Utilizing Fear: An analysis of the use of fear appraisal in crisis communication, in response to terrorism by UK political actors

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Utilizing Fear

An analysis of the use of fear appraisal in crisis communication, in response to

terrorism by UK political actors

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Name: Melissa van der Heijden Student Number: s2090031 Date of Admission: 09-06-2019 Thesis Supervisor: Dr. J. Vüllers Second Reader: MA. S. Wittendorp

Subject: The use of fear appraisal by political actors in their response to terrorism Leiden University

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs MSc Crisis and Security Management

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Abstract

This thesis explores the initial crisis communication responses of UK political actors to three major terrorist attacks. By analysing and coding 14 speeches, this research was able to explore potential fear-arousing content or statements promoting fear consistent appeals and answer the question under which conditions these were used. I argue that there is a difference between the roles of different political actors explaining why or why not to use fear appraisal as a crisis communication tool. The results showed a difference in use of fear appraisal content, both between varying political roles, but also throughout time and societal and political context. In line with this paper’s argument, the use of fear appraisal in crisis communication was highest amongst opposition leaders focussing on the insecurity in hindsight of the attack. On the contrary, political actors in government showed fewer signs of fear appraisal in their

speeches, as they seemed more concerned with restoring peace and normalcy to society. The findings also indicate a difference between the three time periods of 1996, 2005 and 2017 with the use of fear appraisal increasing with each attack. Lastly, a closer look was also taken to the use of different fear appraisal components. Overall, the findings indicate a strong fear appraisal use by opposition leaders and less so by government political actors. Also, the scope and political environment under which the attacks took place seemed to have an impact on the use of different fear appraisal components.

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1. Introduction

The United Kingdom is no stranger to terrorism. Since their involvement in Northern Ireland in the early seventies, the country has become somewhat accustomed to the threat (Bramford, 2004). Bonner (1992, as cited by Bramford, 2004, p. 738) even states that “the principal fear, which has shaped the United Kingdom’s response to threats since 1968, has been terrorism connected with Northern Ireland”. In addition to terrorism originating from the IRA, the UK has also dealt with international terrorism. In 1994, researchers calculated over 250

international terrorist incidents concerning the UK, ranging from kidnappings, hijackings and bombings between the years 1970 and 1992 (Bramford, 2004). It wasn’t until the events of 9/11, however, that the threat of terrorism accelerated, and the political focus shifted towards increased measures against international terrorism (Allen & Dempsey, 2018).

This research then focusses on this political response, especially aimed at recent attacks. The responses from political actors have proven to have the potential to shape public opinion and control the level of fear of terrorism in society (De Castella, McGarthy and Musgrove, 2009). Momentarily, the threat, as presented by the British government from international terrorism, is issued as severe, whereas threat from Northern Ireland has been scaled down to moderate (“Terrorism and National Emergencies”, 2019). From a public and political perspective, the perception of threat of terrorist attacks over the recent years seems to be growing, with counter-terrorism measure such as CONTEST becoming an integral part of society (Qurashi, 2018). Not just incidents in the UK, but also incidents such as Charlie Hebdo in France and the Zaventem attacks in Brussels, have led to increased surveillance measures and a strong culture of suspicion and fear where citizens tend to be increasingly afraid, they will be targeted next (Qurashi, 2018).

With terrorism being one of the major political and security topics and the media reporting dramatically on every incident, society’s perception of this threat seems to have serious political consequences. With islamophobia growing and populist political views gaining more precedence, due to a sense of uncertainty and unsafety, it is important to assess where this state of fear is coming from (Qurashi, 2018). This leads us to question if this increased perception of terrorist threat is justifiable or if the public’s fear is just a mere reflection of other processes at play. Exploring this phenomenon could shed a light on the recent changing political landscape and public opinion. In order to do this, this thesis focusses on different crisis response speeches from British politicians throughout the years, to uncover how they respond to terrorist threat and whether they have played a part in igniting a sense of

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5 fear amongst the public. This research focusses on the role of politicians in this process by asking the question: Under what conditions do political leaders incorporate public fear of terrorism in their crisis communication?

Politicians are often being criticized for taking advantage of fear in order to achieve certain political objectives (De Castella et al., 2009). For example, fear of a certain topic such as terrorism has proven effective in gaining electoral support (Lipshutz 2007; Abramowitz, 2004) influence public opinion in terms of supporting certain policies, restraining civil liberties (Gadarian 2010; Oates, 2006) or to create a common enemy and build a collective identity (Mythen & Walkate, 2006; Leudar Marsland & Nekvapil, 2004). Altheide refers to this as the politics of fear claiming: “political leaders or decision makers promote and use audience beliefs and assumptions about danger, risk and fear to achieve certain goals” (2006, p. 2). By provoking fear amongst the pufblic, they are able to control information, influence public opinion and set the political agenda. This research argues that the fear of terrorism is used by political leaders to enhance their position.

It seems worth it to investigate these allegations towards political leaders and their practices on dealing with such a vulnerable and fear inducing topic. The notion that they are manipulating the democratic political system by freighting their electorate seems like a strange and questionable way of gaining public support. However, history has repeatedly shown examples of such fear inducing strategies are used to gain support. Not just for a political leader or party, but for much serious measures such as the war on terror by American President George W. Bush (Lipshutz 2007; Abramowitz, 2004; Bartolucci, 2012). Where appeals for support for war have a much more dramatic impact, researching this phenomenon in terms of national support and societal consequences seems like a valuable step in grasping the impact terrorism has outside of the imminent harm done by the attacks.

This research will examine how different politicians have used fear of terrorism residing in society for their own political gain. The use of fear appraisal in political and crisis communication on terrorism will first be assessed by looking at the response of politicians in the UK government and their opposition, to various terrorist attacks over the years. The use of fear appraisal in their communication will be tested under three different governments with different political actors in their midst. The frequency and intensity of this strategy will be compared over time in three different cases in 1996, 2005 and 2017. Not just the role of the politicians but also how they have used fear appraisal in the communication will be analysed to assess under what conditions political leaders incorporate public fear of terrorism in their crisis communication.

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6 1.1 Academic Relevance

In terms of relevance, this research serves to fill a gap in academic literature by comparing the responses to terrorism between three different governments including different political actors. Research on fear appraisal and framing of terrorist threat has often looked at singular cases with speeches of a single politician, with a strong focus on George W. Bush and the War on Terror or with a strong focus on the representation of the media (De Castella et al., 2009; De Castella & McGarthy, 2011; Lipshutz 2007; Abramowitz, 2004). However, a comparison of the response of actors with different political positions has not been taken into account, neither has the attempt to find a pattern of the use of fear appraisal in different cases throughout time. This research then aims to turn away from a single case analysis but find the scope under which politicians have used this fear appraisal in their crisis communication by comparing the different positions of these actors and their behaviour resulting from that. By doing so, it has the possibility to shed light on this potentially manipulating strategy and raise awareness on how it is, or can, be used to alter public opinion.

1.2 Societal Relevance

The strategic use of emotions in political communication is not uncommon. However, the manipulation of an electorate through appealing to emotions contradicts the idea of rational informed decision making, upon which a democratic society functions (Brader, 2005). The increasing knowledge on voter behaviour and public opinion presents politicians and their communication teams with a grand opportunity to play upon this knowledge and manipulate their audience’s beliefs and behaviour (Gorton, 2016). This development is ill fit for liberal democracies as citizens are turned into objects able to be manipulated and undermines the public’s ability to rationalize and encourage political deliberation (Gorton, 2016). This

research aims to examine if this strategic use of emotions in times of high uncertainty during a terrorist attack is exploited by politicians and with that undermining democratic principles.

1.3 Reading Guide

In order to come to a clear answer to the research question, this study is composed in a structured way. The first section dives into the theoretical insights and main concepts

surrounding the fear of terrorism and the use of emotions in politics. Following, the focus will turn towards the ways politicians can and are expected to respond to crisis events such as terrorism. This will serve as the basis of how this research expects politicians with different

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7 political roles to use fear in their crisis communication on terrorism. The third section

explains the method and modes of analysis conducted in this research. Through coding 14 different speeches issued as immediate response to three terrorist attacks, the difference between the use of fear appraisal between political actors and throughout time will be mapped out. The fourth section contains the results of this analysis and presents the most interesting findings of this study to help answer the main research question. In the last chapter, the presented theory, arguments, expectations and findings will be bound together providing a cohesive conclusion. This study ends with a discussion section addressing its limitations and recommendations for future research.

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2. Literature

Terrorism discourse including assumptions, definitions, labels and narratives used to give meaning to this concept has become one of the most prominent political discourses in modern society (Jackson, 2007). The fear of terrorism has the ability to serve as a powerful political tool, since it is rooted in the uncertainty of security. Terrorism undermines the ability to protect oneself or society and heightens the feeling of vulnerability (Van Bunschot & Sherley, 2005). Beck’s (1992) risk society explains that common day threats are pervasive, meaning we cannot predict or know who or what could harm us. Terrorism is one of those threats which breaks down our traditional state-based perceptions towards threats, war, crime etc. The globalization of threat brought about by crimes such as terrorism blurs the lines of territory (Beck, 2003). Where in the past, threats were bounded locally, now global danger threatens us all. Because of this, individuals are no longer able to manage or cope with the increasing amount of information that could potentially be harmful to their established well-being. The public must therefore rely on trusted experts, often state actors, to monitor all information and rely on their duty to report relevant and plausible threats (Van Brunschot & Sherley, 2005). Trust in political or state actors to provide a realistic view of our modern-day risk society, thus, serves a key condition of maintaining public fear perception. However, when this threat perception is taken advantage of for political gain, this relationship becomes problematic.

The impact of terrorism on perceived fear in society has been subject of a number of researches. Scholars have, for example, thoroughly examined the impact of the media on the perception of terrorism and the perceived fear that stems from it (Slone, 2000; Nellis & Savage, 2012; Altheide, 1997). Research has suggested that the consumption of terrorism related news increases the perceived threat of terrorism to the individual, as well as the

concern for others. However, whether media content on fear is the ‘cause’ or ‘effect’ of public concern seems to be unresolved. Altheide (2006) presents the politics of fear theory, stating that “political leaders or decision makers promote and use audience beliefs and assumptions about danger, risk and fear to achieve certain goals” (p 6.). He explains that the news media have tied the link between terrorism and other concepts such as fear, crime, victimization and insecurity. Assuming that, through propaganda, political decision makers are key news sources, they can thus shape public opinion. However, as plausible as this may sound in, for example, the American context, we cannot assume the media is a passive tool for political communication.

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9 2.1 Using Emotions: Terrorism and Fear

This research turns away from media effects and framing theories on terrorism and instead focusses on the usage of fear as an emotion in the communication of politicians itself. The appeal to emotions and relationships in politics has been noticed and recognized for a long time (Lazarsfeld, Berelsen & Gaudet, 1944). However, actual research into the role of emotions in politics has been seriously lacking (Brader, 2005; Redlawsk, 2006). Brader (2005) argues that, even though political scientists have been researching the impact of the mass media and political campaigning to a large extent, these studies lack the role which emotions play in this process. Where eventually research has focussed mostly on the tone with which content is presented or the framing of the content itself, the impact of emotions is relatively ignored (Brader, 2005).

There has been an increase in the curiosity of this subject by political psychologists. For example, Marcus (2000) has dived into the process of emotions revolving around political leaders, their personalities and how people respond to their evaluation of these portrayals. He makes a distinction between two groups of scholarly interests, first those who study the role of emotion around political leaders and second those who study the effect of these emotions on the general public. What it also still debated is whether emotions are significant due to the reliance of individuals on early experiences which influence current judgements, or whether emotions are of the essence because they can be evoked and explain the reaction of an individual to current circumstances (Marcus, 2000). This distinction is quite prominent in political science, since it has divided research into two perspectives. These two lines of research, although quite contradictory, allow for an interpretation of how an audience responds and evaluates emotionally, political information (Redlawsk, 2006).

Overall, it is stated that the role of emotions in politics is prevalent because of both of these explanations. It allows for evaluation of past experiences and enables an individual to make sense and cope with current events (Marcus, 2000). Redlawsk (2006), however,

questions whether emotions might have been overlooked due to rational choice theory, which places rational over emotions when it comes to political judgements. It is argued both in psychology and amongst political scientist that emotions are primary in the process of reasoning and have the ability to both enhance and undermine rationality (Brader, 2005). In communication, emotional appeals are used to evoke an intentional emotion or response within an audience (Brader, 2005). Even though theories on emotions and their consequences differ greatly, there seems to be a common consensus on two specific emotions and their implications namely, enthusiasm and anxiety or fear (Lazarus, 1991; Marcus, MacKuen,

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10 Wolak & Keele, 2006; Steenbergen & Ellis). Where enthusiasm reinforces the drive to meet certain goals and increases motivation amongst a public, anxiety or fear are a reaction to threat. Fear pulls people out of their comfort zone and activates the process of critical or alternative thinking (Brader, 2005).

2.1.1 Using Emotions: Fear

The use of fear by political actors for any purpose has been studied extensively and in various contexts. In Dean’s (2005) research on the use of fear in elections campaigns, he found that political parties used fear in their form of campaigning to persuade and convince certain societal groups. Fear has also been linked to influence voting behaviour in terms of far-right preference (Vasilopoulos, Marcus, Valentino & Foucault, 2018). Gadarian (2010) presents his findings on the support for hawkish foreign policy views due to fear of terrorist threat. He states that, when information is presented in an emotional appealing way, including fear-inducing cues, these stricter policies are more likely to be accepted. Mythen and Walklate (2006) have also looked at the political communication of terrorism to the public since 2001 and conclude that it has led to a cultural climate of fear and uncertainty. They examined the reliability and veracity of information provided by the government on terrorism, claiming it has not only led to a reduced notion of safety but also harmful consequences for ethnic groups in society due to a simplistic construction of the ‘terrorist other’.

Oates (2006) also suggests that the fear of terrorism plays a prominent role in election campaigns. Even though politicians choose to frame issues differently, the fear card tends to be played in two out of the three examined cases. It appears that emphasizing the fear and international threat of terrorism is a useful and compelling tool for political leaders to gain and maintain power. In addition, it also aids them in increasing security measures restraining civil rights that originally might not be accepted in democratic societies (Gadarian, 2010). Fear, on the contrary, can also be used to criticize the ruling government. Their failed status of securing their country after a terrorist attack leads to much rejection. Chari (2004) analysed the 2004 Spanish elections which occurred after the deadly terrorist attack in Madrid that same year. He states that the voter preference changed just days before the actual vote due to the perception of a failed government and the opposition feeding on this disappointment.

Looking at the research mentioned above, it seems to make sense for political actors to communicate in fearful rhetoric about the risk of terrorism as it leads to higher political support. Especially as communicating low risk can be proven wrong in the case of an actual terrorist attack (Braithwait, 2013). However, if none such attack occurs, communicating a

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11 high risk will only serve as evidence for effective counterterrorism measures by the

government. Assuming from research and the examples mentioned above that political leaders have used fear as a form of emotional manipulation to achieve desired support, then it is of the essence to examine whether this is a reoccurring case in democratic societies. Since the main quality of democracy relies on the ability to make informed political choices, the importance of unbiased, truthful information on cultural, political and social issues seems crucial (Mythen & Walkate, 2006).

We must acknowledge that when dealing with highly sensitive security issues such as terrorism, that not all relevant information can be shared by governments or their functioning agencies. However, the distinction between the necessary withholding of information and the strategic framing of information in a manipulative manner is somewhat ambiguous. As presented in the research outlined above, it seems plausible that political leaders have used public fear as a strategy. However, it remains tricky to state that actual emotional

manipulation has occurred. Krebs and Jackson (2007) are doubtful whether research is able to overcome the methodological issues of proving political persuasion. Presenting such

conclusions implies one is aware of the political motives of the communicators presenting the information. This research then acknowledges that we cannot predict the motivations of political leaders surrounding their fearful communication on terrorism. However, we are able to assess their political communication and appoint traces of fear-inducing content within them.

2.2 Crisis Communication

In order to address how politicians have used emotions, and in particular fear, in their response to terrorism, one must first acknowledge the scope under which this can be done. The way actors respond in times of crisis has been heavily examined in the field of crisis communication. Various scholars have not just examined the strategic use of communication after crisis but also the importance of the process itself (Coombs, 1995, 1999, 2010; Benoit, 1997; Seeger and Griffin-Padgett, 2010).

Coombs (2010) has written a handbook of crisis communication explaining the essence of the role of communication in crisis management. He states that a crisis situation initiates a collective need for information. It is then through the process of communication that this information is gathered, made sense of and distributed to others. According to this handbook of crisis communication, the analysis of this process is divided into three phases, the pre-crisis response phase, the crisis response phase and the post crisis response phase.

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12 Since this research focusses on the first responses of political leaders to a terrorist events, the crisis response phase is the most significant. This is also the most heavily researched form of crisis communication (Coombs, 1995, 1999; Benoit, 1997; Ulmer & Seeger, 2007). Benoit (1997), for example, has focussed mainly on the necessity of image repair discourse following crises. He states that, in a crisis situation, two conditions always occur: 1) An accused party is held responsible for an act and 2) The act is considered offensive (Benoit, 1997, p. 178). When this is the case, an organization can respond in several ways with the goal of restoring or saving their perception amongst the public.

Although Benoit’s (1997) framework presents preparation, selection and analysis of crisis communication strategies, it assumes all crises to be harmful to an organization or person. Hearit (1994) has outlined various image repair strategies which help control the framing of the narrative after a crisis and “lessen the severity of guilt” (p.118). Crisis

communication can then be used to distance organizations or actors from the responsibility of the crisis or present a competing narrative to safeguard legitimacy and regain a positive reputation. However, most of these scholars look at the inherit process of crisis

communication itself and, to some extent, the precautions or preparations that could be done beforehand in order to effectively deal with such an event (Benoit, 1997, 2000; Hearit, 1994). More recent work has distinguished types of crises generating different responses and

strategies going beyond the mere repairing and protecting of one’s image, but instead looking at opportunities that crisis communication brings with it (Coombs, 2010; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005).

Coombs (1995) has expanded on this notion and has been working on a situational crisis communication theory since 1995. It is through this theory that a crisis is explained as negatively loaded event. A crisis is then a threat to an organization’s reputation. It is here that stakeholders or audiences make assumptions on responsibility and reputation which leads to an alteration in the behaviour of this audience towards the organization in crisis (1995). Applying this argument to politics would imply that a crisis can have serious effects on the popularity and functioning of a politician or political party due to their crisis communication response. Just like a democratic political system, in crisis communication, the effectiveness of an organization or actor depends on attributions made by the audience and the behavioural and attitudinal consequences that come from it (Coombs, 2010). The best way then to restore or protect an organization or actors’ image is then by altering the public’s perception of the responsibility or impression of the organization in crisis (Coombs, 1995).

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13 The work of Griffin-Padgett and Allison (2010) argues for a different approach to unique crisis response situations when it comes to natural disasters and terrorism. They distinguish their analysis from other frameworks claiming that image restoration is not the only primary goal. Instead, they propose the necessity of a combination of strategic

communication, which alleviates risk and focusses on restoring order and public safety, and humanistic communications, which helps the public make sense of the tragedy. In this sense, they do not argue that the communicator is protecting or restoring his/her image, rather, their crisis communication serves a more important function, namely, facilitating and making sense of tragic events for the public. Communication, then, does not just serve as a tool to manage the crisis, but also the help initiate a restorative healing process for the aftermath of the crisis.

Crisis communication can thus be interpreted and used in various ways. This research continues by addressing how crisis communication is then evaluated by political actors in different positions and how the public expects them to respond during such an event.

2.2.1 The Role of the Government

Responding after a crisis such as a terrorist attack can be crucial for a political actor’s reputation. Boin and ‘t Hart (2003) argue that crises and leadership are inseparable and intertwined. In a threatening situation, it is natural for the public to look at political leaders to ‘do something’. However, the outcome of their actions determines their further success. For example, when political leaders are able to restore society to normalcy and reduce threat and stress levels, they are praised as successful competent leaders. On the contrary, when political leaders are not able to diminish fear, responsibility of the crisis is placed on them, making them the perfect scapegoat for anger and discontent (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003). Jong (2017) has explained further the cruciality of government leaders to respond to tragic events in an appropriate manner. He examined what audiences expect from public figures who are responsible or in charge at the time of the crisis. He argues that, in crisis communication, public leaders should be concerned with the public impact of a crisis and the accountability public leaders are faced with when such an event happens. Public leaders in charge at the time of the crisis then have the task of presenting an understanding of what is going on during the event through meaning making (Jong, 2017; Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003; Boin, Kuipers & Overdijk, 2013).

According to Jong (2017) public figures can present themselves is various ways depending on the role required of them during a type of crisis. The collective impact and level of responsibility lead to different forms of public meaning making for these leaders, namely,

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14 ‘mourner-in-chief’ when the impact is high, but responsibility is low, or orchestrator, when both impact is high, as well as perceived responsibility. This is then also what the public expects. Jong and Dückers (2017) explain that, when the public is under severe stress after a crisis, they expect the government to provide them with meaning and respond in a fair, compassionate and reliable manner. However, this expectation and the perception of the public can differ from the strategies and support provided by the public leader themselves (Jong & Dückers, 2017).

Research has shown clear examples of political leaders in power responding to crisis and in particular terrorist threats, by doing so in a strategic manner (Jong, 2017; Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003; Boin, Kuipers & Overdijk, 2013). Various examples also show the use of fear by government actors in response to such events. The most prominent case of this is George W. Bush’s appeal for support on the War on Terror. The American President presented the War on Terror as a global campaign and first war of the 21st_{century. He also launched the first}

conflict that can be characterized under Ulrich Beck’s risk society (Spence, 2005). Altheide (2006) argues that the support and re-election of President Bush was the consequence of a strategic appeal of emotions and fear resulting from 9/11. Lipshutz (2007) explains that the Bush administrations adopted this rhetoric as a mechanism to support their policies. The response to the proclaimed War on Terror has served as a tool for political leaders, enabling them to support, but also manipulate the public in coping with their fear of terrorism.

Abramowitz’s (2004) research on the 2004 election also suggest that the Republican strategy of playing on the existing threat terrorism poses to the US in their response to 9/11 was effective in gaining electoral support. It thus seems that fear of terrorism, according to crisis communication, should be avoided by government leaders. However, the American example has highlighted its potential to gain support and present a strong leader.

2.2.2 A Policy Window: The Opportunity for the Opposition

Where political leaders in government are expected to be more concerned with their own reputation and perception by the public in order to restore society to a state of normalcy, opposing political actors or parties are not burdened with this sense of accountability. It is natural to assume that the role of opposition parties or leaders is to diminish the reputation and perception of the current government (McCaffrie, 2012). A time where their

accountability for a crisis is questioned and their performance to ensure public stability is debated, thus, has the ability to serve as an opportunity for the opposition. Boin and ‘t Hart (2003) state that a crisis can also provide this sense of opportunity for various political

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15 leaders. Indeed, many scholars have claimed the notion that crisis events such as terrorism also create a window of opportunity to challenge the status quo (Keeler, 1993; Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003; Boin, ‘t Hart & McConnell, 2009). This so-called ‘crisis-reform theory’ entails that crises serve as a chance for reform when political actors are able to avoid being tainted by the crisis and simultaneously find a way to utilize the situation (Keeler, 1993). In this case, the opposition can set the agenda and raise public awareness of the failing issues which have been neglected by the government, resulting now into the current crisis (McCaffrie, 2012). To illustrate this process, Boin et al. (2009) argue that a crisis or disturbance of societal normalcy gives way for varying, conflicting interpretations. They reflect the existing competing values and interest residing in the tension between government and oppositions. It is then up to the proponents of these conflicting views to convince the public to support their perception and accept it as the general public opinion. In other words, crisis exploitation, in this case, is defined as “the purposeful utilization of crisis-type rhetoric to significantly alter levels of political support for public office-holders and public policies” (Boin et al., 2009, p.83). During a crisis, the opposition thus has the opportunity to alter the public’s perception of the government. Highlighting its failure to protect its citizens and increasing fear is one of them. Chari (2004) illustrates this with the example of the Spanish election on March 14th, 2004. Only three days prior to the elections, the city of Madrid fell victim of one of the deadliest attacks ever witnessed in Europe at that time. The Popular Party (PP) in government, failed to make sense of the crisis and was critiqued due to their lack of

transparency and shift of accountability towards the wrong third party. The opposition party was therefore able to benefit from this by shifting the public’s anger from the attack towards the failure of the government, leading to a shift of public opinion and voter preference. Consequently, the way in which different political actors thus respond to a crisis can have serious political consequences.

This research then acknowledges the conditions under which crisis communication strategies are being used and where fear appraisal can come into play. According to the theories discussed above, reputation and image repair serve as main driving forces of crisis communication. Once responsibility comes into play and an actor is linked to the

accountability of an event, such strategies take over (Coombs, 2010; Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003). Apart from that, an audience also requires government leaders to initiate a meaning-making process providing them with information, understanding and compassion (Jong, 2017; Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003; Boin et al., 2013). Following this line of argument, in this research I expect political actors with a prominent role in government to show compassion and provide

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16 information to the public to make sense of the event and stabilise their image. Crisis

communication, however, is not under the full control of the political leaders themselves. Other actors in the political or social sphere will possibly offer other credible, yet alternative, viewpoints. Their assessment and interpretation on responsibility, cause, damage, and

measures taken can differ from that of other public leaders. This narrative can undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the prominent political leader (Boin, 2009). It is common for governments to be expected to fix the mistakes that led up to and were made during the crisis. This makes such an event an opportunity for judgement, reform and the questioning of

leadership also known as a ‘policy window’ (Boin et al., 2009; Keeler, 1993; McCaffrie, 2007). Boin (2009) concludes in his research on crisis leadership that a crisis under the circumstances of failure of foresight and lack of prevention can set the agenda for political reform. In this case it is common for opposing actors to advocate their own alternative views to serve their political agenda. In this research I therefore expect that political actors who serve as opposition leaders to stress the threat and fear of the attack and highlight the current government’s failure to protect society to push their own political views.

H1: This research expects political actors in government, who are held accountable for the event, to be less likely to use fear appraisal content but rather show compassion, provide information and protect their image.

H2: This research expects opposition leaders to be more likely to use fear appraisal content as they will aim to highlight the failure of the sitting government and seek to push their own policy views.

2.3 Framing

To address the question, under what conditions political leaders incorporate public fear of terrorism in their crisis communication, this research must illustrate the ways in which the incorporation of public fear in crisis communication is possible. Framing theory consists of the premises that an issue or event can be interpreted or viewed with a range of different perspectives, which can have large implications on a receiver’s values and considerations (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Specifically, framing refers to “the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about such an issue” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p.104). To control or issue such frames can thus give a sender the power to control the interpretation of an event or issue.

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17 In the field of communication studies, framing is viewed as a process by which

language is used by different actors to implement and construct certain interpretations of a concept or issue and connect it with a wider context (Azpiroz, 2013). In political

communication framing, it is especially political actors who determine which interpretations of an issue are prioritized or highlighted. By doing this, they can influence a public’s sense of reality and appeal to widely shared ideas held by members of a specific society. The use of this for politicians is that, by framing certain issues, they can communicate and explain their ideas and proposals in such a manner that falls in line with citizens perception of reality (Azpiroz, 2013).

Norris, Kern and Just (2003) explain that, although framing is used as an important factor in political communication, there is still a lot of uncertainty why certain frames are accepted better than others. The question why one frame is reinforced as the generally accepted interpretation of an event rather than another, even with the presence of rivalling interpretations presented by other contesting political actors, remains unsolved. According to them, framing then works most effectively in ‘one-sided’ cases. Here, society is understood to function at the broadest level with commonly accepted norms, beliefs and values within the community (Norris et al., 2003). In the case of, for example, a terrorist attack, a general consensus is assumed on how the community interprets this event with the inclusion of the media, government and other societal actors. On the contrary, with ‘two-sided’ cases, the awareness of contesting views is greater. The perception and interpretation of an event then differ heavily between sub-cultures and opposing political or societal groups. Often in these cases, credible sources such as political leaders are expected to make sense of the event by providing interpretations and an understanding of the who, what and why questions (Seeger & Griffin-Padgett, 2010; Jong, 2017; Norris et al., 2003).

However, this research turns slightly away from the process of framing. The role of the media is avoided, as well as the effect on public opinion. Although framing leads to the interpretation of a certain event as intended by the initiator, this research focusses specifically on the appraisal of fear. Whether this is accepted by an audience or turns into the predominant frame within society is not under investigation in this research. Framing a certain event around a risk, uncertainty or fear frame is a part of the bigger picture examined by framing theory. This study, therefore, dives deeper into this phenomenon by looking at emotion provoking in crisis communication though appraisal theory.

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18 2.4 Appraisal Theory

Appraisal theory is more specific than framing theory since it touches upon the claim that certain emotions are evoked due to the evaluation or interpretation of an event. It differs specifically from other emotion related theories, since it claims that the interpretations, which are linked to an event or issue, rather than the event or issue itself, cause the elicitation of emotions (Roseman & Smith, 2001). Appraisal theorists argue that “the combination of discrete emotion-eliciting cognitive appraisals produce specific and discrete emotions” (De Castella et al., 2009, p.5). Different patterns and combinations of these appraisals cause different emotional states per perceiver. This research aims to answer the question: Under what conditions do political leaders incorporate public fear of terrorism in their crisis

communication? Appraisal theory will serve to uncover how and if fear eliciting components were used in the crisis communication of several political actors. Through the research highlighted above, this study assumes that politicians act as rational actors with a fixed set of preferences which lead them to protect their own reputation and take advantage of criticizing opportunities. They act in such a way to maximize their preferences and do so in a strategic way (Hall, 1996). Crisis communication research has shown that political actors will aim to protect and enhance their reputation and gain popularity (Benoit, 1997; Hearit, 1994). This research then argues that, in terms of responding to terrorism, they will do so in a strategic way by either restoring peace or using the residing fear in society to their advantage.

In line with the argument that politicians play in on the fear of terrorism in society, De Castella et al. (2009) have analysed political rhetoric of Australian Prime Minister John Howard. By applying so-called appraisal theory to terrorism related speeches, they were able to focus specifically on fear inducing content. De Castella and McGarthy (2011) elaborated on this research by analysing the political rhetoric of UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and US President George W. Bush. They took into account the evidence of fear appraisal content, the variety between speakers and the variety over time due to changing political climates. For the US, they also took a closer look at whether fear content was associated with fear in the population, and whether it was linked to further policies on counterterrorism. Other research using appraisal theory, have linked emotions such as fear and anger to political preference and populist attitudes (Rico, Guinjoan & Anduiza, 2017). Specifically related to terrorism, threat appraisal theory has been used in terms of risk perception (Lerner, Gozales, Small and Fishhof, 2003) towards citizens’ emotional attributes and policy preferences (Small, Lerner and Fishhof, 2006) or for linking fear tendencies with identity (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus and Gordijn, 2003).

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19 Appraisal theory in the sense that this research will use it, is often attributed to Lazarus (1991) (Small et al., 2006; DeCastella et al., 2009, 2011). His research explains that emotions are not evoked by specific situations or events, but rather by the individual’s cognitive

evaluation. Combining these evoked cognitive assessments can then produce certain specific emotional responses amongst individuals (Lazarus, 1991). De Castella et al. (2011, 2009) provide key appraisals that speak to a person’s sense of fear namely: (1) motivational/goal relevance – the assumption that the subject being discussed is relevant to the individual, (2) motivational/goal incongruence – the assumption that the subject is potentially displeasing or damaging to oneself (p.6). The exercising of fear also calls for: (3) concerns of the coping inability with the previously presented threat and (4) the potential blame assigned to those responsible for causing the harm. The last factor, however, is specifically attributed to the emotional reaction of anger as a result of fear. If the receiver of certain information perceives the content to be personally applicable and harmful to the individual or his/her surrounding, fair appraisal is most likely present. When this is combined with their inability to cope with the situation, fear will serve as primary response, and when the blame is contributed to an external party, anger will result from the evoked fear (De Castella et al. 2011).

Based on the criteria of the fair appraisal approach stemming from Lazarus (1991) as interpreted by De Castella et al. (2009, 2011), this research will examine the crisis

communication on terrorism by political leaders in the UK in three different cases. In order to argue under what conditions politicians, play on the public’s fear on this topic, the content analysis will compare the fair appraisal in the context of three terrorism incidents. This allows for public fear increase and changing situational and political context to be taken into account. As mentioned before, this research cannot claim to explain the intentions or motivations of political actors in presenting such fear evoking communication on terrorism. However, by examining the scope under which fear appraisal content is used by various politicians, we might be able to conclude a link between induced fear and certain motivations. The actual effects of present fear appraisal features on the public will not be further assessed, since this falls outside the scope of this study.

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3. Method

To address the question under what conditions, do political leaders incorporate public fear of terrorism in their crisis communication, this research will look at fear appraisal components in the response of political actors in the UK to three different terrorist attacks. A content analysis of their speeches/public statements on terrorism, will answer the question whether fear

arousing content was present in their crisis communication, whether this changed in intensity and frequency throughout time and whether their political positions were linked to the fear appraisal components. To better understand the context in which public fear increased and, thus, might lead to the selected politicians to play on this, a comparison through time and between different actors will be made. Terrorist attacks, which have taken place on the soil of the country in question, will serve as measuring point of increase of public fear of terrorism. A comparison of fear appraisal components used by various actors in their communication will illustrate this argument and possibly shed light on political and domestic circumstances connected to fear-related rhetoric.

3.1 Content Analysis

Several definitions and conceptualizations of content analysis have been provided by scholars. Krippendorf (2004) defines content analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (p.18). Through this process, it allows the researcher to gain new insight and increase their understanding of a specific phenomenon. Prasad (2008) describes this process as ‘the scientific study of content of communication. It is the study of the content with reference to “the meanings, contexts and intentions contained in messages” (p.1). The method gained recognition as an established technique in social science in 1952 through Berelson’s book

Content Analysis on Communication Research (Prasad, 2008). He then defined the method as

“a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (Berelson, 1952 as cited by Prasad, 2008, p.2). Overall, these definitions place the emphasis on a system which draws inferences from communication of content about the sender, the message itself and the receivers of this message. This is then done in a systematic, objective way through quantification, context and validity (Prasad, 2008).

According to Prasad (2008), content analysis adheres to three basic principles often present in scientific method. The first being objectivity, meaning the analysis is done based on

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21 explicit rules leading to the result being consistent under various circumstances and done by various researchers. The second principle, systematic analysis, implies that in advance set out rules are applied for in- and exclusion of content, elimination the possibility of the content only including materials which fall in line with the arguments and ideas of the research. Lastly, generalizability is assumed, meaning the results should be able to apply to other similar circumstances. Content analysis seems fit for this research because it allows for a systematic analysis of texts, in this case speeches, and leads the researcher to draw conclusion from the content of this data.

3.1.1 Qualitative and Quantitative

Content analysis is an appropriate method for this research, since the goal is to gather information from a text in an unobtrusive way, in an efficient amount of time and energy compared to the size of the sample (Schram, 2014). However, content analysis is often assumed to be quantitative and deductive of nature, including counting words or phrases, whilst it also suits a more comprehensive approach (Schram, 2014). Scientific research, including content analysis, has made a distinction between quantitative and qualitative research. In this line of thought, Krippendorf (2004) elaborates on Berelson’s (1952)

requirements, one of which is that content analysis is a quantitative process. Although content analysis allows the researcher to draw conclusions based on the systematic quantification of large texts into measurable data, qualitative methods have also proven to be useful and

successful in this field (Krippendorf, 2004). Where Berelson (1952) goes wrong. according to Krippendorf (2004), is his assumption that content is located within messages, in need of being extracted from its form. However, content is much more elaborate and its nature here is overlooked. Krippendorf (2004) then proposes 6 elaborations to the definition of content analysis including: 1) texts have no objectivity meaning whoever engages in the text brings meaning to it, 2) texts do not have a single meaning, 3) these meanings need not be agreed upon, 4) meanings can speak to something other than the text, it can require interpretation, 5) meanings are relative to context, discourse and purpose, 6) the nature of the text and its form matter. Mayring (2000) explains a more qualitative interpretation of content analysis stating:

“The qualitative content analysis consists in a bundle of techniques for systematic text analysis. Content analysis analyses not only the manifest content of the material: themes and main ideas of the text as primary content; context information as latent content. The analysis of formal aspects of the material belongs to its aims as well.

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Content analysis embeds the text into a model of communication within which it defines the aims of analysis.” (p. 1-2).

Content analysis is thus more than simply quantifying data. Over the last years, research has shifted to a more inclusive approach, combining quantitative and qualitative method and seeing them as complementary instead of opposite (Jick, 1979; Schram, 2014). Using mixed methods allows for research to more thoroughly study diverse issues in a particular field, such as understanding the use of fear appraisal in crisis communication by political leaders.

Although this research is mostly quantitative in nature, by comparing the use of fear appraisal components in the selected politicians’ speeches, an interpretation of under which conditions and how they have used this fear is of qualitative nature.

However, although a mixed approach to content analysis proves useful for this study, providing a measurable and detailed comparison of the use of fear appraisal by British politicians, there are criticism surrounding this method. Since content analysis requires the interpretation of the researcher to provide relevant results, this interpretation can be

questioned. This study, as many other content analyses, relies on the process of the researcher reading and analysing data, following in the formulation of conclusions drawn from the texts. Objectivity or trustworthiness of this interpretation is often called into question (Elo,

Kääriäinen, Kanste, Pölkki, Utriainen & Kyngäs, 2014). Thomas and James (2006) claim that, in theory, it is impossible for a researcher to be free from preconceptions when analysing data. Content analysis is also limited in the sense that it does not fully allow the researcher to explore causal connections between variables (Prasad, 2008). Although such questions are relevant and this criticism seems justifiable, the goal of this research in to shed light on the use of fear appraisal by politicians in their crisis communication and compare under which scope this happens. To make sure the conclusions drawn in this research are as neutral as possible, reliability and validity of this study are addressed further in this section.

3.2 Data Collection

To answer the research question using content analysis as a method, it is important to select the relevant content needed to provide a valid answer. Content analysis usually makes use of data which is originally not intended to serve in answering a specific research question. The content or texts on the contrary serve the purpose of being read, understood and made sense of by the receivers (Krippendorf, 2004). In line with this view, the reading purpose of the

audience and that of the researcher might differ. It should thus be taken into account that we cannot draw conclusion on how the text is generally perceived by an audience. Content

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23 analysis must thus acknowledge that the interpretation of the data they rely on is not the only one possible (Krippendorf, 2004).

The data chosen for analysis in this research consists of speeches and official

statements made by the selected politicians within a week of a significant terrorist attack. This time period is chosen to capture the initial response of the politicians to the attack with the goal of avoiding media interference or connections to further developments in the case. A total of 14 speeches was selected for analysis and form the sample of this research. The details, titles and exact dates of the speeches/statement can be found in the bibliography. Speeches were chosen over other forms of content, such as media reports or social media postings, since they capture the delivered intentions without interference from the medium presented by. A speech act is defined as an account where the speaker intends to address a certain audience, inform or instruct them, attribute on existing knowledge and beliefs and finally intend to arouse a particular emotion (Lazuka, 2006). Especially the latter point serves well fit for this research. The speeches specifically chosen for this analysis were selected on the basis that they were delivered as a monologue and addressing the public. Parliamentary debates or speeches aimed at specific societal, governmental or professional groups were avoided. Interviews were also excluded from this study since the format of questioning and answers might influence the response given due to interpretation of specific questions. Moreover, a speech was considered relevant when addressed at the general public and in original full form, excerpts were not included.

The speeches and statements of the political actors were collected from their primary government websites: https://www.gov.uk/ or their personal website archives to ensure authenticity and accuracy. Many of these archives include a newsroom section enabled with a search option for key words and timeframe. The keyword ‘terror’ was used to filter the results of speeches and press statements in the selected timeframe surrounding the cases which will be expanded on below. The purpose of this research is to compare the speeches and

statements of 14 political actors after three deadly terrorist attacks on their country’s soil. Their political positions vary, which will give an extensive insight in the conditions under which fear appraisal might occur. In order to take into account fear of terrorism in society the European Standard Barometer was used as a guiding point to identify if terrorism was rated a threat to the country by public opinion.

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24 3.3 Case Selection

As mentioned earlier, the UK has been the target of various national and international terrorist attacks, from the IRA, to Al Qaeda and ISIS (Nowrasteh, 2018). Data from the GTD (Global Terrorism Database at Maryland University) shows the precise number of deaths due to terrorist attacks in the UK from the year 1975 until 2017 as illustrated in Figure 1.

Note: excludes deaths of the perpetrator themselves

Source: Global Terrorism Database at Maryland University, 2018, START

Figure 1. Number of deaths due to a terrorist attack in the United Kingdom

Although there has been a significant decline in the casualties as a result of terrorist attacks, since 2001 there has been an increased political focus on the concept of international terrorism (Allen & Dempsey, 2018). With this also came new legislation and counter

terrorism strategies. In order to present a comprehensive understanding of how politicians use fear appraisal in their response to terrorism, three cases were selected. Cases were selected based on their impact requiring considerable damage, the presence of casualties and their location with a big central UK city as the target. All cases have approximately 10 years between them and vary in government composition. An overview of the selected cases and political actors can be found in Table 1.

The first terrorist attack which will be used for analysis is that of the 1996 Docklands Bombing. In this incident, a member of the IRA detonated a bomb placed in a truck in South Quay. The attack killed two people and injured more than 100 others. This attack marked the end of the IRA ceasefire and, thus, even though a warning was issued 90 minutes in advance, came unexpected to the London government. The bombing had a huge impact on the way the

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 7 Nu m b er o f d ea th s Year

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25 capital city was secured and policed, increasing the ring of steel originating from the 1993 Bishopsgate Bombing (Craig, 2010).

The second case will be that of the 2005 London Bombing. On July 7th, four suicide bombers triggered a series of bombs carried around in their rucksacks throughout London. The attacks together cost 52 people their lives and injured hundreds more (ESRI, 2019). This attack sparked a change in security and counterterrorism efforts in the UK. Several

counterterrorism campaigns followed based on the unity and community importance of the nation state, now characterized as the Blitz spirit (Salerno, 2017).

May 22nd, 2017 will serve as the most recent case characterized by a suicide bomber, killing 22 concertgoers at an Ariana Grande concert in the Manchester Arena, injuring more than 800 others (ESRI, 2019). As a result, the Commission for Countering Extremism was formed in the wake of the bombing in order to combat extremist views once turned criminal (Peck, 2017).

Table 1. Overview of cases selected for analysis

Attack Date Government Political actors Public threat

perception*

Docklands Bombing

February 9th 1996

Conservative PM: John Major PM (NI): John Burton Foreign Minister (NI): Dick Spring

Opposition leader: Tony Blair

24% (February 1996) London Bombings July 7th 2005

Labour PM: Tony Blair

Home Department: Charles Clarke Opposition leader: Micheal

Howard

Local Major: Ken Livingstone

34% (October 2005) Manchester Attack May 22nd 2017

Conservative PM: Theresa May

Foreign Affairs Boris Johnson Defence: Michael Fallon

Home Department: Amber Rudd Opposition leader: Jeremy Corbyn Local Mayor: Andy Burham

33% (May 2017)

* Public opinion most important threat to the UK according to the Standard European Barometer (European Commission, 2005, 2017).

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26 3.4 Coding Process

Content analysis was chosen as a relevant method for this study, since it provides an efficient way of grasping large texts and quantify the aspects of content one wants to examine.

Especially in political communication studies, content analysis has proved to be useful in various contexts (Benoit, 2010). Benoit (2010) states that content analysis, when content is quantified in dimensions or variables, can be coupled with other data to draw multiple presumptions. Coding in this method is the process through which raw data is systematically divided into specified units which allow for detailed descriptions of the content and its characteristics (Holsti, 1969). Rules accompanying the coding process serve an “operational link between the researcher’s data and the explored theory and hypotheses” (Holsti, 1969, p.94). The coding process and its rules, thus, are crucial to the research design of any study. Holsti (1969) sets out general requirements for the formulation and development of coding categories. In order to construct these categories, they should a) reflect the purpose of the research, thus, allowing for an answer to the main research question, b) categories should be exhaustive, mutually exclusive and independent from each other, and c) they should be derived from a single classification principle, meaning different levels of analysis should be kept separate.

Following these general guidelines, the data of speeches and press statements collected for this research will be coded according to the fear appraisal components outlined by De Castella et al. (2009, 2011). Each speech was coded by an independent coder for all appointed appraisal criteria with the unit of analysis being sentences. To distinguish to what extent fear appraisal was used, all sentences must be taken into account in order to compare adequately between speeches. This research assumes that the higher the quantity of the categories of fear appraisal in the text, the stronger the effect (Castella & McGarthy, 2011). In order to equally compare throughout speeches with a different length, it is chosen to divide the number of sentences coded on fear appraisal by the total amount of sentences to reflect the percentage of the text including fear appraisal components. Statements will be coded containing 1)

motivational relevance, 2) motivational incongruency, 3) coping inability, 4) other accountability, or 5) no fear component.

• Motivational relevance is identified as statements addressing the publics relevance to

the topic of terrorism. It concerns how the situation or phenomenon affects the public, endangers them personally or is bad for society. Motivational relevance is

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27 government, country, or even EU and others. For example: “We must defend our democratic process, win our arguments by discussion and debate, and stand united against those who would seek to take our rights away, or who would divide us” (Corbyn, 2017). Or statement as “We are grieving today, but we are strong” (Burnham, 2017).

• Motivationally incongruency is identified as statements which highlight the concern of the situation and the harmful dangerous nature of terrorism. Under this fall

statements which contain signs of hatred, remorse, disgust towards terrorist attacks and the risks provided by it. Statements which would fall under this category are “This was an evil act” (Burnham, 2017). “This is a terrible and tragic atrocity that has cost many innocent lives” (Blair, 2005).

• Coping inability is identified as the stressing of a lack of ensured safety or protection

from terrorist threat to the public. The risk of an attack is stressed, and danger is suggested. Examples of coping inability are “We now believe we are experiencing a new trend in the threat we face” (Rudd, 2017). “I must say that this may not be the last such atrocity” (Major, February 12th_{, 1996).}

• Other accountability was identified as the belief that someone or something is

responsible for the harmful or threatening situation. Statements falling under this category were defined as remarks that attributed blame and responsibility for incongruent, harmful or threatening events to a third party as visible in statements such as: “Those terrorists will forever be reviled and implacably held to account for their actions” (Corbyn, May 26th_{, 2017).}

The full codebook and the list of speeches used in this research can be found under appendix A and B.

3.5 Reliability and Validity

Scientific research and its methods are expected to be reliable and valid. A reliable research is understood to be replicable, meaning that under different circumstances and performed at any given point in time, applying a method on the data should provide the same results

(Krippendorf, 2004). Reliability is thus the extent to which a method provides similar results through repeated trials. In content analysis, this entails that the codes must be detailed and descriptive to the extent that several persons can conduct the analysis based on understandable formulations (Neuendorff, 2016). Valid research is understood to uphold the claims made under careful scrutiny (Krippendorf, 2004). Neuendorf (2016) explains validity as the extent

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28 to which a measuring procedure represents the intended goal and only that. It assumes us to ask the question “Are we measuring what we want to measure?” (p. 112). Both reliability and validity place several demands on research performing content analysis (Krippendorf, 2004).

In order to assure reliability of the coding process in this research, a sample of the data was provided to an additional coder. This sample contained 20 sentences retrieved from different speeches. A copy of the codebook as used by the initial coder was provided. The second coder was asked to independently indicate which, if any, fear appraisal components were present, an option of no fear appraisal content present was also provided. These results were compared with that of the initial coder through an inter-coder reliability test. The results of this intercoder reliability test showed a compatibility of 0.8. Only 4 mistakes were made due to some confusion between the categories: other responsibility and motivational incongruency. The code other responsibility was then slightly adjusted clearly stating all references to the responsibility of a third party should be coded as other responsibility taking preference over the appalling nature or motivational incongruency of their acts. Overall, the intercoder reliability for this data is considered high and the results can therefore be viewed as reliable.

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4. Results

4.1 Introduction

This section presents and elaborates on the results of the content analysis performed on the crisis communication statements and speeches of the selected politicians after various terrorist events. Overall, the speeches of 14 different political actors were coded on the use of fear appraisal components in the text, as well as their general crisis communication approach. To answer the question under what conditions, do politicians use fear appraisal in their crisis communication after terrorist attacks, the results of the quantitative analysis will be presented in tables resembling their output. The tables reveal the differences in amount of use of fear appraisal components by the various political actors across times. Additionally, a broader in-depth understanding is given surrounding the differences between cases and the societal and political context in which the speeches were delivered. This section does not yet provide explanations or implications stemming from the observed results. This is done so in the next chapter.

First, the proportion of the coded statements and speeches containing fear appraisal components was assessed by dividing units of analysis, in this case sentences, coded as fear appraisal component by the total number of sentences of the speech. This percentage of the speeches devoted to the recognized fear appraisal components 1) motivations relevance, 2) motivational incongruence, 3) coping inability and 4) other accountability, is presented through a visual representation of their occurrence in the speeches per political actor (Figure 2). Secondly, a distinction between the fear appraisal components and their use by the varying political actors is provided in Table 2. Lastly, Figure 3 illustrates the difference in use of fear appraisal components throughout time, comparing the three selected cases under analysis in this research.

4.2 Comparison of Presence of Fear Appraisal Components

This research assumes that, the higher the quantity of the categories of fear appraisal in the text, the stronger the effect (Castella & McGarthy, 2011). In terms of the overall presence of fear appraisal content, all political actors in one form or another used fear appraisal in their speeches and statements as reaction to a major terrorist event. However, the frequency and nature of these components varies between their different roles as public figures. Figure 2 illustrates the percentage of the speeches and statements in which fear appraisal content was present per political role.

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Figure 2. Proportion of fear appraisal content per type of political actor in crisis response speeches to

terrorism

Noticeably, local mayors tend to score highest on the presence of fear appraisal components in their response to a terrorist event, with an average of 41,82% of the speech coded as fear appraisal content. All three opposition leaders in 1996, 2005 and 2017 also used fear appraisal content frequently in their crisis communication response after a terrorist event. With an average proportion of 29,95% fear appraisal content per speech, this group also scores high in their attempt to play upon the threat of the situation. Lower on the use of fear appraisal scale are the government ministers, whether it be the Minister of Defence, Foreign Affairs or the Home Secretary, these politicians showed fewer signs of fear appraisal content in their speeches or statements. This, however, with the exception of the Home Secretary in 2017, Amber Rudd, whose speech scored a proportion of 33,89% fear appraisal components present. As for the Prime Ministers, their use of fear appraisal seems to correspond with their role. Both Theresa May in 2017, Tony Blair in 2005 and John Major in 1996 score between 23-29% of their speech containing fear appraisal content. There is thus a slight variance in the use of fear appraisal per political actor with local mayors scoring the highest, followed by the opposition leaders. Government actors such as ministers and the Prime Ministers, still show the use of fear appraisal components in their speeches but to a slightly lesser degree. The next paragraph will therefore dive more into detail on the distribution of the different fear appraisal components per political actors in order to attempt to explain these differences.

25,58% 33,89% 13,33% 32,95% 46,15% 29,41% 10,50% 23,53% 37,50% 23,91% 12,07% 33,36% 22,40% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%

PM Home Secr Foreign Affairs Opposition Local mayor

(%) fea r ap p raisal c o m p o n en ts in s p ee ch

Type of political actor

2017 2005 1996