Behind the Bay of Pigs: How Domestic Pressure Contributed to John F. Kennedy's Decision to Invade Cuba in April, 1961

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143419000Y: Master's Thesis in History: American Studies

Behind the Bay of Pigs:

How Domestic Pressure Contributed to John F.

Kennedy's Decision to Invade Cuba in April, 1961

Kennedy Discusses Foreign Policy During a Press Conference, Mar. 23, 1961 Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum

Matthew J. Colton

Master's Thesis in History: American Studies Faculty of Humanities, University of Amsterdam

Student No.: 10619607

Email: matthew.colton@student.uva.nl Thesis Adviser: Dr. H. Beerd Beukenhorst

Second Reader: Prof. Dr. Ruud Janssens June, 2014

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Contents

Introduction...1

Chapter 1: Towards a Theory of Domestic Pressure...8

Chapter 2: Kennedy, Cuba and the 1960 Election...16

Chapter 3: American Attitudes to Castro: The Press...26

Chapter 4: American Attitudes to Castro: Public Opinion...35

Conclusion...43

Appendix 1: Tables...48

Appendix 2: Timeline of US-Cuban Relations from the Cuban Revolution to the Bay of Pigs Invasion...49

Bibliography...51

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Introduction

The US sponsored invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 has been described as the 'perfect failure' and is often regarded as one of the most embarrassing

episodes in United States foreign policy.1_{Codenamed Operation Pluto, the invasion intended} to train and aid Cuban exiles in the overthrow of Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro and its failure humiliated the Kennedy administration which had been instated less than three months prior to the operation. The event was significant not just in US-Cuban relations but in the history of Cold War US foreign policy and the result has been that a plethora of literature has explored the various reasons behind the decision to invade. Yet within this wealth of analysis, there is one factor which has remained largely overlooked; the role of domestic pressure in directing John F. Kennedy's policy towards Cuba. Given Trumbull Higgins' assertion that Operation Pluto never 'had a real chance at any stage', it appears paradoxical that Kennedy, a man whom David Halberstam has described as 'devoted to rationalism', could proceed along such a seemingly irrational course of action.2_{This paradox can be resolved by an analysis of} the domestic factors behind Kennedy's decision. Within the United States, Kennedy's election followed a period in which the second 'Red Scare' and the subsequent rise of McCarthyism had fostered a public scepticism of left-wing regimes, such as the one established by Castro in Cuba. This thesis therefore seeks to answer whether domestic pressure contributed to President Kennedy's decision to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.

There is a pressing need for a greater analysis of the domestic causes of foreign policy. Political leaders have increasingly used foreign policy as a vehicle to foster support from the public in a way which domestic policy, which is inherently divisive, cannot. Joshua Marshall, for instance, has argued that 'crises abroad almost always rally the country around the commander in chief, providing at least a short-term bump in the polls'.3_{It is his belief that} events such as the Bay of Pigs have set an historical precedent in which presidential fates are tied to the success or failure of foreign policy. This is something which has permeated through to the twenty-first century; in 2011 Barack Obama received his highest approval rating of that year in the week following the US assassination of Osama Bin Laden while George W. Bush saw a steady decline in his approval rating as the US continued to be mired in the Iraq War from 2003 onwards.4_{In the introduction to a 2012 study of the domestic}

1 Trumbull Higgins, The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), 13

2 Higgins, 176 and David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972), 12 3 Joshua Micah Marshall, 'Follow the Leader', The New York Times (Apr.23, 2004)

4 Gallup, 'Barack Obama Presidential Job Approval' Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/116479/barack-obama-presidential-job-approval.aspx (Accessed Apr. 23, 2014) and Gallup, 'George W. Bush Presidential Job

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factors behind foreign policy, James McCormick has attempted to explain why this

phenomenon continues to grow in modern politics. He argues that it has been facilitated by 'a process of globalisation [which is] drawing peoples together regardless of state boundaries' and has seen 'the distinctions between foreign and domestic policies across a broad spectrum of issues [become] increasingly blurred'.5_{As McCormick notes, the development of global} relations has resulted in the merging of domestic and foreign policy and domestic factors increasingly direct the ways in which national governments approach one another. If we are to better understand why such trends are present, it is necessary to analyse key instances in which foreign policy has been guided by domestic pressure, such as at the Bay of Pigs.

In exploring the role of domestic pressure, this thesis will also provide a valuable contribution to the historiography on the Bay of Pigs, as the current state of analysis on the domestic factors behind Kennedy's Cuban policy has been limited at best. Much of this historiography has focused on analysing the roles of the various parties involved in the operation's planning. In particular a great deal of responsibility for the invasion has been placed on the CIA and its leaders such as Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell. Indeed, Michael Dunne has argued that the CIA were misguidedly overconfident about Operation Pluto's chances of success as it was compared to the successful Guatemalan intervention of 1954. While Dunne notes that Cuba in 1961 posed a significantly different prospect than Guatemala in 1954, the CIA nonetheless predicted 'an easy victory brought about by propaganda, control of the air and support from disaffected military cadres'.6_{Similarly, Christopher Andrew has} accused Dulles of 'mentally rewriting' the history of the Guatemalan intervention in order to secure Kennedy's approval for the Bay of Pigs.7_{As these authors note, Kennedy's judgment} when approving the CIA's plan may have been clouded by the success of US military coups in the previous decade. Alternatively, authors such as Peter Grose have argued that the CIA deliberately misled Kennedy when planning the operation. Grose argues that Dulles chose not to 'brief candidates on secret operations which were destined to come out only in the future' and subsequently provided Kennedy only with information which 'he could have read in The

Morning Times'.8_{Likewise Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones has argued that because Bissell had devoted}

Approval' Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx

(Accessed Apr. 23, 2014)

5 James M. McCormick, The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 1-2

6 Michael Dunne, 'Perfect Failure: The USA, Cuba and the Bay of Pigs, 1961', The Political Quarterly, Vol. 82, No. 3 (Jul.-Sep., 2011), pp. 448-458 (The Political Quarterly Publishing Co.), 453

7 Christopher Andrew, For The President's Eyes Only (New York: Harper Perennial, 1995), 261

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a great deal of time to the operation he was eager to see it through to completion. Jeffreys-Jones therefore asserts that 'Bissell was a poor counsellor on Cuba' and his obsessive focus on removing Castro was 'to the detriment of [his] operational judgment'.9_{As such Bissell was} willing to withhold information which may have prevented Kennedy from authorizing the invasion, a factor highlighted by Richard Reeves in Profile of Power. Reeves argues that, while Bissell informed Kennedy the proposed amphibious landing was modelled on a successful 1944 invasion, he did not tell Kennedy that the invading forces 'had been pinned down for four months on their beachhead'.10_{As this abundance of literature has rightly} argued, the CIA played an integral role not only in the planning of the invasion, but in persuading the executive office to approve of the plans. Yet, as Richard Welch has argued 'whatever the errors of the CIA, it did not act without presidential authorisation'.11_{It is} therefore too simplistic to argue that responsibility for the invasion lies solely with the CIA.

There are a few texts, however, which have at least raised the question of how domestic factors may have contributed to the decision to invade Cuba by analysing

Kennedy's actions from 1960 onwards. In particular, some scholarship has highlighted how Kennedy's argument for a tougher policy on Cuba during his 1960 presidential campaign was a political tactic designed to discredit Republican candidate Richard M. Nixon. For instance, Halberstam has argued that in 1960 there arose a question of whether Kennedy 'was

sufficiently... anti-Communist'.12_{This was important given the fact that Kennedy was} competing against Nixon who was 'the hatchet man... on the issue of softness on

communism'.13_{Halberstam therefore suggests that Kennedy's campaign rhetoric was used to} persuade the American public that he would implement a stronger Cuban policy than Nixon. Similarly, Rebecca Friedman has argued that Kennedy used his final televised debate with Nixon in October 1960 as a platform to appear tougher on Cuba than the Republicans as he 'defended US government support for anti-Castro Cubans on a national stage'.14_{It would} seem that the Cuban issue provided Kennedy with a significant advantage over Nixon and the Republicans. Indeed, Michael Dunne elaborates on this point in his argument that, following his briefing on the plans for Operation Pluto, Kennedy 'disingenuously charged the

9 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (London: Yale University Press, 1989), 122 10 Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 70 11 Richard E. Welch, Jr., Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961 (London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 82

12 Halberstam, 21 13 Ibid., 20

14 Rebecca R. Friedman, 'Crisis Management at the Dead Center: The 1960-61 Presidential Transition and the Bay of Pigs Fiasco', Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Jun., 2011), pp. 307-333 (Center for the Study of the Presidency), 312

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Eisenhower administration with not bringing down Castro' during a debate with Nixon.15 Given that the debate was televised live, Dunne argues, Nixon was unable to counter Kennedy by admitting that such covert plans were underway. Similarly, John Prados has claimed that Kennedy used his campaign to call on the US to 'train and aid Cuban freedom fighters' for the first time.16_{Welch even goes as far as to argue that Kennedy 'gave}

comparatively little thought to the region of Latin America before the presidential campaign of 1960', suggesting that his rhetoric on Cuba was purely a pragmatic way of winning votes.17 Ultimately, Kennedy won what was the closest election in almost half a century, indicating public approval of Kennedy's proposal for tougher policy on Cuba. Prados has also touched upon another way in which the Bay of Pigs was the result of Kennedy's desire to win domestic support. He argues that Kennedy wished to stamp his authority on the presidency and differentiate himself from his predecessor Dwight D. Eisenhower. Kennedy therefore dismantled many of the supervisory networks put in place by Eisenhower meaning that any doubts about the CIA's plans harboured by groups such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff were overlooked by 'a President who wanted to look tough'.18_{It can be inferred from Prados'} argument that an element of egotism was behind Kennedy's decision to proceed with

Operation Pluto, as he saw an opportunity to win popular support by distancing himself from Eisenhower-era policy. These authors have therefore suggested that the Bay of Pigs Invasion was closely tied to Kennedy's quest for public approval. However, none have addressed the issue directly or assessed whether Kennedy's Cuban policy did indeed meet the approval of the public. This study aims to address the issue and provide a new contribution to existing historiography.

It will do so over the course of four chapters. Given that the term domestic pressure is rather broad, the first chapter will establish a suitable way of measuring how domestic factors can guide foreign policy, which will then be employed in the following chapters. It will develop a theoretical framework based on existing scholarship and then explain how these theories can be applied in the case of the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Indeed, while the domestic causes of the Bay of Pigs Invasion have not been explored, there exists a vast catalogue of theories on subjects such as public opinion, the role of the media in politics and how political leaders appeal to the public during elections. By analysing this literature it will be possible to

15 Dunne, 455

16 John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II through the

Persian Gulf (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1986), 196

17 Welch, 64 18 Prados, 200

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establish the most appropriate ways of determining how Operation Pluto was directed by domestic factors. This chapter will also provide a series of hypotheses as to what the application of these theories will reveal in the following chapters. The establishment of this theoretical framework will ensure that conclusions drawn by this thesis are logical and reliable. Based on this framework, the second chapter will explore Kennedy's use of Cuba as an election tactic during his 1960 presidential campaign. Elections provide an opportunity for the public to express their approval or disapproval of proposed foreign policies and

candidates therefore adopt policies which they believe will appeal to voters. Given Welch's suggestion that Kennedy gave little thought to Latin America prior to his nomination by the Democrats, this chapter will trace Kennedy's rhetoric on Cuba in 1960. It will demonstrate that his rhetoric became increasingly antagonistic as relations between Castro and the

Eisenhower administration steadily deteriorated. It will also argue that, although this rhetoric proved to be pragmatic in helping deliver Kennedy to the White House, he had to deliver on his promises once elected. He therefore implemented the strong foreign policy he had promoted which resulted in the debacle at the Bay of Pigs.

The final two chapters of this thesis will answer whether American citizens were in favour of an antagonistic policy towards Castro's Cuba. Chapter three will analyse how the press portrayed Castro between the Cuban Revolution and the Bay of Pigs Invasion. It will argue that the average American citizen does not directly experience foreign affairs and therefore relies on what is reported by the press to form their opinions. Thus, the public's perception of Castro would be directed by what was reported by the press. This chapter will analyse the reports of prominent American newspapers and magazines with differing political inclinations to reveal how the press depicted Castro's regime. It will demonstrate a shift in opinion, as journalists were initially cautiously optimistic that Castro could bring democracy to Cuba but disapproved of his economic reforms. This chapter will also argue that Kennedy used press conferences to warn the public that Castro was a threat to American interests in the first months of his presidency. The result will be that the chapter will exhibit whether the domestic press contributed to a rise in anti-Castro sentiment. The final chapter will examine whether American public opinion was also in favour of a stronger foreign policy towards Castro's Cuba. It will analyse quantitative data such as opinion polls and approval ratings to show how the American public reacted to Castro's regime and Kennedy's policy towards Cuba. It will then provide an explanation for the results of these polls by analysing the written responses of individual American citizens in newspapers and magazines. Finally it

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will explore whether any interest groups tried to direct US policy towards more diplomatic relations with Cuba. Like the previous chapter it will demonstrate that a shift in opinion occurred, by which Americans became increasingly hostile to Castro as he pursued economic reforms and strengthened Cuba's ties with the Soviet Union. These final two chapters will ultimately determine whether domestic opinion was in favour of the type of intervention which occurred at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961.

Using this methodological approach, each chapter will predominantly rely on

differing types of sources. Because the first chapter will establish a theoretical framework, it will largely rely on scholarly sources produced by notable theorists who have also attempted to analyse the domestic causes of foreign policy. It will draw upon the abundance of available literature by theorists such as Walter Lippman and Richard Sobel and distil their various ideas into a framework which can be applied in the following chapters. The remaining chapters will principally rely on primary sources. Chapter two will analyse Kennedy's 1960 campaign speeches, access to which has been provided by the Roosevelt Study Center (RSC) in Middelburg, the Netherlands. These sources will reveal the type of rhetoric used by

Kennedy when discussing Cuba and determine whether this rhetoric shifted during his campaign. The third chapter will employ a variety of newspaper and magazine articles published in prominent newspapers such as The New York Times and Time. It will rely on these reports rather than other forms of media such as films or television programmes. This selection has been made because reports by the press are far more contemporary

representations of public opinion, given that they are usually published daily, weekly, or monthly. Alternatively, films and television shows take longer to produce which reduces their ability to adequately capture contemporary opinion. Foreign policy is therefore more likely to respond to the contemporary sentiment captured by news articles than the sentiment of a specific time captured by a film. Furthermore, because these publications received a wide circulation in the mid-twentieth century, they were more likely to direct foreign policy than publications with a decreased readership. This chapter will also analyse President Kennedy's press conferences between January and April 1961 to determine how he used the press to portray Castro in the months prior to the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Access to these sources will be provided by the University of Amsterdam and the RSC. The final chapter will use a combination of quantitative and qualitative data to resolve whether public opinion was in favour of a stronger foreign policy towards Castro. It will use statistical data provided by opinion polls and approval ratings to indicate general trends in opinion towards Castro and

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then explain these trends by analysing letters written by individual American citizens. It will also use literature published by interest groups to answer whether a significant portion of the American public was opposed to a stronger foreign policy towards Cuba. Access to these sources will be provided by polling organisations such as Gallup and various newspaper archives. Such a rich range of sources will guide this thesis towards comprehensive and reliable conclusions.

The goal of this thesis is to provide a new contribution to the wealth of literature on the Bay of Pigs Invasion and a fresh insight into the factors which contributed to the decision to execute Operation Pluto. It does not seek to argue that domestic pressure alone was the cause of Kennedy's decision to train and aid Cuban rebels; the wealth of literature previously discussed illustrates that a variety of factors were behind the decision and no single cause can be held singularly responsible. However, this thesis will explore one such area which

deserves greater analysis if we are to understand, not only why Kennedy executed Operation Pluto, but why political leaders increasingly direct their foreign policy based on domestic issues. By answering whether domestic pressure contributed to Kennedy's decision to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, this thesis hopes to contribute to a growing scholarly field.

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The term domestic pressure is a rather broad and multifaceted one which encompasses a variety of different factors and can be measured in multiple ways, some of which are more reliable than others. In order to answer whether domestic pressure contributed to the decision to support an invasion of Cuba in April 1961, it is first necessary to set parameters within which it can be measured. Without setting such parameters, the validity of any conclusions drawn by this thesis will be questionable. This chapter therefore seeks to establish the most suitable way to analyse how domestic pressure can direct foreign policy and will construct a theoretical framework which will then be used in the following chapters to guide the thesis towards its conclusion. For the purpose of this study, domestic pressure refers to the reasons Kennedy believed a strong foreign policy towards Castro's Cuba would help him retain the support of the American public. It does not, however, refer to pressure from federal agencies such as the CIA; the role of such agencies has already been documented thoroughly and this thesis seeks to add to the scholarly field rather than replicate it. Based on this definition, this chapter will discuss the most suitable ways to measure how domestic pressure guided US foreign policy towards Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs Invasion. This discussion will draw upon existing theories and secondary scholarship to justify why these areas have been selected. The result will be that this chapter will establish a reliable way of answering how domestic pressure contributed to President Kennedy's decision to execute Operation Pluto.

One way of measuring how foreign policy can be the result of domestic pressure is by analysing how presidential candidates use foreign issues to advance their campaigns during elections. It is true that on a day to day basis most voters are typically less concerned with, and less informed about, policies which do not directly affect them. As Sobel has argued, 'the public's apparent lack of information suggests that foreign policy issues are not salient to most voters, [which] makes exerting influence difficult'.19_{This means that public opinion is} less likely to influence foreign policy than domestic policy. During elections, however, the realms of foreign policy and domestic pressure come into closer contact as voting provides 'a relatively direct means of constraint by the mass public'.20_{More than at any other time, the} public are called upon to indicate their preferences on a range of issues including foreign policy. Presidential candidates will therefore discuss both foreign and domestic issues in the manner which is most likely to meet public approval. For example, they will promote their foreign policy as a way of uniting the nation. As a team of political psychologists at the

19 Richard Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam: Constraining the

Colossus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 21

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University of Montana have argued, 'messages of hope in campaigns have been found to be imperative for stimulating voting'.21_{Foreign policy is arguably the simplest way for}

candidates to convey such hopeful messages. Unlike domestic policy, which appeals to individual demographics and is therefore inherently divisive, foreign issues provide a means to unite the majority of the public behind a certain policy. As the following chapter will show, Castro's actions during the election year of 1960 presented a threat to US economic interests in Cuba and the Republicans in the Eisenhower administration were criticised for failing to prevent these threats. It is therefore likely that this was one such area of policy which Kennedy could use to both discredit his Republican opponent Richard Nixon and promote a hopeful message which would unite the American public.

It is also necessary to analyse the importance of the Cuban issue during the 1960 election given that Kennedy executed Operation Pluto within the first three months of his presidency. In their analysis of the decision making process behind US involvement in Vietnam, Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts have argued that 'democracy requires frequent accountability of leaders [which] forces them to place a high premium on near term results'.22 The suggestion here is that the democratic process, which includes elections, encourages politicians to pursue policies which they believe will boost their short term popularity. Similarly, foreign policy is theoretically more likely to be the result of domestic pressure when foreign issues carry an urgency. As Sobel has argued 'the more immediate the crisis, the more likely public opinion will constrain policy'.23_{Based on these two theories, it is likely} that Kennedy would have increasingly highlighted Cuba as a key issue during his campaign. As will be discussed, during 1960 Castro pursued a series of land reforms which resulted in the termination of diplomatic US-Cuban relations and the strengthening of Cuba's

relationship with the Soviet Union. Thus, Cuba became an impending crisis which Kennedy could promise to rectify in the first months of his presidency if elected. With this in mind, chapter two will analyse Kennedy's rhetoric towards Cuba during the 1960 election. This thesis hypothesises that Kennedy used the Cuban issue to promote a restoration of American international prestige and also to discredit the Republican party ahead of the 1960 election. Furthermore, it will argue that Kennedy's position on Cuba shifted during 1960, as the

21 Lucian Gideon Conway III, Laura Janelle Gornick, Chelsea Burfeind, Paul Mandella, Andrea Kuenzli, Shannon C. Houck & Deven Theresa Fullerton, 'Does Complex or Simple Rhetoric Win Elections? An Integrative Complexity Analysis of U.S. Presidential Campaigns', Political Psychology, Vol. 33, No. 5 (Oct., 2012), pp. 599-618 (International Society of Political Psychology), 616

22 Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979), 4

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candidate saw an opportunity to increase his popularity. In theory, it seems likely that Kennedy's rhetoric would have become stronger and more urgent following Castro's

economic reforms. Such a shift will indicate that Kennedy proposed a tougher policy on Cuba as a campaign tactic and, once elected, he saw the Bay of Pigs as the most expedient way to deliver upon this promise.

Another domestic factor which can direct foreign policy is the way in which the American press report on foreign affairs. On a day to day basis, the American public's access to information on foreign policy is most likely to be provided by what they read in

newspapers and magazines. Therefore the way in which journalists portrayed Castro following the Cuban Revolution was likely to direct public opinion. Indeed, in his

comprehensive analysis of public opinion, Walter Lippman has stressed the importance of recognising 'the triangular relationship between the scene of action, the human picture of that scene and the human response to that picture'.24_{Essentially, Lippman argues that there is} process by which an event occurs (the scene), it is reported by an individual who has

experienced that event (the human picture) and then public opinion will be a reaction to what is reported (the human response). This is especially true of foreign policy given that the average American citizen rarely has first-hand experience of foreign affairs and therefore relies on what is reported by journalists to form their opinions. In the case of Cuba, then, the American public's opinion towards Fidel Castro was likely to be the result of how the press portrayed Castro's regime. Furthermore, the press can also act as a reflection of public opinion. As Welch has argued 'the press often serves as a prism for the moods and half-formed judgements encompassed within a pluralistic society, and thereby magnifies as it reflects existing fears and prejudices'.25_{Welch's metaphor of the press as a prism for public} opinion contends that reporters draw upon a prevailing public mood and amplify it. This then increases the chance that elected officials will respond to public opinion when it comes to policy-making. The third chapter of this thesis will therefore analyse the reports on Castro published by prominent newspapers between the Cuban Revolution and the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Based on Welch's notion of the press as a reflection of mass public sentiment, the nature of these reports will help to determine whether public opinion was in favour of a stronger foreign policy. Furthermore, the thesis also hypothesises that the press portrayed Castro in an increasingly negative way as US-Cuban relations began to deteriorate. Based on

24 Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), 16-17 25 Welch, 160

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Lippmann's notion that the press can direct public opinion, this would have added to the anti-Castro sentiment present amongst the American public prior to the Bay of Pigs.

In the context of mid-twentieth century America, the American press could also constrain foreign policy and direct public opinion by presenting Castro as a Communist. Castro's rise to power came in the wake of the second 'Red Scare' in the United States, which had resulted in the rise of McCarthyist practices and the vilification of any party or individual deemed to be sympathetic to communism. This McCarthyism was particularly prominent in American film, as Glenda Pearson of the University of Washington has shown. Her

filmography compiled in 1998 shows that the release of anti-Communist films more than doubled from the 1940s to the 1950s.26_{While the list is by no means comprehensive, the} trend is clear. Other theorists have noted how the rise of McCarthyism was particularly influential in the medium of television. For instance, Thomas Doherty has described the McCarthyist influence on television as 'a demonic zeitgeist' which resulted in 'the stifling of free debate and the denial of constitutional rights by the imputation of Communist

sympathies'.27_{While Doherty's description of McCarthyism as demonic is perhaps} hyperbolic, he rightly notes that for public figures it was more important to denounce communism than to speak freely. Any public figures who did not appear to be

anti-Communist risked being black listed; essentially ending their careers. This was especially true during the House Un-American Activities Committee's (HUAC) investigations in to the perceived Communist infiltration of Hollywood in the early-1950s. The investigations would end the careers of many prominent American actors, such as Larry Parks. Parks was called to testify before HUAC in 1951 where he admitted to being a member of the Communist Party in his youth but denied being a Communist. Parks was placed on the blacklist despite his assertion that the investigation itself was un-American and 'more akin to... what is happening in Russia today'.28_{The irony was that the anti-Communist films subsequently produced often} displayed Soviets employing similar tactics to HUAC. The year after Parks' trial, Wesley Barry's The Steel Fist portrayed an idealistic student pursued by Communist police for speaking his mind.29_{Regardless of the disparity between its ideology and its actions, it was} clear that even the most tenuous link to communism was unacceptable in American cinema. This thesis therefore hypothesises that the American press was subject to the same

26 Glenda Pearson, 'The Red Scare: A Filmography', University of Washington Libraries (Mar. 5, 1998) 27 Thomas Patrick Doherty, Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism and American Culture (West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2003), 14

28 Larry Parks, 'HUAC Hearings on Communist Infiltration of the Motion-Picture Industry' Digital History (1951), http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/historyonline/huac_infiltration2.cfm (Accessed Jun. 10, 2014) 29 Wesley Barry (Dir.), The Steel Fist, (1952: Monogram Pictures)

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McCarthyist influences when it came to reporting on Castro. It is likely that the press would have accused Castro of being a Communist sympathiser following the strengthening of Cuba's ties with the Soviet Union. If so, then theoretically this would have contributed to an anti-Castro sentiment prior to the Bay of Pigs.

Any study which seeks to show how domestic factors can direct foreign policy must also consider the state of public opinion towards a specific foreign issue. While there is an ongoing debate about the extent to which public opinion can influence foreign policy, theorists have recently begun to argue that modern political leaders are indeed responsive to voters' interests when approaching foreign issues. Historically, theorists believed that the general public had little interest in politics beyond domestic affairs and therefore did not significantly influence foreign policy. For example, in 1950 Gabriel Almond was rather pessimistic about the public's ability to influence foreign policy, noting that in general 'American attitudes toward world politics tend to be formless and lacking in intellectual structure'.30_{Almond contended that because the public are more concerned with domestic} affairs than foreign affairs, they are less likely to guide foreign policy. More recently, however, scholars have promulgated the idea that modern political leaders are responsive to the attitude of the electorate. For instance, Sobel has argued that while public opinion does not set policy directly, it 'is capable of setting the range or limits of policy'.31_{As previously} noted, Sobel has argued that the public become concerned with foreign policy when it

represents an imminent threat to American interests. He therefore suggests that during such a period, the public can guide foreign policy. Similarly, McCormick has argued that 'the linkage of foreign and domestic policy [has] accelerated in recent decades'.32_McCormick suggests that there is a trend in which political leaders have increasingly based their foreign policy on domestic factors. Others have noted that under Kennedy in particular, public opinion played a significant role in foreign policy decision making. Daniel Fisk, for example, has argued that during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Kennedy worried that 'a failure to stand firm would likely lead to his being impeached'.33_{As Fisk notes, Kennedy was}

concerned about how his foreign policy would be received by the electorate. Similarly, Mark Haefele has argued that Kennedy 'was concerned with world public opinion' because of the

30 Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1950), 56

31 Sobel, 10 32 McCormick, 1

33 Daniel W. Fisk, 'Cuba and American Public Opinion', Cuba in Transition, Vol. 9 (Aug., 1999), pp.303-321 (Papers and Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy), 305

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importance he placed on American prestige and the nation's global image.34_{As President he} therefore 'used USIA [the United States Information Agency] international opinion polling to gauge America's image abroad'.35_{If Kennedy was this receptive to global opinion and also} concerned with how the electorate perceived his foreign policies, as Fisk has argued, then in theory it is likely he would have also monitored domestic opinion polls, such as those conducted by the Gallup organisation. Chapter four of the thesis therefore hypothesises that Kennedy's foreign policy was indeed guided by public opinion and his decision to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs was partially the result of a domestic anti-Castro sentiment.

Given the likelihood that Kennedy would have considered public opinion before executing Operation Pluto, this framework must also include a discussion of how to measure public opinion. While it can be difficult to measure, theorists have developed the most reliable ways of capturing dominant contemporary public sentiment. For example, in their analysis of public opinion in the twenty-first century, Russell Brooker and Todd Schaefer have argued that 'the most common method... for learning about public opinion is the sample survey' or opinion poll.36_{Indeed, opinion polls and presidential approval ratings provide} quantitative data which can be used to indicate general trends in the opinion of a cross-section of the public. This thesis will therefore analyse these statistics to reveal public opinion on Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs Invasion. There are problems, however, with relying purely on these polls as indicators of public opinion. Only a portion of the general public are polled and not all of those polled are concerned with foreign affairs beyond what is reported by the media. This phenomenon is highlighted by William Rogers, Barbara Stuhler and Donald Koenig who have argued that opinion polls are problematic because 'a significant number of people are poorly informed about world affairs'.37_{These scholars have used the} American public's response to the Bay of Pigs Invasion to verify their hypothesis. Two separate groups, one consisting of those knowledgeable of foreign affairs and the other consisting of a cross-section of the general public, were asked whether they approved or disapproved of US policy towards Castro in May 1961. Of the knowledgeable group, only 12% approved of US policy while 55% of the general public approved.38_{The disparity}

34 Mark Haefele, 'John F. Kennedy, USIA and World Public Opinion', Diplomatic History, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 63-84 (The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations), 64

35 Haefele, 84

36 Russell Brooker & Todd Schaefer, Public Opinion in the 21st Century: Let the People Speak? (Boston: Wadsworth, 2006), 26

37 William C. Rogers, Barbara Stuhler & Donald Koenig, 'A Comparison of Informed and General Public Opinion on US Foreign Policy', Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1967), pp. 242-252 (Oxford University Press), 242

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between the two results highlights the fact that some of those polled have limited knowledge of foreign affairs, which therefore jeopardises the reliability of the polls. Similarly, while the polls indicate a general trend in opinion, they do not provide any reasoning for why the public respond in a particular way. One way of remedying these problems can be to analyse the writings of interest groups, who form organised opposition to specific policies and therefore 'compensate for the mass inattention of the public'.39_{Such publications are indeed} valuable in determining whether the American public was particularly hostile to an area of foreign policy. However, as Sobel has highlighted, 'interest groups often convey elite views' which mean they cannot be relied upon as an indication of mass public opinion.40_{It is} therefore also necessary to analyse readers' letters to prominent newspapers. As Brooker and Schaefer have argued 'letters... often spontaneously arise from interested ordinary people'.41 Not only are these letters sent by individuals who have an interest in foreign affairs but they represent the views of average Americans rather than the elitist views of interest groups. This thesis will therefore rely on a combination of opinion polls, readers' letters to newspapers and the publications of interests groups. This will give a more complete picture of American public opinion towards Fidel Castro and help to answer whether the public was in favour of a stronger policy towards Cuba by 1961. Given the aforementioned relationship between public opinion and the press, this thesis hypothesises that public opinion also became more critical of Castro as US-Cuban relations deteriorated.

This theoretical framework will ensure the questions raised in this thesis will be answered reliably and conclusively. The application of these theorists' ideas will help to resolve whether domestic pressure contributed to Kennedy's decision to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. By analysing Kennedy's rhetoric during his 1960 campaign, it will be possible to discern whether he used a stronger policy on Cuba as an election tactic. As the

aforementioned theorists have argued, elections provide an opportunity for the public to exert control over foreign policy and politicians are likely to adopt a rhetoric which will appeal most to the electorate. Given Gelb and Betts' argument that democracy requires leaders to place a high premium on short-term results, it is likely that Kennedy saw the invasion at the Bay of Pigs as the most expedient way to deliver on his campaign promises. It will also be possible to conclude whether the American press fostered the growth of an anti-Castro sentiment by examining the reports and articles published by prominent newspapers and

39 Sobel, 19 40 Ibid., 19

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magazines. Given that the press acts as the public's central source of contemporary

information on foreign affairs, the way in which American journalists portrayed Castro would have directed public opinion. In the McCarthyist climate of the mid-twentieth century, it seems likely that the press would have been hostile to Castro's left-wing regime. Finally, the theoretical relationship between the nature of newspaper reports and the state of public opinion should show that the American public also grew hostile towards Castro. The state of public opinion was also likely to guide Kennedy's policy towards Cuba given Fisk and Haefele's arguments that the thirty-fifth President paid close attention to opinion polls. By cross-referencing statistical data with the writings of newspaper readers and interest groups, the thesis will be able to determine whether public opinion was in favour of the overthrow of Castro. The following chapters will therefore apply these theories in order to answer whether domestic pressure contributed to the decision to execute Operation Pluto.

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When the newly elected President Kennedy delivered his inaugural address on Jan. 20 1961 his message to the nations of the world was that, under his leadership, America would 'pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend [and] oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty'.42_{His tone was one of urgency, which} warned of 'the steady spread of the deadly atom' and, more specifically, the subversion of peaceful revolutions by hostile powers in Latin America.43_{One such Latin American nation} was Cuba, where the suspected Communist infiltration of the Cuban Revolution had seen the US become increasingly committed to the removal of Prime Minister Fidel Castro. The Eisenhower administration had overseen a steady deterioration of relations with Cuba, which culminated in the closing of the US embassy in Havana less than three weeks before

Kennedy's inauguration.44_{For Kennedy, as for many Americans in 1960, Castro's drift} towards an alliance with the Soviet Union represented the intolerable reality of a Soviet satellite 90 miles off the coast of Florida. Yet, when Kennedy set out on his campaign for the Presidency less than a year earlier, Cuba was much less of a concern for the Massachusetts Senator. Indeed, Richard Welch has argued that Kennedy 'gave comparatively little thought to the region of Latin America before the presidential campaign of 1960'.45_{Similarly, Randy} Babish has argued that, despite his position on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1957, Kennedy had not mentioned Cuba until his campaign.46_{It would therefore appear that} political pragmatism was at the heart of Kennedy's campaign for a stronger policy on Cuba. In answering how the Bay of Pigs Invasion was the result of domestic pressure, this chapter will analyse how Kennedy's shifting position on Cuba in 1960 was done to win the election. It will explore the idea that pragmatism was at the forefront of the Senator's policy towards Cuba, yet that this policy created a sense of urgency for Castro's overthrow which resulted in Kennedy's decision to execute Operation Pluto.

Perhaps the greatest evidence for Kennedy's use of Cuba as an election tactic lies in his transition from a rhetoric of non-interference to that of US supported intervention in 1960. It is therefore necessary to establish how Kennedy approached the Cuban issue from the outset of his attempt at the presidency and how this approach changed over the course of the campaign. While Kennedy opposed Castro's premiership in Cuba, when he began his

42 John F. Kennedy, 'Inaugural Address', The American Presidency Project (Jan. 20, 1961) 43 Ibid.

44 For a timeline of US-Cuban Relations between the Cuban Revolution and the Bay of Pigs Invasion, see Appendix 2

45 Welch, 64

46 Randy Babish, 'The 1960 Presidential Election in Florida: Did the Space Race and the National Prestige Issue Play an Important Role?', University of North Florida (Dec., 2000), 88

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campaign for the Democratic nomination he did not advocate the use of military force to remove the Cuban leader. Instead, he took a far more diplomatic approach. Prior to his nomination, Senator Kennedy gave a speech at the University of Wisconsin on March 25, 1960. When discussing Cuba he argued against the use of force in the Caribbean, suggesting:

'If we act wisely in Cuba, if we demonstrate that we are unwilling to impose our will by force on any nation, if we show that dollar diplomacy and the landing of marines are things of the past, then our position, our prestige and our moral leadership throughout Latin America will be enhanced'.47

It was Kennedy's belief that the US should not risk its international reputation by using its opposition to Castro as grounds for armed intervention. Instead, Kennedy advocated that the American public should support the Eisenhower administration's 'policy of patience [and] watchful waiting'.48_{In the wider context of the Cold War, Kennedy was also disinclined} towards a more aggressive foreign policy for fear of worsening relations with the Soviet Union. As he announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination, the Senator argued that it should be the goal of the Executive Branch to decide 'how to end or alter the

burdensome arms race' with the Soviets.49_{While Kennedy maintained that 'Soviet [military]} gains… threaten our very existence', he contended that the use of military force against the Soviets and their allies would not be of benefit to the US.50_{Thus, when Kennedy began his} campaign he was not supportive of the type of military intervention that would occur at the Bay of Pigs.

Cuban economic reforms during 1960, however, would provide Kennedy with an opportunity to sway the election in his favour and therefore provided the catalyst for the Senator's more aggressive policy. Despite an initial attempt at a 'good neighbour policy' and relatively cordial correspondence between the Eisenhower administration and Cuban

Ambassador to the United States Dr. Ernesto Dihigo, by mid-1960 diplomatic relations between the two regimes had steadily deteriorated. Eisenhower's attempts at coming to terms with Castro's revolution had been lackadaisical at best and McCarthyist fears of Communist

47 Kennedy, 'Speech at the University of Wisconsin' (Mar. 25, 1960), The John F. Kennedy 1960 Campaign, Part 2: Speeches, Press Conferences and Debates, Reel 7: 0805 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1986), The Roosevelt Studies Centre, Middelburg, The Netherlands

48 Kennedy, 'Speech at the University of Wisconsin', Reel 7: 0816

49 Kennedy, 'Announcement as Candidate for President' (Jan. 2, 1960), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum

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infiltration in Cuba prevented any substantial progress from being made. The result was the passage of agrarian reform laws in Cuba, which advisor to the Cuban Government Michel Gutelman argues saw the confiscation of approximately 3,816,600 hectares of land by the Cuban Government between 1959 and 1961.51_{This legislated for the seizure of foreign} owned property. Between July and September 1960, US owned sugar factories and banks in Cuba were nationalised, which threatened the US' economic interests in the Caribbean. By October 1960 a military court in Cuba had also begun to order the executions of those who had allegedly revolted against Castro's rule. The New York Times reported that the eight rebels convicted included US citizen Anthony Zarba, who had become 'the first American executed in Cuba since the Republic's establishment in 1902'.52_{These sweeping economic} reforms and purges of government officials were reminiscent of Stalinist Russia in the 1930s, further arousing fears that Cuba had succumbed to communism. These fears seemed to be confirmed in October 1960, when US Secretary of State Christian Herter sent a memorandum to Eisenhower following Castro's address to the UN General Assembly in September of that year. It was Herter's belief that this speech removed 'any doubt that Cuba has.... definitively aligned itself with Russia', something considered unacceptable at both ends of the US political spectrum.53_{As diplomatic relations with Cuba changed, so did Kennedy's rhetoric.}

In late 1960, Kennedy became much more vocal on Cuba and appeared to offer the tougher policy on Castro of the two candidates. Kennedy sensed that the provocative acts of the Castro regime and the increasing suspicion of the Communist infiltration of the Cuban Revolution would see public opinion favour a stronger rhetoric. By October 1960, his speeches had become rife with a discourse of anti-Castroism. During a speech the night before a televised live debate with Nixon, Kennedy described the Cuban revolutionaries as 'bands of bearded rebels' who had 'betrayed the ideals of the revolution and the hopes of the Cuban people'.54_{When criticised for his remarks by Nixon the following evening, Kennedy} reaffirmed his belief that 'today Cuba is lost to freedom'.55_{In a largely unexpected move, it}

51 Michel Gutelman, 'The Socialization of the Means of Production in Cuba', in Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Ed.),

Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movement in Latin America (New York: Anchor Books, 1970), 347-68

52 Anon., 'American Among 13 Executed by Cubans', The New York Times (Oct. 14, 1960)

53 Christian Herter, 'Memorandum for the President', (Oct. 16, 1960), US Department of State: President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Office Files, 1953-1961, Part 2: International Series, Reel 22: 0875-0876 (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1990), The Roosevelt Studies Centre, Middelburg, The Netherlands 54 Kennedy, 'Speech at Cincinnati, Ohio' (Oct. 6, 1960), The John F. Kennedy 1960 Campaign, Part 1: Polls, Issues and Strategy, Reel 3: 0329 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1986), The Roosevelt Studies Centre, Middelburg, The Netherlands

55 Kennedy, 'Open Presidential Debate between Vice-President Richard M. Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy' (Oct. 7, 1960), The John F. Kennedy 1960 Campaign, Part 2: Speeches, Press Conferences and Debates, Reel 12: 0654

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was the Democratic candidate, not the Republican, who offered the more damning condemnation of a left-wing revolution. A week later, during a speech in Johnstown, he became even bolder in his comments on Cuba. He argued that the Caribbean island had 'moved from a position of good neighbour to a position of bitter enemy' and advocated that US foreign policy should aim to 'make the American Revolution the chief import of Latin America'. This was a far cry from his statements in March supporting a policy of watchful waiting and a move away from the imposition of will by force. Instead, Kennedy seemed to advocate the promotion of US political ideology in the Caribbean in order to oppose Castro. By October 21, Kennedy's aggressive rhetoric reached its zenith as he openly called for the US support of Cuban anti-Castroites. At a campaign speech in New York, the Senator urged that the US 'must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista democratic anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro'.56_{As the election date of} November 8 neared, Kennedy had completely distanced himself from his previous oratory of non-intervention. It was a move which was concurrent with the decline of US-Cuban

relations but, more than this, it evidenced Kennedy's pragmatism as he used Cuba to the benefit of his campaign.

One such benefit was that Kennedy's shift in rhetoric allowed him to gain an

advantage over the Republicans. Kennedy saw Cuba as a way to discredit his opponent and the Republican Party at large. Given that Nixon had served as Vice-President under

Eisenhower, Kennedy could use tensions in US-Cuban relations to attack his opponent's role in the deterioration of relations as part of the Eisenhower White House. Indeed, when

questioned whether Nixon should be held accountable for Eisenhower era policy, Kennedy replied that he 'understood this was the Eisenhower-Nixon administration, according to all the Republican propaganda I have read'.57_{In this statement Kennedy turned Nixon's experience} as Vice-President from a political advantage to a disadvantage. On the issue of Cuba, he would apply a similar tactic. During an October 1960 speech in Cincinnati, Kennedy argued that the rise of a Communist state 'under our very noses' was 'the most glaring failure of American foreign policy today'.58_{His rhetoric suggested that the Executive Branch had been} negligent in allowing such an occurrence and highlighted the Republican's ineptitude in dealing with Castro. He continued to state that under Eisenhower, the US had been 'more

56 Kennedy, 'Speech at New York' (Oct. 21, 1960), The John F. Kennedy 1960 Campaign, Part 1: Polls, Issues and Strategy, Reel 3: 0342

57 Kennedy, 'Open Presidential Debate between Vice-President Richard M. Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy', Reel 12: 0686

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interested in protecting our investments than in protecting [Cubans'] liberty' and 'it was our own policies, not Castro's, that first began to turn our former good neighbours against us'.59 This was a bold claim, which essentially absolved Castro from any blame for the

deterioration of US-Cuban relations and placed all responsibility on Eisenhower. Of course, in reality Castro had played his part but for Kennedy this provided the perfect platform to highlight his opponent's weaknesses. Kennedy also used this speech to criticise Nixon's actions as Vice-President. Indeed, Nixon had met with Castro in April 1959 and concluded that Castro was 'either incredibly naive about communism or under Communist discipline'.60 Such comments arguably contributed to the deterioration of relations between the two nations and Kennedy was eager to point out similar errors. In particular he targeted Nixon's visit to Cuba in 1955, arguing that the Vice-President 'saw the conditions, talked with the leaders' but his only conclusion was that 'he was very much impressed with the competence and stability of the Batista Dictatorship'.61_{Kennedy effectively argued that, had Nixon been more attentive} to the discontent in Cuba at this time, the US may have ceased its support for Batista and prevented the Cuban Revolution.

Aside from criticising Nixon's history of relations with Cuba, Kennedy also attacked Nixon's relative silence on the Cuban issue in order to undermine the Vice-President's foreign policy proposals. One of Nixon's perceived strengths in 1960 was in the arena of Cold War foreign policy, yet on the issue of opposing Castro he was forced to remain silent.

Preparations for a covert invasion had been set in motion following Eisenhower's approval of CIA plans in March 1960 and the Republicans were wary of arousing any suspicion.

Seymour Hersh has argued that this provided Kennedy with a 'secret weapon' as the Senator could 'publicly swing away at Cuba knowing that there would be no response in kind'.62 Indeed, to discredit Nixon here would provide a significant advantage for Kennedy. As such the Kennedy campaign used the weakened state of US-Cuban relations to suggest that Nixon was not the Cold War warrior he seemed to be. The New York Times reported Kennedy's claim in September 1960 that Nixon had 'demonstrated no ability to stand up to Mr. Castro'. In the context of the Cold War, Kennedy argued that this weakened the US' position in the eyes of the USSR as 'nothing could encourage Mr. Khrushchev more than to see a

59 Ibid., Reel 3: 0334

60 Richard M. Nixon, 'Comments Following Meeting With Fidel Castro' (Apr. 17, 1959) in Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: The White House Years, A Personal Account 1956-61 (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), 523

61 Kennedy, 'Speech Cincinnati, Ohio', Reel 3: 0332

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Communist satellite ninety miles off the coast of the United States'.63_{In a similar speech in} Pennsylvania a month later, Kennedy accused Nixon of remaining silent despite the fact that in Cuba the Soviets had 'rolled the iron curtain to 90 miles from our shore'.64_Whether Kennedy was aware of the covert plans at this point is debatable but his exploitation of Nixon's silence made the Vice-President appear weak nonetheless.65_{When Nixon had spoken} out on Cuba, it was in far more conciliatory terms than Kennedy would come to adopt. In a question and answer session in April 1960, Nixon argued that the US 'should not do anything that smacks of imperialism, or using the economic power of the United States for coercion' as it was unnecessary to 'hurt the whole Cuban people because of Castro'.66_{While this was not} dissimilar to Kennedy's own opinion at this point, Nixon remained defiant about the

Republicans' position on Cuba during the televised debates in October. The Vice-President disagreed with the notion that Cuba was lost and instead contended that 'as I look at Cuba today, I believe that we are following the right course'.67_{This course had arguably pushed the} Castro regime closer to the Soviets, exacerbating the prospects for communism to expand in Latin America. The result was that, as fear of a Communist state so close to the US grew, Kennedy appeared to be the better equipped candidate to deal with Castro.

Kennedy's shifting position on Cuba also proved to be pragmatic in that he used it to campaign on the notion of restoring American prestige. In his analysis of the 1960 election in Florida, Babish has highlighted the importance of national prestige as both Kennedy and Nixon promoted the restoration of America's international reputation during speeches in the South-East.68_{For Kennedy, this notion was important and was evident throughout his} campaign. Indeed, while preparing for a November 1960 speech in Oklahoma, Kennedy wrote in his notes that his campaign was 'based on the call for a stronger America'.69_Cuba provided an arena in which Kennedy could perceivably deliver on this claim and he

63 Anon., 'Kennedy Attacks GOP over Cuba', The New York Times (Sep. 22, 1960).

64 Kennedy, 'Speech at Johnstown, Pennsylvania' (Oct. 15, 1960), The John F. Kennedy 1960 Campaign, Part 2: Speeches, Press Conferences and Debates, Reel 9: 0922

65 Official records do not show any meetings between CIA Officer Richard Bissell (leader of the Cuban operation) and Kennedy prior to Kennedy's election. Alternatively, Seymour Hersh has argued that Kennedy met with CIA Director Allen Dulles in July 1960 regarding Cold War trouble spots and has suggested that Cuba may have been discussed. There is, however, no evidence to support this claim. See Hersh, 169-170

66 Nixon, 'Comments on Cuba During Question and Answer Session' (Apr. 11, 1960), The John F. Kennedy 1960 Campaign, Part 1: Polls, Issues and Strategy, Reel 3: 0338

67 Nixon, 'Open Presidential Debate between Vice-President Richard M. Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy' (Oct. 7, 1960), The John F. Kennedy 1960 Campaign, Part 2: Speeches, Press Conferences and Debates, Reel 12: 0651-0652

68 Babish, 78-83

69 Kennedy, 'Notes for Oklahoma Speech' (Nov., 1960), The John F. Kennedy 1960 Campaign, Part 1: Polls, Issues and Strategy, Reel 5: 0777

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subsequently made it a prominent issue in his campaign speeches. In his speech notes Kennedy argued that 'the US is having trouble holding its prestige in Latin America', where Washington was viewed as 'suffering a defeat in the Cuban dispute'.70_{By proposing to take a} tougher stance on Cuba than the Republicans, Kennedy offered the opportunity to restore both American hegemony and international respect in the western hemisphere. Of course, the latter of these two factors could only be achieved if America acted in a way that would be supported by the other nations of the Americas. On this point, the notion of prestige also helps to explain why Kennedy's shift from a rhetoric of non-intervention to that of intervention proved pragmatic. For example, when Kennedy advocated supporting the Eisenhower administration's policy of patience in March 1960, this was because he did not wish the US to 'arouse the resentment and suspicion of all Latin America'.71_{Indeed, both} Cuba and the US were members of the Organisation of American States (OAS), which mandated that 'an act of aggression against one American State is an act of aggression against all the other American States'.72_{Thus, while it may have appeared surprising for Kennedy to} openly support the policy of a Republican administration while running for the Democratic nomination, it is understandable given that this was a policy which did not threaten US prestige in the eyes of other American nations. Castro's later implementation of agrarian reform was arguably an act of economic aggression against the US, making it viable for Kennedy to become stricter on Cuba without alienating members of the OAS. This is not to say that the OAS supported intervention in Cuba but it was the beginning of a series of events which would see Cuba excluded from the organisation by January 1962. Thus, while

Kennedy did shift his position on Cuba during his 1960 campaign, it was beneficial to do so given that it was in the interests of US prestige.

It was not just Kennedy who saw the benefits of adapting foreign policy towards Cuba, as his campaign included a team of advisors who also saw an opportunity for the Senator to gain a tactical advantage over Nixon by taking a harder line on Cuba. It is

therefore essential to analyse their role in moving Kennedy towards the sort of rhetoric which would result in the invasion at the Bay of Pigs. One such advisor was William Brubeck, a member of the Democratic Party's research department who detailed ways in which Kennedy could manipulate Nixon's policy on Cuba. When the commerce department imposed export

70 Kennedy, 'Speech Materials: Latin America' (Undated, 1960), The John F. Kennedy 1960 Campaign, Part 1: Polls, Issues and Strategy, Reel 5: 0799

71 Kennedy, 'Speech at the University of Wisconsin', Reel 7: 0816

72 Bogota Conference of American States, 'Charter of the Organisation of American States', (Mar. 30 - May. 2, 1948), Chapter 3, Article 5

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controls on Cuba on October 19, 1960, for instance, Brubeck advised the Kennedy campaign team to argue that the Republicans had in fact aided Castro. It was his belief that 'what Nixon has done is to give Castro a beautiful way of blaming the United States for an action that serves his purpose: cutting down on United States imports'.73_{The trade embargo imposed by} the Republicans could have been perceived as a strength in opposing Castro's regime by threatening the Cuban economy. Yet the spin Brubeck put on the embargo turned it into a weakness. As well as advising Kennedy on how to discredit Nixon, his advisors also played a significant role in constructing Kennedy's rhetoric on Cuba. Special Assistant to the President Arthur Schlesinger has suggested in his memoirs that, despite Kennedy's more aggressive approach during speeches, he remained privately sceptical of a stronger foreign policy towards Cuba. Schlesinger argued that when Kennedy delivered a speech advocating the support of anti-Castro forces and the overthrow of Castro, he had privately stated the night before the 'reasonable view' that 'any measures against the Castro regime must… be taken in concert with the other American republics'.74_{Yet the speech he gave the following day had in} fact been written by Kennedy's speechwriter Richard Goodwin and approved by Kennedy's advisors Ted Sorenson and Pierre Salinger. Schlesinger's account suggests that in private Kennedy was still in favour of a policy of observation and it was his advisors who favoured a stronger policy. Therefore Kennedy's rhetoric on Cuba did not necessarily represent his true feelings towards Castro, but this mattered less than the advantages a stronger rhetoric could provide in the election. While Schlesinger conceded that 'in all probability Kennedy would have approved the text' it is clear that for many influential figures in the Senator's campaign, Cuba provided Kennedy with a tactical advantage which could be exploited to help secure the election.75_{The aggressive policy towards Castro which would result in the execution of} Operation Pluto was therefore an election tactic constructed in part by Kennedy's advisors.

As an election tactic, the Senator's position on Cuba was successful. He frequently appeared the more forceful of the two candidates during his speeches and his eventual victory in November evidenced this. Yet in highlighting Cuba as a key issue for the US in 1960, Kennedy created a sense of urgency surrounding the overthrow of Castro which would eventually result in the execution of Operation Pluto. During his speeches in late 1960 Kennedy's rhetoric on Cuba positioned Castro as a pressing Cold War threat, suggesting that

73 William H. Brubeck, 'Research Department Information on US Trade Embargo on Cuba', (Oct., 1960), The John F. Kennedy 1960 Campaign, Part 1: Polls, Issues and Strategy, Reel 3: 0336

74 Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1960), 72

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the Cuban dictator must be dealt with swiftly. Indeed, during his Ohio speech on October 6, the Senator argued that the US had reached a 'critical situation to find so dangerous an enemy on our doorstep'.76_{Similar rhetoric was used in a memorandum sent to Kennedy from}

Brubeck advising Kennedy on his forthcoming speeches. Brubeck proposed that the US 'certainly must stand firm when the Soviet threat is only 90 miles off our shores'.77_By categorising Cuba as a critical Soviet threat, the Kennedy campaign team had turned the Cuban issue into an imminent one which need immediate attention. The use of such rhetoric would have significant repercussions, as Kennedy had to deliver on his promises following his election. Given that the only viable plan in place when Kennedy took up the Oval Office was Operation Pluto, the new President likely saw it as the most expedient way to deliver on his promises, despite the fact that the plans were by no means infallible. The result was that Kennedy decided to go ahead with the ill-considered invasion at the Bay of Pigs within his first three months in the White House. As such, the decision to support an invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs was the result of Kennedy's desire to win the 1960 election via use of urgent and antagonistic rhetoric.

The pragmatism of Kennedy's shifting position on Cuba would become evident following the closing of polling stations on November 8, 1960. Kennedy's victory was slight with only 0.2% of the popular vote separating him from Nixon; the closest result in over half a century.78_{While a multiplicity of factors contributed to this victory, his stance on Castro} and Cuba no doubt helped to win undecided voters away from Nixon. Throughout his campaign Kennedy had approached Cuba in the way which was most likely to win him the election. In early 1960 this meant a policy of cautious observation and non-intervention so as not to jeopardise US prestige in the eyes of other Latin American states. Later, following the breakdown of relations between Castro and the Eisenhower administration, Kennedy could attack the Republicans for the loss of Cuba while pledging to restore American prestige by opposing Castro and his Communist regime. Under the advice of those running his campaign, Kennedy steadily moved towards a position in which he advocated US support of Cuban exile forces who would overthrow Castro. His stance on Cuba was clearly motivated more by a desire to be successful in the election rather than approach Castro in a way which was beneficial to US foreign relations. Yet the success of this rhetoric proved problematic

76 Kennedy, 'Speech at Cincinnati, Ohio' (Oct. 6, 1960), Reel 3: 0330

77 William H. Brubeck, 'Memorandum to Kennedy: Intervention in Cuba' (Oct.31, 1960), The John F. Kennedy 1960 Campaign, Part 1: Polls, Issues and Strategy, Reel 3: 0345

78 The American Presidency Project, 'Election of 1960', The American Presidency Project,

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following his election. Kennedy's categorisation of Castro as an urgent threat ensured that the new President had to act quickly following his election or he risked appearing weak. He subsequently authorised plans for the Bay of Pigs relatively hastily rather than wait until a more complete plan was presented to him. Ultimately, the Cuban issue proved to be a double-edged sword as it saw Kennedy delivered to the White House but become embroiled in the most embarrassing debacle of his presidency.

Chapter 3 – American Attitudes to Castro: The Press

Kennedy's election success was undoubtedly aided by the fact that he proposed a tougher foreign policy towards Castro's Cuba than Nixon. Yet this success is indicative of