Blurring the boundaries: Citizen journalism, alternative media and
U.S. social movements. An exploration of alt-right citizen
journalists’ coverage of the 2017 Berkeley protests.
Elizabeth Louise Roberts
Master’s Thesis - May 2018
Graduate School of Communication
Master’s programme Communication Science
Erasmus Mundus Journalism, Media and Globalisation
Abstract
This study qualitatively analyses the evolution of citizen journalism in the U.S., which has coincided with the rapid technological development of media tools, the rise of ‘fake news’ and a decline in trust for the mainstream media. In line with these developments, one U.S. social movement in particular has risen to prominence; the so-called ‘alt-right’, which advocates an anti-establishment, anti-globalist and extreme far-right agenda. The
convergence of these two developing phenomena in the U.S., the alt-right and citizen journalism, represents the stimulating sample of this study, more specifically, their reportage of the 2017 ‘free speech’ protests which took place in Berkeley, California. Through in-depth qualitative analysis the study found that, despite their varying self-conceptualisations, the alt-right citizen journalists utilised the same journalistic tools and routines, and broadcast the same skewed narrative of events. Ultimately, their striking similarities provides evidence to support the notion that the six citizen journalists in this study were working together within an unofficial alt-right citizen journalist network. The implications of such a digitalised network, for both the mainstream media and the public sphere, are discussed in detail.
Word count: 9,812.1
1 In consultation with my supervisor, and given the qualitative and textual nature of the findings, a word limit of 10,000 was agreed upon to reflect the complexity of the movement under study and the rich meanings reflected in the analysed texts.
Introduction
Since the 2016 U.S. Presidential election brought Donald Trump to office, public trust in the mainstream media has been truly tried and tested in the United States. Partisanship has always been part of the U.S. media landscape, particularly since the 1990s, when the right-wing Fox News Network was launched to rival the liberal media by “the greatest conservative bugbear in modern politics”, Roger Ailes (Wolff, 2018, p.2). Yet, polarization concerning trust in traditional media has grown exponentially since 2015, only increasing after President Trump first decried “Fake News!” in December 2016 (Wendling, 2018a). In 2017, 66 per cent of U.S. respondents believed the news media did not separate fact from fiction effectively—a 24 per cent increase since 1984 (Knight Foundation, 2018). Moreover, 63 per cent found themselves unable to distinguish between real and fake news in 2017 (Edelman, 2018). This divide is even more significant when viewed across partisan lines; according to Pew Research, 87 per cent of Republicans thought the news media favoured one side in 2017, compared to 84 per cent in 2016, whilst 53 per cent of Democrats thought the media favoured one side, a decrease from 64 per cent in 2016 (Barthel & Mitchell, 2017).
Due to changes in technology allowing for unfiltered and unverified messages to spread like wildfire through social media (Kurtzleben, 2017), it is now easier than ever for fake news to infiltrate the public sphere. The term ‘fake news’ has two meanings: firstly, denoting news stories which are factually inaccurate, often created by trolls and spread via social media, generating an ‘alternate reality’ of events (Holan, 2017); secondly, and more significantly, fake news has become a buzzword deployed by President Trump, the
Republicans and particularly far-right social movements, to smear and delegitimise the mainstream media, as well as debunk any criticism the media launches against them (Kurtzleben, 2017; Holan, 2017; Grove, 2017; Dupuy, 2017).
This adds to an already tense media climate in the U.S. In the middle of the 20th century, benefiting from a favourable economic and political environment, the mainstream media thrived, allowing journalists to be surveyors of truth and bearers of objectivity and
accuracy (Krause, 2011), fulfilling a cherished watchdog role. Since the 1970s, however, that journalistic autonomy has declined, due in large part to newspaper ownership
centralisation, as well as overbearing advertisers (Krause, 2011, Vizcarrondo, 2013). These continuing problems—exacerbated by the rise of the internet and social media—are now coupled with the difficulty of the misuse of the term ‘fake news’, which has been aimed at legitimate media organisations to discredit their practice. As Rose (2017) argues, rather than agreeing on one objective reality, “people are willing to believe incredible stories so long as those stories reinforce their pre-existing world view” (p.557). Due to the polarized political climate, the “post-truth platform” created by President Trump (Harrison, 2017), as well as the ease of access to new technology allowing citizens to create and share their own messages, ‘alternative media’—commonly defined as journalism generated in direct opposition to mainstream media (Harcup, 2005)—have begun to seriously challenge traditional journalism in the U.S. (Herrmann, 2017; Van Zuylen-Wood et al., 2017). These dynamics have
facilitated the rise and influence of anti-establishment, and correspondingly anti-mainstream media, social movements, in particular the so-called ‘alt-right’.
Short for alternative right, this relatively new movement appeared within the public domain during the 2016 presidential campaign, it is uniquely heterogeneous, “enabled in reach by the connective tools of the social internet”, including men’s rights activists, Libertarians, white nationalists, anti-globalists and self-proclaimed neo-Nazi’s (Van Zuylen-Wood et al., 2017, para. 7). Correlating with one of the core beliefs of the movement— distrust in the mainstream media (McBain, 2017)—the alt-right’s most well-known members are fast becoming their alternative media personalities, their citizen journalists. These individuals have garnered huge online followings, producing podcasts, videos and blogs, as well as livestreaming during their increasingly frequent and riotous public protests
(Herrmann, 2017; Evans, 2017; Khandaker, 2017). Indeed, we can see these alt-right citizen journalists as a central force within the movement.
Academic research into citizen journalism has demonstrated the progression of the practice from civilians once simply bearing witness to events and sharing their testimonies
via the mainstream media (Deuze, Bruns & Nueberger, 2007; Paulussen & Ugille, 2008), to activists reporting on behalf of a cause via their own platforms (Allan, Sonwalkar & Carter, 2007; Robinson & Schwartz, 2014; Pain, 2017). Additionally, the technological
advancements allowing citizens to utilise professional media tools have also been frequently explored (Ali & Fahmy, 2013; Lenzner, 2014). However, the use of citizen journalism by activists, as well as the advancements in technology, have both significantly accelerated in recent years, thus their effects merit further study.
Moreover, scholars and media professionals have noted the increasing influence of alt-right citizen journalism within the public sphere (Wendling, 2018b; Bridges, 2017; Khandaker, 2017), though academic literature remains relatively limited. Wendling (2018b) argues, “These largely self-taught reporters, while occasionally scoring an occasional scoop due to their mutual friendliness with the White House, were primarily engaged in erasing the line between journalism and activism” (p.127). Whilst Bridges (2017), exploring the role of “alt-lite bloggers” supporting President Trump’s anti-establishment ideology, argues they have developed their own “conservative ecosystem” (p.7) comprised of “an alternative news source for his supporters” (p.17). Nevertheless, the content of these alt-right citizen
journalists has seldom been explored through empirical analysis, particularly regarding how they frame events, attempt to drive their ideology through their reporting, and how they conceptualise their own reportage. If we are to better understand this movement and its influence in garnering and promoting support for the ‘post-truth’ politics of the Trump era, we need to investigate the content produced by their notable media figures.
Thus, this study shall look at how alt-right citizen journalists reported on the 2017 Berkeley protests, which became both a battle ground and recruitment mechanism for this comparatively new movement. The purpose of this study is to understand how the alt-right comprehends events through citizen journalism; the main research question is therefore:
Citizen journalism: from witness accounts to activist tools
For communication scholars, since the digitalisation of journalism in the early 2000s citizen journalism’s importance has decisively increased, particularly due to its potential to rival traditional media (Scott, 2005; Lewis, Kaufhold & Lasorsa, 2010). The concept isn’t new, and though it has shifted significantly over time no universally agreed upon definition exists. Though, Allan and Thorsen’s (2009) definition of a citizen journalist⎯as someone who happened to be “caught up in extraordinary events, who felt compelled to adopt the role of a news reporter”⎯is frequently cited (referenced in Greer & McLaughlin, 2014, p.40). The concept has often been conflated with participatory journalism entailing members of the public partaking in the news creation process (Deuze et al., 2007; Domingo et al., 2008), user generated content (UGC) whereby professional reporting was supplemented with content created by the audience (Paulussen & Ugille, 2008; Jönsson & Örnebring, 2011), or most commonly, blogging, defined as continually updated online platforms used for opinion and information sharing (Singer, 2005; Ekdale, Namkoong, Fung, & Perlmutter, 2010; Reese, Rutigliano, Hyun, & Jeong, 2007). Therefore, the term was defined broadly
throughout the 2000s, though the majority of scholarship often made reference to the local, or community-based aspect of citizen journalism (Carpenter, 2008; Goode, 2009).
Considerable scholarly work also focuses on the influence of citizen journalism upon professional journalism, for example Singer and Ashman (2009) highlighted its impact on the traditional norms and values of news creation (as referenced in Chung, Nah & Yamamoto, 2017). Gilmor (2006), however, underlined the historic influence citizen journalism could have upon U.S. society, saying that the power to write “the first draft of history” was being transferred from official news organizations to ordinary people (p.xx). The incorporation of basic cameras and the internet into cell phones in the early 2000s facilitated this transfer of power even further (CBC, 2013). Cell phone technology took another giant leap between 2007 and 2012, with 4G internet and high-quality cameras (Lev-Ram, 2012). Citizen journalists could now effortlessly step out of their previously drawn confines as ‘accidental’
reporters, thanks in part to the technology they needed to be active correspondents being right in their back pocket.
Lenzner’s (2014) study of citizen journalist Tim Pool, and his livestreaming reportage from the 2011 Occupy Wall Street (OWS) protests, perfectly exemplifies this transitional period. As Lenzner (2014) argued, “Emerging technology plays a role in deterritorializing the press tools themselves and the accessibility of vast amounts of affordable lens-based
hardware further challenges the definitions of both journalism and citizen journalism” (p.258). Using his smartphone, Pool livestreamed continuously for 21 hours, directly to his online audience, and his use of technology was lauded as ground-breaking (Fox, 2011). Despite having no professional training (Loughran, 2014), Pool does not classify himself as (only) a citizen journalist; rather, he viewed his work as an alternative faction of journalism: “They call me a citizen journalist to belittle the work that I do” (Pool, 2012, referenced in Lenzner, 2014, p.259).
The rise of these technologies has also changed how social movements communicate. In their analysis of actor-network theory, Robinson and Swartz (2014) emphasise the heightened role of citizen journalism in activism:
Making use of the digital technologies that allow them to bypass traditional
journalism, communities’ most active citizens such as non-profit directors, civil rights advocates, volunteers, officials, and lobbyists tap into “citizen journalistic” techniques to argue, persuade and connect with constituents. (p.377).
Similarly, Pain’s (2017) study of community-based citizen journalists in India, who reported on human rights violations in rural areas, exemplifies the changing nature of the practice. The citizen journalists in her study didn’t stumble upon these violations and merely share a photo, they actively sought out information and advocated for change (Pain, 2017). Thus we see that social movements, activism and citizen journalism are now inherently intertwined in many parts of the globe.
On the other hand, the U.S. provides a particularly interesting context for citizen journalism, where this polarization between mainstream media and activist-based citizen journalism has risen to new heights. Kern and Nam (2009) even suggest that activist-based citizen journalism originated in the U.S., after social movement activists wished to challenge the authority of the mainstream media. Downing (2001) emphasized that through the use of radical alternative media, social movements are able to permeate the public sphere in order to shape and convey their cause. Moreover, this permeation is now easier than ever due to the internet, particularly social networking sites such as Twitter and YouTube. As Carroll and Hackett (2006) highlight, in their exploration of democratic media activism, activists have harnessed the advancements in communication technologies, “giving voice to the
marginalized through communication channels independent of state and corporate control” (pp.89-90). On the one hand, individuals fighting for causes which may not seem
newsworthy to traditional media now have the opportunity to disseminate their messages more easily (Kern & Nam, 2009; Gilmor, 2006). Yet, when causes such as the alt-right, known for peddling alternative-facts, bigotry and racism, are utilising these new technologies to influence the public sphere, this can be severely damaging for society (McClure, 2017; Townsend, 2017).
In sum, alt-right citizen journalists have ascended to popularity due to the new technologies available to them, and now effortlessly disseminate their messages without adhering to any form of professional standard, or journalistic accountability (Singal, 2016; Marantz, 2017; Townsend, 2017; Evans, 2017). These individuals have been found to blatantly report misinformation (Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Singal, 2016), which can significantly affect the public sphere and thus be detrimental to U.S. society (Downing, 2001). Some scholars refer to this trend as “radical media” rather than citizen journalism, but they are clearly interrelated, and perhaps the most interesting and troubling aspect is that they are often conflated. As Downing (2001) argues, “we need to add recognition of radical media’s impact in periods of political quiescence and equally how they may light a
unclear, however, is how these citizen journalists define their own roles; do they see themselves as media professionals, or do they believe they are operating in opposition to the mainstream media, as unaccountable observers? Therefore, the first sub-research question this study shall explore relates to how citizen journalism is conceived by those who are carrying out the practice today. RQ1: How do alt-right citizen journalists conceptualise
their practice and negotiate their role?
Risks of Citizen Journalism
Citizen journalism can therefore be seen not only as citizens’ active participation in democracy, but also to pose significant risks to both the public sphere and to the journalistic profession. As Chung, Nah and Yamamoto (2017) found, in their survey of US daily
newspaper editors, many journalists have negative perceptions of citizen journalism, due to issues of “veracity and accountability” (p.13). Furthermore, Örnebring’s (2013) study of mainstream journalists’ role conceptions found that professionals perceived citizen
journalists as inferior, due to their lack of “editorial judgement”, “adherence to ethical codes”, and “professional principles” (p.48). This lack of editorial skills and professionalism was evidenced when alt-right citizen journalists reported on the leaked Hillary Clinton emails during the 2016 presidential campaign (see Singal, 2016). As Singal (2016) highlighted, this lack of professionalism can be damaging for US democracy: “There’s zero incentive to fact-check, because slip-ups are forgotten so quickly, […] the members of the community spreading these falsehoods so forcefully reject — or are unfamiliar with — the values of skepticism and fact-checking […]” (para. 13).
The effects of highly polarized media within society have frequently been studied in reference to the mainstream media. As Levendusky (2013) discovered, testing the effects of partisan news media on U.S. citizens, “When viewers watch like-minded media that reinforce their attitudes, they become more extreme” (p.620). Those already on the political fringe are being pushed even further from the centre, due to the partisan media they consume
expected to ascribe to journalistic norms, such as objectivity and accuracy, unlike citizen journalists. It can be assumed therefore that citizen journalism is even more ideologically driven, as they are not subject to editorial control, commercial influence, or industry oversight. The more partisan media there is in the U.S., the more polarized society
becomes, leading to political gridlock (Levendusky, 2013), and, as Downing (2001) argues, the power of alternative media like citizen journalism is often vastly overlooked for its polarizing effects, simply because they are not “stereotypical mainstream media” (p.27). In sum, the content of these alt-right citizen journalists could potentially be significantly impacting upon U.S. society, but before a study into the effects upon individuals can be conducted, an exploration of this content must take place. Thus, an empirical analysis of citizen journalism, produced by a social movement as divisive in the U.S. as the alt-right, is worthy of study. The final sub-research questions are as follows:
RQ2: How does the reportage of alt-right citizen journalist’s compare to their self-conceptualisation?
RQ3: To what extent do the citizen journalist’s employ and project the ideology of the alt-right within their reportage?
The alt-right and the 2017 Berkeley protests
Before describing the methodology of the study, a quick word on the alt-right movement and their involvement within the 2017 Berkeley ‘free speech’ protests is
warranted. Defining the alt-right, particularly for the purposes of an empirical analysis, is a difficult task due to the heterogeneous and often anonymous nature of the movement (Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Wendling, 2018b; Hawley, 2017). The term ‘alternative right’ was first coined by self-proclaimed ‘white nationalist’ Richard Spencer in 2008, yet he does not claim responsibility for the movement’s recent invigoration and further radicalization since 2015 (Hawley, 2017). Hawley (2017) explains how alt-right has now become a “catch-all term” for a growing online white-identity movement in the US, who sought a substitute label for “white nationalist” (p.69). The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), a non-profit that
monitors hate groups in the US, defines the movement as “a set of far-right ideologies, groups and individuals whose core belief is that ‘white identity’ is under attack by
multicultural forces using ‘political correctness’ and ‘social justice’ to undermine white people and ‘their’ civilization” (SPLC, n.d.-a).
The alt-right has varying levels of intensity and numerous factions, which, as Wendling (2018b) argues, “shrink or swell according to the political breeze and the task at hand” (p.5), often choosing which aspects of the movement to uptake in order to seem more socially tolerable. There are, however, two main identifiable groups: the ‘alt-light’ and those belonging to the hard core. Wendling (2018b) describes the alt-light as those who “disagree with some of the movement’s broader ideas, reject anti-Semitism, begrudgingly admit feminism may have once had a point, and dismiss the influence of extremists” (p.53). Furthermore, Kelly (2017) argues that the alt-light categorically reject political correctness and leftist politics, “and promote a secular ‘classic liberalism’” (p.75). On the other hand, the more doctrinaire section of the movement is unabashed with their extremism, and are known to promote “various forms of white supremacy, white nationalism, anti-Semitism and
Holocaust denial” (Al Jazeera, 2017a, para. 4).
Many who are clearly connected with the alt-right, and the alt-light, have tried to “shun the label” due its negative perception within the mainstream media, making
conceptualisation and identification of their citizen journalists even more difficult (Wendling, 2018b, pp.5-6). Nevertheless, they can be identified by spending time within the online spaces which they frequent, such as 4Chan, Reddit, Twitter and YouTube, where their content is seen as a counter-source to traditional media (SPLC, n.d.-a). Their reportage is viewed by hundreds of thousands of people, who are also funding their work through
crowdfunding platforms (Hicks, 2017). The majority of the movement’s citizen journalists can be more easily categorised as ‘alt-light’, rather than ‘alt-right’, as their commentary is
seemingly more tempered. Therefore, the citizen journalists in this study will be referred to as ‘alt-light’ hereafter.
The significance and popularity of these alt-light media personalities rose considerably during 2017, after they reported on a series of violent clashes in Berkeley, California. University of California, Berkeley, once hailed as the home of the Free Speech Movement following student protests in the 1960s (Rosenfeld, 2012), once again became a hotbed for activism in 2017 over the issue of free speech, following the violent February 1st shutdown of controversial alt-right speaker, Milo Yiannopoulos, on campus (Park & Lah, 2017). Yiannopoulos was invited to speak at the University by the Berkeley College
Republicans and approximately 1000 peaceful students gathered on Sproul Plaza in protest. However, over “150 masked agitators” arrived, throwing “commercial-grade fireworks and rocks at police”, resulting in the event’s cancellation and Yiannopoulos being escorted off campus (Park & Lah, 2017, para. 2 & 5).
Many right-wing groups were perturbed by this silencing of free speech in Berkeley, particularly the alt-right, who hold free speech as another of their core principles (Wendling, 2018b; Hawley, 2017). Thus, Berkeley became the “New Battleground for Free Speech”, and throughout the following months, numerous protests, rallies and speeches were organised on campus, as well as throughout the city (Bailey, 2017). Resulting in various violent altercations, as well as peaceful standoffs, between alt-right ‘pro-free speech’ protestors and a group calling themselves anti-fascists (Antifa), also known as the
‘Blackbloc’. During these protests, alt-light citizen journalists livestreamed, live tweeted and posted reflective videos, making them contemporary, content rich, and highly relevant events for analysis.
Data and Method
The protests
Due to the heterogeneous nature of the movement, the sampling and data collection method of this study was implemented with flexibility, as well as prior researcher knowledge. The researcher was a student at UC Berkeley during the period of January and May 2017, witnessed the violent February 1st protest, and was thus also aware of the six, significant,
follow-up ‘free speech vs Antifa’ protests, which took place between February and
September 2017.2 Each protest during this time period was preliminarily explored in order to assess the nature and extent of the content produced. The two protest dates chosen for analysis were April 15th, also known as the Patriots Day Rally (PDR), and September 24th, the first day of Milo Yiannopolous’ Free Speech Week (FSW). For a thorough explanation of why these protests were chosen, as well as how the others were eliminated, please refer to appendix A.
The citizen journalists
The selection of the alt-light citizen journalists also influenced the protest selection, as there needed to be ample individuals and content relating to those dates, in order for them to be worthy of analysis. To be chosen, the citizen journalists had to be related to the alt-light movement by either overt or veiled dissemination of movement rhetoric, or have clear
association with other known movement members. To be classed as a citizen journalist, they had to produce a regular podcast, video or text blog, to livestream events, or to regularly comment on alt-right affiliated events, to a significant online audience.3 Moreover, they had to have been present at, and/or reporting on the 2017 Berkeley protests. The process of selecting the individuals began with prior researcher knowledge and involved a snowball method.
Lauren Southern
2 March 4th – March for Trump, April 15th – Patriots Day Rally, April 27th – Cancellation of Ann
Coulter’s planned speech, August 27th – Say no to Marxism vs. Rally Against Hate protest,
September 14th – Ben Shapiro speaks at UC Berkeley, September 24th- September 30th – Milo
Yiannopolous’ Free Speech Week.
3 A significant online audience was classed as a combined follower count across their social media
platforms of > 70,000 people. The majority of the individuals chosen had on average 300,000+ followers across their platforms, 70,000 was chosen as it allowed for the inclusion of Chapman, who had 40,000 Facebook and 30,000 Twitter followers at time of writing. As he did not host a YouTube channel this drastically lowered his follower count in comparison to the others. Yet, as will be
explained, he was a significant figure in the Berkeley alt-light free speech movement and his inclusion is warranted.
Originally from Toronto, Canada, Southern was already known to the researcher as a leading figure in the alt-light media-sphere, as well as an active and enthusiastic participant in the 2017 Berkeley protests. She previously worked for The Rebel, a Canadian alt-light YouTube channel, but went “freelance” in 2017 (Sheffield, 2017; Khandaker, 2017). She has been described as a “journalist and activist” within the alt-light movement (Al Jazeera, 2017a), who uses “social media and provocative stunts to attract younger recruits to far-right ideology” (Porter, 2018, para. 1; see Al Jazeera, 2017b). As Wendling (2018b) noted is common for movement affiliates, Southern denies being part of the alt-right, or alt-light (Porter, 2018).
Kyle Chapman – Based Stickman
Chapman rose to infamy within the alt-light movement after he was filmed smashing an Antifa protestor over the head with a stick during the March 4th Berkeley protest, which landed him online pseudonym “Based Stickman”4 (Chang, 2017). A Trump supporting, Bay Area native, Chapman attended almost all of the Berkeley protests, and regularly
communicated with his followers through Twitter and Facebook, informing them of upcoming rallies and plugging his personalised merchandise. Chapman is also a leader within the far-right “Western-chauvinist” fraternity, The Proud Boys, who have frequently been tied to the alt-right, despite rejecting the label (SPLC, n.d.-b; Gilmour, 2017).
Vince James – The Red Elephants
Vince James, from Southern California, editor and lead journalist of The Red
Elephants, was sourced through Chapman, who shared one of his livestreams. Tristan
(2017) conceptualised the viral livestreams of The Red Elephant’s as, “glitch-heavy videos that depict the Left as the sole aggressors in political clashes, which, for Red Elephants, justifies the violent reactions of the alt-right” (para. 2). The decision to focus on the reportage of James as an individual, rather than The Red Elephants as a platform, was to create
4 This nickname was derived from; “’based’ is slang for not caring what others think, and ‘stickman’
refers to the closet dowel he wielded this spring at his first political skirmish” (Feuer & Peters, 2017, para. 10).
symmetry across the sample, as well as the fact he is the founder, editor and lead journalist for the site, who regularly attended the Berkeley protests, livestreamed and actively
participated in the violence.
Carl Benjamin – Sargon of Akkad
More commonly known by his screen name, that of the first great Mesopotamian emperor Sargon of Akkad, Carl Benjamin is in fact a 38-year-old YouTuber from Swindon, UK. He was sourced after being referenced in numerous articles relating to far-right alternative media personalities (Rozsa, 2016; Menegus, 2017; Bennett, 2018). Benjamin staunchly denounces any association with the movement, nevertheless his “videos also focus on attacking favorite alt-right targets like (again) feminism, Islam, [and] Black Lives Matter […]” (Rozsa, 2016, para. 8). The SPLC argue Benjamin is a “stepping stone for some white supremacists on the path to radicalization”, after multiple respondents to a poll, hosted by a far-right blog, named him as one of their biggest influences for joining the alt-right (SPLC, 2018). He only attended one of the two Berkeley protests in person, yet his reportage from both was widely popular online.
Tim Pool – TimCast & 6. Luke Rudkowski – We Are Change
The selection of Tim Pool, the forefather of protest livestreaming (Lenzner, 2014), and Luke Rudkowski, founder of alternative media company We Are Change (WAC), within this sample of alt-light citizen journalists may seem like a peculiar choice. They are not necessarily active members of the alt-light, at least not to the ideologically driven levels of Southern, Chapman, James and Benjamin. However, they represent two of the most
prominent citizen journalists in the US, who both attended and produced extensive coverage of the Berkeley protests. Pool and Rudkowski both shun the alt-right label, for example in March 2018 the SPLC came under fire from Pool after labelling him as alt-right, and subsequently retracted the article (Ansari, 2018). However, in March 2017 he was
sponsored by alt-right media personality Paul Joseph Watson to report on Sweden’s “no go zones” (Gilmer, 2017), where he found no evidence of Watson’s supposed Islamist takeover, despite his best efforts to unearth controversy (Marantz, 2017; The Local, 2017). Being
funded by an alt-right conspiracist to go and report on an alt-right conspiracy is indicative of Pool’s reporting in recent years, in which he provides the alt-right with a platform, without professionally challenging their narrative (Marantz, 2017). Rudkowski also “made his name chronicling various far-right figures” (Breland, 2017), and has been frequently grouped with them due to the controversial nature of his videos, and the questionable actions of other WAC members (Beirich, 2011). Moreover, both Pool and Rudkowski’s reporting has been demonetized by YouTube, following a recent bid to rid the platform of “bigotry and
discriminatory speech” (Beirich, 2011; Tani, 2017). Thus, though Pool and Rudkowski cannot be termed alt-light to the same level as the other citizen journalist’s in this sample, a link between them and the alt-light can be made, particularly, as the analysis will show, due to their reportage during the Berkeley protests.
Data collection and coding procedure
All platforms hosted by the citizen journalists were investigated, including personal websites and blogs, Facebook pages, Twitter pages—which are linked to Periscope
livestreaming accounts—and YouTube channels. The collection process involved using key word searches, such as “Berkeley protest”, or “Battle for Berkeley”, as well as searching by protest dates. Due to the nature of online content being easily deleted or lost, the texts were not always available in their entirety on the original host’s platform. In these cases, often other people recorded and re-uploaded the footage, for example, both Southern and Chapman’s speeches from the April 15th PDR were sourced this way.
The data was amassed in a spreadsheet (see appendix B) and April 15th produced the most texts across all six individuals. September 24th was more limited, particularly for James, whose livestreams were unfortunately irretrievable - mainly due to his Twitter account being recently suspended for hate speech. However, the goal was not to find matching data for both protests, but rather to retrieve all available data for these two most appropriate and interesting protests involving these specifically chosen alt-light citizen journalists.
Qualitative content analysis was conducted as it seeks to draw out in-depth meaning, interpretation and patterns from data (Schreier, 2014). Qualitative was chosen over
quantitative, as it allowed the researcher to look beyond mere frequencies, to understand and interpret hidden meanings in the texts with flexibility (Schreier, 2014). Through a combination of narrative and discourse analysis, looking for the characterisation of events but also the language and ideology implicit within such characterisations (Hijmans, 1996), an initial phase of open coding, followed by axial coding, allowed the data to be broken down and overarching categories and themes to be established (Böhm, 2004). As Bradley, Curry and Devers (2007) state, themes “provide recurrent and unifying ideas regarding the subject of inquiry”, and this organisational process led to the uncovering of clear patterns in the data across all six individuals, enabling analysis (p.1766). Saturation in terms of themes was the goal of the analysis, but as the results will reveal, the heterogeneous nature of the
movement is also clearly reflected in the heterogeneity of approaches employed by these citizen journalists. The implications of that variety will be reflected upon later.
Results and Discussion
How do alt-right citizen journalists conceptualise their practice and negotiate their role?
Three categories of roles emerged from the analysis: the ‘journalists’, the ‘activists’, and the ‘agitator’.
The journalists
Out of all the individuals analysed, both Pool and Rudkowski expressed their role, practice and self-conceptualisation most frequently. Habitually repeated throughout every YouTube video and livestream, as well as located in their online bio’s, the two term themselves as “independent” and “investigative” journalists, as well as “filmmakers” and “reporters”, relentlessly emphasising their “neutrality”, “objectivity”, and freedom from “corporate control”. These self-perceptions reflect the growing overlap between citizen and professional journalists’ role conceptions, as Chung and Nah (2013) argue, “underscoring
the increasingly blending roles of traditionally distinct senders and receivers of information” (p.283).
Moreover, Pool and Rudkowski made it apparent in their frequent plugs for their social media pages and donation platforms, that they are completely dependent on their audience, not only for their channel growth, but also for their livelihood. This focus on audience funding, particularly through crowdfunding, is indicative of the changing business models within the journalism industry. As Carvajal, García-Avilés and González (2012) argue, crowdfunding platforms are changing journalist’s relations with their audiences, to a point where the donors are becoming the gatekeepers of news content. Both Pool and Rudkowski argue the mainstream media is biased and untrustworthy, as Rudkowski tweeted, it has “no allegiance to the truth, WAKE UP”. Their practices directly challenge Carvajal et al.’s (2012) assertion that, “Instead of replacing the journalism professional with citizen journalists, crowdfunded journalism gives users the role of producers without
endangering content quality” (p.645).
James also conceptualises himself as a “journalist,” for his “conservative media/news company”, The Red Elephants. During his PDR livestream, he defines his routine as, “We do live events at least once a month […] we’re gonna eventually cut this up like we do with all our events, and post the highlights on our YouTube channel.” The Red Elephants declares their goal as to “spread truth to the citizens of this great nation by reporting news and promoting free thinking”. This reflects what Chung and Nah (2013) argue is the most
prominent role conception for citizen journalist’s, the “populist mobilizer,” where they actively encourage “audiences to take on more involved roles” (p.283).
The activists
Southern and Chapman never use the word “journalist” in their role conception, rarely defining their practice at all. However, a few key aspects of their routines stand out from their reportage, which arguably reflect their conceptualisation. Firstly, they are both open and passionate defenders of right-wing politics, identifying strongly with the 2017
Berkeley free speech movement, which was closely bound with the alt-right (Lenz, 2017; Lopez, 2017; Picazo, 2017; Morgan, 2017). Secondly, and similar to the ‘journalists’ above, they also continually engaged with their audiences and relied upon them for donations. Southern has previously stated she does not aim to be objective, but sees herself as a “gonzo journalist” (Southern, 2017), a form of biased journalism which involves “the writer's immersion in the subject and often participation in the activity being documented” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Therefore, Southern and Chapman’s self-conceptualisations differ from the first group; they clearly see themselves as active participants and promoters for the
movement. This strongly relates to social activist communication theory; as Carrol and Hackett (2006) argue, “media activism is characteristically embedded in other activist causes” (p.100). In this instance, their cause is to promote the alt-light, which is achieved through their alternative media dissemination.
The agitator
Benjamin represents an anomaly of sorts within the sample and placing him in either of the previous categories, based on his self-conceptualisation, would be incorrect. He vehemently denies he is a journalist or member of the press during his FSW “documentary”,5 and often states he is a “liberal”, or a “pro-free speech advocate”. Moreover, though he does not plug his donation platforms to the same levels as Pool, Rudkowski and James, he is also 100 percent audience-funded. On his Patreon page he describes himself as “a full-time YouTube content creator”, devoted to “dismantling ideological nonsense”. With nearly 800,000 subscribers, Benjamin’s YouTube audience surpasses the subscriber counts of CBS News, NBC News, C-SPAN and RT America.6 Thus, his “dismantling of ideological nonsense” via his video blogs may potentially be impacting upon U.S. media and the public sphere. While not conceptualising himself as a journalist, Benjamin’s potential effect on his
5The documentary was a 1 and a half hour long YouTube video of footage he filmed during the week, which also included other citizen and professional journalist’s footage.
6 YouTube subscriber counts at time of writing: CBS News – 734,000, NBC News – 728,000, C-SPAN
alt-light followers shouldn’t be understated. As Drezner and Farrell (2004) argue, political blogs “may frame political debates and create focal points for the media as a whole” (p.23). Further, Gil de Zúñiga, Veenstra, Vraga and Shah (2010) discovered, in their analysis of the correlation between blog readership and political participation, that “a new digital
democracy” had emerged, combining “the virtual and real world realms of political engagement and action” (p.45).
Therefore, in both the second and third groups of citizen journalists, we see movement activists who are clearly promoting alt-light ideology. However, by utilising journalistic tools and routines they are also blurring the boundaries between activism and journalism. This tension—between what they say they do compared to how they actually report—is the focus of the next analytical section.
How does the reportage of alt-right citizen journalist’s, during the 2017 Berkeley protests, compare to their conceptualisation?
The following section will compare the citizen journalist’s abovementioned self-conceptualisations with how they actually reported on the two protests. First, a general overview of how the protests were interpreted and understood will be given, followed by a deeper exploration of the main themes.
April 15th - Patriots Day Rally (PDR)
The citizen journalist’s coverage of the first protest will be discussed via the three main themes which emerged from their coverage: group identities, militarisation and inciting violence.
Group identities
The Patriot’s Day Rally was universally reported by all six citizen journalists as an event organised by pro-Trump/pro-free speech groups, which was intruded and turned violent by the arrival of Antifa. All six split the protest by these two vehemently divided sides,
unanimously labelling Antifa as “radicalised”, “violent”, and even “domestic terrorists”. Antifa were described as the instigators, aggressors and escalators of violence, for example, Benjamin argued, “[…] the glorious revolutionaries decided to throw fireworks and smoke bombs at their opponents”, adding, “the fascists [sarcastically referring to the free speech protestors] didn’t start it did they”. Pool did acknowledge the pro-free speech side also initiated violence, “I did see several instances where people on the rally side started the melee”, yet along with the other five he took Antifa to be the main aggressors. Moreover, Pool originally labelled the protest as “Antifa vs Alt-Right”, but in retrospective videos referred to the rally goers as “free speech rally attendees”, “liberals”, and “a few older hippy looking people”. This decision to change these labels resulted in Pool’s narrative aligning more closely with the other five, who all understood the rally goers to be a more diverse collective. For example, Southern referred to the attendees as “pro-free speech protestors”, Chapman classed them as “brave warriors”, whilst James emphatically stressed the group were “peaceful Trump supporters”. Despite their differing self-conceptualisations and attempts to distance themselves from the movement, all of the citizen journalists clearly favoured the alt-light side of the protest. Further, by labelling the alt-light protestors as diverse, whilst Antifa were an indistinguishable violent faction, the citizen journalists exemplified classic in-group, out-group psychology (Park & Rothbart, 1982). As Park and Rothbart (1982) state, the in-group view themselves as heterogeneous due to spending pro-longed contact with one another, whereas, by failing to learn about their oppositions
individualised traits, they perpetuate “the view of the out-group as relatively homogeneous and undifferentiated” (p.1067).
Militarisation
Militaristic terminology was used frequently by the citizen journalists to describe events and many even adorned militarised attire, but to varying levels. For example, during Southern’s livestream she frequently turns the camera onto herself, showing her helmet
adorned with a red ‘MAGA’7 sticker, ski goggles and gasmask. She calls the protest the “Battle for Berkeley”, and summarises in her a post-protest video that “we took back
Commiefornia because of one terrible battle decision by the communists”. Chapman tweeted “Victory at Berkeley 4/15 freedom rally!”, whilst James exclaimed “we getting ready for war!” after an M-808 was thrown. Benjamin, though arguably with a tinge of sarcasm stated, “After the battle some of the warriors reflected on their experiences […]”, whilst Rudkowski
frequently referred to his “gear”, which was distinctively similar to Southern and Chapman’s. Pool was slightly more subtle in his militarised description of the event, though he still used battle terminology, for example “the Trump side just charged!” and, “I guess the frontline, as you’d call it”⎯referencing the dividing line between the two groups. Therefore, again despite their differing self-conceptualisations, the ‘journalists’, ‘activists’ and the ‘agitator’ all used militarised terminology, arguably adding a sensationalist frame to their reportage
(Sampedro, 1997).
Inciting violence
By utilising the power of online platforms, as previous radical alternative media have done before them, Southern, Chapman and James were all able to permeate the public sphere and project alt-light ideology (Downing, 2001), particularly by encouraging violence towards their opposition. For example, prior to the protest, Southern encouraged alt-light protestors to fight back, “It’s not a problem if they finish those fights […] that’s always been the motto ‘don’t start the fight but finish it’ I think that’s perfectly reasonable”. Moreover, during her livestream, a member of her Proud Boys security detail stated how much he wanted to get involved in the ensuing brawl, Southern responded, “go for it man!”. Likewise, before the rally Chapman tweeted a photo of his militarised ‘Based Stickman’ uniform, “It
7 An acronym for “Make American Great Again”, President Trump’s 2016 Presidential campaign
slogan.
8 Originally used by the U.S. military to recreate explosives and artillery fire during training exercises,
M-80s are a powerful form of explosive which were once sold as commercial grade fireworks, they were made illegal in the 1970s (Zambo, 2015).
would be nice to listen to our group of speakers tomorrow instead we’ve gotta show up like this”, insinuating he was prepared to fight. Neither Chapman nor Southern conceptualised themselves as journalists, yet their utilisation of journalistic tools and their significant online popularity renders them as online pundits, or bloggers, for the alt-light. As non-professionals bloggers forsake journalistic objectivity (Singer, 2005), though scholars argue they should still adhere to ethical standards. For example, similarly to the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) Code of Ethics (SPJ, 2014), Kuhn’s (2007) proposed code of ethics for bloggers states they must “Promote the ‘human’ element in blogging [and] Minimize harm to others when posting information” (p.34). Both Chapman and Southern’s promotion of
violence is clearly in contradiction to this standard.
Similarly, James’ audience interaction went far beyond his “populist mobiliser” role (Chung & Nah, 2013, p.283), to actively encouraging violence towards counter-protesters. During his livestream he can be heard openly encouraging people to attack Antifa, shouting “Don’t be trying to talk to them, don’t be cucking,9 bash their fucking heads in”, whilst
simultaneously expressing anger at his viewers for not showing up in greater numbers to join the fight, “you guys are the reason why our rights are being threatened like this”. After itching to get involved in the brawl throughout the day, he eventually handed his camera to a friend and ran fists clenched into the melee. James’ self-conceptualisation as a “truth spreading journalist” compared to his violent advocacy during the protest, clearly infringes upon ethical journalism standards. The SPJ ethics code states journalists must work to reduce harm, treating “sources, subjects, colleagues and members of the public as human beings deserving of respect” (SPJ, 2014). Further, Singer (2005) argues “separating fact from opinion and reporting from advocacy” is just as pivotal for journalists as objectivity (p.178).
9 ‘Cucking’ is a commonly used alt-right insult, its literal meaning “refers to the experience of a man
observing his wife being “taken”—in the Biblical sense—by another, often black, man. The alt-right uses it in various forms to refer to certain states of humiliation or subservience to a liberal agenda” (Gais, 2016, para. 17)
24th September 2017 - Free Speech Week (FSW)
Milo Yiannopolous’ Free Speech Week was anticipated by the citizen journalists to be momentous, as Chapman tweeted, “This is going to be a historic event,” calling for his followers to come out and show their support. However, the subsequent reportage from the event, by a majority of the individuals, painted a different picture.
Disappointment and fizzling out
During their September 24th coverage, a majority of the citizen journalists expressed their disappointment and fatigue with the Berkeley ‘free speech’ protest movement. For example, Southern stated in a distinctively short 17-minute livestream, “It’s a little disappointing […] the ridiculous chanting over here and then the disorganisation […]”. Chapman also stated dissatisfaction and cynicism at the disorganisation of the event, “They’re [Antifa] doing a march and Milo didn’t this is a little disappointing […] for me personally, this shit gets kind old sometimes.” Whilst both Pool and Rudkowski expressed boredom at the uneventful nature of the protest, for example Rudkowski mocked both the “left and the right” for their tactics of screaming chants at one another, “you can’t even hear these people speak”. This feeling of disappointment and a lack of enthusiasm towards FSW is synonymous with the fizzling out of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement (Taylor, 2012). As Taylor (2012) argued, the movement deteriorated due to “internal squabbling […] over how, and whether, to engage the political system directly” (para. 4). Moreover, Roberts (2012) argued the OWS movement flourished and then burnt out, without achieving any of its perceived goals due to members being unable to agree on a singular path to accomplish them. Similarly, disagreements over how the alt-light free speech movement should
progress in Berkeley were disputed by the citizen journalists. Southern stated during her livestream, “I would like to see more intellectual talk […] just doing stunts and everything it’s going to get old.” On the other hand, Benjamin did not express the same dissatisfaction with the protest, and concluded it was a “victory” for free speech after Milo spoke on UC
citizen journalists’ coverage could be attributed to the fact it was his first time reporting on the ground, and thus did not have previous protest experience for comparison.
Nevertheless, overall, similarly to the PDR, a majority of the citizen journalists reported from the same perspective during the FSW protest, demonstrating they had become tired and disillusioned with the ‘free speech’ movement in Berkeley.
The realisation of an alt-light citizen journalist network
Following the previous assessment of how the two protests were covered, and despite slight deviations between and within the three groups, it can be seen that ultimately the citizen journalists in this study reported, interpreted and understood the protests in an analogous manner. As the following section will demonstrate, their reportage and
associations with one another arguably support the notion that they were operating within an unofficial network of alt-light citizen journalists. Through interviewing one another and
sharing each other’s content, as well as giving alt-light voices dominance over left-wing ones, a pack mentality between the citizen journalists was established.
Pack mentality and alt-light narrative promotion
Southern and Chapman frequently overlapped their narratives and promoted one another, as well as some of the other citizen journalists, such as Pool and Rudkowski. For example, both prior to and after the PDR Chapman shared Southern’s videos via his Facebook page, praising her work he said, “Lauren Southern total badass and true patriot was by our side yesterday, in this video she sums up our victory at Berkeley beautifully.” During the same rally Southern chased after Chapman to film him for her livestream, exclaiming “Say hi to everyone we love you!”. Furthermore, when stating she may have to turn off her livestream to save her phone battery, Southern directed people to follow Pool or Rudkowski’s coverage, which she also cut down and featured in her own rally breakdown video. As self-declared activists for the movement it is unsurprising Southern and Chapman operated within a network, yet Rudkowski and Pool also exhibited clear associations with the
alt-light side of the protests, questioning their conceptualisations as “neutral”, “independent journalists.”
For example, similarly to Southern and Chapman’s predictions, Pool’s prior-protest videos stated violence would escalate from the Antifa side, “They might attack me or smash my camera”, this prediction was based on previous interactions he had with Antifa protesters during OWS. On the other hand, he painted the alt-light side as more rational and accepting, for example he repeatedly stated how he didn’t feel threated being amongst the “Trump supporters”, but Antifa members had sent him death threats. Similarly, Rudkowski’s
coverage also clearly depicted Antifa as the violent aggressors, whilst the alt-light were the rational counterparts. For example, tweeting, “[…] I only saw Antifa use pepper spray and small explosives/fireworks on pro free speech protestors today”.
Rudkowski and Pool also frequently collaborated with the other alt-light citizen journalists, likewise questioning their conceptualisations as independent journalists. For example, during the PDR Rudkowski arrived with Southern and her security detail of Proud Boys, and played a protective and guiding role towards her throughout the day. Additionally, they made videos with Southern and Benjamin, thus promoting their narratives from both protests. For example, in a post-PDR video Rudkowski asked Southern to explain the day’s events, and interviewed Benjamin for his opinion via Skype. Whilst, Pool conducted sit down interviews with Benjamin both prior to, and after FSW. However, neither gave the Antifa protestors points of view the same level of coverage. Rudkowski crossed the barricade only twice during his livestream on April 15th and did not interview any Antifa’s, but regularly asked alt-light protestors questions, giving them a platform. Pool, on the other hand, did ask Antifa protestors for comment, but rather than asking their perspective of the protest, he argued with them from the alt-light side of the barricade about why they called him “a snitch”. Additionally, James, who also conceptualises himself as a ‘journalist’, was even more blatant in his allegiances to the alt-light. For example, he interviewed Southern during his livestream of the PDR, and repurposed the same footage for a separate YouTube video, thus
frequent references to Chapman, stating they were going to organise a rally together, showing a clear association with the activist citizen journalists of the movement.
Correspondingly, Benjamin did not interview Antifa protestors with any level of professionalism, instead choosing to mock them and roll his eyes at their comments during his FSW documentary. He also continually used the content of the other citizen journalists, particularly Rudkowski and Pool, further pushing the narrative that Antifa were the violent “communist” aggressors, whilst the “pro-free speech” protestors were justified in their retaliation. Moreover, as stated, he produced and took part in broadcasts with the other alt-light citizen journalists, again supporting their commentary and sharing it with a significant audience.
Therefore, despite their varied conceptualisations, all six can be seen to be working together within an unofficial network of alt-light citizen journalists. As Mihailidis and Viotty (2017) argue these digitalised structures “provide open space for like-minded individuals to gather around an idea, theory or conspiracy, and support a set of shared beliefs and ideas in any way possible” (p.445). This support for each other’s narratives, which as it will be shown were laden with inaccuracies, is significant and concerning as it is potentially creating an echo chamber⎯which has already been documented within their YouTube community (Whyman, 2017; Kosoff, 2018; Rolt, 2017). The more these alt-light citizen journalists share one another’s content amongst their similar audiences, the more this echo chamber will increase (Gilbert, Bergstrom & Karahalios, 2009), which will undoubtedly only exacerbate the ‘post-truth’ media crisis in the U.S. (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy & Kleis Nielsen, 2017).
Speculation, rumour and unverified sources
During both protests Rudkowski and Pool stated rumours, speculation and other individuals unverified statements without validation or editorial pushback. For example, Rudkowski often speculated over Antifa’s next moves, reiterating them frequently to both Pool and Southern who repeated them to their own audiences. At the PDR, he claimed
Antifa were “kicking out the press, they’re getting ready to charge”, without any factual corroboration, they consequently did not charge. Whilst, in a pre-PDR video Pool stated, “We’re hearing rumours that many of the Antifa have gone to Home Depot to buy large sticks”, without any reference to a source. Similarly, James also often exaggerated and gave false information without retraction. For example, during the same rally he stated the first arrest was a member of Antifa, when it was in fact a member of the Proud Boys, he did not correct this error. Moreover, similarly to Rudkowski, he often exaggerated Antifa tactics to make them seem more violent. For example, when Antifa threw M-80s into the crowd James inaccurately classed them as “sticks of dynamite,” which “blew the fucking skin off [his] back”. Afterwards, he makes no reference to these injuries and carries on livestreaming as normal. The inaccuracies in the reportage of these self-conceptualised ‘journalists’ is thus clearly in opposition to the universally accepted norms of journalistic objectivity and accuracy (Singer, 2005; Chung, Nah & Yamamoto, 2017; Örnebring, 2013; SPJ, 2014).
Similarly, Southern does not fact check or find supporting sources for her statements, taking other people’s comments at face value and repeating them to her audience, as well as frequently exaggerating the situation. For example, during the PDR violence she shouted, “they just threw, like, a Molotov cocktail!”, in this instance someone corrects her that it was a firework, which she immediately agrees with. Chapman’s narrative during the protests was similarly full of inaccuracy, exaggeration and conspiracy. In a 7-minute speech about the “domestic threat” of “communism” and “cultural Marxism” he states, the “education system which indoctrinates our youth” is just one of the many establishment institutions which are assaulting “freedom loving Americans”. This anti-establishment rhetoric is indicative of the alt-light movement (Wendling, 2018b; Hawley, 2017), and Southern’s reportage was
similarly laced with the same ideology. For example, she repeatedly claimed “communism is alive and well in America”, and that Antifa had been radicalised by the “indoctrination centres known as the education system”. This ideological endorsement in their reporting correlates with the understood alignment between citizen journalism and activism, as Robinson and
Swartz (2014) affirm, activists engage in “self-generated journalism to help control the information flow around their niche interests” (p.377).
In Benjamin’s video covering the PDR he misinterpreted events and added to the inaccurate narrative corroborated by the other alt-light citizen journalists. For example, he also incorrectly labelled the M-80s thrown by Antifa as “smoke bombs”, and stated “after the smoke cleared, the police realised that they probably should actually do something and ended up arresting 21 people”. In reality, arrests were made early on in the day before the fighting had even escalated.
This promotion of inaccuracy by the alt-light citizen journalists, foregoing any substantial repercussion, is symbolic of “The power of citizen-led networks to create and perpetuate misinformation [which] is indicative of a digital media ecosystem […]” (Mihailidis & Viotty, 2017, p.444), In their study of the spreadability of alt-right memes,10 Mihailidis and Viotty (2017) argue, “Partisanship and post-fact cultures will persist and grow as digital technologies continue to facilitate homophilous networks […]” (p.451). The significant online audiences of these alt-light citizen journalists and the evidenced inaccuracies in their content is a testament to this assertion, as well as the current ‘alternative-facts’ era in the U.S. altogether (Newman et. al, 2017; Singal, 2016).
Sarcasm, humour and derogatory insults
Benjamin’s video giving a breakdown of the PDR reached nearly half a million views and was heavily laden with sarcastic condescending narration, which is emblematic of his
standard practice (Bish, 2016). During his FSW documentary he shouts at a member of the Antifa group, Refuse Fascism, “no one cares what you think you’re a communist”, and clearly entertained by the Milo-supporters shouting over the left-wing protestors he laughed, “you can’t stage a theatre this good!”. Though he sometimes turned his mockery onto the
10 A meme is a form if online communication which combines image and text, as Mihailidis and Viotty (2017)
describe they, “provide an accessible format for information to be shared, anchored in cultural relevance and techniques—humor, wit, and sarcasm—that are often visually pleasing and playful” (p.446).
light, as he vehemently denies being part of the movement, he often balances this mockery with a defence for the movement. For example, rhetorically addressing Antifa members following the PDR he states, “I guess it’s a good thing that your opposition look as ridiculous as you do […] but at least […] given that they’re pro-free speech, maybe that means I can have a conversation with one of them”.
The prominence of his enigmatic character correlates to what Bock (2014) refers to as “charismatic authority” belonging to citizen journalists (p.352). Professional journalists derive their authority from the institutions they work for, whilst citizen journalists’ “authority is rooted in their persona […] [they] must be known, seen or heard if they are to testify to their truth-telling” (Bock, 2014, p.356). Similarly, Southern’s entire online persona is tied to her use of sarcasm and humour, also indicative of her “charismatic authority” (Bock, 2014, p.352). For example, she referred to Antifa members as everything from, “deformed off spring of Hot Topic and Tumblr”, to “psychotic radicals”, and “pussy ass liberals”. Whilst, Chapman called them a “mob of retards” and “rabid leftists”. Though neither Chapman, Southern nor
Benjamin conceptualise their work as objective journalism, this level of derogatory verbal attacks towards the opposition, at a time when polarization is at an all-time high in the U.S. (Pew Research Center, 2017), will only serve divide society further. Social media was once professed to be a “boon to democracy”, but it is increasingly seen to be undermining it, particularly due to this kind of partisanship which is flourishing within online spaces (The Economist, 2017; Newman et al., 2017). For example, during the 2016 presidential election Hillary Clinton’s credibility was explicitly undermined by far-right/alt-right bloggers who spread rumour’s she was suffering seizures, this myth even made it into the mainstream liberal media demonstrating the power these partisan bloggers possess (The Economist, 2017).
During the PDR both Rudkowski and Pool rarely, if at all, used sarcasm in their reporting. However, during FSW they occasionally mocked the tactics of both sides of the protest. For example, Pool tweeted, “Milos free speech week in Berkeley officially became Milo’s free speech half hour”, whilst Rudkowski stated during his livestream, “Yeah, as you
can see very articulate points by both sides.” On the other hand, similarly to Southern and Chapman but spiked with even more alt-light ideology, James was extremely derogatory towards Antifa, using aggressive, argumentative and offensive language throughout his livestreams. He continuously picked out individual protesters and called them “scum,” “fat fuck,” and “Low T beta male,” the latter referring to a common alt-right insult meaning emasculated males who subsequently have low testosterone (Bell, 2016; Romo, 2017; Hathaway, 2017). Despite conceptualising himself as a journalist, James’ use of sarcasm and insults resulted in his reportage being highly subjective, offensive, and often violent towards one side of the protest, once again demonstrating he frequently abandons
journalistic norms, such as objectivity and impartiality (Singer, 2005). Whilst examining the rise of political bloggers during the 2004 US election, Scott (2007) defined political blogs as “activist media punditry” (p.54), this seems a more accurate definition for James’ work, as similarly to Southern and Chapman he played more of an activist-journalist role for the alt-light, rather than a “truth-seeking” journalist.
In sum, the use of sarcasm, mockery and derogatory insults by the citizen
journalist’s, though clearly indicative of their popular online personas, once again questions their self-conceptualisations and demonstrates the polarizing effects their content may be having within the public sphere (The Economist, 2017; Newman et al., 2017; Mihailidis & Viotty, 2017).
Conclusion
This study sought to qualitatively analyse the content produced by six alt-light citizen journalists, to establish how they reported, interpreted and understood the 2017 Berkeley protests. When situated within today’s unfamiliar, uncertain and highly-partisan ‘post-truth era’ in the U.S. media landscape, the results of this study reveal significant outcomes for communication scholars, professional journalist’s, and the general public alike. Due to the technological developments of the last decade, the boundary lines between professional journalism, citizen journalism and social movement media activism, are now more blurred
than ever (Ali & Fahmy, 2013; Lenzner, 2014; Robinson & Schwartz, 2014). As this study revealed, despite the citizen journalists varying self-conceptualisations, they utilise the same journalistic tools as one another and the mainstream media—such as live tweeting and livestreaming—and have significant audiences viewing their content, making the task of distinguishing professional vs. amateur, as well as impartial vs. advocacy journalism, increasingly complex (Harcup, 2005; Gilmor, 2006; Robinson & Schwartz, 2014).
Moreover, again despite their self-descriptions and efforts to distance themselves from one another and the alt-right movement, the reportage of all six citizen journalists from the 2017 Berkeley protests revealed they were in fact working within an unofficial, alt-light citizen journalism network. It is through such digitalised networks that distrust in traditional journalism and political polarization has flourished, because those who have sought alternative media, which aligns with their worldview, have located it within these online spaces (Mihailidis & Viotty, 2017; Newman et al., 2017; Rose, 2017). As the content of the alt-light citizen journalists in this study corroborates, it is within these ideological echo chambers in which inaccuracies, conspiracy theories and ‘alternative-facts’ originate and circulate (Gilbert et al., 2009; The Economist, 2017; Singal, 2016).
Like all studies, this one isn’t without limitations. First, owing to the heterogeneous and anonymous nature of this relatively new movement, the individuals and content chosen for this study cannot be said to be generalizable to the entire population of alt-light citizen journalists, or the alt-light/alt-right movement in its entirety. Additionally, although the qualitative content analysis was carried out systematically and following conventional guidelines, the researcher’s “preconceived knowledge of the subject” may have unwittingly impacted upon the interpretation of the data (Bengtsson, 2016, p.8). Therefore, future
research of alt-light/alt-right citizen journalism could benefit from the perspective of someone with less familiarity with the context (Bengtsson, 2016), as well as the utilisation of a
quantitative method to eradicate possible researcher bias. Furthermore, how, and to what extent, these alt-light citizen journalism echo chambers are impacting upon the U.S. public sphere represents a rich and relatively untouched area for future communication research.
Despite these limitations, this study has significant implications for those concerned about the changing nature of citizen journalism, and the threat to the mainstream media’s credibility. Currently, the political ‘Left’ does not have any recognisable citizen journalists, let alone a citizen journalist network to rival the alt-light’s (Whyman, 2017). However, increasing societal partisanship, by encouraging more untrained and highly-politicised individuals to take on journalistic roles, is not the solution. Instead, the focus should be on ensuring the public is conscious of the inaccuracies and ideologies which stem from the reporting of this so-called ‘alternative media’. The risk radical alternative media, such as the alt-light citizen journalist network, poses within the public sphere can be alleviated, if efforts are directed towards rebuilding the financial security, autonomy and ultimately, trust, in an already existing counterforce; the traditional media.
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