The Fight Against Biological Weapons: The Clinton Years

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The Fight Against Biological and Chemical Weapons

The Clinton Years

Matthew Aumais

A thesis submitted for the degree of Masters of American Studies

in the

Faculty of Humanities University of Amsterdam

Professor Doctor R.V.A Ruud Janssens September 2018

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Table of Contents………..2

Introduction………..3

History: Biological and Chemical Weapons……….7

The Clinton Administration foreign policy creation and effectiveness…………..21

Nuclear vs. Biological and Chemical Weapons………..40

History of Nuclear Weapons……….42

Security and Verification Protocol………45

Positives of Dual-Use Technologies……….50

1998 Fiscal Budget and Funding………..54

Conclusion………..60

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Introduction

A 2017 Gallop Poll asked the American public, what should be the most important for-eign policy goal for the United States? The top two responses at five percent and eighty-four percent respectively, agree that the prevention of future international terrorist attacks, and the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction are the most important goals for the United States foreign policy. To put those numbers into perspective, those responses rated sig1

-nificantly higher than securing adequate supplies of energy for the United States and promoting and defending human rights in other countries (53%). The seeds of terrorism can be found all 2

over the world, and it doesn’t have to be state sponsored, it can be sown in someone’s basement or garage. The motivations of terrorists are far ranging, from political statements, to religious fa-natics, to a strict “body count” policy. Biological and chemical weapons are some of the most lethal and inexpensive, making them the weapon of choice amongst terrorist groups. The blue-prints to research and develop a biological or chemical weapon are readily accessible to the pub-lic. Therefore any radicals with the proper biological, chemical, or engineering training can ma-nipulate otherwise good intentioned information into a biological or chemical weapon.

This research thesis will examine how the United States has progressed in multi-lateral agreements internationally and domestic policies under the Clinton administration. More specifi-cally, this paper will take into account some of the events domestically and internationally which had an effect upon the Clinton administration’s decisions made during his presidency. I have de-cided to write this research thesis on the Clinton administration because they were the first ad-ministration that needed to develop a new post-Cold War foreign policy to replace

“containment.” Containment was the foreign policy of the United States for the past forty years in order to fight the spread of communism during the Cold War against the Soviet Union. It is very important to discuss this because it would be the beginning of the post-Cold War world and it was unknown how the United States would conduct themselves without the Soviet Union as an

Justin McCarthy/Gallup, Inc, "Top U.S. Foreign Policy Goals: Stem Terrorism, Nuclear Weapons," Gallup.com,

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January 16, 2017, accessed June 02, 2018, http://news.gallup.com/poll/204005/top-foreign-policy-goals-stem-terror-ism-nuclear-weapons.aspx.

Ibid.

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adversary. This paper will also use a compare and contrast of nuclear arms security measures, funding, and dual-technology potential in comparison to biological and chemical weapons. These three aspects need to be discussed because Clinton’s foreign policy was dependent on the cre-ation of markets in the interncre-ational community. In Clinton’s mind the wealth and prosperity of the world would create peace. The goal of the thesis is to investigate the origins and the success-es of the Clinton administrations non-proliferation policy. I took into account whether the admin-istration was successful in their goal of reducing the development of biological and chemical weapons, and if the administration was successful in preparing our country for potential biologi-cal and chemibiologi-cal weapon attacks. I argue that the limited success of the Clinton administration left the United States unprepared domestically to respond to a biological and chemical weapon attack. In spite of the Clinton administration’s lack of preparedness domestically, the Clinton administration did make it more difficult for rogue nation states and terrorist groups to acquire biological and chemical weapons and materials by passing international multi-lateral arms con-trol agreements.

The sources and materials I use to support my findings to examine how prepared and successful the United States Biological and Chemical Research and Defense team is for a biolog-ical or chembiolog-ical terrorist attack. I use an assortment of primary resources such as specific execu-tive orders by President Clinton, speeches to the United Nations, President Clinton’s biography

My Life, video of speeches by President Clinton at the United Nations, Congressional Records,

along with the 1997 Annual Report by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the 1998 fiscal report by the Clinton administration, to support my findings that the Clinton administration had limited success achieving their foreign policy goals. The secondary sources that provide the academic debate in my argument come from newspaper articles, books, academic journals and United States government websites. The scholars I utilize in academia include Jonathan B. Tuck-er, John Holum, Alberto Alesina, Michael J Mazar, David Boaz, Robert Manning, Patrick Claw-son and Michael Mandelbaum. From these sources and scholars I provide the reader the success-es and criticisms of how the Clinton administration handled non-proliferation policy and promot-ing peaceful biological and chemical defense and research. To compare and contrast the scholar’s analysis of the Clinton regime, my methodology performs an analysis of the entire Clinton

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ad-ministration’s non-proliferation foreign policy towards biological and chemical weapons. This is to critique how the Clinton administration handled funding and dual-use technologies for biolog-ical and chembiolog-ical defense departments. The debate regarding the Clinton administration’s foreign policy post-Cold War examines the successes and difficulties the Clinton administration had dur-ing Bill Clinton’s presidency to deter proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. Along with showing what the debate was in the Senate regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention and how well of a deterrent it could be for the proliferation of chemical weapons. My goal is to show the reader, that the biological and chemical weapons defense, research and development has gradually improved, but it is still not ready to handle a full scale biological and chemical weapons attack. This is because of the public’s perception of biological and chemical weapons compared to nuclear weapons, along with the difference of preparedness for the public health department, money allocated to each department, and the Clinton administrations effectiveness of passing legislation in a timely manner. The scope of my thesis will focus on the Clinton ad-ministration in the mid to late 1990’s. I will look into the nuclear versus biological weapons bate during the 20th century and specifically the 1998 fiscal year budget for the respective de-partments. The goal of the chapter will be to highlight the efficiencies and deficiencies of the budget allocation, security measures, and dual-technologies supported by the Clinton administra-tion. I will wrap my paper up engaging in the academic debate over the Clinton Presidency fo-cusing on the effectiveness of non-proliferation of biological and chemical weapons policy, along with the conversion of biological and chemical to peaceful dual-use technologies. This will show that a biological and chemical weapons attack are more prone to be used against the United States.

The research thesis will consist of three chapters. The first chapter will provide the reader a brief historical narrative of biological and chemical weapons from the first recorded uses up until the Clinton administration. The next chapter will analyze the Clinton administration’s effec-tiveness of their non-proliferation strategies domestically and internationally. The chapter follow-ing the Clinton administrations policies will focus on the compare and contrast of nuclear securi-ty, dual-technological uses, and funding under the Clinton administration compared to biological and chemical under the aforementioned categories. I will then conclude with my findings, and

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engage with the positives and negatives under the Clinton administration and show that the Clin-ton regime, was able to establish strong international ties that continued into the twenty-first cen-tury. Despite the aforementioned achievement the Clinton administration had limited success because they could not get maneuver through the gridlock in Congress in a timely manner to act upon the newly forged relationships through multi-lateral agreements.

The first chapter will provide a history and contextual background on the biological and chemical weapons spanning from the first use of biological and chemical weapons until the commencement of the Clinton administration. I provide context to the biological and chemical weapons history before the Biological Weapons Convention in 1975. After 1975, I elaborate on 3

programs that are still known to be in existence after the ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention, including biological and chemical weapon accidents by rogue governments. This chapter I expand upon the biological mishap inside the Soviet Union at one of their covert facili-ties in 1979. In addition, I also provide the same history time stamp for chemical weapons, to establish the difference between biological and chemical weapons. I introduce international and domestic attacks that have occurred after the signing of the Biological Weapons Convention and after the ratification of the Geneva protocol of 1925 in 1975. For example, an international at4

-tack that affected international policy was carried out by the group Aum Shinrikyo. This terrorist group was based in Japan and the original intent of the group was political. The leader’s goal was to reincarnate original Buddhism into Japan. The terrorist group attacked the Japanese subway 5

with Sarin gas, targeting all trains traveling towards Tokyo’s Central Station.

The next chapter will focus solely on the Clinton administration from 1993-1999. The chapter will examine the policies and strategies set forward by the Clinton presidency in prevent-ing the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. The chapter contains information about the specific origins of Bill Clinton’s executive order 12938 and the significance of this

ex-Janice M. Graham and David M. Siegrist, Countering Biological Terrorism in the U.S.: An Understanding of Issues

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and Status (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana publications, 1999).

"Geneva Protocol," U.S. Department of State, accessed June 2, 2018, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/4784.htm.

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Janice M. Graham and David M. Siegrist, Countering biological terrorism in the U.S.: An Understanding of Issues

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ecutive order on the United States. In addition, the role of Richard Preston’s book, The Cobra 6

Event, which made an impression on the President leaving him to contemplate if this type of

at-tack was possible inside the United States. President Bill Clinton needed to know what was needed to be able to prevent and contain an attack like Preston presented in his novel. I examine additional domestic issues that influenced the President on non-proliferation policy, for example like the impeachment procedure of Bill Clinton during his second term as President. Additional-ly, I will take into account other international events that caused concern during his presidency and influencing his executive decisions and treaty agreements. The main example I will be using is the fall of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the Clinton presidency. Lastly, I will examine how President Clinton was able to bring the United States internationally together with other na-tions for the signing and ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. I will analyze some of the external difficulties that the Clinton administration faced during the Chemical Weapons Convention ratification process to show how Clinton and his administration was able to use bi-partisanship to pass the Chemical Weapons Convention. I look at the opposition facing Clinton by his own party and from the Republican party, with a particular focus on the 1996 re-election campaign against Republican nominee Bob Dole. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of Bill Clinton’s biological weapons legislation heading into the 21st century. The focus of this chapter is on the variables influencing the Clinton administration and how much they influenced President Clinton’s decision to initiate executive order 12938 in November 1994. I culminate this chapter with the end of the Clinton Presidency in the year 2000. In this section I highlight how the United States under former President Bill Clinton began to shape not just the United States view on biological and chemical weapons and international relationships post-Cold War, but the whole international perspective about how to best enforce non-proliferation security measures and how to respond effectively when an attack occurs. The goal of the chapter is to examine how effective the decisions the Clinton regime made in order to pass domestic non-proliferation legis-lation, executive orders, and the handling of multi-lateral treaties

“ Clinton, Bill: Message to the Congress Reporting on the Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons.”

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The third chapter will compare and contrast nuclear versus biological and chemical weapons. This chapter will examine the funding, security, and dual-uses of each discipline of weapons of mass destruction. It is important to examine the connection between the conversion of biological and chemical scientists for civilian positive dual-use applications programs such as nuclear power reactors or vaccine development for infectious diseases. It is important to discuss the Clinton administration’s implementation of a system to provide jobs for ex-biological and chemical weapon scientists in order to deter them from fleeing to known proliferators of biologi-cal and chemibiologi-cal weapons such as North Korea and Iran. It is vital to discuss positive dual-tech-nology industries and programs because each of these are under the umbrella of funding for Weapons of Mass Destruction, and contribute to the public debate on what the government per-ceive as the greater threat to the United States. In this debate I review the security measures re-garding the import and export of nuclear, biological, chemical weapons and materials. I examine how the funding has been dispersed and allocated within the Department of Defense and take a look at the difference between both programs. I also highlight what known governments, or ter-rorist groups, possess these types of weaponry and which entities have them ready for potential deployment. I conclude that biological and chemical weapons are a more likely and realistic threat at this time for the United States rather than the nuclear threat, as supported by the facts presented.

When we think of the largest civilian attack on United States soil in history, we imagine planes and towers crashing, exploding into flames with plumes of smoke and smoldering ashes filling the New York City streets and skyline. It is forgotten many times that there was also a bio-logical weapon attack that took place in the mailroom in the Pentagon. The letter opened con-tained anthrax and killed five people. While the casualty number pales in comparison, they may have been five preventable deaths if the correct policy and procedure were in place. The conclu-sion of my research will review the academic debate that was presented in each chapter. The search will provide the reader with insight into the maturation of the biological and chemical re-search, and development programs, and non-proliferation policies. The final chapter will display the United States’ preparedness and awareness of the potential situation of a biological or chemi-cal attack. While examining if the United States is capable of limiting the effectiveness of a

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suc-cessfully deployed biological or chemical weapons attack at the end of the Clinton presidency. The research will demonstrate that biological and chemical weapons are more likely to be used against the United States population than a nuclear attack. In the conclusion I consolidate all facts presented and refocus on my original thesis statement. I will provide supporting evidence to give my conclusion of the status of the United States Biological Research, Development and Defense at the end of the Clinton presidency. I will also re-establish that the biological weapons threat is much more significant a threat than the nuclear threat due to a multitude of reasons. I also highlight how terrorists motives are fluid, which affects how we need to construct our de-fense, domestically and internationally. After concluding that biological and chemical weapons are a greater risk than nuclear weapons, I conclude that the United States by the end of the Clin-ton administration still remained quite unprepared for a full scale biological or chemical weapon attack.

Chapter One: History of Biological and Chemical Weapons

President Bill Clinton stands and walks to the podium in front of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Pentagon Staff. Clinton is about to address the media for the first time since initiating a military strike against Iraq in December of 1998. Clinton calmly and coherently conveys why the strike took place;

We have to defend our future from these predators of the 21st century. They feed on the free flow of information and technology. They actually take advantage of the free movement of people, information and ideas. And they will be all the more lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. We simply cannot allow that to happen. 7

Clinton, Bill, "Text of Clinton Statement on Iraq," CNN, February 17, 1998, accessed June 8, 2018, http://edi

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The attack is just one of the ways Clinton tried to reduce proliferation of biological and chemical weapons internationally when rogue nations or terrorist groups would not adhere to the Biologi-cal Weapons Convention and the newly ratified ChemiBiologi-cal Weapons Convention. To completely understand the non-proliferation foreign policy of the Clinton administration, we must first un-derstand the historical events of biological and chemical weapons that have brought us to the in-auguration of the Clinton administration.

This chapter focuses on the history surrounding biological and chemical weapon uses, domestic policy in the United States, and foreign policy. The chapter begins in the Middle Ages with the very first historical recorded use of biological and chemical weapons, and touches upon uses of biological and chemical weapons in colonial times. The majority of the chapter provides a more extensive look into the twentieth-century when the military and science become inter-twined with one another. The goal of the chapter is to give the reader sufficient information on the histories of biological and chemical weapons. This also includes the recorded uses of each type of weapon. It will not be until the twentieth-century when advances were made in microbi-ology, that science and the military are re-united as a means to create an effective pathogen used to stifle the opposition. I then focus on domestic and foreign policy of the United States regard-ing biological and chemical weapons. The Geneva Accords of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention and are two documents that I examined because of their significant impact on the international, multi-coalition work. This will be very important to contextualize, so the reader can understand the basis of President Clinton’s decisions in the following chapter.

Medical expert Edmond Hooker defines a biological weapon as, “…any microorganism (such as bacteria, viruses, or fungi) or toxins (poisonous compound produced by microorgan-isms) found in nature that can be used to kill or injure people.” Today there are more than 1,200 8

biological weapons in existence, yet only a small percentage can be harnessed and used for bio-logical attacks. The microorganisms that may be subject to use can be released in a variety of ways. The most covert and effective way to discharge a substance is spraying in the air by an aerosol can. As long as the particles of the germs are finely dispersed in the air, a civilian would

Edmond Hooker, "Biological Warfare Facts & History of Biological Agents," EMedicineHealth, accessed April 03,

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2018, https://www.emedicinehealth.com/biological_warfare/article_em.htm#what_is_the_history_of_biologi-cal_warfare.

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just need to breathe in a sufficient amount of particles to be infected. In contrast to biological weapons, chemical weapons are, “any toxic chemical or its precursor that can cause death, injury, temporary incapacitation or sensory irritation through its chemical action. Munitions or other de-livery devices designed to deliver chemical weapons, whether filled or unfilled, are also consid-ered weapons themselves.” 9

Most of the biological and chemical weapon attacks that have occurred in the twentieth and twenty-first century used an aerosol can for deployment of the foreign substance. Another means of deployment has been using an explosive like artillery, bombs, and missiles. A limitation for using this means of release is the strength of the pathogen after the explosion which is signif-icantly reduced to less than five percent of its capable power. Another alternative, which is very 10

effective, requires an injection of a pathogen into the water or food supply. This is very difficult to accomplish because of the security of fresh water facilities and filtration systems. Filtration systems in most water restoration plants would clean out the pathogen before the water was re-leased to the public. Therefore, the pathogen needed would have to be in abundance in order to make an impact. Most of these agents would require deployment after the water has been filtered through the plant. This situation could pose an enormous threat to the general public, but it is a difficult task to achieve. Finally, the last means of release would be injection. This would be specifically used for assassination purposes. Of the biological weapons that are likely to be de-ployed against civilians, all are odorless, invisible, tasteless and can be spread silently. The re-sults of a successful attack could lead to a long term threat to the population. Presently the knowledge and resources are widely available. Anyone with a biology degree or an engineering degree can have the knowledge to create an effective biological or chemical weapon of mass de-struction.

Biological and chemical weapons can be traced as far back as the Middle Ages. Exam-ples include poison dipped on blades or arrow heads and poison of food and drink. Some of the

"Brief Description of Chemical Weapons, Chemical Weapon as Defined by the CWC, CW Agent Group, Persisten

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-cy Rate of Action," Types of Chemical Agent, accessed May 28, 2018, https://www.opcw.org/about-chemical-weapons/what-is-a-chemical-weapon/.

David W. Siegrist and Janice M. Graham, Countering Biological Terrorism in the United States: An Understand

10

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first documented instances occur in the 14th and 15th centuries in Mediterranean Europe. One specific example took place in 1340 at Thun L’Eveque in Hainault. At this specific event the 11

remains of dead horses and other animals were used to inflict disease and mass casualties. This material was used because medieval medics believed the stench of rotting organic material was thought to be a potent cause of disease. One of the soldiers that faced these unconventional 12

weapons at Thun L’Eveque described what he encountered, “ the stink and air was so abom-inable, that they considered how that finally they could not long endure.” The utilization of the 13

unorthodox weapons forced a truce between the two sides.

Over the next three hundred years there are unsubstantiated claims of biological and chemical weapons use that are un-verifiable. The next highly documented use is in North Ameri-ca during the 18th century. One of the best recorded events took place on the Pennsylvanian frontier at Fort Pitt. During the Pontiac rebellion, the British called a parlay between the two sides. During this parlay the British gave blankets and handkerchiefs that were infected with smallpox, directly from smallpox patients. The event has been corroborated by the Fort Com14

-mander’s ledger, which he had wrote about the cost of replacement of two blankets and handker-chiefs “taken from people in the Hospital to Convey the Smallpox to the Indians.” Soon after, 15

the parlay smallpox had broken out between the Native Americans, however the lack of informa-tion and physical evidence besides the ledger makes it difficult to make a finite connecinforma-tion. Only a mere ten years later the first United States militia would face its first biological encounter with the British army. During the American Revolutionary War Britain used smallpox as a biological weapon, possibly on several occasions. The British army was suspected of infecting civilians 16

Wheelis M. (2004) A Short History of Biological Warfare and Weapons. In: Chevrier M.I., Chomiczewski K.,

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Garrigue H., Granasztói G., Dando M.R., Pearson G.S. (eds) The Implementation of Legally Binding Measures to Strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. NATO Science Series II: Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry, vol 150. Springer, Dordrecht The area called " Thun L'Eveque in Hainnault" is Northern France today.

Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15

Fenn, E. A. 2000. Biological warfare in eighteenth-century North America: beyond Jeffery Amherst. Journal of

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with smallpox with the intent of the disease to spread through the Continental Army on multiple instances. The British would also contaminate their own military in order to build resistance to smallpox, but since it was intentionally given the recipient would only receive a minor case of smallpox with a lower chance of death. 17

The Hague Declaration of 1899 and the Hague Convention of 1907 were the first in-ternational agreements to forbade the use of “ poisonous or poisonous weapons” in warfare. Yet by the end of World War I more than 124,000 tons of gas were produced. World War I experi18

-enced the first uses of biological and chemical offensive and defensive capabilities on a large scale in the military field. World War I is also known as the chemist war because of the chess match over the utilization and development of biological and chemical weapons. The Germans focused extensively on creating only biological and chemical weapons with offensive capabili-ties. The leader of the program of the first German chemical weapons program was Fritz Haber, a prominent German chemist and future Nobel Prize Laureate. Haber was known as the “father 19

of chemical weapons,” and he helped organize the German chemical warfare program at the Kaiser Wilhem Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry. The three notable gasses 20

that were used in military combat during World War I were chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gas. Mustard gas was created by the Germans but was not put to use in the field by the end of the war. Mustard gas causes blistering, eye burning sensations, and lesions to the skin. Biological warfare was independent of civilian oversight unlike the chemical weapons program. The General 21

Staff’s position was that biological warfare was illegal, however the German program continued with their work. The biological program only focused on anti-animal and anti-crop pathogens. 22

Ibid.

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Fitzgerald GJ. Chemical Warfare and Medical Response During World War I. American Journal of Public Health.

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2008; 98(4):611-625. DOI:10.2105/AJPH.2007.11930.

Daniel Charles, Master Mind: The Rise and Fall of Fritz Haber, the Nobel Laureate Who Launched the Age of

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Chemical Warfare (New York: Ecco, 2005).

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2008; 98(4):611-625. DOI:10.2105/AJPH.2007.11930.

Pike, John. "German Biological Weapons." Vietnam War - American Return to Dog Fighting. July 24, 2011. Ac

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-cessed June 8, 2018. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/germany/bw.htm. Ibid.

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The most extensive work of the German biological warfare program was directed at Romania and the United States. The United States campaign was operated by physician Anton Dilger, who was U.S. born German. Dr. Dilger brought seed cultures to the United States and set up a small 23

facility in the Washington D.C. area to nurture the cultures. Dilger’s goal was to supply the cul24

-tures to German merchant ship Captain Hirsch who was stranded inside the United States by a British naval blockade. The attack was not effective, even though some Germans claim the 25

contrary, but there is no evidence to substantiate this claim. Between the two options of the bio-logical and chemical weapons, the German hierarchy believed chemical weapons would be most effective immediately and was the answer to winning trench warfare. Whoever was able to mas-ter these weapons would have the upper hand to win the war. In order to counmas-ter-act the German offensive, British and French researchers led the way for biological and chemical weapon protec-tion. Most of the work was done on gas masks and clothing in order to protect troops. Since the science and military convened, it birthed new programs into existence, and mobilized inside the nations’ academic, industrial, and economic sectors. By the end of World War I, mustard gas caused almost eighty percent of British chemical casualties on the battlefield. At the conclusion 26

of World War I there were over 90,000 recorded deaths and 1.3 million in casualties by result of gassing. A British soldier described the pandemonium that flowed from the front lines to the 27

rear:

I watched figures running wildly in confusion over the fields. Greenish grey clouds swept down upon them, turning yellow as they traveled over the country blasting every-thing the touched and shriveling up the vegetation…Then there staggered into our midst French soldiers, blinded, coughing, chests heaving, faces an ugly purple color, lips

23

Garrigue H., Granasztói G., Dando M.R., Pearson G.S. (eds) The Implementation of Legally Binding Measures to Strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. NATO Science Series II: Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry, vol 150. Springer, Dordrecht

Ibid.

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Ibid.

25

26

2008;98(4):611-625. DOI:10.2105/AJPH.2007.11930. Ibid.

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speechless with agony and behind them in the gas soaked trenches, we learned that they had left hundreds dead and dying comrades. 28

The effects of chemical weapons were more than physical damage but it also caused severe men-tal damage and distress. Many soldiers returned with what historians called “Gas Fright.” The 29

effectiveness of biological and chemical weapons piqued the interest of almost every nation in the world at the conclusion of World War I, which triggered curiosity into further experimenta-tion and development of new offensive and defensive capabilities.

The Geneva Convention of 1925 would affect the research and use of biological and chemical weapons for the future. The League of Nations would meet in Geneva in June 1925 to discuss the future of biological and chemical weapons. The Geneva Protocol would declare, “ the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world.” This was 30

significant because it banned the use of biological and chemical weapons in military combat. The hope was to curb scientific curiosity away from offensive weapons, and focus more on defensive research or contemporary medicine issues like the ongoing flu epidemic. The Geneva Protocol did have its limitations though. It did not develop an efficient means of policing and enforcing this legislation, the writing of the protocol was unclear and thus loopholes were created by coun-tries. The Geneva Protocol was also missing two of the most powerful nations, the United States and the Japanese Empire. The United States actually signed the protocol in 1925 at Geneva, but it was not ratified by the Senate until December 1974. The United States State Department ex31

-plained why the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was not ratified immediately in 1925, “ At that time the United States was not willing to agree to prohibit the use of any weapons of mass destruction

Watkins O. S., Methodist Report, cited in Amos Fries and C. J. West, Chemical Warfare (New York: McGraw

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Hill, 1921), 13; also cited in Joy, “Historical Aspects of Medical Defense,” 90.

29

2008;98(4):611-625. DOI:10.2105/AJPH.2007.11930.

"1925 Geneva Protocol – UNODA," United Nations, accessed April 03, 2018, https://www.un.org/disarmament/

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wmd/bio/1925-geneva-protocol/. Ibid.

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unless they could be eliminated through a disarmament agreement with effective safeguards.” 32

This lack of support made it inevitable that weapons would continue to be researched and devel-oped and therefore it did little to prevent biological attacks.

Unlike World War I, World War II did not feature any biological weapons attacks on Eu-ropean soil, but there were recorded uses of it in Asia, and the development of biological and chemical weapons became much more lethal during this period. Heading into World War II, the Germans developed various biological agents through labs like I.G. Farben, and Krupp Indus-tries. The most powerful chemical weapon developed was sarin gas. Sarin gas was developed by accident in a Farben lab in 1938. The German scientists were trying to create a stronger pesticide to treat crops. If infected by this nerve agent, the exposed person would experience asphyxiation, stimulation through all the nerves in their body, causing convulsions and suffocation. Luckily sarin was never used against the Allies, but it could have severely altered the war if used. Japan had the largest investment into mastering biological and chemical weapons in World War II. The Japanese were first interested in biological weapons in the late 1920’s to gain power over the Pa-cific and China. Japanese army officer, Shiro Ishii became convinced of the raw potential of bio-logical weapons while he was a Lieutenant and surgeon in the Japanese army in Tokyo. The 33

lobbying became a success, and Ishii led both the offensive and defensive research where the project grew exponentially. The Japanese exposed over 3,000 people to plague, anthrax, 34

syphilis and other deadly pathogens for research. The Japanese had a very sophisticated re35

-search and development center called Unit 731. The facility known as Unit 731 covered six kilometers and had more than 150 buildings on the campus. The campus held over 3,000

em-Ibid.

32

33

Leitenberg, M., 1998. The Korean biological warfare allegations resolved. Center for Pacific Asia Studies at

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Stockholm University Occasional Paper 36. May 1998.

Frischknecht F. The history of biological warfare. EMBO Reports. 2003;4(Suppl 1):S47-S52. DOI:10.1038/sj.em

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ployees at one time. An example of the Japanese conducting one of these attacks is in Quozhou 36

a small town in Western Zhejiang province. A Japanese plane dropped plague infected fleas which killed people within a few days and more than two-thousand people for the year. Simi37

-larly to the Germans, the Japanese had an interest in biological and chemical weapons starting after World War I and accelerated the program entering the 1930’s. Japan continued to develop, use, and experiment on un-willing human subjects until the conclusion of World war II.

Before World War I the United States were not as infatuated as other countries with bio-logical and chemical weapons research. The United States military thought of these weapons as impractical and did not give value to the idea of investing money and man power into deep re-search. Not until 1917 where the first beginnings of the biological and chemical research begun. Van H. Manning offered his technical services to the military committee on February 17th, 1917 starting the first biological weapons research program. The program at the time was to specifi38

-cally focus on noxious gas, explosives and breathing devices. The agreement was to start re-searching new biological defense methods that could be used for the public and military. Unlike the Europeans, the United States started their biological and chemical weapons programs two to three years behind Great Britain, France, and Germany. However, the United States grew their program exponentially and it became one of the largest government research programs in United States history. The chemical research grew to more than 1,900 scientists and technicians work39

-ing on the project. By the end World War II, over 5,500 scientists and technicians worked on de-fensive and ofde-fensive research and development. It was not until World War II, that the United States began investing more money and resources into the biological and chemical weapons pro-gram. Sir Frederick Banting, who won the Nobel peace prize for discovering insulin, created the first Biological research center in 1940 with the help of corporate sponsors. In 1942 the United

Don Tow, "Japan's Biological and Chemical Warfare in China during WWII," Don Tow's Website, June 26, 2013,

36

accessed May 28, 2018, http://www.dontow.com/2009/04/japans-biological-and-chemical-warfare-in-china-during-wwii/

Ibid. (Causing Bubonic plague and other plagues)

37

38

2008;98(4):611-625. DOI:10.2105/AJPH.2007.11930.

Slotten Hugh, “Humane Chemistry or Scientific Barbarism? American Responses to World War I Poison Gas,

39

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States created the War Research Service, which was responsible for investigating anthrax and botulinum toxin. Sufficient quantities of both of these subjects were stockpiled until 1944, in 40

case of a biological attack by the Nazis. By the end of the war the United States caught up to the rest of the world in biological and chemical research. The United States was creating thirty tons of mustard gas per day by June 1944, along with employing five thousand people into biological and chemical research and development in 1945. 41

The conclusion of World War II did not end the race for superior biological or chemical weapons. The tensions became strenuous between the United States and the Soviet Union creat-ing the Cold War. The United States, through Operation Paperclip, swept up some of the most 42

brilliant minds from the former Third Reich biological research and development departments regardless of the war crimes committed. The United States continued their research into the 50’s and 60’s, investigating the preparedness and vulnerability of the United States to a biological and chemical weapons attack. During the Cold War, an assortment of accusations of the usage of bio-logical and chemical weapons were given by both the communist and western democracies against each other. In 1949 Communists began accusing the United States for continuing their biological and chemical weapon programs, until the Korean War where accusations and tension rose. Former Soviet United Nations delegate Jacob Malik accused the United States of using poi-son gas in early February 1952. This coincided with the Chinese claiming poipoi-son gas bombs 43

had been dropped on their troops which led the Communists to their most successful biological and chemical warfare propaganda campaigns. This campaign helped induce confessions of such

Frischknecht F. The history of biological warfare. EMBO Reports. 2003;4(Suppl 1):S47-S52. doi:10.1038/sj.em

40

-bor.embor849. Ibid.

41

Jacobsen, Annie. Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program That Brought Nazi Scientists to America.

42

Boston, MA: Back Bay Books Little Barn, 2015.

Operation Paperclip was a recruitment program after the conclusion of World War II ran by the United States gov-ernment. The programs purpose was tor recruit highly skilled Nazi scientists to bring back to the United States for employment. The United States and the former Soviet Union competed for these men at the beginning of the Cold War to gain a technological advantage. The United States recruited Wehrner von Braun and Harry Strughold who were instrumental for the United States to land a man on the moon.

Matray James I and Boose Donald W. 18 Aug 2014 ,South Korea from: The Ashgate Research Companion to the

43

Korean War Routledge. Accessed on: 11 Jun 2018 https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/ 10.4324/9781315613611.ch2

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activities from American prisoners of war. These accusations held up weakly and the United 44

States suffered no punishment.

One of the most notable examples of domestic testing in the United States was when a test substance was released into the New York subway system in 1966. The test lasted for five 45

days, and it was led by the army. Relatively harmless bacteria called Bacillus Subtilis, which was mixed with charcoal particles, a stimulated chemical agent. The agent was put in bulbs and 46

smashed over ventilation vents and the remnants of the bulb were tossed onto the track where trains continued to whirl by. After the experiment took place, the Army produced a report about the testing saying: “ A large portion of the working population in downtown New York City would be exposed to disease if one or more pathogenic agents were disseminated covertly in several subway lines at a period of peak traffic.” At the time, it did not appear that the United 47

States would have the resources and defensive procedures to deal with a biological weapons at-tack in an urban area.

In 1972 a Biological Weapons Convention was held with over one hundred nations in at-tendance, discussing the future of the research and development taking place in the field of bio-logical weaponry. The convention was negotiated in 1969 during a United Nations disarmament forum. After much deliberation by the end of the convention new legislation was agreed upon and ratified by the nations attending on April 10, 1972 in Washington D.C., Moscow, and Lon-don. The new decree prohibited the research on biological weapons and instructed the destruc48

-tion of stockpiles of biological agents which were stockpiled at a very high rate during the Cold War. The United States would sign and ratify the treaty in Congress by 1975 along with the orig-inal Geneva Protocol of 1925. The limitation of this agreement is that there are no set verification

Ibid.

44

45

-ing of Issues and Status (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1997).

Cole, Leonard A. "It Can Happen Here -- and Did." The New York Times. March 23, 1995. Accessed June 7,

46

2018. https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/23/opinion/it-can-happen-here-and-did.html. Ibid.

47

"Fact Sheets & Briefs," Can the U.S. and Russia Avert a New Arms Race? | Arms Control Association, accessed

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standards in place, and it is difficult to differentiate between vaccination research and biological weapon development. Therefore, research continued in some countries because of the loose reg-ulation from the new Biological Weapons Convention 1972. An example was the former Soviet Union establishing a facility called Bio-Preparat. This facility was a gigantic research center with more than 50,000 people employed. In 1979 an accidental release of anthrax from a

weapons facility in Sverdloovsk, in the former Soviet Union, killed up to 66 people. The Soviets covered the entire situation up with their secret police and did not admit the truth until 1992. 49

The Soviets received no punishment after the confession of the cover up, which would not deter countries from continuing their programs.

The biological warfare efforts began to grow in the 80’s and the early 90’s within terrorist organizations and governments. Iraq was a well known user of biological and chemical weapons after the documented assassinations on the Kurds. The Iraqis created one of the largest stockpiles in the world, which could be released in various ways, most impressively in scud missiles, 122-mm rockets, and artillery. While this was taking place in the Middle East, the United States had their own domestic terrorist attacks. In September and October of 1984, there was an outbreak of Salmonella at salad bars in Oregon giving 751 people food poisoning. A terrorist group 50

called Bhagwan Shree Rajneeshe credited themselves for the attack with a biological weapon. The work was conducted on a ranch in rural Oregon. Despite considerable epidemiological evi-dence that the outbreak was deliberately initiated, the investigation team could not identify the event as a bioterrorism attack until an independent police investigation discovered the ranch and its facilities. 51

Another example of a more notable international terrorist attack was in 1994 by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan. A sect of the cult achieved a homemade sarin gas and deployed it in five separate trains in a Tokyo subway heading for central station. Unlike the Rajneeshe cult, Aum

49

-ing of Issues and Status (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1997). Ibid.

50

51

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Shinrikyo was very well funded, and had PhD level expertise in many fields of research and de-velopment. The results were much more devastating killing twelve people and injuring over 52

5,500 people. It was one of the deadliest biological weapons attack on a civilian population. 53

Two members of the group were caught in Los Angeles carrying sarin gas. The men told security they were planning on heading to Disney World. Domestic terrorism poses just as big, if not greater, problem for governments just as how rogue governments would present a problem for national security.

The last country to have confirmed use of biological weapons in war was Iraq during the Persian Gulf-War. Saddam Hussein revealed after the war it had bombs modified to fit in a heli-copter to spray pathogens in specific areas. Hussein confirming these incendiary allegations 54

leaves the possibility of doubt to remain about governments being truthful under the Biological Weapons Convention. Former Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush helped start ne-gotiations over a chemical weapons treaty to pair with the Biological Weapons Convention. Pres-ident George H.W. Bush, continued to pursue the strengthening and creation of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. In 1991 President George H.W. Bush and his administration took part in the third review of the Biological Weapons Convention. The George H.W. Bush administration wanted to overview the entire Biological Weapons Con-vention. The initiative was to re-evaluate the Biological Weapons Convention to see if it was fea-sible to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. The George H.W. Bush administration 55

was successful, and established the Ad Hoc Group. The Ad Hoc Group was a group of govern56

-mental experts known as VEREX. The goal of the group was to analyze the entire Biological 57

Ibid.

52

53

-ing of Issues and Status (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1997). Ibid.

54

55

Ibid.

56

Ibid.

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Weapons Convention and see what could be done to improve the agreement. The goal was to have more ways of verification or a more stringent verification protocol. The other item that was an important sticking point was the dissemination of information between countries to advance intelligence over terrorist and rogue government plots to proliferate biological and chemical weapons. These two points began the conversation between Republicans and Democrats over the committal to the Chemical Weapons Convention, because of the previous non-committal by the other nations to the United States requests of stronger verification and further communication about rogue proliferation schemes.

Heading into the Clinton administration there was a frequent use of biological weapons because of a variety of reasons. The biggest reason was it became a cheaper alternative for many countries rather than trying to start a nuclear program. Biological and chemical weapon facilities can be covertly researched, contained, and concealed. The deployment can be done covertly, un-like a nuclear or atomic strike, by an enemy opposition. By the time of Bill Clinton’s inaugura-tion, the United States was not in any position to handle a biological or chemical weapons attack, George H.W. Bush was a driving force for the Chemical Weapon Convention to reach the Senate floor, yet it was not finally ratified by the Senate until 1998. Something needed to be done to prepare the United States for an attack which they clearly were not ready for.

Thanks to the internet, the resources and knowledge on the use of biological and chemi-cal weapons is widely known to be available. Presently biologichemi-cal weapons, chemichemi-cal, and homemade weapons are the largest threat to society, exponentially more of a threat than any nu-clear threat to the United States in the Clinton era.

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Throughout the Clinton era, a reoccurring issue was the possession and ongoing proliferation of biological and chemical weapons programs. Since the attempted assassination on the life of Pres-ident George H.W. Bush in Kuwait, the Iraqi government was a thorn in the side of the Clinton administration. This lead to steady bombing of military targets over several years, culminating into President Clinton’s address to the American people about new missile strikes and under-standing why it must be done to Iraq. Clinton emphasized to the American people

Earlier today, I ordered America's armed forces to strike military and security targets in Iraq. They are joined by British forces. Their mission is to attack Iraq's nuclear, chemi-cal and biologichemi-cal weapons programs and its military capacity to threaten its neighbors. Their purpose is to protect the national interest of the United States, and indeed the in-terests of people throughout the Middle East and around the world. Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas or biological weapons. 58

This was not the only country the Clinton administration had to attack strategically or restore the peace in hostile areas. In Kosovo and Rwanda military strikes occurred, but they were coordinat-ed through N.A.T.O. and the Unitcoordinat-ed Nations Security Council. President Clinton was very influ-ential for the progression of countering and non-proliferating biological and chemical attacks, along with the distribution of them between proliferating countries. In this chapter, I provide background context on the situation Clinton was dealing with at the time of his election and the changing agendas of terrorism. I follow that up by analyzing three executive orders passed by President Bill Clinton that strengthened domestic non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. I specifically look at the domestic executive order 12938 in 1994, and executive order 13094 in 1998. These orders relate to each other and set the domestic standard of biological and chemical weapons proliferation prevention. I analyze the international agreement derived from the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was a vital agreement needed in order to create other multi-lateral coalitions in the prevention of rogue states and non-state entities acquiring

"Transcript: President Clinton Explains Iraq Strike," CNN, December 16, 1998, accessed April 15, 2018, http://

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cal and chemical weapons. I summarize the chapter discussing the impacts of these agreements domestically and internationally. The purpose of the chapter is to see what the Clinton adminis-tration passed in order to prevent the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons, how did the doctrine of enlargement effect the Clinton administration’s motivation with who to create multi-lateral coalitions with, and examine what type of resistance the administration faced during the process of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Clinton Administrations relationship with Russia. It is important to discuss these international and domestic measures that were executed during the Clinton administration to deter biological and chemical weapons, along with showing the relationship that was being built between the national health service and mili-tary service. I contend in this chapter that during the Clinton presidency, President Clinton suc-cessfully passed the necessary legislation to prepare for and prevent biological attacks on United States soil and on foreign soil, however the legislation that the Clinton administration had intro-duced limited success and did not guarantee security for the United States.

The idea of a multi-lateral coalition internationally, which would turn into the Chemical Weapons Convention, was actually first initiated in discussions by President Reagan and at the time Vice President Bush, but the discussion proved to be only preliminary talks. During his campaign Clinton was an advocate of his predecessors previous foreign-policy work and ideas, which complimented Clinton’s idea called the Doctrine of Enlargement. This idea focused on four different items, but specifically focused on multi-lateral peacekeeping efforts, international alliances and nation building. Additionally it was an international commitment to intervene in world crisis situations when it is practical and morally defensible. Being the first post-Cold 59

War President, Clinton needed to find a new comprehensive foreign policy to replace the previ-ous Cold War foreign policy of containment. Clinton gave the task to develop the new post Cold War foreign policy to National Security Advisor Anthony Lake. Lake then appointed National Security Counselor and Senior director for legislative affairs Jeremy Rosner to draft a new

Robert Manning and Patrick Clawson, "The Clinton Doctrine," The Clinton Doctrine - The Washington Institute

59

for Near East Policy, December 29, 1997, accessed April 13, 2018, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analy-sis/view/the-clinton-doctrine.

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egy for President Clinton. Lake emphasized that Rosner should reiterate that the United States 60

would remain the worlds preeminent military power and advocate liberalizing the global econo-my. Rosner came up with four points that Clinton would define as the doctrine of enlargement. 61

The four points consist of, “strengthen the community of market democracies, foster and consol-idate new democracies and market economies where possible, counter the aggression and sup-port the liberalization of states hostile to democracy, and to help democracy and market eco-nomics take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.” According to Lake, “Clinton 62

embraced the enlargement concept almost immediately.” Clinton understood it as, “A signal 63

that the notion that as free states grew in number and strengthen the international order would become both more prosperous and more secure.” Clinton’s hope was that the world would be64

-come richer and more prosperous, which would create peace. The doctrine of enlargement also helped the cohesion between domestic agencies in the United States. To try and appease critics Clinton’s strategy of enlargement rejected, “the more expansive view that the United States was duty-bound to promote constitutional democracy and human rights everywhere; as a politically viable concept, enlargement had to be aimed at primary United States strategic and economic interests.” An example of this would be in Asia where the emphasis of social order over indi65

-vidual rights in their society. Under enlargement the United States chief concern in Asia would be free market access- the rest, for the most part, would be left to sort itself out. 66

The Clinton administration became interested in Biological and Chemical weapons for a couple reasons. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the discovery of their enormous biological and chemical weapons program, Clinton knew he needed to form a working relationship with

Brinkley, Douglas. "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine." Foreign Policy, no. 106 (1997): 111-27.

60 doi:10.2307/1149177. Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66

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Russia. Domestically the Clinton administration wanted to focus on creating a good working re-lationship between the Public Health agencies and the security community. In response to a bio-logical or chemical attack both of these agencies need to cooperate and work cohesively. The Public Health agencies will provide medical countermeasures, vaccine distribution, health educa-tion, and medical surveillance. The security community, which consists of law enforcement and 67

other intelligence agencies, needed to focus on the prevention aspect of a biological and chemi-cal attack. Their goal is to identify, apprehend, prosecute if an attack is prepared to occur. The 68 69

Clinton administration’s goal domestically was to give enough training and support for the two groups to be effective.

In the international community a big reason for the need of multi-lateral coalitions is be-cause of the changing agendas of terrorists. Traditional terrorism relies heavily on symbolic vio-lence. The significance is that traditional terrorists would stay clear of biological weapons be70

-cause it could alienate supporters of their -cause, and they perceive themselves as taking the morale high ground. Now terrorists are more focused on body count and less about alienating supporters or taking any morale high ground. Examples of this are seen in Aum Shinkriyo in 1995 and the Oklahoma City building bombings, which were both homemade. With the change of goals of terrorists, and rogue governments, Clinton was able to pass very important ground work legislation into the 21st century. With these events taking place domestically and interna-tionally, Clinton also had to deal with the fall of the Soviet Union and how to deal with disman-tling and finding new work for biological and chemical weapon former Soviet Union scientists in order for them to not sell themselves or knowledge to enemies of the free world. President Clin-ton was able to handle these situations with the help of the international community, which set

Perkins D. (2013) The Yin and Yang of Countering Biological Threats: Public Health and Security Under the In

67

-ternational Health Regulations, Biological Weapons Convention, and the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. In: Vaseashta A., Khudaverdyan S. (eds) Advanced Sensors for Safety and Security. NATO Science for Peace and Secu-rity Series B: Physics and Biophysics. Springer, Dordrecht

Ibid.

68

Ibid.

69

David W. Siegrist and Janice M. Graham, Countering Biological Terrorism in the U.S.: An Understanding of Is

70

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the United States and the international community heading in the right direction entering the 21st century.

The evolving motivations for terrorism and rogue state government programs showed Clinton’s hand in the type of legislation he was focusing on. Clinton was focused on securing collective international security and to have a more stringent effort to prevent the spread of bio-logical weapons domestically and internationally. Executive order 12938, which was to provide import bans of all weapons of mass destruction, and 13094, which is an amended version of ex-ecutive order 12938 which is predicated on making inquiries for acquisition and use of chemical and biological weapons along with strengthening import bans over weapons of mass destruction and materials.

The last agreement to discuss will be the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was at the center of the re-election campaign in 1996 against Bob Dole. The Chemical Weapons Con-vention would become the focal point of Clinton’s administration because of the recent attacks staying fresh in our minds like Oklahoma City, and international attacks like the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan. These terrorist groups acquired and deployed chemical and biological weapons dif-ferently, which shows how serious the threat of biological and chemical weapons was to the Clinton administration. President Clinton pushed for the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention through the Senate, along with the executive orders Clinton made himself. The hope of the Clinton administration was with the new legislation passed which would lead to fewer wars and proliferation of biological and chemical weapons, however, despite these efforts the international arm businesses were booming with enormous growth. 71

One of the biggest issues the Clinton administration needed to deal with was the collapse of the Soviet Union. The administration had to focus on the non-proliferation of biological weapons inside the former Soviet Union from spreading to places like Iraq and Iran. The largest issue was dealing with the massive size of the former Soviets biological weapon program “Bio-preparat.” The program was conceived after the Biological Weapons Convention because the 72

FP Editors, "Think Again: Clinton's Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy, November 19, 2009, accessed June 11, 2018,

71

http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/19/think-again-clintons-foreign-policy/.

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Soviets felt it could provide them with an upper hand in the Cold War. The Biological Weapons Program became the largest in the world. The Biopreparat program employed up to 60,000 em-ployees at its peak, with fifty research centers across the former Soviet Union.

The Nunn-Lugar agreement and the transition of biological and chemical weapon scien-tists to the mainstream scientific community started under the H.W. Bush administration in 1992 when the United States, Japan, the European Union, and Russia established the International Sci-ence and Technology Center. It’s purpose was to, “ Develop, approve, finance, and monitor sci-ence and technology projects for peaceful purposes in the former Soviet states.” Former 73

U.S.S.R scientists told the British Journal Vaccine that they made a strain of anthrax which was resistant to immunization. During the collapse of the Soviet Union many of the scientists that 74

were employed had yet to be paid, and thus were seeking out new job opportunities. Terrorists 75

groups or rogue governments seeking biological weapons were actively recruiting many of these scientists with significantly higher wages than they received at previous jobs. About nine thou-sand of those scientists were able to help with the development, research, and deployment of bio-logical or chemical weapons. The United States, along with other members of the United Na76

-tions, needed to figure out a way to deal with the former Soviet Union’s biological weapons pro-gram in order for there to be non-proliferation of biological or chemical weapons.

President Clinton decided the best solution to combat the deteriorating former Soviet Union biological weapons program was to initiate collaborative research projects between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The Clinton administration believed these collabora-tive research projects would employ former biological warfare scientists from the former Soviet Union which would deter the scientists from selling their expertise to terrorists groups or

Ibid.

73

R.Jeffrey Smith.“Did Russia Sell Iraq Germ Warfare Equipment?” Washington Post, February 12,1998, p.A1,

74

B34.

75

-sues and Status, series 2 (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1999).

Clinton, Bill. “Executive Order 12938: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” November 14, 1994.

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erating states. In return the United States would move into the former Soviet Union and provide 77

four different cooperative projects, which would employ some of the former biological weapon scientists. An example of this is the Science and Technology center in Ukraine founded in 1995. These research centers allowed the United States more control over the research taking place, and it allowed the former Soviet Union scientists to transition into the mainstream medical com-munity. The programs in Russia and the former Soviet states employed three-hundred and fifty former employees to work cooperatively with the United States. This was Clinton’s first step to-wards a bi-lateral coalition with the former Soviet Union in order to contain and dismantle the remnants of former Soviets biological weapons program. Without complete investment from the United States, it would leave the former biological weapons program vulnerable to the outside world, or even proliferation by the Russian government with the left-over infrastructure remain-ing from the pre-existremain-ing program.

During Clinton’s first year in office most of his foreign policy was centered around crisis control, with the two important issues being the collapse of the Soviet Union and the accusations swirling around Iraq about an attempted assassination against former President George H.W. Bush. Executive Order 12938 was released on November 14th, 1994 and was immediately put into effect. The goal of the order was to deter the movement of biological and chemical materi78

-als and knowledge, and it would -also include, if a rogue country is found to be dealing with an-other government or terrorist group then an import ban will be placed upon them. After the or79

-der, Secretary of State Warren Christopher explained the Executive or-der, “ shall cooperate in and lead multilateral efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.” This was to specifically deter and target Russian biological weapon scien80

-tists. The collapse of the former U.S.S.R and the Biological and Chemical Weapons Program led

77

-sues and Status, series 2 (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1999).

Clinton Bill, "Executive Order 12938: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Homeland Security Digital

78

Library, November 14, 1994, accessed April 16, 2018, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=467351. U.S. Department of State, June 2, 2009, accessed April 10, 2018, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/c15233.htm.

79

Clinton and Bill, "Executive Order 12938: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Homeland Security

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to no available work for the former biological weapon scientists in Russia which led to serious non-proliferation concerns. The main concern of the United States was to deal with the Iranians recruiting former Soviet scientists to work in exchange to produce chemical and biological agents. Since the Islamic revolution in 1979 lead by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who re81

-fused to support the United States and the Soviet Union. After Khomeini’s death in 1989 there 82

would be new partnership between the Soviet Union and Iran. The Soviet Union and Iran sided with each other on most issues, and the Soviet Union could provide Iran the necessary quantity and quality of arms. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States wanted to pursue 83

a better relationship with the former Soviet Union which would help deter proliferators specifi-cally sending weapon of mass destruction materials to Iran. Executive order 12938 was largely 84

successful and was able to clamp down on rogue governments that would like to start a biologi-cal and chemibiologi-cal weapons program and state sponsored terrorist groups that may be using help and protection from a countries government. There is not much debate about the use of the Exec-utive order 12938, it was able to lay the groundwork for future legislation that Clinton would pass in order to support Executive order 12938. Additionally it has allowed the United States and the international community to have a working rapport. The executive orders and cooperation with the international community showed that countries would have to face consequences if they continually try to proliferate a biological and chemical weapons domestically, and internationally against the United States.

After the passing of the Executive order 12938, another biological incident occurred in-side the United States. Larry Wayne Harris of Ohio was convicted of fraud in 1995, by being in connection with obtaining bubonic plague cultures from a lab in Maryland. The Clinton adminis-tration realized there needed to be additional strengthening of domestic regulations in order to

Rice Matthew, "Arms Control Today," Clinton Signs 'Iran Nonproliferation Act' | Arms Control Association, April

81

1, 2000, accessed April 13, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_04/irnap00.

Eisenstadt, Michael. "Arms Control Today." Russian Arms and Technology Transfers to Iran: Policy Challenges

82

for the United States. March 1, 2001. Accessed August 17, 2018. https://www.armscontrol.org/print/807. Ibid.

83

Ibid.