Framing the volunteer: Influences of framing and maximizing in a volunteer's dilemma

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FRAMING THE VOLUNTEER

Master thesis proposal Psychology Specialization Economic and Consumer Psychology Institute of Psychology Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences Leiden University Date: 18-12-2017 Student number: 1949314 First examiner of the university: Erik De Kwaadsteniet Second examiner of the university: Fieke Harinck

MAUD SANTING

In collaboration with:

Nicolette Nijhuis

Influences of framing and maximizing in a volunteer’s dilemma

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Master Thesis – Framing the Volunteer

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Abstract

The present study investigated the influence of framing and maximizing in a volunteer’s dilemma. An online experiment with two conditions (gain frame and loss frame) was conducted. Contradicting our prediction, participants cooperated more in a loss frame than in a gain frame (Hypothesis 1). Maximizing seemed to have no effect in the volunteer’s dilemma (Hypothesis 2). The first finding is surprising since it contradicts the influential and replicated Prospect Theory. Prospect Theory states that individuals are risk seeking in the negative domain and risk-averse in the positive domain. In the volunteer’s dilemma, they thereby should be more inclined to defect in the loss frame than in the gain frame. Our findings could explain a reversed loss aversion effect when dealing with small amounts of money. It also could be that Prospect Theory predicts behaviour in individual decision-making, but does not predict behaviour in decision-making in a social setting.

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Content Introduction

Social dilemma’s 4

Framing effects and Prospect Theory 7

Maximizers and satisficers 10

Hypotheses 12

Method

Participants 13

Design 14

Procedure 14

The ‘valence’ manipulation 15

Measuring maximization 16

Materials and analysis 17

Results

Exclusion 17

Manipulation check 17

Influence of framing in the volunteer’s dilemma 17 Influence of maximizing in the volunteer’s dilemma 18 Discussion

Framing effects and Prospect Theory 19

Maximizing 23

Limitations and further research 24

References 26 Appendices Appendix I 29 Appendix II 30 Appendix III 31 Appendix IV 34 Appendix V 37

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Introduction

Imagine that you are on holiday with a group of friends in the same holiday house. Because of a storm, a window broke and now there is a lot of broken glass all over the holiday house. Who should clean up? If no one does this, the mess of the broken glass will be lying all around the holiday house, which is annoying for the whole group. If one person volunteers to clean up, the rest will benefit from not having done so. What would you do?

People constantly have to deal with their social environment. On the one hand, there are situations where most people agree on something instantly, for instance, sometimes people’s interests are all aligned. On the other hand, there are situations where your personal goals conflict with the goals of the group, also called social dilemmas. Social dilemmas can be defined as situations in which personal and collective interests are at odds (Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). In order to produce public goods in societies, these mixed-motive social dilemmas often happen (Komorita & Parks, 1994). In these situations, large voluntary contributions have to be made, such as volunteering work in charitable organizations (Chen, Gross, & Dieckmann, 2013).

The volunteer’s dilemma, as described in the holiday house example above, is a situation in which only one person has to volunteer in order to produce a public good (Diekmann & Przepiorka, 2015). In other words, someone has to pay a cost (volunteer) in order to realize a beneficial outcome for the whole group, irrespective of the others’ contributions (free-riding) (Chen et al., 2013). Which person or how many persons volunteer is not important, but at least one person has to do it

(Poundstone, 1992). In contrast, if nobody volunteers, the public good is not produced and the whole group has to pay a cost that is higher than the cost of volunteering

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(Chen et al., 2013). A volunteer reaps benefit from his or her action if nobody else volunteers. Yet, if another group member, or multiple group members, also volunteer, people can feel that their voluntary investment is wasted (Archetti, 2009). Free-riding when someone else volunteers, is the most beneficial outcome. As a consequence, the possibility that the mutually beneficial outcome is not produced increases, because everybody is hoping for someone else to volunteer (Diekmann & Przepiorka, 2015).

A related situation is the ‘game of chicken’. This game is named after a scene from the movie from 1955 ‘Rebel without a cause’ where reckless teenage boys play a game driving cars heads on towards each other at a high speed. As the cars approach each other, each driver has two options, to either swerve (cooperate) or not (defect). If only one driver swerves, that driver is called chicken, and the other person wins. If they both swerve, both are called chicken. Finally, if they both do not swerve, they will both die, which is the worst possible outcome (Totzauer, Chojnacki, & Hofmann, 2006).

The volunteer’s dilemma can be seen as a multi-person version of the game of chicken. In a two-person game of chicken, one person has to ‘cooperate’ (swerve) in order to reach the goal of the common good (Poundstone, 1992). In the volunteer’s dilemma and the game of chicken, the best outcome is that the public good is produced, with you defecting (free-riding, F). In the volunteer’s dilemma, this outcome is seen as free-riding and in the game of chicken, you are seen as fearless. The second-best outcome in the volunteer’s dilemma and the game of chicken is that you are the only one who cooperates. Hereby, the public good will be produced because you made the sacrifice of volunteering (sucker, S). The next consecutive outcome in both of the games is that multiple players cooperate (multiple cooperation, M), which can make you feel that your voluntary investment is wasted, but at least the

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public good is being produced (Archetti, 2009). The worst outcome in both of the games is if all players decide to defect (all defect, D). The public good will hereby not be produced. The outcomes of the volunteer’s dilemma and the game of chicken can be specified as F > S > M > D and can be seen in a representation in Table 1.

Table 1. Representation of the possible outcomes of the volunteer’s dilemma Other group members

At least one cooperates No one cooperates Your choice Cooperate Multiple cooperation (M) Sucker (S)

Defect Free-riding (F) All defect (D)

The volunteer’s dilemma in its generalization can be applied to many different social settings. For instance, who will call the electricity company when the power in your neighborhood has fallen out? Who has to clean up the mess in a shared

accommodation? Or who will volunteer to help in an emergency?

A lot of factors can influence a person’s decision to volunteer or not. A factor that has been demonstrated to influence volunteering is group size. The most

notorious example is the murder of Kitty Genovese in 1964 in the courtyard of her apartment complex in full view of a large number of neighbors while nobody helped (Goeree, Holt, & Smith, 2017). This phenomenon was later called ‘the bystander effect’. This effect describes that when the number of people that is present increases, volunteer rates decline. This phenomenon is called ‘diffusion of responsibility’ (Darley & Latane, 1968).

The volunteer’s dilemma has been researched less than some other games, such as the game of chicken and the prisoner’s dilemma. This research will focus on

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two factors that might influence decisions in the volunteer’s dilemma and that have not yet been researched, namely framing and maximizing. As stated above, the outcomes of the game of chicken and the volunteer’s dilemma show overlap, and can be seen as gains and losses. De Heus, Hoogervorst and Van Dijk (2010) found that in a chicken game, framing the dilemma in a positive frame or a negative frame has an influence on decision- making. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate this influence in the volunteer’s dilemma.

Framing effects and Prospect Theory

The first factor is whether framing the volunteer’s dilemma in a positive outcome or a negative outcome can influence people’s decision-making. Social dilemmas, including the volunteer’s dilemma, can be either about positive outcomes or negative outcomes (De Heus et al., (2010). Earlier research has shown that framing can have major effects in social dilemmas (Kahneman & Tversky (1981), however this effect is not yet being researched in a volunteer’s dilemma. A famous example is the ‘Asian disease problem’ described by Kahneman and Tversky (1981). Here, a problem is framed in terms of how many people could be saved by a treatment versus how many people could be killed by a disease. The problem was phrased in a way that this ‘unusual Asian disease’ could kill 600 people and that the participants could choose between two treatments. When the two alternatives were phrased in positive outcomes (how many people will be saved by the treatment), 72% of the participants chose the sure option - that the treatment would save 200 people for certain (option A) against a 1/3 chance that 600 people could be saved (option B). On the contrary, when the two alternatives where phrased in negative outcomes (how many people would be killed by the disease), 78% of the participants chose the risky alternative - that with the treatment 400 people will die (option B) against a 2/3 chance that all 600 people

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would die (option A). When comparing both options in the positive frame and in the negative frame, option A offered certainty and option B offered uncertainty.

Objectively, the options were the same, because they would save the same amount of people with the same odds. The big difference in the two frames was the reference point. The reference point can be defined as the status quo; what people have when they start. The framing effect, as described by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), was a reversal in the majority choices of subjects receiving different framings of the decision problem outcomes. They were the first to argue that the reversal occurred because people viewed positive outcomes as gains and negative outcomes as losses (Miller & Fagley, 1991).

In which social dilemma will people be more cooperative, or in other words, in which social dilemma will people be prepared to volunteer more often? One that is about gains or one that is about losses? The volunteer’s dilemma can also be framed in two ways, in a gain frame and in a loss frame. In a gain frame people start with zero and have the possibility to increase their incomes. In a loss frame people start with an endowment and can decide how much they want to contribute (Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995). This can be illustrated best by an example with Christmas presents. In the gain frame, a group of people start with nothing and can receive an expensive present when one person decides to receive a less expensive present. On the other hand, in the loss frame, a group of people all start with an expensive present. In order to keep the expensive presents for the group, one person has to decide to receive a less expensive present. The reference point in both of the frames hereby differs. These frames both include a conflict between a personal and a collective interest but show a difference in frame.

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Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) states that people are risk- averse in the positive domain and risk seeking in the negative domain. People compare the possible situation with their reference point; what they had when they started. Another important aspect of Prospect Theory is that there is a difference between the objective value and the subjective value. This means that negative outcomes have a higher impact than positive outcomes, which makes the curve

steeper in the negative domain than in the positive domain, as can be seen in Figure 1. The shape of the value of gains is called ‘concavity’ and the shape of the value of losses is called ‘convexity’ (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).

Figure 1. Visual representation of Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).

Research by De Heus et al., (2010) showed that the use of Prospect Theory could be meaningful for decision-making in social dilemmas. A condition for this to work is that the dilemma should clearly distinguish between a riskier and a less risky option, which is the case in the volunteer’s dilemma. The options in the volunteer’s dilemma vary in riskiness. As an example, when you choose to defect, you can either get the highest outcome when someone else cooperates, or you can get the lowest outcome when everybody chooses to defect. The option to defect hereby is riskier

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than the option to cooperate, because when you cooperate you will definitively

produce the public good. De Heus et al., (2010) found that in a chicken game, framing the dilemma in a positive frame or a negative frame has an influence on decision- making. They found that people defect more in a loss frame than in a gain frame, which is consistent with Prospect Theory. De Heus et al., (2010) also stated that framing effects can only occur when the option that can lead to the highest outcome (you are defecting and someone else is cooperating) can also lead to the lowest

outcome (you are defecting and someone else also is defecting). This condition is also met in the volunteer’s dilemma and can thereby be applied to it.

If, according to Prospect Theory, individuals are risk seeking in a loss frame and risk-averse in a gain frame, they should be more inclined towards defection in a loss frame than in a gain frame (Kahneman & Tversky, 1983). A condition that De Heus et al., (2010) stated is that framing effects can occur when one option can lead to the highest outcome and the lowest outcome. Since this condition is also met in the volunteer’s dilemma a framing effect can be expected. Therefore, the first hypothesis predicts that people in general are less inclined to cooperate in a loss frame than in a gain frame (Hypothesis 1).

Maximizers and satisficers

Secondly, this research focuses on different types of people, namely specified to maximizers and satisficers. Because the options in the volunteer’s dilemma vary in risk, it is fascinating to examine if maximizers and satisficers respond differently to this risk in the volunteer’s dilemma. Schwartz, Ward, Monterosso, Lyubomirsky, White and Lehman (2002) distinguished satisficers and maximizers in decision-making. Maximizers can be defined as people who search and choose for the option with the highest utility. Choosing this option requires an exhaustive search of all

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possibilities. Satisficers, on the other hand, can be defined as people who choose an option that is good enough. In other words, they search until encountering an option that reaches the threshold of acceptability (Schwartz et al., 2002). Maximizers tend to make objectively better decisions than satisficers, but spend way more time and effort in their search than satisficers. Thereby they report less satisfaction with their choices, are less committed to their choices, use more social comparison during the decision making, and experience more regret after the decision-making process (Patalano, Weizenbaum, Lolli, & Anderson, 2015). These findings might be explained by the fact that people who elaborate on all possibilities have difficulties in knowing which option is best (Mogilner, Shiy, & Iyengar, 2013).

Interestingly, there is little research about maximizers and satisficers in decision-making in social dilemmas, while they use different approaches when making decisions. Research has shown that there are many individual differences in decision-making. A difference that has been examined, as stated earlier, is risk aversion. These differences in decision-making might have an influence on the decision that has to be made in the volunteer’s dilemma. Since the options in the volunteer’s dilemma vary in the degree of risk, these differences could lead to contrasting decisions of maximizers and satisficers.

Schwartz et al., (2002) stated that maximizers search for the option with the highest utility, but what option has the highest utility? With defecting, you can either get the highest outcome when someone else cooperates, or you can get the lowest outcome when everybody chooses to defect. Defecting is hereby the riskiest choice. According to Lai (2010) maximizing and risk aversion are positively related. They state that this could be because maximizers associate risk by choice as particularly undesirable. This risk is incompatible with the high standards maximizers have in

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their decision-making. The highest individual outcome in a volunteer’s dilemma is that the public good is being produced without volunteering (free-riding) (Diekmann & Przepiorka, 2015). However, the risk of choosing for the highest individual utility option is that no one of the group chooses to cooperate, whereby you will get the lowest outcome. The risk-averse choice, which is cooperating, thereby seems most appealing for maximizers. When choosing this option, the public good will definitely be produced. With this in mind, maximizers will therefore cooperate in a volunteer’s dilemma since they will definitely not get the lowest outcome, which is the averse option. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1983) people in general are risk-averse in a gain frame and risk seeking in a loss frame. Since maximizers tend to be more risk-averse than satisficers, according to Lai (2010), maximizers will cooperate more in both of the frames. The second hypothesis expects a positive relation between the Maximization Tendency Scale (Dalal, Diab, Zhu, & Hwang, 2015) and the

probability that people will cooperate in both of the frames (Hypothesis 2). This research focuses on the influence of framing and maximizing in the volunteer’s dilemma. Reasoning leads to two hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: People in general are less inclined to cooperate in a loss frame than in a gain frame.

Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relation between the Maximization Tendency Scale and the probability that people will cooperate in both of the frames.

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Method

In order to research whether a gain frame or a loss frame has different

influences in a volunteer’s dilemma and whether this could be different in maximizers and satisficers, an experiment with two conditions (gain frame vs. loss frame) was conducted.

Participants

In this research, 108 participants were recruited via our personal networks. A pre-determined criterion was that all participants needed to speak and understand the Dutch language in order to participate. Participants were sent an online link via social media. The participants in our research received €1,50 as compensation for their participation with the possibility of receiving a €2,50 bonus.

Exclusion. Participants who filled in the questions in less than three minutes were excluded from the sample. Considering the amount of text in the experiment, it was not possible to read and comprehend all of the text in a period shorter than three minutes. Participants who wrongly answered both of the ‘comprehension questions’, were also excluded from the sample, because of a large probability that these people did not fully understand the consequences of their choices in the game. The excluded participants were paid normally.

After exclusion, 48 participants (49%) took part in the gain frame and 50 participants (51%) took part in the loss frame. The participants were 98 people, of which 59 (60.20%) were female and 39 (39.80%) were male. The mean age was 24.05 (SD = 7.41) with a minimal age of 18 and a maximum age of 62.

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Design

The design was a between subject design, with random assignment of

participants to the loss frame or the gain frame, which was done by the online survey design program Qualtrics. The dependent variable was the dichotomous choice made between cooperation and defection in the volunteer’s dilemma. The independent variables were the type of frame (loss frame and gain frame) and the maximizing score measured.

Procedure

The participants were sent a web-link to join an experiment about decision-making in groups. The link led them to a Qualtrics survey. The entire experiment was written in Dutch. When opening the link, first they read the informed consent, where was guaranteed that their answers would be recorded anonymously and confidentially and that they could stop at any moment in the experiment (Appendix I). It also stated that every participant received €1,50 for participating. As a bonus, depending on their decision in the volunteer’s dilemma, they could earn zero up to €2,50 extra. After the informed consent, they had to fill in a few demographic questions, about age and gender, and the Maximizing Tendency Scale – 7 (Dalal et al., 2015). The items were answered on a 7-point Likert scale (Appendix II). Next, they had to answer questions in a ‘filler experiment’. Here they had to compare two similar pictures and had to point out the first difference they saw in a heat map. The purpose of this ‘filler experiment’ was to distract the participants from the actual experiment by weakening the association between the answers in the Maximizing Tendency Scale – 7 and the questions about the volunteer’s dilemma. After completing these questions, they were told that this upcoming part would determine how much extra money they would earn. Thereafter, Qualtrics randomly assigned them to either the gain frame or the loss

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frame, where two questions were asked to confirm that the participants understood the assignment. After each ‘comprehension question’, the right answer was given. They were informed that they were linked to three other participants and with these other participants they would participate in a group task. The decision they had to make was whether they chose to go for the small bonus or the large bonus (gain frame), or whether they chose to pay €1,50 for the group, or not pay for the group (loss frame). After this decision, two last questions were asked. The first question was about ‘if receiving €2,50 felt like a gain or a loss’, to investigate whether the manipulation check worked. The second question was about what information they used as a reference point to make their decision (Appendix III & IV). Next, participants were asked to read the debriefing in which the goal of the experiment was revealed

(Appendix V). Here, they could also choose whether they wanted to be updated about the results of the experiment or not. In the end, they were thanked that they joined the experiment and had the option the fill in their necessary information for the payment. They could choose to get it at the university, to get it at their bank account or, if they were first year students at the University of Leiden, they had the possibility to choose for course credits.

The ‘valence’ manipulation

To manipulate the valence of the volunteer’s dilemma, the dilemma was framed in a ‘gain frame’ and a ‘loss frame’. The pay-off structure is shown in Table 2. In the gain frame, the participants started off with €1,50 and depending on their decisions and the decisions of the other ‘players’, they could earn a maximum bonus of €2,50, which brings the total maximum to €4,00. One participant of the group had to choose for the small bonus of €1,00, in order to get a bonus of €2,50 for the rest of

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the group. When no participant of the group had decided to choose the bonus of €1,00, no participant in the group would get a bonus.

In the loss frame, the participants started off with €4,00 and depending on their decisions and the decisions of the other ‘players’, they could lose a maximum of €2,50. To keep the €4,00, one participant had to pay €1,50 for the group. When no participant of the group had decided to pay €1,50 for the group, every participant had to pay €2,50 to the group.

Table 2. Payoff structure for both of the frames Other group members

At least one cooperates No one cooperates

Your choice Cooperate €2,50 €2,50

Defect €4,00 €1,50

Measuring maximization

To measure maximization, the Maximizing Tendency Scale (Dalal et al., 2015) was used (Appendix II). The MTS – 7 consists of 7 items, which were

answered on a 7-point Likert scale. The scale was translated to Dutch. During the pre-test, we noticed that question number five, ‘I am a maximizer’, was not clear.

Apparently, the concept of ‘maximizer’ was not well known. Hereby, we chose to use the definition of maximizing instead. Question number five eventually was changed into; ‘I always strive for the best outcome’. After the adjustment, the MTS – 7 still showed strong reliability (a=.84).

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Materials and analyses

To set up and run the experiment, the online survey design program Qualtrics was used. To analyse the data, IBM SPSS 23 was used.

Results Exclusion

Two participants were excluded because they filled in the questions in less than three minutes. Eight participants were excluded because they answered both of the ‘comprehension questions’ wrongly. Eventually, 10 participants were excluded from the sample. The data analysis was performed over the remaining participants (N = 98).

Manipulation check

To analyze whether there was an influence of framing in the volunteer’s dilemma, the framing manipulation was checked. The conditions were analyzed on the question ‘whether the small bonus felt like a gain or a loss’ in the gain frame and on the question ‘if getting €2,50 feels like a gain or a loss’ in the loss frame, by using a Chi-square test. The choice was dichotomous, it could be either perceived as a gain or perceived as a loss. The Chi-square test showed that the small outcome was not perceived differently in a gain frame than in a loss frame, χ2(1) = .47, p = .481. This

finding shows that the manipulation check was not perceived as intended. Influence of framing in the volunteer’s dilemma

To test hypothesis 1 ‘People in general are less inclined to cooperate in a loss frame than in a gain frame’, the cooperation rates should be higher in the gain frame than in the loss frame. A Chi-square test showed that there was a marginally

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rates in the loss frame, χ 2 (1) = 3,32, p = .068. In the gain frame 39.6% of the

participants cooperated and in the loss frame 58% of the participants cooperated. Surprisingly, participants cooperated more in a loss frame than in a gain frame, which can be seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Percentages of cooperation versus defection in a gain frame and a loss frame.

Influence of maximizing in the volunteer’s dilemma

To test hypothesis 2 ‘There is a positive relation between the

‘Maximization Tendency Scale’ and the probability that people will cooperate in both of the frames’, the cooperation rates of people with higher maximizing scores, should be higher than the cooperation rates of people with lower maximizing scores in both of the frames. To test this second hypothesis a logistic regression was performed with MTS-score as independent variable and choice as dichotomous dependent variable. The assumptions were checked beforehand. The first assumption for the logistic regression is met since the dependent variable is dichotomous (assumption 1), which

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is the choice between cooperation and defection. This choice is mutually exclusive, whereby assumption three is met (assumption 3) The second assumption is also met since the dependent variable is continuous (MTS-score) (assumption 2). The final assumption is linearity of the independent variable. To check this assumption a Box- Tidwell test was performed. This test showed a non-significant interaction between MTS-score and the natural log of the MTS-score (p = .216). Thereby, this last

assumption was also met (assumption 4). The Chi-square test showed no difference in cooperation rates of people with higher maximizing scores and people with lower cooperation scores, χ 2 (1) = .23, p = .629. This means that hypothesis 2 was not

corroborated.

Discussion

Does framing and maximizing have an influence in the volunteer’s dilemma? The present study investigated whether a gain frame or a loss frame has different influences in a volunteer’s dilemma and whether this could be different in maximizers and satisficers. An online experiment with two conditions (gain frame and loss frame) was conducted. Framing seemed to have an effect, namely participants cooperated more in a loss frame than in a gain frame (Hypothesis 1), whereas maximizing seems to have no effect in the volunteer’s dilemma (Hypothesis 2).

Framing effects and Prospect Theory

Firstly, we expected that people in a gain frame would cooperate more than in a loss frame. Contradicting this prediction, participants cooperated more in a loss frame than in a gain frame (Hypothesis 1). This finding is surprising since it contradicts the influential and replicated Prospect Theory. Prospect Theory

(Kahneman & Tversky, 1983) states that individuals are risk seeking in a loss frame and risk-averse in a gain frame. In the volunteer’s dilemma, they thereby should be

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more inclined towards cooperation in a gain frame than in a loss frame. De Heus et al., (2010) found that in a chicken game, framing the dilemma in a positive frame or a negative frame has an influence in decision-making. A prior condition that they stated is that framing effects can only occur when one option can lead to the highest

outcome and the lowest outcome, which is the option of defection. Since this

prerequisite was met in the volunteer’s dilemma, a framing effect was expected. Our study seems to extend the study of De Heus, et al., (2010). Their study, however, found that people defect more in a loss frame than in a gain frame, which is consistent with Prospect Theory. They stated that framing effects could be expected in N-person chicken games, in which the worst outcome is for the person who defects, if the public good remains unrealized.

To compare the present research with the research of De Heus, et al., (2010), we can have a look at three differences. At first, the number of players in both of the frames in both of the studies. The chicken game that De Heus, et al., (2010) studied consisted of two persons, while our volunteer’s dilemma consisted of four persons. Since in both of the studies, these number of persons in the frames were equal, this could not have influenced the effect we found in our study. However, it could be that framing effects occur differently when the number of persons increases.

The second difference is their use of lottery tickets and our use of money. Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) found that loss aversion is weaker for exchange goods, such as money, than for consumption goods. This predicts a diminished effect when using money, but on the other hand, does not explain why the expected effect was suddenly reversed.

The third and final difference is the payoff structure. The payoff structure in the present study differs from De Heus, et al., (2010). In the study of De Heus et al.,

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(2010) the participants could win zero, one, two, or three lottery tickets in the gain frame. In the loss frame the participants started with three lottery tickets and depending on their choices, they could lose between zero and three tickets. In the present research, the participants in the gain frame started off with €1,50 and could receive, a bonus of zero, €1,00 or €2,50 depending on their choices. The participants in the loss frame started off with €4,00 and could lose zero, €1,50 or €2,50. The big difference between the two studies is that De Heus et al., (2010) has an absolute zero-point, and our study did not. The reference point thereby differs. The use of an

absolute zero-point can make the subjective difference bigger. The subjective value in the present study is smaller, which could also explain a diminished loss aversion effect, but again not why the expected effect was suddenly reversed.

Research of Harinck, Van Dijk, Van Beest and Mersmann (2007) found that loss aversion reversed when dealing with small amounts of money. Our research also seems to extend this study. They stated that ‘people can anticipate on the effect of coping mechanisms for small losses, but not for large losses’. First, people are aware that minor negative incidents will have a smaller impact than major negative incidents (Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). In short, people think that small financial losses are less important than large financial losses, because the impact is less. Second, people can know from experience, that small losses are unlikely to hurt them significantly and are less threatening, whereas large losses are less common and therefore less familiar. This is caused by the fact that people have less exposure to large losses than to small losses (Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006).

Harinck et al., (2007) found classic loss aversion when dealing with large amounts of money (e.g. €50,00), but reversed loss aversion when dealing with small amounts of money (e.g. €1,00). Our research proposes that the curve in Prospect

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Theory could be different for small amounts of money. When small losses can be discounted for, the shape of the curve should be concave for small amounts and convex for large amounts in the negative domain. A visual representation can be seen in Figure 3. Since the shape of the curve differs in the positive- and in the negative domain, the subjective value difference between the possible amounts of money (e.g.

€1,50, €2,50 or €4,00) is therefore smaller in the loss frame than in the gain frame. This difference in subjective value can, according to Harinck et al., (2007), be explained by the fact that people can discount for smaller losses. Because of this difference in subjective value, people are less inclined to take a risk in the loss frame than in the gain frame. In our study, this difference in the shape of the curve could explain why people cooperated more in a loss frame and defected more in a gain frame.

Figure 3. Visual representation of Prospect Theory with an adaptation for the curve

for small amounts in the negative domain (red line).

Another aspect that could explain our results is the influence of a social context. Prospect Theory mainly focuses on individual decisions. Since the

participants received money on the basis of their decision and the decision of others, this social context might have influenced the participants. Research of Linde and

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Sonnemans (2012) studied this influence of social context. They found that people are more risk averse in the loss situation than in the gain situation. Using a social

reference point, in the loss situation the participants were ensured that they could earn at most as much as their referent, and in the gain situation they could earn at least as much as their referent. Research of Bault, Coricelli and Rustichini (2008) found that losses loom larger than gains in individual decision-making, while gains loom larger than losses in a social situation. These two studies both implicate that a social reference point influences behaviour in a different direction than Prospect Theory expects with a standard reference point. A possible explanation for these findings and our finding is given by the study of Vendrik and Woltjer (2007). They stated that the utility functions are concave above and below the social reference points, while a ‘normal’ reference point leads to a convex utility function for losses. When the shape of the curve is concave when using a social reference point, this explains fewer risk seeking decisions in the loss domain than in the gain domain.

Maximizers

Secondly, current research predicted a positive relation between the

‘Maximization Tendency Scale’ and the probability that people will cooperate in both of the frames. However, the results showed no relation between the ‘Maximization Tendency Scale’ and cooperation or defection in either frame (Hypothesis 2).

This finding contradicts with the research of Lai (2010), which stated that maximizing and risk aversion are positively related. They state that this could be because

maximizers associate risk by choice as particularly undesirable. The highest

individual outcome in a volunteer’s dilemma is that the public good is being produced without you volunteering (Diekmann & Przepiorka, 2015). However, choosing for the highest individual utility option is linked to the risk that no one of the group chooses

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to cooperate, whereby you will get the lowest outcome. The risk-averse choice, which is cooperating, thereby seems most appealing for maximizers. When choosing this option, the public good will definitely be produced. With this in mind, maximizers will cooperate in a volunteer’s dilemma because then they will definitely not get the lowest outcome, which is the risk-averse option. On the other hand, Schwartz et al., (2002) found that maximizers are more likely to engage in social comparison and are more sensitive to social comparison. When looking at social comparison, defection is the only choice that can make this person happy. This could be because with

cooperating, they will receive less than other group members. People will socially compare themselves with the other group members and will think that cooperating will result in receiving less than their fellow group members. Thereby, it could be that risk-aversion could lead to higher rates of cooperation, while social comparison could lead to higher rates of defection. It could be that these two effects neutralize each other. This could explain why, in this research, there is no effect of the ‘Maximization Tendency Scale’ and the probability that people will cooperate in both frames. In future research, social comparison could be included as a covariate in the relation between the ‘Maximization Tendency Scale’ and cooperation in a volunteer’s dilemma.

Limitations and further research

Within the conducted research, a limitation which may have been of influence on the results, should be discussed. The manipulation check appeared to be

insignificant, which means that the small outcome was not perceived differently in the gain frame than in the loss frame. This key element could have influenced the

experiment. In both of the frames, the small outcome was perceived as a gain. This might be caused by social desirability. Because we recruited the participants via our

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personal networks, and thereby most of the participants personally know us, they may have thought that it would be ungrateful to answer that ‘the small outcome would feel like a loss’.

For future research, it would be interesting to investigate to which minimum amounts of money the typical loss aversion effect is found and at which amount this changes to a reversed loss aversion effect. With this, boundaries of ‘small amounts of money’ can be determined. In order to research social dilemma’s, future research should preferably not be done with small amounts of money, because social dilemmas in real life often concern larger amounts of money, objects of larger value or

interpersonal conflicts. Another interesting research would be to further investigate the influence of a social setting on Prospect Theory. To test if maximizing influences the choices made in social dilemmas, it would be interesting to include social

comparison as a covariate, as is stated above. This could (partly) help explain our results.

Concluding, our findings could explain a reversed loss aversion effect when dealing with small amounts of money. It also could be that Prospect Theory predicts behaviour in individual making, but does not predict behaviour in decision-making in a social setting.

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References

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Bault, N., Coricelli, G., & Rustichini, A. (2008). Interdependent utilities: how social ranking affects choice behavior. PloS one, 3(10), e3477.

Chen, X., Gross, T., & Dieckmann, U. (2013). Shared rewarding overcomes defection traps in generalized volunteer's dilemmas. Journal of theoretical biology, 335, 13-21.

Dalal, D. K., Diab, D. L., Zhu, X. S., & Hwang, T. (2015). Understanding the construct of maximizing tendency: A theoretical and empirical evaluation. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 28(5), 437-450.

Darley, J. M., & Latane, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: diffusion of responsibility. Journal of personality and social psychology, 8(4p1), 377. De Cote, E. M., Lazaric, A., and Restelli, M. (2006). Learning to cooperate in multi agent social dilemmas. In Proc. of the 5th Int. Joint Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 783–785.

De Heus, P., Hoogervorst, N., & Van Dijk, E. (2010). Framing prisoners and chickens: Valence effects in the prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken game. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(5), 736-742.

Diekmann, A., & Przepiorka, W. (2015). “Take One for the Team!” Individual Heterogeneity and the Emergence of Latent Norms in a Volunteer's Dilemma.

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Harinck, F., Van Dijk, E., Van Beest, I., & Mersmann, P. (2007). When gains loom larger than losses: Reversed loss aversion for small amounts of money. Psychological science, 18(12), 1099-1105.

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Komorita, S. S., & Parks, C. D. (1994). Social dilemmas. Brown & Benchmark. Lai, L. (2010). Maximizing without difficulty: A modified maximizing scale and its correlates. Judgment and Decision Making, 5(3), 164.

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Schwartz, B., Ward, A., Monterosso, J., Lyubomirsky, S., White, K., & Lehman, D. R. (2002). Maximizing versus satisficing: happiness is a matter of

choice. Journal of personality and social psychology, 83(5), 1178.

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psychology, 53(1), 1-26.

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Weber, J. M., Kopelman, S., & Messick, D. M. (2004). A conceptual review of decision making in social dilemmas: Applying a logic of appropriateness. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8(3), 281-307.

Willems, E. P., Arseneau, T. J. M., Schleuning, X., & van Schaik, C. P. (2015). Communal range defence in primates as a public goods dilemma. Phil. Trans.

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Appendices

Appendix I. Explanation about the experiment and informed consent

(English version and used Dutch version)

English version;

In a minute you will join an experiment about decision-making in groups. This will approximately take 10 minutes of your time.

For participating in this experiment you will receive €1,50. You can earn extra money in a group task (minimal €0,- and maximal €2,50 extra).

Participating is completely voluntarily and non-committal. This means that at all times, without a statement of reason, you can stop your participation. We will keep our right to only pay you for the time that you participated and to not give you the total reward.

All the data of the experiment will be handled anonymously. All data will be anonymously processed and kept. There will be taken care of that unauthorized persons will not have access to the data and that the data will not be diverted to the participants.

This experiment is being coordinated by Erik de Kwaadsteniet (tel: 071 - 577 4109, email: kwaadsteniet@fsw.leidenuniv.nl). If you have any questions of complaints you can contact him.

Dutch version;

U zult zo dadelijk meedoen aan een onderzoek over het nemen van beslissingen in groepen. Dit neemt ongeveer 10 minuten van uw tijd in beslag.

Voor deelname aan dit onderzoek krijgt u €1,50. Daarbij kunt u nog extra geld verdienen in een groepstaak (minimaal €0,- en maximaal €2,50 extra).

Deelname aan dit onderzoek is geheel vrijwillig en vrijblijvend. Dit betekent dat u te allen tijde, zonder opgaaf van reden, kunt besluiten om deelname aan het onderzoek te beëindigen. Wij behouden ons het recht voor om u dan alleen het bedrag uit te betalen voor de tijd die u hebt deelgenomen aan het onderzoek, en u dus niet de totale beloning uit te keren.

Alle informatie die in het kader van dit onderzoek wordt verzameld, wordt als strikt vertrouwelijk behandeld. Alle gegevens worden in anonieme vorm verwerkt en bewaard. Er zal voor worden gezorgd dat onbevoegden er geen inzage in krijgen en ook dat de gegevens niet tot personen zijn terug te leiden.

Dit onderzoek wordt gecoördineerd door Erik de Kwaadsteniet (telefoon: 071 - 577 4109, email: kwaadsteniet@fsw.leidenuniv.nl). Indien u vragen of klachten heeft over dit onderzoek, kunt u contact met hem opnemen.

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Appendix II. Maximization scale and information on how to answer (English version and used Dutch version)

English version;

Following is a questionnaire with 7 statements about the way you make decisions. We ask you to indicate the extent to which you agree with the statement. The answer scale has 7 points, which vary from ‘totally disagree’ to ‘totally agree’. Would you like to fill in all the questions and with each question ask yourself how you would handle this in daily life?

1. No matter what I do, I have the highest standards for myself. 2. I never settle for second best

3. No matter what it takes, I always try to choose the best thing 4. I don’t like having to settle for ‘good enough’

5. I am a maximizer

6. I will wait for the best option, no matter how long it takes 7. I never settle

Dutch version;

Er volgt een vragenlijst met 7 stellingen over de manier waarop u beslissingen maakt. Wij vragen u om aan te geven in hoeverre u het eens bent met de stelling. De

antwoordschaal heeft 7 punten, die variëren van 'helemaal mee oneens' tot 'helemaal mee eens'. Wilt u alle vragen invullen en bij elke vraag even stilstaan hoe u dit in het dagelijks leven aanpakt?

1. Het maakt niet uit wat ik doe, ik hanteer altijd de hoogste standaarden voor mijzelf. 2. Ik neem nooit genoegen met de tweede plaats.

3. Koste wat het kost, ik probeer altijd de beste optie te kiezen. 4. Ik neem niet graag genoegen met 'goed genoeg'.

5. Ik streef altijd naar de beste uitkomst.

6. Ik zal wachten op de beste optie, ongeacht hoe lang het duurt. 7. Ik neem niet snel ergens genoegen mee.

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Appendix III. Gain frame manipulation

English version;

You are linked to three other participants. Together with these three other participants you will do a group-task. So you are in a group of four persons. In this task, every group member starts with €1,50. This reward you will get for participating in this experiment. Every group member can also earn a bonus of €2,50, what brings the maximal individual amount to €4,-. To get the bonus, one group member has to choose for a lower bonus of €1,-. However, when no one chooses to go for the lower bonus of €1,-, the whole group will not get a bonus.

Now two questions will follow in order to check if you understand the outcomes. You cannot earn money with these questions.

When you choose for the lower bonus of €1,-, the other group players will get in total (compensation + bonus)….

A. €1,50 B. €2,50 C. €4,00

The right answer is answer C (€4,-). When one player chooses the smaller bonus, all other player will get the larger bonus. When no one chooses the lower bonus, no one will get a bonus.

Repetition: You are linked to three other participants. Together with these three other participants you will do a group-task. So you are in a group of four persons. In this task, every group member starts with €1,50. This reward you will get for participating in this experiment. Every group member can also earn a bonus of €2,50, what brings the maximal individual amount to €4,-. To get the bonus, one group member has to choose for a lower bonus of €1,-. However, when no one chooses to go for the lower bonus of €1,-, the whole group will not get a bonus.

When you will not choose for the lower bonus of €1, and the other players also not choose for the lower bonus, you will get….

A. €1,50 B. €2,50 C. €4,00

The right answer is answer A (€1,50). When no one chooses for the lower bonus, no one will get a bonus. The €1,50 is a compensation for your participation.

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This part of the experiment will determine the amount of your reward

You are linked to three other participants. Together with these three other participants you will do a group-task. So you are in a group of four persons. In this task, every group member starts with €1,50. This reward you will get for participating in this experiment. Every group member can also earn a bonus of €2,50, what brings the maximal individual amount to €4,-. To get the bonus, one group member has to choose for a lower bonus of €1,-. However, when no one chooses to go for the lower bonus of €1,-, the whole group will not get a bonus.

Which option do you choose?

I choose the lower bonus of €1,00 I choose the bigger bonus

Below there are two statements, with which statement do you agree most?

Getting a bonus of €1,00 feels like a gain Getting a bonus of €1,00 feels like a loss

While deciding I compared my outcome with….

The amount that the others players would get The minimal amount that you could get (€1,50) Other, …..

Dutch version;

U bent gelinkt aan drie andere participanten. Samen met deze drie andere deelnemers gaat u een groepstaak doen. U zit dus in een groep van vier personen. In deze taak begint ieder groepslid met €1,50. Deze beloning krijgt u voor deelname aan het onderzoek. Elk groepslid kan echter ook een bonus verdienen van €2,50, wat het maximale individuele bedrag op €4,- brengt. Om de bonus te ontvangen, moet één groepslid kiezen voor een lagere bonus, zijnde €1,-. Echter, wanneer niemand kiest voor de lagere bonus van €1,- krijgt niemand in de groep een bonus.

Er volgen nu twee vragen om te controleren of u de uitkomsten begrijpt. Hiermee kunt u nog geen geld verdienen.

Wanneer u kiest voor de lagere bonus van €1,-, ontvangen de andere spelers in totaal (vergoeding + bonus)...

A. €1,50 B. €2,50 C. €4,00

Het juiste antwoord is antwoord C (€4,-). Wanneer één speler kiest voor de lagere bonus, krijgen alle andere spelers de hogere bonus. Wanneer niemand kiest voor de lagere bonus, ontvangt niemand een bonus.

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Herhaling: U bent gelinkt aan drie andere participanten. Samen met deze drie andere deelnemers gaat u een groepstaak doen. U zit dus in een groep van vier personen. In deze taak begint ieder groepslid met €1,50. Deze beloning krijgt u voor deelname aan het onderzoek. Elk groepslid kan echter ook een bonus verdienen van €2,50, wat het maximale individuele bedrag op €4,- brengt. Om de bonus te ontvangen, moet één groepslid kiezen voor een lagere bonus, zijnde €1,-. Echter, wanneer niemand kiest voor de lagere bonus van €1,-, krijgt niemand in de groep een bonus.

Wanneer u niet kiest voor de lagere bonus van €1, en de andere spelers ook niet, ontvangt u...

A. €1,50 B. €2,50 C. €4,00

Het juiste antwoord is antwoord A (€1,50). Wanneer niemand kiest voor de lagere bonus, ontvangt niemand een bonus. De €1,50 is een vergoeding voor uw deelname Dit onderdeel van het onderzoek bepaalt de grootte van uw beloning.

U bent gelinkt aan drie andere participanten. Samen met deze drie andere deelnemers gaat u een groepstaak doen. U zit dus in een groep van vier personen. In deze taak begint ieder groepslid met €1,50. Deze beloning krijgt u voor deelname aan het onderzoek. Elk groepslid kan echter ook een bonus verdienen van €2,50, wat het maximale individuele bedrag op €4,- brengt. Om de bonus te ontvangen, moet één groepslid kiezen voor een lagere bonus, zijnde €1,-. Echter, wanneer niemand kiest voor de lagere bonus van €1,-, krijgt niemand in de groep een bonus.

Welke optie kiest u?

Ik kies voor de kleinere bonus van €1,00 Ik kies voor de grote bonus

Hieronder staan twee stellingen, met welke stelling bent u het het meest eens?

Het krijgen van de bonus van €1,00 voelt als winst Het krijgen van de bonus van €1,00 voels als verlies

Ik heb tijdens mijn beslissing mijn uitkomst vooral vergeleken met...

Het bedrag wat de andere spelers krijgen Het minimal te verkrijgen bedrag (€1,50) Anders, namelijk …

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Appendix IV. Loss frame manipulation

English version;

You are linked to three other participants. Together with these three other participants you will do a group-task. So you are in a group of four persons. In this task, every group member starts with €4,00. To make this payment, one group member has to pay €1,50 of her/his own money. A group member that decides to hand in €1,50, keeps €2,50 left. When every group member refuses to pay, every group member must pay €2,50.

Now two questions will follow in order to check if you understand the outcomes. You cannot earn money with these questions.

When you choose to pay €1,50, the other group players receive….

A. €1,50 B. €2,50 C. €4,00

The right answer is answer C. When you pay €1,50, the other players receive the maximal amount of €4,-.

Repetition: You are linked to three other participants. Together with these three other participants you will do a group-task. So you are in a group of four persons. In this task, every group member starts with €4,00. To make this payment, one group member has to pay €1,50 of her/his own money. A group member that decides to hand in €1,50, keeps €2,50 left. When every group member refuses to pay, every group member must pay €2,50.

When no one chooses to pay €1,50, you will lose…

A. €1,50 B. €2,50 C. €4,00

The right answer is answer B. When no one pays €1,50 for the group, all players have to pay €2,50.

Beware: This part of the experiment will determine the amount of your reward

You are linked to three other participants. Together with these three other participants you will do a group-task. So you are in a group of four persons. In this task, every group member starts with €4,00. To make this payment, one group member has to pay €1,50 of her/his own money. A group member that decides to hand in €1,50, keeps €2,50 left. When every group member refuses to pay, every group member must pay €2,50.

Which option do you choose?

I will pay €1,50 for the group I will not pay €1,50 for the group

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Below there are two statements, with which statement do you agree most?

Getting €2,50 feels like a gain Getting €2,50 feels like a loss

While deciding I compared my outcome with….

The amount that the others players would get The minimal amount that you could get (€1,50) Other, …..

Dutch version;

U bent gelinkt aan drie andere participanten. Samen met deze drie deelnemers gaat u een groepstaak doen. U zit dus in een groep van vier personen. In deze groepstaak begint ieder groepslid met €4,-. Om deze uitbetaling te bewerkstelligen, moet één deelnemer van de groep €1,50 betalen van zijn/haar eigen geld. Een groepslid dat besluit €1,50 in te leveren, houdt dus slechts €2,50 over. Wanneer ieder groepslid weigert te betalen, moeten alle deelnemers €2,50 betalen.

Er volgen nu twee vragen om te controleren of u de uitkomsten begrijpt. Hiermee kunt u nog geen geld verdienen.

Wanneer u ervoor kiest om €1,50 te betalen, ontvangen de andere spelers...

A. €1,50 B. €2,50 C. €4,00

Het juiste antwoord is antwoord C. Wanneer u €1,50 betaalt, ontvangen de andere spelers het maximale bedrag van €4,-.

Herhaling: U bent gelinkt aan drie andere participanten. Samen met deze drie deelnemers gaat u een groepstaak doen. U zit dus in een groep van vier personen. In deze groepstaak begint ieder groepslid met €4,-. Om deze uitbetaling te

bewerkstelligen, moet één deelnemer van de groep €1,50 betalen van zijn/haar eigen geld. Een groepslid dat besluit €1,50 in te leveren, houdt dus slechts €2,50

over. Wanneer ieder groepslid weigert te betalen, moeten alle deelnemers €2,50 betalen.

Wanneer niemand ervoor kiest om €1,50 te betalen, verliest u ...

A. €1,50 B. 2,50 C. €4,00

Het juiste antwoord is antwoord B. Wanneer niemand €1,50 betaalt voor de groep, moet iedereen €2,50 betalen.

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LET OP: Dit onderdeel van het onderzoek bepaalt de grootte van uw beloning.

U bent gelinkt aan drie andere participanten. Samen met deze drie deelnemers gaat u een groepstaak doen. U zit dus in een groep van vier personen. In deze groepstaak begint ieder groepslid met €4,-. Om deze uitbetaling te bewerkstelligen, moet één deelnemer van de groep €1,50 betalen van zijn/haar eigen geld. Een groepslid dat besluit €1,50 in te leveren, houdt dus slechts €2,50 over. Wanneer ieder groepslid weigert te betalen, moeten alle deelnemers €2,50 betalen.

Welke optie kiest u?

Ik betaal €1,50 voor de groep Ik betaal niet €1,50 voor de groep

Hieronder staan twee stellingen, met welke bent u het meest eens? Het ontvangen van €2,50 voelt als winst

Het ontvangen van €2,50 voelt als verlies

Ik heb tijdens mijn beslissing mijn uitkomst vooral vergeleken met… Het bedrag wat de andere spelers krijgen

Het minimal te verkrijgen bedrag (€1,50) Anders, namelijk….

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Appendix V. Debriefing

English version;

This was an experiment about the collaboration between four people. After filling in a few questionnaires, you had to, together with the other participants, perform a group task while you did not know what the choice of the other participants was going to be. There were two groups in this experiment, which we are going to compare with each other; one group of participants were told that they could earn money in a group task, and the other group were told that they could lose money. With this, we are going to investigate in which of these two situations people are inclined to sacrifice their own self-interest for a group.

If you have any questions or complaints in response to this experiment, please contact Erik de Kwaadsteniet via kwaadsteniet@fsw.leidenuniv.nl or 071-5274109.

Dutch version;

Dit was een onderzoek naar samenwerking tussen vier personen. Na het invullen van enkele vragenlijsten, moest u samen met andere deelnemers een groepstaak uitvoeren terwijl u niet wist wat de keuze van de anderen zou zijn.

Er waren twee groepen in dit onderzoek, die we met elkaar gaan vergelijken: één groep deelnemers werd verteld dat zij geld konden winnen in de groepstaak, en een andere groep werd verteld dat zij geld konden verliezen. Hiermee onderzoeken wij in welk van deze twee situaties mensen eerder geneigd zijn om hun eigenbelang op te offeren voor een groep.

Als u naar aanleiding van dit onderzoek vragen of klachten hebt, neem dan contact op met Erik de Kwaadsteniet via kwaadsteniet@fsw.leidenuniv.nl of 071-5274109.