“Unite the Right” Rally – The Alt-Right Self-Presentation Strategy and its Role
on the Construction of White Identity
MSc Political Science: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and
Development Specialization
Fernanda Gomes
S2370751
Thesis Supervisor – Dr. Vasiliki Tsagkroni
Second Reader – Dr. Floris Mansvelt Beck
July 15, 2019
Acknowledgements
I would like to take the opportunity to thank my thesis supervisor Dr Vasiliki Tsagkroni, for her enduring support. She consistently steered me in the right direction, and her door was always open for additional clarifications. I could not have asked for a more qualified and attentive supervisor to encourage me along the way. I would also like to acknowledge the patience and faith in me of my better half that backed me up on this endeavor and was my rock through this study.
Contents
Acknowledgements ... 2 Abstract ... 1 Introduction ... 2 Theoretical Framework ... 6 Key Concepts ... 12 White Identity ... 13White Extremist Discourse ... 14
Literature Review ... 15
Research Design ... 19
Case Study – “Unite The Right” Rally ... 19
The Alt-Right ... 20
Discourse Analysis ... 21
Methods of Data Collection and Operationalization ... 22
Methods of Data Analysis ... 23
Analysis ... 23
Conclusion ... 30
1
Abstract
The Unite the Right rally that took place in Charlottesville, August 2017 remains as a milestone in a polarized America as it demonstrates the aptitude of the Alt-Right to mobilize white nationalists from different ideological leanings across the far-right spectrum. Building on the anxieties of many white people, Alt-Righters make use of a toned-down discourse and a new self-presentation strategy to encourage white solidarity across far-right factions and mainstream whites aiming to create a sense of attachment. This study uses a discourse analysis approach to investigate and explain the role of Alt-Righters’ self-presentation in the construction of white identity. It draws on spoken and written texts collected from various digital sources to analyze themes such as victim ideology and explore the overall strategy of self-presentation used by the Alt-Right. At the same time, it focuses on the role of the media both as a platform to the dissemination of the Alt-Right message and a tool to create a sense of “groupness” and “belongingness”.
2
Introduction
The events of August 11 and 12, 2017, in Charlottesville, Virginia, illustrates well the polarization and the revival of American nativism in today’s America. The chain of events leading to the white nationalist rally dubbed “Unite the Right” starts earlier in 2017 when the City Council votes to remove the statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee from a city park. Arguing that the decision was unlawful under state law, opponents to the removal file a lawsuit and months of protests end in the organization of the rally by Alt-Righter Jason Kessler. Long story made short, following a torchlight march with white nationalists chanting “white lives matter” and “you will not replace us” on the night preceding the rally, violence brakes out on the next day shortly after white nationalists start heading to the Park designated for the event. The clashes between counter-protesters and white nationalists led to the Governor declaring the state of emergency. However, it fell short of stopping an Alt-Right member of ramming his car towards the crowd, killing one counter-protester and injuring other 191 triggering widespread condemnation.
Driven by demographic change, the Alt-Right, short for Alternative Right, has grown in size and scope. On its ranks, it has white nationalists, KKK factions and neo-Nazis, and aims to unify the different groups sharing an anti-foreign spirit and the belief that the nation belongs to the white race (Sanchez G. J., 1997; Higham, 1955). For decades now that Confederate monuments “have mediated public memory and operated as centres of White identity politics” and have “established a symbolic and cultural web of belonging for economically discouraged and politically marginalized Whites” (Rushing et al., 2018, p.18). They play a central role in the
1 See https://www.salon.com/2018/08/11/a-timeline-of-racism-in-charlottesville-from-1607-through-2017s-unite-the-right-rally-aftermath-2/ retrieved on 1/4/2019 for more information
3 construction of a collective group identity to a subset of the white population, who sees the removal of these monuments as subverting the history, the traditions and the southern culture. On the other hand, to other population subsets, they are offensive reminders of a past of slavery and segregation and seen both as an expression of white domination and validation of racist discourse (Gordon-Reed, 2018; Buffington, 2017; Martinez, Richardson, & McNinch-Su, 2000). As such, it does not come as a surprise the politicization of Confederate monuments and backlash to their removal.
At first white nationalists promoted their interests and voiced their ideologies and anxieties predominantly in digital platforms; however, they slowly have begun organizing beyond the digital space and rallying on the streets. Thus, the relevance of the “Unite the Right” rally, which drew an estimate of 500 to 600 participants from all across the US, bringing together five times as many members as any other similar event in the last decade2. It is worth to mention that the event
received intense media coverage and that the traditional media has been central in facilitating the dissemination of Alt-Right ideology, as reporting on Alt-Right online and public activities have made possible the spreading of their message to new audiences (Philips, 2018). As Wodak (2015) noted, digital platforms are a unique space to use self-presentation tactics to appeal to mainstream individuals, which traditional media helped to advertise. Thus, contemporary media outlets did afford the Alt-Right an enormous platform by giving prominence to far-right messages and ideology that otherwise would not have had national publicity (Philips, 2018).
This thesis seeks to explain the role of self-presentation in constructing and developing a white identity. The focus is not on race relations per se but on the discursive practices used on
2 See file:///D:/Msc%20Thesis%20New%20Topic/Factiva.html retrieved on 1/4/2019 retrieved on
4 media platforms to furthering group solidarity and identity. Nevertheless, it will touch upon race as an identification marker as such identity builds upon a white/black dichotomy. Thus, through the lens of the social identity approach and drawing on the self-presentation theory, this thesis argues that self-presentation triggers processes of categorization and of identification, which are crucial to the construction of social identity. Nevertheless, the social identity approach does not account for the significance of race in the construction of white identity. Therefore, using the group position theory to add another layer to the theoretical framework will help to explain the importance of racial hierarchy and perceptions of threat in such construction. Likewise, the theoretical framework would be incomplete if there was no media theory to explain the importance of media platforms in the construction of social identities. On the one hand, traditional media platforms inform vast audiences in a timely manner giving prominence to messages that otherwise would go unnoticed, and therefore, contributing to the formation of opinions. On the other hand, new media platforms are crucial in providing an exceptional “space” for sharing ideologies, for developing and strengthening emotional bonds and engaging individuals into discussions. Therefore, incorporating media theory in the theoretical framework will help demonstrate that both traditional and new media are central to identity formation.
Part of the relevance of this research lies in understanding the processes and dynamics of self-presentation on identity construction that may contribute to explain the growth of the Alt-right and white nationalism in today’s America. Understanding these processes holds relevance both in societal and academic levels, as often far-right groups promote violence and intolerance, resulting in a rise of hate crime and race/ethnic-related tensions. As well, understanding the role that media platforms and self-presentation strategies play in the construction of white identity is pivotal to
5 find solutions to prevent white nationalism of becoming mainstream and be of influence in policy-making. Finally, understanding the nature of white identity provides insights to understand the interplay between demographic shifts and racial dynamics. Ultimately, this thesis seeks an answer to the following question:
How do Alt-Righters’ discourses in media platforms explain the role of self-presentation in the construction of white identity?
The first chapter discusses the theories as well as the theoretical concepts of white identity, and extremist discourse that underpin this thesis. The following chapter critically assesses the literature on the debates on the role of digital networks, the “new” extremist discourse, and self-presentation strategies in the construction of identity. The third chapter expounds the reason for the choice of Charlottesville as the case study, the discourse analysis as the working methodology, and of Alt-Righters discourses as units of analysis. Whereas the analysis section aims to show the role of self-presentational discourses in furthering group solidarity to construct white identity, the conclusion intends to link the theories to the findings.
This thesis will use discourse analysis to come with an answer to the central question steering this research. It will analyze, spoken and written texts gathered from various digital sources looking for recurrent themes, such as victim ideology, within Alt-Righters’ discourse to showcase the overall self-presentation strategy that may explain the construction of white identity.
6
Theoretical Framework
This chapter aims to explain and discuss in more detail, the theories used as the theoretical foundation of this thesis. On the one hand, it focuses on intergroup oriented theories, such as the social identity theory, which infer that group identity is a central element for the occurrence of out-group hostility and that identity salience is ought to perceptions of threat. On the other hand, it focuses on the self-presentation and media theories to stress the import of impression management in the construction of social identities.
One of the premises of intergroup oriented theories is that people categorize themselves and others into groups often without giving too much thought to that categorization and frequently even unaware they are doing it. In everyday encounters, people tend to categorize others based on their similarities and differences, and this process of categorization is what helps individuals making sense of who they are and who they are not (Jardina, 2018; Spears, 2011; Hoog & Abrams, 1998). On the other hand, unlike categorization processes that arise from social comparison, identification processes relate to one’s sense of belongingness or as Tajfel & Turner (1979) say are telling of the emotional bond individuals have with their own group. People identify and construe themselves according to the value they derive from their group memberships, and “may develop a strong sense of commitment to particular groups, which motivates them to display progroup behaviour out of an intrinsic concern with group goals” (Barreto & Ellemers, 2000, p. 892). Once a social identity forms based on the individual’s knowledge that he belongs to, and shares a bond with, the group, the adoption of values, norms and behaviours of the in-group, as well as ethnocentric behavior, follow. As a matter of fact, the more people identify with a social
7 identity the likely they are to engage in out-group derogatory behaviour (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Taijfel, 1982, Hoog, Terry, & White, 1995; Deaux, 2000; Hoog & Reid, 2006).
As said elsewhere, social categorization and identification processes underpin the construction of any social identity, but the process of social comparison is central to that construction as individuals can only derive value from their social identities by positively comparing their group to others (Spears, 2011; Hoog M. A., 2003). It is worth to emphasize that besides dividing society into groups and developing strong bonds with many of the groups they belong, people also feel motivated to favor their own group over others in order to maintain a positive social identity (Spears, 2011; Hoog & Abrams, 1998; Turner, Hoog, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). The social identity approach has been used to analyse a large set of social phenomena and partakes some of its theoretical propositions with other theories such as the structuralist perspective. Both these perspectives share the premise that social categories are the foundation of society and that groups are the fabric of the social structure, which is continuously changing because groups may be transitory such as numerous occupational categories that no longer exist or pervasive and enduring social categories like race or caste (Hoog & Abrams, 1998; Hoog M. A., 2003).
However, the social identity approach follows, rather than the structuralist “consensus” theory, the structuralist “conflict” theory, which draws attention to the fact that various groups profoundly disagree in their ideologies, values and beliefs because it puts emphasis on “the forces and pressures upon groups to differentiate themselves from other groups rather than strive for similarity” (Hoog & Abrams, 1998, p.13). That is to say, whereas the “consensus” theory sees society as a well-oiled machine where groups conform to society’s norms and values and work
8 together to guarantee social stability, the “conflict” theory sees society as being structured in a way that some groups’ access to resources, power and status is better than others. For instance, South Africa Apartheid system and Jim Crow laws illustrate well the competitive and conflictual nature of group relations (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Hoog & Abrams, 1998). Whereas whites enforced racial segregation to keep blacks from challenging their social dominance, blacks battled for equal access to resources, power and status. Therefore, when groups’ interests are at odds conflict rather than consensus likely ensue, and in-group favoritism and out-group animosity take centre stage.
Nevertheless, the social identity approach does not account for the worth of race in the construction of white identity. It does explain the reciprocal relationship between in-group bias and out-group hostility, it does point out that individuals tend to strongly identify and express favoritism to the groups they belong to, and it does demonstrate that individuals feel motivated to attain and uphold a positive social identity (Taijfel & Turner 1979; Tajfel, 1982; Hoog & Abrams 1998; Hoog M. A., 2003; Spears, 2011). However, it does not differentiate between dominant or subordinate groups when putting forward these inferences (Jardina, 2018). Therefore, group position theory comes to complement this lacking. The theory argues that dominant groups define and redefine lower groups in the racial structure, and that hostility manifests when individuals have the perception that racial/ethnic minorities are challenging the racial structure and the resources and status of the dominant group (Jardina, 2018; Blaylock, 2010; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). As Bobo & Hutchings (1996) state “the sense of group position involves assumptions of proper or proprietary claim over certain rights, resources, statuses and privileges” (p.955). It is worth noting, that the perception of threat and beliefs about one’s rightful place in the social
9 hierarchical structure spring from long historical, social and collective processes (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996)
At present, intergroup relations in America are becoming increasingly competitive and conflictual as many white people feel their lion’s share of power and privilege threatened by racial/ethnic minority groups. Their perception is that those groups besides demanding the same access to resources and privileges are also threatening whites social dominance. At this time, whites are still a majority in the political and socio-economic milieus; however, intermarriage, immigration and birth rates are closing the gap and threatening the group position in the social hierarchy structure. Furthermore, the white population decline has heightened whites’ fears that at a certain point, white as a racial identity will cease to exist. Many conspiracy theories put forward by white nationalists explore this population decline, which is real according to the latest US census and population growth previsions3 and substantiated by many scholar works (Jardina, 2018; Bai & Federico, 2019). Therefore, I claim that this threat is raising a white racial consciousness that was not there before because white identity was not noteworthy, and that this consciousness is causing stronger in-group bias and out-group hostility in today’s America4.
It is important to note, that being white is a synonym of privilege and that throughout their lifetime, whites are less likely to experience prejudice or discrimination (Jardina, 2018). More often than not, white people do not think either what means to be white or in the advantages attached. They are often unaware of their racial identity and rarely do they think of themselves in
3 See https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2008/02/11/us-population-projections-2005-2050/ retrieved on
5/7/2019 for further information
4 See https://www.pewresearch.org/topics/discrimination-and-prejudice/ retrieved on 6/7/2019 for
10 terms of race. Jardina (2108) points out, that dominant groups “often experience the normalization of their group identities” and that “the status of whites as the dominant group has served as an obstacle to the development of a strong salient group identity” (p.35). However, present-day challenges to a status quo of power and privilege are causing white identity in America to become more salient, and the perception that whites are faring worse than, and loosing out to, other groups are driving collective action in defense of group interests (Sengupta, Osborne, & Sibley, 2018). When a social identity becomes salient, individuals are more likely to pursue joint interests and act at the best interest of the group (Turner, Hoog, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Barreto & Ellemers, 2000).
It is within this context of perceived loss of power and privilege that white nationalist groups have grown in recent times. My claim is that this growth is in part ought to self-presentation strategies used to shape audiences’ impressions of particular group members and the group in general to attain a more desirable group image and trigger processes of identification in whites that highly identify with their racial identity. The self-presentation theory examines how individuals as agents attempt to convey a particular image to others and shape the responses of others to accomplish personal or group goals. It further suggests that deception and manipulation greatly underpin the management of impressions in spite of some truthfulness being involved when attempting to create a preferred impression (Schlenker, 2003). As Goffman (1959) highlights, individuals as performers are always playing a role in their encounters, which can be countlessly repeated, changed according to the situational contexts or enhanced owing to ulterior motives. Brown ( 1998), refers to self-presentation as any behavior “intended to create, modify, or maintain an impression of ourselves in the minds of others” (p.160), and Arkin, Appelman & Burger (1980)
11 as “the manner in which individuals plan, adopt, and carry out strategies for managing the impressions they make on others” (p.23).
As claimed by Barreto & Ellemers (2000), the theory posits that an individual’s behaviour when in the presence of an audience, “is strongly determined by a fundamental desire to avoid censure and seek positive evaluation by others” (p.892). The theory’s basic proposition is that individuals are very much concerned with what others think of them and strategically behave to win their approval rather than their disapproval (Barreto & Ellemers, 2000; Brown, 1998; Baumeister, 1982; Arkin, Appelman & Burger,1980). Hence, I contend that Alt-Righters seek to win the sympathy of whites feeling alienated and marginalized by following self-presentation strategies such as exemplification and on doing such furthering group solidarity and building a collective white identity. That is to say, that they are mindful that whether online or offline their performance and message, need to be oriented towards specific audiences. That each audience needs to feel they are specifically talking to them whether they are students or workers, youth or middle-age. By tailoring the message and the way they present to the audiences while speaking the language of comradeship, white nationalists are able to create a sense of attachment.
As said elsewhere, traditional media did afford a tremendous platform for Alt-Righters by systematically reporting on their doings what amplified their message. Adding media theory to the theoretical framework is essential to explain the role of the media when covering far-right groups. In the specific case of the Alt-Right, the media gave coherence to an “amorphous mass of disparate personalities and motivations, in the process helping facilitate unified messaging” (Philips, 2018, p.10). Every time the media reports on the Alt-Right, members use that opportunity to present their message in a way mainstream whites can relate to it like addressing specific topics, especially
12 those that touch upon individuals’ anxieties, using the right register to convince people they are not alone on their worries, and performing in a way to satisfying the emotional and cognitive needs of their audiences (Wodak, 2015). That is to say, that the media as a meaning-maker becomes a powerful agent of the social system (Laughey, 2007; McQuail, 2005).
On the other hand, Alt-Righters have been widely using digital platforms for quite a while to voice their anxieties and grievances, promote their image, and to advance the central ideas of free speech and preservation of a European-American identity. They perceive online spaces as “safe” to discuss contentious issues, use inflammatory language, and share ideas with like-minded people. Baym (2015) points out that the sense of safety that comes from anonymity in websites, forums and other social networks “may be important for honest self-expression” (p.127). In addition, the internet has supported the dissemination of alternative views and news in various digital platforms, and it has created the opportunity for individuals to be both consumers and producers of news content allowing for real-time communication across various media platforms. (Brunsting & Postmes, 2002; Chadwick, 2017). In other words, the creation, sharing and discussion of content endorses the development of a sense of “groupness”, which is key to the construction of social identities.
Key Concepts
This sub-section will expand on the concepts of white identity, and white extremist discourse used to steer this research.
13 White Identity
Wodak, de Cillia & Reisigl (2009) stress that identity is a complex and multifaceted construct made of values, behaviours, norms and attitudes. In the same vein, Maalouf, (1996) and Stets & Burke, (2000) point out that identity is fluid and malleable because of its changing character and as a result of the many interactions and processes of self-categorization and social comparison an individual engages on during his lifetime. Clearly, who people are changes over the course of their life and owe much to the meaning they derive from, and give to, their social identities as foretold by the social theory approach. At times, Maalouf (1996) claims, in some individuals a particular social identity seems to override all other identities becoming “the identity”. However, he adds that no social identity has absolute supremacy unless people feel that that social identity is in danger, much in line with the premises of the social identity approach. Thus, a social identity becomes salient when an individual considers that social identity as extremely important to the self-concept and bearing in mind the situational context (Maalouf, 1996; Brubaker & Cooper, 2000).
According to Jardina (2018), one-third of the white population in America view their white identity as important. She contends that whites feeling threatened as a group activated white identity in today’s America as postulated by the position theory (Jardina, 2018). It is not an easy task to define the concept of white identity as whiteness appears to be seen as “inherently “invisible,” “transparent,” or “unmarked” (…) seldom noticed by those who possess it” (Knowles & Peng, 2005, p.223), and merely a default category used to define other racial identities (McDermott, 2015). Attached to this notion of whiteness is the idea that white people have
14 privileges just because of the colour of their skin. As such, white privilege is best understood as a set of benefits granted by the nature of identity, that facilitates access to resources (Blakemore, 2018). However, a new narrative of disenfranchisement connects those sharing this white identity as they feel left behind and victims of unfair policies. Particularly white millennials, “resent progressive rhetoric of white privilege when, instead of privileges, they experience un/under-employment, job insecurity”, and poverty (Phillips & Yi, 2018, p.222). To those to whom race matters and endorse American values, a strong sense of white identity is likely to be present, particularly in those belonging to organizations on both ends of the racism spectrum (McDermott, 2015).
White Extremist Discourse
White extremist discourse can be defined as complex and diverse ranging from hate speech to a much less discriminatory and more stylized type of discourse. Some researchers make a distinction, within a broader line of discourse, between “an older more open racist style and a “new racist” discourse” that stems from a more stylized presentation (Berbrier, 2000, p.176). In the new line of discourse, white nationalists present themselves as respecting the differences among peoples while emphasizing “ their “love” for their own kind rather than their hatred of others” (Berbrier, 2000, p.177). On the other hand, the construction of “race” and realities associated to the images of black men as “rapist”, Mexican as “drug dealers” and Muslims as “terrorists” is still much alive in white extremist discourse, particularly in digital spaces (Berbrier, 2000). Discrimination, racism, and the us versus them dichotomy very much underpin this type of discourse, despite efforts to refrain expressions of hatred and contempt (Ferber, 1998; Delanty, Wodak, & Jones, 2008; Brown, 2009).
15 Presently, white extremist discourse tends to limit the use of discriminatory or racist language to avoid sanctions from mainstream individuals and institutions. Yet, the use of linguistic cues, which are more often than not only understandable to the members of the in-group is a tactic used to overcome public censure (Delanty, Wodak, & Jones, 2008). The “new” extremist discourse is becoming more normative as there is a disassociation from negative connotations through the communication that violence and hate are wrong (Berbrier, 1999; Phillips & Yi, 2018). There is a “relative paucity of demeaning racial slurs” and a high level of sophistication on the discourse (Berbrier, 1999, p.415). It is worth noting that racial superiority is embedded in the discursive practices whether or not derogatory language is used. However, when communicating on their blogs, websites, and so forth, the discourse becomes blatantly racist (Brown, 2009). Nevertheless, whether offline or online, white extremist discourse is taking advantage of particular fears and anxieties by exploring issues of “threatened identity” and victimization amongst others.
Literature Review
In recent times, many studies have stressed that the capacity of far-right groups to recruit and mobilize has grown exponentially because of the free flow of discourse and imagery in digital platforms. Others also highlight the daily use of the Internet to enable networking across geographically separated individuals and groups, as well as in encouraging interaction through the setup of group discussions (Diani, 2000; Adams & Roscigno, 2005; Caiani & Parenti, 2013; Crosset, Tanner, & Campana, 2019). Even in the early days of the Internet, prominent figures, as the Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke, recognized the potential value of the Internet to forward extremist right ideology (Turner-Graham 2014). At present, the myriad of digital platforms
16 available and the tools and techniques developed by such groups allows for a concentrated online presence bringing both awareness and visibility to their cause as well as enhancing their legitimacy (Turner-Graham 2014; Hawley, 2017; Crosset, Tanner, & Campana, 2019). On the same line, Atton (2006) and Ekman (2014) stress that the production and distribution of content on media platforms like YouTube or Twitter allow far-right actors to overcome the limited access to conventional distributional channels to reach new audiences. Hence, increasing the potential of circulation and facilitating “the dissemination of far-right propaganda to non-members (Crosset, Tanner, & Campana, 2019).
Therefore, the multiple digital platforms used by far-right groups is thought to provide a rich milieu to build up emotional bonds between group members and attract those who may share some of the beliefs and perspectives of such groups (Brunsting & Postmes, 2002; Caiani & Parenti, 2013). For instance, Turner-Graham (2014) claims that interaction with like-minded individuals in online forums creates identification and a sense of “groupness” because it allows both to reflect and critique content as well as create it. In addition, she emphasizes that the process of creating and recreating opinions by sharing, liking and re-blogging enables categorization and comparison with others, allowing for self-validation (p.419). Likewise, Caiani & Parenti (2013) argue, that the Internet may construct a social identity for the reason that online forums, as arenas of discussion, play an “important role in the construction of the collective identity of a group, by defining who are the ‘enemies’ and the ‘allies’ (…) and the main goals of the group itself” (p. 92). On the same vein, Brunsting & Postmes (2002), call attention for the likelihood that anonymity may “enhance group salience by reducing attention to individual differences within the group”, therefore, strengthening the group’s unity (p.530).
17 Yet, there are other scholars that despite agreeing that digital platforms may foster identification processes, stress that virtual interactions do not replace face-to-face encounters in the construction of social identities (Diani, 2000). Nonetheless, de Koster & Houtman (2008), point out that online platforms provide a safe space for those who often meet criticism and recrimination offline for freely expressing their views and beliefs, and that the comradeship that stems from shared experiences fuels identification through inclusion. However, most of the studies focusing on far-right groups online presence play little attention to offline life dismissing the social context in which membership occurs hampering potential explanations for identification with, and participation in, such groups.
In harmony with other scholars’ claims, put forward elsewhere, Della Porta & Mosca (2005) contend that online platforms enable processes of identity formation through the sharing of information and experiences, to what Caiani & Parenti (2013) add the socialization of actors and promotion of solidarity. In addition, Bamberg, De Fina, & Schiffrin (2011) draw attention to the relationship between discursive practices and identity construction that emerges from continuous social interaction, with Brunsting & Postmes (2002) claiming that the internet “is an empowering platform to the formation and definition of social identity” (p.530). The type of discourse is also chief on processes of identity construction. Thus, far-right groups have somewhat moved away from open racist discourse as this type of discourse has become increasingly stigmatized by society at large (Blee & Yates, 2015). In particular, the Alt-Right has framed their “fringe narratives through socially more acceptable lens of freedom of speech and criticism of multiculturalism” (Davey & Ebner, 2017). Some researchers assert that the reframing of discourse is fundamental to penetrate the mainstream, attract whites leaning towards their political views, and create a more
18 favorable impression of the in-group in general (Jardina, 2018, Davey & Ebner, 2017; van Dijk, 1992). This effort to attain a less negative image is to a great extent built on a narrative of denial of racism, which is part of a broader strategy of positive in-group presentation adopted by white nationalists to construct the dominant white consensus (van Dijk, 1992; Berbrier 1999).
The “new” white extremist discourse emphasizes the lack of representation of white interests, stresses the challenges of the current racial makeshift to white people, presents a victimhood narrative (Ferber, 1998; Kincheloe, 1999; Berbrier, 2000; Schmitz, 2016), and seems to serve as foundation for the values shared by most far-right groups (Rollef, Cothran, & Torr, 2001). Not to mention that it comprises a great deal of impression management. Currently, white nationalists use a stylized presentation to convey the image of being articulate and polished while denying being racists and using reverse racism to claim they are the ones being discriminated (Berbrier, 1999; van Dijk, 1992). Berbrier (2000), underlines that some other features of this “new” extremist rhetoric are the emphasis on white pride and heritage preservation, which white nationalists use as a way to imply that they are “just another ethnic group with similar needs” (p.183). They claim that if they express pride in their race, they will be stigmatized but that being unable to express that pride is an assault on their identity (Berbier, 2000). Adams & Roscigno (2005) concur that the idea of whites as victims of discrimination “deprived of exploring and celebrating their identity” is recurrent on the ideological framing and discourse of white nationalist groups.
As such, issues of identity, heritage, discrimination, and abrogation of rights, are embedded in the extremist discourse and used not only for purposes of identity formation/maintenance but for purposes of mobilization as well (Davey & Ebner, 2017; Adams & Roscigno 2005). As noted
19 by Adams & Roscigno (2005), leaders of white nationalist groups focus on the perceived or real threats towards the power and status of the in-group to frame “grievances in terms of white oppression” and call for action (p.762). Therefore, mobilization runs across the lines of loss of power, perceptions of injustice and worries of whites becoming a minority as these can generate a sense of “togetherness” and bridge ideological differences amongst the various white nationalist groups (Adams & Roscigno, 2005). On this context, the “Unite the Right” rally illustrates well the bridging of ideological differences across the different factions as it mobilized “many loosely affiliated far right communities” (Davey & Ebner, 2017, p.14). As Davey & Ebner (2017) point out, Charlottesville wide-ranging mobilization showcases well group solidarity coming from the convergence of overlapping interests and grievances, echoed on the coalescence of, and collaboration between, the different sub-movements.
Research Design
Case Study – “Unite The Right” Rally
This research uses a single case study and a discourse analysis to explore the role of self-presentation in the construction of white identity. The case study selected was the “Unite the Right” rally organized by the white nationalist group Alt-Right, and the selection based on two criteria. First, white nationalists see the rally as a historic moment and a turning point to the far-right as it was able of bringing together a range of different sub-groups with similar ideologies in one of the largest public gatherings in past decades. Second, it was widely covered by various media outlets both at national and international level giving a significant level of exposure to the
20 Alt-Right and triggering a heated debate about white nationalism in America (Davey & Ebner, 2017).
The Alt-Right
Not so long ago, the Alt-Right was an obscure, amorphous, and mostly online fringe group (Heikkilä, 2017). The term, coined in 2008 by Richard Spencer lived until today despite the waning of the Alt-Right as a nationalist group a few years after its outset. Nevertheless, the Alt-Right resurfaced in 2015 when the term suddenly appeared out of the dark corners of the Internet and began to be used in multiple venues and social media by the radical right (Hawley, 2017). The movement grew in significance during the 2016 electoral campaign, and “capitalized on the anti-immigration and anti-establishment campaign themes of Donald Trump” (Heikkilä, 2017; p.7). However, they can hardly be called an organized movement as they are largely leaderless. A more accurate description of the Alt-Right is that of a loose movement with no formal institutions or leadership and no single ideology, as people who say being Alt-Righters want different things (Hawley, 2017).
According to Hawley (2017), the movement is at its core a white-nationalist one, and very much concerned with race, despite to its critics being nothing more than an extremist white supremacist group that slightly changed in style and emphasis. However, Michael (2017) puts forward that the Alt-Right despite rooted in white nationalism “is more nuanced, as it encompasses a much broader spectrum of rightist activists (…) who believe in libertarianism, men’s rights, [and] cultural conservatism” (p. 9). Members such as Richard Spencer have outright rejected the notion of racial supremacy and worked hard to rebrand white nationalism. Regardless of the many
21 different views about foreign policy, economic policies or the like, and even if not everyone calls himself a white nationalist, white identity remains at the core of the Alt-Right (Hawley, 2017).
As mostly an online movement, the Alt-Right gained visibility and public attention through the meme culture and the art of trolling. That is to say, enticing people to engage in heated arguments in response to controversial comments online. Trolling aims to sow discord and more often than not change the topics of conversation by using sensationalism and provocation (Heikkilä, 2017; Hawley, 2017; Michael, 2017). Furthermore, as they mastered the art of trolling, they were able to permeate mainstream platforms and discussions and to circulate their message widely. The use of humor and irony has as goal to come across as a “youthful, light-hearted, and jovial” group to which tech-savvy and college-educated millennials can relate (Hawley, 2017, p. 20). It is worth noting that young people are a major presence on conferences and other Alt-Right venues happening across America (Hawley, 2017). Also noteworthy is the group leaving the safety of the internet to protest in the streets and being able to bring together in large numbers people of different leanings as it happened in the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville.
Discourse Analysis
The choice of discourse analysis, (henceforth DA), as work methodology lies on the adequacy of the methodology to analyze social phenomena. DA looks at the relationship between language and the social context in which it is used and considers how discourse constructs identities and assigns meaning to language through social practices (Paltridge, 2006; Wodak, Maingueneau, & Angermuller, 2014). Since it has a social dimension it is, therefore, appropriated to study how language is “recruited ‘on site’ to enact specific social activities and social identities” (Gee 1999 as cited in Alba-Juez, 2009, p.16). Hence, DA is a sound choice to address matters of
22 identity and cognitive processes such as group identification. This research will follow a
poststructural perspective. To be exact, the Foucaultian notion that the process of obtaining a
social identity is both a process of engaging into discursive practice and subjecting to discursive practice and that language means reality in the sense that builds meanings for it (Alba-Juez, 2009).
Methods of Data Collection and Operationalization
To answer the research question, this thesis will look into two documentaries done by mainstream media at the time of the event, and published on YouTube. “Charlottesville: Race on Terror”5, made by the media outlet Vice News, and “See the Sparks that Set off Violence in
Charlottesville”6 from National Geographic. It will also analyze a press conference given by Alt-
Righter Richard Spencer7 in the aftermath of the rally, and an interview with Jason Kessler8 the rally organizer both published on YouTube as well. On the other hand, it will look at a couple of articles and a podcast9 from the Alt-Right Web Site to compare online and public discourse. With
respect to operationalization, as most of the times it is not possible to measure a concept directly because of its vagueness and abstraction, there was the need to choose indicators to measure effectively the key concepts. Hence, to measure the concept of white identity will be used the following indicators: race, sense of belonging, victim. On the other hand, to measure the concept of white extremist discourse will be used the following indicators: superiority, discriminatory,
5 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P54sP0Nlngg retrieved on 10/05/2109 6 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FDIfPhx-Fm0 retrieved on 10/05/2019 7 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W7gAXyX2ths retrieved on 10/05/2019 8 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mIA9_RZpsdQ retrieved on 10/05/2019
9 See https://affirmativeright.blogspot.com/2017/09/shortpod-10-alt-right-metapolitical.html retrieved
23 toned-down. By choosing these indicators, the goal is to understand how white nationalists use self-presentation in discourse to construct white identity.
Methods of Data Analysis
The data gathered will be analyzed in a way to identify themes such as victim ideology, and will explore the notion of “who we are” by opposition to “who we are not” and positive presentation and negative other-presentation. As well, it will look for the strategic self-presentational strategies used, such as exemplification. Moreover, it will focus on the personal pronouns to analyze exclusion and sense of belonging and in the attribution of negative or positive traits found implicitly or explicitly in predicates, all of this used in presentation (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003).
Analysis
“We came out here, we’re loud and proud, and we don’t go anywhere. We’re an American organization, and our membership represents this.”
(First Young Alt-Right Member)
The statement shows the pride of being American, with American meaning also white. Thus, white American linked to heritage and bestowing legitimacy to the Alt-Right based on the claim that whites are the rightful “heirs” of the country. The use of the personal pronoun we denotes belongingness and groupness as we are proud of belonging to the group that represents white Americans. Moreover, proclaiming membership signals that the rally attendee shares the values and beliefs of the group, which is defending the interests of the white people, and therefore, “we
24
came out here” in defense of those interests what denotes a progroup behavior out of concern for
group interests (Barreto & Ellemers, 2000). Furthermore, the use of the demonstrative this denotes the proximity of the speaker to what is happening. It signals that the speaker feels greatly involved in the actions of the in-group. The speech is not hostile, but there is a hiding meaning in “we don’t
go anywhere”. The indefinite pronoun anywhere puts across a veiled threat and reinforces the
feeling of groupness, as we the group do not intend to lose our position in the social hierarchical structure. The moderation in the language, which does not use race slurs or discriminatory wording, shows the desire of avoiding censure and of obtaining a positive evaluation by others (Barreto & Ellemers, 2000).
It is worth noting that the sense of belonging springs from identification with the beliefs of the group.
“Following your parents believes just because they raise you is not a good idea. You should believe for yourself you should look at the things for yourself and then decide who you are”. (Second Young Alt-Right Member)
Implicit is the notion that the family is not in favor of his identity constructed out of identification with the Alt-Right rather than the family. Also implicit, the notion that the similarities with the group are far greater than the ones with the family. The sense of attachment coming from the identification with the values, norms and beliefs of the Alt-Right helps him to make sense of “who he is”.
On the other hand, the emphasis is given to the importance of symbols, fundamental in the construction and development of social identities (Rushing, et al., 2018)
25
in honor of the history of Western civilization and European peoples”. (Jason Kessler - Rally Organizer)
The statue as a symbol of white identity goes far into the past and links to ancestry, which does not mean just being white, but to belong to Western civilization, which European peoples built. Therefore, implying that being white is belonging to an intelligent and superior race and that America belongs to white men because white men built America (Ferber, 1998). As well, stressing that white nationalists are attending the rally “to protect this statue”, therefore, putting forward the idea that they are there to defend the heritage and shared interests of the group.
There are many references to race in Alt-Righters’ discourses. Race intertwines with identity and a sense of groupness that arises from the acknowledgement of whites as a racial group. “My fellow white people” not only differentiates the in-group from the out-group based on race as well as constructs a sense of groupness expressed on the personal pronoun my and reinforced by the adjective fellow. Furthermore, race becomes a cohesion factor, as the fear of becoming a minority ought to demographic shifts triggers solidarity.
“I think every race should have a homeland for their own race. There is a demographic decline going on, and we need some place
that can be a white homeland before we bled out.” (First Young Alt-Right Member)
The expression “before we bled out” clearly illustrating the centrality of race. The metaphor encased on the intransitive verb bleed puts forward the idea of whites as victims, here as part of a strategic self-presentation supplication strategy. Although they are not advertising they are weak, they are highlighting the inadequacy of the current state of affairs, where they do not feel, they have a homeland. Furthermore, whites are bleeding because minority groups are draining
26 their resources and take their rightful place in the social hierarchy (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). Moreover, claiming for some place they can call homeland, is advertising that they need the support of other whites to attain that goal. This line of discourse resonates with whites feeling dispossessed and disheartened and believing whites have to unite if they want to survive as a race.
It is worth noting that the victim ideology is a recurrent theme on white extremist discourse fulfilling two key functions at the same time. First, it creates a narrative with which other whites identify. Second, it justifies and excuses for less moral attitudes. The victim ideology puts forward whites as victims of discrimination and hatred while asserting the out-group as the one being racist (Berbrier,1999). Thus, the narrative is that regardless of white nationalists respecting the out-group because they “don’t think people should be treated unfairly because of their race or any other
characteristic” the out-group still have a “distinct hatred for the white people” (Jason Kessler, Rally Organizer). As pointed out, this narrative of victimhood does not aim only to entice other
whites to join the group but also to justify attitudes or actions likely to trigger censure like resorting to violence but just because they were “not able to have civil liberties like the first
amendment”(Jason Kessler, Rally Organizer). This narrative of both victimization and
justification is a discursive tactic used both in traditional and online media platforms.
Websites and blogs aiming to appeal to mainstream whites make use of the same soft-spoken discourse as in events covered by traditional media outlets. In these digital spaces, Alt-Righters stress they “have to present the message in an acceptable manner for normal people” and that they have to follow a “more reasonable, more mainstream kind of approach” (Collin
Liddel - podcast). Therefore, using deception and manipulation when presenting to whites outside
27 presentation strategy is also the awareness that Alt-Righters should “conduct with more decorum” and be “more moral” to gain the respect of mainstream whites and achieve legitimacy. As well, similarly to the offline environment, there is heavy use of the plural personal pronouns and the possessive form our in online platforms, which strongly underpin the construction of the minority groups as victimizers and white nationalists as victims, helping to construct the dichotomy of us versus them but without obvious discriminatory language.
In fact, a toned-down discourse is taking place over an overtly violent one, as Alt-Righters are eschewing overt discriminatory and confrontational speech to seduce mainstream whites that may feel angry but do not hold racist views. Once more, the use of plural pronouns and possessive
our form helps to sharpen the us versus them division drawing in-group hostility towards the
out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Taijfel, 1982).
“We, our people we are not being violent, they are being violent to us and for my understanding our people were tear gas. After they declared an unlawful assembly, our people left immediately and they still tear gas us.” (Jason Kessler- Rally Organizer)
In two short sentences, the speaker uses the plural personal pronouns and possessive form our ten times to put forward strong imagery of whites as victims rather than wrongdoers. Although behaving as law-abiding citizens, white nationalists were the ones aggressed. Likewise, the image of the police cracking down “on some of the most peaceful people in the rally” (Jason Kessler,
Rally Organizer), intends to produce the same effect. Therefore, clearly a strategy of positive
self-presentation and negative other-reself-presentation. Alt-Righters were on the right the other was not. The message put across is that they are non-violent and were peacefully exerting their right to free
28 speech nothing more nothing less. Altogether, this is a powerful message likely to create a bond with the group out of identification and solidarity. In fact, this type of discourse seeks to appeal to group solidarity, as the aggression suffered is symbolic of the struggle of whites to stay afloat in what they perceive as an increasingly hostile environment.
In addition, the use of the possessive form our also plays a main role in camouflaging discrimination towards minorities as it enables the speaker to assert his rights while, without using prejudiced language, denying the rights of the out-group. Thus, “this is our country, built by our
forefathers, sustained by us, and is going to remain our country” (Robert Ray, Alt-Righter, Daily Stormer website writer), subtly suggests that the resources the out-group is claiming access to do
not belong to them but to the in-group. However, this softened discourse continues to be discriminatory and illustrative that white nationalists still see themselves as the dominant group in the social hierarchy (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). In spite of the toned-down discourse, there is still many openly expressions of hatred and discrimination in white extremist discourse. Slurs like
“little black (…) savage” comparing blacks with dangerous animals with no education or social
manners or implying that the other is a “parasitic class of anti-white vermin” that only survives at the expenses of the white group are still very common.
However, the image of a young, well-spoken, articulate, college-educated and tech-savvy individual is slowly becoming the trademark of the Alt-Right in the public sphere (Hawley, 2017). Richard Spencer, a well-known face of the movement, took advantage of the platform provided by the media during the rally to pass once more that image across national audiences. In the press conference that took place in the aftermath of the event, he framed the events in a way to deflect any type of responsibility from the Alt-Right in a polite, coherent and fluent manner. The police
29 became the main culprit of things going wrong, with blame ascribed to minority groups, as well. Whereas the authorities did not perform their job to the best of their abilities, counter-protesters were “violent tugs [that] all they want to do is harm us, harm white people” (Richard Spencer,
Alt-Right ‘leader’). Violence did not occur because “we were here talking about identitarianism or something, but because the Alt-Right was there” (Richard Spencer, Alt-Right ‘leader’). The
recurrent themes in victim ideology strategy once again put forward: rights abrogation and whites as an object of discrimination, (Berbrier, 1999).
Nevertheless, the victim ideology, despite pivotal in the overall self-presentation strategy, is part of a larger set of tactics such as the strategic self-presentation exemplification strategy used to elicit perceptions of moral worthiness.
“We need a moral power, this isn’t just a movement about policy this is a movement about capturing people’s hearts and minds and for us to do that we are going to need that moral power, to be the people in the right, (…) who have great ideals and want to change the world for the better.” (Richard Spencer – Alt-Righter ‘leader’)
The core message is that the Alt-Right has great ideals that can change the world for the better. However, the goal of the speaker is not just to convey that message across national audiences but also to create in the minds and hearts of the audiences the impression that the group is morally righteous, credible and sincere. The exemplification strategy aside from ascribing positive traits to him in particular, and the wider group to charm mainstream whites also strength the group bond by reaffirming that they are the “people in the right”.
30 In a nutshell, two of the recurrent themes in Alt-Righters’ discourses are the victim ideology and the non-violence narrative. The victim ideology comprehends the sub-topics of abrogation of rights and whites as victims of discrimination. It also performs two functions simultaneously, one as a narrative that resonates to mainstream whites and the other as a justification for less moral attitudes. The non-violence narrative underpins the victim ideology but also puts forward an image of law-abiding citizens that intends to increase Alt-Righters legitimacy. As for the overall self-presentation strategy, it is worth noting, that it comprises several tactics from a toned-down discourse where the discriminatory language is masked through the heavy use of plural personal pronouns and the possessive form our to the use of strategic self-presentation strategies such as exemplification and supplication. Also noteworthy is the use of the same personal pronouns to construct a sense of “groupness” and “belongingness”.
Conclusion
This thesis set out to research if Alt-Righters’ discourses in media platforms explained the role of self-presentation in the construction of white identity. The results show that there is a sense of “belongingness” and “groupness” that stems from the value that members derive from their membership in line with the intergroup oriented theories chosen to underpin the research. The findings also corroborate the position theory when claiming that when dominant groups perceive their resources and social structure challenged, they tend to be hostile towards the subordinate groups demanding for access to those resources and power. At present, whites are feeling challenged in their dominant position by demographic shifts that are causing anxieties to grow and hostility to manifest. They are closing rows and becoming more open to alternative solutions like
31 those of the Alt-Right, as they increasingly fear the end of whites as a racial group. This threat is raising a racial consciousness in whites and causing greater in-group favoritism and out-group resentment what the intergroup oriented theories substantiate as they claim that a strong identification with the in-group likely results in greater derogatory behavior.
Demographic shifts are not new but certainly more accentuated now than in the past, and it is within this context of demographics but also moral dispossession that the Alt-Right is managing to penetrate the mainstream. To this, much as contributed the media as it has provided an outstanding platform for Alt-Righters to present themselves to those withes feeling that their interests and grievances overlap with the Alt-Right message. The traditional media has been pivotal in the dissemination of the white nationalist message by covering Alt-Right events and their online trolling and memes. Every time the media reports on the Alt-Right, they take the opportunity to present themselves through a toned-down discourse and strategic self-presentation strategies to mainstream whites.
On the other hand, the internet has facilitated the building of emotional bonds through the elimination of geographic constraints and increased interaction. Altogether, both traditional and new media have contributed to creating a sense of attachment in many whites, especially young millennials, by disseminating the Alt-Right message. The change in Alt-Righters’ presentation has led to a change of perceptions. The image of the Alt-Right as a violent supremacist group is becoming more nuanced and giving place to a more acceptable image to many whites as the growing numbers of Alt-Righters show. Therefore, the strategic self-presentation of Alt-Righters has arisen a racial consciousness and made group identity salient, constructing a white identity to mainstream whites that identified with their message, values and beliefs.
32
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