List of Contents
1. Introduction 1.1. Relevance 1.2. Purpose 2. Literature Review 3. Theoretical Framework 3.1. Hypotheses 4. Methodology4.1. Explaining Outcome Process Tracing 4.2. Time Frame
4.3. Sources 5. Analysis
5.1. A Brief Sketch of the Socio-Political Situation under Saddam Hussein
5.1.1. Fear and Neopatrimonialism 5.1.2. Al-Zarqawi’s Political Mobilization 5.2. The Road to ISIS: Camp Bucca
5.3. The Islamic State Declared: Building a Religious State 5.3.1. A Societal Foundation?
5.3.2. Political and Military Wings 5.3.3. Leadership 6. Conclusion 7. Discussion 8. References p. 2 p. 3 p. 4 p. 4 p. 6 p. 8 p. 10 p. 11 p. 12 p. 12 p. 12 p. 13 p. 13 p. 16 p. 17 p. 20 p. 20 p. 22 p. 24 p. 25 p. 27 p. 28
The Social Embeddedness of ISIS Traced: Back to the Roots of the
Insurgent Organization
Although much research has already been devoted to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-‐Sham, it seldom tries to identify its social embeddedness comprehensively. This paper therefore builds upon the work done by scholars who demonstrate the importance of social embeddedness for the success of organisations. It then tries to identify the different indicators pointing towards a certain degree of social embeddedness. By applying process tracing, several snapshots are taken of various important situations and dynamics in Iraq to extract the mechanisms that underpin ISIS’ social embeddedness. I argue that, although having expected the contrary, ISIS has a low degree of social embeddedness. I conclude that this lack of social embeddedness does not stop the insurgent organization from becoming a totalitarian state, under the command of ex-‐Ba’athist officials and its caliph.
1. Introduction
The Islamic State of Iraq and al-‐Sham (ISIS)1 has proven itself to be highly
successful in acquiring territory and capital over the past few years. Anoop Sarbahi (2014) has recently argued that ‘social embeddedness’ exercises a significant effect on the trajectory of civil wars, by using a quantitative cross-‐ national study. Staniland (2012) contended that strong pre-‐existing ties have a significant effect on the effectiveness of resource endowments. Other scholars too have put forward the great importance of social embeddedness for the success of insurgent groups (Weinstein, 2007; Gates, 2002; Sanín and Giustozzi, 2010). This paper will therefore do an attempt to identify the degree of social embeddedness of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-‐Sham.
1 The group has been renamed many times (ISIS, ISIL, IS), the Arabic acronym being
‘Daesh’. In 2014, The Islamic State dropped the –IS or –IL from its name. However, most scholars and journalists still use the name ISIS, since referring to ISIS by its self-‐
appointed name, would legitimize it, as Stern & Berger (2015) argue. See also France24 on why the French Government uses the Arabic acronym
http://www.france24.com/en/20140917-‐france-‐switches-‐arabic-‐daesh-‐acronym-‐islamic-‐state/
This results in the following main question: How and to what extent has
The Islamic State in Iraq and al-‐Sham been socially embedded? This paper seeks to
address the factors that would lead to a certain degree of social embeddedness and explain the underpinning causes and dynamics.
Specifically, attention will be paid to what pre-‐existing ties ISIS has evolved from and bring forward an assessment of six indicators for social embeddedness. It shall do so by going beyond the scope of conventional factors, such as shared religion, ethnicity or tribe, and look at decisive shared experiences, connections and social and political dynamics.
By using ISIS as a case study, explaining-‐outcome process tracing shall be used as a method to give snapshots of different relevant periods between the years prior to the US-‐led invasion of Iraq in 2003 up to 2015. Specifically chosen events that and dynamics that have shaped ISIS’ social embeddedness will be analysed. Iraq will be the main area of focus, specifically Sunni dominated areas in the West of Iraq, where ISIS and its precedents have been active predominantly.
1.1. Relevance
The relevance for this research is twofold. Academically, ISIS has been discussed quite extensively already, despite their recent establishment and still on-‐going conflict, although mostly in news media. Most academic research has been focussed on the factors that have led to the rise of ISIS (Napoleoni, 2014; Stern & Berger, 2015; Weiss & Hassan, 2015). This research is however devoted to scrutinizing a specific part of ISIS of which little light has been shone upon so far: its social embeddedness. This sociological dimension expands the more often used political approach and enriches the debate on insurgent organizations.
Societally, ISIS is the ‘richest terrorist organisation ever’ (BBC, 2015) and poses a large threat to the security and stability in the Middle East (Biddle, 2015). Also in Western countries there is a clear need for better understanding this insurgent organization to counter them. Politicians are namely concerned of possibility that radicalized ISIS fighters could return to their home-‐countries to force an attack (Newsweek, 2014; NRC Handelsblad, 2015).
Again, by knowing on what foundations ISIS is built upon, we can better understand the current state of ISIS, and with that counter their strategies and alter the situation. It must be noted, however, that this paper does not attempt to propose a grand plan for the optimal strategy against ISIS with a post-‐conflict development policy. It merely tries to contribute to the debate of the social embeddedness within the Islamic State of Iraq and al-‐Sham.
1.2. Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to identify a degree of social embeddedness of ISIS. In particular, this research will be focussed on extracting the indicators that characterize its social embeddedness. The analysis will in turn lead to an assessment of some crucial observations, which result in concluding on the degree of its social embeddness.
2. Literature Review
This paper builds from the literature examining the role of social embeddedness in civil wars and insurgent groups (Granovetter, 1985; Padgett & Ansell, 1993; McCarthy, 1996; Weinstein, 2007; Staniland, 2012;). In particular, it builds on the recent research by Anoop Sarbahi (2014) on the implications of social embeddedness for civil war trajectories. This paper seeks to measure the degree of social embeddedness of ISIS before its establishment and explores possible indicators for embeddedness after ISIS announced the Islamic State in June 2014. But before diving into the theoretical arguments, attention will be paid to conceptualising certain concepts at stake here.
The term ‘insurgency’ will in this study be used to ‘mean conflict between a regular or conventional military and an irregular force that is incapable of facing the former in force-‐on-‐force fighting’ (Hashim, 2006). Following broad academic consensus, ISIS shall be discussed as a non-‐state actor, even though ISIS claims to be a state (Stern & Berger, 2015). ISIS is imaginable as a state looking at tax collection and possession of infrastructure. But it has no monopoly on violence, is internationally not recognized and has no clear borders (ibid). For these reasons, its weaker precedents ISI and AQI, will also be regarded as a non-‐
state actor. In particular, ISIS will be discussed as an insurgent organization, following Hashim’s definition as described above.
Social embeddedness as a concept is derived from the work of Sarbahi (2014), who adopted it from sociological studies. ‘The concept of social embeddedness’, Sarbahi states, ‘highlights the relational aspect of actors’ behaviour in arguing that individual and group actions cannot be studied apart from the context of a network of relations within which they take place’ (Granovetter, 1985; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993 in Sarbahi, 2014: 1475). Sarbahi (2014) concludes that social embeddedness within a rebel group expresses a form of power towards the opposing state, which in turn leads to divergent possible trajectories of a conflict. A socially embedded insurgent organization would generally provide a stronger stance against an opposing state, he argues (Sarbahi, 2014).
The importance of studying social embeddedness is also derived from the argument made by John Padgett and Christopher Ansell (1993). The two sociologists argue that social embeddedness is not a denial of agency, groups or organizations, but rather an acceptance that individual lives are characterized by a level of complexity and ambiguity. Paul Staniland adds that networks and organizations are not opposing concepts, but rather complementary ones, which are highly intertwined. The social ties which are synergized into networks and organizations lay the basis for when and how institutions can be built (Staniland: 2012: 142).
To investigate such ties, McCarthy (1996: 141) argues that one should ‘include the range of everyday life micromobilization structural social locations that are not aimed primarily at movement mobilization, but where mobilization may be generated: these include family units, friendship networks, voluntary associations, work units, and elements of the state structure itself.’
In his Organizing Insurgency, Staniland’s main argument is that resource endowments have great implications on the discipline and behaviour of insurgent groups, but that the effect of the resources largely depends on the organizational structure of the insurgent group (Staniland, 2012: 151). He argues that insurgent organizers with a strong social base provide a powerful foundation on which the group can effectively control an expansion of the group
(ibid: 152). Resources can thus strengthen the organization’s mobilization, provided that the organization has strong pre-‐existing ties. Staniland argues that social ties are of such importance because they can facilitate the creation and effectiveness of institutions in insurgent organizations (ibid).
As described earlier, little academic research yet exists on the social embeddedness of ISIS. In this section I have to put forward the importance of studying the social embeddedness of an insurgent organization: achieving a high level of social embeddedness will lead into a higher probability in strengthening the organization’s resource endowments, enabling the construction of new organizations and institutions, and increasing its position against opposing states. Now, I shall continue by outlining the framework used in this research specifically. The framework is mainly build upon the work of Sarbahi (2014) because it allows a comprehensive and practical analysis of insurgent organizations.
3. Theoretical Framework
Sarbahi argues that ‘“social embeddness” moves beyond the shared ethnicity debate, because ethnicity and interpersonal networks may facilitate organization, but cannot guarantee the importance of social embeddedness’ (Sarbahi, 2014: 1476). Sarbahi, like Staniland (2012) and Weinstein (2007) trace social embeddedness of rebel groups to ‘pre-‐war political processes’.
Sarbahi (2014) distinguishes two groups, which can be identified by their level of social embeddedness. First are “anchored” rebel groups. These are often successful insurgent groups that are characterized by powerful pre-‐existing political parties that have performed extensive political mobilization during the period preceding the launch of rebellion. (Sarbahi, 2014: 1478). With respect to post-‐rebellion characteristics, Sarbahi argues that anchored rebel groups develop more and more ties with societal actors in the catchment population2.
This broad-‐based network of ties, which is responsive to its catchment
2 Sarbahi (2014: 1497) describes the catchment population as a geographically
contiguous population from which a rebel group seeks to draw their support and resources, and whose interests the group purports to represent. In the case of ISIS, this would be the Sunni population, mostly located northwest of Iraq, including the ‘Sunni-‐ triagle’ (Cordesman, 2006)
population, would create a political agenda. This political agenda would in turn ‘promote the primacy of the civilian leadership within the rebel organization’ (Sarbahi, 2014: 1478).
“Floating” rebel groups, on the other hand, are groups that lack social embeddedness. They are often characterized by an extreme ideology and typically start with a small, densely connected core of upstart political entrepreneurs. They are, however, less responsive to the catchment population. (ibid: 1474). Sarbahi suggests that the lack of responsiveness can be shown in their internal characteristics: a lack of clearly separated political and military wings should be witnessed and the ‘leadership of a floating group may refuse to compromise because of their strong ideological commitment’ (ibid: 1479-‐80). A floating group would however be able to attain a high level of secrecy and mutual trust. (ibid: 1479). Whether these characteristics apply to ISIS shall be treated in the analysis.
Sarbahi (2014) operationalizes social embeddedness through six characteristics, which shall be used here accordingly: (1) origin in political party, (2) pre-‐war support base, (3) pre-‐war political mobilization, (4) ties with societal actors, (5) leadership structure, and (6) separation of political and military powers. In his quantitative analysis, Sarbahi (2014) uses these indicators as dichotomous variables, where 1 was “yes” and 0 was “no”. He is consequently able to give a clear, though abstract, answer about what degree of social embeddedness is present within an insurgent group. The scores added would mean a number between 0 and 6, where the closer to 6, the more “anchored” the group is. Sarbahi distinguishes three indicators, which can be measured before the rebellion, and three that are measured after of the rebellion (Sarbahi, 2014: 1483):
‘A perfectly anchored rebel group would originate from a pre-‐existing political party, which had a powerful political presence in the affected territory and undertook significant political mobilization of the catchment around the demands of the group for at least 2 years before the launch of rebellion. Post-‐rebellion such a rebel group has ties with important societal actors, a collective leadership, and distinct military and political wings with the political wing being the dominant’ (emphasis added).
This distinction in time frame measurement has the implication that only the first three characteristics can be analysed to a full satisfactory level, due to the simple fact that, writing around May 2015, ISIS is still involved in conflict with the US-‐led Coalition forces3 (US Department of Defense, 2015). The
consequence of this is that Sarbahi’s conceptualisation of an insurgent group’s degree of “anchoredness” cannot be fully explained through this work solely. However, as Sarbahi (2014: 1484) points out: ‘[t]he last three characteristics relate to the post-‐rebellion phase but groups undergoing certain pre-‐war experience are expected to exhibit them; their origins lay in pre-‐war processes’. So although aware of this slight limitation, it is not impossible to explore the indicators that could lead to probable explanations.
3.1. Hypotheses
In the section above, six characteristics have been shown that would suggest a measure of degree of an insurgent group being “anchored” or “floating”. With the knowledge we know have by means of available literature and other sources, it could be argued that ISIS’ success seems to tell that it is, or making its way to becoming a fierce “anchored insurgent group”: it is the richest terror organization of the world, controls a relatively large area and is determined to sustain the area4 (BBC, 2015; Cordesman, 2014; Dabiq, 2014a). Due to its
“success” and “effectiveness” defined in their declaration of the caliphate, enormous disposable capital and continuing acquisition in territory, following the literature described above, ISIS is expected to show a high degree of “anchoredness”. The following hypotheses are therefore taken into analysis:
- Hypothesis 1: The Islamic State of Iraq and al-‐Sham has a high degree of social embeddedness, resulting in being an “anchored group”, which entails the following sub hypotheses:
3 For a full list of the coalition forces, see Al Jazeera:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2014/10/isil-‐us-‐syria-‐airstrike-‐coalition-‐uae-‐ saudi-‐2014101142731382476.html
4 The October 2014 issue of ISIS’ Dabiq magazine stated its current mission is both to
o Hypothesis 1.a: ISIS has origins to be found in a pre-‐existing political party.
o Hypothesis 1.b: Of which the political party had a strong political base prior to the invasion in 2003.
o Hypothesis 1.c: ISIS undertook significant political mobilization of the catchment population around the demands of ISIS for at least two years prior to the conflict5.
During the ‘post-‐rebellion’:
o Hypothesis 1.d: ISIS contains strong connections with societal actors in Iraq.
o Hypothesis 1.e: ISIS has distinct political and military wings, of which the political is dominant.
o Hypothesis 1.f: ISIS does not contain political agenda that promotes a civilian leadership.
By approaching these hypotheses in a qualitative way, the ability arises to nuance the six characteristics, instead of merely answering them with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’. This will have the consequence that a round mark will not emerge from the analysis, but rather an aggravation of arguments, which will from an assessment of the degree of ISIS being anchored or not.
Some clarification is needed on the concepts used in the hypotheses. First, a ‘political base’ entails possessing support from a given population, which will be Iraq here. This, because the international community still recognizes the current borders of Iraq, regardless of the announcement of the Islamic State and because ISIS finds most its originating activity in Iraq, as described later on.
Second, Sarbahi (2014: 1474) argues that groups with pre-‐conflict political mobilization experience have a high degree in social embeddedness. Political mobilization strategy, he argues, is dictated differently whether the goal is to launch a political movement or immediate rebellion. In the former, broad
5 “Pre-‐war mobilization” as noted by Sarbahi, accounts here for the period prior to the
mobilization is anticipated and rebellion may not have been envisioned per se. In the latter, the scope of political mobilization is limited. (Sarbahi, 2014: 1477).
Hypothesis 1.f. is the only hypothesis that predicts more characteristics of a floating rebel group outcome, since it seems highly unlikely that civilians already have a large say in its leadership, due to their extreme religious ideology (Neriah, 2014).
Having described the hypothesis with its indicators, we shall now turn to the methodology, outlining the importance of process tracing for this research.
4. Methodology
To find out what pre-‐existing ties and dynamics form the social embeddedness of ISIS, process tracing shall be used, as formulated first by Alexander George and Timothy McKeown (1985) and further developed by George and Bennet (1997; 2005), Collier (2011) and Beach and Pedersen (2013). Process tracing is most useful for the purpose of this paper, since the studied case is a complex aggregation of possible variables and explanations and hence requires a method that can intensively and comprehensively analyse ambiguous situations and mechanisms.
George and Bennett (2005: 206) defined process tracing as the ‘method [that] attempts to identify the intervening causal process -‐ the causal chain and causal mechanism -‐ between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable’ (in Falleti, 2006). This paper shall hence focus on the interlaying variables, events and dynamics that form the causal mechanisms that have shaped social embeddedness. Beach and Pedersen (2013) conceptualise ‘causal mechanisms’ as:
‘the causal chain or story linking event A with outcome B. A mechanism is made up of a number of ‘parts’ composed of entities (for example, people, organisations, systems) that engage in activities (for example, protesting, researching, campaigning); and each part of the mechanism is necessary to give rise to the subsequent part (in Punton, 2015: 2).
4.1. Explaining Outcome Process Tracing
Various scholars suggest process tracing permits the generation, but also the
testing of hypothesis (Falleti, 2006: 2; Hall, 2003; Collier et al, 2004). With the
contributions made by Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen (2013), Melanie Punton (2015) distinguishes a third type of process tracing: explaining-‐outcome
process tracing. This approach is interested in fully explaining how B (the
outcome – a degree of social embeddedness) happened. It works out ‘all the various factors that contributed to it in order to craft a ‘minimally sufficient’ explanation for B’ (Punton, 2015: 2). Explaining-‐outcome process tracing is the approached used in this paper to get a full grip on the outcome, social embeddedness of ISIS, without knowing exactly what has shaped it.
This research shall hence be focussed on unravelling the causal mechanisms that underpin a certain degree of social embeddedness within ISIS. Although the method of analysis being recent, improvements in systemizing and strengthening process tracing has been occurring for the last two decades (Collier et al, 2004, Collier, 2011; Beach & Pedersen, 2013). One of the foremost strengths of qualitative analysis is that these methods can contribute to the question why and how a given input has led to a particular effect, an aspect which is often lacking in qualitative research (Punton, 2015: 1).
The scholars Collier, Brady, and Seawright (2004) build upon the work done by the well known King, Keohane and Verba, also known as “KKV”. The main contribution on process tracing by Collier, Brady and Seawright (2004) is their “causal-‐process observation” (CPO). A CPO is ‘an insight or piece of data that provides information about context, process, or mechanism, and that contributes distinctive leverage in causal inference’ (Collier et al, 2004: 277). This paper will analyse particular events to assess causal-‐process observations that could have led to the evolvement of causal mechanisms, resulting in answers about ISIS’ social embeddedness.
As Falleti (2006) indicates, lots of ink has been spilled on the debate whether secondary sources are sufficient or if fieldwork is a necessity for good (process tracing) research. Clearly, due to constraint time, financial and security
reasons, a combination of primary and secondary resources, without going into the field, shall be used here only. This “desk-‐research strategy” will, however, not have to influence this work significantly, due to the sufficient amount of data available in the form of secondary and primary sources such as literature, news media, audio files, videos, documentaries and ISIS propaganda magazine Dabiq.
4.2. Time Frame
David Collier argues that process tracing begins not with observing certain changes or sequences, but ‘rather with taking good snapshots at a series of specific moments’ (Collier, 2011: 824). Three ‘good snapshots’ shall therefore be described and analysed intensively. First, a brief sketch shall be drawn of the last years of Saddam’s rule over Iraq, accompanied with some important events of his rule. Thereafter, the focus shall be on Camp Bucca, in the midst of the US intervention, which provides a highly relevant snapshot of a process occurring between 2005-‐2009. Last, the recent period since the declaration of the Islamic State shall be covered, dating June 2014-‐present, where the last three sub hypotheses shall be explored.
4.3. Sources
I have been relying on a reasonable variety of sources, which include secondary sources from Western scholars and some non-‐Western scholars, news media sources and translated original documents. Most important data will be extracted from Toby Dodge’s Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism, Stern & Berger’s ISIS: a State of Terror and Weiss & Hassan’s ISIS: Inside the Army of
Terror. Primary sources include documents from ISIS or its precedents; ISIS’
magazine Dabiq and audio/visual sources from ISIS leaders.
5. Analysis
The analysis consists of six main sections, each dealing with a sub hypothesis. First, a brief historic overview of the political situation prior to the Invasion of Iraq will be given. This section will also include an analysis of the political mobilization of AQI, assessing both sub hypotheses 1.b and 1.c.
Second, as often suggested in much literature, the processes occurring in the US detention camp, “Camp Bucca” will be used to assess the relation between ISIS leaders and the former Ba’ath regime, confirming sub hypothesis 1.a.
Lastly, as noted earlier, the three post-‐rebellion sub hypotheses shall be explored in the period after the announcement of the Islamic State in June 2014. Again, being aware of the conflict not being over, signs pointing towards a certain direction (or not) shall be analysed, hence trying to answer sub hypotheses 1.d., 1.e., and 1.f.
5.1. A Brief Sketch of the Socio-‐Political Situation under Saddam Hussein Finding out whether ISIS has origins in a pre-‐existing political party will be answered more comprehensively in the next paragraphs. I will argue that ISIS indeed has origins in the Ba’ath party and even firmly relies on its military expertise, network and skills. Here, however, I shall question whether the Ba’ath party had a strong political base prior to the invasion in 2003. Also, attention will be paid to sub-‐hypothesis 1.c, where I argue that ISIS’ precedent Al Qaeda in Iraq undertook some political mobilization, but appealed only to a small part of the catchment population.
5.1.1 Fear and Neopatrimonialism
The Ba’athist leadership, with Saddam starting to rule from 1979, has incrementally led to a system that has benefited the Sunni minority most. With 95% of the Iraqi’s practicing Islam, of which 65% are Shi’a and around 35% Sunni, the Sunni minority living in the northwest of Iraq was in favour of the regime. (Hashim, 2003: 8). It is hence difficult to argue that the Ba’ath regime controlled a firm political base. It seems that a political base was primarily based on three dynamics: fear, patronage and pragmatism. Fear of the repressive means Saddam propagated, of which the Shi’a were most often bearing the bunt of and the patronage Sunni people relied on.
Many Sunni (tribes) were part a patron-‐client system incrementally set up by Saddam (Tripp, 2002; Dodge, 2012). Already during the emergence of Saddam during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the amount of Tikritis – Sunni Arabs from the northwest town of Tikrit – coming into power was significant.
Saddam, himself a Tikriti, had many times relied on these Sunni Arab tribes, filling the ranks in his Republican Guard, for example during the Shi’a tribal uprising, later with help of the Kurds, in 1991 (Brownlee, 2002: 44). The Sunni Republican Guard, Brownlee and Hashim argue, formed the keystone for the control and security of his neopatrimonial system, keeping the Sunni population in a privileged position (Brownlee, 2002; Hashim, 2010: 11).
To prevent another uprising, the party moved towards a more nationalist-‐ Islamist stance to appeal more to the country’s ethno-‐sectarian groups (Hashim, 2010: 27). Instead of taking on a neutral stance however, ‘a chauvinistic Sunni Arab nationalist streak crept back into the discourse of some Ba’athist and nationalist-‐Islamist groups’ (ibid). Although the instable country, characterized by a sanctioned economy, the Ba’ath regime in Bagdad survived, until the collapse in 2003 (Drezner, 1999 in Dodge, 2012: 25).
That the Ba’ath regime possessed a reasonably political base can be confirmed by looking at the Sunni response of the toppling down of the Ba’ath after the invasion in 2003. But first of all, it must be recalled that the ethnic majority of the Iraqi’s, the Shi’a, were denied from political participation, discriminated and massacred during the Ba’ath regime under Saddam (Stern & Berger, 2015). Support for the regime, clearly, did not come from this repressed part of the population. Second, however, arguing that Sunni’s fully supported the Ba’ath regime is also disputed (Hashim, 2010; Cordesman, 2006).
What is clear is that the Sunni population on the first hand did not support the new authority, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), formed by the US (Dodge, 2012: 41-‐5). During the general election in 2005, only 2% of the Sunni population voted: a sense of lack of Sunni representation was echoed. In the second nationwide election, the turnout numbers were higher, reflecting a bigger Sunni turnout, but resulted only in ceremonial seats for the Sunni representing parties, with the consequence of remaining discontent amongst Sunni’s (Dodge, 2012: 47).
One of the biggest strategic mistakes in Iraq, argued by numerous scholars and reporters, was one of the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremers’ first major decisions in Iraq: removing between sixty-‐ five and ninety-‐five thousand members of Saddam’s Republican Guard,
Mukhabarat and the Fedayeen Saddam6 with a stroke of a pen, as part of the “de-‐
Ba’athtification” strategy7 (Weiss & Hassan, 2015: 21-‐22; Stern & Berger, 2015:
19; Time, 2015). Moreover, Toby Dodge adds that this decision included disbanding the whole Iraqi Army in 2003, sending 400,000 ‘armed, trained and alienated ex-‐soldiers out onto the streets, facing unemployment’, resulting in discontent and anger amongst many Sunni’s who were part of this regime (Dodge, 2012: 38).
But even if the Ba’ath regime was to be supported by Iraqi Sunni’s, arguing that they would also support ISIS would be naïve. Extreme Islamic groups were namely not the only insurgent groups in Iraq after 2003. The war in Iraq consisted of many other groups that are fuelled by different ideologies and rely on different support bases. Anthony Cordesman explains that other insurgent groups8, most with Ba’ath origin, are more secular and nationalist in
character and are ‘concerned with Sunni rights and preventing Shi’ite dominance’ (Cordesman, 2006: 22). The violence is however dominated by Sunni Islamist extremists who oppose any negotiations or settlement with the Iraqi government or compromise with the Coalition forces (Cordesman, 2006: 34). Hashim too argues that the various other more nationalist-‐Islamist groups also attack the Shi’ites, but not for religious reasons, where Salafi groups such as ISIS do so (Hashim, 2006: 29).
In a later section the relation between ISIS and the former Ba’ath regime will be been proven to be strong. This might have increased some popular support for ISIS, although that seems unlikely, given the fact that ISIS ideology and their means to achieve it, have proven to be extreme and opposed by the many.
Having briefly described the situation in Iraq under Saddam before and shortly after the invasion, it can be stated that indeed mainly the Sunni minority supported the regime for pragmatic reasons and if not, there was little possibility to turn against the regime, due to Saddam’s repressive means. The political base
6 The Mukhabarat is a catchall term for Iraq’s intelligence directorates. The Fedayeen Saddam was a state-‐subsidized militia force (Weiss & Hassan, 2015: 21).
7 James Pfiffner (2010) argues that the decision actually came from Vice-‐President Dick
Cheney.
for Saddam’s regime seems to be rather strong under Sunni’s, since the de-‐ Ba’athtification led to a complete disruption of the system they were largely part of, leading many Sunni’s in discontent. This however does not imply equal support for ISIS allying with the once ruling Ba’ath party. It seems that many more nationalist insurgent groups have been created that enjoy support too at the cost of ISIS’ support base. Now, we shall turn our scope to the man who was most important for prior political mobilization of ISIS, Abu Musab al-‐Zarqawi.
5.1.2. Al-‐Zarqawi’s Political Mobilization
Looking at hypothesis 1.c seems ambiguous and raises questions. It refers to political mobilization ISIS exercised ‘before the conflict’, which as noted above, is the invasion in 2003. ISIS however did not exist before 2013. Taking its predecessor ISI would not be satisfactory either, since the Islamic State in Iraq has been established in 2006 only. One of the major actors, who was responsible for the eventual opportunity to announce the Islamic State in Iraq, however, was Abu Musab al-‐Zarqawi, the so-‐called “heroic predecessor of [ISIS current leader] Abu Bakr al-‐Baghdadi” (Weiss & Hassan, 2015: 1). Al-‐Zarqawi led Al-‐Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) from the making of its bayat9 to Osama bin Laden in 2004, until his death in 2006. AQI was in 2006 responsible for creating the umbrella organization Mujahedeen Shura Council (MSC), which would later that year announce the Islamic State of Iraq in October 2006 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015).
The importance of Zarqawi for ISIS is widely shared amongst scholars (Stern & Berger, 2015; Weiss & Hassan; Napoleoni, 2011; Cordesman, 2006). Due to limited available space, only Zarqawi’s most relevant political mobilization prior to the conflict shall be taken into account.
AQI had not been responsible for the 9/11 attacks directly. Zarqawi held the ideology that the Muslim should turn its focus to the “near enemy”, the
takfir10, instead of the “far enemy”, the US and other crusaders (Weiss & Hassan, 2015: 2). This principle came from his spiritual father Sheikh Abu Muhammad al
9 Bayat, is ‘a religiously binding oath of loyalty’ (Stern & Berger, 2015: x).
10 Takfir is the pronouncement by a Muslim that someone is an unbeliever (kafir) and no
Maqdisi, who also was the architect of jihadi Salafism. Al Maqdisi dictated an ideology that was based on the principle that any government that does not rule through a strict interpretation of Shariah must be violently opposed (Wagemakers, 2009). The main pollutants of Arab civilization were not Western-‐ style democracy, though heavily opposed, but the the illegitimate and “apostate regimes” in Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq (Weiss & Hassan, 2015: 3).
Zarqawi used his time in prison to recruit other inmates into helping him overthrow the Jordanian leadership. In 2000 he tried to bomb two Christian holy sites between Jordan and Israel and a hotel in Amman. Both failed however. (Stern & Berger, 2015: 16). Thereafter he spent time in Iran, Syria and Lebanon, where he continued recruiting and networking. While after 9/11 the Americans invaded Afghanistan, Zarqawi is noted to be defending al Qaeda and the Taliban and in 2002 joined the Kurdish jihadist group Ansar al-‐Islam that mainly executed attacks on the incumbent regimes in the Middle East (ibid). He was also responsible for the bombing of a US mission centre, the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad and an important Shi’a mosque, killing dozens of people and a prominent Ayatollah (ibid: 21).
The above demonstrates that Zarqawi from the beginning had not been looking to creating a political movement without coercion or violence. His jihadi Salafism dictated an armed battle against the apostate regimes in the Middle East. Later indeed, ISIS-‐leader Al-‐Baghdadi calls upon the Muslims to come to “their” country, the caliphate, which looks more like a broader movement, but from the years prior to the Invasion in 2003, this ISIS predecessor has focussed on a very limited scope of political mobilization. Although achieving some political mobilization, he did not succeed in establishing a broad-‐based political movement until his death in 2006.
5.2. The Road to ISIS: Camp Bucca
In this paragraph, evidence that an alliance between many prominent former Ba’ath officials and future ISIS leaders have come to exist in Camp Bucca, shall be brought forward.
After the death of Zarqawi in 2006 and death of the head of the Islamic State of Iraq in 2010, an Iraqi from Samarra, a city just north of Bagdad, would
lead the Iraqi division of Al-‐Qaeda, also known as The Islamic State in Iraq. The man, under the nom de guerre Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was a Sunni Arab, born into a Salafi family. (Stern & Berger, 2015: 33).
What is known from his earlier background is that he was highlighted as a descendent of the Muslim Prophet Muhammad's Quraysh tribe: a key qualification for becoming a caliph, as Baghdadi’s biographer Turki al-‐Binali writes (BBC News, 2014). He enrolled in the Islamic University of Bagdad where he received a doctorate in Islamic culture and Shariah Law (ibid).
Serious networking would however only begin during his time in Camp Bucca. Camp Bucca was a notorious US detention centre in Iraq, established from the beginning of the Invasion in 2003, where suspected terrorists were detained until its closure in 2009. Baghdadi was captured somewhere around the start of 2005 after an American-‐led raid near Fallujah and subsequently imprisoned in Camp Bucca. (BBC, 2014; Arango & Schmitt, 2014). The detention would have great consequences for his personal network with ex-‐Ba’ath commanders, recruitment pool and leadership skills.
Former servant at one US-‐run detention centre in Iraq, Andrew Thompson, wrote an article with Jeremy Suri, professor in Texas, arguing that the US helped ISIS with its detention centres. They argue that Baghdadi and other future leaders of ISIS were already radicals, but ‘their time in prison deepened their extremism and gave them opportunities to broaden their following’. Sectarian separation created such a group dynamic that ‘the detainees who rejected the radicals in their cells faced retribution from other prisoners through “Shariah courts” that infested the facilities’. (The New York Times, 01-‐ 10-‐2014).
One could question the direct contact senior officials of the former Ba’ath regime had with Baghdadi or other radicals. Divergent sources however confirm that only after 2007 the detention centre policies changed and senior leaders were separated from small criminals, young prisoners and other easy influencers (Stern, 2010; War in Context; 11-‐08-‐2014; NY Times, 01-‐10-‐2014).
Amongst the former Ba’ath officials detained in Camp Bucca were several of major importance for ISIS: Abu Muslim al-‐Turkmani, al-‐Baghdadi’s number two; Abu Ayman al-‐Iraqi, a senior military leader; Haji Bakr, who helped
Baghdadi into power; Abu Ayman Al-‐Iraqi, a former officer in the Iraqi army under Saddam Hussein and currently situated as a member within the military council of ISIS and Osama al-‐Bilawi, also a former Saddam officer, but before he was killed in 2014 a head of the Shura council. In total, it is said there were at least eight leading ISIS figures of who spent time in Camp Bucca. (War in Context, 2014; Al Akhbar, 2014; Soufan Group, 2014).
When Abu Bakr al Bagdadi did leave prison, Abu Abdullah al-‐Rashid al-‐ Baghdadi was in charge of the ISI. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi came into power when Abu Abdullah al-‐Rashid al-‐Baghdadi was killed in April 2010 by a US-‐Iraqi joint air strike. The new leader immediately set out to eliminate possible critics and replaced hem with trusted allies, many of whom he spent time in Camp Bucca. (Stern & Berger, 2015: 37).
So what can we draw from this? Richard Barrett from the terrorist analyst organization Soufan Group argues that in Camp Bucca ISI closed an alliance with former Ba’athists, who had lost their jobs after the toppling down of the Saddam regime and the de-‐Ba’athtification strategy initiated by Paul Bremer (Soufan Group, 2014). Barrett stated it was a “more than a marriage of convenience”: the jihadists found organizational skills and a network of fellow ex-‐Ba’athists, the ex-‐ Ba’athists found a purpose and coherent ideology in the jihadists (Soufan Group, 2014). The socialization process occurring in Camp Bucca resulted in the process of former Ba’athists later filling top organizational positions in ISIS like the above described.
That the alliance had been successful is proven by the recently released documents by Der Spiegel. In 2014, confidential files that were in the possession of ‘the architect of the Islamic State’, the former Ba’athist colonel Haji Bakr, were found when he was killed, which shall be dealt with more extensively later on. The alliance closed in Camp Bucca has an important implication for the sub hypothesis. Even though ISI itself is not directly derived from pre-‐existing political parties, it is clear that strong ties have existed between the future leaders of ISIS and ex-‐Ba’ath commanders, from the beginning of the formation of ISI. It seems clear that although ISIS was not directly originated from the Ba’ath party, the ties between then the ISI and ex-‐Ba’athists were already strong
