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Taking care of an increasing flow of asylum seekers: local

decision-making on a refugee center

A case study of the Orangerie in Eindhoven

University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences

Research Project: Citizens in Europe

Supervisors : Dr. Julien Jeandesboz & Dr. Rosa Sanchez Salgado Second reader: Judith Huigens, MSc

Student Name: Wietske Boskma Bachelor Thesis Political Science

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Table of content

Introduction ...3

Chapter 1: ...5

1.1 Theoretical framework ...5

1.2 Research design, methodology, and data collection ...7

Chapter 2: Which claims are made by the different actors on the opening of the refugee center?...11

2.1 Claims of political parties ...11

2.2 Claims of a NGO ...13

2.3 Claims of representatives of the public ...14

Chapter 3: To what extent are the claims included in the decision-making? ...16

3.1 The process of decision-making ...16

3.2 The final policy...16

Chapter 4: Which actions are undertaken by the actors to sustain their preferences? ...18

4.1 Actions by opponents ...18

4.2 Actions by proponents ...20

4.3 Concluding remarks ...21

Chapter 5: Conclusion and discussion ...23

5.1 Conclusion ...23

5.2 Discussion ...24

Bibliography: ...26

Annex ... 1. Content analysis of claims-making...30

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Introduction

Recently the amount of people applying for asylum in Europe has increased. This is mostly due to the tense situation in Syria, Iraqi and Eritrea. Recently the UNHCR has called for European states to provide more locations for shelter for asylum seekers (UN High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR), 2014). This has motivated Minister Fred Teeven, State Secretary of Safety and Defense, to call for help of local governments In the Netherlands (Teeven, 2014). COA, the central (state) organ of refugee centers in the Netherlands, quickly started to look for new locations. This has resulted in local governments agreeing on caring for these refugees in unusual locations and with unusual numbers. For example, in Doetinchem an old prison is used as refugee center for 800 Syrian and Eritrean refugees. Besides Doetinchem, comparable cases can furthermore be found in Veenhuizen, Zwolle, Budel, Rijs and Eindhoven. In the cases stated above, decisions by the local governments have been made quickly. This has caused a heated debate within these localities between citizens, the town council and NGOs. The actors have different preferences and interests and are therefore trying to influence the decision-making on opening a refugee center. In the different cases this has been successful for disagreeing as well as agreeing parties. For example, in the case of Rijs the heated discussion caused that the decision was of the web. In other cases, for example in Budel and in Eindhoven, the government decided to go through with the opening of refugee center despite the heated debate. These discussions take place in for example the media, but can also be recognized in banners on the street and protest actions. Investigating the opinions and political strategies of the public, NGOs and governments can provide information on why decisions are made. Therefore this thesis will contain an analysis and an

examination on which preferences have been dominant in the debate. More specifically, it will analyze the political arena by looking at the relation between the government, NGOs and the (organized) public. Furthermore, it will analyze the influence in the decision-making process on these rapid choices on asylum policy.

Besides social relevance, this thesis also offers an academic addition. Most theories on immigration policy and decision-making are based on a national context, whereas the local context is left out. However, local municipalities in the Netherlands have the autonomy to make own decisions and often do so (Fleurke and Willemse, 2006: 85). By applying theories that are based on a national context to the local context, the tenability of these theories can be examined on different governmental levels. In order to have a feasible subject of analysis, the Orangerie in Eindhoven is chosen as a case. For this location an old care house is repurposed as refugee center for maximum 700 refugees with mainly Iraqi, Syrian and Eritrean nationality. This case seems most interesting, since there was a heated debate happening in the public, which was most visible in local media. The issue has regularly been addressed in local media by, for instance, Eindhovens Dagblad (website) and Omroep Brabant. It furthermore could be observed on the street through banners. These actions show the salience of the

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4 topic for the municipality. Besides the salience for the municipality, it has a national salience since a similar trend is going on in the other locations.

The more specific political actors which will be analyzed in this case are Stichting Nieuwkomers en VluchtelingenWerk Brabant Centraal(SNV), the VVD, PvdA and LPF in Eindhovenand the action committee ‘geen asielzoekers in de Orangerie in Eindhoven’ (English: no asylum seekers in the Orangerie in Eindhoven). These actors can be seen as the most present stakeholders in the debate. The question which will be answered in this thesis will therefore be:

Whose claims have had most influence in the making of public policy regarding asylum in Eindhoven? And why are some actors more successful than others?

To answer this question, the following sub questions will be used:

 Which claims are made by the different actors regarding the opening of the refugee center?  To what extent are the claims included in the decision-making?

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Chapter 1: Theoretical framework, methodology, research design and data

collection.

In this first chapter the basis of the thesis will be outlined. For answering the research question it is important to have an understanding of how NGOs, the public and the government can influence public policy regarding immigration policy. To get a better understanding of this, theories on claims-making and lobbying tactics are first outlined in the theoretical framework. The methodology, research design and data collection of this thesis are following.

1.1. Theoretical framework

Making claims about immigration policy

Before examining how political actors influence public policy, it is necessary to understand which claims can be made on the topic of immigration and why they are made. These questions are answered by Freeman (1995; 2002) and Statham and Geddes (2006). For answering these questions, Statham and Geddes (2006) have focused on the UK, whereas Freeman (1995; 2002) has focused on several western liberal democratic states. It is important to keep in mind that therefore these theories focus on the national level. However for this thesis it is expected that they can be relevant for the local level as well and therefore for analyzing the case of the Orangerie in Eindhoven.

To start, claims-making in immigration policy can be categorized as either restrictionist or expansionist. According to Statham and Geddes a claim can be considered restrictionist when the proposed activity would go against rights and/or interests of the migrant group(s) (2006: 252). A claim is expansionist when the opposite is true and the proposed activity would advantage the migrant group(s) rights and/or interests (ibid.). This conceptualization will be used throughout the thesis. In discussing whether immigration policy is characterized by expansionist or restrictionist views, the literature comes up with opposite findings. Statham and Geddes (2006) find that state authorities are generally more restrictionist than the public opinion Freeman (1995; 2002) finds that state authorities tend to be more expansionist than the public opinion. Freeman explains his findings as an

‘expansionary bias’ of the public policy on immigration (1995: 882).

To continue, Freeman identifies several factors that explain this expansionary bias. Firstly, he states that citizens tend to be ‘rationally ignorant’ on the topic of immigration (Freeman, 1995: 883;

2002:78). This is the result of an information deficit, mostly caused by a misperception of the dynamic of migration flows. Furthermore, the fact that the debate on immigration policy is easily linked with racism causes that dialogue on this topic is difficult wherefore obtaining information is difficult. Freeman ascribes this information deficit to a consideration of costs and benefits; where mostly for the unorganized public gaining information is more costly than beneficial (Freeman, 1995: 883-884).

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6 Secondly, he states that the unorganized public is mostly working in labor-intensive industries, which causes direct competition with immigrants for example for government services (Freeman, 1995: 885). Therefore the public opinion tends to be mostly restrictionist.

Furthermore, Freeman states that it is likely that political parties form an expansionist consensus, in order to take conflicts on immigration issues of the agenda. Therefore, they regularly do not take in specific views on these issues (Freeman, 1995: 884). Additionally, he states that political parties have the tendency to base decisions on how votes can be maximized. This cannot be done by following a restrictionist opposition with poorly articulated claims (ibid.: 885-886).Therefore most political parties will follow well organized groups, which are accepting an anti-populist norm. This norm is not based on ethnic, racial or immigration based fears, but is perceived as rational and legitimate (ibid.). Statham and Geddes also agree that political actors are more likely to follow well organized groups than the unorganized. They however focus on organized public as NGOs instead of employees. They furthermore find that Freeman overestimates the influence of organized groups (2006: 266). They state that the position of the political elite is more important for how the debate is formed (ibid.). Therefore, the way in which immigration is politicized and publicly mediated is important for claims-making (ibid.: 251).For this reason they also argue that collective mobilization cannot solely be explained by the distribution of costs and benefits. Instead of these objective interests, collective action is led by perceived interests intended by political elites. These positions have to be perceived as most feasible, reasonable and legitimate, for collective mobilization to occur (ibid.).

Following this argument the government is responsible for the context in which actors position themselves. The state is an ‘entrepreneur’ who is dominant in the political environment instead of promoting client politics (ibid.: 254). They therefore conclude their research with the statement that political elites are the dominant actor for making claims and they are generally setting a restrictionist agenda (ibid.: 253).

Putting claims into work: (strategies for) influencing public policy

In this part theories on how interest groups are advertising their claims to the decision-makers will be outlined. For this, theories on tactics of interest groups are used. In this thesis interest groups are defined by using a broad definition, namely that interest groups are a group of people who try to influence public policy outcome. These groups can be formally organized, but can also take action informally.

When talking about influencing public policy, a lot of different factors can be distinguished. De Jesus talks for example about issue characteristics, lobbying tactics, type of influence and the impact of resources (2010: 72). Other factors which can affect the possibility to influence public policy are the

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7 institutional framework (Dür and De Bièvre, 2007) and the legislative context (Victor , 2007).

However, following several authors, it can be stated that the choice of strategies is expected to be more important for influencing public policy than resources, issue characteristics and type of influence (De Jesus, 2010: 98-99; Dür, 2008: 1218). Since this case study is having a similar institutional framework and legislative context, these factors will also be of less importance. Therefore in this thesis the focus will be upon these lobbying tactics, in order to be able to explain one important aspect of the process of influence.

Lobbying can be seen as the act of informing actors with the goal to influence or changing policy (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1999: 1001). The strategies of lobbying can be distinguished in direct and indirect lobbying tactics (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1999; De Jesus, 2010). Direct strategies are those activities for which direct contact with the decision-maker is made, for example by speaking to government officials or presenting research or technical information (De Jesus, 2010: 73). Indirect lobbying tactics are activities as protests, demonstrations, running campaigns and speaking with the press (ibid.). It is expected that interest groups will use direct or indirect lobbying tactics to gain political support for their claim.

Furthermore, it can be added that it is likely that interest groups who are agreeing with the status quo are more likely to have success, since it is harder to initiate policy change than to prevent change (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1999: 1003). Lobbyists who want change are more likely to use indirect lobbying tactics. This contains trying to show decision-makers there is public support for change (ibid.). Moreover it can be expected that indirect lobbying is more costly and time-consuming than direct lobbying. This causes that this strategy will most likely only be used when the issue is perceived to have great implications for them (ibid.: 1004).

1.2. Research design, methodology and data collection Research Design

As mentioned in the introduction, the question which will be central in this thesis is:

Whose claims have had most influence in the making of public policy regarding asylum in the Eindhoven? And why are some actors more successful than others?

To examine the question a case study design is used. The case is the refugee center in the Orangerie in Eindhoven. This case is a typical case, since there are comparable situations to be found in the

Netherlands. Examples are Doetinchem, Veenhuizen, Zwolle, Budel and Rijs. These cases are similar on the factors which will be examined in this thesis, namely the decision-making process and the involved political actors. Furthermore, there is a heated debate mainly visible through media. This comparability strengthens the external validity of this thesis (Bryman, 2008: 56). Moreover the fact

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8 that the process in Eindhoven is currently happening is an advantage for gaining information through among others interviews. The focus of this case study will be on the local level. However this does not mean that the national level can be excluded. It could, for example, be the case that a political actor acts on the national level to reach their goals on a local level.

Similar to the national political system in the Netherlands, municipalities also have a system of proportional representation. Seats in the town council are therefore based on the number of residents of the municipality. The town council of Eindhoven therefore has 45 seats. For analyzing the town council, the PvdA, VVD and LPF are outlined. The PvdA1 is the biggest party in coalition with eight seats and the VVD2 is the biggest party in opposition with six seats (Gemeente Eindhoven, 2014b). Therefore they are important political parties in the town council of Eindhoven. Additionally, LPF3 will be analyzed, since this is the only political party in the town council of Eindhoven who is openly disagreeing with the opening of the refugee center. The LPF is therefore the political party whom is most present in the debate. The LPF is, similar to the VVD, an oppositional party. LPF, however, has only two seats which gives it a smaller role in the town council (ibid.).

The remaining actors that are analyzed are Stichting Nieuwkomers en VluchtelingenWerk Brabant Centraal (SNV) and the action committee ‘Geen asielzoekers in de Orangerie in Eindhoven’ . SNV is the regional delegate of the national organization VluchtelingenWerk Nederland. VluchtelingenWerk is seen as the most influential NGO on immigration concerns in the Netherlans (EMN NCP, 2012). Therefore, it is interesting to see if this also the case for SNV. Furthermore, the action committee ‘geen asielzoekers in de Orangerie in Eindhoven’ is selected, since this oppositional group is the most present in media and is most actively trying to influence policy. The committee is a collective which organized as a reaction on the discussion about the Orangerie in Eindhoven. It exists out of mostly citizens from the neighborhood and some citizens from Eindhoven who want to show commitment on this topic. They can therefore be seen as representatives of a public opinion.

Methodology

Three different approaches on measuring influence on political processes can be distinguished, being process tracing (Dür and De Bièvre 2007), attributed influence (March, 1955) and the degree of preference attainment (Dür, 2008). Since process tracing is focusing on providing detailed

1

The PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid) Eindhoven is delegated from the national party. The PvdA is of origin a progressive social democratic party, which exists since 1946. Almost all municipalities in the Netherlands have a representation of the PvdA in town council (Eindhoven.pvda.nl).

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VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie) is also delegated from the national party. The VVD is of origin a (economic) liberal party and exists since 1948 (deeindhovensevvd.nl).

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The LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn) follow the ideas of Pim Fortuyn. Pim Fortuyn was a Dutch politician leading the national party LPF. He got attention for his extreme standpoints on mostly the islam and immigrants. He emphasized the dangers of the ‘islamization’ of Europe and the Netherlands. In 2001Pim Fortuyn is executed, which caused the downfall and eventually the disappearance of the party on the national level. Currently the LPF in Eindhoven is the only (local) party in the Netherlands who is still representing the ideas of Pim Fortuyn. (http://lijstpimfortuyn-eindhoven.nl)

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9 explanations of causal relations, it does not fit the aim of this thesis to generalize as much as possible. Attributed influence is measuring perceptions of influence rather than actual influence, which also makes it an unsuitable method for this thesis (De Jesus, 2010: 77).

The method of degree of preference attainment gives the possibility to measure influence for all different political actors individually and conclude on which political actor has been most powerful. Dür states that “The idea is that the distance between an outcome and the ideal point of an actor reflects the influence of this actor” (2008a: 566). This method can therefore be executed by comparing the preferences of the different actors with the policy outcomes. The advantages of this approach are that it can measure influence even if nothing visible happens and gives possibility to state the amount of influence. This method gives the possibility to measure influence in a pragmatic and feasible way. Therefore, this method is most suitable for answering this research question and is used in this thesis. However, the ‘degree of preference attainment’ does not provide information on why an actor is more influential than another (De Jesus, 2010: 77). To obviate this pitfall of the degree of preference attainment, a final chapter will be devoted to explain actions of the different political actors. As previously shown in the theoretical framework, direct and indirect lobbying tactics can be seen as the most important aspects for influencing the decision-making process. A relation between the used lobbying tactics and the policy outcome could possibly be recognized. Therefore, to give insight in the process of influencing, indirect and direct lobbying tactics will be used to give insight in this gap.

Data Collection

Data is collected through document analysis and interviews. Documents are collected through online research and provided by the recorder of the town council. To collect data on the claims of the political parties, board questions have been an important source. These questions are written by political parties from the town council, in order to get information from the executive committee4. These questions are not solely asked to gain information, but often also to show the standpoint of a political party. Furthermore, press releases created by the actors are analyzed. The SNV did not specifically mention the Orangerie in press releases or documents. This can be explained by the fact that they are part of the national organization called VluchtelingenWerk. In order to find out their claims on this topic and how they are acting on a local level, documents of the national organization have been used.

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The executive committee in local governments in the Netherlands exists out of the major and aldermen who are delegated from the political parties in the coalition. They are mandated by the town council to take certain decisions which are included in the coalition agreement, in order to decrease the work load of the town council. The executive committee operates independent from the political parties and the town council. This is according the dualistic structure of local governments in the Netherlands (Eindhoven.nl).

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10 The time frame for this data is from September 19th (the date that the major made the decision public) until December 15th (two weeks after the opening of the refugee center). The collected data is analyzed through a content analysis (annex 1). The claims made in the documents have been classified in two categories, being restrictionist and expansionist. This content analysis is done according to the conceptualization discussed in the theoretical framework.

To gain information on strategies of the different actors, interviews have been necessary. These interviews have been important for understanding the process of decision-making and the role of the political actors. Furthermore, interviews are also supplementary to the content analysis of claims-making. One interview has been held with the recorder of the town council, since he is a neutral and independent informant of the town council. This provided information on the process of decision-making and some general observations on party behavior. Furthermore interviews are held with the chairwoman of the PvdA and the chairman of the LPF. For political parties chair(wo)men are interviewed since they are the most informed about the political party and are part of the presidium (responsible for the agenda setting). Lastly an interview with the spokeswoman of the action committee is held since she is also the most active member of the committee. Therefore she is the most informed on the activities and standpoints of the committee.

The questions asked in the interviews have been through using an interview guide. The interviews have been semi-structured, since the order of the questions was based on the answers given by the actor. This gave the possibility to dive further into certain topics and to add questions based on given answers. Each interview started with some introductory questions. This was followed up by questions on claims-making and then questions on strategies. This makes the interviews fit within the theoretical framework, since they were structured in a similar way by laying attention on both subjects of claims-making and lobbying tactics. The attention given to each topic is based on availability of information beforehand. Therefore the questions asked to the different actors have varied, but were based on a similar list of questions. Therefore, the interviews have been additional and providing new information which could not be found through other sources.

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Chapter 2: Which claims are made by the different actors regarding the

opening of the refugee center in Eindhoven?

This chapter discusses the preferences of the different actors involved in the opening of the refugee center in the Orangerie (Annex 1). This information is necessary for answering the sub questions in the remaining chapters. The claims made by these actors are presented and categorized as either expansionists or restrictionist. A key finding here is that actors are not always exclusively expansionist or restrictionist: their claims are often more nuanced and include elements of both registers. As such, the chapter further discusses the implications of these findings for theoretical discussions on claim-making and immigration found in Statham and Geddes (2006) and Freeman (1995; 2002). Given that theoretical expectations are different for each actor group, the chapter examines them in turn. Firstly the claims of the political parties will be analyzed, because consecutive the claims of the NGO and the representatives of the public can be compared to them.

2.1. Claims of political parties

First, the argumentation LPF is using to make claims have to be seen in the light of some general views they have on immigration and asylum seekers. An assumption of the LPF is that asylum seekers are not returning to their country of origin, even when the situation there would improve. This is perceived as an undesirable situation, since it is assumed that providing long-term services to refugees, including a center is too costly and is likely to disadvantage local citizens (LPF Eindhoven, 2014; LPF Eindhoven, 2014b).

Their argumentation on the specific topic of the refugee center in the Orangerie starts with the statement that the party is aware of the increase in asylum seekers in Europe. They agree that help is needed. This creates the expectation of an expansionist argumentation for their standpoint. They however, state that a refugee center should rather be provided in the neighboring regions of the conflictual areas instead of in Europe. The establishment of a refugee center in Eindhoven is mainly framed in relation to financial and security concerns. LPF states that the center would influence the livability of residents of Eindhoven, for example through making use of services. By making use of services, the refugee center would diminish the access to municipality services for Dutch citizens. Providing these services for asylum seekers is therefore seen as too costly and would disadvantage the citizens of Eindhoven (LPF Eindhoven, 2014b). The chairman of the LPF illustrates this by stating that citizens of Eindhoven are working to pay the services used by asylum seekers:

“De zorg, wat er allemaal ingeleverd moet worden [..] Dat mensen werken en weten dat ze voor deze maand geen geld krijgen. .En we laten wel al die mensen (asielzoekers) toe. En die krijgen

gezondheidszorg, krijgen een huis, krijgen zakgeld, krijgen eten en drinken. En ze mogen niet werken. En daar kunnen wij allemaal voor werken.“ (R. Reeker, 2015)

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12 Furthermore, the LPF links the coming of refugees to an increasing risk of terrorism and religious fundamentalism (LPF Eindhoven, 2014b). This instigates the perception of a decrease of security coming along with the coming of asylum seekers. Therefore the LPF is, overall, against the coming of additional foreigners in Eindhoven. Additionally they contend that a new asylum center would cause an incentive for immigrants to come to the Netherlands (LPF Eindhoven, 2014). They therefore state that providing refugee center for asylum seekers would increase the migrant community significantly which they perceive as a negative tendency (LPF Eindhoven, 2014b). The preferences of the LPF are therefore mainly restrictionist (annex 1, table 2).

The other political parties in Eindhoven are proponents of the opening of a refugee center. PvdA and VVD formulated together with the remaining political parties an argumentation on this topic. The parties claim that establishing a refugee center in the Orangerie in Eindhoven is part of a social and humanitarian responsibility Eindhoven has on a national and global level. This means that the parties find that Eindhoven should actively and directly help caring for the increasing amount of asylum seekers from the conflictual areas (PvdA, VVD e.a., 2014).These claims clearly show an expansionist view on the topic (annex 1, table 6). The parties also state critical claims, but these criticisms involve the importance of communication in the neighborhood and the importance of arranging new housing for the former residents of the building (PvdA, VVD e.a., 2014a). These policy preferences would not influence the position of the asylum seeker, but are directed to the execution of the policy.

PvdA has not made claims on this topic in the town council by using individual board questions, but solely participated in asking the board questions together with all the agreeing parties. When talking to the chairwoman of the PvdA in Eindhoven she repeats the statement that the PvdA agrees with the policy because of the social and humanitarian principles of the party. Social and humanitarian principles here intend the sharing of welfare (M. Verhees, 2014). She states:

“[…] dat is wel een waarde die is van de hele partij. Daarom zijn we ook voor één Europa, niet zozeer omdat we .. één groot land willen maar omdat we zien dat er dan in andere landen ook … .. welvaart, dat er meer kans is op welvaart in andere landen. En dat je dat wil delen. Dat zijn wel beginwaarden van de partij. Beginselen, ja.” (ibid.).

The local PvdA representative in Eindhoven thus claims that these principles intend the sharing of welfare. She furthermore states that this is in line with the national position of the party on asylum seekers and immigration (ibid.). Therefore their standpoint also has to be seen in the light of the national debate on the increase of asylum seekers.

Opposed to the PvdA, the VVD has discussed the topic in the town council through asking own board questions as well. They firstly state that basic services, as food and housing, are necessary and should

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13 be arranged for the asylum seekers. This is in line with the expansionist claims made earlier (in the joint board questions). However they are critical about the extent to which these services should be provided. In the board questions they for example express critics on providing services to persons who failed to obtain refugee status and who would nonetheless reside in the Orangerie. They do not agree on providing services to them, which is a restrictionist claim. Besides the doubts on the policy for people who failed to obtain refugee status, they share the opinion with LPF that permanent housing of the asylum seekers in Eindhoven is undesirable. The Orangerie in Eindhoven should be a temporary location as refugee center (VVD Eindhoven, 2014). So, although VVD agrees with the decision to arrange a refugee center and is agreeing with the other political parties, they also make some restrictionist claims (annex 1, table 3).

When looking at the analyzed political parties in the town council the expectations of Freeman (1995; 2002) are mostly right. Freeman states that political parties generally take in anti-populist norms. They do not use ‘racial, ethnic or immigration-related fears’ to argue for their claim (Freeman, 1995: 885-886). Furthermore, as Freeman has stated, it is likely for the bigger political parties to try and find an expansionist consensus on issues of immigration. This happens to take conflicts on immigration issues of the agenda (Freeman, 1995: 884). In the town council the VVD and PvdA (together with the other political parties, except LPF) entered into a consensus like this. These political parties have agreed on opening a refugee center in the Orangerie in Eindhoven and made a statement together.

2.2. Claims of a NGO

Similar to the VVD and PvdA, SNV (or VluchtelingenWerk) is agreeing with the opening of a refugee center. The claims they are making (on a national level) are expansionist (annex 1, table 1). This is according to the expectation of Statham and Geddes, that NGOs on immigration issues are mostly expansionist (2006: 256). The claims of SNV are based on research done by the organization or other official research institutions (VluchtelingenWerk, 2014; 2014a; 2014b). Therefore the SNV is seen as a professional organization by the different political parties. According to Freeman (1995; 2002) and Statham and Geddes (2006), the fact that they are well organized increases their possibility to influence public policy.

The argument of SNV contains that opening a refugee center is an element of protecting human rights of asylum seekers. These rights contain the access to basic services as a bed, bath, food and housing. According to SNV these services are human rights which should be protected by states. This could be done by for example better European collaboration in providing asylum and services for refugees (VluchtelingenWerk, 2014). They also argue that the Netherlands should open more refugee centers, since the demand for it is currently high (VluchtelingenWerk, 2014a).

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14 Furthermore, they state in a flyer presented to all municipalities in the Netherlands that local

governments have a responsibility to take care of people who failed to obtain a refugee status. The municipalities should arrange emergency shelters for these people and they should prevent them from living on the streets (VluchtelingenWerk, 2014c). The claims of SNV therefore clearly follow an anti-populist norm, and their claims are not based on ethnic, racial or immigration based fears.

The main difference between SNV and the political parties is that SNV is directly representing asylum seekers instead of local citizens. They do not mainly look at national or local interests, but they are focusing on the interest of asylum seekers. This difference in focus changes the starting point of why certain claims are made. The social and humanitarian claims of the PvdA are therefore also made from the viewing point to enlighten the burden of the Netherlands or other European states. This could be for example a financial burden, which comes along with providing services. This is a difference with the claims about human rights from SNV, since these claims are solely based on improving the situation of refugees and asylum seekers.

2.3. Claims of representatives of the public

According to the expectation of Freeman (1995: 884), the action committee has been slow in

mobilizing and organizing. They have not been operating as they are currently operating from the very beginning. They firstly had to find like-minded people and devise a strategy, before they started representing a public opinion. At the moment the action committee still does not have fixed members. The participants are varying for each activity. There is a basis of about ten to twenty members who are most active, but there is no sophisticated organizational structure. As Hendriks explained:

“’t gaat een beetje op en neer. Niet een vast aantal, 10-20 mensen zijn heel actief bezig. Er is niet een heel vast aantal, maar dan tel ik gewoon een beetje de mensen die het meeste regelen. En soms zitten we rond de 30-40 mensen. We zijn niet zo gestructureerd zeg maar” (A. Hendriks, 2015).

Therefore, the claims-making of this actor cannot be compared with for example the SNV. It rather should be seen as an organization which is representing a public opinion.

The action committee ‘geen asielzoekers in de Orangerie in Eindhoven’ is representing opponents of the opening of a refugee center in Eindhoven. They are mostly commenting on the decision-making process, the suitability for its function and the exact location (AZC-alert, 2014). This can be found in several articles by the committee and in a statement by the spokeswoman:

“Het ging gewoon over hoe wij als buurt door de gemeente en het COA behandeld zijn en dat er een locatie wordt uitgezocht die niet geschikt is voor zoveel personen. En dat is altijd.. de insteek van het burgercomité geweest.” (A. Hendriks, 2015).

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15 Their argumentation furthermore matches the argumentation used by LPF. The action committee therefore similarly states that asylum seekers should be cared for in the neighboring regions (A. Hendriks, 2015). The Netherlands itself is perceived as an unsuitable location for caring for asylum seekers. The difference, however, is that the action committee’s starting point is based upon the local level, since the committee is solely focusing upon this topic. The LPF is also more emphasizing the national issue, since the political party has a local background.

Despite stating that the decision-making process and the practical matters are the most important factors for disagreeing, the argumentation of the action committee contains more aspects. In press releases on their website they are critical about for example the allocation of housing and the ‘bed, bad en brood’ (eng: bed, bath and bread) arrangement for undocumented migrants. In this article they also bring up the argument that tax paying citizens should have more access to social services than asylum seekers (AZC-alert, 2014a). The claims made by the committee are therefore restrictionist (annex 1, table 5).

The difference between the claims of political parties and the committee goes hand-in-hand with the notion that political parties are mostly strongly anti-populist. The action committee responds, similarly as the LPF, to racial, ethnic and immigration related fears (as security, diminishing of services etc.). The expectation that political parties will not follow these groups is according to Freeman, who states that parties are likely to follow the well organized groups (SNV) instead of a restrictionist opposition with poorly articulated claims (1995: 885-886). From comparing these claims with policy it can also be concluded that Freeman’s (1995; 2002) expansionist bias is mostly correct. State authorities are, in this case, generally more expansionist than the (representatives of the) public.

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16

Chapter 3: To what extent are the claims included in the decision-making?

In this short chapter the actual policy will be compared to the preferences of the different actors presented in the second chapter. Through this the actual influence of the actors can be observed. This will be done as it is an essential part of the preference attainment method, presented in the

methodology. First, the process of decision-making will be explained in order to entirely understand the policy. Following, the final policy in comparison with the claims will be outlined. Therefore, parts of the agreement which are comparable with the preferences of the actors will be outlined.

3.1. The decision-making process

The process of decision-making in the case of the Orangerie is mostly dependent upon a decision which is made by the executive committee of the government of Eindhoven on September 17th. The opening of a refugee center in the Orangerie is perceived as urgent situation by the executive

committee (Gemeente Eindhoven, 2014). The executive committee of Eindhoven is mandated by the town council to make decisions in urgent situations such as these. The majority of the town council agreed on the decision of the executives in the following meeting of the town council. Therefore, the topic is not debated in the town council meeting. The agreement was followed up by a period where objection was possible. This period is mostly used by the actors to address their standpoints for example through asking board questions.

This process is not according the normal regulation. The opening of a refugee center in the Orangerie changes the zoning plan. Officially, shifts in the zoning plan always have to be discussed in a town council meeting. This however has been delayed through an official regulation, which makes it possible to make temporary decisions in urgent situations. Therefore, the use of the Orangerie as refugee center is firstly temporary permitted, with the expectation of an extension. The majority of the town council has agreed on this. Therefore the decision has not been placed on the agenda of the town council or is not reversed by the town council.

3.2. The final policy

In short the decision of the executive committee of Eindhoven contains an agreement with COA (the central (state) organ of refugee centers in the Netherlands), which means that the Orangerie is

currently functioning as refugee center (Coa and Gemeente Eindhoven, 2014). This decision is agreed upon by all the political parties, except the LPF. The executive committee explains their decision by stating that it is an aim for an inclusive society and that Eindhoven has a national and global

responsibility to arrange a refugee center for these people (Gemeente Eindhoven, 2014). As we have seen in the second chapter, this is also the central argument used by the PvdA. Furthermore, it can also be recognized in the argumentation used by VVD and SNV. The LPF has also agrees that there is a

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17 humanitarian responsibility towards refugees, but disagree with the opening of a refugee center in the Orangerie.

In the agreement it is furthermore stated that services regarding health, education and daytime activities have to be taken care of (COA and Gemeente Eindhoven, 2014: 3). This part of the agreement is similar to the claims of the PvdA, VVD and SNV. As seen in the second chapter they define these services as basic services, which should be provided for the asylum seekers. Additionally, it is also included in the agreement that people who have failed to obtain refugee status, should not be on the streets. The government of Eindhoven states in the agreement that it is their responsibility to provide (temporary) accommodation for the migrants (COA and Gemeente Eindhoven, 2014: 5). This part of the agreement is similar to the claims made by SNV, who state that it is part of human rights to provide these services (VluchtelingenWerk, 2014c). It is different from the claims made by VVD, since they have stated that services should be limited and not be provided for people who have failed to obtain refugee status (VVD Eindhoven, 2014).Another important aspect of the agreements are that the refugee center is supposed to be open for two years (ibid.: 5). This last statement can be mostly recognized in the critical claims by the VVD, namely that the refugee center should be temporary (VVD Eindhoven, 2014).

When looking at the policy and the different claims that are made, it can be stated that the claims of the action committee cannot be recognized the policy. They disagree with the opening of a refugee center and providing services, which is all included in the agreement. Furthermore, all political parties have obtained some of their objectives. It can however be stated that LPF has had the least influence in the decision-making, when comparing the party with the other political parties.

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18

Chapter 4: Which actions are undertaken by the actors to sustain their

preferences?

In this chapter the actions which are undertaken by the different actors will be outlined. For the analysis of the action committee, LPF and PvdA the interviews held with A. Hendriks (Spokeswoman of the Action Committee), R. Reeker (Chairman of the LPF) and M. Verhees (Chairwoman of the PvdA) are leading. For VVD and SNV general observations on the availability of documents and articles on this topic will be the explaining factors. Concluding the successfulness of the strategies used by the different actors will be outlined. In this chapter the opponents (LPF and action committee) and proponents (VVD, PvdA and SNV) are discussed separately, because according to the theory of Hojnacki and Kimball (1999) a different use of lobbying tactics is expected. Furthermore, a key finding is that the actions of the proponents and opponents have to be seen in light of each other. First the opponents will be discussed, followed by the proponents. To conclude, information from both paragraphs will be combined in the concluding remarks.

4.1. Strategies of opponents

The committee has used several tactics for trying to influence the policy. These tactics have been direct as well as indirect. The first action was to create a facebookpage, on which they provide information on this topic (Geen asielzoekers in de Orangerie in Eindhoven, 2014a). Following activities executed in the name of the action committee have been the placement of banners and organizing a protest. The banners have been placed at the Orangerie to protest against the opening of the center. For this action the committee has received donations from certain citizens of the

neighborhood (A. Hendriks, 2015; Eindhovens Dagblad, 2014). A few days after placing these

banners, they have protested at an informational meeting for neighboring citizens about the opening of the refugee center (A. Hendriks, 2015; Eindhovens Dagblad, 2014).

These first actions have been important for the continuation of the committee. Since these actions the amount of followers of the committee has increased significantly and they have gained public support for neighboring citizens. Therefore these actions can be seen as the starting point from where they started to act as a committee:

“We zijn niet de straat opgegaan. Wel met, je hebt zo’n informatiemiddag, daar zijn we natuurlijk wel naar toe gegaan (om te protesteren). Maar toen waren we niet zo’n comité zoals we nu zijn. Toen waren we meer afzonderlijk boze burgers.” (A. Hendriks, 2015).

Following this, several strategies have been used by the committee to gain influence on this topic. These activities were not solely indirect lobbying tactics, but also direct strategies. For example, the action committee has tried to influence public policy, by finding supporting political parties.

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19 “Ik heb ook politieke medestanders te zoeken. Ik heb ook een gesprek gehad met andere politieke partijen, maar ... die zijn, naja, allemaal heel afhoudend” (A. Hendriks, 2015).

As stated by the spokeswoman of the committee, most political parties however have reacted void on this request. The committee has a strong connection with solely the LPF, through which they try to influence the political arena. The initiative to create a connection is taken by the committee, through contacting the chairman of the LPF right after the announcement that the local government was planning to use the Orangerie as refugee center (A. Hendriks, 2015). The contact mainly has been between the spokeswoman of the committee and the chairman of the LPF. Furthermore, the chairman of the LPF stated that he is present at the meetings of the committee, which also shows his

involvement. He is not in charge of decisions, but contributes by sharing thoughts:

“Ik zit dus bij de vergaderingen die men heeft en ik praat mee, maar ik heb geen beslissings- bevoegdheid. En ik zit ook niet in het bestuur.” (R. Reeker, 2015).

The connection with the LPF is important for the committee, since they have increased the

possibilities for the action committee to use direct lobbying tactics. The committee has, for example, been involved in the writing of the board questions on this topic (Interview A. Hendriks, 2015): “We hebben vooral heel veel contact gehad met de fractievoorzitter en die ... kan natuurlijk

raadsvragen stellen. En daar hebben we natuurlijk wel op ingespeeld. Van nou.... we willen dit weten en dat heeft hij wel allemaal op papier gezet.” (A. Hendriks, 2015)

Compared to other political parties in the town council, the LPF has been most active in asking those questions and has done this in four meetings. This can therefore also be ascribed to the activities of the action committee.

The LPF has furthermore supported the action committee in proceeding5 against the local government. They have done this through receiving donations of certain citizens on the bank account of the

political party. Through this the committee could benefit from the tax advantages of the party and was able to pay for the proceedings (J. Verheugt, 2014; A. Hendriks, 2015; R. Reeker, 2015).

“Een rechtszaak kost natuurlijk geld. En voor de gemeente is dat natuurlijk geen probleem, maar … voor zo’n kleine organisatie [..]We hebben onze rekening gewoon opengesteld daarvoor, omdat we ze steunen”(R. Reeker, 2015).

The most recent activity of the committee has been the creation of an online national platform called AZC-Alert. Until now ten committees from different localities have gathered there (AZC Alert,

5

These proceedings have been partly successful, since the judge has criticized the process of decision-making. However the judge has perceived the interests of the refugees as more urgent than the interests of the local citizens

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20 2014c). On AZC-Alert they share information through posting press releases and articles. Near upon they are planning to have regular meetings to discuss which strategies would be successful for each location:

“En binnenkort, het staat in ieder geval op de agenda voor deze maand, gaan we elkaar zoveel mogelijk ook in het echt ontmoeten. Met een bijeenkomst, om te kijken wat de mogelijkheden zijn voor elk comité afzonderlijk.” (A. Hendriks, 2015).

By gathering on a national level, the committee creates more public and political support and possibilities to influence policy through lobby on different governmental levels.

For the LPF the connection with the committee is a way to increase the indirect lobbying strategies executed by the committee. This has been necessary since they only have two seats in the town council, which gives them limited influence. This will also benefit the position of the LPF, since they can increase the public support for their policy preference through the committee. However, as seen in the third chapter, this has been unsuccessful until now.

4.2. Strategies of proponents

The proponents of the policy have lobbied less visibly than the opponents. In this case SNV has furthermore been present at the informational meeting about the refugee center in the Orangerie to provide neighboring citizens with information (J. Verheugt, 2014). Furthermore, the lobbying tactics of SNV have to be seen as part of VluchtelingenWerk. VluchtelingenWerk has written a program on how to lobby in municipalities (VluchtelingenWerk, 2014c). One important strategy they have used is providing information for political parties in municipalities. For the local elections in 2014 they have written an informative flyer for municipalities on how to act on immigration concerns. They have done this by giving policy options and explaining how the local and national government should act. For example, they state that local governments should provide emergency shelter for people who have failed to obtain asylum. For this they furthermore add the necessity of dialogue between the local and national government (ibid.). As seen in the third chapter this flyer has been a successful way to lobby, since the protection of people who have failed to obtain asylum is included in the agreement.

VluchtelingenWerk has a broad campaign on the national level, and is also using direct as well as indirect lobbying strategies .They for example use direct lobby strategies on the national level to influence the legislation on migration. They mostly do this by providing research and by presenting this to the decision-makers. Indirect strategies they use are for example the provision of education programs for middle schools (VluchtelingenWerk, 2014d). The use of these indirect strategies can be explained by the fact that the issue has great implications for the NGO, since defending interests of refugees is their purpose. SNV is however not using a lot of strategies on the specific topic of the opening of a refugee center in the Orangerie.

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21 The political parties have been less active in asking board questions than the LPF. The chairwoman of the PvdA explains that making their point heard in the public is unnecessary since the PvdA in Eindhoven is following a national line of politics (as shown in the second chapter). Also the fact that there is a majority of proponents in the town council makes this less useful (M. Verhees).

Furthermore, the fact that the accountable alderman on this topic is delegated from the PvdA, is also an important aspect for not speaking out very publicly as political party. She states:

“[..] kijk onze wethouder is van de PvdA natuurlijk. Die is daar direct bij betrokken. Die heeft dit mee.. gerealiseerd. Dus dat is natuurlijk ook een PvdA geluid” (M. Verhees, 2015).

The fact that PvdA less actively making their voice heard than LPF is according expectations of Hojnacki and Kimball (1999), since lobbying is costly and time-consuming (especially the use of indirect strategies). Therefore, lobbying strategies will only be used when they are perceived as necessary.

Furthermore, the chairwoman also states that it is a conscious decision of the agreeing parties to not talk much about this topic. It is a consensus between them that this would slow down the process of decision –making. It is assumed by them that in most cases the execution of such a plan is less of a problem than the decision-making process (M. Verhees, 2015). This also explains why the VVD has not been very actively in discussing this subject. This furthermore matches the findings in the second chapter that major political parties try to find a consensus with other political parties, in order to take conflicts on immigration issues of the agenda (Freeman, 1995: 884).

4.3. Concluding remarks

From this chapter it can be concluded that there is a clear distinction between agreeing and disagreeing parties in undertaking action to sustain their preferences. It is found that disagreeing actors as the action committee and LPF are inclined to express their claims more than agreeing parties as PvdA, VVD and SNV. This can be explained through the theory of Hojnacki and Kimball, that using

lobbying tactics and undertaking action is costly. Therefore, this will only be done when it is perceived as necessary (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1999: 1004).

Considering the policy outcomes, the lobbying strategies of SNV can be seen as successful. SNV has lobbied via a program developed on the national level by VluchtelingenWerk. Some important claims of SNV have consequently been included in the agreement such as the protection of people who have failed to obtain refugee status (which we have seen in the third chapter). This can be attributed to their use of indirect as well as direct strategies on a long term, through which they provide information for political parties as well as for the public.

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22 Furthermore, Hojnacki and Kimball (1999: 1003) add that it is harder for opponents to initiate policy change than for proponents to prevent change. This can be observed for the LPF and the action committee, whom have been using lobbying tactics (direct and indirect) more than the other actors. However, they still have been unsuccessful in changing the policy. Furthermore, the fact that the action committee has used the most indirect tactics compared to the other actors is furthermore due to the perception of great implications of the refugee center for the members of the committee and the public they are representing (ibid.: 1004).

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23

Chapter 5: Conclusion and discussion

5.1. Conclusion

In this thesis the process of decision-making regarding the use of the Orangerie as refugee center has been analyzed. In order to do this the claims and strategies of several political actors have been analyzed. Through this the research question “Whose claims have had most influence in the making of public policy regarding asylum in Eindhoven? And why are some actors more successful than others?” is answered. To analyze the claims made by these actors, theories on claims-making by Freeman (1995; 2002) and Statham and Geddes (2006) have been used. To examine why certain actors have been more successful, lobbying tactics are observed.

First, it is found that claims made by SNV and PvdA were mostly expansionist. The VVD has made some restrictionist claims, but also made mostly expansionist claims. For making claims the PvdA and VVD (together with the remaining political parties, except LPF) collaborated and expressed claims through asking board questions written together with all the participating parties (PvdA, VVD e.a., 2014). The political parties view the opening of a refugee center in the Orangerie as part of social and humanitarian responsibilities towards the national, European and global level. Therefore, an anti-populist norm in the town council can be observed, whereas racial, ethnic and immigration fears were not used to gain public support. The VVD, however, has also made some restrictionist claims. The party is critical towards providing services to people who have failed to obtain a refugee status (VVD Eindhoven, 2014).

The SNV explains there claim by stating that the opening of a refugee center is part of the

responsibility to protect human rights of refugees and asylum seekers. They state that states should open more refugee centers, since the demand for it is currently high (VluchtelingenWerk, 2014a). Furthermore, they emphasize the importance to protect refugees who failed to obtain asylum has been addressed by the NGO (VluchtelingenWerk, 2014c). These claims have been according to the

expectations of Statham and Geddes (2006: 256), who stated that NGOs on immigration are mostly making expansionist claims.

The LPF and the action committee have made mostly restrictionist claims. The LPF states that they understand the urgency of the problem, but do not think Eindhoven should open a refugee center. They state this for several reasons, as the amount of costs and the increase of the migrant community (which is perceived as undesirable). The action committee uses a similar argumentation, but is also critical on the decision-making process and criticizes the suitability of the Orangerie as refugee center (AZC-alert, 2014).

Compared to the other actors, the preferences of SNV and PvdA can be recognized the most in the final agreement. The executive committee explains the decision as a social and humanitarian

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24 responsibility. Furthermore, there is a specific reference to stress the responsibility of the government of Eindhoven to provide (temporary) accommodation for people who failed to obtain refugee status (COA and Gemeente Eindhoven, 2014: 5). The VVD has therefore not obtained all of their objectives, since they do not approve of providing services for people who have failed to obtain refugee status. The LPF agrees that there is a humanitarian responsibility, but do not approve of the opening of a refugee center in the Orangerie. The preferences of the action committee cannot be recognized in the final policy.

The fact that PvdA has been successful can be attributed to the fact that they were part of a consensus with most political parties in the town council. This has strengthened their position in supporting the decision of the executive committee. Furthermore, according to the chairwoman of the PvdA, it has been a conscious decision from the political parties whom are part of the consensus to not talk much about this topic, in order to prevent the process of decision-making to slow down (M. Verhees, 2015). This is according to the expectation of Freeman, who states that political parties tend to form an expansionist consensus in order to take conflicts on immigration issues of the agenda (1995: 885-886). Moreover, to answer why certain actors have been more influential, lobbying tactics of the different actors are examined. This shows that there is a difference in the intensity of expressing claims between disagreeing actors as LPF and the action committee and agreeing actors as PvdA, VVD and SNV. Actors who agree with the presented policy have less incentive to express their claims and/or to use lobbying tactics. This is according to expectations of Hojnacki and Kimball (1999). In this case direct lobbying tactics can be seen as more successful than indirect lobbying tactics. SNV has influenced the political parties by providing information and using lobbying strategies on a long term. However, these direct strategies only work when an organization is well organized and is professionally

executing these tactics. The action committee has not been successful in attaining objectives, which is due to the fact that they mobilized slowly and the fact that they are not articulating arguments which are seen as legitimate by political parties. Through this it can be explained why SNV has been more successful than the strategies used by the action committee.

5.2. Discussion

When reading the results of this thesis, some critical notes should be taken in mind. Firstly, it is difficult to determine preferences and to take in account all aspects of preferences. Therefore the execution of the method of preference attainment has some flaws. Furthermore, by using lobbying tactics to explain why certain actors were more influential, other possible influential factors have been led out (for example resources and issue characteristics). Therefore, it has been difficult to examine the causality of influence and lobbying tactics.

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25 Besides this the national political context is not intensively analyzed, which also could be an

important factor for this issue. For example, this could be an aspect of the position of the VVD in this case (since Teeven is a VVD party member on the national level). Other contextual factors, as the rare process of decision-making, are possibly affecting the manners to influence the policy. Moreover, for this research a selection of analyzed actors is made, which excludes other possible influential actors (for instance: not all political parties are analyzed). These shortcomings have consequences for the internal validity of this thesis. Therefore it would be interesting to look at this case more intensively and to analyze it by focusing on other possible factors. Other impeding factors have been the

accessibility of data. Interviews with the chairman of the VVD and a representative of SNV could not be arranged within this time frame, which could have been useful for answering the research question more thorough. This has consequences for the reliability as well as the internal validity of this thesis.

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26

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VluchtelingenWerk (2014) Toename asielaanvragen: ‘Migratiestromen ombuigen is geen oplossing’. May 15th. Available at: http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/actueel/persbericht/toename-asielaanvragen-migratiestromen-ombuigen-geen-oplossing (Accessed on 13 January 2015)

VluchtelingenWerk (2014a) 3 miljoen Syriers gevlucht; een trieste mijlpaal. August 29th. Available at: http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/actueel/nieuws/3-miljoen-syriers-gevlucht-een-trieste-mijlpaal (Accessed on 13 January 2015)

VluchtelingenWerk (2014b) Petitie ‘Europe Act Now’ aangeboden aan Herman van Rompuy. June 30th. Available at: http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/actueel/nieuws/petitie-europe-act-now-aangeboden-aan-herman-van-rompuy (Accessed on 13 January 2015)

VluchtelingenWerk (2014c) Vluchtelingenbescherming in gemeenten. Gemeenteraadsverkiezingen 2014. Available at:

https://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/sites/public/Vluchtelingenwerk/VWN_Gemeenteraadsverkiezingen %202014.pdf (Accessed on 13 January 2015)

VluchtelingenWerk (2014d) Belangenbehartiging: aandacht vragen bij overheid en politiek. Available at: http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/wat-wij-doen/belangenbehartiging (accessed 26 January 2015) VVD Eindhoven (2014) Raadsvragen Van het raadslid dhr. F. van den Broek (VVD) over Orangerie. 25 september 2014. Online accessible via:

(31)

30

Annex 1: Content analysis of claims-making

Table 1: Claims of SNV

SNV Restrictionist Expansionist Comments

Press Release VluchtelingenWerk 1

Opening a refugee center is part of protecting the human rights of asylum seekers (and states should therefore take care of it).

Press Release VluchtelingenWerk 2

. VluchtelingenWerk shares the

notion that the Netherlands should do more for the

refugees and take care for more Syrian asylum seekers. It is necessary to raise the amount refugee centers in the Netherlands (and Europe) Press Release

VluchtelingenWerk 3

VluchtelingenWerk asks the government to take care of more asylum seekers. Flyer for local

municipalities (pg. 3)

People who failed to obtain refugee status should not be living on the street:

VluchtelingenWerk wants localities to provide emergency shelter for these refugees.

This is an

informative flyer, released for and before the elections in municipialities last year. It is written for members of the local political parties.

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