The Dutch denuclearization process after the Cold War

The Dutch denuclearization process after the Cold War.

Author: F.A. den Hollander

Institution: Leiden University Master: International Relations

Specialization: Global Conflict in the Modern Era Date of Submission: July 2, 2020

Table of Contents List of Abbreviations p. 2 Preface p. 3 Abstract p. 3 Introduction p. 4 Literature Review p. 9

Chapter 1: Tactical nuclear weapons in the Netherlands p. 12 1.1 Why store tactical nuclear weapons p. 12

1.2 Control of the TNWs p. 13

1.3 Dutch security Policy p. 14

1.4 NATO security Policy p. 16

1.5 Link between Dutch politics and NATO p. 17

1.6 Securitization p. 19

Chapter 2: Denuclearization in Dutch politics p. 21

2.1 Dutch nuclear policy p. 21

2.2 Dutch governmental debates p. 21

2.3 Desecuritization as end goal p. 26

Chapter 3: NBT Negotiations p. 28

3.1 Driving force behind participation p. 28 3.2 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons p. 29 3.3 Dutch consequences because of the ambivalent attitude p. 31 3.4 Implications for the denuclearization process p. 32

Conclusion p. 34

Discussion p. 38

List of Abbreviations

CDA Christian Democratic Appeal

CU Christian Union

DCA Dual-Capable Aircraft

D66 Democrats 66

EU European Union

ICAN International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear

Weapons

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

MAD Mutually Assured Destruction

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NPG Nuclear Planning Group

NPR Nuclear Posture Review

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty

PVDA Labor Party

SLBM Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles

SP Socialistic Party

TNW Tactical Nuclear Weapon

Preface

This thesis came about when I started my internship at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2018. I was selected to be an intern at the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) which consults parliament on foreign policy. The AIV has four different committees. I interned for the Peace and Security Committee and the Development Cooperation Committee. In March 2018 the AIV received a request for advice from the Dutch government to investigate the question what the future role of nuclear weapons should be and what the Dutch government could mean in NATO. I was able to help with this advisory report and I was able to attend meetings with high placed officers, which was very inspiring. I was an intern for 5 months and unfortunately, I had to leave before the advisory report was finished. As a result of my internship, I decided to write my master thesis on nuclear weapons, and in particular on the Dutch denuclearization process after the Cold War.

Abstract

When NATO was established the world was in a different place. The world had seen the use of nuclear weapons in Japan for the first time and was confronted with the devastating consequences of these weapons. NATO was established as an Alliance between the United States, Canada, and European countries. Meanwhile, the Cold War had started between the United States on one side and the Soviet Union on the other side. To ensure the safety of the European counterparts, NATO decided to establish the nuclear sharing arrangement that would provide certain countries in Europe with nuclear weapons. The Netherlands is one of these countries. This was in the Netherlands’ own security interests, which are heavily influenced by NATO’s security policies. After the end of the Cold War, there was no direct threat and therefore, no direct need to keep these nuclear weapons. However, the Netherlands has been unable to denuclearize. It will use securitization theory as a theoretical framework to try to understand the denuclearization process. This thesis will analyze the denuclearization debate in the Netherlands and what role nuclear weapons play in Dutch security policy.

Introduction

Ever since the first time nuclear weapons were used, in the Second World War, there is no guarantee that another nuclear attack will never happen again. When the United States (US) bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world discovered how powerful and destructive these weapons are. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union started to produce its own nuclear weapons in order to counter the US. The US has possessed nuclear weapons since 1945 and the Soviet Union since 1949. After that, seven other countries began producing nuclear weapons for their own protection in case of war; the United Kingdom followed in 1952, France in 1960, China in 1964, India in 1974, Pakistan in 1998 and North Korea in 2006 (Davenport and Reif). In addition, there is one undeclared nuclear power, which is Israel. Israel has never publicly tested a nuclear weapon and it has never denied or admitted to possessing nuclear weapons. However, it is universally believed that Israel owns nuclear weapons (Davenport and Reif). This shows how an arms race can develop over time. The reason that countries develop their own nuclear weapons is the belief that these weapons will bring them security, as other countries will more possibly refrain from attacking them. Although the world knows how devastating these weapons can be, paradoxically, nuclear weapons also create a certain stability in the political sphere.

In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established: an intergovernmental military alliance between the US, Canada and several European countries. NATO was founded to create a pact that would counter the risk that the Soviet Union would enlarge its empire and seek control of Eastern Europe and beyond. The organization formulated the North Atlantic Treaty, at the heart of which is ‘collective defense’. One of the most important principles that binds NATO member states together, is the commitment to protect each other and show solidarity. The Netherlands joined NATO right from the start, for its own security reasons, those being that the Netherlands is a small country which relies on other countries for defense and security. The Dutch have been strong supporters of international law because of their insufficient military capacity to fight major powers; hence, the Dutch would be protected by international rules formed by NATO.

In order to protect the European member states of NATO during the Cold War, nuclear weapons were stationed on European soil. After the Cold War, there was no immediate threat and no direct motive to keep nuclear weapons in Europe. This thesis focuses on the Dutch position

within NATO, and principally on the Dutch denuclearization debate after the end of the Cold War, where the question arose whether or not to keep providing storage to nuclear weapons on Dutch soil. To provide more of an overview on how the Netherlands acquired its nuclear weapons, an overview is given below of the stationing of nuclear weapons in Europe and what kind of weapons are on European soil. The consecutive chapters of this thesis are mainly focused on Dutch political decision making and the Dutch political debate on denuclearization between 2010 and 2019.

The arms race between the US and the Soviet Union started with the Soviets nuclear weapon. When the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957, the US was made aware of the Soviets missile capability. In order to protect its members against possible Soviet aggression, NATO decided to station nuclear weapons in Europe, at the insistence of the US. NATO understood that it was important that the Soviet Union would be made aware that if it were to launch a missile, the Alliance would be able to strike back within minutes. Good to note is that the organization had been considering stationing nuclear weapons in Europe from the start of the Alliance. The idea of a US nuclear umbrella over Europe goes back to the late 1940s. A nuclear umbrella is the guarantee that states who possess nuclear weapons will defend an allied state that do not own nuclear weapons themselves. To European supporters of the North Atlantic Treaty, obtaining a nuclear umbrella was a very important motive for joining NATO. “The first ‘Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area’, approved by the allies in December 1949, included a US commitment to employ nuclear weapons in defense of the allies” (Yost 1402). After the decision was made that the North Atlantic council would employ nuclear weapons in Europe, the nuclear stockpile peaked at 7,000 at the end of the 1960s (Weitz 4). To properly control this large number of weapons, it was important to set up a decent communication structure to regulate nuclear weapons in Europe, so the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) was set up in 1966. Their task was to provide a consultative process on nuclear doctrine within NATO (“Nuclear Planning Group”). The NPG coordinated the nuclear-sharing arrangement, which was secretive until after the negotiations of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was completed in 1968 (Schulte 42). Under the nuclear-sharing arrangement, the US deploys nuclear weapons in Europe and the US keeps ownership of these weapons.

The NATO members that are part of this nuclear sharing arrangement are Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey. The weapons they harbor are so-called tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) “are delivered by means such

as tactical aircraft, artillery, or short-range ballistic or cruise missiles. TNWs are generally intended for use in battle, against troop concentrations, ships, or similar targets” (Walton 198). In contrast, the Nuclear Weapon States (countries who have their own nuclear weapons at their disposal) possess strategic nuclear weapons, which “are usually delivered at very long ranges by intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) of intercontinental range, or long-range heavy bombers. These weapons can strike deep into enemy territory, thousands of miles from the point at which they were launched” (Walton 198). For most European countries, it was a difficult decision to harbor these TNWs, because by harboring these weapons, they would make themselves a target in case of war. The Netherlands chose to be part of the nuclear arrangement, as did the five other NATO countries mentioned above. In the Netherlands there was a broad consensus that the security of the country would be sufficiently guaranteed by NATO and by the alliance with the US (Baehr 247). According to NATO nuclear policy, the countries who are part of the nuclear sharing arrangement cannot disclose whether or not they store TNWs (Kristensen and Korda).

After the end of the Cold War, there was no direct threat coming from the Soviet Union anymore for the western countries that are a part of NATO. After the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, the Russian Federation was formed. Their attention shifted towards other issues that were important to them, such as rebuilding their country. Moreover, NATO was converting its own attention towards other parts in the world, like Afghanistan after 9/11. Therefore, the initial reason why TNWs where on European soil dilapidated. Consequently, after 1991, the Dutch have been openly questioning whether or not to keep nuclear weapons or to work towards a Global Zero i.e. a world without nuclear weapons (Snyder). The Netherlands, however, is in a difficult and unique position. In order for the Netherlands to work towards a Global Zero, they will have to remove the TNWs that are stored on its soil. Besides physically removing the TNWs, there are other factors that come into play. As mentioned earlier, the Netherlands relies on NATO for its security. And NATO is dependent on the US for providing the nuclear umbrella. It will, therefore, not be easy to change directory that goes against established policies.

Considering that there is no longer an immediate need for TNWs on Dutch soil, the problem has arisen that the Netherlands is not readily able to denuclearize because nuclear weapons are an intrinsic part of its security system. To provide insight in this problem, this thesis will examine the denuclearization debate in the Netherlands after the Cold War, which ended in

1991. Three dimensions that play a role in this debate are looked into, after which a conclusion is presented. Firstly, this study looks into relevant Dutch and NATO security policies. Secondly, the Dutch political debates that were held between 2010 and 2019 are addressed in detail. Lastly, this thesis will look at the latest particular event to move the world towards Global Zero through legal measures, in which the Netherlands participated. In order to purposefully examine the denuclearization debate and provide useful insights, it is crucial to provide a theoretical framework. In this thesis, securitization theory is used, which revolves around the idea that a state or actor should do anything within its power to make the state survive and will be further explained in the literature review, below. Nuclear weapons are mostly used for deterrence. This means that, for example, North Korea deters other countries with its nuclear weapons in order to make the totalitarian state survive. This theoretical framework will help revealing whether the Netherlands considers nuclear weapons to be essential for its security or if it is shifting towards pursuing denuclearization. Therefore, changing the belief nuclear weapons are inherent for its security. The parliamentary debates are examined to see what arguments the Dutch members of the House of Representatives use to change nuclear policy.

The relevance of this research lies in the fact that the world is currently in an unstable position. Additional countries such as Iran are suspected to be acquiring their own nuclear weapons, while other countries are trying to disarm and set up structures to work towards the Global Zero (Kindler). With this thesis, the hope is to better understand what the international dimension brings to the Dutch nuclear policy and to discern where the difficulty lies for the Netherlands to fully denuclearize.

Research question

The aim of this study is to answer the following research question: In what way does securitization theory help to explain the denuclearization process in the Netherlands after the Cold War?

In order to answer the main question, it is necessary to keep the following questions in mind:

1) What is the international dimension in Dutch security policy and what are Dutch nuclear obligations as agreed within NATO?

The focus is on the post-Cold War era, because since then there has been no immediate justification for harboring nuclear weapons in the Netherlands.

In the first chapter it is examined what the Dutch and NATO security policies are. The Netherlands has proclaimed that it wants to move towards a Global Zero. This means it is relevant to examine what the international link is between the security policies. The expectation is that the Dutch government is heavily influenced by NATO and the US, whereby it is difficult for a small state like the Netherlands to choose to differ from such policies. Moreover, the first chapter will discuss the unique military position the Netherlands currently occupies.

In the second chapter, the denuclearization debates of the Netherlands are analyzed. During the last 10 years, the debate surrounding TNWs has been revived. Members of the Dutch House of Representatives have reopened the debate on whether or not to move towards disarmament. Because of the contradicting views from different political parties, it has been a constant dilemma for the Netherlands to design a clear nuclear weapons policy. It seems as if the Dutch are stuck between their obligation towards NATO and their goal for a Global Zero. This can be seen in the different policy motions that different parties have filed. Some of these nuclear debates are highlighted in this chapter in order to try to understand who is driving the denuclearization debate in the Netherlands.

Lastly, in chapter three, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (NBT) is discussed in detail. The Netherlands has been trying to change its nuclear policies. By filing different motions, the Dutch parliament was able to get the Netherlands to be the only NATO country to actively engage in the negotiations of the NBT. By participating, the Netherlands showed other countries its willingness to change course in the debate about nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it is relevant to see what drove the Netherlands to engage in the negotiations and what the eventual outcome was of these negotiations, because it can determine whether the Netherlands is moving towards a different opinion about the importance of nuclear weapons in Dutch security policy. In addition, possible consequences are discussed if the Netherlands would have decided to ratify the NBT.

Literature review

As stated before, securitization is used as a theoretical framework to try to answer the research question. Securitization theory is a conceptual innovation that emerged over the nature of security (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 75). The concept of securitization theory was first used by the Copenhagen School, which refers to Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, where the scholars that have been most influential in the field of security studies have employed their works. These scholars are Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. When a state securitizes a certain matter, the issue shifts “out of the realm of ‘normal’ political debate into the realm of emergency politics by presenting an existential threat” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 76). This in itself is not as straightforward as described. There are several conditions that Buzan and Waever have identified to move a certain subject into the securitized realm. They have classified three particular conditions: The first one is the so-called speech act in which “an existential threat is presented as legitimating the use of extraordinary measures to combat that threat. The second condition entails the requirement that the securitizing actor […] is in a position of authority […] Third, it will be easier to present an issue as an existential threat if objects associated with the issue carry historical connotations of threat, danger, and harm, or where a history of hostile sentiments exists” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 79). In the first condition, the Copenhagen school mentions the so-called ‘speech act.’ The way in which the speech act is performed is important, because it initiates the “potential to let an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have been obeyed” (Stritzel 361). To give an example, there are many treaties in place that prohibit storing nuclear weapons. The audience condones these violations because of a successful speech act. If the speech act is unsuccessful, extraordinary measures are less likely to be accepted by the audience.

The second condition has to do with the entity that securitizes a subject. The securitizing actor has to be in a position of authority. According to Hubert Zimmerman, “a more permanent success of […] securitization depends on embedding the commitment in a framework of institutionalized context factors, such as dominant identities or established alliances” (Zimmerman 239).

For the third condition, not only an existential threat to the state can be used as an argument to securitize a subject; more factors come into play to securitize a matter. Thierry Balzacq confirms the idea that a securitized subject does not necessarily have to be dependent on an existential threat.

He writes that “securitization is a rule-governed practice, the success of which does not necessarily depend on the existence of a real threat, but on the discursive ability to effectively endow a development with such a specific complexity” (Balzacq 179).

The purpose of the securitization of nuclear weapons is complex. Mainly, the purpose is to create deterrence, which is a strategy to deter a potential aggression through threat of fear (Nye and Welch 2). This would mean that there is no reason to be afraid of war in general. By placing nuclear weapons in a securitized state, with one or all three of the conditions, states try to guarantee ultimate safety. They assume that no other country would dare to attack states that possess nuclear weapons; thus, deterrence works. However, as Juha Vuori argues, “the continued existence of nuclear weapons, and thereby the possibility of such a war, counts as a failure in their securitization” (Vuori 270). After all, with or without nuclear weapons, there is always a possibility for war and the use of nuclear weapons. With this argument in mind, it would be logical to move towards the desecuritization of nuclear weapons. However, as Vuori also argues, “final desecuritization could be achieved only once the possibility of waging war with these weapons was eliminated – that is, when the world would be ‘emancipated’ from nuclear weapons” (Vuori 271).

This leads to another important notion that is part of securitization theory: desecuritization. The Copenhagen School describes this as “the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 83). In other words, desecuritization is the “transferal of a particular issue ‘out of the threat-defense sequence into the ordinary public sphere’. […] [it] implies that the issue is being ‘re-politicized’ – that is, subjected to normal political processes” (Zimmerman 229). With the desecuritization of a subject, and bringing it back to normal political debate, it would be possible to change policies. If a subject stays in the securitized realm, however, there is no room for other policies to be adapted. Philippe Bourbeau and Juha Vuori developed a model which might help to understand the difficulty of moving a subject from one dimension to another, provided below.

Figure 1. Bourbeau, Philippe and Juha A. Vuori. “Security, resilience and desecuritization: multidirectional moves and dynamics.” Critical Studies on Security. Routledge, 16 Nov 2015. 253-68. Print.

The figure can be explained as follows: non-security politics applies to situations where a certain issue is on the political agenda but are not treated in an extraordinary way. Security in the figure indicates a situation in which extraordinary measures can be taken. Lastly, resilience indicates a situation “‘where endogenous or exogenous shocks have been dealt with patterned adjustments to maintain the status quo, to implement marginal changes or to renew a given policy. The arrows in the figure represent political moves that aim to transform an issue from one status to another, or to keep the current status and repel a status transformation” (Bourbeau and Vuori 256-57). Figure 1 is a guideline that simplifies the processes that happen when political debates are held. Moreover, it clarifies what changes have to be made in order to move nuclear weapons to different positions. Therefore, in order to apply securitization theory to the main question, it is important to look at how the political debate after the end of the Cold War evolved, with a focus on governmental arguments for maintaining nuclear defense. And therefore, made the decision not to desecuritize nuclear weapons. This will help to better understand how the denuclearization process has evolved and what the Dutch security priorities are.

Chapter 1: Tactical nuclear weapons in the Netherlands

1.1 Why store tactical nuclear weapons

During the Cold War, there was a potential existential threat coming from the Soviet Union. When drawing up the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO was centered around creating a collective defense in case there would be an attack. The most important article surrounding collective defense in the North Atlantic Treaty is Article V, which states the following: “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that […] individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” (‘Collective defense - Article 5’). It is important for the members of NATO that they can rely on each other in case of an attack. The Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Alliance cannot always ensure safety when Article V is invoked. Even though the US, the United Kingdom and France own strategic nuclear weapons, safety is not assured, since these weapons can only guarantee safety up to a certain level. Mostly, these weapons were used to function as a deterrent, because they are so destructive. If a Nuclear Weapon State would fire either an ICBM or an SLBM, it could expect a devasting retaliatory blow. This situation is called mutually assured destruction (MAD). This begs the question why strategic nuclear weapons were not enough to keep Europe safe against possible Soviet aggression? One explanation could be that the Soviet Union would not believe that the US would risk one of its major cities for the people in Europe (Nichols viii). Additionally, another explanation is that the US was of the opinion that for Europe, relatively inexpensive nuclear forces, which TNWs are considered to be, would offer alternative means to respond to possible Soviet aggression in its early stages (Advisory Council on International Affairs 79). Concluding, the TNWs provided an appropriate response to any kind of Soviet attack and would be able to keep all NATO member states under the nuclear umbrella.

One other possible explanation why the US decided to store TNWs in Europe was because it wanted to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Mattelaer 2). If multiple European Union (EU) countries would seek to acquire their own weapons, the US would not have any control over them. Therefore, to ensure the safety of the entire Alliance and to control proliferation of nuclear weapons, the NATO Council decided to equip NATO forces in Europe with TNWs (Advisory Council on International Affairs 80). The prime minister of the Netherlands signed a bilateral agreement with the US on 6 May 1959. They agreed to the nuclear sharing agreement and the

Dutch government decided that it would also take over some of the US’ dual-capable means of delivery (Advisory Council on International Affairs 80). Dual capable refers to an aircraft that can perform either a conventional nuclear strike or a theater nuclear mission (Department of Defense). Hitherto, the Netherlands stores nuclear weapons on their soil.

After the end of the Cold War, Russia turned its attention away from potentially attacking NATO member states. The question then arose what to do about the TNWs that were stored in Europe. After all, the TNWs were originally stored to protect NATO countries from Russia. In 1999, NATO drew up a strategic concept, in which the nuclear weapons in Europe were explicitly mentioned. NATO was under the impression that the TNWs function as an indispensable transatlantic link. It was essential to show the world that NATO was still a credible Alliance after the Cold War, because it was believed that NATO would no longer have a purpose if Russia was no longer a threat and would therefore fall apart. Tom Sauer and Bob van der Zwaan stated that “nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between European and American members of the Alliance” (Sauer and van der Zwaan 81). Instead of the TNWs carrying the function of a deterrent and a quick response in case the Soviet Union would attack, they got the function of a symbol for cohesion within NATO. This is supported by Alexander Mattelaer. He writes: “They [TNWs] have demonstrably contributed to (a) countering the proliferation of nuclear arsenals in Europe, (b) fostering alliance cohesion by giving non-nuclear weapon states a voice on the nuclear posture of the alliance, and (c) making nuclear deterrence more effective military by offering a wider array of force options” (Mattelaer 1). Perhaps the question should be, why would NATO not store TNWs? This could mean in case of the Dutch that they might prefer keeping the TNWs for security reasons and therefore not to desecuritize TNWs.

1.2 Control of the TNWs

One might assume that because the TNWs are stored in European countries, they also have control over these weapons. However, only the US president or the British prime minister can decide to launch and use a nuclear weapon according to the nuclear sharing agreement. If the decision were made to use one of the forward-deployed US warheads and have it delivered by a NATO dual-capable aircraft (DCA), “the decision to release the warhead would lie with the U.S. president; the use of a DCA would require the assent of the relevant host country” (Lunn 43). Be

that as it may, the US president cannot make any decision it wants. The NPG, as mentioned in the introduction, has an important function in this. The NPG acts as the senior body on nuclear matters within the Alliance and discusses specific policies regarding nuclear forces, nuclear arms control and nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, the group discusses the “effectiveness of NATO’s nuclear deterrent, the safety, security and survivability of nuclear weapons, and communications and information systems” (“Nuclear Planning Group”). In practice, however, the meetings with the NPG are mostly used by the US to inform and consult its allies on nuclear policy (Lunn 41). It is thought that the US wanted to retain as much control over the TNWs, because it feared that the host nations would seek to acquire their own weapons. That is why the host nations do not have their own say in nuclear decision-making (Advisory Council on International Affairs 80). Concluding, despite the fact that it is not required, it is widely assumed that the decision to launch the TNWs would be made in close deliberation with all parties concerned (Lunn 43). However, the US has final say.

1.3 Dutch security policy

To better understand the Dutch position within the nuclear debate, it is crucial to look into Dutch security interests and security policy. On June 25, 1997, the Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote a letter to the Dutch parliament. He stated that the Dutch input in international organizations has always been coordinated based on the rationale that the indivisibility of security and the importance of cooperation require an active Dutch attitude (Van Mierlo). A voice within these international organizations has always been important for the Netherlands. With accepting the responsibilities of being a host nation for the TNWs, the Dutch has the ability to influence NATO. On August 16, 2005, the Netherlands stated that security post 9/11 calls for national, European and international measures that reinforce and complement each other (Bot). Security policy after the end of the Cold War existed mainly in active cooperation and collaboration, because the threat level against the Netherlands was not high. In a report of the Ministry of Defense, written in 2013, the Netherlands has been clear that the Netherlands needs NATO for their security. It states that “the Netherlands is unable to guarantee its security on its own. Our security interests are interwoven with the world around us. NATO therefore continues to be the cornerstone of our security policy” (“In the … the Netherlands” 9). This is supported by the view of Frans-Paul van der Putten. He writes: “The Netherlands must […] actively cultivate and engage in international

cooperation within the EU, NATO, the United Nations (UN) or other international frameworks” (Van der Putten et al. 12). These reports affirm that Dutch security interests focus on international organizations and their alliances. Without NATO, the Netherlands cannot provide security for itself or other NATO member states. There are two ways that this statement can be illustrated. On the one hand, the dependency of the Netherlands on NATO is one of the reasons that the Dutch are part of the nuclear sharing arrangement. On the other hand, the statement suggests that the Dutch active participation within NATO is the country’s way to exercise power in the international realm. The first argument is supported in the Dutch Security Strategy document from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2018: “International cooperation is a key prerequisite for our security. Partly because internal and external security have become increasingly interconnected, the Netherlands is hardly ever able to tackle threats alone. This makes international cooperation to our security, and the Netherlands will continue to invest in it” (“Working Worldwide … the Netherlands” 39). The second argument is supported by the fact that only five NATO members have TNWs. Therefore, this creates a niche capability that other member states do not have. “The Netherlands recognized that maintaining expensive niche capabilities, such as air-to-air refueling tankers, submarines and Patriot surface-to-air missile systems, all of which are scarce in NATO, offered political benefits in coalition politics” (Osinga 78). These niche capabilities are discussed in more detail further on in this thesis.

In 2019, the Dutch government released its National Security Strategy report, in which it specifies the national security interests, as well as which interests are under threat and how the Dutch government can decrease these threats (“National Security Strategy”). In this report, the Dutch government once again underlines that the cooperation with the EU and NATO is of vital interest for the Dutch security agenda. “Within this climate of uncertainty and increasing threats and risks, it is even more important for the Netherlands that the two organizations via which the Netherlands wishes to safeguard its national security interests – the EU and NATO – function smoothly” (“National Security Strategy” 22). Concluding, Dutch security is dependent on NATO and therefore, Dutch security policy and the Dutch nuclear policy rely heavily on NATO security policy.

1.4 NATO security policy

After the end of the Cold War, NATO was looking for a new purpose. Some elements that kept NATO together was the protection of western values, and the concerns about the future. After 9/11 a new dynamic came into existence. This new dynamic was focused on military engagement of members outside Europe. Beginning with the mission in Afghanistan in 2003 and much later the air operations in Libya in 2011 (Haglund). NATO evolved from being an organization that is mostly concerned with direct threats to their member states into an organization that was also focused on broader security issues that went beyond the European scope. In the last 10 years NATO has been outspoken about its position. When the organization drew up its 2010 strategic concept, it stated that the Alliance is aware of the changing security environment and the instability and conflict outside NATO borders. It also stated that the “proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in the world’s most volatile regions, terrorism, cyber-attacks, disruption of energy supplies and transit routes – [are] all security challenges” (Marrone 102). To counter threats, NATO is also very outspoken about the fact that it is a nuclear alliance. At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, it stated the following: “NATO will maintain an appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear, and missile defense forces” (“Lisbon Summit Declaration”). NATO, however, is aware of the fact that other Nuclear Weapon States that are not part of NATO pose a threat. In 2016, during the Warsaw Summit, NATO made it clear that in order to provide security to the Alliance, nuclear weapons are key, and disarmament will not come swiftly. The official statement declares: “The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies. […] [NATO] relies, in part, on United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe” (“Warsaw Summit Communiqué”). Additionally, at the last NATO Summit in 2018, the organization explicitly mentions the niche capabilities that some of the member states have. NATO stated the following: “National contributions of dual-capable aircraft to NATO’s nuclear deterrence mission remain central to this effort” (“Brussels Summit Declaration”). NATO is still committed to providing security to its members, and in these summits, it states that nuclear weapons are essential for its security policy. NATO’s security policy is highly determined by the security policy of the US. The US has more influence than other members, because without it, there would not be a nuclear umbrella. Since 1994, the US has been releasing the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) every eight years. The US Department of Defense writes these NPRs to determine what the role of nuclear weapons

should be in US security strategy, which extends to the country’s strategy within NATO. The Obama Administration issued its NPR in 2010. “The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) explicitly elevated non-proliferation ‘for the first time’ to the highest priority of US nuclear policy, among other priorities, including deterrence and assurance” (Payne et al. 10). A parallel can be made between the NPR and the Lisbon Summit. Before the start of the Lisbon Summit, the US stated firmly that non-proliferation was one of the key objectives for the first time. In the Lisbon Summit Communique this objective was endorsed. Consequently, non-proliferation was made a new goal in European policies. In February of 2018, a new NPR was released under the Trump Administration. There was a shift from the NPR of 2010 to the new one, partly because the security environment internationally has deteriorated since then. Therefore, the NPR of 2018 advocates the sustainment and replacement of US nuclear forces. The US also clearly commits itself to the transatlantic partnership by stating: “The U.S. commitment to NATO is unwavering. A strong, cohesive nuclear Alliance is the most effective means of deterring aggression and promoting peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region” (Nuclear Posture Review 2018, 35). While in the NPR of 2010, the US was talking about reducing the role of nuclear weapons, eight years later it is talking about the fundamental importance of these weapons. Not only that, but the US recommits to the forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe. “The United States […] commit nuclear weapons forward-deployed to Europe, to the defense of NATO” (Nuclear Posture Review 2018, 36). In conclusion, although with changes in the proposed way of use of the nuclear weapons, US security and nuclear policy are intertwined with NATO policies on nuclear weapons. Because the US provides the nuclear umbrella its security policies cannot be overlooked.

1.5 Link between Dutch politics and NATO

The main assertion that keeps coming up is the idea that NATO and the US provide protection for NATO member states by placing nuclear weapons in Europe. Consequently, smaller states would have less influence in these international Alliances because they do not have the means at their disposal to provide security. Therefore, these smaller states cannot change security or nuclear policy. This makes it relevant to look at what kind of influence small states can have in multilateral alliances. This is particularly relevant because it could play a role in the desecuritization process of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands. If small states are dependent on these bigger states and do not exercise great influence in these alliances, it could be difficult for these states to decide if they

want to divert from existing overarching security policies. According to Viadotas Urbelis, “small states are not merely servants of the bigger ones; they can push and shape decisions according to their wishes and interests. They can do this in several ways: by including relevant security issues into wider political agenda, or by making impact upon implementation of already existing agenda” (Urbelis 64). This implies that these smaller states have a significant place within Alliances. It does not, however, imply that the smaller states do not need the larger states. Larger states can provide the protection that the smaller states need. Therefore, an Alliance like NATO depends on both the larger states and the smaller states.

The Netherlands being a small state has an exceptional position within NATO. They are part of the nuclear sharing arrangement and they have some niche capabilities that are crucial for NATO. The F-16 airplanes that currently carry the TNWs possessed by the Netherlands will not meet the requirements to be able to carry the modernized nuclear weapons. Therefore, the US is designing and building new aircrafts, the F-35s. The Dutch parliament has decided to invest in these new F-35 DCA’s and purchased approximately 37 new planes (Ministerie van Defensie). This helps solidify the Netherlands’ sphere of influence within NATO. The Dutch government released the following statement about the choice to invest in the F-35s: “The F-35 is a well-considered choice for a high-tech, future-oriented air force. […] With this decision, which concludes a process of almost fifteen years, we are responding to the Alliance’s call for investment in quality and, consequently, in the collective security of the Alliance” (“In the … the Netherlands” 18-19).

In addition, the upgrade to the F-35 is seen as especially important for the newer NATO members, particularly the Central and Eastern European countries. “This link, without question, enticed these recent members to join the Alliance […] This [transatlantic] partnership is critical to the credibility of the ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’ policy” (Anderson 18-19). This statement is supported by Damon Coletta: “the coalition of Central and Eastern European members, who equate US nonstrategic bombs in Europe with indispensable proof of the commitment to collective defense” (Coletta 71). Dutch political decisions affect NATO and its member states. This underlines the interwovenness of smaller states with larger alliances for security reasons.

Because the Dutch possess these niche capabilities, there is a strong alignment between them and NATO. Therefore, the international dimension in Dutch security policy is indispensable. There is a shared interest, namely security. The Netherlands needs NATO and the US for its

security, and NATO needs the niche capabilities the Dutch provide. Moreover, the Dutch government has maintained a clear line that Dutch national security remains aligned with the interests of NATO.

1.6 Securitization

The Dutch decision to store TNWs could imply that all three conditions that are described by the Copenhagen School were met. The prime minister at the time, Willem Drees, delivered a suitable speech act that the Netherlands should assume the nuclear tasks. Moreover, he was in a position of authority as he was prime minister. Lastly, there might not have been a direct existential threat to the Netherlands specifically, but based on the Soviet Union’s earlier behavior, the storage of the TNWs could be justified to protect the Netherlands and other NATO member states. Hence, the debate about storing nuclear weapons went from being politicized, where the subject is part of a public policy debate, to being securitized, where it is justifiable to use extraordinary political measures (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 77). These extraordinary measures imply the storing of the TNWs on Dutch soil. The Netherlands is finding itself in an exceptional position, which is followed by difficult decisions, like the decision to upgrade the F-16s to the new F-35s. Investing and purchasing these DCA’s was a way for the Dutch government to contribute to the security for NATO member states, as well as for its own security, and place of influence within NATO.

Looking at Figure 1 from the literature review, the Netherlands was in the non-security politics realm concerning nuclear weapons before joining the nuclear sharing arrangement. When some European countries got the chance to protect other members and store TNWs, the Netherlands stepped up and decided to take this chance, thereby taking extraordinary measures and securitizing the TNWs. The Soviet Union remained a threat throughout the Cold War and, afterward, the Soviet Union did not pose a threat anymore the question of complete disarmament of Europe arose. So, after the end of the Cold War, debates were held about disarmament and that could have been a time for the Netherlands to think about desecuritization of the TNWs. However, NATO had never before decided to desecuritize nuclear weapons, not even after the Cold War. Reason for this lies in the fact that nuclear weapons are fundamentally securitized from the first moment, hence there is no possibility to deal with nuclear weapons outside of a securitized realm. The question then ensues if it is possible to ensure national security without having to fall back on nuclear weapons. If that is achievable, and nuclear weapons can be desecuritized, it would open up a way towards

denuclearization. In order to go towards desecuritization, according to Figure 1, adjustments need to be made, given policies should be renewed or marginal changes should be implemented. Although there have been marginal changes, nothing significant has changed. Dutch official security policy has remained the same, and values NATO security policy as leading. In addition, because of the strong alliance between Dutch and NATO security policies, the Netherlands has to decide for itself if they want to move forward on their own to desecuritizing TNWs. Paradoxically, the Netherlands is trying to move TNWs into a desecuritized realm, but it ends up holding onto the status quo.

Concluding, there needs to be a significant change or policy modification to be able to desecuritize the nuclear weapons. The Dutch parliament has been trying to achieve this in recent years with one momentous event that could have changed the current status quo, namely the Nuclear Ban Treaty (NBT) negotiations. Special attention will be given in the following chapters on debates in the Dutch parliament and the NBT negotiations will be discussed.

Chapter 2: Denuclearization in Dutch politics

2.1 Dutch nuclear policy

Since the 1990s, the Dutch nuclear weapons policy has consisted of two pillars that are at odds with each other, namely the deterrence that nuclear weapons offer and the wish for disarmament. According to Frank Osinga, “the security and defense policy developments in the Netherlands – informed by both a transatlantic and European mind-set – tended to closely follow NATO and EU thinking” (Osinga 76) from 1990 to 2014. Since 2010, the Netherlands has shifted towards creating a nuclear policy of its own. In 2010, the Dutch government made a clear statement towards the US by saying that the Netherlands wants to work towards the withdrawal of nuclear weapons, because the Dutch does no longer believe in the protection through the presence of TNWs on European soil (Shirobokova 41). Be that as it may, the juxtaposition between the deterrence and actively engaging in disarmament became clear again when the Dutch government chose to purchase the F-35s. Wilbert van der Zeijden states that “the deployment contrasts with the Dutch general policy to promote international efforts for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation” (Van der Zeijden 48). If the Dutch government had decided to not purchase the F-35s, that could have been a sign towards NATO, the US and the world that the Dutch are changing policies in order to work towards disarmament. That could have moved the Netherlands towards further desecuritization and denuclearization. However, the government chose not to do this, which begs the question if it perceives desecuritization as desirable. In order to investigate this question, parliamentary debates between 2010 and 2019 are looked into. A closer look is taken at motions that have been filed.

2.2. Dutch governmental debates

When President Barack Obama declared in the NPR of 2010 that the US wanted to move towards disarmament, this was a clear sign to other countries to reopen the debate and start asking questions to their respective governments. This also included the Netherlands. As mentioned earlier, the US plays a significant role in NATO security policies and therefore, other member states are highly influenced by this. Moreover, the willingness of the US might open doors for opportunities to achieve significant policy changes. Without the US’ compliance, it is difficult for other countries to change their nuclear policies. On April 21, 2010, Mrs. Van Velzen, Socialistic

Party (SP), and Mrs. Azough, Green Left Party, filed three motions. The first motion called on the government, in a NATO context, to state that the Netherlands no longer attached importance to tasks involving nuclear weapons and therefore no longer wished to execute these tasks. Moreover, the motion stated that the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe should no longer be seen as a security guarantee. The motion referred to the TNWs that are stored in Europe, because there has never been official confirmation that there are in fact TNWs stored on Dutch soil. However, it is widely known that these are based at Volkel Air Base (Frank). Hence, the second motion stated that NATO’s nuclear weapons policy prevented the Dutch government from disclosing the possible presence of nuclear weapons on Dutch territory and called on the government to urge NATO to openly disclose the presence of nuclear weapons in NATO member states. The last motion stated that the American ambition to come to disarmament should be supported by the Netherlands and that the TNWs that are on European soil could be part of the negotiations about disarmament between the US and Russia. This motion requested for the Dutch government to report to the American government that the Netherlands sees no more value in protecting European mainland and consider the withdrawal of these TNWs desirable (Van Velzen and Azough). Only the third motion was adopted by a majority. This means that the majority of the Dutch parliament did not want to have full disclosure of the storage of TNWs and that the majority of parliament still believed that the TNWs fulfill the security guarantee. If these two motions would have been adopted, it would have put the Dutch government in a difficult position. Considering, it would mean that the Dutch government would have to go against official NATO policy, since NATO does not allow for countries to give up these locations and the majority of parliament is aware of this (Andreasen et al.).

On June 11, 2010, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister Verhagen, wrote a letter to parliament reflecting what was done with the adopted motion. He wrote that he had been to New York to participate in the quinquennial NPT Review Conference. The Netherlands has, among other things, advocated for the role of TNWs in nuclear doctrines to be included. Although efforts were made during the Review Conference to get these weapons excluded from the text, the Netherlands had partly ensured that these weapons were added to the NPT. This concerns not only the TNWs that are stored on European soil, but also those stored in other countries (Verhagen).

In May 2012, the US released its ideas for the modernization of the TNWs. The official statement explained that in order to “meet and uphold the U.S. commitment to NATO, Washington

must proceed with the B61 LEP [Life Extension Program]” (Dodge). Moreover, the US stated that “unless the current policy changes and the U.S. decides to develop new nuclear weapons, the LEPs are […] necessary to sustain the current stockpile” (Dodge).

On May 16, 2012, new motions were filed after the news that the US would start modernizing its TNWs. Accordingly, Mr. Van Bommel, member of the SP, filed a motion for complete removal of the TNWs. He believed that the TNWs in Europe as a remnant of the Cold War no longer served a military purpose. He also noted that despite widespread support for the removal of these weapons from European soil among NATO member states, there had been no real steps towards achieving this goal. Therefore, he called upon the Dutch government: if no agreement on the removal of the TNWs was reached at the NATO summit in Chicago of that year, he stated the Netherlands should refrain from reserving resources for the maintenance of the Dutch nuclear weapons tasks as of the next budgetary plan (Van Bommel). Furthermore, in another motion that he filed, he called upon the government to negotiate directly with the US government to end the Dutch nuclear tasks if no agreement would be reached in Chicago. Both motions were turned down by the majority of the Dutch parliament. The reason why the majority turned these motions down became evident when the Dutch government decided to purchase the F-35s. Because the Dutch government would now be able to fulfil its nuclear task and actively take part in setting up a nuclear grid for the future.

Furthermore, another motion was filed on the same day by Mr. Peters, member of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), in which he declared that the modernization of TNWs by the US undermines international nuclear disarmament efforts. He also noted that there had been no visible progress in conversations about the removal of TNWs from Europe, despite the Van Velzen and Azough motion, which was unanimously adopted two years prior to this motion and the government at that time declared it to be the starting point of Dutch policy. Therefore, he called upon the government to declare itself opposed to the modernization of TNWs by the US on European soil and to enter into a dialogue with the US as soon as possible about the removal of the currently available TNWs in Europe (Peters). This motion was also dismissed. In the NATO Summit in Chicago in 2012, NATO declared that it was committed to maintain a diverse mix of nuclear conventional and missile defense in order to preserve deterrence (Chicago Summit Declaration).

The motions that were filed in favor of disarmament have mostly been turned down. The members of the Dutch House of Representatives have not been able to convince Dutch government to change course towards desecuritizing TNWs. Mrs. Azough, Mrs. Van Velzen and Mr. Van Bommel were all part of the opposition when they filed their motions. Only Mr. Peters was part of the coalition government at the time he filed his motion. At the beginning of the 2010s, members in the House of Representatives that were not governing tried to push the Dutch government to start desecuritizing TNWs.

On March 18, 2014, Mr. Sjoerdsma, member of Democrats 66 (D66), filed a motion, stating that it is desirable to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons, including the TNWs in Europe. He called upon the Dutch government to advocate for NATO to end Dutch nuclear weapons tasks (Sjoerdsma). The motion was adopted by a narrow majority in parliament. During the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, NATO declared that as long as nuclear weapons existed, NATO would remain a nuclear alliance. Moreover, it reiterated the importance and ultimate security guarantee nuclear weapons provide for the Alliance (Wales Summit Declaration). Looking at these motions, it becomes clearer that the Dutch parliament is willing to adopt motions that revolve around their wish for disarmament, but the Dutch government do not implement them. Moreover, the Netherlands has not advocated for the end of the Dutch nuclear task during the Wales Summit.

Two years later, on April 28, 2016, a motion was filed by Mr. Van Klaveren, one-man fraction in the Dutch parliament, in which he declared that US nuclear weapons in Europe counter the Russian threat and must be maintained. Therefore, he called upon the Dutch government to abandon the objective to try to influence NATO to remove all US TNWs from Europe (Van Klaveren). Only 14 of the 150 members of the Dutch parliament voted in favor of this motion. He was part of the opposition in the House of Representatives; however, he could not gather enough votes from the Dutch government, that might have indicated where the government stand in the denuclearization debate. A different motion was also filed that day by multiple members of parliament. It stated that Article VI of the NPT stipulates that States should start negotiations for a full nuclear disarmament treaty; it noted that in 2015, an open-ended working group was set up by the UN General Assembly to consider new measures, legal or otherwise, in the field of nuclear disarmament, and called upon the government to actively engage in effective measures within this working group. It included the start of negotiations on an international nuclear weapons ban, to

achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world and to include other NATO member states in these negotiations (Servaes et al.). This motion was filed by five members of the House of Representatives. Only one was part of the government, while the other four were part of the opposition. This motion was adopted by the majority in parliament. The result of this motion was one of the most important and effective ones that was filed concerning the active process of denuclearization. It led to the active participation of the Dutch government in the negotiations for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017. This is discussed in further detail in the next chapter.

On June 21, 2018 the Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote a letter to the Dutch parliament about the Netherlands’ commitment to nuclear disarmament. He wrote that the Netherlands is actively committed to a nuclear-weapon-free world, within the framework of the alliance agreements, and in view of the great risks of proliferation of these weapons. However, he also stated that although his letter focused on the Dutch disarmament effort, it is necessary to keep in mind the broader nuclear context: as long as there are nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence in the NATO context continues to play an important role in Dutch security policies (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken).

On November 15, 2018, Mrs. Ploumen, Labor Party (PvdA), filed a motion in response to this letter, stating that the government is implementing a policy change from previous governments, which have made efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in (security) doctrines. Thus, she called on the government not to increase the role of nuclear weapons in Dutch security policy (Ploumen et al.). This motion was filed by the opposition and was voted down.

At the beginning of 2019, Minister of Foreign Affairs Stef Blok and Minister of Defense Ank Bijleveld-Schouten wrote a letter to the Dutch parliament, explaining the current policy regarding nuclear weapons. They wrote that NATO is of fundamental importance for the safety of the Netherlands. Moreover, to deter potential aggressors under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, collective deterrence is essential. NATO membership and the security guarantee from the US cannot be separated from nuclear deterrence. Therefore, the question is if the Dutch want to defend themselves apart from the nuclear umbrella the US provides. If the Netherlands is convinced it needs the nuclear umbrella, the government cannot make a unilateral decision and disarm. However, the Dutch government will work to achieve the goal set by the government’s Coalition Agreement, which is an agreement between the political parties that form the

government. The goal of this agreement is to focus on nuclear disarmament (Blok and Bijkeveld-Schouten).

The last motion concerning nuclear weapons was filed on December 5, 2019. Mrs. Karabulut, member of the SP, noted that nuclear disarmament can contribute to global security, particularly in Europe. She called upon the government to gain support for a disarmament plan to ensure that European countries return the TNWs to the US, while at the same time Russia would also proceed towards nuclear disarmament (Karabulut et al.). The members that signed this motion were again from the opposition.

Since then, there have not been any official statements about where the Dutch government stands at the moment. The members of the Dutch parliament have continuously filed motions in order to get the government to actively change policies and work towards disarmament. They also tried to convince the Dutch government to speak up during NATO meetings and have serious negotiations with the Americans about disarmament. The Dutch government could decide to bypass NATO and remove the nuclear weapons without NATO’s consent. The Netherlands does not have to have consent from NATO in order to remove the TNWs from its soil. The deployment of TNWs is a bilateral agreement between the US and the Netherlands (Van der Zeijden 52). However, if the Dutch would decide to unilateral disarm, other discussions would arise, such as whether the Dutch government can provide security, especially because the Dutch contribute to the nuclear umbrella. Concluding, the question remains if it is even possible to desecuritize TNWs looking at the parliamentary debates. Most of these motions were filed by members of the opposition. The Dutch coalition government has not been actively filing motions to steer security policy towards the desecuritization of the TNWs. Moreover, when it comes to approving these motions in which these changes are proposed, it looks as if the Netherlands does not want to work towards denuclearization and prefers the status quo. Therefore, the Dutch government might be wanting to hold onto the status quo.

2.3. Desecuritization as possibility

In light of what has been argued above, one could say that there is enough base for a change in policies and there is enough legitimacy for the Dutch government to change its course. The Dutch House of Representatives has supported motions to implement policy changes and work towards the desecuritization of the TNWs. According to Ole Waever, desecuritization “fosters

critical attention to the costs of securitization but allows for the possibility that securitization might help society to deal with important challenges through focusing and mobilizing attention and resources” (Waever 469). It is possible that by filing these motions and working towards desecuritization, it is in fact better if TNWs stay in the securitized realm in order to move towards denuclearization. Moreover, by placing TNWs in the securitized realm, the Netherlands stays in the negotiations within NATO and US; and together, there might be a way to work towards disarmament. Paul Roe supports this view in his article, and states “desecuritization can disempower. Having issues settled by ‘ordinary’ politics is a nice idea: who would not prefer it to the threat of political violence? But ‘ordinary’ politics might not help in extraordinary circumstances; indeed, treating extraordinary issues as ordinary politics is a problem, not a solution” (Roe 261). He argues that subjects that have been placed in the realm of extraordinary politics – securitized realm – should stay there. The Netherlands is in a conundrum when it comes to its nuclear weapons policy and in the next chapter, the NBT negotiations is discussed.

Chapter 3: NBT negotiations

3.1. Driving force behind participation

The force behind the participation of the Netherlands in the NBT negotiations was already being formed after the Netherlands decided to be a host nation. One of the biggest peace movements for the disarmament of nuclear weapons in Europe happened in the Netherlands. In the 1970 and 1980s the mobilization of the Dutch peace movement was one of the first and longest in Western Europe (Miedema 262). It is important to note that since the 1970s, the Dutch Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Interchurch Peace Council has been fighting for the disarmament of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands. “In 1977, the IKV [Interchurch Peace Council] decided to start a long-term 10-year campaign to remove all nuclear weapons from the Netherlands. IKV president […] proposed that a smaller Western European country, such as the Netherlands, should remove nuclear weapons and this would start off a chain of disarmament” (Miedema 264). The Interchurch Peace Council has been actively protesting against nuclear weapons since then. In 2006, this council merged with another NGO in the Netherlands named PAX.

In April of 2007, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) was globally launched. “ICAN is a broad, inclusive campaign, focused on mobilizing civil society around the world to support the specific objective of prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons” (“People and Structure”). The Netherlands has partner organizations associated with ICAN, among which are PAX, the Dutch Medical Association for Peace Research, Pugwash and Artsen voor Vrede. In 2017, ICAN won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for drawing attention to the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons and for its work in achieving a treaty-based prohibition.

When the General Assembly of the UN gathered in 2012, the nations expressed their concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequence of the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the General Assembly adopted resolution 67/56, entitled “taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations” (“Treaty on … UNODA.”). With this resolution, the General Assembly established an open-ended working group in 2013. This group would develop ideas and proposals in order to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. Therefore, three international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons were held in 2013 and 2014. These conferences were attended by a large majority of states and by hundreds of

representatives of NGOs. These were being coordinated by ICAN (“Treaty on … UNODA.”). After these conferences, ICAN campaigned for the establishment of another special UN working group, the task of which was to examine specific ideas for nuclear disarmament. This special working group met in Geneva in February, May and August 2016. Eventually, it issued a report advocating for the negotiations of a ban treaty (“The Campaign”). These conferences of the special working group led to the Humanitarian Initiative, in which the deep concerns were expressed about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences in case of the use of nuclear weapons The Humanitarian Initiative presented a renewed way to look at the possible consequences of the deployment of nuclear weapons. This not only motivated politicians to fight for disarmament, but many NGOs, medical doctors, civil society groups and citizens all over the world began supporting this initiative. It has been one of the most successful peace movements on behalf of the disarmament of nuclear weapons, because it led to NBT, and as result 50 States signed the treaty (United Nations). Moreover, after many years, the Humanitarian Initiative was a new way to advance nuclear disarmament through legal means. Therefore, it filled a legal gap towards advancing the nuclear disarmament agenda (Onderco 1). This Humanitarian Initiative resulted in the most recent proposal, the NBT.

The process that set the active participation in motion in the Netherlands, was the pressure from NGOs in the Netherlands. PAX collected 40,000 signatures against storing nuclear weapons. After this, a parliamentary debate was triggered. The debate was set on April 28, 2016, with the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Bert Koenders, and it lasted for four hours. During this debate, different motions were approved in favor of a nuclear ban. These were supported by the coalition parties as well as the opposition. The result of this debate was that the Netherlands would play a constructive role at the UN open-ended working group in August of 2016 (Sauer and Reveraert 16).

3.2 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Hence, PAX was the leading organization behind the debate concerning the popular initiative to create a nuclear ban. As said before, the debate was held on April 28, 2016. In total, 13 motions were filed that day. The first motion was filed by Mr. Van Bommel, member of the SP, noting that the Netherlands had previously supported the bans on chemical weapons, biological weapons, landmines and cluster munitions, among others. Furthermore, he noted that the use of

nuclear weapons cannot distinguish between civilians and military personnel and that the effects of nuclear weapons cannot be limited in time or distance. So, he called upon the government to draw up national legislation for a comprehensive ban on the use and threats of use, possession, testing, acquisition, development, production, financing, deployment and transfer of nuclear weapons under all circumstances (Van Bommel). This motion was not supported by a majority of parliament.

Mr. Voordewind, member of the Christian Union (CU) party, did file a motion that was supported by a majority of parliament. He noted that the Netherlands has nuclear weapons tasks within NATO and so he called on the government, in consultation with the US, to work on phasing out Dutch nuclear weapons tasks (Voordewind). Mr. Van Bommel’s motion was dismissed because it was too detailed and the Netherlands could not live up to these demands, contrary to Mr. Voordewind’s motion, which was adopted because it was a more general statement. As mentioned before, even though not all motions were supported by the majority, the debate led to the active participation of the Netherlands in the NBT negotiations.

On March 24, 2017, the Dutch government informed the House of Representatives of its efforts regarding the participation in the first round of negotiations held at the UN in New York City. Before the Dutch delegation went to New York, its members wrote a parliamentary document to inform the members of the Dutch House of Representatives of the key points for the Netherlands’ participation in the negotiations (Koenders and Hennis-Plasschaert). First of all, the Treaty should be an effective step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Treaty should complement existing legal documents and in particular the NPT Treaty. It should also enjoy widespread support within the UN and non-nuclear weapon states. Furthermore, the most relevant requirement was that a ban on nuclear weapons has to be verifiable. Transparency and verification are essential building blocks of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Verification of dismantlement is key to prevent the nuclear ban from going awry (Onderco 4). Without proper verification, there is no base to make other countries comply to the new treaty. Moreover, verification is pre-eminently an area of disarmament where non-nuclear-weapons-bearing countries have a concrete and important role to play. Lastly, a ban has to be compatible with the Dutch commitments as an ally to NATO, a nuclear alliance. NATO adheres to the principles of the US nuclear policy, including the notion that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist (Koenders, A.G., and J.A. Hennis-Plasschaert). Although the Netherlands