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The Costs of Receiving Money
Access of lobbyists to the white house during the Obama Administration
A.C. Achterberg (10830111)
Master Thesis Political Theory and Political Behaviour (GSSS, UvA)
Research Project: Electoral campaigns: US primaries 2016 & Dutch national elections Lecturer: Dr. G.Schumacher
2nd Reader: M. (Marc) van de Wardt MSc June 2016
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Contents Introduction Theory on access Research Design Hypotheses Results Conclusion ReferencelistAppendix A: Coding Manual Appendix B: Document List
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Introduction
"I am in this race to tell the corporate lobbyists that their days of setting the agenda in Washington are over. I have done more than any other candidate in this race to take on lobbyists — and won. They have not funded my campaign they will not get a job in my White House, and they will not drown out the voices of the American people when I am President."
Barack Obama, Speech in Des Moines, Iowa- November 10, 2007 (Drutman 2015:1).
This is probably Obama’s best known quote about his ideas about the pervasive influence of lobbyist, in a speech that became one of Barack Obama’s most famous. The quote says a lot about the intentions Barack Obama had in 2008 about taking on lobbyists and reducing their influence. The quote featured prominently at the top of the website of his presidential
campaign for over a year (McGrath 2013). The rhetoric of Obama against the influences of lobbyists is to some extent nothing new, politicians usually attack special interests in times of elections and Barack Obama was far from the first person who ran a campaign in which he portrayed himself as a Washington outsider. Senator John McCain also talked about taking on special interests, as well as Sarah Palin, as did nearly every presidential candidate of the last few decades (Grossmann 2009). Lobbyists seem to be targets for populist politicians, indeed any speech in which a politician includes an attack on lobbyists is met with applause (McGrath 2007).
Obama however went much further than most politicians in his attack on lobbyists and made it one of the cornerstones on which his campaign leaned. McGrath (2013) speculates that the memories of the un-happiness of Obama’s mother caused by the lobbying of his stepfather may have caused an internalization of the idea that lobbying is hateful and wicked. In Obama’s youth lobbying was often a source of conflict between his stepfather and his mother, with his stepfather and his mother arguing about whether her attendance was required at the dinner parties that his stepfathers company held with businessmen (Obama 2008: 47). Obama’s childhood experience with lobbyists thus may have caused him to have an unfavorable view of lobbyists in general.
Whatever the reason may be for his unfavorable view of lobbyist, Obama continuously repeated his message that ‘the days of lobbyists setting the agenda in
Washington are over’ throughout his campaign, and that as a president he would change the way Washington works (Thurber 2011). This message was widely believed and inspired and motivated ordinary citizens to contribute to his political campaign on an unprecedented scale (McGrath 2013). The enormous amounts of money in the form of small campaign
contributions from the many Obama donors really stood out. On the 27th of February 2008 (Wisconsin Report 2008) the Obama campaign website reported the millionth contributor to the Obama campaign.
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This moment was highlighted by Obama the day after in his speech in Texas, in which he took pride in the fact that his campaign had raised 90 percent of its contributions from amounts of 100 dollars or less, without taking a dime from Washington lobbyists or special interest PACs (Wisconsin Report 2008).
Extending his campaign rhetoric into action, Barack Obama used the symbolism of his first day in office to show to the American people that he was serious in his effort to reform the lobbying culture of Washington. Through his executive order 13490 he
immediately started to make an impact on lobbying culture, by setting ethical standards for the presidency as well as for his appointees. In executive order 13490 Obama prohibited everyone that was appointed to his administration to take any gifts from registered lobbyists or lobbying organizations (Obama 2009). The president’s policies were predominantly aimed at leveling the playing field and reducing unwanted influences of special interests. As well as making sure that all Americans would have their concerns addressed by Washington and not just those with access, money or power (Hasen 2012).
The academic world is divided into whether these new regulations have had a significant impact. The reactions to the actions of Barack Obama range from the view that the president has really delivered by making exceptional progress through bold and decisive action and has limited the action of lobbyists (Painter 2009), to the opinion that the
presidents’ record on campaign finance reform has been all talk and no action (Elliott 2009). However you see the president’s efforts, it would be surprising if many political scientists believed that the Obama reign would be free from the influences of special interests,
however defined. Even Painter (2009) acknowledges that ‘Neither this President nor any other can avoid the fact that the more money flows through government’. Government officials are unable to stop the industry that profits from the campaign finance system, and are highly unlikely to enforce effective ethical rules that distance themselves from the flow of money, because governments profit from the system through campaign contributions, job offers for themselves and their staff and many other advantages (Painter 2009). There are big similarities between lobbying reform in general and campaign finance reform, since lobbying often involves campaign finance issue. Many lobbyists and their organizations give individually to political campaigns and their organizations may help to organize bundled donations to help candidates win elections (Apollonio, Cain & Drutman 2008).
Whether Obama’s policies have made an impact or not is up for debate, fact is that political spending on campaigns has risen to a record high during his reign (Franz 2013). Where in 2004 the total amount of money spent in the election was 4 billion, this amount has risen to over 5 billion in 2008 and as much as 6 billion was spend during the presidential election cycle of 2012. Of these 6 billion, more than one billion was spent directly by outside groups (Franz 2013).
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While during the election cycle of 2008 only 2.8 percent of the ads about the election were produced by outside interest groups, this amount increased dramatically to a staggering 59.13 percent in 2012 (Franz 2013).
The huge increase in election spending is one of the consequences of the Supreme Court decision of 2010 in the case Citizens United vs. The Federal Election Commission. Here, The Supreme Court ruled that corporations, unions and other groups are allowed to spend money to influence the election in any way they want. This decision has fundamentally altered election campaigns and has the effect that candidates spent most of their time on fundraising (Grim & Siddiqui 2013). As Ted Cruz (Hohmann 2005) told pro-gun activists during his campaign in New Hampshire:
"I've told my six-year-old daughter, 'Running for office is real simple: You just surgically disconnect your shame sensor,'" he said. "Because you spend every day asking people for money. You walk up and say, 'How are you doing, sir? Can I have money? Great to see you, lovely shirt, please give me money.' That’s what running for office is like."
Candidates thus spend most of their time raising money, while there is a huge increase in campaign funds combined with the fact that this increase comes mostly from a small number of large companies and individuals. The question that rises is: What do these businesses and individuals get back for the money they spend on these elections? And is the increase in campaign spending by corporations problematic?
Since Campaign money can buy valuable campaign advertisements that increase the chances of being elected significantly (Gordon & Hartmann 2010), it would be logical to suspect that legislators who are devoting so much of their time to raising money will sometimes choose to satisfy the needs of contributing donors above the needs of voters. Many political philosophers condemn the influence of money by corporations as it may lead to political corruption and thereby forms a threat against democracy (Pierre et al. 2000). Although this logical line of reasoning might have an intuitive appeal, the measured influence of campaign donations on the behavior of legislators is by no means clear. Political literature shows that there is little evidence that confirms the image of the big influences of large companies that lead to political corruption (Grenzke 1989, Pierre et al. 2000, Milyo & Cordis 2013, La Raja & Schaffner 2014). If the monetary contributions of companies given to candidates do not give them much of influence, than why do companies invest in political campaigns?
McMenamin (2012) distinguishes two reasons for why companies will invest in a political campaign. The first reason is support for ideological reasons; companies can invest in a political candidate whose ideology matches the ideology of the company. For example, companies producing solar panels will give money to a Green candidate in the hope that
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after the candidate is elected he will produce green policies which are beneficial for the company.
The second important reason for companies to put money in an election campaign is pragmatic lobbying (McMenamin 2012). Decision makers will grand easier access to
lobbyists of companies that have helped them win the election. More on the workings of the access theory of lobbying will be explained in the theoretical framework of this paper.
The assumption that interest groups that donate large amounts to political campaigns can have influence on congressional policies is an area that is studied in many academic political studies (Strattman 2002). While direct political corruption is rarely found in these studies, some studies suggest that there is a direct relation between campaign contributions and votes of legislators in the senate. Other researchers point out that there are several problems with these conclusions and that the significant correlations found do not justify the conclusion that money influences legislation, since companies usually spent money on candidates who already support their causes (Strattman 2002). Less research is done on the theory that money from interest groups does not buy them legislation, but instead buys access to the legislators. Research on access indicates that this is indeed the case in the US congress (Langbein 1986, Brodbeck et al. 2013).
The aim of this paper is to test whether the money interest groups spend does indeed gain them access. Instead of measuring the influence of campaign donations on access to members of congress this paper will measure whether money spend on the presidential election by interest groups gets them access to the white house. The impact of campaigns contributions will be measured by the access it provided to the White House. Since 2009, all visits to the White House have been released and it can be verified with whom the President had meetings. By comparing this variable with the independent variable campaign donation this thesis will measure whether contributing to the campaign of Obama provided access to the lobbyist of companies. Thereby holding Obama’s record of tough rhetoric against the influences of Washington lobbyists as the standard against which his actions in the white house will be measured.
The paper will start with the definitions of the used terms in this paper. This is followed by the theoretical framework which explains the state of the art of academic research on the access theory of campaign finance. Next, the research design will be explained, including the variables that are tested, the hypotheses, the data gathering, the data analysis, and the issues that arose while the data was gathered. After that, the results will be presented and checked against the hypotheses. The conclusion will summarise the findings and present suggestions for further research.
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Definitions
Organization: An organization is defined in accordance with the definition provided by
Richmond et al (2009): as an organized collection of individuals working interdependently within a relatively structured, organized, open system to achieve common goals.”
Interest groups: Interest groups are defined as such by three key factors (Beyers et al.,
2008: 1106-7): Organisation, political advocacy, and informality. First, interest group politics concern aggregated individuals’ political behaviour and organised forms of political
behaviour. Second, these groups are involved in political advocacy, i.e. they attempt to use political means to reach their goals. Third, interest groups do not aim to have their members elected in parliament or government offices. In this sense they are ‘informal’ (Beyers et al., 2008: 1106-7). However, interest groups can have internal elections.
Lobbyist: A lobbyist will be defined in accordance with the definition of lobbyist.info as: a
person who advocates on behalf of himself or a client to pass a law or to make changes to a bill being considered in a federal or state legislative body, or to help shape policy in the executive branch and its regulatory departments. Lobbyists can come from either the private sector or from a legislative affairs department in a federal agency. There are two types of lobbyists: grassroots and professional. The definition is narrowed in accordance with the definition that is set in the Lobbying Disclosure Act Guidance of The United States House of Representatives and The United States Senate (Representatives 1996). This act includes the following definition of a lobbyist: “any individual (1) who is either employed or retained by a client for financial or other compensation; (2) whose services include more than one
lobbying contact; and (3) whose lobbying activities constitute 20 percent or more of his or her services during a three-month period.” If this is the case, then this person must register as a lobbyist under the Lobbying Disclosure Act.
Public Official or Legislator: I will use the terms legislator and public official
interchangeable and I will follow the definition in accordance with the lobbying disclosure act (Representatives 1996). A public official includes an elected or appointed official, or an employee of a Federal, state, or local unit of government in the United States. There are five exceptions to this definition, including a college or university, a government-sponsored enterprise, a public utility, guaranty agency, or an agency of any state functioning as a student loan secondary market. The 1998 amendments to the LDA expanded the definition of a public official in Section 3(15)(F) to add a group of governments acting together as an international organization.
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Money Talks
The establishment of a representative democracy with a presidential system ensures that winning elections gives presidential candidates the right to govern. Freedom of speech plays a critical role as it helps citizens to get informed so they can make an informed decision on who they would like to be represented by (BeVier 1985, Smith 1997). Freedom of speech gives citizens not just the rights to express themselves, but also gives the public access to discussion and the freedom the spread information and ideas. It is constitutionally forbidden for the state to make laws that abridge freedom of speech and contract the spectrum of available knowledge (Dalal 2001).The first amendment also gives citizens permission to use information to persuade one another. It allows citizens to communicate with their
representatives and allows candidates to communicate back to voters and gather electoral support (BeVier, 1985). Freedom of speech is thus a crucial part of a representative democracy as it affects political outcomes as well as political victory.
Speech is usually easy to recognize, addressing a public is speech, an article in a newspapers, and pamphlets as well as the editorial decisions of newspapers about
publication are all forms of speech (Smith 1997). It gets however difficult when we need to define action-symbolic speech instead of the spoken or printed word. The first amendment however also protects symbolic forms of speech, such as the display or burning of a flag, wearing clothing to protest, or holding a parade (Smith 1997). Not only does money permit the purchase of communication giving a monetary gift to a political candidate is also a form of protected symbolic speech, since the action is intended to convey support for a
candidate(BeVier 1985). People in favor of limiting campaign contributions want to ban these contributions exactly for the message it conveys. Some proponents of stricter regulations state that the first amendment protects the freedom of expression of an individual, but spending money on a candidate is not entitled to the same amount of
constitutional protection as it is ‘speech by proxy’ (Powe 1982). Problematic with this stance is that nearly all political campaign speech is proxy speech. When vice-presidential
candidates or family members speak on the behalf of the president it is proxy speech, as well as the campaign advertisements and even most of the campaign speeches that candidates give are written by others. Individuals often join in giving money to others to speak for them because it enhances the impact of the message they want to convey (Powe, 1982).
The right to free speech however is not an absolute as some speech is forbidden, like for instance shouting fire in a packed theater (Scanlon 1972). Proponents of campaign finance regulation are applying this principle to campaign finance and argue that the political speech in the form of money should be restricted because it corrupts the political process (BeVier 1985). Most of the influences of campaign money are exerted through subtle
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means of influence, rather than the narrow defined definition of corruption as an exchange of money for votes. Campaign contributors for instance enjoy more than their fair share of access to political decision makers (Smith 1997). Most reformers want to change this perceived imbalance of political power. Proponents of campaign reform argue that liberty means the opportunity to express yourself in a society in which ideas are judged evenly. Increasing the influence of organizations with large resources would be at the expense of the voice of the individual and thereby lead to a net loss of freedom (Cox 1980).
While the first amendment does protect against quid pro quo corruption, it is not a rule that was set in order to enhance the relative voice of people. Limiting the size of political contributions however would place serious constrains on the efforts of groups and individuals to effectively advocate their positions (BeVier 1985, Smith 1997). Money can facilitate
political speech while it can also have a big influence on the outcome of elections, since the more money is spent on a candidate the better the chances are of winning (Alexander 1976, Lioz & Fund 2003). The attempts to have an influence on political outcomes are legitimate functions of the right of freedom of expression. Campaign contributions therefor have a legitimate function in a democracy as they can be used to spread information or persuade other citizens about certain issues or candidates. Placing monetary limits on speech would restrain the ability of citizens to scope the extent of their political participation (Smith 1997).
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Perspectives on access
Austin-Smith describes three different reasons for why contributors may seek access to political legislators. The first is reason is in line with Snyder (1990), in this perspective candidates promise to deliver as many factors as possible to maximize contributions. They can however only make a few credible promises to deliver, since all favors need resources such as time and money time and these resources are very limited once the candidates are in office. Interest groups spend money to make sure that the candidate will deliver on his promise and the campaign investment is just to make sure that there is a return on
investments (Snyder 1990). Access is in this case implicit and indeed; just a euphemism for securing the return on investment (Austin-Smith 1995).
The second perspective on access is a perspective held by Hayes (1981) he assumes that access is mostly symbolic. Interest groups are seeking access to signal their importance. Access is in this perspective a way for groups to maintain and increase their membership base. Under this view legislators seek campaign contributions and influences of groups contributing is mostly incidental. This perspective places the power in the hands of the legislators who decide whether or not they recognize an interest group. "Groups that pressure or antagonize policymakers may forfeit access and thus lose the symbolic benefits of being consulted and the opportunities for credit-claiming that go with it" (Hayes 1981:86)
The third perspective is the most dominant in the perspective literature and focuses on information (Austin-Smith 1995). Campaign contributors are determined to get access to a legislator as a return on their investment. Access is hereby an opportunity to share their perspective on an issue. Political analysts agree that access is the primary goal of interest groups, while lobbyists have always recognized that access is the key to persuasion (Austin-Smith 1995). This thesis is primarily concerned with the latest perspective on access.
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Access Theory
Access is linked to campaign contribution through the premise that time and information are valuable resources to politicians (Austen-Smith, 1995). Or as Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963:405) stated: The biggest problem a legislator has is "not how to vote but what to do with his time, how to allocate his resources, and where to put his energy". When politicians are uncertain about how they should act, they will therefor seek information from experts on the issue. Lobbyists can often provide valued expertise and perspective on the issues and regulatory matters that legislators face (Apollonio et al. 2008). Since time is such a valuable resource, legislators can only choose to listen to a small amount of possible sources of information (Austen-Smith 1995) When a legislator picks someone to whom he will listen they will do so, at least partially on the base of who has provided them with contributions during the campaign (Austen-Smith, 1995).The actions a legislator will take are partially dependent on the information they will get regarding the consequences of their actions. Interest groups will provide this information in such a way that it is to their own strategic advantage (Austen-Smith, 1995).When Herndon (1982) conducted several interviews with interest groups involved in the lobbying process they immediately stressed the importance of access. Lobbyists of interest groups stated that the main effect of campaign donations was that it gave access to legislators or their staff. Access does not consist of access to special events but instead usually consists of one-on-one meetings with a decision maker. The money spend on political campaigns often achieve nothing more than an answer to a phone call (McMenamin 2012). As one lobbyist replied in his interview with Herdon (1982) to the question what he expected in return of campaign contributions:
"About all you get is a chance to talk to them. And that's all you need when the angels and right are on your side. If you have a good case, you
can win them over. But you have to be able to talk to them."
Campaign contributions and access produce a system in which interest groups and politicians seek a beneficial relationship. These relationships are a reciprocal exchange between rational actors, as interest groups seek the highest return on their investments, while politicians seek campaign contributions (McMenamin 2012). Favorable action on legislation issues that affects them is one of the things that interest groups seek. The relationship between these actors however is one of implicit exchange: quid pro quo
exchange of money for favors is considered bribery; actors therefore have to speculate about the credit they have gained with the other party (Hall & Wayman 1990). The number of lobbyists an organization has is highly related to the amount of lobbying in which an
organization is engaged. Organizations that seek access on multiple issues should therefor attempt to gather additional resources to hire more lobbyists (Leech 2006). Interest groups
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that contribute to campaigns expect at least some special consideration to the efforts of their lobbyists (McMenamin 2012). As Justin Dart, a former lobbyist once noted about his
interactions with politicians: "dialogue is a fine thing, but with a little money they hear you better"(Wertheimer 1986). Instead of legislation interest groups will pursue access as a proximate goal of pursuing the legislative desired outcome (Hall & Wayman 1990).Access is crucial to agency as it gives an interest group the possibility to let legislators know that a certain issue is important to them (Hall & Wayman 1990). As senator Charles Mathias stated (Wertheimer 1986):
“An official may not change his or her vote solely to accommodate the views of such contributors, but often officials, including myself, will agree to meet with an individual who made a large contribution so the official can hear the contributor's concerns and make the contributor aware these concerns have been considered”.
The result of special treatment of large campaign financers will be that other citizens are denied the ability to confer with elected officials which they otherwise may have gotten (Wertheimer 1986). The effect of campaign finance will thus at least be that politicians distort the representativeness of deliberations, which is a measure that is used to evaluate the legitimacy of legislative assemblies (Hall & Wayman 1990). Money may also affect the representativeness of political decisions, by selectively subsidizing the costs of information. Through their campaign contributions groups will affect the intensity with which their positions are promoted by their lobbyists. Therefor not all preferences of the people will be weighted equally as money will determine this at least partly. PACs of interest groups are increasingly dominating the political process by providing donors access and influence (Wertheimer 1986).
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Picking how to spend resources
An interest group can direct its lobbying to legislators that tend to agree with the position a lobbyist takes or they can try to target those who are against their groups’ position and try to sway their votes. Most researchers support the idea that lobbyists seek access and will do so mostly with legislators who already agree with them.
Lobbying hereby encourages and reinforces the bond that already exists between an interest group and a legislator (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963). Dexter (1969) notes that lobbyist will most of the time act to reinforce strengthen and reassure legislators who tend to be on their side. Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963) also stated that directing persuasion to opposed legislators is just a minor activity of lobbyists.
Hayes (1981) claims that interest groups that spend their resources on opposition parties or are putting too much pressure on legislators who they agree with, can be denied access and lose the benefits of being consulted such as the opportunity of credit-claiming. Smith (1996) agrees with Hayes, by stating that interest groups who contribute to campaign must be careful with who they give money to. When they give money to challengers it will work counterproductively as it sets bad blood with legislators who may in return decrease their access.
Austen-Smith & Wright (1994) however oppose this view and offer an alternative explanation to the actions of interest groups. Austen-Smith & Wright propose the idea that organizations lobby their opponents as well as their supporters. Lobbying friendly legislator is a strategic effort to counter proposals of opponents. Austen-Smith & Wright (1994) conclude that groups spend most of their time lobbying their opponents to be able to counter their proposals.
Chamon & Kaplan (2013) differentiate between special interest groups who are not party affiliated and a second group which consists of general interest groups who are affiliated and will prefer one candidate winning over the other. Chamon & Kaplan (2013) agree with Austin-smith & Wright (1994) that interest groups will not only contribute
resources to friendly legislators. The most important to legislators is to get more support than their opponent since candidates who are able to gain the most support from special interest groups are more likely to win elections. Therefor the net contribution is most important to candidates (Chamon & Kaplan 2013). For example if an interest group were to spend 10000 dollars on the republicans and 2000 on the democrats, the net contribution would be 8000 dollars while the other 4000 dollars would be redundant. Special interests may however use this redundant money as a way to gain influence. Redundant money shows politicians that the interest group is willing to put more money into the process as well as that they are willing to contribute to the campaign of the opposition.
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By threatening to sway their money from one candidate to the other, they would thereby gain strategic leverage over the office holder. Murakami (2008) shows that interest groups indeed may at times threaten candidates to donate to the other side. They may even carry these threats out and retaliate against a candidate. The closer the race the more influence these threats carry out. When a candidate is likely to win however, special interest groups will increase their net contribution to the winning candidate.
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Hypotheses
A number of expectations follow from the existing literature about how campaign contributions may have an effect on the access of interest groups to legislators. These expectations will form the hypotheses that will be tested within this research.
The first expectation derives from the article of (Leech 2006), who stated that interest groups that have more lobbyists will gain more access than interest groups that do not. We will thus expect a significant positive correlation between the number of lobbyists and to the number of times that access was given to an interest group this will become our third hypothesis (H1).
The second expectation that derives from the literature is that interest groups will gain more access to legislators when they contribute more money to their election campaigns. This research will thus expect a significant positive correlation between the amounts of money interest groups gave to a candidate, in this case Obama, and to the number of times that access to the white house was given to them. This will become the first hypothesis (H2).
The third expectation that derives from the article of Smith (1996) is that interest groups that spend money on political opponents of candidates are getting less access to the legislator when he or she gets elected. We thus expect to see a negative correlation between the amounts of money interest groups gave to political opponents, in this case McCain in 2008 and Romney in 2012, and the number of times that access to the white house was given to them. This will become the second Hypothesis (H3).
The fourth expectation derives from the article of Chamon & Kaplan (2013) who stated that the net campaign contribution is the most important thing to candidates. Therefor we expect that the net campaign contribution an interest group gave to a candidate is
significantly positive related to the number of times that access to the white house was given to them. This will become the fourth hypothesis (H4).
The fifth expectation also derives from the article of Chamon & Kaplan (2013) who stated that redundant money gives interest groups leverage over legislators, we will therefor expect that the amount of redundant campaign contributions an interest group has is
significantly positive related to the number of times that access to the white house was given to them. This will become the fourth hypothesis (H5).
The sixth and final expectation that is derived from the article of Chamon & Kaplan (2013) is that interest groups who do not spent money on either of the candidates during a political campaign will have less leverage over political officials since they have not shown willingness to contribute and are unable to make credible threats that can give them leverage. This research will therefor expect that less campaign contributions lead to less access to the white house for these groups. This will become the sixth hypothesis h6.
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H1 More campaign contributions for Obama lead to more access to the white house H2 More campaign contributions to political opposition leads to less access to the
white house
H3 More lobbyists will lead to more political access to the white house.
H4 Larger amounts of net campaign contributions to Obama leads to more access to the white house
H5 More redundant contributions lead to more access to the white house
H6 More campaign contributions to either side leads to more access to the white house
Data collection
Forty-five organizations that all fit the definition interest group (Beyers et al, 2008: 1106-7) have been selected to measure the effect of campaign contributions to access. These interest groups have been selected on base of their presumed impact on the elections of 2008 and 2012. Large campaign contributors will enjoy a more than average share of access according to the theory (Cox 1980, Smith 1997. The interest groups that have been selected are therefore the top contributors to the elections of 2008 and or 2012. The campaign
spending data of these groups are derived from opensecrets.org which is known to be the world’s most comprehensive database for analyzing lobbying data and federal campaign contributions (Auble 2013). Only the top 20 contributors to the presidential campaigns will be considered as top contributors, the top contributors to the Obama campaign are outlined in the Appendix 1. To control for the possible negative effect of spending on opponents which is assumed by Smith (1996) this research will also evaluate the access of the top 20
contributors to the campaigns of McCain of 2008 and Romney of 2012, these interest groups are outlined in Appendix 2. The data about how much certain firms contributed comes from the database of The Center for Responsive Politics. The Center collects and organizes information from the lobbying disclosure forms into a database located at the website OpenSecrets.org.
The third group that is researched consists of 7 large companies that have not contributed significantly to any of the candidates in these presidential campaigns. This third group consists of large companies who are all originating in the United States and they are outlined in appendix 3. The aim of adding these interest groups was to enlarge the dataset
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and to add groups who might have less access since they may lack value as a consequence of a lack of redundant money (Chamon & Kaplan 2013). The research of deFigueredo & Silverman (2006) proves that large interest groups, particularly large corporations are more likely to engage in lobbying efforts compared to smaller groups such as small businesses. The same pattern exists with large universities when they are compared to smaller ones (deFigueredo & Silverman 2006). The added companies were therefor selected because they were all consistently ranked in the top 100 of fortunes global 500list of largest
companies in the world (as seen in fortune) during the years investigated. An exception is made for Cargill which is privately owned and thereby not included in the fortunes global 500. Yet in size and revenue Cargill is comparable to the other top companies in the US and if Cargill were a publicly held company, it would have consistently been in fortunes top 500. Cargill would have ranked 10th on the list of the largest U.S. companies in 2013 (Cargill 2014). The second type of data that was needed was to see how many lobbyists each firm had during the years we investigate.
The data about individual lobbyists who worked for these interest groups was also compiled out of the database of The Center for Responsive Politics, located at the website OpenSecrets.org. The website names the individuals working as lobbyists as well as well as the companies they work for. This data is derived from their personal registrations as
lobbyists which they are obligated to by law since the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. The third source of data which will make our independent variable is derived from the visitors access records that the White House has released. These records are part of
Obamas commitment to open up the government to the public under the voluntary disclosure policy. The White House visitors’ access records list all the visits of everyone that has visited the White House during the Obama presidency. To create the independent variable which is whether a lobbyist has visited the White House, the names of individual lobbyists had to be checked against the database of the White House to check whether the individual had been given access.
The database also shows to some extend the contents of the visit as it shows to which building access was given, and whether the President, the Vice-President or the First Lady of the United States was met during their visit. All the incidences in which lobbyists accessed the white house as part of a visiting tour were removed. As this access cannot be contributed to campaign donations, as it is freely available for everyone and it is very unlikely that during a visiting tour lobbyists were given the chance to have influence on any of the public officials.
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Data selection and Validity
Unfortunately not all previously mentioned contributors could be analyzed. In 2008 the big contributors to Obama; Sidley Austin LLP and Wilmer Hale LLP, did not have any registered lobbyists working for them in 2008. While 2 other large donors were government agencies who of course also do not have any lobbyists working for them. These companies are there for excluded from the analysis. Three of McCain’s biggest donors fell off because of their status as government agency while Greenberg Traurig LLP and Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher fell off because they did not have any lobbyists working for them. Two special cases are the Wachovia Group who due to corporate take-over will be analyzed as part of Bank of America, and Merrill Lynch who due to its corporate take-over will be analyzed as part of Wells Fargo. During the 2012 election Obama got the support of 3 government agencies, and DLA Piper who had no lobbyists. A special case is Kaiser Permanente who did not have in lobbyists working for them in 2013 but will be examined for 2009 when they did employ lobbyists. For Romney the following contributors did not have any lobbyists working on their behalves: HIG Capital, Kirkland & Ellis, Barclays and the Rothman Institute.
The second problem derives from the differences between the database of The Center for Responsive Politics and the White House visitors’ access record. Both datasets register the names of individuals unfortunately they do not always apply the same standards. Instances of this include many persons who were registered in one database by their nickname like Chris, or Joe while they were registered in the other database by their full names such as Christopher or Joseph. A similar problem arises when they were registered in one database as for example Steve Smith, while they were named Steve N. Smith in the other. As the White House visitors access record consists out of more than 5.3 million
records of access it was at times impossible to be a hundred percent sure whether a lobbyist had visited the white house or not. These problems were however quite incidental, and I do not expect any problems concerning the validity of outcomes.
The last problem which may have an impact on our data is that the white house visitor’s access records do not report the reason for visit. Lobbyists often work for multiple companies at the same time and although most of the lobbyists that were analyzed did not work for multiple giant corporations, who are more likely to get access we cannot be sure on whose behalf the access to the white house was granted.
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Data Overview
There were a total of 1167 times that lobbyists from the 39 different interest groups were given access to the white house. The access of these 39 interest groups were analysed for the years 2009 and 2013. Not all interest groups could be researched for both years since interest groups did not always have hired lobbyists in both years. The number of cases in which an interest groups access to the white house could be analysed is there for 75.
The 39 interest groups can be divided into 7 different categories according to their campaign distribution statistics.
The first category consists of 13 interest groups who have been subject to 25 of the 75 cases. This first group consist of interest groups who had a clear preference of Obama in 2008 as well as 2012 in terms of campaign contributions. The second category consists of groups consists of interest groups that were in favour of Obama in 2008 while taking a neutral stance in 2012. This category exists of 1 interest group; The University of Michigan. The interest group has been researched in 2008 and 2012 making it 2 out of the 75 cases. The third category consists of interest groups that were clearly in favour of Obama in 2008 while they were Pro Romney or Anti-Obama in 2012. This category consists of 10 different interest groups that have attributed 18 of the 75 cases. The fourth category consists of 2 interest groups that contribute to 3 of the 75 cases. This group took a neutral stance in terms of campaign contributions to Obama in 2008 while taking the same neutral position in 2012, while spending a lot of money on both sides of the presidential election thereby giving it a lot of redundancy value. The fifth category consists of interest groups that took a neutral position in 2008 while they spent a lot of money; they however swayed their campaign contributions to Romney in 2012. The fifth category consists of 4 companies that made up 7 of the 74 cases that were invested. The sixth category consists of interest groups that did not contribute a significant amount of money to either of the candidates in 2008 or 2012. They are there for seen as neutral as they do not use their power to influence the election in a significant way. Because they do not spend they are also said to have very little redundancy value since they have not shown that they are willing to contribute money to a presidential candidate. This category consists of 7 different interest groups 14 out of the 75 cases. The seventh and final category consists of interest groups that were in favour of McCain in 2008 while they were also in favour of Romney in 2012. This category consists of 3 groups that made up 6 of the 75 cases. The graphs below display the percentages of the different categories have, followed by their numeric amount of access they gained displayed as a percentage of the whole.
20
Categories of interest group displayed as percentage of the total amount of cases that were researched
Percentage of the total amount of access to the white house that was given to lobbyists to interest groups from different categories.
21
Analysis
The next step in the analysis is to test whether there is a significant positive correlation between the number of lobbyists an interest group had hired, and the frequency a company got access to the White House. This is of course answering the H1 hypothesis. The
significance of the correlation between these two variables will be determined through the conducting of a Pearson correlation test. The strength of the relationship is indicated by the r coefficient while it is measured by the r2.
The hypotheses; H2, H3, H4 and H5 are also questions in which a correlation between 2 continues variables is assumed. All these hypotheses will therefore be subjected to the same Pearson Correlation test. For the H2, H4 and H5 this research expects a significant positive correlation while the H3 a negative correlation is expected.
The next step in the analysis is to determine whether the differences between the groups that we established in the previous part were significantly different from each other. A one-way Anova test will determine whether the observed differences between the number of visits that each group got are significantly different from each other or if they can be explained by mere chance. When there is a significant difference among groups, the post-hoc Hochberg will reveal where these differences come from. The Games Howell post-post-hoc test is in case we cannot assume equality of variances. This test will only be conducted if the statistics fail the levene test, otherwise we would use a One-way Anova with post-hoc Hochbergs GT to research whether the H6 can be accepted or not. The test may also reveal evidence that help to prove H2 and H3 in case the test shows clear differences between the first and seventh group.
If the One-way Anova with post-hoc Hochbergs GT does not reveal evidence that leads to the acceptance of H6 there will be an additional test conducted. In this case, the sixth group, which is the only group of non-contributors, is measured against the rest of the groups of contributors. To establish this there needs to be a dummy variable set up which allows comparing the means of the group 6 against the means of the rest of the groups. Afterwards the establishing of a dummy variable, a sample t-test is used to test whether the mean of the sample of non-contibution interest groups differs significantly from the group of contributing interest groups.
Results
The results part of this research shows the results from that were given by applying the research analyses method that was given in the previous part.
The regression analyses which are plotted through the computer software program for data-analyzing SPSS are shown in this chapter. At first the variables of the first hypothesis; namely lobbyist number and the number of times a lobbyist has visited the white house are tested on regression.
Figure 3 shows the regression plot with an intercept slope.
H1:
Model Summary Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 1 ,716a ,512 ,506 13,181
a. Predictors: (Constant), Lobbyistnumber
As shown in the table above spss shows a model summary which shows the R square, the adjusted R square in this table is 0,506 this means that 50.6 percent of all the variance in visit
frequency can be explained by the number of lobbyists that a company has. After that it drawed the Anova table underneath. This table calculates significance between the two variables. As
seen in this table the significance is 0,000. This is a lower number than the alpha of 0,05 which means that the lobbyist number an interest group has, has a significant influence on the number
of visits lobbyists of these interest groups were able to get at the White House. The coefficients table does not have a significant constant, so although there is significance it is not possible to
make a regression formula.
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 13331,501 1 13331,501 76,733 ,000b
Residual 12682,979 73 173,739
Total 26014,480 74
a. Dependent Variable: VisitFrequency b. Predictors: (Constant), Lobbyistnumber
Coefficientsa Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 1 (Constant) ,994 2,254 ,441 ,661 Lobbyistnumber ,421 ,048 ,716 8,760 ,000
H2: The variables of the second hypothesis; namely the amount of money that was spend on the presidential campaign of Obama and the number of times a lobbyist has visited the white house are tested on regression.
Figure 4 shows the regression plot. The Number of visits is coded as Frequency, while the amount spend on the campaign of Obama is coded as ObamaMoney.
( Figure 4)
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 1 ,347a ,120 ,108 17,708
a. Predictors: (Constant), ObamaMoney
The R squared score is 0,120 this means that 12 percent of the variance in visit frequency can be explained by the amount of money an interest group has given to Obama.
The table above shows a model summary which shows the R square. The adjusted R square in this table is 0,120 this means that 12 percent of all the variance in visit frequency can be
explained by the amount of money an interest group spent on the Obama Campaign. After that it has drawn the Anova table underneath.
As seen in this table the significance is 0,002. This is a lower number than the alpha of 0,05 this means that the amount of money an interest group has given to Obama has, had a significant
influence on the number of visits lobbyists of these interest groups were given to the White House.
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 3124,484 1 3124,484 9,964 ,002b
Residual 22889,996 73 313,562
Total 26014,480 74
a. Dependent Variable: VisitFrequency b. Predictors: (Constant), ObamaMoney
Coefficientsa Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 1 (Constant) 9,090 2,895 3,140 ,002 ObamaMoney ,018 ,006 ,347 3,157 ,002
a. Dependent Variable: VisitFrequency
The regression formula is also significant, it is therefore possible to calculate the one without knowledge of the other based on the regression formula Y = 9.090 + 0.18x. Y = the number of lobbyists that visited the White House X= Money spend on the Obama campaign. The B score of 0.018 is positive which means that on average more money does indeed lead to more visits to the white house. For every extra visit that an interest group gets, they also have on average an additional 0.018 units of money. The money is set at the average that was spent on Obama. The test is sig of 0,002 means that the test is significant therefor we can accept the H2 hypothesis.
H3: The variables of the third hypothesis; namely the amount of money that was spend on an opponent of Obama during an election; and the number of times a lobbyist has visited the white house are tested on regression.
Figure 5 shows the regression plot.
(figure 5)
Correlations
VisitFrequency
OpponentMone y Pearson Correlation VisitFrequency 1,000 -,046
OpponentMoney -,046 1,000
Sig. (1-tailed) VisitFrequency . ,349
OpponentMoney ,349 .
N VisitFrequency 75 75
Model Summary Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 1 ,046a ,002 -,012 18,858
a. Predictors: (Constant), OpponentMoney
The table above shows a model summary which shows the R square, The adjusted R square in this table is -0,012 this means that 1,2 percent of all the variance in visit frequency can be explained by the amount of money an interest group spent on the Opponent of Obama. The Anova table underneath shows that the test significance is 0,697 this is higher than the alpha of 0,05 therefor we cannot accept the H3 hypothesis.
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 54,168 1 54,168 ,152 ,697b
Residual 25960,312 73 355,621
Total 26014,480 74
a. Dependent Variable: VisitFrequency b. Predictors: (Constant), OpponentMoney
Coefficientsa Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 1 (Constant) 16,230 2,773 5,852 ,000 OpponentMoney -,004 ,010 -,046 -,390 ,697
H4: The variables of the fourth hypothesis; namely the net amount of money that was spend on Obama during an election (this is calculated by the subtracting the amount that was spent on Obama off of the amount spend on obama’s oponents), and the number of times a lobbyist of an interest group have visited the white house are tested on regression. (
Figure 6 shows the regression plot.)
(figure 6)
Correlations
VisitFrequency NetDonation Pearson Correlation VisitFrequency 1,000 ,305
NetDonation ,305 1,000
Sig. (1-tailed) VisitFrequency . ,004
NetDonation ,004 .
N VisitFrequency 75 75
Model Summary Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 1 ,305a ,093 ,081 17,976
a. Predictors: (Constant), NetDonation
The table above shows a model summary which shows the R square, The adjusted R square in this table is 0,093 this means that 9,3 percent of all the variance in visit frequency can be explained by the net donation an interest group made. The Anova table underneath shows that the test significance is 0,08 this is lower than the alpha of 0,08 therefor H4 hypothesis is accepted. This means that the amount of net donation an interest group has, has a significant effect on the number of visits an interest group had to the White House.
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 2425,026 1 2425,026 7,504 ,008b
Residual 23589,454 73 323,143
Total 26014,480 74
a. Dependent Variable: VisitFrequency b. Predictors: (Constant), NetDonation
Coefficientsa Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 1 (Constant) 13,275 2,237 5,934 ,000 NetDonation ,013 ,005 ,305 2,739 ,008
a. Dependent Variable: VisitFrequency
The regression formula is also significant, it is therefore possible to calculate the one without knowledge of the other based on the regression formula Y = 13,275 + ,013X Y = the number of lobbyists that
visited the White House X= Money spend on the Obama campaign. The B score of 0.013 is positive which means that on average more money does indeed lead to more visits to the white house. For every extra visit that an interest group gets, they also have on average spent an additional 0.013 units of Net donation.
H5: H4: The variables of the fifth hypothesis; namely the redundant contributions and the number of times a lobbyist of an interest group have visited the white house are tested on regression. (
Figure 7
shows the regression plot.)
Correlations
VisitFrequency
Redundant_Con tributions
Pearson Correlation VisitFrequency 1,000 ,108
Redundant_Contributions ,108 1,000
Sig. (1-tailed) VisitFrequency . ,178
Redundant_Contributions ,178 . N VisitFrequency 75 75 Redundant_Contributions 75 75 Model Summary Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 1 ,108a ,012 -,002 18,767
a. Predictors: (Constant), Redundant_Contributions
The R squared score isgiven in this table, the adjusted r is -0,002 this means that 0,2 percent of the variance in visit frequency can be explained by the amount of redundant money an interest
group has put into the political process. The Anova table belowe shows that the significance level is 0,355 which is higher than the alpha of 0,05 therefor we have to reject the H5 hypothesis
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 304,865 1 304,865 ,866 ,355b
Residual 25709,615 73 352,187
Total 26014,480 74
a. Dependent Variable: VisitFrequency
b. Predictors: (Constant), Redundant_Contributions
Coefficientsa Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 1 (Constant) 13,704 2,945 4,653 ,000 Redundant_Contributions ,019 ,020 ,108 ,930 ,355
H6:
Test of Homogeneity of Variances
VisitFrequency
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
1,825 6 68 ,107
ANOVA
VisitFrequency
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 1624,492 6 270,749 ,755 ,608
Within Groups 24389,988 68 358,676
Total 26014,480 74
The significance value (sig.) in the Anova table above determines whether the condition means were relatively equal or if there was no significant difference between the groups in terms of their values. Since the significance value is 0,608 which is way bigger than the alpha of 0.05 we therefore cannot conclude that the increase of campaign contributions leads to more access to the White House. We would therefor need to reject our H6 hypotheses on the base of this statistical outcome.
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: VisitFrequency Hochberg
(I) Position (J) Position
Mean Difference
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound Upper Bound ProObama08-ProObama12 ProObama08-Neutral12 16,320 13,917 ,995 -27,39 60,03 ProObama08-ProRomney12 2,653 5,854 1,000 -15,73 21,04 Neutral08-Neutral12-Spending 9,320 11,572 1,000 -27,02 45,66 Neutral08-Against12 8,749 8,099 ,998 -16,69 34,18 Neutral08-Neutral12-nonSpending 7,820 6,322 ,991 -12,04 27,68 ProMcCain08-ProRomney12 12,987 8,610 ,939 -14,05 40,03
ProObama08-Neutral12 ProObama08-ProObama12 -16,320 13,917 ,995 -60,03 27,39 ProObama08-ProRomney12 -13,667 14,116 1,000 -58,00 30,67 Neutral08-Neutral12-Spending -7,000 17,289 1,000 -61,30 47,30 Neutral08-Against12 -7,571 15,185 1,000 -55,26 40,12 Neutral08-Neutral12-nonSpending -8,500 14,316 1,000 -53,46 36,46 ProMcCain08-ProRomney12 -3,333 15,463 1,000 -51,90 45,23 ProObama08-ProRomney12 ProObama08-ProObama12 -2,653 5,854 1,000 -21,04 15,73 ProObama08-Neutral12 13,667 14,116 1,000 -30,67 58,00 Neutral08-Neutral12-Spending 6,667 11,810 1,000 -30,43 43,76 Neutral08-Against12 6,095 8,436 1,000 -20,40 32,59 Neutral08-Neutral12-nonSpending 5,167 6,749 1,000 -16,03 26,36 ProMcCain08-ProRomney12 10,333 8,928 ,996 -17,71 38,37 Neutral08-Neutral12-Spending ProObama08-ProObama12 -9,320 11,572 1,000 -45,66 27,02 ProObama08-Neutral12 7,000 17,289 1,000 -47,30 61,30 ProObama08-ProRomney12 -6,667 11,810 1,000 -43,76 30,43 Neutral08-Against12 -,571 13,069 1,000 -41,62 40,47 Neutral08-Neutral12-nonSpending -1,500 12,049 1,000 -39,34 36,34 ProMcCain08-ProRomney12 3,667 13,392 1,000 -38,39 45,73 Neutral08-Against12 ProObama08-ProObama12 -8,749 8,099 ,998 -34,18 16,69 ProObama08-Neutral12 7,571 15,185 1,000 -40,12 55,26 ProObama08-ProRomney12 -6,095 8,436 1,000 -32,59 20,40 Neutral08-Neutral12-Spending ,571 13,069 1,000 -40,47 41,62 Neutral08-Neutral12-nonSpending -,929 8,767 1,000 -28,46 26,61 ProMcCain08-ProRomney12 4,238 10,537 1,000 -28,85 37,33 Neutral08-Neutral12-nonSpending ProObama08-ProObama12 -7,820 6,322 ,991 -27,68 12,04 ProObama08-Neutral12 8,500 14,316 1,000 -36,46 53,46 ProObama08-ProRomney12 -5,167 6,749 1,000 -26,36 16,03 Neutral08-Neutral12-Spending 1,500 12,049 1,000 -36,34 39,34 Neutral08-Against12 ,929 8,767 1,000 -26,61 28,46 ProMcCain08-ProRomney12 5,167 9,241 1,000 -23,86 34,19 ProMcCain08-ProRomney12 ProObama08-ProObama12 -12,987 8,610 ,939 -40,03 14,05 ProObama08-Neutral12 3,333 15,463 1,000 -45,23 51,90 ProObama08-ProRomney12 -10,333 8,928 ,996 -38,37 17,71 Neutral08-Neutral12-Spending -3,667 13,392 1,000 -45,73 38,39
Neutral08-Against12 -4,238 10,537 1,000 -37,33 28,85
Neutral08-Neutral12-nonSpending -5,167 9,241 1,000 -34,19 23,86
(figure 8)
Since there was no significance found between any of the groups as could be read in the One-way Anova-table, the post-hoc test will also not give any significant differences between groups. We therefor do not find any support for the H2 and H3 hypotheses on the base of this One-way Anova Test. This research however conducts a second more extensive test aimed at finding whether spending money on elections, in general, gives interest groups who donate to political parties more access to legislators.
Second test of H6:
For the second test to be able to judge the H6 hypothesis, a dummy variable was made in order to be able to measure the mean access of the non-spending group against the mean of the rest of the
sample. Afterwards an independent samples test was conducted in which the differences in mean could be measured. The results show that on average the amount of non-spending interest groups had less access as is shown by the lower mean of the group statistic.
Group Statistics
Other Non-Spending N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Visit Frequency Other 61 16,26 19,909 2,549
Dummy-Variable-nonspending 14 12,50 12,623 3,374
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference
Std. Error Difference
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Lower Upper
VisitFrequency Equal variances assumed ,738 ,393 ,675 73 ,502 3,762 5,577 -7,353 14,877
Equal variances not assumed ,890 29,964 ,381 3,762 4,228 -4,874 12,398
The independent t-test shows that the groups variances can be assumed to be equal as the significance of the levene’s test show a significance higher than 0, 05. This means that to find whether the difference between contributing members and non-contributing was significant the significance level of the upside of the table should be taken. The value that is given on the upside of the table is 0,502 which is way higher than the alpha of 0.05. This research therefor has to reject the H6 hypothesis as the differences in mean could be the result of mere chance.
23
Model Summary Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 1 ,716a ,512 ,506 13,181a. Predictors: (Constant), Lobbyistnumber
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 13331,501 1 13331,501 76,733 ,000b
Residual 12682,979 73 173,739
Total 26014,480 74
a. Dependent Variable: VisitFrequency b. Predictors: (Constant), Lobbyistnumber
Coefficientsa Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 1 (Constant) ,994 2,254 ,441 ,661 Lobbyistnumber ,421 ,048 ,716 8,760 ,000
a. Dependent Variable: VisitFrequency
Hypothesis 1 Having more lobbyists will lead to more access to the white house.
Supported
Hypothesis 2 More campaign contributions to Obama lead
to more access to the white house
Supported
Hypothesis 3 More campaign contributions to political opposition leads to less access to the white house
Rejected
Hypothesis 4 Larger amounts of net campaign contributions to Obama leads to more access to the white house
Supported
Hypothesis 5 More redundant contributions lead to more access to the white house
Rejected
Hypothesis 6 More campaign contributions to either side leads to more access to the white house
Conclusion
This research started with a quote from Obama during his campaign in 2007 in which he stated that lobbyist that the days of lobbyist were over, and how he had taken on lobbyists and won. While a lot of research by academics has been focused on the academic debate on whether money influences governments, it turned out that incidences in which interest groups could buy legislation that they prefer were very rare (Strattman 2002). Because of this marginal measured influence question raised on why rational interest groups would invest in a political campaign. This has led to a new
perspective which sees campaign contributions mainly as a vehicle through which interest groups can get access to political officials (McMenamin 2012). This access buying function of political campaign money was proven in studies on access to congressman (Langbein 1986, Brodbeck et al. 2013).
The aim of this thesis was testing whether the money interest groups had spent gave
them access to political officials. Instead of analyzing congress as has been done before in many studies, this study measured the influence campaign money had on access to the White House. The reason for studying this type of access is that access is predominantly bought to influence high level officials. It is therefore interesting to see whether campaign contributions also affected the highest public official of the United States.
The theoretical framework has shown that regulations that seek to prevent the
influences of campaign contributions will immediately raise questions of constitutionality. As spending money to promote causes that groups support is an expression of their first amendment (Powe 1982). The theoretical framework also provided information about how academics believe buying political access works. While some believed academics believed that most of the power was in the hands of politicians whose access to interest groups is a favor (Hayes 1980) others placed the power in hands of the interest groups who can use their power of campaign contributions to extort politicians (Chamon & Kaplan 2013) and may retaliate by voting to opponents when they do not deliver.
The theory on how access is provided lead to six hypotheses about whether campaign
contributions lead to more access and giving money to the opposition influences the access that is given to lobbyists of interest groups. The White House visitors records was used to assess whether lobbyist of interest groups were given access. The data on lobbyists was taken from the website of the Center for Responsive Politics. These datasets were combined and tested using regression analysis. One hypothesis was tested through an individual sampled ttest which measured whether there was a difference between companies who spend loads on electoral campaigns and those who only spend small amounts.
The analysis of the data lead to the conclusion of this thesis gives that campaign
contributions to president Obama have led to access for interest groups that contributed to the White House. Campaign contributions to political opposition did not lead to less access for lobbyists of interest groups.
New regulations may have had a significant impact on the way Washington works,
indeed without Obamas effort to create more openness of the government, the visitors’ data which has been used would not have been available and this research would not have been conducted. It seems however from this data that Obama who talked about changing the influence of lobbyists at
Washington and winning back the power for average American people is under the influence of lobbyist himself. As campaign contributions lead to systematically more access to interest groups that provide them. The reason these interest groups remain influential may be partially due to the
systematic influence of the first amendment that protects lobbyists especially since the Citizens United decision. The protection of lobbyists may not have been able to drown out the voices of the American people completely, but lobbyists sure were able to speak a lot.
Suggestions for improvement
The easiest way in which this research can be improved is by adding in more date points. Due to extend of this research only the access of 2009 and 2013 could be tested instead of all the years of the Obama presidency. Especially the sixth hypothesis seemed to lack support due to the small number of cases that this research used. Additional research from other countries in which less money is spent by interest groups can help to extent the research beyond the presidency of the United States.
Especially countries with similar party systems but strict rules on campaign finances may show which other means interest groups have to influence policies. Future research may be able to access what the reasons behind visits where since we now have to speculate if a lobbyist spoke on behalf of the company that was assigned to him.
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