1 Empowered Leadership:
The Influence of the Secretary-General on the Transformation and Adaptation of NATO to a New Security Environment.
Julia Puente Duyn, S1517910 Leiden University
MSc International Organization,
International Institutions and Security Governance Thesis Advisor: Niels van Willigen
Second Reader: Michael Meffert The Hague, 2018
2 INDEX
Abstract 3
Introduction. 3
Literature Review. 5
Broader IR Theories and the relevance of Constructivism 5
The Role of the Secretary-General 9
Theoretical Framework. 10
Methodology 14
Case Study 1 - Javier Solana 15
Solana’s role during NATO’s enlargement in 1997 16
Solana’s Role in the Kosovo Crisis of 1999 18
Case Study 2 - George Robertson 21
Robertson’s Role after 9/11. 22
Robertson’s Role during the Prague Summit in 2002 24
Robertson’s Role in Defending Turkey in 2003 26
Conclusion 29
3 Abstract
NATO has continued to exist after the crumbling of the Soviet Union, which triggers the question: why does it still exist? Principal-Agent theory is used in this thesis as a lens to examine the role of NATO’s secretary-general (the agent) in influencing the organizational transformation and adaptation of NATO in a post-Cold War security environment. As opposed to how Principal-Agent theory describes this relationship between the principal and the agent as one distrust the relation between the allies and the secretary-general is increasingly focused on ‘positive’ cooperation between the two through the mechanism of empowered leadership, which has allowed the organization to adopt transformative changes.
Introduction.
Following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, the USSR was no longer posing a substantial threat to Western European countries or the United States. Thus, the continued relevance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), an alliance formed to counter the Soviet threat in Europe during the Cold War, was put into question when the Soviet Union started to crumble. The persistence of the organization, despite the absence of a Soviet threat, has made NATO an interesting institution to analyze as it has managed to transform itself gradually and to increase its mandate, keeping countries interested in being part of the alliance (Webber et. al, 2012).
Different theories in the school of International Relations such as realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and social constructivism have aimed to provide answers to the following question: Why does NATO still exist? (Hellmann et. al, 1993). Building on the explanations of the broader IR theory Constructivism, there is literature like Mayer's (2014), that aims to further research the survival of NATO by incorporating the mid-range theory of bureaucratic politics, analyzing the latter question from an internal perspective (Mayer, 2014), and stating the importance of social structures like IGOs (Martin & Simons, 2012).
4 Parallel to literature that explores the continued existence of NATO through bureaucratic politics, there is other literature that explores the role of the secretary-general within NATO's bureaucracy and how this role has changed alongside the organization. Therefore, this study, adopting a social constructivist perspective and considering the important role of bureaucracies in shaping international policies as argued by bureaucratic politics, aims to analyze the influence of NATO's key bureaucratic actor, the secretary general, on the organization's transformation through Principal-Agent theory. By using Principal-Agent theory, which is part of bureaucratic politics theory, the focus lies on the role of one bureaucratic actor, the secretary general, in shaping the transformation of NATO. Deriving from the Principal-Agent theory, a new concept, empowered leadership, will be introduced to explain the role of the secretary-general in adopting changes that have influenced NATO’s transformation and thus, it’s survival. By NATO's transformation, it is meant that the organization changed from being a collective, western European, defense organization to one that enlarged its membership including eastern European countries, engaged in military crisis management mission and enlarged it's mission to a global scale by engaging in the fight against terrorism.
Firstly, broader IR theories will be introduced to give an overview of their interpretations of NATO’s survival. Next, the literature on NATO’s changing role and the importance of its bureaucracy will be introduced. Then, the literature on the transforming role of the secretary general will be presented, leading to the question of this thesis: How did the empowered leadership of NATO’s secretary-generals influence the transformation of the organization to adapt to a new, post-Cold War, security environment? Following the research question, a theoretical framework, explaining the concept of empowered leadership, and a methodology section will be presented to clarify how this study will be carried out. This will
5 be followed by an analysis of several case studies, aiming to provide an answer to the study’s research question. Finally, the findings of this study will be summarized in the conclusion.
Literature Review.
Broader IR Theories and the relevance of Constructivism
According to neo-realism, it is assumed that states must take care of their own security, as there is no higher authority that will do this for them (Waltz, 2010). Therefore, states are concerned to increase their relative power in order to survive in an anarchic world (Waltz, 2010), however, the theory does accept states may form alliances out of self-interest to maintain the balance of power (Mearscheimer, 1994; Keohane, 1986). So, in the view of neo-realist theory, NATO’s existence during the Cold War can be explained by the Alliance members’ interest in balancing the Soviet Union’s power in the European territorial area. However, neo-realists have predicted NATO to dissolve once the main threat, the USSR, crumbled (Hellmann et. al, 1993). This has not been the case nevertheless.
On the other hand, neo-liberal institutionalism establishes that states are rational actors capable of cooperation that can emerge from the establishment of international norms and institutions (Keohane & Martin, 1995). According to neo-liberal institutionalism, international institutions can continue to endorse cooperation between states even when the original interests for which they have been set up are no longer in place (Hellmann et. al, 1993). So, unlike neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism has been capable of providing an explanation for the continued existence of NATO after the Cold War. However, according to other authors like Mayer (2014), it has been too abstract to explain the bureaucratic organization of the IOs internal dynamics, which I hypothesize have had a major influence on NATO’s continued existence.
Finally, Constructivism claims that many aspects of international relations are socially constructed by a series of shared norms and values rather than "given by nature" (Wendt,
6 1999). The view of constructivism in IR on international organizations is that they are crucial actors in upholding the norms and values of states, which shape their behavior (Martin & Simmons, 2012). So, even though both neo-liberal institutionalism and social constructivism stress that international institutions are relevant in promoting cooperation between states in international politics, the theories differ from each other (Hellmann et, al. 1993; Martin & Simmons, 2012). Constructivists do not believe international organizations are set-up in a functionalist way by member states in order to cooperate in an anarchic world like neo-liberal institutionalists do (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010). Constructivists refute the assumption that states are operating in an anarchic system, as defined by realists. Instead, they believe everything, including international politics, is socially constructed by shared norms and values (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010). In this case, international organizations are formed to uphold the norms and values held by members of the international society (Martin & Simmons, 2012). Following the constructivist argument, Ian Johnstone has analyzed the role of the UN secretary general and had concluded that the secretary general can take on a role of norm entrepreneur by setting the agenda for particular issues of concern, influencing policy decisions (Johnstone, 2007). Social-constructivism thus allows for other relevant actors to be key in the construction of the ‘international community', including bureaucracies, as has been shown in the study of Johnstone (2007).
Inspired by this study, this thesis aims to adopt a social constructivist perspective to analyze the influence of bureaucracy, more specifically of one bureaucratic actor, the secretary-general, in playing a key role in NATO's transformation and continued existence (Mearscheimer, 1994; Hellmann et. al, 1993). To analyze the role of the secretary-general in NATO's transformation, Principal-Agent theory, which is part of bureaucratic politics theory, which aligns with social constructivism in this particular case will be introduced.
7 NATO’s Changing Role and the Importance of Bureaucracy
After the Cold War, NATO re-invented itself and changed its role in order to adapt to the changing environment in Europe. According to Holmberg, NATO has gone from being a regional defense organization within Western Europe to becoming a security organization on a global scale (Holmberg, 2011). In the face of the debate concerning NATO’s future, a series of new strategic concepts were introduced by the organization at different times (1991, 1999 and 2010), which contained ideas on how to change NATO’s role and tasks concerning security and defense, developing more into a modern security organization. This reform was a product coming principally from member states and was facilitated by the bureaucratic actors within the institution (Holmberg, 2011; NATO, 1991; NATO, 1999). It can be argued that this new role NATO took on as an actor in security governance provided the organization with a new mandate to legitimize itself after the Cold War. This development, parallel to the transformed role of NATO’s secretary general, triggered my interest in analyzing the organization’s continued existence from an internal point of view in NATO, focusing on the role of the secretary general.
According to Mayer (2014), IR theory has recently started to recognize the importance of bureaucratic politics in international organization. The “internationalization” process, described by Mayer, by which “national procedures of planning, decision-making or implementation” in a particular policy area are linked or shifted to IOs has led to their increasing importance (Mayer, 2014, pp.2). This process and the expansion of NATO’s security agenda have increased the significance of the organization’s bureaucracy concerning the building of consensus and implementation of policies to establish security (Mayer, 2014). Furthermore, Pollack (2003) has argued that organizations like NATO can exploit their institutional advantage of knowledge vis-à-vis member-states to increasingly engage in agenda-setting concerning security issues. Another advantage organizations posses, according
8 to Pollack, is their ability to mobilize a coalition to support its mission (Pollack, 2003). Pollack’s argument can be linked to the research by Barnett and Finnemore (2004) on the different types of authority a leader of an IO has, which helps to gain an advantage in steering the organization in the direction they are willing to, therefore transforming and defining it.
According to Barnett and Finnemore (2004), IOs are bureaucracies with authority conferred by other actors. In the view of the authors, this consists of rational-legal authority as well as moral authority and authority gained by their expertise and delegated tasks (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). These types of authorities an IO possesses are instrumental to get other actors to defer to the IO's policies (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). By rational-legal authorities, the authors mean the recognition of that authority by the general public as enhancing a legitimate social purpose and upholding certain values, which empowers them to act as impersonal, general, rule-making bodies. It concentrates mostly on impersonal legalities and procedures and rules of the bureaucracy (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).
IOs also have moral authority, claiming to defend and serve a shared set of values by the international community. This moral stance, the authors claim, is what allows IOs to have a certain degree of autonomy to engage in authoritative action (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). The authors mention that even though defending a set of values is almost always political and partisan, the extent to which IOs present themselves as protectors of the values held and shared by the international community against individual interests, IOs can manage to surface above politics and gain support for their mission (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).
Furthermore, IOs also enjoy expert authority, which can be seen as the basis of rational-legal authority. What makes bureaucratic authority rational is the fact that tasks are carried out by professionals that have the specialized knowledge in the specific policy fields they are working in. This type of authority also helps IOs to present themselves as impartial bodies trying to serve the society for the common good (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).
9 Finally, delegated authority, which is the power given by the principals to the agent, may seem quite limited at first. However, the authors argue that authority is delegated to bureaucracies because states may lack the capacity to carry out certain actions (ex: expertise) and therefore they need bureaucracies to do this job for them. This often results in mandates given to IOs being vague and open to interpretation, which is where the values and expertise of the bureaucracy come in to fill the gap (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Therefore, the authors argue, IOs must have some authority and therefore autonomy, when interpreting and fulfilling their delegated tasks (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).
This theory, describing the possibility of executives having autonomy to steer an organization, will be used later on to explain and identify the empowered leadership, of NATO’s secretary general, which is a new concept that will be developed within the Principal-Agent theory, to explain the secretary-general’s influence on the organization's transformation and adaptation to a post-Cold War security environment, using Principal-Agent theory.
The Role of the Secretary-General
In this paper, the focus lies on the influence of the secretary-general on the transformation of NATO. Robert Cox (1969) wrote about the significance of executive leadership in steering the scope and authority of international organizations, emphasizing the role of secretary-generals in serving IOs in gaining autonomy in the international environment (Cox, 1969). Following Cox's writings on the importance of executive leadership in international organizations, Ryan Hendrickson has analyzed the evolving role of NATO’s secretary general. The official role of the secretary-general in NATO is to serve as the political leader and chief administrator of the organization. His primary responsibilities include leading NATO's international staff, chairing meetings at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and other committees in the alliance like the Military Committee. However, military
10 and political decisions have traditionally always been in the hands of member states, which is still the case today (Hendrickson, 2016).
Nevertheless, the role of the secretary-general has evolved since the end of the Cold War. Due to NATO's transformation and expanding mission after the Cold War, most of the secretary generals that took office after 1991 played a critical role when military action was to be adopted and implemented (Hendrickson, 2006). According to Hendrickson, secretary generals including, Manfred Wörner, Willy Claes, George Robertson and Javier Solana have brought their own diplomatic style and culture to the organization, changing the leadership opportunities of the secretary general in the post-Cold War era. Secretary generals have become increasingly important in the decision-making processes of the organization by their evolving diplomatic, military and political significance. They were instrumental in leading organizational change by achieving consensus among member states when adopting new missions in a post-Cold War security environment. Furthermore, secretary generals started to have an increased leeway to set the agenda for particular issues concerning the organization and its involvement in certain areas of the new security environment (Hendrickson, 2006). The evolving role of the secretary general parallel to the survival of NATO after the Cold War as well as Barnett and Finnemore's theory on institutional leaders' ability to steer an organization have inspired this study on the role of the secretary-general in influencing the continued relevance of NATO in a post-Cold War security environment.
Theoretical Framework.
To answer the main research question I investigate what role the secretary general of NATO had in the bureaucratic structure of the organization by using the Principal-Agent theory. This theory has analyzed problems that arise from the relation between the principal and the agent when the principal delegates authority to the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). According to Eisenhardt, problems arise when "(a) the desired or goals of the principal and
11 agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is doing" (Eisenhardt, 1989).
The principal-agent theory has been used to analyze the behavior of international organizations like the WTO (Graham, 2014), the European Commission (Kassim & Menon, 2003), the IMF and the IDA (Vaubel, 2006). In these studies, the focus lies on explaining the agency problem in these organizations from different perspectives. However, according to Graham (2014), there is a bias towards the power exercised by the principal in the principal-agent framework, which fails to give a complete view on IO behavior. The author states that most analyses of IO's through the PA framework continue to assume IOs are unitary actors and therefore give little importance to the role of bureaucracy (Graham, 2014).
In international organizations, member states (principals) delegate power to an IO (agent) to perform functions that will benefit them, establishing goals for the agent, which are to be pursued with little interference from the principal (Nielson and Tierney, 2003). According to Vaubel (2006), one of the reasons principal-agent problems exist in international organizations is because the delegation chain from principal to the agent is more extended, having the executive of the IO far removed from the principal. It is assumed that international bureaucrats are mainly concerned with the growth and survival of the organization, causing a diverging of goals between the principal and the agent (or international bureaucrats) (Vaubel, 2006). Thus, principals can exercise control over the agent through a number of methods like selecting personnel that reflects their interests, directly monitoring the agent by monitoring important actors like the executive, introducing checks and balances or vetoing decisions made by the agent (Nielson and Tierney, 2003).
Even though the international organization serves as a “scapegoat” for state governments to implement unpopular policies, member-states face costs when delegating authority, like risking information asymmetry between them and the agent (Vaubel, 2006).
12 These information costs are larger on the international level as the fusion of such a large number of international bureaucrats from different backgrounds have the collective aim of furthering the bureaucratic interest of the organization (Vaubel, 2006). This increases the agency problem faced by the principal(s) when delegating authority to an IO (Vaubel, 2006).
However, coming back to Graham’s (2014) statement, there is a bias towards studying how the principal controls the agent. According to the author “empowered leadership has an enhanced ability to shape the organization under a unified vision and coherent goals”, which can benefit both the agents and the principals and the relationship between them. (Graham, 2014, pp). So, for this reason, I want to shift the lens and analyze how the agent, the secretary-general, through obtaining empowered leadership, has managed to cooperate with his principals, the member-states, to accept organizational change in NATO. Thus, central to this study’s analysis secretary general’s role in leading NATO’s transformation to adapt to a new security environment is the concept of empowered leadership, which will now be explained.
The term leadership has many definitions to this day (Bass & Bass, 2009). Bass and Bass have argued that the most appropriate definition of leadership depends on the purpose of the study (2009). Therefore, for this study, I find it is most relevant to define the concept through the character traits that can be observed in a leader. In today’s information age, the most significant characteristics exhibited by leaders are “contributing to social order, introducing major change [in the organization], giving purpose and meaning to work in the organization, empowering followers and infusing organizations with values and ideologies” (Bass & Bass, 2009). This definition is most relevant for studying the leadership of NATO’s secretary-general, as it focuses on the ability of the leader of promoting organizational change and giving (new) meaning to the organization, two factors this study focuses on when analyzing the secretary-general’s role. However, in the context of principal-agent theory, the
13 principal would be the only actor able to carry out the kind of leadership described above, unless it empowers the agent by giving it a considerable amount of trust and leeway to carry out this kind of leadership. Empowered leadership is characterized by the close relationship between NATO’s member states, especially the US, and the secretary-general. This is measured by the amount of trust of the principal in the agent and the degree of leeway the secretary-generals get from the allies to adopt organizational change. I include this concept in the hypothesis because, in NATO's case, the close relationship between the member states (principals) and NATO's secretary general (agent), is reflected in this concept of empowered leadership. In order to measure these indicators, the case studies will be analyzed to determine what type of bureaucratic authority described by Barnett and Finnemore (2004) played role in gaining the secretary-general the sufficient trust and leeway, from the allies to carry out change within NATO.
Having explained the concept of empowered leadership within the Principal-Agent theory, the predictions of this study will now be explained. Having conducted research on the transforming role of NATO's secretary general and the transformation of the organization itself, I hypothesize there is a different dynamic going on between the principals (member-states) and the agent (NATO's secretary general) compared to the main assumptions Principal-Agent makes of this relationship. In the case of NATO, I hypothesize that the relationship between the principals (the member-states) and the agent (NATO's secretary general) is closer and increasingly focused on ‘positive' cooperation, through empowered leadership, rather than a distant power relation where the principal is mainly concerned with imposing its wishes on the agent and monitoring it to prevent information asymmetry. I hypothesize that, through empowered leadership, the secretary-general obtains the trust and leeway needed to influence organizational transformation because of the different kinds of authority he possesses as a bureaucratic actor. This links back to bureaucratic politics theory
14 and social constructivism, which emphasize the influence of bureaucracies and their actors on policies in international organizations. So, considering the relevance and influence of bureaucratic actors in the international arena, I hypothesize that through empowered leadership the secretary-general has been able to influence NATO's transformation and thus it’s continued existence. The different types of authority described, rational-legal, moral, expertise, and delegated authority, will be used to explain how the secretary-generals managed to get empowered leadership from the principals to pursue certain policies that have contributed to the transformation of NATO and its adaptation to a new security environment. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: The closer the relation is between the principal and the agent and the more support the agent gets from the principal, giving the former leeway and trust to lead the organization (empowered leadership), the more success NATO’s secretary general had in influencing the transformation and adaptation of the organization to a changing security environment
Methodology
The influence of two different secretary-generals (Solana and Robertson) on the transformation of the organization will be researched. These two cases are most relevant because a) they are two of the relatively most recent cases which served during pivotal moments of organizational change and b) I hypothesize to find interesting results as these two secretary-generals have carried out their tenure in a dynamic and changing security environment compared to previous secretary-generals who have served in a time where their role as secretary-general was still being shaped and transformed after the end of the Cold War (Hendrickson, 2006).
I will carry out process-tracing throughout these two case studies to analyze whether there have been instances in which the secretary-generals have been instrumental in achieving a certain outcome that influenced the transformation and adaptation of the organization to a
15 post-Cold War security environment. I will do this by looking into official NATO documents as primary sources and academic literature as secondary sources. While process tracing these cases and applying my hypothesis I will observe if there is any evidence of empowered leadership and whether that is positively correlated with instances of organizational change. I will refer to correlation instead of causality as the evidence on this topic is still thin and has to be increasingly researched. Nevertheless, this study will give me the opportunity to research whether there is a relation between the dependent variable of my hypothesis ‘the transformation and adaptation of the organization to a changing security environment’ and the independent variable ‘the increasingly empowered leadership of NATO’s secretary general’.
Process-tracing is the most relevant method to analyze these case studies as it involves a systematic and detailed analysis of qualitative data in the light of the research question and hypothesis (Collier, 2011). Furthermore, process-tracing can contribute to describing political and social mechanisms while evaluating whether there is a correlation between the two variables of the hypothesis (Collier, 2011).
Case Study 1 - Javier Solana
Dr. Javier Solana took office at NATO in 1995 as the ninth secretary general of the organization. A Spanish socialist politician who served as Spain's foreign affairs minister in 1992 got elected to become NATO's secretary general (NATO, 2002). At first, Solana's nomination generated quite some opposition from the US Congress due to Javier's socialist history when exercising his political career in Spain and his previous opposition to Spain joining NATO as the country's foreign affairs minister. However, as the US Congress had no official legislative role in the secretary general's nomination, Solana got elected (Hendrickson, 2006). Nevertheless, during his first two years in office, Solana managed to
16 gain the trust of NATO's member states, most importantly the United States, by helping the organization expand its membership and carrying out a military peacekeeping operation in Kosovo (Hendrickson, 2006).
When Solana entered office the alliance was already undergoing transformation and restructuring in the line of the New Strategic Concept introduced in 1991 to maintain security and stability in Europe (Hendrickson, 2006). The organization had already begun to implement military aspects of the peace agreement in Bosnia under NATO command and was preparing itself for a potential enlargement, which eventually happened in 1997 when Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were invited to join the military alliance (NATO, 1995). Dr. Javier Solana, as the chairman of the North Atlantic Council, the highest decision-making body comprising high representatives of the 16 member countries, was supposed to lead the allies as well as the organization to successfully implement these organizational changes to enhance the goals set out by New Strategic Concept implemented in 1991 (NATO, 2002).
Solana’s role during NATO’s enlargement in 1997
When the time came for NATO's expansion, there were still conflicting views between the allies, mainly between the US and European states, on NATO's enlargement (NATO, 1997). At first, European states were unsure whether to support NATO's enlargement because they feared the consequences this action would have on Europe's relations with Russia (Asmus, 2012; NATO, 1997). Before the Madrid Summit in 1997 and before the issue of expansion even moved to NATO's public agenda, Solana aimed to resolve these differences by negotiating with allies behind closed doors and by bringing their concerns on the issue to the NAC meetings to be mediated (Hendrickson, 2006; NATO, 1997). After substantial bargaining in private meetings and creating a climate of consensus
17 around the issue, member states entrusted the secretary-general to create a Draft Communiqué on NATO's membership expansion, which all parties approved in the end (Hendrickson, 2006).
A Draft Communiqué is an official, legally-binding document which discusses the deliberations of the NAC on a certain issue and the changes adopted after consensus has been reached. Furthermore, these documents address the opinion of the allies about a certain issue, in this case, the expansion of NATO's membership, and provide recommendations of actions to be adopted by the alliance (University of Macedonia, 2017). In his speech “A time for cohesion, a time for renewal” Solana uses his rational-legal and expert authority to provide arguments to the allies to pursue NATO's eastward expansion. Member states entrusted Solana and gave him the leeway to draft this legally-binding document, representing their interests in regards to this change, which can be considered a transformation for NATO. In the Final Communiqué that came out on December the 8th 1998, NATO welcomed three new members: Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to join the alliance, stating this expansion would “contribute to an overall strengthening of the Alliance and enhancing security and stability in Europe” (NATO, 1998).
This example shows how Solana as an agent gained sufficient trust from the allies, the principals, by establishing close relations using his expert and rational-legal authority to convince the allies that adopting this change would be a positive step forward for NATO’s purpose. By doing this Solana managed to get the sufficient leeway to draft the final decision-making document on the expansion of the alliance and successfully move the issue forward, which influenced the transformation of NATO, as the alliance moved eastwards for the first time. It could be argued that the secretary general's expert authority allowed him to convince the allies this change would lead to enhancing NATO's purpose of improving security and stability in Europe. The fact he managed to get the allies to accept NATO's expansion by
18 arguing it was a course of action favoring NATO's broader purpose and values shows Solana also used his moral authority to get empowered and push forward this change. Furthermore, the empowerment of Solana to lead this issue within the organization shows the close relationship between the principal and agent in NATO and the different dynamic this relationship has compared to the problems Principal-Agent theory concentrates on. The end result of Solana's efforts to negotiate and convince the allies to support the enlargement has led to a transformation of the organization to adapt to a new security environment. For this reason, it could be argued there is a positive correlation between the dependent and independent variable of this paper's hypothesis.
Solana’s Role in the Kosovo Crisis of 1999
In 1998 a crisis broke out in Kosovo, after the forces behind the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, mainly coming from Serbia, seized Kosovo and imposed a mixed regime of Communism and Serbian nationalism in the region (Cottey, 2009). Slobodan Milosevic had built an authoritarian regime, claiming to be the defender of Serb minorities in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. However, a part of Kosovo's population was Albanian, who rebelled against the Serbian nationalist regime (Cottey, 2009). The Serbian leader refused to engage in peaceful negotiations and continued his aggression towards the Albanian population in Kosovo which was opposed by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), an ethnic Albanian paramilitary organization that sought the separation of Kosovo from Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Cottey, 2009).
The UN Security Council remained unsure of whether to take on military action in Kosovo to stop the attacks between the KLA and Milosevic's forces, which were causing increasing humanitarian atrocities (Hendrickson, 2006). Mainly the UK and the US believed Milosevic's aggression had to be met with military action, while Russia and China claimed the war in Kosovo was a sovereign issue and could not be interfered with (Hendrickson,
19 2006). As the aggression in Yugoslavia continued and the UN Security Council did not authorize a military intervention, the UK and US turned to NATO, empowering the organization to take action. As China and Russia opposed military action it was evident this would never take place through the authorization of the UN, which is the main reason the UK and US turned to NATO. In the end, NATO authorized military aircraft to fly over Serbian borders in order to deter the continuing of the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo (Hendrickson, 2006).
Solana was calling for military action against Serbia before the allies even turned to NATO (Hendrickson, 2006). However, as most of the European allies including, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Greece and France, favored a peaceful diplomatic solution for the Serbian crisis through the UN, neither Solana nor NATO had much to say on the situation (Hendrickson, 2006). The moment the UN failed to prevent the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Serbia by not allowing a military intervention, the US and UK turned to NATO and then Solana was able to put pressure on the allies, in private, to engage in a military action (Hendrickson, 2006). It can be argued that the main driving force behind Solana’s ability to start advoking a military action policy within NATO was the support of two of the most powerful allies, namely the US and UK.
The secretary-general was an important figure during the bombing campaign in Kosovo, as he was the key actor in leading the organization towards taking military action against Serbia (Hendrickson, 2006). As the chairman of the NAC, Solana managed to create consensus amongst the previously mentioned European allies that were skeptical of NATO's legal authority in taking military action against the Serbs (Hendrickson, 2006; NATO HQ, 1998). Being backed by two of the most predominant allies, the UK and US, Solana set out to create a legal position for the alliance which allowed for him to obtain an Activation Order (ACTORD) from the allies to start preparing for military action in Kosovo (Hendrickson,
20 2006; NATO HQ, 1998). In his effort to find consensus among the allies on the definition of NATO's "sufficient legal basis" to take up military action, Solana again used his diplomatic tactic of negotiating with all allies behind closed doors, never criticizing them in public, in order to obtain support from the European allies to go forward with military action against Serbia (Hendrickson, 2006, pp. 102). In October 1988, a statement to the press by Solana announced that following the NAC's decision on the Activation Order, "limited air strikes and a phased air campaign in Yugoslavia" would be executed in 96 hours (NATO HQ, 1988).
In an interview with the BBC, Solana stated military action in Kosovo had to be undertaken to uphold the values shared by the international community (rational-legal authority) to contribute to a wider social purpose being the protection of human rights by preventing a humanitarian catastrophe (moral authority) as Milosevic refused to engage in peaceful negotiations and a military intervention was the only way to stop him (expert authority) (BBC, 1999). In his speech the secretary-general uses his rational-legal, moral and expert authority when providing arguments in favour of pursuing military action in Kosovo, allowing him to obtain sufficient trust and leeway to create a "sufficient legal basis" for the ACTORD to be accepted by the allies, moving the organization forward in engaging in military action. Solana's role at NATO during the Kosovo crisis is another example of how he, as the agent managed to get empowered by his principals by gaining trust and leeway through his rational-legal, moral and expert authority, allowing him to steer the organization into an armed intervention to prevent a humanitarian crisis. NATO's military intervention in Kosovo "contributed in some measure to the continuing transformation of NATO and the EU" and the adaptation of NATO to the new security environment (Cottey, 2009, pp. 593). This mission particularly contributed to NATO's transformation as it actively engaged in crisis management through military intervention, which was a strategy that was adopted in a post-Cold War environment, transforming NATO from being a defensive to offensive
21 security organization to accomplish its mission (Cottey, 2009). In this case, it is also evident that the relationship between the principal and the agent was closer and increasingly focused on ‘positive' cooperation rather than a distant power relation as is assumed by Principal-Agent theory. The principals' empowerment of Solana to undertake military action in Kosovo transformed NATO's manner of operating and fulfilling its mandate of enhancing peace and security in the European continent. It can be argued this case also shows there is a positive correlation between the dependent and independent variable of this paper's hypothesis.
Case Study 2 - George Robertson
Lord George Robertson served under a completely new security atmosphere which ensued after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11 of 2001(Hendrickson, 2006). The US’s new defense policy on combating terrorism diverged considerably from European allies’ foreign policy interests, which ended up creating a division between the United States and other European members of NATO. These tensions created a challenging environment at NATO, of which Robertson was the key diplomatic actor (Hendrickson, 2006).
Before becoming NATO's secretary-general, Robertson developed his political career as Secretary of Defense in the UK. During his tenure as UK Defense Secretary, Robertson had been an advocate of NATO's military action in Kosovo in 1999, making the American government favor him to take the position as secretary-general at NATO (Hendrickson, 2006). He had also demonstrated his interest in advancing the technological and military capacity of the UK by pursuing a defense transformation, which other European allies strongly needed as became evident during the intervention in Kosovo (Hendrickson, 2006). His expertise in the field of defense became highly regarded by several allies including the US, France, Italy and Spain and eventually led Robertson to be chosen as NATO's
secretary-22 general in 1999, a position he held until 2003 (Hemdrickson, 2003). Furthermore, Robertson was constantly an advocate of change at NATO on issues such as the alliance's expansion, enhancing capabilities and creating a greater role for NATO as an international security organization (Hendrickson, 2006).
Robertson’s Role after 9/11.
On the 12th of September in 2001, after terrorist attacks had struck the US, Robertson, with the approval of the US, invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO, 2001). Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states the following:
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” (NATO, 1949).
In Robertson’s statement to the press it was noted that, with the invocation of Article 5, all allies must individually and collectively take a set of 8 measures to expand their defense technology and military capacity to combat terrorism (NATO, 2001). This was a pivotal point for NATO as a security organization as it proclaimed its fight against a new security challenge: terrorism. NATO's expanded mission to fight this new and especially foreign security threat changed the organization's initial purpose of pursuing stability and security in Europe to encompass a broader purpose of international security (NATO, 2001).
By invoking Article 5, the secretary general showed the support of NATO to contribute to the US-led fight against terrorism (NATO, 2001) and therefore showed his solidarity to one of the most important members of the alliance. Nevertheless, this move was not without the approval of the US, which shows Robertson needed this in order to pursue these measures that influenced NATO's adaptation to fight terrorism (Hendrickson, 2006). It
23 can be argued that the US gave Robertson the leeway to adopt these new measures because it was in their interest. Furthermore, the secretary general was able to create a common feeling amongst the rest of the allies that the adoption of these new policies of enhancing NATO's defense and military capabilities was the right action to pursue after the attacks of 9/11, for self-defense purposes (NATO, 2001). Robertson thus got the backing and trust of the allies to make these changes because, as Article 5 notes, an attack against one of the members is considered an attack on all of them and therefore such a situation allowed for defense measures to be taken, including the use of force (NATO, 1949). The secretary-general acted with his rational-legal authority in this case by taking measures to combat terrorism, which was justified by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and therefore was bound to be supported by all allies. As mentioned earlier, Robertson established a reputation for himself as an expert in defense capabilities when he served as secretary of defense in the UK, which is one of the reasons he got chosen by the allies to be NATO's secretary-general (Hendrickson, 2006). In this case, Robertson used his rational-legal and expert authority on defense and security matters as a source of generating trust and getting sufficient leeway from the allies to implement these new measures in the organization. So even before invoking Article 5, it could be argued the US entrusted Robertson with this issue because of his past experience in the field of defense, allowing him to get expert authority on the matter.
Furthermore, the adoption of new collective defense measures can also be regarded as an example of Robertson acting with moral authority. The moral obligation of NATO to defend their organizational values of defending international peace and security (NATO, 1949), is another reason that would explain Robertson being trusted by the allies to adopt these new defense measures, which transformed the organization to adapt to the new and more challenging security environment, including the threat of terrorism. Robertson claimed that by taking these measures he was defending NATO's values, being international peace
24 and security (NATO, 2001), which can be seen to embody a wider social purpose shared by all allies. Robertson's advice and the acceptance of the allies to adopt these measures, including a broader mandate with the fight against terrorism, shows how the secretary general's empowerment on these issues allowed him to steer the organization to adapt to a new security environment. Furthermore, this suggests there is a positive correlation between the transformation and adaptation of the organization to a changing security environment’ and ‘the increasingly empowered leadership of NATO’s secretary general’. This case also shows the focus of the Principal-Agent theory on the importance of the principal imposing its power top down to monitor the agent is not all there is to the relationship between principals and agents. As has been mentioned before, the relationship between the principal and the agent is closer and increasingly focused on ‘positive’ cooperation in the case of NATO, regarding the influence of the secretary-general’s types of authority on the principals.
Robertson’s Role during the Prague Summit in 2002
During the Prague Summit of 2002, some major changes were made within NATO concerning the organization's role in the area of security within Europe and across the Atlantic (NATO, 2002). Heads of states agreed to expand the alliance once more inviting Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to join the organization, which was claimed a necessary step to help the organization enhance its capabilities to transform itself and adapt to the new security environment (NATO, 2002). Furthermore, it was agreed upon that every member country would adopt a set of measures, based on NATO's most recent Strategic Concept at the time (1999), to enhance their military capabilities in order to meet new security challenges like terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (NATO, 2002). These changes were claimed to be made for the strengthening, transformation and enlargement of the Alliance in times where the world was being confronted with serious new threats (NATO, 2002)
25 According to Hendrickson, Robertson's constant calls for increased military capabilities within the organization eventually led to the Prague Summit of 2002 (Hendrickson, 2006). Robertson was a crucial actor in getting all member states to accept the new defense measures adopted at the Summit in 2002 since there was still a deep divide between US' and European allies' foreign policy interests (Hendrickson, 2006). Even though there was a divide between the Atlantic over the war on terrorism, all allies still ended up accepting the new mandate of NATO that was introduced at the Summit, including actively combating terrorism (Hendrickson, 2006). As these new measures were clearly in the US' interest of fighting terrorism and enlarging NATO’s role in providing international security (Hendrickson, 2006), the more interesting question is why European allies agreed to these changes. It can be argued that European members placed their trust on Robertson and gave him the leeway to adopt these changes in Prague because of his expert, rational-legal and moral authority within NATO.
In Robertson's "Towards Prague and Beyond", the first thing the secretary-general reminded the audience of is the traditional values of NATO being "cooperation and integration", which according to the secretary-general had helped Europe and the US fight the security challenges they faced throughout the Cold War (Robertson, 2002). Parallel to this argument Robertson made clear that throughout its history NATO had embodied the key security lesson it learned during the Cold War and the instability within the Balkans: "effective and credible armed forces are absolutely essential to building peace and security" (Robertson, 2002). It can be argued that by drawing on past lessons and with that advising future action to deal with new threats, Robertson showed his expert authority by arguing the practical reasons why the changes should be adopted. Furthermore, in his speech, the secretary-general recalls the principles upon which NATO was built being “the stabilizing benefits of integration; the importance of preserving the transatlantic link; and the necessity
26 of maintaining effective armed forces” (Robertson, 2002). He then links these principles to NATO’s broader mission: the preservation of security and stability. Here the secretary-general is using his moral as well as rational-legal authority, by invoking the values and principles upon which NATO was built and linking these to the changes that were to be adopted in Prague, to convince NATO's members these changes were the right course of action to face new security threats. So it can be argued that Robertson got empowered by the allies to deal with the adoption of these new measures due to his expert, moral and rational-legal authority, which eventually influenced the transformation of NATO to adapt to the post-Cold War security environment of that time. Furthermore, the fact Robertson got empowered by the allies to lead this issue shows the different dynamic there is between the principal-agent relationship in NATO as an IO compared to the problems Principal-Agent theory concentrates on. The empowerment of Robertson to adopt these changes within the organization has allowed for NATO to transform itself and adapt to a new security environment. This suggests there is a positive correlation between the dependent and independent variable of this paper’s hypothesis.
Robertson’s Role in Defending Turkey in 2003
In February 2004, Turkey invoked Article 4 from the North Atlantic Treaty, requesting NATO to take measures to protect it against potential attacks from Iraq (Hendrickson, 2006). Article 4 states that “the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened” (NATO, 1949). Feeling threatened by the possible retaliation of Iraq if it would go to war against it, Turkey became skeptical of whether to go to war and ended up invoking Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty for its own protection if it were to engage in the war against Iraq (Hendrickson, 2006).
27 Turkey had troubled relations with Iraq since the Gulf War of 1991, which set Iraq as a top issue on Turkey’s foreign policy agenda (Altunişik, 2006). Throughout the 1990s Turkey cooperated with the US to maintain the post-war settlement in Iraq and in return the US gave Turkey the tacit consent of carrying out its military operations in Northern Iraq against the Kurdish Workers’ Party, Turkey’s Separatist Kurdish Organization, to prevent an increase of Iraqi Kurdish refugees coming into Turkey (Altunişik, 2006). With the issue of Kurdish separatists in Turkey, the state was afraid of starting another war in Iraq by supporting the US because of the territorial and political instability that would ensue, economic costs and possible retaliation (Altunişik, 2006). However, Turkey, in the end, decided to engage in war and defined it as a ‘strategic necessity' as it would face greater costs if it did not take part in the war against Iraq, like the possibility of losing its biggest ally (especially economically), the US (Altunişik, 2006). As Turkey decided to participate in war, it wanted to secure its safety from potential retaliation, which led to it invoking Article 4 of NATO (Hendrickson, 2006).
European member states still felt isolated by the US as the latter decided to proceed with the war against terrorism separately from the former, excluding the alliance from its foreign policy in the process (Hendrickson, 2006). For this reason, a great division developed between the US and European allies, which led to European states feeling skeptical on whether to defend Turkey against Iraq upon the US's request (Hendrickson, 2006).
When America put the issue of defending Turkey formally on NATO's agenda by urging the NAC to discuss what measures could be taken to defend the country in case of war with Iraq, Robertson found the opportunity to become a key actor in building consensus around this issue (Hendrickson, 2006). By bringing this issue to NATO, it could be argued the US placed it's trust on the organization to find a solution regarding Turkey's defense, which means Robertson, as chairman of the NAC, indirectly got the trust and leeway needed
28 to push forward the policy of adopting defense measures for Turkey. In order to pursue their interests, the US needed Turkey to cooperate (Altunişik, 2006), which in this case included giving Turkey the security they requested from the alliance.
The trust and leeway the US gave NATO, and therefore Robertson, to achieve consensus amongst allies and therefore find solutions to this issue, most probably were due to Robertson’s expert authority in the field of defense, especially enhancing capabilities. Also, the rational-legal authority surrounding the organization, and therefore the secretary general, concerning Article 4 and the deployment of military defense to Turkey, is another reason the US might have placed the resolution of this issue in the organization’s hands. By receiving support, including trust and leeway, from the US, Robertson was able to start pursuing the adoption of military assistance to Turkey, which was a transformative policy for the organization as it was now actively siding and cooperating with the US and their war on terrorism (Hendrickson, 2006). Giving support to Robertson was equally beneficial for the US as the secretary-general had the same views and therefore lobbied for the American position at NATO (Hendrickson, 2006).
As the secretary-general tried to achieve consensus among European allies to accept the adoption of defense measures in Turkey, Robertson proceeded to argue in his speech “Building Transatlantic Consensus” that defending Turkey was essential for two reasons: a) NATO’s credibility and b) upholding the values of international security and peace, which now included fighting new threats like terrorism, as established at the Prague Summit in 2002 (Robertson, 2003). Here Robertson used his rational-legal and expert authority when providing arguments to achieve consensus on the issue amongst European allies, gaining their trust and the leeway needed to draft a decision sheet to defend Turkey (NATO, 2003). It can be argued that the empowerment the allies gave Robertson to adopt the necessary measures for Turkey’s defense against Iraq’s potential threat is another factor that influenced the
29 transformation and adaptation of NATO to a new security environment. Furthermore, Robertson’s efforts to convince the allies to accept this action and his success herein shows the different relationship dynamic that has been described between the agent and his principals within NATO compared to the assumptions of the Principal-Agent theory. Also in the light of this case, it can be argued there is a positive correlation between the dependent and independent variable of this study's hypothesis.
Conclusion
NATO's secretary-generals have been key actors in influencing the transformation of the organization to adapt to a new security environment which has allowed the Alliance to remain relevant in a post-Cold War environment. The developing role of the secretary-general in influencing the policy directions within NATO can be seen as a process parallel to the organization’s transformation throughout the years after the Cold War. This has of course not been without the acceptance and involvement of NATO’s member-states whose relationship with NATO’s secretary generals have been crucial to adopting policies that have led to the transformation and adaptation of NATO. Throughout the case studies it becomes evident there is a different dynamic in the relationship between the principals, being the member states, and the agent, being the secretary general, that has allowed the agent to steer the transformation of the organization. As opposed to how Principal-Agent theory describes this relationship between the principal and the agent as one distrust, emphasizing the principal’s control over the agent to regulate information asymmetry, in the case of NATO, the relation between the principals and the agent is increasingly focused on ‘positive’ cooperation between the two through the mechanism of empowered leadership. The allies were willing to empower NATO’s secretary-generals, Solana and Robertson, to introduce major changes in the organization, which shows the relationship between principals and
30 agents can also contain trust and be increasingly positive as opposed to the theory’s assumptions. The relationship between the organization's leader and the member-states was not focused on imposing top-down control on the agent to prevent information asymmetry and preventing the agent from having any leeway in steering the organization. Therefore, as Graham (2014) suggests, there is a bias towards the role of the principal in Principal-Agent theory that ignores the role of the agent, when having empowered leadership, in steering organizational change. In the case of NATO, the secretary-general is empowered and given the sufficient trust and leeway to lead NATO’s organizational change. Having observed the cases of Solana and Robertson in leading NATO’s transformation, it becomes evident that their different kinds of authority as leaders of the organization has allowed their leadership position to become empowered by the allies, allowing them to push forward certain policies that have been key to transforming NATO’s mandate for its continued existence.
Furthermore, the case studies show that the transformation of NATO can also partly be explained by observing the role of bureaucracy, especially the leading bureaucratic actor, providing an internal point of view on the organization's survival. As Mayer (2014) has argued, the "internationalization process by which national procedures of planning, decision-making or implementation" in a particular policy area are linked or shifted to IOs has led to their increasing importance (Mayer, 2014, pp.2). Also, the importance of bureaucratic actors within an IO, like in this case NATO's secretary-general, in steering an organization is also evident from the case studies. Furthermore, these particular examples of NATO's secretary-generals have shown a new side of Principal-Agent theory that should be explored further. The concept of empowered leadership as has been explained in this paper should be considered a possible outcome of the relationship between a principal and an agent when analyzing the importance of other bureaucracies and their actors. Even though it does not have to be the case, empowered leadership could be a potential explanation for the
31 transformation and survival of other international organizations from a bureaucratic perspective.
Bibliography.
Altunişik, M. (2006). Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 14(2), 183-196.
Asmus, R. D. (2012). Opening NATO's door: how the alliance remade itself for a new era. Columbia University Press.
Bass, B. M., & Bass, R. (2009). The Bass handbook of leadership: Theory, research, and managerial applications. Simon and Schuster.
BBC News (1999). Text of Solana’s Statement. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/302281.stm
Collier, D. (2011). Understanding process tracing. PS: Political Science & Politics, 44(4), 823-830. Cottey, A. (2009). The Kosovo war in perspective. International Affairs, 85(3), 593-608.
Cox, Robert W. (1969) ‘The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization’, International Organization 23:2, 205-230
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of management
review, 14(1),
57-74.
Graham, E. (2014). International organizations as collective agents: Fragmentation and the limits of principal control at the World Health Organization. European Journal of International Relations, 20(2), 366-390.
Hellmann, G., & Wolf, R. (1993). Neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and the future of NATO. Security Studies, 3(1), 3-43.
Hendrickson, R. (2006). Diplomacy and war at NATO the secretary general and military action after the Cold War. Columbia: University of Missouri Press
Hendrickson, R. (2016). NATO’s next secretary general: Rasmussen’s leadership legacy for Jens Stoltenberg. Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 14(3), 237-251.
Holmberg, A. (2011). The changing role of NATO: exploring the implications for security governance and legitimacy. European Security, 20(4), 529-546.
32 Johnstone, I. "The Secretary-General as norm entrepreneur". In K. Annan & S.Chesterman (Ed.), Secretary or General? : The UN Secretary-General in World Politics (pp. 123-138). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jackson, Robert, and Sorensen, Georg.Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 4th Edition. Oxford University Press, 2010. Print.
Kassim, H., & Menon, A. (2003). The principal-agent approach and the study of the European Union: promise unfulfilled?. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(1), 121-139.
Keohane, R. O. (1986). Neorealism and its Critics. Columbia University Press.
Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. (1995). The promise of institutionalist theory. International security, 20(1), 39-51.
Mayer, S. (2014). Introduction: NATO as an Organization and Bureaucracy. In NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics (pp. 1-27). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994). The false promise of international institutions. International security, 19(3), 5-49.
NATO. (1949). The North Atlantic Treaty. Retrieved from
https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm
NATO. (1991). The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept (1991). [online] Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm [Accessed 6 Mar. 2018].
NATO (1995). Final Communique. [online] Available at:
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24718.htm?selectedLocale=en [Accessed 1 Apr. 2018]
NATO (1997). “A time for cohesion, a time for renewal”. [Online] Available at: https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970221d.htm [Accessed 1Jun. 2018]. NATO (1998). Final Communiqué. [online] Available at:
https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p981208e.htm [Accessed 2 Apr. 2018]
NATO HQ (1988). Statement to the Press by the Secretary-General Following the Decision on the ACTORD. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981013a.htm
NATO HQ (1998). Transcript of the Press Conference by Secretary-General, Dr. Javier Solana. Retrieved From https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981013b.htm
NATO. (1999). The Alliance’s Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C.. [online]. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/on/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm [Accessed 6Mar. 2018].
33 NATO. (2001). Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, on the North Atlantic Council Decision on Implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks against the United States. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm
NATO. (2002). Prague Summit Declaration: issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague, Czech Republic. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19552.htm
NATO. (2003). Decision Sheet of the Defence Planning Committee: NATO Support to Turkey within the Framework of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Retrieved from
https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/official_texts_20284.htm?selectedLocale=en
Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2003). Delegation to international organizations: Agency theory and World Bank environmental reform. International organization, 57(2), 241-276.
Pollack, M. A. (2003). The engines of European integration: delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the EU. OUP Oxford.
Robertson, G. (2002). “Towards the Prague Summit and Beyond”. Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson at the Hanns <br />Seidel Stiftung. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_19861.htm?selectedLocale=en
Robertson, G. (2003). Building a Transatlantic Consensus. European Institute, Washington, D.C. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030220b.htm
Simmons, B. A., & Martin, L. L. (2002). International organizations and institutions. Handbook of international relations, 192-211.
The University of Macedonia. (2017) (pp. 1-11). Thessaloniki, Greece. Retrieved from http://www.thessismun.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Communique-2017.pdf
Vaubel, R. (2006). Principal-agent problems in international organizations. The Review of International Organizations, 1(2), 125-1
Waltz, K. N. (2010). Theory of international politics. Waveland Press.
Webber, M., Sperling, J., & Smith, M. A. (2012). Thinking NATO through Theoretically. In NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory (pp. 22-46). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
