1 From Friends To Foes:
Explaining the fight between Hamas and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis
Hamas Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis
Abstract
In the beginning of January 2018 the ISIS branch in the Sinai (Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis) declared war on Hamas and published a video in which they behead a Hamas operative. Hamas responded by arresting numerous jihadists connected to ISIS in the Gaza Strip. This development occurred three years after the Israeli Prime minister Netanyahu claimed that Hamas and ISIS are the same organizations and therefore should receive the same treatment. This paper studies the reasons why two Sunni terrorist organizations, Hamas and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis shifted from cooperating and being allies, into fighting and becoming foes. By using investigative reports, news articles and security journals a comparison is made based on their ideologies, goals, modus operandi and allies in order to understand why they shifted from cooperating to fighting.
Itay Garmy S2095254 University of Leiden Master thesis 17-07-2018 Word count: 19220
2 Table of contents
Preface and abstract………..….1 Chapter 1: Introduction………..3-5 Chapter 2: Methodology………...6-8 2.1 Comparative case study and sources………..6 2.2 The choice for Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis………6 2.3 Levels of comparison……….….7-8 Chapter 3: Relevance………...9-11 3.1 Academic relevance………...…....9-10 3.2 Societal relevance………...…...…………..……..11 Chapter 4: Literature review………...………....12-16 4.1 Comparing Muslim terrorist organizations………..12-13 4.2 Cooperation and fighting between Muslim terrorist organizations………...14 4.3 Hamas………15 4.4 ISIS and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis……….16 Chapter 5: Hamas and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis………..……...17-22 5.1 Hamas ……….…...…..17-20 5.2 Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis……….………..21-22 Chapter 6: Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi Jihadism…………..……….23-27 6.1 The Muslim Brotherhood………..……23-25 6.2 Jihadism………...26 6.3 Differences in ideology………...27 Chapter 7: Type and target of attack………..…..28-32
7.1 Hamas………..29 7.2 Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis/Islamic State in the Sinai...……...30 7.3 Conclusion modus operandi Hamas and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis………31-32 Chapter 8: Allies of Hamas and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis………...…...33-36 8.1 Hamas and its allies……….………....…...33-34 8.2 Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis and its allies……….…35 8.3 Conclusion allies of Hamas and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis………...……...36 Chapter 9: Conclusion, limitations and future research………..…...37-39 9.1 Conclusion………..37-38 9.2 Limitations and future research………....39 Bibliography………...…..40-48
3 Chapter 1: Introduction
On September 2014 the Israeli Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the General Assembly at the United Nations. He stated that ‘’Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas’’
(Netanyahu, 2014). His statement came after Israel and Hamas were embattled in a fierce war against each other during the summer of 2014. This war resulted in hundreds of deaths and wounded on both sides (Hartman, 2014). During the same period, the Islamic State (ISIS) established their caliphate in Syria and Iraq (Barrett, 2014). Most of the world considered the Islamic State to be a dangerous Islamist jihadist terrorist organization that had to be stopped from expanding at all cost. This resulted in the formation of a military coalition of multiple Golf states and Western countries with the aim to fight and cripple the caliphate (Friedman & Siemaszko, 2014).
Prime minister Netanyahu attempted to convince the world that the bombing of Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip should receive the same legitimacy and support as bombing ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq as the two organizations have the same objectives and backgrounds
(Netanyahu, 2014). But is this true? Should Hamas and ISIS be treated as equal terrorist organizations and if so why are the two organizations fighting one another?
Israel and the Palestinian territories have a long history of violent conflict. Ever since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, multiple jihadi groups like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have emerged from Gaza and the West Bank (The Other Palestinian Militant Groups, 2017). These groups have received support by numerous Palestinians as well as Arab Israelis (Slater, 2015). The objectives of these groups are among others to eradicate the state of Israel and to conquer the land of Israel together with its capital Jerusalem (Lappin, 2018). Additional jihadi groups that have emerged in other countries like Afghanistan and Syria have expressed similar objectives. These groups are also aiming to destroy the state of Israel and capture Jerusalem (Marteu, 2016).
Ever since the emergence of ISIS in 2014, Israel has faced numerous terrorist activities by jihadists that identify themselves with ISIS (Shabak, 2017). Some jihadists in both Israel and the Palestinian territories switched their support from Hamas and other jihadi factions to ISIS due to ISIS its appeal and its sudden success. Their support was expressed through numerous activities such as gathering funds for ISIS and funding ISIS militants, training ISIS militants, preparing and executing terror attacks on Israeli soil in the name of ISIS. This also included recruiting ISIS militants and traveling to ISIS territory (Koch, 2016).
On January 2018, the ISIS based group in the Sinai named Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis published a video denouncing and criticizing Hamas (Mikelionis, 2018). They declared that Hamas is a legitimate target for jihadists and should be fought with all necessary means. At the end of the video an execution of a Hamas operative from the Gaza Strip was brutally displayed. The execution was conducted by defected Hamas militants. In the video they accused Hamas of only serving Israeli interests, of being supported by Iran and of failing to prevent the
American recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. The video was published after Hamas made multiple arrests of Salafi militants in the Gaza Strip in 2017 (i24News, 2017). Hamas responded to the video by stating that it was a Zionist production and that ISIS wants to prevent Hamas from fighting Israel (Ditz, 2018). In the past Hamas has provided ISIS with training, advanced weapons and allowed wounded soldiers of ISIS to visit the Gaza Strip to receive medical treatment (Yaari, 2015).
4 To better understand why Hamas and ISIS switched from being allies to foes it is essential to study their ideologies, their goals and their modus operandi. The Israeli government considers the two organizations as being the same but is this true? Why would two organizations fight each other if they have the same supporters, ideology and goals.
Since the end of the First and Second World War multiple organizations have emerged in the Middle-East who have chosen armed battle as a means to reach their objectives. Some organizations chose to do so in order to seek territorial and political independence for the group they represent while others tried to overthrow their governments and establish a new state or a new rule of law. This is especially the case with the Syrian civil war that started in 2011. Due to the civil war, turmoil and lawlessness in Syria, multiple groups have emerged that are fighting against one another or fighting against different state actors who are active in the civil war like Syria and Iran (Holliday, 2012, pp. 27-29). Some of these groups have switched their alliances multiple times due to ethnic, religious, ideological and political differences, due to pressure from external supporters and due to mistrust and operational necessities (Holliday, 2012, pp. 27-29). This infighting between groups is also applicable in the case of Hamas and ABM as they are also both terrorist organizations who are using terrorist tactics and have an ideology led by violent jihad. The causes of their current fight are studied in this paper but due to some of the organizational similarities with organizations who are dealing with infighting in Syria and Iraq, it can be assumed that some of the causes are similar. Hamas and ABM have different objectives and a different ideology and are both pressured by external supporters therefore such factors can also play a role in their current fight. The same way it plays a role in infighting in Syria and Iraq (Holliday, 2012). The different terror activities that occurred in Israel in the last few years were mostly attributed to Hamas or to ISIS affiliated groups. Although Hamas has gained more support and the activities attributed to ISIS are still less than those attributed to Hamas. It is unclear why someone would prefer to choose one organization over the other but by studying their similarities and differences an understanding can be achieved that partly explains what kind of person would prefer one organization above the other. This can be studied in future research as this paper focusses on why two Sunni jihadist organizations are fighting one another. Both Hamas and ISIS organizations call for the destruction of Israel, so they are both considered to be enemies of the state of Israel but the way they want to achieve their goals and objectives are different.
In order for Israel to better understand and to be able to effectively deal with the threats each organization presents, it will be important to understand who they are, how they differ and what their similarities are. Such understanding can drive policies that effectively deal with each threat. In addition, it is also necessary to understand the ideologies of different jihadi organizations as not every jihadi organization operates and thinks the same way. Both groups base their activities from different religious sources and their targets can also differ. However, all jihadi organizations are considered to be a threat to the West as their primary goal is to enforce global Islamic rule (Ganor, 2009). To prevent this from happening there has to be a clear analysis of each jihadi organization so that their appeal and modus are understood and dealt with accordingly.
5 This paper aims to conduct a comparative research on the ideology, goals, modus operandi and allies of the Palestinian terror organization Hamas with a branch of the Islamic State in the Sinai named Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. By comparing their charters, media appearances, publications, terrorist activities and religious aspirations, an understanding can be reached as to why these two Sunni organizations who were once partners, are fighting one another. In addition, similarities and differences between jihadi organizations can be identified to
determine which feature of jihadism can be attributed to each jihadi organization and which is peculiar for each organization.
The research question of this paper is:
To what extent can the animosity between the Sunni organizations Hamas and ISIS in the Sinai be explained in terms of each organizations ideologies, goals, allies and modus operandi.
6 Chapter 2: Methodology
This chapter describes which sources and methods are used to analyze Hamas and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) and why each level of analysis was chosen. In addition, this chapter
describes why the focus of this study is ABM, a local branch of ISIS.
2.1 Comparative case study and sources
The research question of this paper is answered by comparing two cases, Hamas and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in order to see what their similarities and differences are. These similarities and differences are then analyzed in order to see if they can give possible explanations for the reasons why both organizations are currently fighting one another. The levels of comparison are determined by studies that previously have examined Muslim terrorist organizations and have determined which levels of analysis are necessary in order to understand what such an organization stands for and what its operational tactics are. The levels of comparison that are used for this paper based on these studies are goals, ideology, modus operandi and political allies. A more extensive explanation on each level of analysis can be found further on this chapter.
The sources that are used for this paper are primarily open sources. These sources are news articles and investigative reports about important events and attacks, analyses in different security journals of terrorist organizations and Islamic ideologies, and databases that collect and analyze terror attacks throughout the world. The abovenamed sources contain the necessary information in order to understand each group, what it wants and how their objectives can conflict with one another. The sources that have been used for this study are: Google Scholar, Google, Bing, RefSeek, CTC, INSS, Moshe Dayan Center, Global Terrorism Database and the Shabak. In addition two researchers from the INSS (Institute for National Security Studies in Tel-Aviv) have assisted in finding literature on Hamas and ABM that address the necessary levels of comparison. The sources that were acquired through the Israeli security organization the Shabak, are mostly all in Hebrew. These sources were necessary in order to gather data on terrorist attacks by Hamas as will be explained further on this chapter and they are accessible due to the background of the researcher of this study. The use of these sources means some sources of this study cannot be used by people who do not speak
Hebrew.
The search terms that were mostly entered when using the abovenamed sources are: Hamas, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, Sinai region and ISIS, modus operandi Muslim terrorist organizations, ideology Muslim terrorist organizations, analyzing religious terrorist movements and allies of Hamas/ABM.
7 2.2 The choice for Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis is the branch of ISIS ISIS were this paper is mostly focused on as the Sinai desert borders with the Gaza Strip and Israel they are the main branch that is fighting with Hamas. The relationship Hamas has and had with is primarily through ABM as they are the only ISIS branch as far as it is known that have been in contact with Hamas due to their geographical location. In addition, it is unclear how the central command of ISIS views the relationship of ABM and Hamas and what their judgement is on Hamas in general as there have barely been any published ISIS communications about Hamas while ABM has expressed their opinion on Hamas on different occasions.
2.3 Levels of comparison
As mentioned previously, the levels of comparison that are used to analyze Hamas and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis will be based on four levels of analysis: goals, ideology, modus operandi (operational) and political allies. The purpose of this analysis is to determine through a comparison between the two organizations if certain patterns can be identified that are applicable to both groups or that can only be applied to one specific organization. This will lead to a clearer understanding on why the two groups are fighting each other.
The reasons why these levels of analysis are chosen is because these levels of analysis are necessary in order to understand how these organizations operate, what they want to achieve and who influences their decisions. As it will be explained further on in the literature review, numerous studies who have analyzed Muslim terrorist organizations have based their analyses on goals, ideology, modus operandi and structure (Fishman & Moghadam, 2010, pp. 6 – 16). This paper will not include a comparison on the organizational structures of both groups as this level of analysis is not relevant to answer the research question of this paper. This study does however add another level of analysis, political allies. This level of analysis is added because multiple reports have shown that Hamas and every strategic decision Hamas takes is heavily influenced by state actors like Iran and Turkey (Gunning, 2009). In addition, the pledge of allegiance of ABM to ISIS means there is another party that is influencing ABM`s decisions and objectives. Such allegiances can significantly affect the capabilities, longevity, strategy, and tactics of ABM (Moghadam, 2015)
The level of ideological analysis will be conducted based on the different forms of ideology both organizations have, the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi Jihadism. In the case of jihadi terrorist organizations ideology plays a crucial role as these groups justify their actions through religious Islamic sources and it presents a program of action (Fishman & Moghadam, 2010, pp. 6). These sources are used as the foundation for their ideology and this ideology is used as the moral guide of the organization (Ganor, 2009, pp. 15).
Their ideology affects their recruitment process, the motivations of their members and leaders, their support and it influences the strategies they use to reach their goals (Ganor, 2009, pp. 15-17). Therefore, it is necessary to study the ideology of Hamas and ISIS as it shows how their actions are influenced by their ideology. This level of analysis gives insight in what their ideological differences can mean for their relationship.
8 The level of analyzing their modus operandi will be determined by looking at the type of attacks and the targets of their attacks. By looking at both the type of the attack and the target of the attack, operational differences and similarities between Hamas and ABM can be identified that can give a clearer understanding of who their enemies are and how they aim to fight these enemies (Fishman & Moghadam, 2010, pp. 10-14). This analysis is necessary in order to understand if the organizations have the same enemies and/or friends, how they fight these enemies and if these decisions and target choice influence their relationship. Both organizations have criticized each other on how they conduct their operations (Mikelionis, 2018). Therefore their modus operandi could also have an influence in their changing relationship.
Attacks that will be looked at are attacks that have been conducted by the ISIS branch ABM and attacks that have been committed by Hamas. The databases that are used to gather all the necessary information about each attack are the Global Terrorism Database (Global Terrorism Database, 2018), the Israeli security services database (Shabak, 2018) and the Esri Story maps of terrorist attacks (Esri Story Maps, 2018). These databases have been chosen as they
provide a clear overview on attacks committed by ABM and Hamas during the last few years. Due to a limitation in time to conduct this research, the focus will lay only on terrorist attacks that have been committed since the rise of ABM in 2011 up until May 2018. In the case of Hamas the same time period will be addressed in order to be able to analyze attacks by both parties that happened in the same time frame. The locations of the attacks that are analyzed are attacks that took place in Israel, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Egypt. These are the main regions were Hamas and ABM are active therefore they are the most relevant regions for this analysis.
The level of analyzing their political allies will be conducted based on determining which nations and/or groups are supporting Hamas and ABM and what this support entails. In the last couple of years, the Middle East conflicts have shown that allies and enemies are switching constantly (Moghadam, 2015). As is also the case with Hamas and ABM. By studying who is supporting Hamas and ABM and in what way, it can give insight in how these groups are influenced by other parties and what meaning these influences have on their relationship and their operations. Hamas have been accused of being a puppet for Iran and has received financial and operational support from other nations therefore it is important to study how their relationship with these other nations influence their relationship with ABM
(Gunning, 2009). In addition, Egypt is the main enemy of ABM and has had a difficult relationship with Hamas since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip (Gunning, 2008). They are considered to be together with Israel the strongest actor in the Sinai region therefore their relationships with Hamas and ABM are essential to study in order to understand what their influences are on those parties and what these influences mean to the relationships those parties have with other groups. The analysis on political allies will be conducted by looking at media reports and security journals that explain which party is supported by other groups and/or nations and what this support entails.
9 Chapter 3: Relevance
3.1 Academic relevance
There is a large amount of literature on both Hamas and ISIS but there is no available literature that compares both organizations. A comparison of both organizations can
strengthen the knowledge about differences between Sunni jihadi organizations. In addition, it can lead to a better understanding of the differences between organizations that are considered to be terrorist organizations by the West like the case with Hamas and ISIS. Since both
organizations are seen as Sunni, jihadi terrorist groups, it is relevant to understand why groups that are both Sunni and advocating for jihad are fighting each other.
Throughout the Arab and Western world scholars are discussing the differences in jihad and about the differences between organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS (Hegghammer, 2009). Both groups interpret the Koran and Hadith in different ways. This results into different ideological differences and different modus operandi to achieve their ideals (Hegghammer, 2009).
This paper can assist in this discussion. By studying two organizations where one is
considered to still be a part of the Muslim Brotherhood and the other seen as an organization that has used the ideas of the Brotherhood to change into a more radical organization (Nabih, 2016).
The available literature on Hamas is outdated. It mostly stems from the time in which Hamas was founded during the early nineties or from the period in which Hamas has won the
parliamentary elections in the Palestinian territories in 2006 (BBC, 2006). Since that period, Hamas has experienced numerous changes through battles fought with Israel, due to the developments of the Arab Spring in Syria and Egypt and due to certain agreements with the Palestinian Authority about the control of the Gaza Strip (Al Jazeera, 2017).
These developments among several others led to a change in the charter of Hamas in which they state their goals and ideology (The Guardian, 2017). It is therefore necessary to study Hamas again and to review how their ideology has changed and what it means for the way they operate. This can assist in developing effective policies that can put a stop to their terrorist activities and potentially stop their growth as a terrorist organization. In addition, it can lead to a more accurate threat assessment of Hamas as a terror organization for both the West and Israel.
Hamas is currently negotiating with the Palestinian Authority about the formation of a unity government and about calling on new parliamentary elections in the Palestinian territories (Al Jazeera, 2017). The last time these elections took place was in 2006. If both parties can come to an agreement it means Hamas will be part of the legitimate and recognized government of the Palestinian people in the Palestinian territories. This can have serious consequences on the relationships the Palestinian Authority has with Israel and with the West as Hamas is
10 In addition, for the first time, Hamas has openly started to discuss a change in their modus operandi. In April 2018 a Hamas operative was killed by two unknown assassins in Malaysia. Hamas states Israel is to blame for the killing (Memri, 2018). As a reaction multiple Hamas representatives and supporters have started to discuss the possibility of targeting Israelis outside of Israel (Memri, 2018). This may lead to a significant change to how Hamas
currently operates as they up until now have only been targeting Israelis inside of Israel. The discussion can eventually lead to a new outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas.
In contrast to Hamas, ISIS has been extensively studied during the last few years. Due to the sudden rise of ISIS and the appeal the organization had towards certain Muslims around the world as well as their terror attacks and refugee influx the group created, ISIS became the point of attention of multiple scholars researching security and terrorism. This attention has led to a vast amount of literature that explains what the organization is, how it operates and how it was created (Stern & Berger, 2015).
Although ISIS has been studied extensively, the amount of literature that compares ISIS to other terrorist organizations is scarce and this comparison mostly involves Al-Qaeda (Byman, 2015). In addition, some ISIS branches in other countries than Syria and Iraq have not been extensively studied. Some jihadi groups that sympathized with ISIS have declared their allegiance to ISIS as is the case for Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, an organization that is active in the Sinai region in Egypt. The fear is that these groups who are active in other nations than Syria and Iraq will become the new leaders of ISIS and will form a threat towards the whole Western world. This paper aims to study one of these groups.
It is important that such comparison is made in order to have a better understanding of the difference between jihadi organizations. This will lead to a more comprehensive
understanding on what the jihadi threat entails. A better understanding of the threats can lead to more effective policies that address the jihadi threat and that can also lead to a better understanding on why a jihadist would choose one jihadi organization over the other.
11 3.2 Societal relevance
Hamas and ISIS have both expressed their wish to eradicate Israel from the world. Since the founding of Hamas, Israel has suffered multiple terror attacks, rocket fire and kidnappings that have been attributed to Hamas (Shabak, 2017). Since the founding of ISIS, Israel has been continuously threatened by them as well and had to deal with numerous terrorist activities on Israeli soil that were attributed to ISIS (Shabak, 2017).
Besides the threat that both organizations pose to Israel, they are also considered to be a threat to Egypt due to their geographic location; the Gaza Strip and the Sinai desert (Klein, 2015). Egypt has faced multiple terror attacks by ISIS mostly in the Sinai desert and has accused Hamas of helping ISIS gaining power in the Sinai (Shamni, 2014). Eventually Hamas has shifted its stance towards ISIS and in order to understand why Hamas has shifted its stance towards ISIS, it is necessary to investigate their ideology and their goals.
Due to the growing war Hamas is waging against Israel as well as their struggle to become a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, their position has been strengthened in the eyes of the world (Counter Extremism Project, 2017). For both Israel and Egypt, the
comparison between Hamas and ISIS can assist in having a better picture of their ideological differences and modus operandi. This can lead to a clearer threat assessment for both
countries. By studying their charters, their religious arguments, their modus operandi and their choice of targets, the Israeli and the Egyptian governments will know what they are up against and may have a better chance of successfully curtailing their activities. Both organizations form a great threat to both the Israeli and Egyptian society therefore both governments are under pressure to study the two organizations in order to be able to fight them and stop them from hurting and threatening their societies. As Hamas has for the first time threatened to attack Israelis abroad, the urge for the Israeli government to put a stop to their activities has grown.
Besides Israel and Egypt, the Palestinian leadership in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as well as the Arab population in Israel have faced pressure from each Palestinian faction including Hamas and ISIS, to join and support them (Abu Nasra, 2016). By studying and comparing both organizations, it is possible to show what makes each organization unique. In future research this can be used to study why an Arab Israeli or Palestinian would support one group over the other.
12 Chapter 4: Literature review
This chapter explains the current literature that is available on comparative studies that were conducted on Muslim terrorist organizations. This explanation is needed in order to
understand how such organizations can be studied and how comparisons between different terrorist organizations can be made. In addition, this chapter addresses literature on the different types of cooperation`s of terrorist organizations in order to understand what the motivations are for terrorist organizations to create such cooperation`s and in order to be able to describe the cooperation between Hamas and ABM and how this cooperation has changed. Lastly, an overview is given on the available literature about Hamas and ABM. A more detailed description about the two organizations, their goals and their history can be found in the next chapter.
4.1 Comparing Muslim terrorist organizations
There are multiple studies where different Islamic terrorist organizations have been compared and analyzed. Examples are: ‘’Hezbollah and Hamas: a comparative study’’ (Gleis & Berti, 2012), ‘’Self-inflicted Wounds’’ (Fishman & Moghadam, 2010) and ‘’Aptitude for
Destruction’’ (Jackson et al., 2005). Those studies mainly aimed to identify patterns between different organizations, to understand the multilayered structures of these organizationsand to identify larger trends in terrorism. The aims of these studies are directed at both scholars and policy makers. In order to shape the responses of policy makers and security forces to such groups it is necessary that these groups are analyzed on different levels and are compared to other similar groups in order to assist policy makers in the ways they can deal with similar threats (Gleis & Berti, 2012, pp. 3-4). As terrorist organizations tend to be generalized or reduced to mere hybrid armed groups, it is essential that they are studied based on different levels of analysis as it can lead to new knowledge and it can lead to a new understanding of what makes each organization different from one another as not all Muslim terrorist
organizations justify their actions based on the same religious ideas and not each Muslim terrorist organization has the same political or religious goals (Gleis & Berti, 2012, pp. 3-4). One study named ‘Self Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions Within Al-Qa`ida and its periphery’ that was conducted by multiple experts on terrorism from different military academies and universities, gives a clear overview on how jihadi organizations should be analyzed and why such analyses are important. The study was conducted at the military academy in West Point (Fishman & Moghadam, 2010). Although the main focus point of the study is Al-Qaeda the analyses and conclusions of the study can be largely applied to every jihadi organization (Fishman & Moghadam, 2010).
According to the study, the levels of analysis that are primarily used to compare Muslim terrorist organizations in such studies are goals, ideology and beliefs, modus operandi and organizational structures (Fishman & Moghadam, 2010, pp. 6 – 16). Goals are identified as they determine what the objectives are of the organization and who it is fighting against. In addition these objectives are one of the main factors that attract new recruits to the
organization (Fishman & Moghadam, 2010, pp. 8).
Ideological analyses are used in order to identify what and how the ideology of a Muslim terrorist organization influences their goals, strategy and tactics (Fishman & Moghadam, 2010, pp. 6-7).
13 Operational analyses are used in order to understand what targets terrorist groups have, how they attack these targets, what weapons they use for these attacks and to identify what the groups strategies are both politically and military (Fisman & Moghadam, 2010, pp. 10-14). Organizational structures are identified in order to determine the hierarchy of the
organization, the lines of command and the size and the centralization of operations and recourses (Shubik & Zelinsky, 2009).
A brief summary of the conclusions the abovenamed study has based on these levels of analysis are as followed:
- In terms of ideology most Muslim jihadi organizations are driven by the principle of violent jihad. This means that they believe that they need to use violence in order to achieve a revolution that stops the decline of the Islam caused by the West, apostates, Shia`s and Zionists. These groups are also considered to be their enemy. Eventually this should lead to a world that is ruled by Islamic law under Islamic rule (Fishman & Moghadam, pp. 7). Their ideology shapes their strategy and tactics as to who their actual enemy is, which enemy should be attacked first and how the crisis of the Islam should be dealt with. Theological debates surrounding their ideological motivations shape how the organization operates.
- In terms of goals most Muslim jihadi organizations have a variety of goals that are not clearly defined. Some of these goals are never achieved and sometimes those
organizations do not act upon these goals. The reason goals are not clearly defined is so that they can appeal to a variety of people (Fishman & Moghadam, pp. 8). Their goals are also sometimes influenced by geographic and ethno-linguistic considerations therefore jihadi organizations from different places can have different goals.
- In terms of modus operandi it cannot be separated from other issues like goals and the definition of the enemy. For example, there is an ongoing debate in jihadi
organizations if other Muslims should be targeted and if suicide attacks should be allowed (Fishman & Moghadam, 2010, pp. 13). Jihadi organizations usually thrive in using excessive violence and focus most of their strategies on military tactics although some jihadi organizations like Hamas also use political and social tactics to gain support (Fishman & Moghadam, 2010, pp. 13-14).
- In terms of organizational structures it is difficult for jihadi organizations to exercise authority as they usually comprise of different cells and or wings who have different goals and different functions in the organization (Ganor, 2015, pp. 79). Their
hierarchical structure differs based on what their objectives are and based on the amount of governance they can exercise in the areas they control and based on the multitude of groups that are included in their organization (Fishman & Moghadam, 2010, pp. 15-17).
It is worth mentioning that most of the conclusions based on these levels of analysis can also be found in other studies like ‘’Aptitude for Destruction’’ (Jackson et al., 2005) and
‘’Essentials of Terror Medicine: Terrorism in the First Century’’ (Ganor, 2009). These conclusions are also partly applicable to the jihadi organizations that are studied in this paper as will be further explained in the next chapters.
14 4.2 Cooperation and fighting between Muslim terrorist organizations
In 2015 Assaf Moghadam, an expert in terrorism and counter-terrorism at the IDC and the director of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point published a typology of terrorist inter-group cooperation (Moghadam, 2015). This typology is relevant for this study as it shows how terrorist organizations can cooperate with each other, what this cooperation entails and it explains the motivations behind such a cooperation. This typology can also be partially applied to Hamas and ABM as will be explained further on in this paper.
A relationship between terrorist organizations can be influenced by the expected duration of cooperation, degree of interdependence between the collaborating entities, variety of
cooperative activities the groups can engage in, the expected level of trust that the parties have in one another and lastly, the ideological affinity of the groups (Moghadam, 2015). Based on these influences four types of terrorist cooperation can be identified; mergers, strategic alliances, tactical cooperation and transactional cooperation (Moghadam, 2015). These types can be distinguished in high-end cooperation (mergers and strategic alliances) and low-end cooperation (tactical and transactional cooperation).
‘’Mergers entail the unification of the collaborating groups’ command and control structure, the integration of their fighting forces, and the pooling of their resources’’ (Moghadam, 2015). Groups are forming a single entity therefore their cooperation can last forever. Mergers also entails that groups merge all their forms of cooperation; logistically, ideologically and operationally. One of the main conditions of a merger is that groups share a common ideology.
‘’Strategic alliances are relationships in which the collaborating groups share know-how and resources extensively and may exchange fighters, but at the same time (and in contrast to mergers) retain ownership of their respective assets as well as distinct command and control over their organizations’’ (Moghadam, 2015). Groups expect to cooperate on multiple levels and that the duration of their cooperation is for an extended period of time. The main
difference with mergers is that the groups stay independent.
Tactical cooperation’s are shorter in time, focused on the short term, dependent on shifting interests and do not entail the full range of cooperative activities (Moghadam, 2015). These collaborations are based on specific issues and they can be between groups who are
ideologically opposed. Therefore the main function of a tactical alliance is to fulfill objectives based on shared interests and not based on ideological similarities. They can shift quickly as interests of parties change.
15 4.3 Hamas
Numerous studies have been conducted on Hamas. Those studies address their rise, their ideology, their tactics, their modus operandi, their development in becoming a professional terrorist organization and the support they receive. Examples of such studies are: ‘’Hamas: a historical and political background’’ (Abu-Amr, 1993), ‘’Hamas in politics: democracy, religion, violence’’ (Gunning, 2008) and ‘’Hezbollah and Hamas: a comparative study’’ (Gleis & Berti, 2012).
The studies that were conducted on Hamas were mostly published during the First and Second Intifada and after their election win in 2006 and takeover of the Gaza Strip from the
Palestinian Authority in 2009. During the last few years Hamas has experienced multiple changes and has not been studied extensively during that period. This paper will add a new and current analysis of Hamas to the existing literature.
The most important findings of the existing literature on Hamas are as followed (a more detailed and lengthy explanation can be found in the next chapter):
- Hamas is an organization that was established in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank by the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas its name means the Islamic Resistance Movement in Arabic (Abu-Amr, pp. 5-8).
- Their goals are to fight and liberate Israel and establish an Islamic front (Abu-Amr, pp. 5-8).
- Since the creation of Hamas it has committed multiple terror attacks in Israel ranging from suicide bombings, knife attacks, firing rockets, car bombs and kidnappings (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).
- Hamas has an ongoing dispute with Egypt due to their ties with the Muslim Brotherhood (Shamni, 2014).
- Hamas its allies have traditionally been Qatar, Iran, Syria, Turkey, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Taylor, 2014). This alliance is patly based on their mutual hate towards Israel, the US and Western imperialism and their support for an independent Palestinian State (El Husseini, 2010).
16 4.4 Islamic State (ISIS) and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis
The Islamic State`s ideology is based on the ideology of Islamic Jihad. This means that through a decisive armed struggle, a revolution can be achieved that will lead to an Islamic State were Islamic principles and laws can be applied in an Islamic society (Counter
Extremism Project, 2018). The goal of ISIS is to make each person in the world Muslim and to ensure everyone lives and abides by Islamic law (Counter Extremism Project, 2018).
The Caliphate was established in 2014 in Syria and Iraq by jihadists from all over the world. Since the establishment of the Caliphate multiple jihadi fighters and groups have declared their allegiance to ISIS. One of these groups is Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (supporters of the Holy House). This is a group of Bedouin jihadists who operate in the Sinai desert in Egypt (BBC, 2016). They have committed multiple terror attacks in Egypt and Israel. Their most known terror attack is the downing of a Russian passenger jet in the Sinai dessert in 2016 resulting in multiple casualties (Pike, 2017).
The studies that have been conducted on Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) addresses among others their ideology, targets, operations, supporters and allies (Al-Tamimi, 2015). They have been compared to other branches of ISIS in other areas but have not yet been compared to Hamas (Azoulay, 2015). The ideology of ABM is similar to that of ISIS as they are both Salafi jihadi and therefore they also support violent jihad (Al-Tamimi, 2015). Their main goal is to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Egypt and Israel by liberating these countries from all the kefirs (unbelievers) and by implementing Islamic law. Their targets are somewhat different although the differences mostly have to do with their geographical locations. The targets of ABM are mainly Israel, Egypt and as of last year Hamas. ABM does not control any substantial amount of territory and does not administer any state like governance like ISIS did in Iraq and Syria (Al-Tamimi, 2015). They usually fight using a variety of guerilla tactics like IED`s, mortar attacks and attacking multiple places simultaneously. This makes their modus operandi slightly different compared to ISIS in Iraq and Syria as they have different targets and capabilities.
17 Chapter 5
Hamas and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis
Who are they and what are their objectives?
This chapter explains the history and goals of Hamas and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM). The chapter describes how and by whom Hamas was created, what Hamas wants to achieve and how Hamas views other Islamic organizations by using Hamas its founding charter. This is relevant as it can explain how Hamas views ABM. In addition, this chapter describes how and why ABM became one of the largest branches of the Islamic State and it describes their targets and current enemies. The aim of this chapter is to show the development Hamas and ABM made into becoming the feared organizations they are today in order to understand who these groups are and what these groups want. Hamas has been studied extensively as it is larger than ABM and it exists already for decades while ABM is a relatively small and new organization therefore this chapter has more information about Hamas than ABM.
5.1 Hamas
The meaning of Hamas is ‘zeal’ and it is an acronym for ‘Harakat Muqawama al-Islamfrya’ (the Islamic Resistance Movement (Abu-Amr, 1993, pp. 11). The creation of Hamas was a consequence of the first Palestinian intifada (uprising) against Israel (Abu-Amr, 1993, pp. 5). The uprising started due to a traffic accident in the Gaza Strip in 1987 involving an Israeli truck driver and multiple Palestinian workers whom were killed in the accident (Abu-Amr, 1993, pp. 10). After the accident occurred various riots erupted in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. A day after the accident numerous Muslim Brotherhood members in Gaza came together to discuss the events. The meeting was led by Ahmed Yassin, who would later become the founding father of Hamas. After the meeting the Muslim Brotherhood decided to create Hamas and they called upon the Palestinians to stand up against Israel (Abu-Amr, 1993, pp. 10).
Hamas installed a leader both in the West Bank and Gaza, who would command Hamas in both regions. Hamas received financial support from the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza and the West Bank and from the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan to fund their operations.
Hamas charter 1988
In August 1988 Hamas issued their first charter on the goals and objectives of the
organization (Hamas Charter, 1988). The charter has thirty-six articles. This charter has been changed in 2017 (Tamimi, 2017). As the charter is too lengthy to describe fully, only the articles that give an important insight in who Hamas is and what its wants, will be explained. In the first two parts of the charter they refer to different Islamic scholars and parts of the Koran. They use these scholars and parts to legitimize their struggle against the Jews and they state that only the Islam can obliterate Israel. They express how the organization was created and that the organization shows the words and deeds of God (Hamas Charter, 1988).
Afterwards they use different articles to define the organization and to describe its objectives, strategies and methods.
18 In the last few articles they express their attitudes towards different organizations, nations and religious groups and they end their charter by writing down their testimony of history (Hamas Charter, 1988).
The ideology of Hamas is based on Islam. ‘’From it, it draws its ideas, ways of thinking and understanding of the universe, life and man. It resorts to it for judgement in all its conduct, and it is inspired by it for guidance of its steps’’ (Hamas Charter, 1988, article 1). This shows that Hamas is a religious organization that uses religious texts to justify their actions. In the second article Hamas expresses that it is a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. This shows the strong connection between the two organizations.
In article three up to and including article seven, Hamas states that the organization aims to use Jihad to free Palestine from its evil people and to establish Islamic order in all its cities and villages as ‘’in the absence of Islam, strife will be rife, evil prevails and oppression spreads’’ (Hamas Charter, 1988, article 6). They express that the organization is universal and that every Muslim who lives the life of Islam should support the group and help kill all the Jews. They mention three circles who should fight Israel, the Palestinian circle, the Arab circle and the Islamic circle. This is important to note as it explains why Hamas is supported by numerous Muslims and Muslim countries throughout the world and it shows how they see their fight with Israel. Hamas is focusing on the Muslim world outside of the Palestinian territories to gain support.
In article nine and ten Hamas states that its objectives are to fight against Israel and to establish a state of Islam in Palestine so that everything will come back into peace and order (Hamas Charter, 1988, article 9-10). In other parts of the charter Hamas rejects any peaceful solutions or negotiations as they see Palestine as a Muslim land that can only be ruled by Muslims and can only be governed by Muslims. This means only a battle between Muslims and Israel can decide the faith of the Palestinian people.
In addition, Hamas describes what they consider to be jihad (struggle). They see jihad as an individual duty of every Muslim and all Muslims in the Palestinian society must support this jihad through their own means to ‘’instill the spirit of Jihad in the heart of the nation so that they would confront the enemies and become fighters’’ (Hamas Charter, 1988, article 15). This shows that the fight against Israel is a mutual obligation for every Muslim and that every aspect of the Palestinian society should be focused on convincing Muslims to become Hamas fighters.
In the final part of the charter Hamas states that they view other Islamic organizations with respect and appreciation regardless of any differences. If these organizations reveal good intentions and dedication to Allah they are a part of the Islamic circle (Hamas Charter, 1988, article 23). This is important to note as this can be used as a legitimacy to defend the
cooperation between Hamas and ISIS branches in the Sinai from 2011 until 2015 (Yaari, 2015). In article twenty-four Hamas states that it will not act against any Muslim or against non-Muslims who are peaceful towards their goals as it will only serve as a support for groups who operate against ‘’the Zionist enemy and its lackeys’’ (Hamas Charter, 1988, article 24). This is one of the most relevant articles for this study as Hamas will later use the content of this article to express why they are fighting against ISIS.
19 Hamas 1989-2007
Since the establishment of Hamas numerous events have taken place in the Middle East that have influenced the development of Hamas. The signing of the Oslo Accords by Israel and the PLO in 1994, the failed peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO after the Oslo
Accords, the terror attacks of Hamas in Israel, the expulsion of Hamas its leadership in Jordan, the Second Intifada, the assassinations of Hamas leaders by Israel, the death of PLO leader Yasser Arafat, the decision of Israel to leave the Gaza Strip in 2005, the building of the wall between Israel and the West Bank and lastly the Palestinian legislative elections that were won by Hamas in 2006 have all influenced how Hamas operates and how Hamas is seen by the rest of the Arab world.
The legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in 2006 were the first time Hamas could participate in such elections. Before 2006, the last elections took place in 1996 due to
disagreements with the ruling Fatah party and other Palestinian parties like Hamas (Gunning, 2008, pp. 40). Hamas won the elections due to corruption in the ruling Fatah party and due to the Israeli occupation. After the signing of the Oslo Accords in the nineteen nineties Fatah did not manage to end the occupation and achieve the creation of a Palestinian state. This led to dissatisfaction among the Palestinian citizens in the territories and therefore they were seeking a different ruler thus resulting in Hamas its win of the elections (Gunning, 2008, pp. 145). In 2007, Hamas violently expelled Fatah (the leading party of the Palestinian people) from the Gaza Strip (Black and Tran, 2007). This became the first time that Hamas had the opportunity to govern a large area by itself as Israel had already retracted its citizens and forces from the Gaza Strip in 2005 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005). Since then and until today Hamas has complete control of the Gaza Strip. All their operations and all their branches are in the Gaza Strip as Israel and the PLO have arrested or expelled nearly all Hamas
representatives from the West Bank (Nammari, 2007). This and the building of the wall between Israel and the West Bank have greatly reduced the capabilities of Hamas to attack Israel (Steves, 2013). Once their main form of attack was through suicide bombs and hijackings in Israel. Currently they have switched to other tactics like firing rockets and digging tunnels into Israel territory (Sherwood, 2014).
20 Hamas 2007-2018
After Hamas managed to conquer the Gaza Strip they fought multiple wars with Israel. Those wars have led to a blockade of Gaza`s borders by Israel on land, sea and air (OCHA, 2018). Only humanitarian supplies are allowed into the Gaza Strip. In addition, Egypt also decided to block its border with the Gaza Strip. Egypt claims that weapons and fighters are smuggled from the Gaza Strip into the Egyptian Sinai desert and that these fighters use these weapons to attack Egyptian security forces and tourist sites (Abu Toameh, 2015). This is important to note as the blockade plays a large role in the fight of Hamas against ABM in the Sinai desert. Hamas and Fatah have signed multiple reconciliation agreements since 2007 in order to form a unity government, but those agreements were never implemented (Beaumont, 2017). The latest agreement was signed in 2017 and was combined with a change in Hamas its founding charter. The most important changes that were made to the charter are as followed (Dekel, 2017):
- The charter does not mention the word ‘jihad’ nor does it mention that Palestine is ‘Islamic sacred property’
- The charter does not mention any connection to the Muslim Brotherhood
- The charter mentions willingness to accept a Palestinian state within the borders of 1967
- The charter stresses that its focus is on defeating and battling Israel and Zionists and not Jews
- The charter leaves open the possibility of negotiations to create a Palestinian state It is important to note that the charter does not reject the articles that were mentioned in the previous charter, only small changes were made to portray Hamas as a pragmatic and non-extremist organization in order to improve its image in the world and to be able to form a unity government with Fatah (Dekel, 2017).
The most notable difference between the first and second charter is that the Islamic parts of the charter are weakened or replaced. The focus is more on Palestinian nationalism than on Islam. This is important to note as it can partly explain the current distant relationship
between Hamas and ABM as both are considered to be organizations that have Islam as their leading principle. If one group takes a step back from that principle it can lead to animosity between the two organizations.
21 5.2 Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Group of supporters of the Holy House)
ABM is an organization that was founded in the Sinai desert in Egypt in 2011. The
organization consists of different religious Bedouin tribes who were unhappy with the rule of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (Crowcroft, 2014). Bedouins were treated as second class citizens in Egypt and ABM took advantage of this dissatisfaction. Due to the disenfranchisement of the population in the Sinai, extremist elements had the possibility to grow and to establish a permanent Salafi jihadi presence in the region (Herman, 2017). The Sinai is controlled by a large amount of Bedouin tribes who have ties with Bedouins in the Gaza Strip. Due to the displacement of Palestinians in Israel after the Independence war in 1948 and the Six Day War in 1967 a large number of Palestinians established themselves in the Sinai desert. After their displacement they did not receive any access to government services as these services were only available for Egyptian nationals (Herman, 2017). This in combination with the exclusion of the Bedouin population in joining government related jobs like working for the police and the army resulted in an identity that was not focused on Egypt but was rather focused on the Palestinian territories and Islam (Herman, 2017).
The exclusion of the Bedouin tribes and the Palestinians from the formal economy forced them into black markets and criminality (Herman, 2017). This led to the Bedouin tribes being disenfranchised and vulnerable to extremist ideas like Salafism. In addition, this led to an infrastructure of smuggling. Later this became an important mechanism for jihadists to gain weapons and funds. In the late nineties and the early two thousand there was an influx of Salafists in the Sinai due to their ambition to challenge the hegemony of the Muslim
Brotherhood as the Islamist party of Egypt and to challenge Hamas as branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (Herman, 2017). These Salafists came from countries in the Gulf region and some of them were trained Al-Qaeda operatives. The Sinai desert was a good place for them to hide due to the mountainous terrain and lack of enforcement of security by Egyptian forces. This meant they had the right training and ambition to pose a direct threat to Hamas its power in Gaza, the Egyptian governance of the Sinai and to Israel`s villages in the Israeli Negev desert.
After Mubarak’s downfall during the Arab Spring multiple groups in the Sinai desert among them ABM, drove Egyptian security forces out of the region. The power vacuum gave the possibility for ABM to grow and to gain control of the region. The group became popular as it was fighting the Egyptian government and the government was blamed for having neglected the region (Crowcroft, 2014). The name of the organization is based on the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem (Holy House). This partly shows the influence of Palestinians from Gaza in the organization as the main focus point of the group was Israel.
But after the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood President Morsi was overthrown by the Egyptian army ABM its primary targets became Egyptian police officers and soldiers. ABM stated that they want to take revenge for the suppression of Islamists following the coup by the Egyptian army. ABM describes the government of the current Egyptian President Sisi as ‘taghut’, people who rebel against God and go against his will (Al-Tamimi, 2015).
In different propaganda materials spread by ABM they shared their sympathies for al-Qaida. In January 2014 al-Qaida leader Ayman Zawahiri recognized ABM as the legitimate
representative of the Sinai jihadists (Pike, 2017). After the rise of the Islamic State in the summer of 2014 ABM decided to pledge their allegiance to ISIS and renamed itself Islamic State in the Sinai. They incorporated the flag of the Islamic State into their logo and they started to receive additional funds, weapons and trainings by IS operatives (Kirkpatrick, 2014).
22 The allegiance and received support led to a rise in the amount of terrorist attacks they
conducted and their attacks became more sophisticated (Pike, 2017). Hundreds of Egyptian police officers and soldiers have been killed. Also a few known politicians have been targeted by ABM.
The terrorist attacks and assassinations by ABM is mostly known for its bombings in the Sinai desert, bombings and suicide attacks in large Egyptian cities like Cairo, targeting politicians and security forces, attacks on oil/gas pipelines between Egypt and Israel and the claim for downing a civil Russian airplane in 2015. After ABM killed more than 300
worshippers at a Sufi mosque in the North of Sinai, Sisi ordered his army to end the insurgency within three months (Reuters, 2017).
Due to the rise in the amount of terrorist attacks and the loss of control by the Egyptian security forces in the Sinai desert, President Sisi requested Israel to enter the Sinai with armored convoys and soldiers thus violating the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt that was signed in 1979. Israel has approved this request as Israel was suffering from the insurgency in the Sinai as well (Frantzman, 2018). In addition, the New York Times has published a report at the beginning of 2018, stating that Israel has been cooperating with Egypt and has been carrying out a covert air campaign targeting ABM targets in the Sinai for over two years (Frantzman, 2018). This means ABM is currently fighting with Egypt, Israel and Hamas.
In addition, Sisi has closed off the border with Egypt and the Gaza Strip. This expanded the use of underground tunnels and smuggling. Hamas initially profited by this as it could charge taxes on goods that were imported through the tunnels (Herman, 2017). Hamas initially worked together with ABM at first but Hamas was afraid its rule would be threatened and started to target Salafist groups like ABM in the Gaza Strip. They expelled numerous Salafists from the Gaza Strip into the Sinai desert.
The development and rise of ABM shows that their connection with Hamas is complex and gives ground to battle as they have different ideologies and different objectives.
23 Chapter 6
Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi jihadism
Ideological differences of Hamas and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis
This chapter explains the ideological differences of Hamas and ABM. The chapter delves into the existing debate about the differences between the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi jihadism (jihadists). The aim of this chapter is to understand what drives Hamas and ABM and how they use these drives to conduct their actions. This can give a clear overview on their differences and similarities and explain what pushes their current battle. The chapter starts by describing the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Afterwards an explanation is given on the ideology of ISIS and ABM. At the end of the chapter the differences in ideology of both organizations are presented.
Hamas is considered to be a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology while ABM is considered to be a supporter of the jihadi ideology. This difference leads to different objectives and differences in how Islamic rule should be applied as is presented in the final paragraph. It is important to note that the information presented in this chapter is only a summary of the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. There is much more to be told on their ideology and the different factions of the Brotherhood but this chapter only addresses the ideological aspects that are relevant for the analysis with regards to Hamas.
6.1 The Muslim Brotherhood
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna. His goal was to revive the Islam in the Arab world by forming society in a way that is most similar to the society of the prophet Muhammad (Abu-Amr, 1993, pp. 6). Based on revival, organization and upbringing, an Islamic State must be established where the Quran and the Sunna
(religious practices that were established by Muhammad and his followers) form the base for all aspects of life including government and jurisdiction (Abu-Amr, 1993, pp. 6). The
upbringing of an Islamic State is seen as a process of gradual reform that takes time and should be pursued with patience (Zollner, 2009, pp. 9-12).
This Islamic State should be a universal state where the common denominator for all its citizens and institutions would be the Islam. A couple of years after the creation of the Brotherhood, they created a ‘Secret Unit’ that was seen as a paramilitary unit of the
Brotherhood (Zollner, 2009, pp. 12). At the beginning the main focus of the unit was to train fighters to fight against Israel and the British during and after the Second World War.
Afterwards they also started to fight the Egyptian government in Egypt and there were rumors that the Brotherhood wanted to overthrow the government (Zollner, 2009, pp. 13). Therefore the Egyptian government decided to arrest multiple Brotherhood members and to kill its leader and founder, Hasan al-Banna. Eventually the Brotherhood decided to dissolve its ‘Secret Unit’ in order to improve the relations with the Egyptian rulers and in order to save the organization as they ware under massive pressure by the Egyptian government to dissolve the organization.
24 Since the death of Banna in 1949 the Muslim Brotherhood has developed itself and has
become one of the largest Muslim organizations in the world. They are currently active in almost every Muslim country (Zollner, 2009, pp. 146-151). Their development came together with a few shifts in their ideology. As nationalism became an important system for identity building in the modern world, the Muslim Brotherhood also embraced this system. They became politically active in numerous countries and their focus changed from building a universal Islamic State to reforming the existing political systems in the Arab world (Zollner, 2009, pp. 146-151). In addition some Brotherhood scholars developed the principle of violent jihad as will be explained later on this chapter.
This is one of the main reasons that numerous Arab countries decided to label them as a terrorist organization (Al-Jazeera, 2016). Their aim to reform the political regimes by embracing elections and other features of democracy in the Arab world constitute a threat to the reigning order of authoritarian regimes that have ruled the Arab countries since their independence (Leiken & Brook, 2007). By calling on their supporters to participate politically and gain electoral legitimacy they have put massive pressure on Arab leaders to issue political reforms. The Brotherhood believes that an Islamic society will need Islamic leaders and will therefore support them during elections thus replacing the current authoritarian Arab leaders. In order to achieve these reforms, it is allowed to form alliances with other parties like liberalists and communists (Leiken & Brook, 2007).
Through different social programs that provide education, funds, religious classes and food they have gained support under a large group of supporters that mostly come from low income classes in the population (Zollner, 2009, pp. 9-12).
The large support and the political activism of the Muslim Brotherhood have resulted in a huge election win of the Brotherhood in Egypt in 2012. It was the first time that a
democratically chosen Islamist would be the head of state in the Arab world (Al-Jazeera, 2016). In less than a year after the elections the Egyptian military arrested the then Egyptian President Morsi and the whole Muslim Brotherhood leadership. The military took over all the government institutions and put a new leader into power. The coup came after widespread national protests against Morsi`s government.
In the months following the coup, the Egyptian military arrested thousands of people affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood. A day after the coup insurgency groups in the Sinai, among them ABM staged multiple terror attacks on security forces in the Sinai. As a result, the military leadership decided to enter the Sinai and close all crossings between the Sinai and the Gaza Strip as Hamas was accused for helping the insurgency groups due to their good connections and affiliation with Morsi`s government (Al-Jazeera, 2017).
25 Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood
As explained in the previous chapter Hamas was created by the Muslim Brotherhood
members and has established itself as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. This means they support their ideas and use the same methods as the Brotherhood to gain support from the Palestinian people. Although Hamas and the Brotherhood have the same ideologies there is one large difference that also partly shows the shift the Brotherhood has experienced in the countries they are active in. Hamas combined the ideas of the Brotherhood with Palestinian nationalism (Abu-Amr, 1993, pp. 12-13). The focus shifted from creating a universal Arab Islamic State into creating a Palestinian Islamic State to give the Palestinian people a new home that would be governed by Islamic law and Islamic institutions. This shift to
nationalism has occurred in nearly all branches of the Muslim Brotherhood (Zollner, 2009, pp. 146-151).
In addition, Hamas have combined their nationalism and Islamic ideology with military activism as they have stated that it is their duty as Muslims to clear the Islamic holy land (Israel) from Muslim rulers (Abu-Amr, 1993). The reasons for their shift from non-violent gradual political and societal reform to military activism are connected to the sudden Palestinian Intifada and to internal conflicts of the Palestinian leadership (Abu-Amr, 1993, pp. pp. 13-16). Hamas believed that turning to military activism would be the only way they could achieve the destruction of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian Islamic State as gradual reform would take too long and it would result in losing their support under the Palestinian people as the people were fighting against Israel.
Military activism currently does not have a large role in the ideology of the Muslim
Brotherhood. This is in contrast with the past where they were actively creating and using a unit to fight the Egyptian government. Although military activism does not have a large role in their ideology, the move of Hamas to conduct military operations has not been condemned by the Brotherhood. It has been supported by multiple branches of the Brotherhood in
different Arab countries as the fight against Israel is considered to be justified due to the fact that Israel is seen as Muslim land that is occupied by a foreign power (Leiken & Brook, 2007). The Brotherhood views this as a struggle that falls under ‘defensive jihad’. A jihad that is necessary to defend Muslims and Muslim land. Therefore, they also supported the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and against the United States in Iraq (Leiken & Brook, 2007).
This backing of defensive jihad has been criticized by jihadists as they claim that this jihad is for the sake of territory instead of for the sake of God (Leiken & Brook, 2007).
26 6.2 Jihadism
The current jihadi ideology that is mostly known from its attacks against Western and Arab states was formed in the 1960`s by Sayyid Qutb (Leiken & Brook, 2007). Qutb was a scholar of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt who was arrested after the Muslim Brotherhood had a rift with the Egyptian military government led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. After he and other Muslim Brotherhood supporters were arrested and tortured by the Egyptian government he stated that these acts were the acts of apostates. This meant that they were legitimate targets of jihad as they were acting against the laws of Islam (Leiken & Brook, 2007). His statement gave jihadists the opportunity to endorse a confrontational approach against the authoritarian Arab regimes instead of gradual political change as was advocated by the Muslim
Brotherhood.
After the death of Qutb in 1966 some of his followers developed a strategy based on
revolutionizing Islamic societies and states through military violence. Later on, they also used these arguments in order to attack Western states as these states were repressing and
intervening in Muslim affairs thus making themselves a legitimate target for jihad (Zollner, 2009, pp. 55-57).
The idea of establishing an Islamic State that is ruled solely by Islamic law is similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood but the way this state should be achieved and how this state should look like is different than that of the Brotherhood (Lynch, 2010, pp. 472). The Islamic State according to jihadists, should be based on a strict reading of Islamic behavior and practice. Islamic rules and morals should be strictly enforced and there is no place for any independent civil law (Lynch, 2010, pp. 472). Every person in the world should become Muslim and live in the Islamic State. There can be no diversity nor tolerance to non-Muslims. They reject the idea of democracy as they consider it to be an unforgivable sin as it gives humans sovereignty instead of God. In addition, they reject the notion of nationalism as it is a Western concept that was created through meaningless borders and identities. The only identity that matters is a Muslim one and the goal of this identity should be to establish a universal Islamic State
(Leiken & Brook, 2007). While the Muslim Brotherhood sees itself as a part of society that aims to change this society through social and political actions, jihadists see themselves as an outsider that must change a corrupt society through violence and revolution (Lynch, 2010, pp. 472).
Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis and Jihadism
As explained in the previous chapter ABM is an organization that is controlled by Salafi Bedouins who were marginalized and by Salafists from other Arab countries who got expelled due to their religious ideas and the actions that followed from these ideas. Therefore, they quickly embraced the idea of a violent struggle based on religious arguments against the authoritarian oppressor in this case Egypt. Waging jihad against Egypt was seen as a
legitimate cause and tactic in order to gain more rights and autonomy (Al-Tamimi, 2015). In addition, the Egyptian regime is considered to be an apostate regime who does not govern through Islamic law therefore it is also a legitimate target for ABM.
