the total population in 2001 (Migrant Information Centre, 2001; World Bank, 2017)). The MurleBoma, with an estimated population of 25,000, Murle Maruwa, with an estimated population of 27,000, and Kachipo Bale, with an estimated population of 5,000, make up the minority ethnic groups in southern Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2013; Young & Sing’Oei, 2011).
The Dinka speak the Nilotic language (Heine & Nurse, 2000; Lacey, 2013). The Murle Boma, Murle Maruwa, and the Kachipo Bale have a language that derives from the Surmic language. Within the Surmic language the Murle communities and the Kachipo Bale have their distinct language; the Murle language and the Kachipo Bale language (Heine & Nurse, 2000; Joswig, 2009). The lexical similarity of the Murle and Kachipo Bale language is between 40%-54% (Ethnologue, 2017). Both the Nilotic and Surmic language are branches of the Eastern Sudanic language (Heine & Nurse, 2000).
The livelihood activities and the commodity structures of the Kachipo Bale, Murle Boma and Murle Maruwa are described and depicted in graphs below, together with a description of the SPLA/SPLM activities within Boma National Park. Figure 2 below gives an overview of the approximate location of where the Murle Maruwa, Murle Boma and Kachipo Bale in Boma National Park live. Also, the villages Boma and Pibor and the Maruwa Hills are depicted in figure 2.
Figure 2. Approximate location of where the Murle Maruwa, Murle Boma and Kachipo Bale in Boma National Park live
Murle Boma
The Murle Boma is an ethnic community with an estimated population of 25,000 that is part of the Murle tribe that live in the uphill area of Boma. This group has adopted farming as its primary source of livelihood both before and during the war (Deng, 2001).
Before the start of the Second Sudanese Civil War, the Murle Boma was active in crop production but also in hunting, collecting wild foods, gold mining, fishing, rearing of small livestock and general trading (Deng, 2001). Deng (2001) points out that prospecting of gold at the Boma Hills was an important livelihood before the war. Gold mining contributed between 4-7% of the livelihood activities of the Murle Boma. The community leaders prohibited the mining of gold just before the war broke out, through traditional binding rituals as the community leaders realized that gold mining took away youth from their homes to lead relatively luxurious lives resulting in the traditions and beliefs of the community being undermined by those active in prospecting gold.
The fertile plateau supported a variety of agriculture production for the Murle Boma, such as maize, sorghum, groundnuts, beans, and vegetables. Banana, mango, guava, pawpaw, sugarcane, and lemon were also found in the uphill area where the Murle Boma lived. The average area had put under cultivation before the war was approximately 1.26 hectares per household, which would enable a family under normal conditions to obtain about five sacks of maize, six to seven sacks of sorghum, and one sack of groundnuts (Deng, 2001). The livelihood activities before the war were adequate to provide the Murle Boma community with a healthy, sustainable and a secure livelihood (Deng, 2001).
The Murle Boma was primarily active as farmers during the war, but they were also active in hunting, collecting wild foods, fishing and rearing small livestock. New additional crops were introduced by the Red Cross in 1993 and the Norwegian People’s Aid in 1996, such as cassava, sweet potatoes and a variety of beans (Deng, 2001). The war had an adverse effect on farming as a livelihood activity, which saw a decline in this activity of circa 19%. However, the Murle Boma, described by Deng (2001) as the food basket of Boma National Park during the war, still provided other communities living in Boma National Park with considerable amounts of crops. Cultivated land for farming per household decreased to approximately 0.42-0.63 hectares per family. Hunting became a significant activity during the war, contributing approximately 20% of the total livelihood activity of the Murle Boma. Deng (2001) did not specify if the sources of livelihood during the war could provide an adequate healthy, sustained and secured livelihood. However, the Murle Boma provided other communities with crops so it can be assumed it did contribute to a healthy sustained and secured livelihood.
Graph 1, below, shows that the Murle Boma had several livelihood activities both before and during the war. During the war, their main form of livelihood activities was farming (29%) and hunting (20%). Their sources of livelihood activities became more balanced, but primarily their primary source of livelihood remained farming. Deng (2001) still describes the Murle Boma as agriculturalists during the war. Therefore, I theoretically expect the SPLA restrained the use of violence against the Murle Boma. The agriculturalists Murle Boma would have a commodity structure that would significantly consist of agriculture commodities. However, using the theory presented, it is also possible that the SPLA used violence against agriculturalists. Another theoretical expectation is that the SPLA used high levels of indiscriminate violence during the harvesting season because in this season agriculture output, i.e. commodities, are available to obtain for low-committed individuals within the insurgency. Also, my expectation is that they would have used indiscriminate non-lethal violence on a higher level than indiscriminate lethal violence against the Murle Boma during the harvesting season, in the case that the SPLA used violence against the Murle Boma.
Graph 1. Proportional contribution (%) of the sources of livelihood of the Murle Boma
Murle Maruwa
The Murle Maruwa is the largest ethnic community in Boma National Park with an estimated population of 27,000, being also part of the Murle tribe. The Murle Maruwa used to be agro-pastoralists but became agro-pastoralists before the Second Sudanese Civil War broke out. The Murle Maruwa community lives around the Maruwa Hills (Deng, 2001).
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% Farming Herding
livestock Hunting Fishing Collectingwild food Exchange Kinshipsupport
Murle Boma Sources of Livelihood
Before the start of the Second Sudanese Civil War, the Murle Maruwa were agro-pastoralists producing crops and herded cattle, with households owning approximately 100 head of cattle. Crops produced included sorghum and maize, and in good years families could harvest between four and ten sacks of cereals. This would meet their annual cereal requirements (Deng, 2001). The average area under cultivation per household was approximately 0.84 hectares. Also, the Murle Maruwa had diverse sources of livelihood activities including hunting, fishing, collecting wild foods and general trade (Deng, 2001).
Their livelihood pattern changed totally during the war. Farming, one of their main livelihood activities before the war, reduced to 7% during the war. The average cultivated land during the war reduced to between 0-0.42 hectares (Deng, 2001). The reliance on herding cattle and hunting increased to circa 52% of the total source of livelihood during the war. Livestock management increased slightly to circa 24% of total livelihood activity source. Average cattle held decreased significantly to 22 heads of cattle per household. Diseases, inadequate water, and poor pastures are the three most important reasons for the decline in cattle ownership by the Murle Maruwa (Deng, 2001; Jones, 2001). Hunting played a major role in the livelihood activities of the Murle Maruwa during the war. The method of hunting changed with the start of the war, as small firearms became the primary hunting tool. The numbers indicate that the Murle Maruwa became hunters rather than pastoralists. However, Deng (2001) argues that the Murle Maruwa were pastoralists during the war. The Murle Maruwa would herd their cattle in grazing areas while other members of the community hunted for wildlife in the areas the Murle Maruwa herded their cattle (Deng, 2001). Deng (2001) points out that the food security of the Murle Maruwa declined but that the food demands were met through their food production in combination with the crops provided by the Murle Boma.
The communities in Boma National Park used firearms to hunt wildlife during the war. The Murle Maruwa were, for a large part, active in hunting and gun ownership increased by a ratio of four to one compared to the pre-war period (Deng, 2001). Deng (2001) finds that a household owned three to four firearms, compared to the pre-war period of between none and one per household. This number is slightly higher compared to the Kachipo Bale, between two and three firearms, and the Murle Boma, owning up to three guns per household during the war. The Kachipo Bale and Murle Boma were less active in hunting than the Murle Maruwa, as Table 2 below depicts. Deng (2001) does not specify in his research the average community household numbers. However, the ACAPS (2015) claims the average family in South Sudan in 2012 consisted of seven persons. For this reason, this study takes seven as the mean size of a household in Boma National Park.
