The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: An Expression of Economic Expansion or Value Driven Commitment?

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The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union:

An Expression of Economic Expansion or Value Driven Commitment?

MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities

University of Amsterdam

Author: Daniel van Heijningen Student number: 0545074 Main Supervisor: P.W. Zuidhof

Second Supervisor: Dr A. van Heerikhuizen.

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Introduction

The recent crisis in Ukraine has once again highlighted the tension between norms and interests in the EU’s external policy. On the one hand, the EU expressed its support to the pro-Western protesters as support for democratization, peace,

freedom of speech and human rights (Balmforth & Grove). Similarly, the EU framed the sanctions against Russia as punishments for the violations of these values. On the other hand, the main causes of the crisis in Ukraine were the economic and

geopolitical conflict between the West (US and EU) and Russia. This contradiction inherent in the EU’s policy regarding the crisis in Ukraine goes to show the

importance of understanding the relationship between norms and interests in the EU’s external policy.

To understand the relation between norms and interests we need to consider the role that the EU plays in international politics. Academics have been arguing for over four decades over what kind of power the European Union is. This debate mainly focuses on three aspects: what kind of power the EU is, what the EU says, and what the EU does. When Ian Manners introduced the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE) in 2002, the debate once again returned to the foreground of international relations (IR). With NPE, Manners wanted to describe a power that was different from the two traditional forms of power: military power and civil power (non-military mostly economic). The idea of normative power differs significantly from the concept of civil power as it goes beyond the economic means and objectives of civil power. According to Manners, the EU’s does not act solely out of

self-interests, but is more profoundly influenced by its attachment to international norms, even when these norms go against its own interests. He argues that not only the EU’s objectives are normative, but also the means it uses in international

relations are predominantly normative, as the EU exerts influence not through economic means but through the force of ideas (Diez and Manners, 2007).

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Many academics have participated in the debate regarding the way the European Union behaves in international politics. The way in which scholars from different academic schools approach the idea of normative power varies greatly. However, in general, most academics either consider the EU a normative power or dismiss the notion of normative power as mere rhetoric in a world dominated by economic interests (Manners, 2002; O’ Brennan’s, 2006; Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2005). In practice, what divides most authors and causes different conceptions of the power of the EU is the conflict between norms and economic interests. Accordingly, this tension also influences the value and impact that the different authors ascribe to normative power.

Recently Diez proposed a completely different approach to normative power (2013). He suggests replacing the concept of normative power with that of neo-Gramscian hegemony. In neo-neo-Gramscian theory, hegemony is based not on the oppression by states, but on the ability of certain social forces to create consensus regarding their dominance. Studying normative power in this context could offer a solution to the tension between norms and interests. Diez argues that norms and economic interests should be seen as ‘a whole’ and that between them an interaction takes place, as economic interests influence norms and vice versa. He chooses to describe the EU as an actor that “has normative power (as opposed to acts as a normative power)” (Diez, 2013, p. 198). He states that by approaching normative power in this way it is possible to analyze which social forces compete in the struggle for hegemony. Diez’s suggestion of considering normative power in the light of hegemony, shifts the focus from studying the EU as a normative power to how certain social forces within the EU use normative power. Accordingly, Diez (2005) argues that normative power is not an objective category of power but a form of discursive representation.

Discovering whether the EU bases its external policy on norms, economic interests or a combination of both has significant implications. Not only does it

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change our understanding of the way the EU operates, it also changes the way we perceive the EU and ‘EUropean’ identity. For example, representing the EU as either normative or rationalist, completely changes our understanding of the EU’s

objectives in its external policy, the motivations behind that policy, and the identity of the EU as an international actor. Where a constructivist representation might risk depicting the EU as a morally superior promotor of values, a rationalist

representation might think of the EU as the executor of member state economic interests. Moreover, if we take Diez’s observation that normative power is an integral part of the struggle for hegemony, normative power obtains a specific political function. If we consider that using normative rhetoric can serve the purposes of certain interest groups within the EU in obtaining their objectives, it becomes all the more important to understand the function normative power plays. For these reasons, an investigation of the EU’s normative dimension can lead to a better understanding of the EU’s role in international politics and a clearer idea of how we should perceive the EU as a policy actor.

While most studies focus on whether or not the EU is a normative power or not, this thesis will investigate normative power itself. This thesis aims to discover what role the normative dimension plays in EU’s external policy. To do so, it will focus on the relation between norms and economic interests in the EU’s external policy and the way different academic schools explain this interaction. In specific, this thesis will look at what the role and impact were of normative dimension in the EU Enlargement of 2004.

In practice, it has proved difficult to analyze the EU’s normative power in IR. This is mainly due to two factors. First, several studies that criticize the concept of normative power have demonstrated that the conflict between norms and economic interests leads to inconsistent behavior by the EU (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2005; Khasson, Vasilyan & Vos, 2008). Second, it is often difficult to distinguish the EU’s influence and the effects of that influence from the influence of other international

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actors and the influence of its own member states. This is why, in order to answer the question what role the normative dimension plays in EU external policy, a case study will be made of the 2004 EU enlargement.

The 2004 enlargement was the largest single expansion of the EU; on the 1st of May eight Eastern European countries, as well as two Mediterranean islands

simultaneously joined the EU. The process leading to the 2004 EU enlargement lasted fourteen years, from 1989 just after the fall of the Iron curtain until 2004. Besides this impressive scope and long-lasting period, enlargement is a significant context in which to study normative power, because it is not affected by the two main difficulties of studying normative power described above. First, enlargement is one of the few contexts in which the influence of the EU is directly perceptible as it is an arena in which the EU has an almost exclusive say. The policy of the 2004

enlargement was almost completely in the hands the European Commission, and the member states had only limited influence. In addition, the role of other international actors in these countries was limited, especially towards the end of this prolonged process the EU was the single most predominant influence in these countries. Haukkala describes enlargement as the EU’s ‘main instrument of its normative power’. He argues that the EU as a normative power uses enlargement to channel its norms and values in a genuine and effective manner. Moreover, he states that it was only in this unique field of external policy, with its combination of rewards and punishments, that the EU was able to exercise the strongest form of normative influence on other political actors (Haukkala, 2008, p. 1604). In short, the EU has a more discernable and stronger influence in the process of enlargement compared to other areas of external policy, which makes this a very useful context to study normative power. A second element that makes enlargement a significant context to study normative power in is that it is often described as a context that is not directly associated with economic interests. Considering the fact that the enlargement

process is a formative process for future members, the normative dimension could

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be argued to be all the more important, for the ability to shape conceptions of the normal is a vital instrument if the other will soon become part of the self.

In order to analyze the role of the normative dimension in the EU’s external policy, this study will proceed in three different steps. The first chapter will analyze normative power and three alternative conceptions of the power of the EU: Manner’s Normative Power Europe, Damro’s Market Power Europe, Rosamond and Parker’s bipolar system of economic and legal liberalism, and Diez’s normative power as hegemony. These four conceptions are of importance to the analysis because they all consider the tension between norms and economic interests and their influence on policy outcomes in a different way. This analysis will look at the way they conceive the power of the EU, as well the role these conceptions ascribe to normative power. The second chapter will apply these four conceptions to the 2004 EU enlargement. They will be considered as part of four larger academic schools (Constructivism, Rationalism, Sociological Institutionalism and Materialism), which share their considerations concerning normative power. The function of this chapter is to provide an overview of how these four schools regard the process of enlargement.

The final chapter will test the viability of these four theories of the power of the EU and the role they ascribe to normative power by confronting them with the public discourse of different EU political actors on the one side, and the actual treaties of enlargement on the other. Comparing what EU political actors say with what the EU actually does provides a clearer idea of the real influence of normative power and the relation between norms and economic interests. By comparing these results to the Constructivist, Rationalist, Sociological Institutionalist and Materialist interpretations we can identify which theoretical framework best explains the function of normative power in the EU’s external policy.

The treaties this study will analyze are Poland’s 1999 Accession Partnership (AP) and Poland’s 2000 Regular Report (RR). The introduction of the Accession

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Partnerships in 1998 marked a turning point in the process of EU enlargement (Grabbe, 1999). They served the purpose of bringing all conditions for membership and financial aid together into one framework and thereby increasing conditionality. In the APs, short and medium-term priorities were set for the applicant states, while the Regular Reports measured the progress made by the applicant state in question. Because the APs and the RRs increased conditionality and expanded the scope of enlargement, they are crucial for understanding the objectives of the EU in Central and Eastern European (CEE). This study will focus on the treaties with Poland because Poland was the biggest and most important CEE economy to join the EU in 2004 and therefore there was more at stake. This study will not consider the actual implementation of policy in Poland, first of all because there is an obvious language barrier. Second, and more importantly this study wishes to investigate the function of normative power as a form of discursive representation and therefore

implementation is simply not part of the analyzed field. If, as expected, this study encounters inconsistencies between the EU’s normative discourse and the treaties of enlargement, then analyzing the role normative power played in the 2004 EU

enlargement process will be all the more significant.

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1. Normative Power Europe and Alternative Ways of Conceiving

European Power

This chapter will analyze Normative Power Europe (NPE) and a number of its theoretical critiques. To begin with, it will consider Manners’ NPE theory and some general criticism inherent to the theory itself. It will then discuss three alternative ways of conceiving EU power: Damro’s Market Power Europe, Rosamond and Parker’s bipolar system of economic and legal liberalism, and Diez’s normative power as hegemony. These theories all address the tension between norms and economic interests, as well as their influence on policy outcomes differently. In order to answer the question what the role and impact are of the normative dimension in the EU’s external policy, it is fundamental to have a clear sense of the various critiques of normative power. The aim of this review in this chapter is to provide a framework for determining how and in what sense external policy is normative or not, which the following chapters will then investigate.

Normative Power Europe

Since Ian Manners introduced the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE) in 2002, it has been one of the most debated topics in international relations (Manners, 2002). With the concept of normative power Europe, Manners wanted to distinguish a new form of power Europe exerts on the international stage from the more

traditional civilian and military power. According to Manners, normative power is different from these two categories of power for three reasons. First, in both theories the Westphalian nation-state takes a central position and civil society is ignored. Second, related to the fact that these theories work within a framework of the Westphalian nation-state, they focus exclusively on European interests. Third, both civilian and military power are based on the capabilities for the physical exertion of power, be it military or economic. Normative power on the other hand is based on a post-Westphalian society, and challenges the idea that the EU should be studied as a

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state. The concept of normative power Europe also stresses the cosmopolitan nature of the principles at its basis.

With the concept of normative power, Manners tries to steer the discussion away from direct forms of physical power towards a model that includes less coercive and more indirect means of power. In fact, normative power does not depend on physical forms of power but consists of Europe’s “ability to shape conceptions of the ‘normal’ in international relations” (Manners, 2002, p. 239). Manners argues that the international role of the European Union is not primarily shaped by “what it does or what it says, but what it is” (Manners, 2002, p. 252). Manners considers the European Union to be normatively different from the rest of the world, this difference is the outcome of three inherent characteristics of the EU. First, its historical context: the project European Union was started in period in which the horrific consequences of nationalism were freshly in mind as a result of this different countries collaborated by putting together their resources in order maintain and reinforce peace and liberty. Second, its hybrid polity: the EU’s form of government, which contains national and supranational elements, goes beyond the Westphalian norms. Manners argues that this form of governance emphasizes certain norms that are common to its member states. Finally, its political-legal constitution: Manners describes the formative process of the EU as an “elite-driven, treaty based, legal order” in which the protection of fundamental rights played an important role (Manners, 2002, p. 241).

Manners considers the normative basis of the EU to have been formed in the past six decades through publications, policies, criteria and conditions, by the union and its predecessors. He identifies five core norms (peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and human rights) and four minor norms (social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance) within the acquis communautaire. Manners suggests that the EU is not only build on a normative foundation, but that its normative basis also inclines the EU to act according to these norms in world politics.

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Manners’ analysis of the EU is based on two different types of sources, for his formulation of the normative basis of the EU manners focusses on the representation of the EU in its communications, to analyze how the EU acts as a normative power, on the other hand, he selectively analyses the policies of the EU. To demonstrate the EU’s normative power Manners looks at the Union’s campaign for the abolition of the death penalty. The case of the death penalty is a good choice as it as a field in which the EU has indeed acted as a normative power in the way Manners intends it. It is especially a good choice as the struggle for the abolition of the death penalty is not intertwined with strategic or economic interests and therefore is not plagued by inconsistencies. This is not however true for all aspects of normative power and leads to the question if the way we interpret normative power should be different depending on the context.

After the publication of Manners article in 2002 there was a lot of criticism on the theory of normative power Europe. Most of these critiques focused on the

inconsistencies in the behavior of the European Union when promoting their norms outside the Union or the difference in rhetoric and actual policy. Although Manners argues that NPE focusses more on what the EU is than what it does or says, the question arises if it is possible to define what something is without considering how it relates itself to others. However, before discussing these inconsistencies it is necessary to consider normative power on itself. Diez (2005) was one of the first major critiques that did not focus on the inconsistencies of normative power, but instead analyzed the consequences of portraying the EU as a normative power. Diez starts by specifying the concept of normative power, which he considers to have three distinct aspects. First, a normative power is an actor. Second, normative power also describes the balance of power within a relationship as one has the power to shape the ideas of another. Finally, normative power is also a means, for it are the norms themselves that achieve the goals instead of other means such as military or economic intervention.

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In his article Diez moves away from the discussion on the consistency of the external policy by stating that the difference between norms and interests is one that depends on the political point of view, he therefore does not see normative power as an objective category of power. He approaches normative power as a practice of discursive representation applying it to the poststructuralist concept of self/other constructions. He argues that the NPE discourse simultaneously creates the identity of the EU and the identity of the EU’s others in such a manner that it permits the EU to ignore its proper flaws and impose its norms on others. Diez identifies four

different practices of construction of the self and the other (othering): representation of the other as an existential threat (securitization), as inferior, as violating universal principles, or as different. According to Diez, the EU mostly operates along the line of the third strategy as it presents the EU as united in their norms and as a savior of the despairing ignorant and is thus very satisfactory to the EU. Considering that Diez describes normative power as a form of discursive representation, it makes sense that in his analysis he focusses primarily on what image the EU creates of itself in declarations and reports when dealing with countries outside the EU. Diez also problematizes two other fundamental aspects of Manner’s normative power concept. First, Diez opposes the distinction between normative and civilian power, he argues that normative power is as a distinct form of civilian power, or the other way

around. Second, he refuses the idea that Europe is the only normative power. He gives the example of the USA in the first half of the 19th_{century to prove his point.}

Diez in his critique on normative power makes a few observations on the way that normative discourse creates identity that are of great use. He argues that

normative discourse is a process of othering defining the identity of the EU and its other. What he does not mention is that it is possible to use normative discourse as part of a legitimizing strategy that not only influences the third country that the EU is treating with, but also the EU itself.

The substantial influence Diez’s article has had on the NPE debate is made evident by the fact that Manners considered it necessary to write an article with the

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single aim of responding to Diez’s arguments: The European Union as a Normative Power: A response to Thomas Diez (Manners, 2006). In his article Manners tries to counter Diez’s arguments on the interaction between identity and normative discourse. To begin with, Manners argues that another category of othering should be added to the list of othering practices, namely that of “the self as other”, by this he means that the “abject-foreigner” is part of the conscious and unconscious self (Manners, 2006, p. 178). With this reference to theory from psychoanalysis, he explains that the EU recognizes the elements that are alien to its normative identity within the EU itself. Manners gives the example of the hostile reactions to victory in the elections of the extreme right in the EU. What he leaves out of his analysis and was central to the point Diez was making is that in dealing with countries outside the EU these internal inconsistencies remain unaccounted for. The EU in some cases thus berates countries for not abiding to the norms, while within the EU certain member states do the same.

Manners’ second argument, and maybe his strongest, is that there is not a single EU identity and therefore “the EU cannot be considered a ‘difference engine’ in the multiplication of a separate, single, essential, categorical, supranational EU self” (Manners, 2006, p. 178). He does not consider the EU a ‘self’ that is capable of strategy and sees the normative power more as the result of the heterogeneous many than as the result of a single ideology. He argues that this is why the normative basis of the EU has such a fragmented character. Manners here is actually claiming two different things, on the one hand he states that the EU does not have a single identity, on the other he argues that the EU is not capable of strategy and does not work as a machine that tries to create a single European identity. The first

observation is easy to agree with, as the EU consists of culturally very different member states. The second however is more open for discussion, for it can be argued that the EU uses its normative dimension for identity purposes, be it outside or inside the Union. Finally, Manners observes that self-othering processes are always at work and that they are not limited to the cases of normative power. Manners

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therefore argues that also without the normative discourse, discursive

representations of the EU would be present. It is true that processes of self-other construction are always at work, however, what is deceiving about the concept of normative power Europe is that it portrays the EU as the morally better actor, that at times goes against their own interests.

These points of critique pose valuable questions regarding normative power: what is normative power? What does normative power do? What makes an actor a normative actor? Are norms and interests objective categories? What this paragraph has shown is that there are various problematic aspects inherent to the theory of Normative Power Europe itself and that we should not accept Manners’

constructivist formulation without questioning its theoretical basis. All these questions will return at various points throughout this thesis. Now that these general problems have been discussed, this thesis will turn to the main point of interest, namely the tension between norms and interests.

Normative Power and Economic Interests

One recurrent critique on NPE is that it does not consider the EU’s economic

interests. There is in fact a tension between normative aims and economic interests. Three different theories that deal with this tension will be briefly discussed to analyze their merits and flaws in dealing with the concept on normative power Europe. In specific, the way these theories address the tension between norms and interests shall be the basis of the rest of the analysis conducted in the rest of this thesis. It is important to have a clear picture of what divides these different approaches to EU power, before we apply these theories to the case study of enlargement.

Market Power Europe

Damro (2012) in response to NPE paints a very different picture of the EU’s power. He argues that at its core the EU is an experiment at market integration and that its

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single market is its most prominent facet of its role on the international level. Damro therefore argues that it would be more fitting to describe the EU’s power as Market Power Europe (MPE). According to Damro, the size of its market is of great

importance to understand the power that the EU has in the world for at least two reasons. First, markets size influences the choices of governments concerning the adoption of regulatory standards, thus a bigger market means that there is a greater possibility that governments of another country will adapt to the regulatory

standards of that market. Second, market size has an influence on the way actors perceive possible outcomes, meaning that a bigger market is more likely to change expectations of the possibility of a certain outcome. Damro contends that the EU is primarily a regulatory state, which produces social and economic regulation. This regulation can either restricts or liberalize market activity and may have significant external effects. The EU’s market power depends upon its ability to make others adapt to their regulatory standards. Damro states that the EU as a regulatory institution is open to public influence, and within the EU different groups strife to have their interests fulfilled. He considers this interest contestation a part of the development of the internal regulatory policy, but also suggests that this affects the probability of externalization as certain groups, which he calls ‘pro-externalization coalitions’, might profit from this process. A last important distinction that Damro makes in comparison to Manners’ normative power, is that Europe’s market power is also exerted in a coercive manner, while normative power is not.

Although Damro’s article is mostly trying to formulate an alternative

theoretical model to normative power, he also presents some initial evidence for his claims. He bases his findings mostly on reports by the European Commission, which state that many countries are adopting European regulations and that the EU’s competition policy is widely used to combat negative aspects such as the formation of cartels.

Damro’s theory of market power Europe is useful for it sheds light on certain aspects of the EU’s internal functioning and the externalization of this functioning.

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Market power Europe could be considered a specific form of civilian power that externalizes certain economic norms. The fact that not only state actors but also public actors are part of the theory is also valuable. Although Damro considers the material aspects more important than the normative aspects, the fact that gives no place in his critique of normative power for the norms that Manners discusses is a missed opportunity. He therefore does not explain the function of the normative dimension of the EU within the single market, where different groups vie to have their interests satisfied.

Economic Liberalism and Normative Power

Rosamond and Parker (2013) have a different approach; they do not completely discard the idea of normative power but argue that it should be modified. As

Damro, they consider the regulation of the common market as one of, if not the, most important aspect of the EU inside or outside the Union. They argue, therefore, that it is strange that economic liberalism is not part of the normative power discourse. In their approach, they follow Foucault’s distinction between legal and economic liberalism. Two conflicting forms of liberalism with two associated distinct types of citizenship. On the one hand, freedom by the government with a subject of right, on the other hand, freedom from government and a subject of interest. Where the authors differ from Damro is that they do not oppose the material to the normative but try to incorporate them both into one framework. Rosamond and Parker

consider both these dimensions to be at work within the EU and they argue that it is difficult to differentiate between strategic and normative motivations. Considering that, Manners already demonstrated the presence of the legal liberal values in the EU (2002), the authors focus mostly on demonstrating the presence and the importance of the economic liberal aspect. Analyzing the exclusive competencies of the EU, they conclude that four out of five are coherent with the liberal economic rationale even if they are embedded in a broader liberal package that includes the (legal liberal) normative dimension Manners discusses. Although they acknowledge that legal

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liberal norms are evidently present, for example in the rhetoric of the treaties, they argue the EU primarily uses economic liberal instruments to achieve their goals.

The authors stress “that the entanglement of cosmopolitan universal values and a ‘neoliberal culture’ is always already present in the EU’s ambiguous

cosmopolitics” (Rosamond & Parker, 2013, p. 238). The authors directly link the rationale of economic liberalism to the surging of the post supranational in Europe. They consider economic liberalism in general and more specifically the creation of markets as central characteristics of the post-Westphalian society that Manners celebrates, for economic liberalism has been the guiding factor in the process of Europeanization and thus the surpassing of the nation-state and the formation of a post-Westphalian system. Therefore, the authors argue that the promotion of markets can be considered an important part of the EU’s normative agenda. A warning Rosamond and Parker give is that entanglement does not mean that

economic and legal liberalism are converging as they rest on opposing principles; it is better to this relation as an “eclipse, whereby one conceals and excludes the other” (Rosamond & Parker, 2013, p. 241). The authors focus is pointing out the large flaw in the normative power concept of not including liberal economic norms; they occupy themselves with elaborating the theoretical concept in order to give these norms a place. However, they do not apply their adapted model to a specific case.

With their analysis of normative power, Rosamond and Parker reveal a weak point in Manner’s theory, namely the absence of economic liberal norms in his theory and the subsequent explanation of the entanglement of these norms with legal liberal norms. Rosamond and Parker expand the idea of normative power in a way that makes it possible to analyze not only what the EU is, but also what it does. By linking economic liberalism to the upcoming of the post-Westphalian system, they have laid bare what Manners has sought to ignore. What the theory of

Rosamond and Parker does not explain is why these norms are used and by whom; there is no explanation of the actors at play or their motives. Because the theory links

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neoliberalism to normative power, it makes knowing who use these norms and the purpose of their use even more relevant.

Normative Power as Hegemony

In his recent article, Diez has proposed a different approach in order to resolve some of the most problematic issues concerning normative power; this includes an aspect that is of particular interest to this study: the tension between norms and interests (2013). He suggests that we should replace the concept of normative power with the concept of hegemony. According to Diez,

“many of the problems identified in the debate originate in the drawing of boundaries and oppositions that do not allow scholars to appreciate the complexities of the power relations involved in the EU’s external relations, and the concept of hegemony puts these boundaries and oppositions into question”(2013, p. 196).

Diez does not choose for a realist conception of hegemony based on ‘brute force’, such an interpretation would fit better with the more traditional forms of power (civilian and military). Instead, Diez opts for a neo-Gramscian understanding of hegemony that concentrates on the power of ideas and consensus, in which the explanation of normative power as the “ability to shape conceptions of the ‘normal’ in international relations” (Manners, 2002, p. 239), can play a central role. He argues that adopting the framework of neo-Gramscian hegemony it is possible to resolve four of the core problems within the normative power debate, three of which add valuable insight to the discussion at hand. The first problem is the question if the EU bases its external policy on interests or norms. As discussed above Diez in his

previous articles (2005) already problematized the difference between norms and interests stating that they are not objective categories. The neo-Gramscian

framework combines these two categories as elements in the struggle for hegemony and within the neo-Gramscian framework, the economic and cultural are both examined. Moreover, neo-Gramscian hegemony considers norms and economic

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interests as ‘a whole’; between them an interaction takes place for interests influence norms and vice versa. Second, the fact that the European Union is inconsistent in its normative power inside and outside the Union, applying the concept of hegemony these inconsistencies could be explained as the outcome of ‘competing worldviews’ and ‘normative visions’. Hegemony does not start with a fixed normative basis but concentrates on the struggle over these norms, and inconsistencies are part of this struggle. Diez chooses to describe the EU as an actor that “has normative power (as opposed to acts as a normative power)” (Diez, 2013, p. 198). The Third point of discussion is what part the state and non-state actors play in the EU’s external policy. Within the traditional normative power Europe approach it would be difficult to include actors other than the EU itself, while it is inherent the neo-Gramscian framework to analyze which social forces compete in the struggle for hegemony. Therefore, if we understand normative power as hegemony, it is possible to consider which actors have a role in the formation of norms and policies.

Diez’s article can best be seen as a proposition, for he suggests combining normative power and neo-Gramscian hegemony but does not elaborate on what this entails. However, by applying normative power to the concept of hegemony, Diez has combined the advantages of Rosamond and Parker approach that allows for a broader inspection of the norms of the EU and that of Damro, which permits a better analysis of the actors involved. Diez’s theory explains less than the other two

theories do, but it supplies a well-equipped theoretical framework to analyze the normative power of the EU. Diez demonstrates which problems could be overcome by the adaptation of neo-Gramscian hegemony, but he does not explain how to integrate normative power in the concept of hegemony. He argues that we should replace normative power with the concept of hegemony, and that if the EU possesses the capability to “shape conceptions of the normal” this could be central in a neo-Gramscian conception of hegemony (Diez, 2013, p. 195).

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The Neo-Gramscian Framework

Considering that Diez, in his article, leaves the neo-Gramscian framework rather unspecified, it will be briefly discussed. Cox laid the basis for the Neo-Gramscian framework in his article Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International relations Theory (1981). His article was mostly a reaction to theoretical approaches, such as the neorealist approach, that do not question how the situation they analyze came to be but take it for granted. Cox on the other hand wanted to develop a critical theory, by this he meant that it should question the origin of social power and

relations and analyze if and these relations change. The framework Cox proposes to analyze, what he calls them, ‘historical structures’, consists of three correlated forces: ideas, material capabilities, and institutions. First, material capabilities are the means of production and destruction, industries and arms, and the focus is on those that command these through possession of wealth. Second, ideas Cox identifies two categories of interest, intersubjective meanings and collective images. Cox argues that intersubjective meanings are ideas that are shared by a very broad part of the population within a historical structure, while collective images are more diverse and may be in opposition. Third, institutions, according to Cox institutions have a stabilizing function; they do this by promoting collective images that are coherent to the power relations. He argues that eventually, institutions evolve and become an arena for the struggle between rival dispositions, or they lead to the establishment of rival institutions. These three forces together do not dictate people’s actions but they do influence people’s decisions by exerting “pressures and constraints” (Cox, 1981, p. 135). The pressures and constraints can either be followed or resisted. If enough people resist a certain historical structure, a rival structure arises. Cox states that institutionalization is an important for the theory of hegemony for they permit resolving internal problems with a minimal use of force. Hegemony is based on making concessions to weaker social forces and a form of leadership that is framed as representing general or universal values. Institutions are important since they can be used for the express diverse interests and “the universalization of policy” (Cox,

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1981, p. 137). Differently from the realist conception of hegemony, Cox does not consider state power to be the only factor at play. He sees hegemony as the result of the interaction between power, ideas and institutions.

Conclusions

This chapter has looked at four different ways of conceiving European power. The central focus has been the relation between norms and interests. All four theories approach this aspect differently.

NPE considers norms to be the guiding light of EU policy. According to Manners, the EU influences others through its “ability to shape conceptions of the ‘normal’ in international relations”, the EU thus leads by example. Moreover, he argues that the EU is founded upon a unique normative basis, which makes it a normative actor.

MPE considers the EU to be an experiment at market integration, with the single market as its most prominent facet in IR. Damro contends that the EU is primarily a regulatory state, which produces social and economic regulation. The EU’s market power depends upon its ability to make others adapt to their regulatory standards, which the EU mainly achieves due to its market size. Contrary to NPE, MPE argues that the EU’s behavior is at times coercive. MPE has no role designated for norms and values, it is purely based on economic interests.

Rosamond and Parker’s bipolar system of economic and legal liberalism does not oppose the material to the normative but tries to incorporate both into one framework. They argue that it is difficult to differentiate between strategic and normative motivations. They have a more complex vision of the EU’s value system, which consists of both legal and economic liberalism. However, they stress that economic and legal liberalism are not converging as they rest on opposing principles, therefore in every case one of the two dominates over the other.

Diez has proposed a completely different approach to normative power (2013). He suggests replacing the concept of normative power with that of

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Gramscian hegemony. He argues that studying normative power in this context offers a solution to the tension between norms and interests; norms and economic interests should be seen as ‘a whole’, between them an interaction takes place, as economic interests influence norms and vice versa. He chooses to describe the EU as an actor that “has normative power (as opposed to acts as a normative power)” (Diez, 2013, p. 198). In his approach, the focus shifts from studying the EU as a normative power to how certain social forces within the EU use normative power.

Now that this chapter has created a clearer understanding of how these

different theories see the relation between norms and interest it is time to apply them to the case study. The next chapters will analyze enlargement, the four conceptions discussed here will serve as stepping stones in that chapter.

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2. Theorizing Eastern Enlargement of the EU: Four Different

Conceptions

The previous chapter discussed four different ways of conceiving EU power. In specific, it considered the way these theories regard the relation between norms and interests and the role they ascribe to normative power. This chapter will focus on operationalizing these four conceptions of the EU’s power discussed in chapter 1, so that this chapter can apply them in its analysis of enlargement. The question this chapter will answer is, how can these conceptions and their perspective of normativity be applied to the subject of Eastern enlargement?

Several studies have already applied NPE to the case of enlargement and it will thus serve as a point of reference. As for the three critiques of NPE, the question rises, what would perspectives of enlargement that take these critiques of NPE into account look like? The purpose of this chapter is thus to elaborate how alternative perspectives based on the critiques of NPE would approach enlargement. For this purpose, these alternative ways of viewing EU power will be integrated into larger academic schools that reflect the central points of their critiques in an analysis of the 2004 EU enlargement. The focus will lie on the way these four academic schools approach the power of the EU and the EU’s use of normative discourse in the process Eastern enlargement. The reason this chapter analyses these approaches to enlargement so that in the next chapter we will be able to analyze how these

academic schools relate to the evidence encountered in the public discourse and treaties of enlargement. This will help to determine which approach is most suitable to explain the enlargement process and thus assist in answering the question what role the normative dimension plays in EU’s external policy.

As stated above academics have already applied NPE to the case of

enlargement and these analysis clearly place it in the constructivist school. In the other three cases, the academic school that most reflected the critiques inherent in these alternative conceptualizations of EU power were chosen. In the case of

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Rosamond and Parker, Sociological institutionalism most accurately reflects their hybrid system of economic and legal liberal values. In the case of Damro’s Market Power Europe, finding an academic school of thought that matched his critiques was a bit more complicated, as his conceptual model is not part of an already existing current in academia. MPE seems to fit best within a rationalist approach as both focus on economic factors and hardly give importance to normative arguments. In the case of Diez, this study will focus on a materialist neo-Gramscian approach to enlargement, as this is the origin of Diez’s understanding of hegemony. In a second instance, this study will analyze how to integrate the normative dimension in the neo-Gramscian framework, if we wish to interpret normative power as hegemony.

A Normative Approach to Eastern Enlargement

Although normative approaches to enlargement vary greatly from one another, both theoretically and in complexity, they all share one conclusion, namely that norms played a central role in the decision to enlarge and in the process of enlargement itself. Their analysis of enlargement rests on Manner’s original concept of Normative Power Europe. This form of constructivism can also be described as normativity in a strict sense, meaning that the normativity these authors describe covers only legal liberal norms as opposed to normativity in a wider sense that includes economic liberal values as well. This paragraph will discuss two detailed normative accounts of enlargement. First O’ Brennan’s (2006) account is useful for this analysis because he not only describes the process of enlargement itself and the normative role of the different European institutions in the process but also considers the value of

explanations other than the normative for enlargement (geopolitical and economic). Second, Sjursen (2002) provides a deeper insight into what kind of normative

arguments the EU used by dividing these arguments into more specific categories. After both authors have been discussed a brief critique of the normative approach will follow.

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O’ Brennan’s (2006) strong claims about the policies the European Union pursued during the process of eastern enlargement, provide a clear example of the normative vision on enlargement. He claims that during the enlargement process the importance of political norms was continually stressed and that while the EU was to a certain degree forgiving when it came to economic shortcomings of the CEE

countries the same could not be argued for the failure to meet political demands. He states that “norms of transparency of democracy institutions and fundamental freedoms for all took precedence over those of market capitalism in every case” (p. 6). His arguments are very similar to Manners, he claims that the reason for the prevalence of the norms over market capitalism is that the norms represent what the EU is in the global political system. He defines the EU as “a transnationalistic

pluralistic security community, founded on the principles of peaceable interstate relations, and dedicated to institutionalizing both market relationships and political problem-solving among its member states” (p. 6). To support his argument he presents the case of Slovakia, the only candidate country in the 2004 enlargement that the EU initially excluded from the accession negotiations because of flaws in their political system although they met the economic standards the EU had set.

The Normative Role of the Institutions in the Enlargement Process

O’ Brennan extensively deals with the role of the three political institutions of the EU (the Council, the Commission and the Parliament) describing their roles in separate chapters. Regarding the Council, he argues that although there were various entities within the council involved in the process, “the presidency played perhaps the most crucial role within the council structures in facilitating agreement and maintaining momentum in the process” (p. 72). O’ Brennan stresses that although some

presidencies used pragmatic discourse to promote enlargement, which focused on economic and security issues, the most common way to frame enlargement was normative. He identifies three different returning patterns in this normative discourse: enlargement as a moral obligation after the fall of the iron curtain,

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enlargement as the logical outcome of European normative dimension and praxis, and finally as the most suitable tool for norm transfer towards the CEE (more on this in Sjursen’s analysis of normative argumentation below). There is also a critical note regarding the role of the council as the author argues that the council members as representatives of their countries did not always put the Union’s interests up front, which he argues led to fragmentation on the issue of enlargement.

In the process of eastern enlargement, the commission played a central role it was were the institution that provided aid, monitored progress and decided where improvements were necessary. O’ Brennan argues that through its economic aid the commission learnt a lot about the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), which made the council more able to decide which policies were necessarys.

Moreover, it provided the commission assessments additional authority in

deliberations with the other institutions. The Commission had the task of mediating between the member states and the candidate states, both parties were not fully enthusiastic about the commission’s role. The candidate states considered the Commission as somewhat of a bully who unreasonably pressed them to adopt the acquis in its entirety, while the members states watched the Commission with a certain degree of distrust as they felt that the Commission was too sensitive to candidate state preferences. However, O’ Brennan states that these uneasy relations were worth it, considering “the greater prize which enlargement facilitated” (p. 94). Moreover O’ Brennan argues that the Commission was frequently the only actor “to look beyond narrow partisanship and focus on the community-building logic which Eastern enlargement rested upon”(p. 94). Because of the specific and central role the Commission played in the 2004 enlargement, O’ Brennan states that although the Commission is “sometimes misidentified as the ‘Brussels Bureaucracy’” it should really be considered “as the unsung hero of the Eastern enlargement process” (p. 94).

According to O’ Brennan the European parliament was the most normative actor in the enlargement process. Formally, their role was very limited and came at the very end of the process when they had to accept each candidate state before they

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could become a member, therefore in practice the Parliament has no formal say in the content of enlargement and can only express a yes or no vote when the process is already completed. As O’ Brennan argues this veto option is in reality a formality as the Parliament is not able nor willing to use this “nuclear option”. However, O’ Brennan points out that the Parliament acquired an informal role during the enlargement process through which it was able to exert influence. The parliament had a clear idea in which direction the process should move. Through parliamentary activism, they persuaded candidate states to improve the implementation of certain normative aspects of the agreements between the EU and the CEECs. The parliament strived to put democratic norms at the front of enlargement. They stood up for those norms both in their interactions with the CEECs, by publicly denouncing deficiencies in their democratic functioning and other issues concerning civil society and human rights, as in their interactions with the other EU institutions that were more focused on preparing the CEECs for the EU’s internal market. It was the European

parliament, in 1992, that insisted on adding a democracy clause to the enlargement process thereby creating political conditionality. O’ Brennan therefore rightly argues that the EP should be considered as an important norm entrepreneur within the EU. The fact that O’ Brennan is full of praise for the different institutional actors that helped further the process of enlargement is logical considering that he thinks of enlargement as a normative objective, he seems to genuinely believe in the importance of the EU’s duty to reunite Europe and thus in the EU’s special responsibility towards the CEE.

The Normative Process of Enlargement

Although most normative accounts of enlargement acknowledge that other

geopolitical and economic motivations played a role in the creation of the policy of enlargement, they argue that the principal logic behind it was normative (O’

Brennan, 2006; Sjursen, 2002; Noutcheva, 2008). In other words, they argue that democracy and human rights had more influence on the policy outcomes of

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enlargement than considerations about power, new markets or strategic advantages. O’ Brennan argues that enlargement policy was framed in a normative environment in which certain norms and rules apply, and enlargement was brought to a

successful completion by sticking to those norms. In fact he argues the way the EU conceives itself and the central position of the EU’s core set of values is evident in the principles of governance that have been developed during the integration of the Union. He argues that the normative dimension of the EU cannot be simply cast aside as merely cognitive or rhetorical, but argues that eastern enlargement demonstrated what the EU institutions and the member states judged to be

appropriate behavior for themselves as representatives of the European collectivity towards the CEECs and demonstrated the moral obligations they felt towards the CEE. O’ Brennan argues that the enlargement caused the EU to re-deliberate its self-understanding and thereby helped reasserting what the EU represents and how enlargement should be considered.

The EU should be seen as a genuine pluralistic security community and eastern enlargement represented an extension of that community, and especially its value system. A core set of norms developed around the

European integration process and influenced the EU’s enlargement policy in a decisive way. (p. 176)

One of the most common arguments normative authors use to demonstrate the normativity of the process of eastern enlargement is questioning the reason why the EU decided to enlarge in the first place (O’ Brennan, 2006; Sjursen, 2002). They argue that if, as the rationalists argue, everything revolved around self-interest it is strange the member states allowed these new countries to join the EU, as it came at a significant prize and they could have stopped at the level of association agreements. Especially those countries that stood to lose the most in the process should have objected if self-interest was the only factor at play. Instead, normative authors are of the opinion that norms constitute the identity of the EU; these norms not only limit

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their behavior but also make up their worldviews and preferences. In Sjursen’s words “norms do not matter because it costs something not to comply with them, but because they are ends in themselves “(2002, p. 508). It is thus logical that

normative accounts frequently refer to the Copenhagen criteria as the EU introduced these political requirements specifically for eastern enlargement. In the case of

Eastern enlargement, the Copenhagen Criteria are the primary example of the supposed European core norms of democracy, human rights and minority rights as well as demonstrating the dedication of the EU to pursuing the transfer of these norms are.

O’ Brennan is of the conviction that eastern enlargement is publicly

misconceived and that the evidence up until 2006 showed a “smooth transition” for both the existing member states as well as the new member states. To support his conviction he relates that when the CEECs entered the EU in 2004 the trade between the two parts of the EU increased with more than ten percent because of the removal of the last trade barriers. Eastern enlargement was conceptualized differently from preceding rounds of enlargement. Where during earlier rounds of enlargement economic matters and market integration were the almost exclusive points of focus, this new round of enlargement framed more as the expansion of the EU’s democratic ideals and stressed the importance of human rights, freedom and well-functioning political systems for the entering member states. O’ Brennan argues that the

asymmetrical relation between the two parties and the strict conditionality on the part of the EU, was not the only reason the CEECs accepted the measures of enlargement, but that the resonance of the norms in CEE itself was also very

important. To support his argument he points to the fact the CEE elites hardly ever contested the EU’s measures, because the CEECs understood that the short-term costs for the economy and society would be repaid in the long run. The author is convinced that if the norms could not have been transferred if there had not been consent on the receiving side or if they would have collided with CEE norms and local habits.

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In all O’ Brennan only has one slightly critical note regarding the entire enlargement process, and that is that enlargement might have made the democratic deficit from which the EU “is alleged” to suffer slightly bigger and could “perhaps” have created new deficits. This is because the respective political elites of the EU and the CEECs handled the process without mentionable input from their societies. The commission was the main driver and the CEE public got a vote at the end of the process, while the EU citizens did not even get that.

The Normative Argumentation of Enlargement

Sjursen (2002) bases her theory on the arguments of two other scholars. She makes use Weber’s assumption that rulers need legitimacy to retain their authority, and Habermas’ theory of communicative action. This theory claims that rational behavior of an actor is not limited to seeking to maximize their self-interests but that an actor is also behaving in a rational way if they are able to justify and explain their actions to others. By combining these two points, she argues that the policy of enlargement was the result of a process of deliberation in which arguments and reasons for enlargement are brought forward that were considered to be able to convince others because of their legitimacy. Therefore analyzing which arguments were successful in gathering support for enlargement gives insight into what EU actors deemed

important in the process. These mobilizing arguments thus have to be considered legitimate and reasonable by the other actors. She briefly discusses the fact that there could be a gap between what actors say and what they actually meant or actually did. She states that for methodological reasons all actors are considered to have the scope of being concentrated on self-interest, but that she will leave the consideration of interests out of the analysis. She takes this decision because “it is impossible for us to reach into the ‘hearts and souls’ of policy-makers and thus to uncover their ‘real’ or ‘sincere’ beliefs and convictions” (p. 496). What matters for Sjursen is not that the arguments are universally valid or based on sincere principles, they just have to be convincing. The author very usefully divides the arguments used to justify

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enlargement into three categories: pragmatic, ethical-political and moral arguments, which she links to three attributes: utility, values and rights. Pragmatic arguments are based on interests and highlight economic and security gains, while ethical-political refer to a community’s collective identity and what is considered

appropriate in light of this conception of the self. Finally, moral arguments are those arguments that all parties considered just, heedless of their interests and collective identity. This is because rights stand for principles that all parties recognize. Out of this distinction between the three strategies of argumentation, she forms three hypotheses. First, if utility was the EU’s main focus, the EU would enlarge to those countries where it could gain the most economically or security wise. Second, if rights were the central issue the enlargement would focus on states that respect the universal principals the most. Finally, if values were the deciding factor they would focus on states towards which they feel a certain kinship.

As far as pragmatic justification is concerned Sjursen argues that although there are some positive aspects economically, increase in trade and access to primary resources and low cost labor, most studies demonstrate that enlargement costs will be greater than the gains for the short and medium term. Moreover, even though member state preferences for enlargement are in some cases linked to their possible gains in the process this is not so for other member states. In Sjursen’s analysis enlargement is also hard to explain if the focus is on security. She argues that

enlargement could well lead to a security vacuum further east, which would make a common foreign policy all the more important, but considering that enlargement meant the addition of ten countries to the EU it was more likely to complicate decisions on a common foreign policy than that it would simplify this process.

Considering that economic gain and security aspects cannot explain the choice for enlargement Sjursen concludes that normative factors must be in play, not in the least because these normative argumentative structures are omnipresent in official EU documents. She argues that “it is the commitment to norms that are considered legitimate that allows us to understand enlargement” (p. 500). It is

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therefore important to understand the type of normative arguments that have been influential. The EU often frames enlargement as guided by universally valid

principles, which would make it a moral process in Sjursen’s model, this would be in line with Manners and O’ Brennan’s conception of NPE. Sjursen argues that Spain’s decision to not veto to enlargement could be understood that way. However, this moral approach is difficult to use in mobilizing support for enlargement as it does not lay down criteria for bordering the project of enlargement and in principle, any country could join. The prevailing argumentative structure for enlargement in policy documents and public speeches is the framing of the EU and CEE as two parts of the same entity. Which is not a moral consideration, but an ethical-political argument. This structure is composed of the notion of a shared history, a common destiny, combined with the idea of a special responsibility of the EU towards the CEE. To support this thesis she discusses the differentiated treatment of the CEE compared to Turkey. She argues that it was the kinship-based duty argument that made the difference and was the main mobilizing argument for eastern enlargement in general. In a way, Sjursen thus deviates from what Manners argues, because she challenges the universality of the norms as the motor of mobilization in the process of enlargement. Manners argued that the universality of the EU’s norms is what makes the EU influential, Sjursen claims something different, at least regarding enlargement. She argues that the norms that are important are not shared worldwide, but are those that are linked to a perceived common identity on the European continent.

Discussing the Normative Approach

Normative accounts of enlargement focus on the EU’s normative dimension, this would not be problematic if these accounts considered other aspects on an equal foot with the normative. It is true that normative authors often dedicate some space to other factors that could have played a role in the formation of the enlargement policy, but this is often goes no further than a superficial analysis. These authors

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seem too readily to declare that, even though other factors may have been of

influence, normative reasons trump all other factors in the formation of the policy of enlargement. This underestimation of the other factors involved would not be a problem if their research was restricted solely to the normative aspect of

enlargement and thus made no claim to the prevalence of normativity in the process of enlargement. The normative approach mostly looks at the reasons behind

enlargement and normative aspects of enlargement such as the promotion of democracy and minority rights and little at the other aspects of enlargement. Although O’ Brennan describes the entire process of enlargement, there is hardly any mention of the economic measures the CEECs were forced to undertake. In fact the whole process of transition and the role of the IFIs is absent in his account, while in the case of eastern enlargement this is of significant importance. It is because of his neglect for the non-normative that O’ Brennan is able to claim that the transition went “smooth” (p. 173); there is no mention of the economic hardship enlargement caused in the CEECs. This is related to another characteristic of the normative

approach, namely the almost exclusive focus on the EU institutions and their official documents. This makes sense as the normative rhetoric is omnipresent in these documents, but this approach misses the role of many other actors. Because of the focus normative authors have on EU documents there is also little attention given to how the normative aspects of democracy and minority are promoted in the CEECs and how the CEECs implement them. In fact, studies on the actual process of democratization of CEE paint a more complicated picture of the EU’s normative transfer. These studies demonstrate that norm transfer during enlargement was not without its inherent problems, the two most influential ones being, the top down nature of the democratization and the checklist approach of the EU in

democratization and the promotion of minority rights (Dimitrova & Pridham, 2004). What this implies is that it was important for the EU that the CEECs effectuated the changes, but that the EU paid less attention to how this was done and the quality of the changes. This does not take away from the fact that the EU did give importance

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to democratization, but if normative accounts exclusively focus on the normative aspects, the analysis of those aspects should be in-depth.

A last problematic aspect of the normative approach is the fact that authors do not question the EU narrative, but take what the EU declares for granted. Sjursen argues that one way of questioning the credibility of the normative approach is based on the difference between what the EU says and what the EU actually thinks or does. She then states that for methodological reasons all actors will be considered to be egoistical, but that interests will not be part of her analysis. This seems

counterintuitive for first she argues that something is the most important motivation and then in the same sentence that this motivation will not be take in to

consideration. Still this approach could function if there was an exclusive focus on the EU narrative itself, but this is not the case because Sjursen makes an analysis of the motivations behind enlargement, which factors functioned as mobilizing arguments. Based on one declaration of the European Commission she concludes that if there was a hidden agenda behind the normative discourse this agenda could not rest on utilitarian calculations. Sjursen thus first claims that self-interest is

paramount for the actors involved, then states that interests will not be discussed and finally comes to the conclusion that economic and security interests could not have been the reasons for enlargement.

What seems to be the problem with the normative approach is that normative authors do not engage with the subject of enlargement in a sufficiently critical way. By basing itself almost exclusively on the words of one actor, by not questioning the credibility of those words, by analyzing the normative aspects of enlargement only superficially and by often putting aside other explanations for enlargement too easily.

Rationalist Explanations for Enlargement

Rationalist approaches are economically orientated views of the EU, they provide a more cynical envisioning of enlargement than normative narratives. Rationalists

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focus more on economic power, or civilian power if we want to use Manners’ term, and corporate and member state interests. Rationalist explanations of enlargement hardly consider the normative dimension at all. This discussion of the economic explanations for enlargement will use three sources. First, Damro’s previously discussed model of Market Power Europe. Second, O’ Brennan’s discussion of possible economic reasons behind enlargement. Although O ‘Brennan argues that “Normative factors proved consistently more important than any other in

determining the shape and trajectory of eastern enlargement” (p. 152), he still provides a useful analysis of what economic factors could have been at play in the decision for enlargement. Finally, Moravcsik’s and Vachudova’s liberal

intergovernmentalism model of enlargement, based on bargaining theory and member state preferences. In general, these economic approaches argue that eastern enlargement can be explained as the outcome of egoistic cost-benefit calculations and the preferences and relative power of the member and candidate states.

Certain aspects of Damro’s theory of Market Power Europe can be used to clarify certain facets of enlargement. Damro argues that at its core the EU is an experiment at market integration and that its single market is its most prominent facet of its role on the international level. If we apply this argument to enlargement, it would thus explain enlargement as the expansion of the single market. Damro sees the EU primarily as a regulatory state, he therefore argues that the EU’s market power depends upon its ability to make others adapt to their regulatory standards. Considering that in the case of eastern enlargement, contrary to earlier rounds of enlargement, the EU forced the CEECs to adopt all of the EU’s regulations in the form of the entire acquis communautaire, we can conclude that the EU’s market power is quite significant. According to Damro, the size of its market is of great importance to understand the power that the EU has in the world for at least two reasons. First, markets size influences the choices of governments concerning the adoption of regulatory standards, thus a bigger market means that there is a greater possibility that governments of another country will adapt to the regulatory