University of Amsterdam
How Japanese Culture
Consolidates Democracy
BA Thesis Political Science
Felix Fischer
11331410
June 2019
1
Index
Introduction ... 2
Theoretical Framework ... 4
Democratic Deconsolidation ... 4
Economic Stagnation and Democratic Deconsolidation ... 7
The Japanese Case ... 9
The Stagnant Japanese Economy ... 9
The Bubble Economy ... 9
The Lost Decades ... 11
Democratic Stability ... 13
How Japanese Culture Prevents Democratic Deconsolidation ... 15
Japanese Ethics ... 15
Confucianism and Democracy ... 15
Traditional Values and Freeters ... 17
Japanese Political and Economic Culture ... 19
Japanese Political Culture and Group Harmony ... 19
Japanese Economic Culture ... 20
Implications ... 22
Conclusion ... 22
2
Introduction
On the first of May of 2019 the Heisei period came to an end with the abdication of emperor Akihito. His son, Naruhito, ascended the Chrysanthemum Throne and thus the
Reiwa period started (Ray 2019). Reiwa can be translated as ‘Beautiful Harmony’.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that Reiwa was chosen as a representation of the ability of the Japanese people to bloom beautifully, as if after a long winter (ibid.). While this interpretation of the name might just be that, Shinzo Abe’s poetic interpretation, it seems a perfect description of the current economic and political state of Japan. In the rest of the world, however, this ‘Beautiful Harmony’ seems less and less prominent. Democracy as we know it is in crisis (Mounk 2018). All around the globe, authoritarian leaders, populists and strongmen politicians are gaining office. Not only are these politicians gaining office, but government and media mistrust is higher than ever (Foa et al. 2017: 5). In the United States of America especially, the beacon of western liberal democracy, democracy is at risk of deconsolidating (Norris 2017).1
Japan, however, is holding on to its ‘Beautiful Harmony’ between democracy and the people. The fact that Japanese democracy does not seem to be deconsolidating is really quite interesting. One of the prime origins of democratic deconsolidation in the world is economic malaise of the people that results in a fear of the future (Mounk 2018: 151-160). The Japanese economy has been stagnant since the so-called ‘Bubble Economy’ crashed at the beginning of the 1990s. This crash marked the beginning of the 失われた二十年 (Ushinawareta Nijuunen) or ‘Lost decades’ in English. Japan has thus experienced a prolonged period of economic malaise, but democracy in Japan has not deconsolidated like it has been doing in Poland and Hungary and is not at risk of deconsolidating like many Western democracies (Norris 2017). This paper will analyse the Japanese case and will try to explain why it is that Japanese democracy is not deconsolidating.
Japanese culture plays an important role in Japanese society. This thesis argues that Japanese culture can therefore be used to explain the lack of democratic deconsolidation in Japanese society and in its political system. Linking Japanese culture
1 While it is clear that democracies like Poland and Hungary are backsliding, there is still some discussion
about whether democracies in the United States and Europe meet the requirements for democratic deconsolidation. On the surface these democracies seem rather resilient. Certain trends, however, like the rise of populist parties and the election of Donald Trump, seem to suggest that these Western democracies are not completely immune against democratic deconsolidation (Mounk 2018; Norris 2017).
3 to the lack of democratic deconsolidation will be done on two different levels. On one hand, the lack of democratic deconsolidation can be explained through Japanese personal ethics and on the other hand, it can be explained by looking at the Japanese political and economic culture. These different branches of Japanese culture do overlap on certain points, but it is important to look at the different dimensions that influence the way the people look at democracy. This is especially salient when looking at democratic deconsolidation because of economic stagnation.
This article will address the following research question: why is Japanese democracy not deconsolidating even though the Japanese economy is stagnant? To answer this question, certain sub-questions need to be answered. First of all, the Japanese case needs to be explained more thoroughly. It is important to explain the economic situation Japan finds itself in, but most of all it is important to show why Japanese democracy is not deconsolidating. Only after those assumptions are proven, is it possible to analyse why these trends are happening. This article will argue that Japanese culture has been able to keep democratic deconsolidation in check in times of widespread and long-lasting economic malaise. There has been research done one the topic of culture as an important factor in politics and democratic practice (Wedeen 2002; Inglehart 2000). There, however, has not been extensive research done on the decisive role of culture in preventing democratic deconsolidation during times of economic stagnation (Fukuyama 1995; Van Wolferen 1989). In this area, this paper can add a valuable dimension to the discussion about democratic deconsolidation in the world, especially concerning the discussion about how to solve the current democratic crisis (Mounk 2018).
This thesis is structured as followed. First of all, in the theoretical framework I will explain what democratic deconsolidation is and what is causing democratic deconsolidation around the world. Because populism plays an important role in democratic deconsolidation, but also in explaining why democratic deconsolidation is passing by Japan, there will be a small section dedicated to conceptualizing populism. After sketching the theoretical framework, the Japanese case will be explained and analysed. Here, the economic stagnation and recession will be described. Furthermore, this section will argue that Japanese democracy is in fact not deconsolidating. When the Japanese case has been thoroughly described, it is time to formulate the main argument. In this section it will be argued that Japanese democracy is as stable as it is because of
4 cultural influences, namely traditional culture and political and economic culture. Finally, everything will be summarized and an answer to the research question can be formulated.
Theoretical Framework
Democratic Deconsolidation
To be able to explain why Japanese democracy is not deconsolidating, it is important to form a clear definition of democratic deconsolidation. The term democratic deconsolidation, however, is not a clear-cut term. Originally, democratic deconsolidation was used to describe the challenges of new democracies (Schedler 1998: 91); for example, the challenge of extending the life expectancy of these new democracies, namely by making them immune to authoritarian regression. In later years, however, many more challenges for democratic consolidation were found, making the term democratic deconsolidation overcomplicated (ibid.). Oversimplified, democratic deconsolidation is the antonym of democratic consolidation, which means that instead of solidifying a democracy, democratic deconsolidation weakens the foundations of a democracy. In other words, instead of democracy being ‘the only game in town’, there are other alternatives (Linz 1990: 156). While this is true in simple terms, democratic deconsolidation is a lot more than just the weakening of democracy. Foa and Mounk (2016; 2017; Mounk 2018) remark that the prime reason for democratic deconsolidation is the lack of trust of the people in the democratic institutions of liberal democracy. This is salient, because for a country to be fully democratically consolidated, democracy needs to be fully legitimized by its citizens. To accomplish this, democracy requires political institutionalization (Diamond 1994: 15). When democracy is no longer being legitimized by its citizens, it is prone to deconsolidation. This is why on the one hand, people are turning to authoritarian alternatives and on the other hand, there is an eroding respect for democratic norms (Norris 2017: 10-17).
In the past few decades, people have become decreasingly attached to democracy. While 72% of Americans after World War II thought it was essential to live in a
5 democracy, only around 30% of millennials agree nowadays (Foa et al. 2017: 62).
Similar results can be found in other western democracies like New Zealand, Sweden, the Netherlands and Great Britain. Not only are people getting increasingly dissatisfied with democratic government, but liberal institutions within the democracy face almost as much scepticism (ibid.). This scepticism might be conceived as a state of law, a way for citizens to defend themselves from the state abusing its powers. A state of law is crucial to the consolidation of democracy (Linz et al. 1994: 19). In the case of governmental scepticism, however, it is not so much a defence against an abuse of power, but more of an attack on democratic institutions. Most importantly, this scepticism can be identified in the support for a strongman leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections. Leading to a growing support for authoritarian alternatives to democracy (Foa et al. 2017: 6). These strongmen leaders, like Viktor Orbán, dismiss the state of law and ignore the institutionalized limits on their power. Without a clear state of law, respected by both the people and the leaders, democracy is far more likely to deconsolidate (Linz et al. 1994: 19-20).
While some argue that a turn to authoritarianism is the main threat to democracy, others argue that it is not the rise of authoritarianism that is threatening democracy, but the erosion of basic norms and values that connect people to their society (Howe 2017: 28). This means that, while the formal rules of democracy are still intact, the informal rules that legitimize democracy are eroding. The equilibrium between the respect for the formal democratic institutions and the informal democratic norms is disturbed (O’Donnel 1996: 41). In other words, democracy is deconsolidating when the civil society no longer legitimizes democracy and is no longer willing to support it. While the civil society is separate from society as a whole, social malaise in the society as a whole often penetrates into civil society (Diamond 1994: 5-13). Therefore, when the cohesion of society is eroding, it is harder to mobilize a civil society for a united cause and bring people back into democratic politics (Howe 2017: 28).
A growing support for authoritarian alternatives and a lack of civic engagement, however, are not the only signs of democratic deconsolidation. Another important sign of democratic deconsolidation is the erosion of respect the people and politicians have
2There has been some controversy regarding the data and the interpretation used by Foa and Mounk. For one they
only coded a 10 out of 10 answer as ‘essential’ on the question whether living in a democracy was essential. In their interpretation this meant that a large part of millennials did not find living in a democracy essential, while many old people did find living in a democracy essential. Some scholars regarded this as a major flaw in the articles, however Mounk and Foa were not persuaded by them and stand by their coding and interpretation (Mounk 2018: 301).
6 for the democratic norms (Mounk 2018: 112). Some of these rules are formal: a leader allows investigations against his government and does not fire the prosecutor. A president, prime minister or the likes leave office peacefully after a lost election. Both of these examples are formal, however, many democratic norms are informal. This makes it harder to decide whether they are being violated (idem: 112, 113). The democratic norms dictate that upholding the norms, so abiding by the formal and informal rules, is critical for the stability of the political system. Politicians might try to get the advantage over their adversaries, but democratic politics should never degenerate into an all-out war (idem: 113). This, however, is not how politics function in a big part of the democratic world. Adversaries on the political stage are growing into enemies. Enemies, in contrast to adversaries, seek to destroy one another, while adversaries just wish to defeat each other. A lot of the blame for this transition can be put on newcomers on the political stage. Newcomers on the political stage are usually more anti-establishment and often want to represent a break from the status-quo. Look at populism for example (idem: 115). The democratic norms particularly, that support democratic consolidation, are being broken by these newcomers. Good examples of newcomers breaking democratic norms are Donald Trump, the Law and Justice party in Poland and many other populist parties. They break democratic norms by expressing clear authoritarian rhetoric and by ignoring the state of law (Norris 2017: 18). This is especially dangerous, because when members of the system itself break these formal or informal rules, what is stopping others from breaking them as well (ibid.)?
Like stated before, populist are not shy of breaking the democratic norms. Not only do they break the democratic norms, but they also flirt with authoritarianism. Cas Mudde (2004: 543) defines populism as: “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale of the people”. This populist ideology has inspired many people to vote against the ruling government and to vote for a more authoritarian leader who promises to comply with ‘the general will’. Populist leaders, like Viktor Orbán, have undermined the democratic values by turning to a more authoritarian kind of government (Foa et al. 2017: 8). The populist ideology is in a sense caused by the dissatisfaction of the people with democracy, but it is also aggravating the instability of democracies by playing out the people against those who should be governing them. Therefore, populism is not only
7 caused by democratic deconsolidation, but it also worsens or quickens the effects of democratic deconsolidation. This is particularly so when considering that populist parties are spearheading the attack on the democratic norms and the democratic political establishment (Mounk 2018: 115). Donald Trump is an important example of this phenomenon. He promised to jail Hillary Clinton, he refused to accept the outcome of the election if it was not in his favour and he even called out many media stations for reporting fake news (idem: 119). This only happened during his campaign. After his election Trump, disregarded many more basic democratic norms, thereby undermining liberal democracy itself (ibid.).
All in all, it seems that the people, the same people that democracy should be giving power to, are feeling less inclined to support democracy. Liberal democracy ensures their freedom and it ensures their equality. Many citizens, however, feel like liberal democracy can no longer, or never has been able to, make good on these promises. Consequently, they look towards more authoritarian alternatives and their respect for democratic norms is eroding (Norris 2017: 10-17). Democracy is no longer ‘the only game in town’ for some political parties or political actors (Linz 1990: 156). Democracies have entered a ‘performance crisis’. They cannot deliver on their promises and that is why democracy is deconsolidating (Mounk 2018: 131). While populist parties are a symptom of this democratic deconsolidation, they are a catalyst as well. They are exploiting this crisis of democracy to dismantle the pillars that stabilize the democratic system (ibid.).
Economic Stagnation and Democratic Deconsolidation
Like stated before, democracy deconsolidates when the people lose trust in the liberal institutions of democracy. This is especially so when democratic institutions can no longer keep their promises of freedom and equality. While there are many more origins of democratic deconsolidation, like the rise of social media and the crisis of identity, for the Japanese case it is advisable to focus on the connection between economic stagnation and democratic deconsolidation.
Since the eighteenth century, economic growth has increased massively. Before the eighteenth century, many people could only wish to progress on an economic scale. Stagnant economic growth was a fact of life (Piketty 2014: 72-112). This rapid economic
8 growth, however, also brought with it growing economic inequality. In 1928, the richest one percent was able to capture around twenty percent of all wealth in Europe. In contrast, in the 1960s, this percentage was brought down to around ten percent. Income from wealth, or capital as defined by Piketty, grows much quicker than labour income. This is why the wealth distribution in 1928 was unequal. After World War I, but especially after World War II, taxes in the United States and Europe were raised and income inequality decreased. In the years of economic growth, however, capital and income inequality rose once again (Piketty 2014). Many people who did not grow up with basic household appliances, like a television or a fridge, were able to afford those appliances later in life. This rapid growth of wealth was most prominent in developed democracies. So much so, that it became expected of developed democracies that their economies would reassure economic growth coupled with relative equality of the wealth distribution (Mounk: 152-153).
In recent years however, this rapid post-war growth has slowed down considerably. Furthermore, income inequality and wealth distribution has returned to the state it was in around the 1930s (Piketty 2014: 72-112). The combination of rising economic inequality and the decreased growth has led to stagnant economic growth for many households and stagnation in living standards, especially when comparing this fact with the previous decades of democratic stability. The drop in growth of living standards is immense (Mounk 2018: 153). Until the 1980s the American economy saw a rapid burst in the increase of the living standard of the median household. Since 1985, there almost has not been any increase in the living standard of the median American household. While this development was shocking for older people, who saw their economic progress suddenly stall, it is even more shocking for younger people that grew up with the promise that their economic status would increase if they worked hard enough (idem: 154). These young people are now falling behind the accomplishments of their parents. For many young people, the American dream is just that, a dream. This same trend is not exclusive to the United States. In most parts of Western Europe, this same trend holds true. This trend, in a big part of the democratic world, is leading to frustrations among young and old alike (idem: 155-156).
The rapid economic growth of the decades after World War II legitimized liberal democracy for many people. After all, people never believed in the politicians themselves, but they did believe in the economic growth and affluence they could
9 achieve for their citizens (Mounk 2018: 156). Now that this promise has been broken for many citizens, the trust in the government has, for many people, deteriorated (OECD 2017). The economic insecurity and social deprivation of many citizens has fuelled resentment for the political elite. It has made these people more susceptible to anti-establishment and populist rhetoric, blaming the political elite for their economic stagnation (Inglehart et al. 2016: 2). What is interesting about this event is that it is not necessarily class based. An upper middle class citizen can be as critical on their economic progress as someone who remains poor all their life (idem: 157). Remarkably, relatively wealthy people are more likely to be critical of the government (Dalton 2007). Mounk argues that this is partly due to an economic anxiety instead of their economic reality. They see what could happen to their wealth, living standards and to the economic status of their children when the government breaks their ‘promise’ of economic growth (ibid.). In short, the people with the most to lose, which differ from country to country, are the most fearful of the current affluence without growth.
The Japanese Case
Now that democratic deconsolidation has been conceptualized and the influence of economic stagnation on democratic deconsolidation has been explained thoroughly, it is time to discuss the Japanese case. Firstly, the Japanese economic circumstances, namely its stagnation, will be analysed. Secondly, it will be shown that Japanese democracy is, in fact, not deconsolidating.
The Stagnant Japanese Economy
The Bubble Economy
To be able to explain the stagnation of the Japanese economy, it is necessary to first look towards the rapid economic growth in post-war Japan, which ultimately resulted in the burst of the bubble economy. From 1950 to 1973, the Japanese economic miracle happened. The Gross National Product (GNP) increased with a rate of, often more than, ten percent per year (Gordon 2014: 243-245). A large part of this baffling economic growth in the years after World War II is due to the management of the Japanese
10 government. By using industrial policy, supporting some businesses and discouraging others by using important war time powers over access to important resources, the Japanese government was able to stimulate its economy to outperform many others (idem: 247). While this system of industrial policy did not enable a completely free market, many big companies still took significant initiatives, even against governmental advice. The role of the Japanese government during this period of economic growth, could be best described as an ‘economic cheerleader’: Supporting the success of certain industries and not being shy of acting as private investors for upcoming businesses. These state interventions were mostly informal in nature and were known as ‘administrative guidance’ (idem: 248).
During the first oil crisis, the Japanese economy suffered from a small recession. The Japanese economy recovered quickly however and started growing once again. Albeit lower than during the economic miracle, the economic growth was more than double that of Western countries (Gordon 2014: 297). This stability was partly caused by the fact that Japan had become a corporate-centred society. Many Japanese believed that whatever was good for the corporations, was good for Japanese society. Furthermore, the adaptability of Japanese corporations was astonishing. Japanese corporations were able to quickly adapt to the changing global economy. During the oil crisis in particular, this proved to be a profitable venture (idem: 297-299).
At the start of the 1990s, the Japanese economy was going through an economic golden age. There was a trade surplus with the United States as well as the European Union. The turning point came when the Japanese Ministry of Finance enacted a policy, the ‘Plaza Accord’, that would stimulate investments and encourage domestic consumption (Gordon 2014: 318). As a result of this policy, stock prices soared to dangerous heights and the bubble was formed. Taking note of this event, finance officials tried to deflate the bubble by trying to stop speculative investment. Interest rates were increased from 2.5 percent to 6 percent, leading to a capital flight. As a result, the Nikkei index fell by almost a half (ibid.). Prominent trading and manufacturing companies went bankrupt, because they branched out into stock trading before the collapse of the market. High borrowing rates put a stop to dozens of real estate projects, because the interest on the borrowing rates was much higher than the projected revenues of these real estate projects. The failures of these real estate projects lead to a major drop in land prices, which further eroded the value of land used as a loan collateral. In the late 1990s,
11 a lot of property companies went bankrupt. This led to a vicious cycle of failures of companies and drops of land prices (ibid.). This puncture of the stock market bubble spilled over to many more facets of the Japanese economy. This started an economic recession. With it, consumer and business confidence dropped significantly.
The Lost Decades
To combat the recession caused by the burst of the Bubble Economy, Japanese officials tried to lower interest rates. This, however, was to no avail. Investment stagnated and production fell by eleven percent. The Gross domestic product (GDP) rose only about one percent in 1992, while in 1993 the GDP was almost flat (idem: 319). These low interest rates remained in effect for almost a whole decade, but they did not stimulate investments nor economic recovery as expected. The main obstacle for increased investments and economic recovery were the so-called ‘bad loans’. Even if banks were able to loan money these ‘bad loans’ scared away many banks from lending money (ibid.; Hoshi et al. 2004: 8-12). Unlike in the past, Japan could not rely on exports to pave the way to economic recovery. Because of rapid deflation of the yen, the growth of exports slowed down (Gordon 2014: 320; Hoshi et al. 2004: 9). In a coordinated Japan-U.S. intervention, the Bank of Japan was able to lower the cost of the yen, thereby increasing export levels. This intervention also led to a promotion of domestic investment and spending. In the years 1995 and 1996, Japan experienced a slight growth of the GDP (Gordon 2014: 320). Unemployment, however, kept growing during these years of economic recovery. Companies were reluctant to hire new workers. Furthermore, prices continued to fall, but consumer spending only moderately increased. Faced with a continued recession and an aging population, government officials decided to take a risk by increasing consumption tax to solve the Japanese budget deficit (ibid.). This increased consumption tax was poorly timed and completely ruined consumer confidence, which slowed their spending. Recovery was still far away for Japanese economy (ibid.).
To dampen the effect of the recession, and most importantly avoid an even deeper recession, the Japanese decided in the late 1990s that hard measures needed to be taken. Firstly, they deregulated the financial markets. Secondly, they tried rebuilding the failed banking system by taking over insolvent banks using public funds. While this solved the debt problem of many banks, the ‘bad loan’ problem was still relevant. Many
12 non-performing loans were shed of by banks, but during the economic slowdown in 1996 and 1997 they incurred ‘bad loans’ once again. By 2002, the six biggest banks of Japan had once again acquired many non-performing loans (idem: 321). Finally, the Japanese government decided on large deficit spending to jump start the stagnant domestic economy. From 1997 to 2000 the government ran an eight percent deficit of the GDP to prevent a further deepening of the economic recession. While new economic industries, like the electronic sector, were growing, old economic industries, like agriculture and retail, remained in decline (ibid.). Furthermore, domestic demand remained low, deepening the gap between the old and new financial sectors. At the end of 2000, repeated fiscal deficits had accumulated to a debt of over 140 percent of the GDP (ibid.).
From 2003 to 2008, the Japanese government was able to stabilize its economy and once again outperform all G-7 countries except for Great Britain on GDP. The Japanese economy was still recovering from the previous recession however, and was only able to achieve modest growth. In hindsight, the ‘lost decades’ were mostly caused by bad policy making. The damage done by the ‘lost decades’ can still be felt in modern Japan (Gordon 2014: 329).
By 2008, the Japanese economy was steadily, but modestly, growing. As the foundations of American economy began to crumble, the Japanese economy was holding strong. When the Lehman brothers failed, however, this posed an enormous problem for export-orientated economies like Japan. The commercial paper, or short-term trading credit the Lehman Brothers provided, were paralyzed and as a result global trade collapsed (Gordon 2014: 336). This ‘Lehman Shock’ halted the Japanese economic growth abruptly. Many fundamental problems that caused the ‘lost decades’ were not resolved. The Japanese government therefore, needed to rethink their policies. The ‘Lehman Shock’ brought Japan back to a stagnating economy. While the economy has been growing in the past few years, it has only been growing a moderate amount. Stagnation is still a problem in Japanese society. One commentator argued that Japanese policy makers were unable to pull Japan out of its stagnation. Not out of sheer stupidity, but because the problems Japan has to cope with are intractable (idem: 336-338). The Japanese economy is a prime example of a country where there is affluence, but growth is absent. This is partly due to bad policy making, but also partly due to the increasing age of the population and traditional working norms (Shane 2017). A country with
13 affluence and almost no growth should be a perfect breeding ground for democratic deconsolidation. This, however, is not the case in Japan.
Democratic Stability
When looking at the economic status of Japan and considering the decades of stagnation, it would be reasonable to expect that the Japanese democracy is deconsolidating. The economic status quo of Japan ticks all the boxes of a country whose democracy is deconsolidating. The people are wealthy, but their income is not growing. The economy as a whole is stagnating and maybe most importantly, the blame for all of this can be put on governmental failure. Japanese democracy, however, seems to be stable (Mounk 2018: 111-112, 121). There are three main factors to support this claim: high approval ratings, absence of a call for authoritarianism and the lack of populism (Reuters 2018; Mounk 2018: 111-112; Funabashi 2017; Lind 2018).
While democratic deconsolidation is happening in the rest of the world and with many people being disenchanted with the elite, this is not the case in Japan. Prime Minister Abe is almost as established as they come. His father was a foreign minister and his grandfather and uncle both served as prime ministers. The current approval ratings of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe consistently exceed 50 percent (Funabashi 2017). This is quite remarkable for Japanese standards. Before Abe took office for the second time in 20123, Japan had 14 Prime Ministers in only 20 years. Abe’s current term will end in
2021. His current term is technically his last one. It may, however, not be over for him yet since some have called for a change of rules (Reynolds 2019).
In addition to the support the Japanese have for their prime minister, the call for the authoritarian alternatives is relatively low compared to some western democracies like the United States. Support for army rule, for example, is low. The change per year in favour of army rule is less than 0.1 percent. In the United States, the support for army rule changes with more than 0.5 percent per year (Mounk 2018: 111; WVS 2010). The same development can be seen when polling the Japanese people on the support for a strong political leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections. While the yearly percentile change is slightly higher, this is also the case in Germany and the United States (Mounk 2018: 112; WVS 2010).
14 The most important factor in the absence of democratic deconsolidation in Japan is the lack of populism (Lind 2018; Funabashi 2017; Hellmann 2018). There are a few reasons why populism has not been prominent in Japanese politics. First, politicians do not use the terms ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ as antagonistic terms, or basically at all. Generally Asian societies, like Japan, do not attach much relevance to class division (Hellmann 2018: 13; Shin et al. 2005: 285-394; Jou 2010: 370-372). Part of this is caused by a non-class based left-right division of political parties. In Japan especially, left-right placement does not structure party support (Hellmann: 2; Jou 2010: 370). Japanese politicians, however, do often single out specific political actors as the enemy of ‘the people’. They do not treat the elite as a homogeneous group, but focus their critique on society on specific actors and problems (Uchiyama, 2010: 12–16). Second of all, it is seen as better strategy to be a ‘friend to the poor’ than being antagonistic towards the elite. This strategy is especially compelling when trying to mobilize voters of lower socio-economic status (Hellmann 2018: 12).
While these two reasons explain why populism has skipped Japan, it only explains it for the ideological interpretation of populism explained before. It is, however, possible to argue that Japanese populism is a political strategy (Yoshida 2019). Former Prime Minister Koizumi adopted a ‘theatrical style. He preferred to reach out to the Japanese public directly through television, which was unusual for Japanese politics. Furthermore, he adapted a slightly antagonistic strategy against ‘politics-as-usual’ and established political institutions and actors (idem: 2). These attacks, however, were aimed towards specific actors and problems. Therefore, circumventing the ‘the people versus the elite’ narrative known from traditional populists. Adding to this, his goal was not authoritarianism, but neo-liberalism (idem: 2-3). Another example of this is current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. While running for office, he used patriotic and nationalist rhetoric to please the Japanese crowd, while still supporting the welfare state (Funabashi 2017). By using a populist rhetoric to address voters without having a true populist agenda, Koizumi and Abe were able to win over voters that might have been swayed by a populist agenda. By doing so, the voters did not need to turn to radical populist thoughts from other political movements, thereby reducing the possible influence of ideological populists on Japanese politics.
All in all, Japan has a stable democracy, without the common ailments of democracies and states around the world. Democracy is not deconsolidating in Japan
15 and this is remarkable in particular because of the stagnant economic situation. There has not been a clear answer however about how this is happening. This article will be looking towards Japanese culture as a leading factor in stabilizing Japanese democracy as well as restrict the effects of economic stagnation on democratic deconsolidation.
How Japanese Culture Prevents Democratic Deconsolidation
In the rest of the world it looks like democracy is deconsolidating. While some democracies are growing a lot less than they were before the ‘Lehman Shock’ many democracies are still less stagnant than Japan. How is it possible that these countries are democratically deconsolidating while Japanese democracy is stable? The main difference between Japan and the rest of the world is culture. Therefore, this article argues that this is the main explanation to this conundrum. Two aspects of Japanese culture are important here. The first aspect is Japanese personal ethics, largely influenced by Neo-Confucianism and traditional values. The second important aspect is the Japanese political and economic culture, which differs largely from the rest of the world.Japanese Ethics
The first aspect of Japanese culture this article will discuss is Japanese ethics. The first dimension of these ethics is the Neo-Confucian approach. This dimension explains how Japanese culture and its Neo-Confucian ethics influence democratic stability in a positive way. The second dimension of Japanese ethics is the traditional, family, values. This dimension explains how democracy is not deconsolidating even though the economy is stagnating. Traditional values mitigate in some sense the effects of economic stagnation on democracy.
Confucianism and Democracy
Some prominent political theorists, like Huntington, argue that democracy and Confucianism are not compatible. They often reason that countries like Japan and the Philippines are only democracies because of their dependence on the United States. Confucianism prioritizes group over the individual, authority over liberty and responsibilities over rights (Huntington 1991: 24). Most importantly, according to
16 Huntington, Confucian societies lack a state of law and therefore could never be full democracies. The term ‘Confucian democracy’ is a contradictio in terminis (ibid.). The main area of incompatibility is the lack of support in Confucian societies like Japan for individualism that provides the ground for the individual as the ultimate authority (Fukuyama 1995: 25).
On many levels, however, democracy and Confucianism are in fact compatible. The first example of this compatibility is the emphasis on meritocracy with egalitarian implications. The examination systems implemented in many modern Confucian societies are meritocratic institutions. They form a gateway into higher-education and allow for many paths to upward mobility. This contributes to the largely egalitarian society of Japan, where social mobility is possible (Fukuyama 1995: 25). The second example of the compatibility between democracy and Confucianism is the emphasis on education. A high level of education, is not a prerequisite of democracy, but it allows for higher and better political participation (ibid.). Furthermore, a higher education often individualizes a person. They get a desire to be recognized and to be an adult with certain basic human rights; the same rights democracy often provides (idem: 22). Therefore, higher education, as a result of Confucian ethics, leads to less governmental scepticism and is seen as a large part of why Asian societies like Japan and South Korea are so quick to modernize and democratize (idem: 21). Furthermore, modernization can give rise to cultural and social changes that make democracies more likely to flourish (Inglehart 2000: 227). While western democracies are often seen as tolerant, Confucian societies are as tolerant if not more tolerant. Confucianism has for a long time coexisted with other religions, for example Shinto-Buddhism in Japan. This tolerant nature of Confucianism is an important foundation for the idea of egalitarianism in democracy (idem: 25).
While Confucianism in Japan shares these compatibilities with democracy, it is a slightly different teaching. Neo-Confucianism in Japan is more authoritarian than its Chinese counterpart. The obligations of the Japanese to an authority were superior to the obligations to their family. Hence, family is a weak rival to political authority. This fact seems to imply that Japanese Confucianism strengthens authoritarian regimes and does not support democracy. History, however, has shown otherwise. This in large part is due to the fact that the Japanese have more respect for political power and therefore do not need an authoritarian system (Fukuyama 1995: 28). Because Japanese society is
17 group-orientated and based on the authority of the government or previously the emperor, the feeling of natural unity is much higher in Japan than in a large part of the world. This feeling of national unity makes society more stable and generates a large incentive for civic engagement under the Japanese (ibid.). Because of this high level of citizenship in Japanese society, legislators do not need to legislate everything. Many internalized rules in Japanese society already do that work for them. This means that while the respect for authority is high in Japan, it is often unnecessary to use this authority (ibid.). This is especially salient when considering the facts that democratic deconsolidation is often caused by an anti-establishment sentiment.
To conclude, Japanese Confucian society is a good foundation for democracy. While it might sound counterintuitive that the authoritarian nature of Neo-Confucianism leads to a more stable democracy, it is in fact happening in Japan. On the one hand this is due to the group orientated nature of Japanese society, which stimulates national unity and citizenship, but on the other hand it is due to the respect the Japanese have for stately authority. Thus, the Japanese are more likely to accept governmental policies they do not agree with.
Traditional Values and Freeters
The main reason why many democracies in the world are deconsolidating in the context of economic stagnation, is because the people believe that the promise of the government has been broken (Mounk 2018: 156). It is reasonable to expect that if the blame for the stagnating economy and the broken promises was not put on the government, but for example on the individuals themselves, democratic deconsolidation would be far less likely. This is exactly what is happening in Japan. Many salary men, when faced with economic malaise, do not blame the Japanese government, but themselves (Hidaka 2010).
Japanese society is highly influenced by Japanese culture. Family values in particular play an important role. Hegemonic masculinity is especially prominent in family relations. This masculinity is personified in the ‘salary man’ (Hidaka 2010: 112). The ideal for Japanese men has been the heterosexual productive male breadwinner, who works hard for his company and thereby supports the economic development of Japan and their families (ibid.). These traditional families are called daikokubashira, meaning to be the central pillar of a house. Being the central pillar of the family, the
18 breadwinner, but also the main supporting pillar of Japanese economy (ibid.). This idea of the male breadwinner became especially prominent during the period of rapid Japanese economic growth. Reinforcing the privilege of men as being the male breadwinner, in contrary to women who were expected to be housewives (idem: 120).
Daikokubashira, however, has been contested in recent years. Because of the economic
stagnation, many men can no longer be the main breadwinner of the household, despite large companies trying to protect this culture. Yet these changes have not necessarily changed public opinion on daikokubashira. Therefore, not being the main breadwinner as a man is seen as a disgrace and shameful (ibid.). On the one hand, this is because they can no longer support their families, but on the other hand they are seen as a burden to society (Cook 2013). These so called ‘freeters’ try to reinvent Japanese masculinity, but public opinion is not in their favour (idem: 39-40). They are not only considered an antithesis to the male ideal of productive male adulthood, but most importantly, considering democratic deconsolidation, they are seen as an increasing risk to the competitiveness and profitability of the Japanese state. In a sense, this male workforce is blamed for the continued economic stagnation.
While some Japanese men try to reinvent the Japanese gender division and more importantly the daikokubashira way of thinking about gender division, many unemployed men still adhere to this way of thinking and inevitably blame themselves for their economic failure and as an extension the economic stagnation of Japan. This means that a large part of the people that are being affected by the economic recession and stagnation do not blame the government, but themselves. This is partly because the future of their children depends on them being the breadwinner (Cook 2013; Mounk 2018: 157). The salary men that should be having the most to lose do not try to change the system, but try to conserve it. The current way of thinking gives them prestige in cultural context; they can be proud husbands and can be proud of supporting Japanese society.
This cultural dynamic of family values and the role of men leads to a dampened impact of economic stagnation on democratic deconsolidation. Freeters, as they are called, are frowned upon by Japanese society for the economic downfall of Japan. Many unemployed Japanese men do not want to become a freeter and thus blame themselves. One could state that the ones who bear the most burdens by the economic stagnation blame themselves for it. The public generally does not blame the government for the
19 economic malaise either, but they blame these unproductive and unemployed men that do not conform to traditional values.
Japanese Political and Economic Culture
Japanese culture does not only prevent democratic deconsolidation during economic stagnation with its ethics and values, Japanese political and economic culture helps prevent democratic deconsolidation as well. Political and economic culture are closely linked in Japan, especially because of the ‘informed guidance’ by the Japanese government. The presence of government in important economic decisions is not only preferred by Japanese companies, but by the public as well (Wei-ming 1996: 32). The cultural background of Japanese politics in particular, with a lot Confucian influence, and the fact that Japanese economic traditions have conglomerated into collective capitalism, make it so that Japan is resistant to the influences of democratic deconsolidation during economic stagnation.
Japanese Political Culture and Group Harmony
Like previously stated, Japanese political culture has a lot of Confucian influences. The fact that Japanese society favours the political elite is clearly a derivative of Confucian influences and is embedded into Japanese political culture (Wei-ming 1996: 35). The political elite are seen as duty-conscious and hence the Japanese trust them to run their country, in contrary to democracies that are deconsolidating. Japanese political culture dictates that political power is based on group identity, which is reflected in a feeling of loyalty, obligation and hierarchy to a certain tightly-knit political elite (McCargo 2012: 70-73). This political dynamic can also be seen in economic culture. While the Confucian idea of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’, which is especially strong in Japanese political culture, might imply that authoritarianism is the norm, it reinforces the ethic of responsibility of the elite, which is more in line with democracy than the Divine right of kings (Wei-ming 1996: 35).
Another important part of Japanese political culture is the importance of group harmony. In Confucianism, social or group harmony is important for the well-being of the state. Without group harmony, the social system would fall apart and with it, the respect the Japanese have for the political elite would diminish. Because group harmony
20 is so important, the Japanese political elite aims to uphold it, which is also in the interest of the Japanese people (Wei-ming 1996: 35). True group harmony is only attainable through communication and negotiation. The emphasis on political status and rank means that everyone is aware of their position in the hierarchical structure of the Japanese political system. Scepticism towards the government is highly frowned upon, because it is seen as a major threat to social stability and most importantly, seen as a threat to group harmony (McCargo 2012: 70-73). This focus on group harmony enforces the power of the Japanese political elite, so much so that they are not seen as the enemy of the people in contrary to deconsolidating democracies. This focus on group harmony does not only enforce the power of the elite, it also makes sure that it is frowned upon to criticize the political elite. This means that governmental scepticism is a much rarer case in Japan than in many democracies. It is important to note that this is not because of the authoritarian policies of Japanese government, but that it is internalized into Japanese political culture.
Japanese Economic Culture
While Japanese political culture is characterized by the respect and the duty-conscious political elites, Japanese economic culture is characterized by big corporations and collective capitalism, or Japanese welfare capitalism (Estévez-Abe 2008: 1). Just like with Japanese political culture, economic culture is based on group identity and loyalty towards an authority. This culture of group identity and loyalty becomes especially apparent when looking at how Japanese workers often stay with a company their entire life (McCargo 2012: 70-73). While the political elite in Japan are the politicians and bureaucrats, the elite of the Japanese economy are the so-called keiretsu. Keiretsu are clusters of companies with intricate economic relationships, between banks, manufacturers, suppliers and distributors. ‘Cross-shareholding’ is an important part of
keiretsu and prevents hostile take-overs and limits the control of outsiders (Tajima
2016; Gordon 2014: 330). This keiretsu system is the main reason why democracy is able to consolidate in Japan even though the economy is stagnating.
Japanese economic culture is centred around loyalty. The same is the case for the
keiretsu. While in the West, job security can never be completely evident. In Japan, it
usually is. When Japanese workers accept the unlimited duties ordered by their employer, they will get employment security in return (Yamada 2018: 94). This
21 ‘employment compromise’ is the central foundation of Japanese economic culture and is based upon loyalty. While this may propose job rigidity, there is a lot of mobility in the Japanese work environment. Japanese workers acknowledge their inferior status on a managerial level, but see it as temporary. The keiretsu system makes sure that competent workers are able to easily make a career. Therefore submission to authority is seen as a temporary burden that will be solved by the passage of time, hard work and especially loyalty (idem: 94-96). Japanese economic culture can be described as one of rigid employment, but flexible job definition. This system dampens the effects of economic stagnation on democracy, because it is not, like in other democracies, the government that promises economic mobility. It is the companies that promise and often provide economic mobility. Therefore, the Japanese democratic government has not broken any promises concerning economic mobility, because that promise was never made by the Japanese government in the first place.
One might argue that it is the governments job to provide these conditions, so that companies can meet demands of economic mobility. As explained, the Japanese government has taken on the role of ‘economic cheerleader’ (Gordon: 248). By using industrial policy they have been supporting certain industries and acting as private investors, enabling companies to offer job security and other financial benefits to its employees (ibid.). Even if a company is struggling and needs to lay off employees the
keiretsu system ensures that these employees find new jobs at industry-related
companies (Tajima 2016; Gordon 2014: 330).
One way the Japanese economic culture repays loyalty is by ensuring job security. This, however, is not the only way companies repay loyalty. Another way Japanese companies repay loyal employees is by providing social security. In the rapidly aging Japanese society, this has become increasingly important. Another way Japanese corporations reward loyalty is by providing for the family of the employee by, for example, offering education to his children so that they too can eventually work for the company (Yamada 2018: 94-100). By providing social security and these bonuses, Japanese companies further secure the loyalty of their employees. In a sense, it is not the Japanese government that takes care of its people, but the companies they work for. These securities provided by corporations ensure that the economic status of the Japanese worker remains stable. This reward system embedded in Japanese economic culture helps prevent the fear of the future that plagues democracy (Mounk 2018:
151-22 160). By preventing this fear of the future, it is far less likely that economic stagnation will lead to democratic deconsolidation.
Implications
Even though Japanese culture seems so different from Western culture, it might still be possible to learn something from the Japanese case and apply it to the Western world. While Japanese traditional culture does prevent democratic deconsolidation, it is much harder to apply to the rest of the world. When looking at the prevention of democratic deconsolidation especially, Western countries that are at risk of deconsolidating should look towards Japanese economic culture.
The Keiretsu system and Japanese welfare capitalism, especially, could be implemented in the rest of the world. While it would be difficult to fully implement the
keiretsu system in the rest of the world, certain parts of this system could be
implemented and could take the form of economic reforms (Fukuyama 1995: 22). To combat the ‘fear of the future’ job security and economic mobility are increasingly important. The Western idea of employment would have to be changed from rigid job definition and flexible employment to the Japanese variant of rigid employment and flexible job definition (Yamada 2018: 94-96). This ensures economic mobility for the employees.
Conclusion
The core problem this article tried to solve was explaining why Japanese democracy is not deconsolidating even though the Japanese economy is stagnating. It is argued that Japanese democracy is stable, because of its culture. On the one hand, Japanese culture is able to stabilize Japanese democratic institutions and most importantly public opinion about them. On the other hand, Japanese culture is able to dampen the negative effects economic stagnation has on democracy.
To summarize, there are a few things to take away from the analysis of Japanese culture as the main explanation of the absence of democratic deconsolidation in Japan. First of all, the public opinion about the government has a different cultural basis than in many other democracies. In the western world this is for example Christian traditions, but in Japan it is largely based around Confucian traditional culture. This is seen in the
23 personal ethics of the Japanese, but also in political culture. The foundation Confucian tradition provides in Japan ensures that authority is respected and that political elites, unlike in the west, are largely trusted. This creates a stable foundation for democratic ideals and most importantly democratic consolidation. The fact that the Japanese political elite are duty-driven further ensures that democracy will not deconsolidate, because abuse of power, which negatively impacts their duty to the people, almost never occurs. The strong group identity and national unity of Japan that promote high levels of citizenship and creates informal internalized rules explains why the call for authoritarianism is so low in Japan and why governmental scepticism is low as well. Despite the Japanese economy being stagnant since the start of the 1990s, democracy is extremely stable, more so than in some other democracies like Hungary. This is in large part due to the group identity, based around loyalty, the Japanese inhibit. This plays out in traditional family values, but also in economic culture. Because of the
daikokubashira, it is expected of Japanese men to provide for their families. They are
seen as pillars of their family, the main breadwinner, but also as the pillar that supports Japanese economic prosperity. When men do not conform to this ideal, they are widely criticized as bringing shame to their families and risking the future profitability of Japan. This dynamic dampens the effect of economic stagnation and malaise on democracy, because the economic stagnation in Japan is not perceived as being caused by the Japanese government. The system of keiretsu ensures that the ‘fear of the future’ is absent in Japanese society, because it ensures job security and welfare to its loyal employees. Japanese democracy is not deconsolidating during a period of economic stagnation, because the Japanese population feels protected from the effects of economic stagnation, even when prolonged over multiple decades.
To conclude, a culture of authority based elites, which are trusted by the people and the culture of daikokubashira and keiretsu, has been able to break the trend of democratic deconsolidation in the world. As is shown in this article, trust of elites, but most importantly a strong national union and group identity fortify democratic ideals and leads to a society where even during times of economic failure, democracy stays stable and does not show signs of deconsolidation. Japanese culture is a unique case and the unorthodox combination of democracy and a group driven culture makes for a ‘beautiful harmony’. When looking at the rest of the world, where authoritarian
24 alternatives have become more prominent and democracy is continuing to deconsolidate, it might be wise to look at the Japanese example and learn from it.
25
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