On the Fight against Religion

ON THE FIGHT

AGAINST RELIGION

18-08-2017

Tjeu Oomen

S4161963

Political Science

Nijmegen School of Management

Words: 31.799

Supervisor:

CONTENTLIST

CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION

P.

4

Thesis statement P. 7

Liberal democracy P. 8

Laïcité and secularism P. 9

Agonism P. 10

Research question P. 12

Outline P. 13

CHAPTER TWO – LAÏCITÉ

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15

CHAPTER THREE – POLITICAL SECULARISM

P. 28

Political secularism P. 28

Neutrality P. 32

Christianity P. 35

Critical Evaluation P. 37

CHAPTER FOUR – AGONISM

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43

Political vs Politics P. 44

Constitutive outside P. 45

Cultural hegemony P. 47

Liberal democracy P. 48

Agonism and the adversary perspective P. 50

Critical discussion P. 52

CHAPTER FIVE – ANALYSIS

P. 59

Qualifying Laïcité P. 59

Criticizing Laïcité P. 62

Consequences for neutrality P. 79

Alternative politics P. 71

Applying alternative politics P. 77

CHAPTER SIX – SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

P. 80

Discussion P. 81

REFERENCE LIST

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CHAPTER ONE

-INTRODUCTION

Throughout history the relationship between states and religions has at times been problematic. Many wars have been fought in the name of religion. One of the most important conflicts between states and Christianity is the so-called Investiture Contest; in the 11th _and

12th _{century the Pope challenged the sovereignty of the monarchs. The Church claimed to}

have the highest authority on the Earth. This went against the claim of the monarchs. They had been presented with the highest authority from God. The conflict was resolved in the 12th

century by dividing power into kinds; spiritual power and political power. The decision essentially involved separating the state from religion. The power struggles between state authority and religious authority are not limited to only the relation between states and Christianity.

The Investiture Contest shows that in the interplay between religion and politics there is always a need for rules. In that case the state decided how religion is allowed to function in society. The rules have the purpose of determining how much power religion can have within politics, and the other way around. However, they also determine how religion is to be expressed within the boundaries of the state. It regulates the types of religion that are allowed within the state and in which manner they can be expressed. This interplay between religion and the state, and the then implied rules, are of particular interest to this thesis.

The tension between religions and states is still present in societies worldwide today. It is still a source for new conflicts and challenges that have to be faced. Recent examples of this conflict between states and religion are the religious inspired terrorist attacks in the Western world. A more particular example is the attack in the city of Nice on July 14th ₂₀₁₆

where a lorry ploughed into a large crowd watching a firework display to mark the Bastille Day (BBC, July 2016). This lethal attack was later claimed by ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant); a radical Islamist terrorist organization that fights for an Islamic state.

Outside of the Western world religion leads to conflict as well. In China 50 people died in an attack on a coalmine (Blanchard, October 2015). The Chinese government says the attack was executed by Islamist militants (ibid.) The militants killed the security guards, raided the buildings with sleeping workers and rammed the trucks of the police when they arrived at the mine.

Both cases show that religion still remains a source for conflict all around the world. In both countries, the state decided how religion is supposed to be expressed within the state. A pertinent example of this in France, was an incident occurring at a beach in Nice where the police asked a veiled woman to remove her veil, because of the controversial ban on the burqini (Quinn, August 2016). In China, the government instated a law that banned religious baby names for Muslims, veils and beards (Haas, April 2017). This is a response to religious inspired violence.

In both cases the state responds to these violent incidents by instating more laws focussing on religion. It mostly means a limitation of the expression of religion within the state. This shows that individuals are caught within the tension of two big powers, namely the state and religion. They seem to be in conflict and what follows is that the room for expression for individuals is limited. One of the main examples in both cases is the ban on veiling.

The debate on veiling seems to have two sides. On the one hand, the ban on the burqini is controversial, because the ban provides a feeling of safety for many people in countries who feel threatened by the recent flow of immigrants and provides a way to hold on to traditional values of society. On the other hand, a ban on certain types of veiling can infringe on the rights of persons to dress however they want and believe in whatever they want. As such the ban on the burqini points to a certain conflict between views within the society; on the one side should the state be separated from religion, which means that the public sphere should be free from any expressions of religion. However, on the other side, wearing a burqini could at the same time be perceived as an expression of religion protected by basic civil liberties, especially freedom of religion. From this point of view, it does not seem legitimate for a state to intervene in these human rights and to ban the burqini.

In both France and China, the limitation of religious expression might point us to an underlying frustration. Religious minorities feel seriously constrained in the right of expression. In that case religious rules applied by the state do not solve the conflict between the state and religion at its core, but seems to aim at trying to exclude the problem. Limiting religion in a way that it is no longer part of state-life.

This recent case in France reflects that the challenges surrounding the state and religion are far from settled. In the Western historic cases, the battles of religion and the state were mainly focused around Christianity. However, nowadays it is no longer one religion that seems to contest the power of the state. Currently, the conflicts with Christianity seem to be solved, but now the challenge comes from a diversity of religions within the state. The attack in France seems to be a consequence of a plurality of views and cultures within the French society.

We witness today in Europe and in the United States a rise of extreme right-wing populist parties which call for protection of so called ‘traditional’ values. This call for protection polarizes the debate even further. Therefore, diversity is a difficult and contested concept within Western societies. Due to immigration, diversity is perceived more and more in religious terms. Immigrants’ integration depends on how their identity is able to transform or adapt to the identity of the new host country. If their religious identity is not being tolerated in their new country integration will become difficultly, maybe even impossible. Therefore, policy-makers increasingly perceive integration problems in terms of the governance of religious diversity (Koenig, 2005, p. 220). This makes state policy that deals with religion an interesting topic, since it connects to the topics of diversity, immigration and integration.

In France, this religious diversity lead to the rise of Front-National, a French version of an extreme right-wing populist party. Front-National wants to prevent religious diversity by closing the borders for immigrants (Nowak & Branford, 2017). Immigrants are considered to bring a certain threat in the shape of a religion, namely the Islam. This suggests that the state of France is not capable of handling multiple different religions in one state and especially not Islam, because it is considered to be fundamentally different than other religions. This has led to laws banning the headscarf in the public sphere. It is based on a politicization of the headscarf, where certain values were connected to this certain expression of religion. However, the Conseil d’Etat, a committee that provides the state with judicial advice, ruled, in

1989 and 1999 that discriminating based on religion was not in line with the laws of laïcité (Idriss, 2005, p. 272). This ruling shows that the headscarf ban is unconstitutional according to the French law.

This thesis will investigate the French policy of laïcité, this is a specific type of policy that deals with the plurality of religious views. Laïcité can be considered a form of secularism, it entails the separation of state and religion. In this analysis “neutrality”, specifically a liberal type of neutrality, appears to form a central concept within laïcité and the theory of secularism. The concepts of laïcité and secularism are expressing an ambition to give a neutral response to a plurality of religious views within society. The extent to which this ambition can be realized is contested (Ahdar, 2013; Bhargava, 1998; Anidjar 2015). The main aim of this thesis is to evaluate the legitimacy of state policy regarding the separation of church and state in France and thereby assess if laïcité is an acceptable regime for the accommodation of religious diversity.

Thesis Statement

This thesis will investigate the policy of laïcité by means of two theories; the theory of secularism and the theory of agonism. Laïcité is a form of secularism, where the state attempts to separate itself from religion within society and to maintain a neutral position towards religion. With the theory of agonism, Chantal Mouffe claims that state neutrality cannot be achieved, because there is no objective standard with which to judge different claims within society. Consequently, if objectivity does not exist, it follows that neutrality does not exist either. Mouffe, therefore, argues that all decisions in society will be subjective, i.e. means non-neutral. However, secularism states that neutrality is achievable by, for instance, separating religion from the state. This contradiction forms the theoretical problem of this thesis. On the one side stands the theory of secularism which argues that neutrality is possible and on the other side stands the theory of agonism from which follows that neutrality is impossible.

In liberal democracies, there is a standard of liberal equality, this means that the state should not give any religion a special position within society. The state should treat all religions in the same manner, which arguable can be considered a neutral position for state policy. However, agonists argue that the claim to be “neutral” creates a power relationship

where certain actors are able to dictate the behaviour of others. This implies another problem. If neutrality is just a different way of exercising power within society it is not neutral. Neutrality then turns into a ‘covert’ way of exercising subjective power. This power is “subjective”, since it stems from one individual or a group attempting to “dictate” the behaviour of other groups or individuals within society. By exercising this “subjective power”, it loses its label of neutrality which at the same time should be its justification. Furthermore, the state by exercising its “subjective power” excludes individuals from society. One group in society dictates if individuals can participate in society and how they can participate. By excluding individuals from the public sphere, a liberal democracy loses its justification, because individuals are no longer equal.

In laïcité organized religion is defined as a “Cult”, which means a liturgy that is performed inside a familiar sacred place once a week that involves teaching to guide private life (Bowen, 2007, p. 30). The concept of a “Cult” is shaped after the template of the Catholic Church. However, in this thesis the focus is on pluralism for religious expression. When discussing more room for religion within society the focus is on more space for religious expression within society. This does not refer to religion as the institute, which would mean the institute of religion should get direct political power, but it focusses on creating more room for the individual’s right to expression within society.

Liberal democracy

This thesis will focus on the notion of liberal democracy. The term liberal democracy is a specific notion within the work of Chantal Mouffe. She argues that a liberal democracy consists of both the liberal tradition, which is the rule of law, the defence of human rights and the respect of individual liberty and a democratic tradition which is focused on ideas like equality, identity between governing and governed, and popular sovereignty (Mouffe, 2005, p. 3). Modern liberal democracies have a certain tension within them, because there is a strong focus on the rule of law and human rights. However, this focus seems to undermine the importance of popular sovereignty (ibid.; p. 4). This is a serious problem, because the legitimacy of a democracy is based on the idea of popular sovereignty (ibid.). This means that when a democracy no longer includes all members within the state it loses its legitimacy. In this thesis France is considered a liberal democracy.

The legitimacy problem in liberal democracies that Mouffe describes forms one of the main reasons to look at secularism in France; is France still a legitimate liberal democracy if it in some sense would exclude religious individuals from society? In this sense, the theory of agonism by Mouffe provides a critical tool in order to investigate the legitimacy of policy regimes within states. Agonism expresses an aversion to the presumption of “consensus” and, therefore, is very critical regarding policy standards based on consensus within a state (Mouffe, 2005, p. 102-103). It argues for a constant debate, or conflict, around these common standards in order for them to be open to change depending on contextual factors. Mouffe in this way tries to strengthen the notion of liberal democracy (Mouffe, 1993, p. 2).

Laïcité and secularism

Laïcité is defined in some cases as the French secularism (Abilmouna, 2011, p. 124). However, this is a problematic definition, since both laïcité and secularism are contested concepts that can have multiple meanings. Secularism can narrowly be defined as the separation between state policy and the practice of religion (Bhargava, 1998, p. 9). Secularism refers broadly to those practices and institutions that have to do with separating the state (like laws and policies) from religion. Laïcité is interpreted as a neutral stance of the state towards religion (Altglas, 2010, p. 495). The topic of neutrality is apparent within both of the theories, because the policy of laïcité and secularism both maintain the pretence of neutrality. The neutrality claim is part of the French identity, because the policy of laïcité is imbedded within the French identity. However, neutrality is a difficult goal to achieve. This is where laïcité becomes a problematic ambition. This can be seen in the headscarf affairs in 1989 and 2004 where laws based on laïcité had the ambition to provide a neutral response to Muslim girls wearing headscarves in public schools. The 2004 and 2011 laws passed in the name of laïcité seemed to argue that religious expression in the public sphere would jeopardize the neutrality in the public sphere (Adrian, 2006, p. 102).

France is an interesting case for a number of reasons. Firstly, because of the high number of immigrants in France, (around 14 million (in 2009) (Resnik, 2010, p. 213). France hosts the largest Muslim population in Europe (Abilmouna, 2011, p. 123). The Muslim community is the second largest religious community in France, with about five million people (ibid.). Secondly, because of the stress on political unity resulting from republican values (Freedman, 2004, p. 6). As such there is the strong focus on assimilation of individuals

within society; those from outside the community are expected to adopt the values of those inside. This is in contrast to other Western European countries where there is generally more room for ethnocultural diversity. A third reason why France is an interesting case, is because of the hostility it maintains towards religion, which is due to the high degree of state’s centralization of public functions and the policy of laïcité (Koenig, 2005, p. 227). The goal is to ban religion from the public sphere in France. A fourth reason is that laïcité is a specific type of secularism that is embedded within France culture and has a special meaning to the French society. It consists of certain norms and values, which are still highly debated in France, but which are considered to be an ingrained part of the concept of a French citizen. Laïcité is considered to be part of the French identity.

Laïcité is a special case, since laïcité is a unique form of secularism compared to secularism in other European states (Willaime, 2009, p. 24). The word laïcité is hard to translate into different languages. It is often associated specifically with the French historical experience of church-state relations (ibid.; p. 25). The meaning of laïcité is connected to the history of France, especially to one specific event. France had an extremely confrontational history in order to get to the separation between state and church (ibid.; p. 25). During the eighteenth century, France was characterized by a struggle between politicized Catholics and secular nationalists (Beydoun, 2008, p. 191).

Agonism

Chantal Mouffe argues that contemporary liberal democracies deny the role of conflict within democracy (Mouffe, 2005, p. 99). This occurs, because liberal democracies establish a cultural hegemony, which becomes the norm of society. A cultural hegemony has two central features, namely the establishing of a hegemonic structure that is both contingent and at the same time is constitutive in creating social relations within society (Mouffe, 2005a, p. 17). This means that a cultural hegemony will establish norms that will determine social relations. As such, the norm can exclude individuals with different views of politics. Therefore, she proposes to create more space for conflict within liberal democracies. This focus on conflict originates from Mouffe’s vision on neutrality, namely that neutrality does not exist. In her theory, there is no pure objectivity (Mouffe, 2005, p. 21). If there is no objectivity, there is no standard to determine beforehand what a legitimate argument is. This means that a passionate clash of political positions is the only way for politics to determine what is the proper

argument or standard. Mouffe argues that a liberal democracy does not create enough space for conflict, because it sets certain standards and “controls” the notion of a legitimate arguments (Mouffe, 2005, p. 99). Hence, some arguments might be excluded from the debate. Since there is no neutrality, or no objective point of view, this is not a legitimate situation in a liberal democratic society.

Furthermore, the theory of agonism can normatively provide a way to improve the liberal democracy in many states, since agonism provides a critical evaluation of standards like secularism. The theory of agonism expresses an aversion to the presumption of “consensus” and, therefore, is able to be critical regarding the exclusion of different voices and positions in the name of “shared values” or “neutrality” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 102-103). The theory argues for a constant debate, or conflict, around these common standards in order for them to be open to change depending on contextual factors. As such, a standard that is unchangeable cannot be legitimate, because standards can never be completely objective. Conflict is necessary to be able to change certain standards within a state that exclude positions and individuals from society. Without sufficient room for civil conflict and political debate, there is the risk of violence either from the point of view from the excluding party or the excluded party. In this way agonism can provide a way to a more open standard, which is not enforced on the basis of neutrality. This standard will be open to constant debate and will not exclude certain individuals with different arguments.

This is where agonism links to secularism, in the sense that it can provide a critical perspective on the standards secularism applies to a state and whether these are just or efficient for subverting violence that might occur through conflicting views. As such, the theory of agonism can provide a critical standard to which secularism can be evaluated. However, this does not mean that this thesis will celebrate the position of agonism uncritically. In the chapter on agonism certain criticisms on the theory of agonism will be discussed. As such, the alternative perspective will not follow the theory of agonism blindly, but will also take into account the criticisms that Mouffe’s theory of agonism has received.

Research question

The main aim of this thesis is to evaluate the legitimacy of state policy regarding the separation of church and state in France. This means that it will investigate whether laïcité can

be considered a legitimate politics for accommodating religious views in a liberal democracy. Laïcité will be investigated by qualifying it as a form of secularism. Then we will critically evaluate laïcité from the perspective of agonism on the themes of “neutrality” and “plurality”. This will lead to an alternative political framework which offers more room for differing religious views in France and has a more viable interpretation of neutrality. In my alternative, more viable interpretation of neutrality the concept of secularistic politics is not completely disregarded, because it is a standard that should be part of a modern state. Secularism in its essence tries to maintain the autonomy of individuals within society. It tries to make sure that religion is not forced onto people and their freedom is respected in that sense. Therefore, my focus will be on an alternative secularistic politics in France with a particular attention to neutrality and religious diversity. The main research question reads:

How can France maintain a neutral secularistic politics that is better able to accommodate religious diversity on fair terms than the current laïcité model?

In this thesis, we will argue for a neutral state politics which creates more room for religious diversity within society by arguing for the importance of a neutrality of justification as an alternative to the exclusive neutrality of laïcité. Different views should be allowed in the French society without any illegitimately imposed standards or values.

A second aim of this thesis is to create a better insight into the concepts of secularism and neutrality. By unfolding the theory of secularism with a specific aim of examining neutrality, this thesis provides new insights into the consequences of secularistic politics for neutrality. In that sense, this thesis aims to contribute to the theories surrounding laïcité and secularism. Furthermore, this thesis has the intent to create a new and more viable type of secularistic political framework for the state of France. By using agonism as a critical tool to evaluate secularistic politics in France, new insights are gained in the exclusion of religion from the public sphere through theories of secularism.

Outline

In order to answer the question this thesis will look into the case of laïcité and parts of the French history. This will be investigated in the second chapter which focusses on the policy of laïcité in France. The chapter will examine the case of laïcité focusing on the historical background, on a definition of laïcité and laïcité in social life. Consequently, it will be shown

that laïcité is a hot topic within the French state. Thereafter, the application of laïcité will be discussed on the basis of the headscarf issues in 1998, 2004 and 2011 within the French state. These headscarf affairs will serve as a practical introduction into the problems surrounding laïcité, which are mainly problems on the themes of integration and immigration.

The third chapter will discuss the theory of secularism. This chapter will serve as a bridging chapter. It will provide a theoretical background to laïcité and thereby introducing some important concepts that in the next chapter can be linked to the theory of agonism. The theory of secularism will be set forth by the writings of Rajeev Bhargava, Rex Ahdar and Charles Taylor. Bhargava is an expert on the field of secularism, who has written many articles on the types of secularism and cases like India. Rex Ahdar is another interesting author, because he connects neutrality and secularism in “Is Secularism Neutral” (2013) which provides a very useful guidance in the topics of secularism and neutrality together. Charles Taylor provides useful insights in the background of secularism and especially in the theory of Christianity. These writers are the main contributors to the chapter on secularism. Moreover, in the chapter some additional authors will be used to explain specific parts of secularism, like types of secularism, neutrality within secularism and the theory of Christianity. After this explanation of the theory of secularism, a critical evaluation will follow. This critical evaluation will discuss the criticisms of different authors based on the importance for this thesis and the case of laïcité.

Chapter four will introduce the theory of agonism. In this thesis, the focus will be on the theory of agonism articulated by Chantal Mouffe. This theory will be discussed on the basis of The Return of The Political (1993), The Democratic Paradox (2005), On The Political (2005a), Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically (2013). Chantal Mouffe provides with her theory of agonism not simply a rejection of liberal democracy, but tries to improve current liberal democracies, which makes her writings very useful in this thesis. She tries to improve the theory within the current framework. This gives the theory of agonism a practical application that fits with the aim of this theory. Furthermore, Mouffe shares the focus on neutrality in her theory. This is the same focus as can be found in the theory of secularism. Therefore, by applying the theory of agonism to secularistic policies, new insights can be gained on neutrality. Mouffe will be operationalized to help formulate an alternative politics

to the existing politics of laïcité in France. Chapter four will also deal with the weaknesses and the strengths of the theory of agonism that will be used in this thesis.

The fifth chapter is a critical evaluation of laïcité and secularism which argues that laïcité is a form of secularism. By arguing that laïcité is a form of secularism, our understanding of laïcité is enlarged by a theoretical background. Agonism will serve as a critical evaluation on the policy of laïcité. This chapter will end with a substantiated alternative to the policy of laïcité in France, based on arguments that follow from the critical evaluations throughout this thesis.

This thesis will end with a summary and discussion. The summary and discussion, in chapter six, will discuss shortly the findings of this paper and suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER TWO –

LAÏCITÉ

This chapter will outline and focus on the politics of laïcité in France as a preliminary analysis, so that in the next chapters it can be analysed and discussed with the theories of agonism and secularism. For in order to get a proper understanding of laïcité some features of its history will be discussed as well as the way in which the French look at contemporary issues of social life. In order to truly understand the political and legal conditions of a particular state, the history of a state should be discussed (Beydoun, 2008, p. 195). This

chapter shows the ideas that are connected to laïcité in order to get a sense for what laïcité means within the French society. Furthermore, two events surrounding headscarves will be discussed in order to see how laïcité is applied within government policy and how the issue of headscarves was framed within the French society. As such, this chapter is to show how laïcité is connected to neutrality, in the sense that the French government purports to give a neutral response to diversity.

Historical perspective

Laïcité in France can historically be characterized by an extremely confrontational relationship with the dominant religion (Willaime, 2009, p. 25). The separation of the state from religion is represented by French philosophers Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Jean Bodin (Selby, 2012, p. 80). They emphasized the social contract, which should bond citizens together, and therefore hypothetically assign power which flows from that social contract to the sovereign (in Rousseau’s case the people itself). This process leaves out any notions of sacrality from political power. This means that in the notion of worldly power, there is no reference to any god. Individuals focus on the life here on earth and power does not come from God, but from the people. These philosophical ideas came to expression first within the French Revolution (1789-1798), where there was a confrontation with the dominant religion and the state at that moment.

The French revolution is central to the idea of laïcité (Selby, 2012, p. 80). In the French Revolution, there were two important sides which contributed to the idea of laïcité, namely the individuals loyal to the Catholic Church and the individuals loyal to the Enlightenment ideas. Those loyal to the church thought that the church should have influence in state power. In contrast, those loyal to the Enlightenment ideas thought that the state should serve the people and that its power comes solely from the people themselves. These two sides formed the main debate about religion in France. The secular nationalists won the struggle with the politicized Catholics. This eventually led to a secularist law in 1905, which fully articulated the separation of church and state (Beydoun, 2008, p. 191, Selby, 2012, p. 81). Therein the state no longer officially funded religious education and public institutions were to be independent of religious interests. As such, the public status of organized religion was taken away (Bowen, 2007, p. 26). Instead, the secularistic law, however, recognized that organized religion could be a private association. This meant that religion was banned from

the public sphere and could only be expressed in the private sphere. In 1946 the principle of laïcité was further enshrined within the French Constitution by stating that France is an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic (Selby, 2012, p. 81).

Defining Laïcité

Laïcité is a difficult concept to define. It remains a contested concept that has no agreed-on definition (Bowen, 2007, p. 32). As such, because laïcité is a term that is highly complex and confusing, it can therefore not be taken for granted. It needs clarification because it has multiple meanings (Altglas, 2010, p. 495). Essentially, it has a range of clustered associations and meanings that are linked to the term (Sachs, 2014, p. 330). This is shown by the different views authors have on how it should be defined. For instance, Bowen (2007, p. 28/29) articulates two different characterizations of laïcité. On the one hand, laïcité is the sum of laws that arranges how the state and organized religions should be separated. The legislation associated with laïcité seems boundless (Altglas, 2010, p. 495). However, not all of these associated laws mention laïcité, let alone explicitly define the term laïcité. On the other hand, laïcité is the equivalent of a religion, namely an atheistic philosophy that determines the secularism is the norm and has a strong influence on the perception of religion within the state. Altglas (2010, p. 496) characterizes laïcité in the same way, meaning vigilance towards cults threatening citizens and society. As such, in the characterization of Altglas there is a certain negative undertone towards religion, which the second characterization of Bowen lacks, because Bowen talks about the place of religion and does not talk about the threatening effect of religion, like Altglas. Nonetheless, they both focus on the position religion needs to have within society.

Roy (2007, p. xii) states that laïcité has also developed itself in those two separate ways, namely as a strict separation between church and state as well as an ideological and philosophical doctrine. The strict separation between church and state has to be understood on the backdrop of the political conflict of the state with the Catholic Church mentioned above. This resulted in the 1905 law, which restricted the presence of religion in the public sphere. In this sense laïcité is an explicit ideology, because it entails a political choice, which determines the place of religion within the public sphere in an authoritative or, legal manner (ibid.; p. 8). This means that the state determines by the means of laws which role religion is allowed to play within the public sphere. Therefore, the state is the main actor when it comes to

organizing the public sphere where actors are told which standards they must adhere to in common. As such, Bowen (2007, p. 29) argues that laïcité focusses on defining the character of the public space. The state does this by a vision of protecting citizens from religion (Abilmouna, 2011, p. 124).

The French state has a specific focus on republican values which runs throughout France’s history. As seen in the French national motto, the French republican values are freedom, equality and fraternity (Resnik, 2010, p. 203). Consequently, these three principles constitute the French laïcité (ibid.; p. 212). The first value of freedom assures non-subjection to the will of others. The second value of equality affirms that the republican law applies to everyone equally and that it prevails over religious rules. The third republican value of fraternity identifies the moral, cultural and political principles of the French community and implies a commitment to assimilation. Therefore, the French system can be characterized as a Republican model, which has certain characteristics (Van Zanten, 1997, p. 352). First, there is a strong emphasis on high culture, which means that there is a strong emphasis on the Republican values of freedom, equality and fraternity. Secondly, the focus is on the individual within society, rather than on group participation and integration. The third characteristic is that citizenship is constructed through rational and political factors, not through cultural or sociographic factors. This ideal of French republican citizenship entails that state institutions, particularly the school, have the unifying function of building and reproducing these Republican values.

Laïcité as the separation between state and church provides a useful definition of laïcité, because it focusses on the institutional level of policy, which will be discussed in this thesis. As such the state manages the role of religion in the public sphere. In order to get a good grip on this definition, the term “public” has to be unpacked. Bowen (2007, p. 29/30) does this by giving three meanings of the public within the French society. The first makes institutions and actors that are affiliated with the state part of the public sphere. In this sense public services, public schools, public servants and public teachers can be considered public. The second meaning of public states that all shared social space is public. The last meaning involves the idea that public refers to the general interest.

On an institutional level, laïcité,is considered as the separation of the state from religion. The first definition implies a particular vision on the public sphere. The public

sphere, in the vision of laïcité, is envisioned as a ‘hypothetical space’, which can be seen as an empty space that provides the conditions of possibility for founding an autonomous political association (Sachs, 2014, p. 333). This means that laïcité considers the public sphere to be a ‘fictional space’ that exists within the French society, which is capable of creating an association between autonomous individuals. What needs to be understood is that laïcité is a spatial term in the sense that it refers to an ‘a priori space’ within society. As such, this space needs to be filled with measures that contribute to a political association of autonomous beings within society. An important example of this space in France are schools (ibid.; p. 331). The school is considered a space that is cut-off from the proverbial real world. This separation of the real world allows for students to engage in a process of self-formation by means of their own rational capacities (ibid.). The school then refers to a space where the individuals are enabled to autonomously develop themselves. It must provide individuals a critical distance with respect to themselves, which can lead them to change their identities and while doing this together, forming a political association (ibid.; p. 335). Therefore, the school has an important position within laïcité.

Schools can be considered an extension of the public arm of the state (Beydoun, 2008, p. 204). This is because the school system is explicitly constructed as a central agency of the nation-state (Van Zanten, 1997, p. 357). This means that the French school system focusses on the transmission of a unique, national culture, and patriotic values. In French schools, students will learn the qualities and values that will transform them into French citizens. Furthermore, there is a strong focus on uniformity within the French schools. Students should assimilate through the French school system into French citizens. This French school system has a certain theoretical background included, namely one where the individual is viewed as a “self-developing subject” (Chaudhary, 2005, p. 355). Schools are built on the principles of equality, liberty and rationality and these principles should guarantee that individuals can use the instrument of school to develop themselves. Notwithstanding the stress on transmission of French values and culture. The French school is often considered a “neutral” project of developing autonomous students, which have the capacity to make their own decisions. This neutrality follows from the focus on values, like equality, liberty and rationality, which are considered to be neutral values that are necessary to create autonomous beings.

Laïcité organizes the public sphere according to certain principles that are considered to be associated with the French Revolution and the French Republic, namely the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity (Idriss, 2005, p. 261). These principles are, however, very vague and can contain multiple meanings. As mentioned above laïcité is also a vague term. Idriss (ibid.), however, argues that the French secular system is based on certain principles that can be connected to this ideal. The first principle is that no religious code should be imposed on citizens by the state. The second principle holds that references to religious beliefs in order to justify state policy are politically wrong. The last principle holds that religious beliefs should remain outside of the public sphere, but are allowed within the private sphere.

Even if this thesis focusses on laïcité as an instrumental form of politics that entails the separation of state and religion, it is still important to look at laïcité as an ideology, because it provides us with an insight in what laïcité can mean for individuals within society. Laïcité as an ideological and philosophical interpretation means that laïcité has provided many French citizens with a value system (Roy, 2007, p. xii). This means that it has provided a norm that prescribes that religion should be expelled to the private sphere. De Poli (2010, p. 32) makes a similar argument when she argues that laïcité has become synonymous with pluralism and tolerance (ibid.). Laïcité focusses on politics which is connected to values, like respect for pluralism and freedom of conscience, but these do not have a clear application in every context (De Poli, 2010, p. 32). Weil (2009, p. 2704) argues that laïcité is built around three principles, namely the values of freedom of conscience, separation of state and church, and the equal respect for all beliefs and faiths. However, again these values do not always have a clear application within the French society. Willaime (2009, p. 26) argues that the application of these values can lead to different types of church-state relations. What this shows is that laïcité as an ideology is based on certain values, but all writers agree that this does not always have to lead to the same outcome.

Neutrality

Strongly related with laïcité are neutrality and diversity, which are studied by many authors (Abilmouna 2011, Akan 2009, Altglas 2010, Balibar 2004, Gedicks 2006, Idriss 2005 and Laborde 2003). Laïcité is a way to respond to diversity within the public sphere. The French government tries to maintain religious neutrality by curtailing religious freedom within the

public sphere (Abilmouna, 2011, p. 124). As such, by limiting religion within the public sphere, the French government aims at a neutral response towards different religions.

For instance, Laborde (2003, p. 162) argues that laïcité is a form of state neutrality, because it establishes a regime of mutual independence. Firstly, in the public sphere it establishes freedom of religion, in an individual dimension as well as in a collective dimension. This means that individuals can pursue a religion they choose to believe without any interference of the state in that choice. Secondly, it maintains that state policy should be pursued without any regard for religious arguments. Consequently, these points are seen as the privatization of religion (ibid.; p. 163). However, this privatization is not complete within the French state. The French government does subsidize private religious schools, provides financial help towards the maintenance of religious edifices, respects the internal structure of authority within religious associations, and makes possible the exercise of religious liberties within prisons and state boarding schools (ibid.). This shows that the state does not remain completely neutral towards religion, in the sense that it does not consider religion to be a completely private matter. As Laborde (ibid.; p. 164) argues state neutrality requires the state to neither promote nor hamper the expression of religious and cultural identities. Therefore, neutrality is connected to laïcité, but it is also a controversial issue which can be up for debate.

Social life

As discussed above, laïcité provides a normative framework for individuals within society. Laïcité deals with contemporary social issues within society, because managing the public sphere will involve decisions on issues of religion and the measure of state intervention. Therefore, it is important to assess how the French view contemporary social issues within the society. This means assessing concepts, which play an important role in the mind of French citizens when they look at social issues. As a consequence, these concepts influence the way the French talk about social issues within their society. Bowen (2007) distinguishes three important features within the French society.

The first concept is the ubiquity of genealogy, which means that the French will explain contemporary policies by looking at their history (Bowen, 2007, p. 19). This means that in France the history plays an important role in the minds of French citizens. As an

example, Bowen (2007, p. 29) argues that scientists who focus in their explanations on history are closer to politics, than scientists who focus on empirical findings, because the values of the French Revolution are still used in politics today. Therefore, politics seems to be based on historical values and these historical values seem to have more support. This shows how the French look at social issues in the sense that this determines which arguments will be accepted. It appears that French politics and citizens are more drawn to arguments based on their history then on arguments based on empirical findings that can be contrary to the continuity of history.

The second common feature that plays a role when looking at contemporary issues is state intervention. French citizens believe that the state should regulate and protect both public order and the freedom of the individual (Bowen, 2007, p. 30). This means that the French will not be negative towards state intervention and might even promote state intervention. The state in France has a big responsibility in the minds of the French, because it must regulate and protect the public sphere and individuals. As such, this responsibility is not for the individuals, but for the state. Consequently, the state must determine a good way to regulate and protect the public sphere and the lives of citizens within society.

The last feature is a distinction within the French society, namely the distinction between cult and belief (Bowen, 2007, p. 30). This distinction plays at the public - private distinction discussed in the chapter of secularism. Cult is defined as organized religion, which means it will play a role in the public sphere, while belief is more personal so it is banned to the private sphere. Cult, as organized religion, is a template, which makes religions fit to certain standards in order to be qualified as religion. The cult template that is mostly used in the minds of the French is the template of the Catholic Church, namely a liturgy, which is performed inside a familiar sacred place once a week that involves teaching to guide private life (Bowen, 2007, p. 30). Religions that do not fit with the template of the Catholic Church have a difficulty of being considered organized religions in France. As such, this template will influence in what is considered an organized religion.

Hot topic

Laïcité is a burning topic within the French society. Bowen (Roy, 2007, p. 16) gives two reasons why laïcité is such a widely debated and important issue for French citizens. The first

reason is that laïcité lies at the heart of the French identity. Laïcité is enforced in the public sphere and promoted in schools. Due to the history of France, where the French Revolution played an important part, citizens consider laïcité to be an achievement that shaped the Republic in a way that is still noticeable today. Therefore, laïcité is considered a big part of their identity. A contemporary issue within the European Union is the identity of nation-states. The nation-states within the European Union are struggling with their own identities, because the European Union eliminates more and more sovereignty of nation-states by making decisions on their behalf. Consequently, it can be argued that French citizens want to hold on to their identity as a counter-action to the removal of sovereignty by the European Union. French citizens cling onto republican and national values to react to the challenged French identity (ibid.). These republican values play an important role for the French identity, in the sense that the French feel that living together requires a consensus on shared basic values (Beydoun, 2008, p. 197). Therefore, the French feel that newcomers need to be integrated in society by accepting these shared basic values. This also explains why schools play an important role within the French society, as they are a way of teaching what is the French identity and integrating children in these values. As such, the embracing of shared basic values is important in getting a French identity. Thus, to be part of the French identity is to accept laïcité, which is the hallmark of the French identity today (Beydoun, 2008, p. 198).

The second reason why laïcité is a hot topic is because the meaning of laïcité is unclear. The debate that is concerned with the meaning of laïcité is still on going. Laïcité has different meanings for citizens and scholars within and outside of France. Therefore, laïcité is a much contested and highly debated concept. This makes laïcité a burning topic within society as well as in the scientific world. For instance, Roy (2007, p. 16) argues that there is a debate between supporters of a more open and modest type of laïcité on the one hand and supporters of laïcité as a comprehensive project on the other.

Headscarf affairs

This section will show the practical consequences of laïcité within France. It will discuss the headscarf affairs to show the still ongoing debate about laïcité. The three affairs – 1989, 2004 and 2011 – will also serve as an example of how laïcité influences religions and cultures different than the traditional French cultural variants and religions. In France, this had some

severe consequences for individuals who have a different culture or religion than what is traditionally accepted.

The first headscarf affair was in 1989. The affair started when three Muslim schoolgirls were excluded from their school in Creil in the Northern part of France (Idriss, 2005, p. 271). They insisted on wearing the hijab in the classroom: the girls claimed that they were fulfilling their religious duties when they wore the hijab. When this affair reached the media, a national furore started and right-wing politicians expressed their worries about ‘Islamic fundamentalism’. It lead to a major debate where on the one hand many condemned the schoolgirls for their aggressive religious attitude and on the other hand others argued for the girls’ right for self-expression and to be different (ibid.). The Conseil d’Etat, who provides the state with judicial recommendations, advised the state on this affair based on a number of principles. The first law the Conseil d’Etat took into account was the 1905 law that separates the state and church. It also considered the first article of the Fifth Republic Constitution, namely the article that guarantees fundamental civil liberties. The Conseil d’Etat then concluded that any discrimination based on religion was unconstitutional and the girls should be allowed to wear their hijabs (Idriss, 2005, p. 272). However, some conditions had to be fulfilled. The first condition was that school pupils would respect the freedom of others. Second, the school pupils’ religion should not interfere with daily school activities. The third and last condition was that school pupils still attended classes. School pupils were therefore allowed to wear religious symbols if they involved no provocation or an act of pressure (ibid.; p. 273). In short, religious freedom was allowed as it did not contradict the public order within schools. Determining whether this was the case was a matter left to the schools themselves.

In 1999 the Conseil d’Etat repeated its judicial advice when they stated that laïcité was no longer a principle that forbade any religious manifestation. The principle of laïcité, according to them, tolerates any religious manifestation (Idriss, 2005, p. 275).

The second headscarf affair was in 2004 when the old law of 1989 was changed. This affair took place in a world, which was changed after the attacks on The World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in September 11th _{2001 (9/11). The law of 2004 banned all ‘ostentatious’}

religious symbols in state schools (Idriss, 2005, p. 276). The law thereby enforced religious neutrality within the public sphere and confined religion to the private sphere. The 2004 law became known as the ‘headscarf ban’, because its main effect was to ban headscarves from

public schools (Beydoun, 2008, p. 189). It was argued that the hijab stood for immense political implications, namely that to wear the hijab was to ask recognition of the state for the Islam in state schools (Idriss, 2005, p. 276). Therefore, wearing a hijab was interpreted as an intrusion of religion in the public sphere. Furthermore, the French government portrayed the women wearing a hijab as in need of emancipation, because they were supposedly forced to wear the headscarf (ibid.). The new law followed the recommendations of the Stasi Commission, who reported that wearing a hijab is a clear sign of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ (ibid.). In other words, the headscarf was politicized after the 9/11 attacks (Beydoun, 2008, p. 190). As such, the 2004 law banned ‘ostentatious’ religious symbols only from public schools, not from any other places within the public sphere.

Since 2011 the French government began the enforcement of the ban on face-veil in the wider public sphere (Abilmouna, 2011, p. 118). This new enforcement goes further than the 2004 ban, which focused solely on schools, because the new ban focusses on the whole public sphere. This means that face-veiling is banned from any place except in the sanctuary of individual houses and private property. The enforcement of the ban was justified by stating that face-veiling is contrary to French traditional values, because face-veiling was considered to be linked to a doctrine of radical fundamentalism (ibid.; p. 118, 127).

These affairs show that secular politics is highly debated within France. Secular norms in France and religious diversity do not always go hand in hand. Religious diversity still plays an important role in the Western secular states. Furthermore, these affairs serve as an introduction to show how policy can lead to problems with religious diversity within the French society. These affairs show that secularistic politics can have serious implications for certain minorities within society.

There is a tension between Western values and religious diversity, especially the religious Islamic values (Molokotos Liederman, 2000, p. 368). This is especially true for France, where nationhood and citizenship require some uniformity of individuals within the French state. This type of uniformity is achieved by assimilation of immigrants in order to integrate in the French society (Freedman, 2004, p. 6). The unity aimed at is political unity, but focusses on a cultural unity as well (ibid.). In this light, the headscarf affairs can be explained as a search for cultural uniformity by the French government. Immigrants should assimilate to the French society by adhering to certain French cultural values. This means a

strong focus on secularism, which is an important part of the French identity. Therefore, this can be seen as evidence for the return of assimilation and the retreat of a culture based on the right to difference (ibid.). However, this French goal of unity within society can lead to problems for immigrants trying to integrate in the French society. It could lead to exclusion and resentment as a result of failed integration.

The 2005 riots, which occurred in October and November, demonstrated that there still is a tension between ethnic immigrants and the French politics (Adrian, 2009, p. 345). The riots and daily violence in particular neighbourhoods in France showed the dissatisfaction on the immigrants’ side. The neighbourhood where these disturbances occurred were inhabited by poor minorities (Bacquet, 2011, p. 6). These minorities are mostly undereducated, unemployed which leads to marginalization (ibid.). It can, thus, be argued that these ethnic immigrants cannot find their rightful place within society. Laïcité excludes the possibility for these immigrants to claim a mixed identity, a combination of their own identity and the French identity. In that case ethnic immigrants in these areas were looking for accommodations on religious grounds, which are not provided under laïcité (Adrian, 2009, p. 346). This means that the riots are signs of resentment of the immigrants towards the French society. This shows why there is a tension between laïcité and ethnic immigrants with different cultures and religions, because the French state will try to form a unity within society- based on shared values- like secularism. Ethnic immigrants do not always agree with these values, because they do not fit with the needs of immigrants. Therefore, they feel misunderstood by the French government who enforces laïcité and assimilation, which can lead to even further resentment. The French politics does not, as is shown from the headscarves affairs, anticipate the needs of ethnic minorities with a religious background.

One of these reasons for the tension between laïcité and immigrants is the search for an identity, namely immigrants trying to establish their own identity within the French border. In some cases, immigrants do not want to completely give up their own identity and take on the French identity. They are rather looking for ways to integrate within the French society by creating their own identity. Muslim immigrants who adhere to a certain dress, the Ramadan and dietary practices, do so in loyalty towards their origins (Freedman, 2004, p. 9). They do not want to completely abandon their origins in order to become French. In this way, they shall resist the French secular laws, because it will deny them their own identity. As such, it is

a means of individualization of a group (Resnik, 2010, p. 217). Individualization means that a religious person will not be part of the French society as such, but wants to form an own group with similar religious individuals. This group would, in this case, be based on religion, because all the individuals can identify themselves with the other members of the group based on sharing a religion. In the case of laïcité a group will form outside of the French society that is based on religious believe. Laïcité attempts to work against this individualization, by erasing religious diversity and disapproving religious identity within the public sphere (Lépinard, 2011, p. 210). Accordingly, this leads to disturbances within the French society, because immigrants are limited in terms of expressing their own identity within the French society (Freedman, 2004, p. 9).

A second reason for the tension between laïcité and immigrants can be found within schools. In the neighbourhoods where disturbances occur, public schools have tended to achieve very poor educational success (Bacquet, 2011, p. 6). Therefore, it is no surprise that the headscarf affairs occurred at public schools in these neighbourhoods. As argued before, in French schools there is a strong focus on individual self-development, which means that under the right circumstances individuals should be able to develop themselves. However, if certain conditions are not satisfied the individual is likely to fail. It can be argued that when looking at laïcité in schools, laïcité limits the religious conditions at schools. Immigrants with a strong focus on religion, which they are not allowed to express in schools, are excluded from the school system. This is one of the reasons why the schools in these neighbourhoods perform badly, because immigrants are provided with conditions that do not fully satisfy their needs in order to develop themselves. The schools try to enforce unity by teaching according to a certain system and teach certain uniform values in order to create French citizens. However, this secular school system and secular French values do not easily fit with the experiences and background of immigrants, which will frustrate their development into French citizens.

These developments show that the French Republican model runs into certain problems based on anti-religious policymaking. Laïcité, as part of the Republican French identity, directly or indirectly, leads to disturbances, riots and exclusion of immigrants and religious individuals. The tradition of assimilation of immigrants within the French society by integrating them, via for example schools, into certain French shared values leads to

problems. Hence, the question this raises is whether laïcité can be considered a legitimate form of secularistic policy, to be enforced by the French government? Moreover, does laïcité regard religion with hostility or a mere neutrality?

CHAPTER THREE –

POLITICAL

SECULARISM

After discussing the problems associated with laïcité in chapter two, this chapter will provide a theoretical background to laïcité. The theory of secularism can provide a theoretical background to the policy of laïcité and in this way explain why the policy of laïcité is used the way it is in France. This introduces the underlying problems of legitimacy and neutrality of secularistic policy. This chapter will discuss the theory of secularism through three important concepts, namely political secularism, neutrality and Christianity. Furthermore, it will introduce some criticisms of the theory of secularism and at the same time evaluate these criticisms. The chapter will start off with a section concerning political secularism, which will focus on discussing the aspects of secularism as a theory. The next section will focus on the concept of neutrality within secularism. And lastly, the theory of Christianity will be discussed to show the lack of neutrality within secularism. This chapter will end with a selection of criticisms on secularism, neutrality and the theory of Christianity, which will be evaluated on their merit.

Political secularism

A secular, and a liberal, state must necessarily have a demarcation between religion and government (Ahdar, 2013, p. 406). This idea or belief guides the theory of secularism. Secularism is connected to the state and is a way to promote certain moral and political

standards to counter values that the state conceives as harmful (Bilgrami, 2014, p. 3). The theory of secularism can be defined very narrowly as the separation of religion from the policies and institutions of a state (Bhargava, 1998, p. 9). Separation works both ways in the sense that it protects the state from intrusion of religion and religion from intrusions of the state (Ahdar, 2013, p. 406). However, this is a narrow definition, because the focus on separating religion and the state can come in many shapes. As such, it does not always mean a clear separation of the two. Secularism can also allow influences of religion in state affairs or influences of the state into religious matters.

To illustrate the different manners in which a secular state can be separated from religion, Bhargava (2011, p. 639) defines three levels of disconnect. The first level of separation is a separation on the level of ends (Bhargava, 2011, p. 639). This implies a separation of religion from the ends of a state, which means that government policies are not a result of any religious belief the state maintains. For example, with regard to Christianity, the state will have the goal of creating good citizens rather than a good person that will go to heaven, which is the purpose of religion. The second level of separation divides the state and religion on the level of state institutions (Bhargava, 2011, p. 639). A separation on the level of institutions means that the state does not establish a church as institution of the state and the state does not give special privileges to church institutions. The third level separates religion from the state on the level of public-law and policy (Bhargava, 2011, p. 639). This level of separation means that the state does not give any special privileges to a particular religion in law or policy. However, a secular state does not always involve a clear separation on all of the three levels. Instead, secular states could have a separation on one of the three levels. This shows how there can be different types of secularization within states.

Furthermore, Taylor (2007, p. 2) argues that secularism implies a separation between the public and private sphere. Secularism is understood in terms of public spaces, where public spaces have been allegedly emptied out of any religion. Or in other words, individuals function within different public spheres, like economic, political, cultural, educational, professional and recreational spheres, while the norms and principles in those public spheres do not refer to religion. For example, a teacher cannot wear any religious symbols when they stand in front of a class. However, a teacher is allowed to wear religious symbols in their private sphere, for instance at home. As such, Taylor argues that there is a separation made

between the public and the private sphere. The public sphere is free from religion, but in the private sphere people can have religious beliefs. This is a consequence of secularism, because a state that carries out secular policies will create such a separation.

Secularism provides different arguments in favour of a separation between state and religion. The first argument focusses on the autonomy of individuals within a state, namely that state and religion can interfere with the capacity of individuals to be autonomous (Bhargava, 1994, p. 1786-1787). Both institutions, state and religion, have the capacity to undermine individual’s capacity to lead the good life as they themselves perceive it, because both institutions make decisions for individuals in the way they should act. This can come in the form of a certain enforced vision of the good life, which will undermine the free choices of individuals to live a life that they themselves attach value to. One measure of secularism is to split religion and the state, because combined they could administer a bigger influence on the autonomy of individuals then they would do separately. As such, the endeavour of secularism is to protect the ideal of autonomy. Secularism in this way wants to end oppression so that individuals can develop and exercise their capacities, which is to be autonomous (Dagger, 1997, p. 179).

A second argument emphasizes that religious disputes cannot be settled, because religion is about believing (Bhargava, 1994, p. 1788-1789). It is about a conviction that individuals might have, and this will not lend itself to a coercive settlement of disputes, which is the nature of a state. As states make a decision, disputes will appear, and so the state enforces this decision. As such, the power to enforce a decision is an instrument that cannot fit with religious matters. Therefore, religion should not intervene with politics and both institutions should be separated.

A third argument in favour of separating church and state focusses on the different views of the good life within a state (Bhargava, 1994, p. 1789-1790). Religion involves a certain vision of the good life. If religion is part of the state it will try to enforce a certain vision of the good life, because this is inherently to religion, which considers itself to be the only true religion. However, this vision of the good life might not fit with every individual within that state. To make sure that no individual is limited in his or her vision of the good life, religion should not have direct influence in state affairs. Therefore, religion should be separated from the state.

The fourth argument for separation emphasizes equality, which means that individuals should not, by virtue of being a member of one institution, also be a member of another institution (Bhargava, 1994, p. 1788-1789). In other words, citizens who are part of a religious institution should not get a privileged position within the state, and citizens who are part of the state should not be forced into one religious institution. This separation makes sure that individuals within society are treated as equals and no individual ought to get a privileged position by either being part of the state or a religious institution.

The last argument argues against a concentration of power with certain individuals or institutions (Bhargava, 1994, p. 1788-1789). This argument involves the opportunity to exercise power of institutions or individuals. If either religious institutions or individuals, which are part of religious institutions, can exercise direct power within political institutions, it will lead to powerful religious institutions or individuals. This means that power is concentrated within those institutions or individuals. Consequently, in order to avoid the concentration of power, state and religion should be separated.

Ahdar (2013, p. 409-412) makes a distinction between two types of secularism, namely “benevolent secularism” and “hostile secularism”. A similar distinction is made by Kuru (2009, p. 12-14) who calls the two types “passive secularism” and “assertive secularism”. Benevolent or passive secularism prevents the state from adopting and imposing any established religious or non-religious beliefs upon its citizens (ibid.; p. 409). This means that the state does not express any forms of religious or non-religious belief. Therefore, benevolent secularism suggests the possibility of a state with a non-established secular order (ibid.). This means that the state does not actively pursue the politics of secularism, but incorporates religious and non-religious equally. As such, benevolent secularism stays passive, in the sense that it will respect religious and non-religious beliefs of citizens within the state and will try to give them an equal standing. The state, however, will not play an active role in promoting these beliefs. Furthermore, this means that religious and non-religious beliefs will be publicly visible within a state, because the state will try to accommodate these beliefs equally (Kuru, 2009, p. 11). To be able to fulfil this task benevolent secularism recognizes that religious and non-religious impulses are not confined solely to individuals, thus recognizing religious and non-religious associations and communities within the state as well, which means that benevolent secularism grants