The plastic lobby : a thesis on the development and improvement of the Interest Group Influence Framework applied in the political context of the Netherlands

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August 31, 2018

The Plastic Lobby

A thesis on the development and

improvement of the Interest Group

Influence Framework applied in the

political context of the Netherlands

Stijn Vendrik #10247653

stijn.vendrik@student.uva.nl Master thesis

Political Science – Public Policy & Governance Graduate School of Social Sciences

University of Amsterdam Supervisor: Dr. C. M. Roggeband Second reader: Dr. R. M. Sanchez Salgado Word count: 27.174

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Abbreviations

ACF = Advocacy Coalition Framework

CBL = Centraal Bestuur Levensmiddelenhandel

CPB = Centraal Planbureau

FNLI = Federatie Nederlandse Levensmiddelen Industrie

IGIF = Interest Group Influence Framework

KHN = Koninklijke Horeca Nederland

KIDV = Kennisinstituut Duurzaam Verpakken

MP = Member of parliament

NGO = Non-governmental organization

PDMS = Packaging deposit money system

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Abstract

Lobbyists and interest groups form an essential part of a well-functioning democratic society. Their knowledge and expertise provide policymakers with the input they need to make well-informed decisions. However, how influential are these lobbyists exactly and what determines the extent of their influence? Based on the work of political scientists like Andreas Dür and others, the Interest Group Influence Framework is developed; a tool which can be used to analyse a specific policy process in which one or multiple interest groups were actively influencing the outcome. By applying this tool to the case of the extension of the packaging deposit money system in the Netherlands, it provides a valuable understanding and explanation of the influential role these interest groups had within this policy process. The findings of this research do not only provide a comprehension of the different aspects of the case, but also make a first step in the development of an analytic tool applicable to other policy processes and in comparative case studies as well.

Key words: Lobbyists; Interest groups; lobbying success; interest group influence framework; advocacy

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Introduction

“Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland Report 1987: 37). This was the definition provided in 1987 by the World Commission on Environment and Development in their famous report ‘Our Common Future’, otherwise known as the Brundtland Report. Headed by the former Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, this commission was set up as the result of the growing international concern with numerous global environmental threats following the boundless growth-based economic development taking place around the world. The magnitude of issues like pollution, deforestation, desertification, ozone layer depletion and also global warming were starting to get recognized and the question was raised how to protect the environment, while still maintaining economic development at the same time. The Brundtland Commission had the purpose of identifying these problems, raising awareness of these problems and promoting the implementation of sustainable solutions to these problems within the international community. This commission popularized the term ‘sustainable development’ and strongly influenced the public debate, the political discourse and the national and international policies, of which the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit and consequently the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 2015 Paris Agreement are some prime examples.

The influence of the Brundtland Report can also be seen within the national political context of the Netherlands in the growing focus of its government on sustainable development. The year 2050 marks a special moment in time in the policy agenda of the Dutch government. This is the year that the Netherlands, according to their current objectives, will become a country with a climate neutral society and a circular functioning economy. For the purpose of managing the inevitable resource shortages, as well as diminishing the harmful environmental effects the current consumption patterns have, the Dutch government has started a program in September 2016 called ‘Nederland Circulair in 2050’, which has the objective of transforming the finite growth-based economy into a sustainable and circular one, where waste products are no longer disposed off, but rather reused as new resources in a continuing cyclical process. This program is widely supported by many different stakeholders from different parts of society like entrepreneur- and employee-organisations, environmental protection- and social organisations, municipalities and other governmental authorities, financial and educational institutions and other types of platforms, partnerships and (non-governmental) organisations (NGOs). All of these partners have pledged their dedication to reaching the 2050-objectives of this sustainable development program, when they signed the ‘National Agreement on the Circular Economy’ (Grondstoffenakkoord).1

This national program is focused on five different categories where transitions need to take place. These include ‘biomass & food’, ‘plastics’, ‘manufacturing’, ‘construction’ and ‘consumer goods’. For all of these sectors, transition agendas were developed in accordance with the different participating partners and

1_{The title of the document literally translates to ‘raw materials agreement’, but the government of the Netherlands}

(Rijksoverheid) chose a loosely translated title, namely ‘The National Agreement on the Circular Economy’ (Rijksoverheid 2017a; Rijksoverheid 2017b).

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presented by the newly formed government Rutte III in January 2018. Although all of these areas are of importance to reach a sustainable, circular economy, one of these areas of transition, the plastics, is especially interesting, for it is not only connected to the intention to deal with the resource scarcity and the consequence of the consumption of these resources on the process of climate change (like it is the case with biomass & food, construction and manufacturing), but also the overall damaging effect these materials have on the environment and its inhabitants, both fauna as well as humans. The effect of plastics on the environment has been a growing concern ever since the production and consumption increased tremendously halfway the twentieth century and plastic debris was discovered in the oceans in the 1960s (Science History Institute n.d.). Although recognized and present on the political agenda, the amount of plastic ending up in the oceans still keeps on increasing. According to research published in 2014, more than five trillion (1012_{) pieces of micro and nano plastics are afloat in the oceans (Eriksen et al. 2014), where}

they have a harmful effect on the marine life and a toxic effect on the entire food chain, thus effecting the human health system as well (Gregory 2009; Thompson et al. 2009). Combined with the issue of plastic litter on land as well as the great amount of fossil fuels and energy necessary to produce these materials, society’s demand for plastic is an issue, which is both considerable and complex.

The National Agreement on the Circular Economy shows the wide commitment of the Dutch society to deal with this multifaceted issue of plastic consumption. However, the different political and societal stakeholders are in conflict with each other regarding the right methods to reach their goal. “The goal should be central, not the method”, is a phrase often uttered (Tweede Kamer 2018a: 36). On a lot of issues, these methods are subject to discussion within the political arena. Every stakeholder desires the political decisions to be the closest to their own preference and advantage. Lobbyists play an important role in these decision-making processes, for they represent the interests of the different stakeholders and act in an informative manner towards the decision-makers. Decision-makers need these lobbyists because their relevant information, knowledge and expertise enables them to comprehend the situation to the fullest, which allows them to make well-informed decisions. For this reason, lobbyists are an essential part of a well-functioning democratic society in which they fulfil an influential position (Keulen 2017: 260). For a long time, the position of these lobbyists has been and still remains to be a subject of political scientific research. Their activities raise questions regarding the form and extent of their influence as well as the success these lobbyists have in influencing policy outcomes. With regard to the plastic issue and the transition agenda set up in the Netherlands to deal with this issue, the same questions appear.

How successful can lobbyists be in their effort to influence policy when it comes to the issue of sustainability? This initial question lead to the development of this research. Climate change and the associated problem of sustainability are considered to be the number one issue of today (Jackson 2017). The extent in which lobbyists can be successful in promoting or opposing sustainability within a policy process is therefore highly relevant. In order to research this, a specific case was chosen which is illustrative for the broader context and enjoys the practical aspect of having relative accessible data as well. The political conflict following the transition agenda regarding the best methods to address the plastic issue is well exemplified in the discussion on the structure and possible extension or removal of the ‘packaging deposit

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money system’ (PDMS) in the Netherlands. This discussion includes multiple aspects of the sustainable development goals and the circular economy for it addresses the problematic resource scarcity through its focus on the increase in the quantity and quality of plastic recyclate, while also including the issue of the plastic soup as well as the effort to decrease the amount of litter, which ends up in both the urban and natural environment. Lobbyists have been actively shaping the debate surrounding the PDMS in the Netherlands through direct of indirect involvement in discussions and scientific publications for over more then two decades. Proponents favour an extension of the system for it has proven to be an effective tool to address the waste issue, while improving the quality of recyclate. Opponents favour the disappearance of the system because of the financial the costs involved and the possible advantages other strategies might provide. After years of political standstill though, the State Secretary of Infrastructure and Water Management Van Veldhoven, tasked with the topic ‘Milieu’, achieved a breakthrough in the discussion in March 2017, when she announced her decision to conditionally extent the system in 2021. This decision was preceded with months of lobbying activity from many different stakeholders. This activity and the extent of influence and success of these lobbyists is the central focus in this research. In order to capture this focus, the following research question has been formulated: How influential were the different interest groups on the development of the March 2018 policy decision of the Dutch government regarding the extension of the packaging deposit money system?

For the purpose of answering this question in a structured manner, the choice has been made to divide the main research question into three sub-questions. Firstly, it is of the utmost importance to identify the different stakeholders and the interest groups who were involved in the policy process. Therefore, the first sub-question to be answered is: Who were the prominent influential interest groups involved in this policy process? As the main research question already shows, the focus of this research has been put on the influencing activity of the ‘different interest groups’. To clarify this conceptualisation, in this particular case lobbyists and other types of stakeholders all acted on account of larger interest groups and therefore the focus does not lie on the activities of individuals. Furthermore, the interest groups discussed in this research are different types of groups (public, private, semi-public). All these types are included within the scope of the research on the important condition that only those interest groups are included who had access to the policymakers and could arguably be considered important or influential in this process.

The second sub-question of this research focusses on analysing the activities and amount of access of the interest groups, for the purpose of providing a full understanding of the applied lobbying strategies of these different parties. This sub-question is constructed as the following: How did the different interest groups influence the policy process? Different types of strategies all have their advantages and disadvantages. Based on a theoretical review, these strategies are analysed and their success is evaluated. In addition, not only the type of strategy but also the frequency of access of the interest groups to the policymakers affects the amount of influence they have. A high frequency of contact undeniably says something about the prominence of an interest group and the relationship it has towards the decision-makers. Therefore, the frequency of access aspect is also included in this research. Lastly, after identifying the different interest groups as well as their applied lobbying strategies, the third sub-question of the research

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focusses on the core of the thesis by addressing the aspect of influence and answering the question: How successful were the different interest groups in influencing the policy decision of the Dutch government to conditionally extent the national packaging deposit money system?

In order to answer these questions, a proper theoretical substantiation of the concept ‘influence’ is required. The question how it can be measured need to be asked and the influential capacity of different types of interest groups need to be understood. Influence is however not a simple concept to measure. Within the political scientific field, a vast amount of literature has been written on both the determinants of the capacity to have influence as well as the right method to measure this capacity. Multiple methods are available and a discussion exists within the academic community as to which method is the best suitable to measure influence (Chalmers 2011; Dür 2008; Klüver 2009a; Woll 2007). By building upon this vast amount of scientific literature on the measurement of influence and by applying a mixed-method strategy, the methodological issues are resolved. In the theoretical review and research design chapter, the issues of and solutions to the measurement of influence are discussed and the choice for the mixed methods approach is explained.

The activities of interest groups and their role and influence within in a democratic society has also been a subject of research within the political science for over more than a century (Bently 1908; Odegard 1928; Schattschneider 1935). The research that has been done in the last two decades has contributed to a growing understanding of the determinants of interest group influence (Dür et al. 2015: 953-954). Chapter one of this research will provide a review of the existing theoretical literature. Within the body of scientific publications, a theoretical framework can be identified of what determines the amount of influence interest groups have in a specific case. Within this framework, different types of contextual characteristics are identified. These characteristics include the actor characteristics, issue characteristics, the institutional context and the applied lobbying strategy. (Dür & De Bièvre 2007; Klüver 2009a; Mahoney 2007; Princen 2007; Weiler & Brändli 2015; Woll 2007). These four categories together form the theoretical ‘interest group influence framework’ (in this research called the IGIF), which can provide an analysis of a specific policy case and an explanation of the policy outcome. This framework can be found in some form or another in the publications of political scientists like Eising (2007) and Klüver et al. (2015) and is best portrayed by Andreas Dür (2009).

This IGIF is well applicable to some case studies to analyse the different interest groups involved and the amount of influence they have exerted. However, as this research shows, the IGIF also has its flaws. It is not applicable to every context and not comprehensive enough to fully understand the case and the possible outcome of every policy process. In its current state, it is not applicable to the case of the PDMS for it can not explain the policy outcome based on the different determinants present in this case. For the purpose of improving the theoretical framework, this research provides improvements to the IGIF to make it better suitable. These additions include the special attention for the decision-maker’s political background, the presence of advocacy coalitions, contextual model of interest representation and type of democracy. In the theoretical review of this research, a complete insight in the different aspects of the current IGIF is provided, the multiple flaws of the framework are discussed in an extensive manner and the several

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improvements are presented, which together provide the newly formed ‘extended-IGIF’. This new extended-IGIF serves as the central scientific contribution of this research. Although the primary objective of this research is to answer the case-specific socially-relevant research question, the development of this theoretical framework is the second objective of this research. This theory-building aspect of the research has the purpose of providing a new framework, which is applicable to different cases of policy processes in which interest groups are actively influencing the outcome as well. Based on this extended-IGIF, the policy process of the PDMS and the role of the interest groups within this process are analysed. In other words; the case of the PDMS functions as a test case for the applicability of the extended-IGIF.

After discussing the theoretical review in the first chapter and the research design in the second chapter of the research, the case will be described in chapter three. As mentioned before, this case of the possible extension or removal of the PDMS has been actively lobbied by interest groups in the Netherlands for over more then two decades. The scope of this research however is directed on a much smaller time frame. For the purpose of providing a better understanding of the context, a short history of the PDMS in the Netherlands and the political developments of the last two decades are discussed in this chapter. The real focus however lies on the events which took place between November 2017 and March 2018. This is the timeframe in which the cabinet was deliberating on its decision and the majority of the lobbying activity of the policy process took place. This period is discussed in a chronological order and complemented by a stakeholder analysis, presented in chapter four. Within this analysis, certain aspects like the preferences, activities and reactions of the stakeholders in the policy process and towards the decision are discussed. Multiple quotes of the policymakers are included in this section for the purpose of fully capturing their different perspectives. This chapter functions as a direct answer to the first sub-question. Together, both chapters provide a clear understanding of the activities and effects interest groups have on a highly lobbied issue in the Netherlands. In addition, they also provide transparency in the workings of the Dutch national politics and the relationship certain interest groups have towards policymakers. Therefore, these chapters together provide the answer to the second sub-question through describing the activities and the applied strategies of the different interest groups. However most of all, this chapter provides the detailed information necessary to evaluate the applicability of the extended-IGIF and carry out the analysis of the influential activities of the different interest groups in this case.

This analysis is presented in the fifth chapter of the research. In this final chapter, both the IGIF as well as the four improvements are applied to the case of the PDMS through which the analysis is made. Furthermore, this chapter will also provide an answer to the third sub-question as to how successful the different interest groups were in influencing the policy decision of conditionally extending the PDMS in the Netherlands. As chapter one and two will discuss extensively, measuring influence is not an exact science. Based on the multiple methods used in this research, this chapter includes an assessment of the extent of influence the different interest groups had as well as an evaluation of the degree of success the different interest groups had in influencing the policy outcome. After this, the research and its main findings are summarized, reviewed and wrapped up in the conclusion.

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1. Theoretical framework

“There is no such thing as the model lobbyist; rather, there are varieties of lobbyists” (Holyoke et al. 2015: 9). During the course of this research, this statement made by Holyoke and his colleges has many times proven itself to be true. Lobbyists, advocates, activists, interest groups or public affairs consultants; these are all synonyms of the same phenomenon. But what actually is a lobbyist? According to the Cambridge Dictionary, a lobbyist can be best defined as: “Someone who tries to persuade a politician or official group to do something” (Cambridge Dictionary n.d.). Although this definition covers an important aspect of the concept, it does not fully suffice due to the diverse varieties of lobbyists and the different tasks they are assigned with. The common view of what lobbyists are considered to be, are professional consultants, working at large public affairs offices, available for hire and who oftentimes find themselves in the service of big (profit-oriented) corporations, for whom they represent their interests in the political arena. The concept ‘lobbyist’ includes more than that. It can also be one of those actors working directly (in-house) for the interests of companies, professional associations, federations, unions, NGOs, social movements, think-tanks, academic organisations, (civil or religious) communities or public authorities (cities, municipalities). By this definition, a group of teachers going on strike for better wages can therefore also be considered lobbyists.

All of these different types of lobbyists have the same thing in common; their objective. Although they are involved in a range of different activities (e.g. the persuasion of politicians or public officials, steering the public debate or setting the political agenda); all of these activities are essentially expressions of the intent to have the most amount of influence on public policy. According to Chalmers’ ‘information processing theory’, influence should be considered as: “a function of a group’s ability to efficiently process information” (2011: 471). From a rational choice perspective, it might therefore be concluded that the core business of lobbyists is the gathering and transmission of information to the right people at the right time, for the purpose of utilizing the maximum amount of influence on the policy outcome. Their input could be supplied to policymakers or media outlets, in the form of expertise, knowledge or other forms of information. Additionally, in the words of Hall & Deardorff, interest groups can be best understood as ‘service bureaus’, who offer input to like-minded decision-makers (2006). The extent to which interest groups are successful in their effort is largely affected by certain determining aspects like the type of issue and the amount of resources available to the lobbyists (e.g. money and expertise).

1.1. The issues of influence measurement

Chalmers’ information processing theory provides a practical definition of influence, which makes it more tangible and measurable. This practical definition is applied in this research, but the more generally accepted definition of influence of Dür and De Bièvre as: “the control over outcomes” is also maintained (2007: 3). Lobbyists and interest groups are influential: “to the extent that they succeed in obtaining policies they prefer while averting policies they dislike, even if the latter are preferred by other actors” (Dür et al. 2015: 954). Although these two definitions are different, they are also compatible with each other. Chalmers’

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definition helps the study of influence. Measuring the control over outcomes is considered to be rather difficult. After reviewing hundreds of books and articles of interest groups and lobbying literature, Baumgartner & Leech defined the research area of power and influence as: “an area of ‘confusion’ in the literature” (1998: 37). Many researchers avoid the concepts of power or influence as the focus of their research all together, precisely because of the methodological issues surrounding it (Woll 2007: 58). Still, some political scientists pursue this challenge to distinguish the right approach to measure influence. Within this community, the common perception is that, although it may be very difficult, measuring influence is certainly is not impossible (Dür 2008: 560). Chalmers is one these political scientists and it is his perception on influence which is central in this research.

Arguably, there are three main difficulties accompanying the assessment of influence. First of all, there is the everlasting problem of proving causality. It is nearly impossible to determine with certainty that a specific outcome is the result of the input of a certain actor, specifically when countless of other (unaccounted) actors and factors might also have had (unintended) influence in the matter and counter-lobbying might have played a large part in it (Chalmers 2011: 475). This problem of causality is an issue which exists in all branches of social sciences. Correlation is no causality. However, when all the different methods provide answers pointing in the same direction, some conclusions can be made. Secondly, influence is a mechanism, which exists in many forms. Lobbyists are often primarily associated with inside lobbying strategies, where lobbyists exert influence through forms of networking and other ways of direct contact with policymakers (Beyers et al. 2008: 1121). However, lobbyists are also involved in outside lobbying strategies, which include for instance media strategies. In some cases, they are influencing the selection of decision-makers themselves, through for example the support of political campaigns. There is also the presence of influence in the form of structural power, which is hard to detect, for it requires no visible activity to take place. (Dür 2008: 575). Due to these multiple forms of influence it is difficult to develop and apply a method which takes all of them into account.

This second problem of measuring different types of influence can be placed within the larger context of the ‘three faces of power’ theory. Following the work of Lukes, the first face of power includes that: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957: 202). The second face of power consists of the potential for agenda-setting and the third face of power includes a manipulative form of power, which influences the wishes and thoughts of others (Lukes 1974). It is arguably impossible to include all three faces of power in the analysis of a single research. Focussing on less than three faces of power is therefore completely justified, as long as the researcher acknowledges the limits of the generalizability of the chosen methods (Dür & De Bièvre 2007: 3) This research is focused on the influence expressed during the policy process, making the first face of power the most obvious to be researched. Studying the third face of power is considered extremely difficult and therefore not suitable for the scope of this master thesis research project (Dür 2009: 13). The second face of power will be discussed in the third and fourth chapter of this research, because some lobbying strategies where aimed at influencing public opinion and the political agenda. However, the timeframe of the research

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lies on the policy process after the agenda had already been set, which makes the first face of power the primary focus of this research.

The third problem of influence measurement arises when the effect of influence is approached purely as the difference between interest groups’ preferences and the policy outcome. Determining the exact preferences of interest groups is difficult, especially considering the fact that sometimes interest groups are not fully aware of their own preferences or when they are not honest about their preferences. According to Chalmers, this difficulty can be overcome, when the focus of the research is not on the preferences, but on the input. He makes a plea for his information processing theory, which includes the assumption that lobbyists only lobby their friends by supporting them with information. In this way, comparing the input with the eventual outcome provides an adequate indicator of the lobbying effort. This approach also provides a solution to the problem of measuring the influence of interest groups in cases where there is no conflict, due to the presence of only one interest group or advocacy coalition. (Chalmers 2011).

1.2. The interest group influence framework

As mentioned before, the information provided by lobbyists is a necessary element for policymakers to carry out their tasks in an effective manner. Moreover, interest groups provide representation and involvement for their constituency in the public policy domain. Therefore, they should be considered an important part of a democratic society (Braun-Poppelaars et al. 2011). At the same time however, inequality in the amount of resources, access and the extent of influence different kinds of interest groups have, provide profit-oriented lobbyists and interest groups with a bad reputation, specifically because they are acting on account of their private interests at the expense of the public’s. A society where private interests prevail too often, risks developing a democratic deficit and growing social and economic inequality as the result of ‘corporate capture’ (Pabst 2010). To what extent the inequality in influence between different types of interest groups truly exists is a topic of discussion within the scientific community and also subject to inquiry in this research (Dür et al. 2015; Kluger Rasmussen 2015; Van Huisjtee & Glasbergen 2010).

The inequality of the capacity between different types of interest groups to successfully influence policy outcomes is considered here to be determined by several categorical contextual factors. These factors are incorporated in the interest group influence framework (IGIF). The IGIF is a tool which can be used to analyse a specific case and provide an explanation of the outcome and the amount of influence different stakeholders had in this process. As a matter of fact, in no publication has it been officially called a framework. Dür calls it: “a large number of hypotheses” in which he distinguishes four “broad clusters of determinants” (2009: 2). These clusters of determinants have been used on many occasions by different researchers either in separate or combined form (Chalmers 2011; Dür & De Bièvre 2007; Dür et al. 2015; Klüver 2009a; Mahoney 2007; Princen 2007; Woll 2007). The acknowledgement of these determinants is a necessity, which will benefit the overall understanding and insight in the specific case and will also provide the possibility for comparative case studies.

One of the determinants that has received arguably the most attention are the actor characteristics. As the name suggest; actor characteristics differ greatly per lobbyist or interest groups. Companies, trade

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unions, public affairs organisations and NGOs are just a couple of the different types of interest groups, which can be involved in policy issues. The identity of the actors affects the possibilities they have to influence policy. Whether an interest group acts on account of the publics interest or for their own private interest influences the level of responsiveness of a policymaker towards this interest group when this policymaker is democratically eligible (Mahoney 2007: 41). The possession of a great amount of resources allows actors to be better able to address policymakers, provide them with information and play a meaningful role in a decision (Chalmers 2011: 472). Dahl defines these resources as: “anything that can be used to sway the specific choices or the strategies of another individual” (1961: 226). This includes different types of information like knowledge about the publics or constituency’s preferences, strategic political information on the opinions or activities of (rival) policymakers or expertise on policy issues (Dür & De Bièvre 2007: 5). These resources also include the political support or legitimacy some groups can provide to a politician based on the constituency the group has. Furthermore, financial resources also play a role for it allows the interest group to hire more manpower to gather, process and distribute their information and expertise or to influence the political opinion of politicians through campaign donations. (Dür 2009: 3).

Resources are not the only distinction effecting the amount of influence different types of interest groups have. The size of their membership base also plays an important role in this matter. An interest group with a great amount of members has more political legitimacy and is therefore more likely to be invited to the table and express its preferences to the policymakers. Possible coalitions between different interest groups have the same effect, as has been demonstrated by the Statiegeldalliantie in the case of PDMS (which will be further discussed in chapter four and five). These groups might even form (transnational) coalitions with each other or against each other to improve their chance of effectively influencing a policy outcome (Sabatier 1998). A side note in this regard is the fact that interest groups or coalitions with diffuse interest are often less successful in their effort than coalitions with concentrated interests, because they are involved with multiple issues and have to divide their resources. Due to their diffuse agenda, these groups also might find it difficult to organise in the first place, overcome problems of collective action and have all its members face the same direction (Dür & De Bièvre 2007: 6). The type of interest group and the resources at its disposal are important, but the amount of influence an actor eventually has is largely dependent on the other determinants within the IGIF. For instance, an environmental NGO like Greenpeace differs greatly from a public affairs corporation like Business Europe, both in amount and type of resources. However, in a number of cases, Greenpeace can be much more influential than Business Europe, as the next determinant will show.

The second determinant which affects the possibility of success for interest groups are the issue characteristics. These characteristics include the type of issue, the complexity, the salience and the level of conflict of the issue. Ethical issues produce a different situation than highly technologically or low salience issues (Dür & De Bièvre 2007). Following the work of the American political scientist Theodore Lowi, three different types of issues can be distinguished. The distinction is made based on the type of policy which addresses the issue. These types of policies are regulatory, distributive or redistributive by nature (Moran 2015: 5). A regulatory policy consists of rules or laws which have the purpose of influencing the behaviour

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of the citizens. Distributive and redistributive policies are created for the purpose of relocating resources from the government to a societal group or from one group to another. Subsidizing social housing projects is an example of a distributive policy and inheritance taxation is an example of a redistributive policy. The type of policy issue affects the amount of influence an interest group can have. Regulatory policies can produce benefits for one group at the expense of another. Therefore, this type of policy issues is often accompanied by the involvement of multiple clashing interest groups in the policy process. Distributive policy issues can strongly favour one social group, while broadly dividing the costs of the policy across the population. Interest groups favouring these policies are more frequently successful, because they are less likely met by opposing interest groups. In addition, interest groups are less frequently involved and successful in lobbying redistributive policy issues for this policy type results in diffuse costs and benefits for the population. (Dür et al. 2015: 7-8).

Another issue characteristic is the level of complexity. Issue complexity is defined by Klüver as: “the degree to which a given policy problem is difficult to analyse, understand or solve” (2011: 487). The level of complexity depends on the both the level of technicality as well as the scope of the issue. Certain economic policies within the European Union might affect the entire internal market, making it very complex, while other policy decisions might only include small, simple legal adjustments to existing policies. Policy issues which demand large-scale solutions result in less influence on the part of the lobbyists, because politicians act more cautious due to their far reaching effects (Mahoney 2007: 40). At the same time however, if an issue is technologically highly complex, policymakers oftentimes require all the help from external parties as they can get. These are the moments when lobbyists as information service bureaus are functioning at their best. Policymakers are in these cases depending on their input to function properly and the framing of the issue and the solution to this issue by the lobbyists allows them to greatly influence the policy outcome. Research on the lobbying success of business interest groups in the European Union has shown that these types of interest groups have the advantage when the issues are technologically complex and without conflict (Dür et al. 2015). The amount of resources these interest groups have allows them to be active in a large amount of policy domains. However, the same research shows that in cases where issues are accompanied by a lot of salience, where business interests are opposed by conflicting interest groups or coalitions counter-lobbying their effort, then they are less influential and usually ‘lose’ (ibid).

Increasing the salience of an issue can sometimes have a beneficial effect for interest groups. Salience, the prominence, importance or popularity of an issue, affects the amount of influence interest groups have due to the presence or absence of the publics opinion and attention in the matter, thus resulting in a different handling of a politician of the issue (Klüver 2015: 451-452). These politicians might feel reserved to let the interest groups be to much involved in the policy process due to the negative effect the favouring of concentrated interests might have on the publics opinion and consequently his or her own approval rate and electoral consequences (Dür 2009: 8). The amount of salience of a policy issue also affects the possibility of the interest groups to experience the presence of (strong) competitive interest groups, thus making it more difficult for them to have an influential effect on the policy outcome, then when they remain unopposed. The amount of salience can be affected in numerous ways. One of the ways in which the salience

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of an issue is increased is after the occurrence of a so-called ‘focusing event’ (Kingdon 1995). A focusing event is an event which alerts the politicians and the public to the presence of the issue. This might produce the urge to act on it and develop new policies. Examples of focusing events include a natural disaster, a terrorist attack or simply the publication of a scientific research with remarkable findings. The success which an interest group might have as the result from a focusing event depends on their own agenda and whether they are lobbying in favour or against the status quo (Mahoney 2007: 40). Interest groups might also influence the amount of salience of an issue themselves. Through different types of campaigning or ‘outside lobbying’, the interest groups might increase the salience and therefore their own success.

The applied lobbying strategy of an interest group is the third determinant within the framework which analyses and explains the influential effect interest groups can have on a policy outcome. Different types of interest groups use different types of lobbying strategies. Categorically speaking, interest groups can apply inside lobbying strategies and outside lobbying strategies. Inside strategies include the networking capabilities of the lobbyists, where policymakers are influenced through direct contact. This happens most of the times behind closed doors and access is an important condition for the lobbyist’s success. Outside lobbying strategies are usually applied, when this access is not available to the lobbyist or when the strategy to influence public opinion and the political agenda seems to be the better choice. Influencing the public opinion through large-scale media campaigns is one way in which pressure can be put on the policymakers. Strikes and demonstrations are other methods which can be applied for this purpose. The position of the interest group with regard the policymakers greatly affects their choice of strategy. Although interest groups have a choice which type of strategy they apply, this choice is still strongly affected by their insider or outsider status (Maloney et al. 1994: 32-34). When an interest group has the status of a so-called ‘core-’, ‘specialist-’ or ‘peripheral insider group’, they are very likely to pursue insider lobbying strategies. This is also the case for interest groups interest groups, which can be qualified as ‘outsiders by ideology or goal’ or ‘outsiders by choice’. (Idem: 30-32).

The choice of strategy has consequences for the eventual outcome of the policy development process. However, the selected strategy is not always per definition the most effective and successful one. As Dür puts it: “If groups always adopted ideal strategies, strategies would only be an intermediary variable that is perfectly explained by a group’s resources, the institutional framework and so forth, and hence could be ignored in attempts at explaining interest group influence. Yet while very little research exists on this issue, it seems plausible that groups sometimes fail to pick the most effective lobbying strategy” (2009: 9). This failure of the interest groups might result from the inability to recognize and grasp the right opportunities. Although this ability can be learned through experience, it still puts professional public affairs agencies at an advantage in respect to young and small NGOs. Furthermore, some interest groups might favour strategies which can be considered less effective for reaching their preferred policy outcome, but are successful in maintaining or enlarging their membership base. Lastly, the choice for a less effective lobbying strategy might also be the result of the institutional complexity in which the interest group operates. This is especially the case when it comes to the context of an international organisations like the European Union,

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but this also applies to the national context for it includes many different kinds of governmental bodies, actors and institutes. (Ibid).

This difference in institutional context includes the fourth and final determinant within the IGIF. This context refers to the multiple levels of governance where the policy process might take place, as well as the composition of governmental- and other types of bodies within these levels. The governmental level in which the policy process takes place also affects the activity of the interest groups in different ways. The supranational institutional context of the EU provides very different chances and obstacles for interest groups to pursue their policy preference than the institutional context of a municipality or the national context of The Hague (Mahoney 2007). The complexity of the institutional landscape of the European Union as an important obstacle has already been mentioned, but these different institutional contexts also provide the interest groups with opportunities. For example, addressing issues on an international scale allows interest groups from different countries who share the same objective to develop a coalition or platform, where they combine their resources and increase their chance for lobbying success. Furthermore, the difference in institutional contexts also provide different regulations, mores and constitutional rules. For instance, in the case of the European Commission, contrary to the nationally elected politicians, the policymakers are appointed. This provides these commissioners with less electoral restraints regarding their activity, thus making them less dependent on the financial support of campaign donors and therefore less receptive to their interest groups (Mahoney 2007: 38). This again results in a more equally divided playing field for the other less well-endowed interest groups.

In addition, extra levels of government provide the interest groups with extra access points towards the policymakers. In some cases, interest groups might be very unsuccessful in their efforts to influence policies in their national context due to the presence of an unreceptive governing party or coalition in office at that moment. Through the use of a ‘boomerang effect’, these interest groups might try to achieve the same goal by influencing policymakers at a higher level, like the European Union, the United Nations or any other influential intergovernmental or supranational organisation, which will in turn affect the national policies (Tarrow 2005: 145-147). These extra access points have produced a trend of interest groups who take part in ‘venue shopping’ at both national and international levels (Callanan 2011). Within the same governmental level, the composition of the institutional context might also differ. This is often the case at the national level between the different countries. For example, countries like Switzerland where instruments of direct democracy like referendums are used on a regularly basis enjoy a strong integration of non-profit oriented interest groups. This is in contrast to countries like Germany where these instruments are rarely used and where these non-profit oriented interest groups have a weaker position. Consequently, this composition of the institutional context again affects the behaviour of interest groups and the lobbying strategy they choose to apply. (Weiler 2015).

1.3. Flaws and improvements

These four determinants and the contextual factors they analyse are interrelated and together form the coherent interest group influence framework. As mentioned before, in no publication has it officially been

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called a theoretical framework. The construction of this framework within this research is based upon the combined work of multiple academics like Mahoney, Klüver and Weiler, who all use and describe some of the determinants of the framework in their own publications. However, the work of German political scientist Andreas Dür and his co-authors has been the most influential in this regard, for they make the same distinction between the “four broad clusters of determinants” (Dür 2009: 2), otherwise called the “factors shaping the influence of interest groups” as used in this research (Dür & De Bièvre 2007: 3). This framework is a tool which is well-suited in providing an analysis of a specific policy process, the influential activity of the interest groups involved and an explanation of the eventual policy outcome.

However, as the analysis in chapter five will also show, this framework is not applicable to every case. Based on the four determinants, certain policy decisions can not be explained, for the framework would have predicted a different outcome. This implies that the current framework has its flaws and needs to be adjusted or even extended. As mentioned before, besides providing an answer to the main research question, this research also has the purpose of developing a better functioning theoretical framework, which is comprehensive and can be applied as a tool to all other cases in which interest groups were actively influencing a policy process. This is a high standard and chances are that the newly formed ‘extended-IGIF’ is still not perfectly applicable to every other case. This only suggests that developing this framework is a process for which the case of the extension of the packaging deposit money system in the Netherlands is the first step. It allows the possibility of well-grounded future adjustments based on different case studies, which will only improve the framework as an analytical tool. Before all that, it is required to describe the flaws of the current framework and provide the necessary adjustments to improve the IGIF.

Within the current theoretical framework, four flaws have been identified which need to be addressed. The first flaw of the framework is the lack of attention regarding the agency and beliefs of the decision-makers. Politicians and policymakers have no tabula rasa. As Chalmers has already stated: “interest groups […] tend to lobby friends, not foes” (2011: 472). Within the IGIF the focus of the determinant ‘actor characteristics’ primarily lies on the interest groups and their political agenda and no attention is paid to the activity and preferences of the decision-makers themselves. This gives the appearance of them being inactive neutral policy brokers, which is not the case (Peters 2009). The determinant ‘actor characteristics’ should therefore either be expanded or the framework should be extended with a fifth determinant called ‘decision-maker characteristics’. This determinant would provide an analysis of the decision-makers, their political position, beliefs or ideological position for the purpose of estimating the accessibility for the interest groups towards these decision-makers and the receptiveness of their input.

A second flaw which has been identified within the framework is the fact that the interest groups are oftentimes portrayed as single entities who are acting alone. However, this is in practice often not the case for interest groups frequently find themselves to be a part of a greater advocacy coalition. The ‘advocacy coalition framework’ (ACF) as developed by the American political scientists Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith offers a well-fitting theoretical perspective on the structure and mechanisms of these coalitions, which should therefore be included within the ‘actor characteristics’ determinant, for it contributes to the improvement of the IGIF. The ACF is a framework which was been developed for the

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purpose of providing a better understanding of the major factors and processes which shape a policy process. As Sabatier states himself, it has been specifically designed: “to explain an exceedingly complex situation involving hundreds of actors from dozens of organizations seeking to influence the overall policy process over periods of a decade or more in situations where relatively technical information concerning problem severity and causes cannot be neglected” (Sabatier 1998: 98).

As can be viewed in the diagram on the next page in figure 1, the ACF identifies ‘policy subsystems’. These consist of a variety of public and private actors, who are involved with certain policy issue and who all try to influence the public policy regarding this issue. Within these policy subsystems, coalitions are formed between these actors, which include interest groups leaders, agency officials, politicians from different governmental levels, researchers, journalists and other types of publically engaged actors. Within a policy subsystem, usually one to four advocacy coalitions are active, which are united by the shared set of beliefs and goals and their cooperation. A distinction can be made regarding these beliefs between the broad fundamental ‘deep core’ beliefs (e.g. religion or ideology), the more specific ‘policy core’ beliefs which include their shared commitment and perspective on the policy subsystem and the ‘secondary aspects’ which contains narrower beliefs like the seriousness of the problem or certain specific policy preferences, which might differ between actors within the same coalition. The policy core beliefs and more especially the secondary aspects are more likely to change over a certain period of time than the deep core beliefs. (Idem: 103-104).

The composition of advocacy coalitions also changes over time. Certain ‘exogenous variables’ affect the constraints, opportunities and resources of the subsystem actors. The variables can be divided between relative stable parameters and dynamic external system events. These stable parameters are rather solid and only change over long periods of time. They include the basic distribution of natural resources, fundamental socio-economic values, social structures and the constitutional structure of the country. Variables of the second category; the dynamic external system events, are more receptive to change, which can take place over a time period of ten years. These variables are therefore the main cause for changes in the composition of the advocacy coalitions. These events include changes in socio-economic conditions (like the establishment of social movements), changes in public opinion (e.g. awareness of climate change and a need for sustainability), changes in systemic governing coalition (resulting from periodically elections) and policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems (like changing tax laws).

These external variables affect the policy subsystems and the composition of the advocacy coalitions, but are also at the same time subject to change as the result from the lobbying strategies and the success of the advocacy coalitions. (Idem: 102-103). Within these coalitions, one or more strategies are adopted which have the purpose of influencing the policymakers and eventually realising their preferred policy outcome. Both the strategies as well as the beliefs of advocacy coalitions may change during the process of policy influence. When two or more advocacy coalitions are opposing each other, their conflicting strategies cause the involvement of a third group of actors; the policy brokers. These policy brokers will try to reduce the conflict by producing a reasonable compromise. Policy brokers are often but not necessary governmental agents. They can also be actors from a third advocacy coalition acting in a strategic manner,

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when a certain compromise appears to be in its own best interest. (Bratt 2013: 2-4). Eventually, the efforts of the different advocacy coalitions and the policy brokers are concluded by the decision-makers.

Figure 1. The revised diagram of the ACF (Sabatier 1998: 102).

A third flaw of the interest group influence framework is related to the determinant of the institutional context. Although the differences between certain national contexts are addressed by the current IGIF, it still does not sufficiently acknowledge the general position of interest groups within the specific society. Within the political scientific literature, a lot has been written on the different systems of interest representation (e.g. Cohen & Rogers 2001; Greenwood 2011; Sanchez Salgado 2014; Schmitter 1979). Whether a society shows elements of a (neo-)pluralistic, neo-corporatist, elitist or associative system of interest representation affects the amount of influence interest groups can have on policy decisions. These models differ in a number of aspects, but the main division lies in the role authorities have in providing support to interest groups and the equality or inequality in the position or prominence of these interest groups (Sanchez Salgado 2018: 3-8). The traditional division is made between the pluralistic and elitist model. Within a pluralistic system interest groups have equal access to the policymakers and therefore an equal chance to represent their interests. The plurality of different interest groups provides a self-correcting system, which prevents the possibility for a few interest groups to become to dominant at the expense of the others (idem: 3-4). This is in contrast to the elitist model of interest representation, where certain interest groups have more resources, are better organised, have more access and consequently have far more influence on policy decisions than others (idem: 4-5).

102 RA. Sabatier

exceedingly complex situation involving hundreds of actors from dozens of organizations seeking to influence the overall policy process over periods of a decade or more in situations where relatively technical information concerning problem severity and causes cannot be neglected.

Structural overview of the ACF

Figure 1 presents a general overview of the framework. On the left side are two sets of exogenous variables - the one quite stable, the other more dynamic - that affect the constraints and opportunities of subsystem actors.

The former include the basic constitutional structure, socio-cultural values, and natural resources of a political system. Being extremely difficult to change, they are seldom the subject of coalition strategies (except in the very long term). Neverthe- less, they clearly affect behavior. For example, Moe (1990) has recently argued that changing the law is typically the focus of coalition strategies in separation-of-

RELATIVELY STABLE PARAMETERS 1 Basic attributes of the

problem area (good) 2 Basic distribution of

natural resources 3 Fundamental socio-

cultural values and social structure 4 Basic constitutional structure (rules) EXTERNAL (SYSTEM) EVENTS 1 Changes in socio- economic conditions 2 Changes in public opinion 3 Changes in systemic governing coalition 4 Policy decisions and

impacts from other subsystems Constraints and resources of subsystem actors

Figure I Revised diagram of the ACF

POLICY SUBSYSTEM Coalition A Policy

a) Policy beliefs brokers b) Resources Strategy A1 re. guidance instruments Coalition B a) Policy belief~ b) Resources Strategy B1 re. guidance instruments

/

Decisions by sovereigns Institutional rules, resource allocations, and appointments

Policy outputs

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A neo-corporatist model of interest representation is a model often associated with the Dutch polder model in which the three categories of government, employers and employees are functioning in a deliberative and balanced manner (idem: 5-6). Other types of interest groups, which are not included within these three categories are limited in participating in the policy process. Lastly, an associative democratic system resembles the pluralistic model in some form, but differs in its stronger focus on equality, democracy and citizen participation. Besides the representation that citizens enjoy through their electoral bodies, they also seek representation through the interest groups who represent their interests in the policy processes (idem: 6-7). For the purpose of levelling the playing field and establishing equal representation among these different interest groups, the government provides state-funding to groups who would otherwise not have the capabilities to exist. A prime example of a context in which this takes place is the European Union, where the European Commission benefits from the presence and input of NGOs and other public-oriented interest groups. For a clear overview of all the differences between these models of interest representation, see table 1. According to Sanchez Salgado, the neo-pluralistic model is nowadays the most popular model for describing a country’s system of interest representation (2018: 3). It is presumed here that, depending on the specific national or international context, other models might be better applicable in some cases like the European Union exemplifies. For this reason, when conducting an analysis of a policy process and the institutional context, it is important for the extended-IGIF to take account of the model of interest representation which is best applicable to this context, for it provides awareness of the chances and limits of the interest groups within these contexts.

Finally, the fourth flaw of the IGIF lies in the fact that it does not take into account some of the constraints a politician might have to implement the preferences of an interest group. Although the institutional context is one of the determinants within the framework, still too little attention is paid to the limits the politicians might have in their decision-making power due to the type of democracy and the constitutional rules which structure these democracies. This contextual element of the type of democracy affects the agency of the politicians and therefore consequently the amount of influence an interest group might have. Within this research, a distinction is made between majoritarian democracies and consensual democracies (Lijphart 2012). Both types provide extra chances and extra limits for the interest groups. In a majoritarian democracy, there is usually only one political party in office which has the power to implement policies and adopt laws. Examples of these majoritarian democracies are Anglo-Saxon countries like the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the United States. It only takes one party or in some cases only one person who needs to be influenced or pursued to act in a certain way, to have an interest group’s desired policy-outcome. (Idem: 9-29).

Contrary to majoritarian democracies, in consensual democracies no single party is capable of achieving an absolute majority. This results in multiple parties forming a government coalition. A lot of European countries like Germany, Belgium, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands are examples of this type of democracy. When multiple parties are in a governing coalition, the decision-making power is shared. This provides interest groups with multiple access points where they can pursue influencing the policy decisions. At the same time however, because the decision making power is shared and the governing parties

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have to take each others preferences into account, the influence of interest groups is also limited. In this type of democracy, multiple decision-makers need to be influenced by the interest groups to have their preferred policy outcome. (Idem: 30-45). Within a multi-party democracy, an advocacy coalition also becomes more diverse as multiple political parties can be included in the same advocacy coalition, which provides extra means to have the preferences of the advocacy coalition lobbied for.

These four flaws and the provided solutions to these flaws are the extensions to the interest group influence framework, which together form the new extended-IGIF. Besides the four original determinants of the actor characteristics, issue characteristics, the lobbying strategy and the institutional context, four new aspects are added to the framework. These are the decision-maker characteristics, the focus on advocacy coalitions, the model of interest representation and the type of democracy. Together these eight determinants provide an analytical tool, which creates a much better understanding of the entire context in which interest groups operate and influence policy decisions. After disusing the research design and the case specifics of the packaging deposit money systems in the upcoming two chapters, the extended-IGIF will be applied to the case of the PDMS, after which the functionality of this framework will be determined.

Pluralism Elitism Neo-corporatism Associative

democracy

Public intervention Ensures basic rights and competition among groups Ensures representation of powerful groups Ensures stability and governability Ensures effective and balanced representation

Access Open to all groups

respecting basic rights and

constitutional rules

Restricted to an elite of groups with wealth and power

Restricted to a limited number of groups

Open to all groups fulfilling certain normative criteria Representativeness Groups represent

a segment of the population

Elite’s wealth and power give them greater access and influence Hierarchical and centralized system of interest aggregation Accountability and completeness of group’s membership

Autonomy The state should

not interfere in the internal dynamics of groups

Elites have a disproportionate influence on policy

The state controls the articulation of demands and selection of leaders Subsidies in exchange for observing behavioural constraints Limits/risks Unbalanced representation Undemocratic, aristocratic, oligarchic Excludes voices and endangers autonomy of groups Bureaucratic politics

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2. Research design

As has been discussed in chapter one, influence measurement is not without its difficulties. Proving causality, detecting all different forms of influence and determining the real preferences of stakeholders are issues which accompany the measuring of influence. Acknowledging these issues is a first step in dealing with them. Addressing influence with Chalmer’s information processing theory is a way to manage the preference determination issue, but this only takes care of one of the issues and it should also be noted that it is oftentimes not possible to access and inquire every bit of information distributed from the interest groups to the policymakers. Similar to the information processing theory approach, every other method has its benefits and drawbacks. Within the academic community, political scientists disagree with each other on the matter which method should be considered the best suitable to measure influence (e.g. Chalmers 2011; Klüver 2009a; Woll 2007). Some of them favour one method over the other, while others encourage the application of a triangulated approach (Dür 2008: 569; Mahoney 2007: 37). This triangulated (or sometimes called a mixed-method) approach, includes the use of multiple methods in the same case. This approach should only be applied on the condition that the researcher is aware of the drawbacks of every separate method and adjusts for these drawbacks through the choice of compatible and supplementary methods. This way, the researcher can produce a comprehensive and well-substantiated understanding of the activity and influence of the different stakeholders in this policy process. For the purpose of uncovering the influential effect of the interest groups in the case of the PDMS, a triangulated approach has also been applied in this research.

2.1. Influence measurement methods

Within this research, multiple influence measurement methods have been used. This mixed-method approach includes process-tracing, a stakeholder analysis, preference attainment and a moderate version of attributed influence measurement. These are four methods which are often used within the academic community (Dür 2008; Klüver 2009b; Woll 2007). The suitability of these methods dependents on the case specifics. This is the reason why a fifth method, quantitative content analysis, was not applied. This method is considered very suitable for large-N case comparison studies and therefore not applicable to this case study (Klüver 2009a). The other methods are very suitable for qualitative case studies, while at the same time also being very compatible to each other.

The first one of the methods applied in this research is process-tracing. As the French political scientist Pascal Vennesson defined it: “[it is] a research procedure intended to explore the pathways through which initial conditions are turned into outcomes” (2008: 224). Process-tracing as a method has some similarities with investigating and developing a historical narrative, but it is more than that. It is a technique which can be used in different variants for three different scientific purposes. The first one of these purposes is to test an already existing theory. This theory is formulated in the form of a hypothesis of a causal mechanism between variables X and Y, of which the relation is tested by tracing the process of a specific case. A second way in which process-tracing can be applied is for the purpose of theory-building. In this

The plastic lobby : a thesis on the development and improvement of the Interest Group Influence Framework applied in the political context of the Netherlands

August 31, 2018